NGO-State Relations in Contemporary China: The Rise of Dependent Autonomy

The development and functioning of NGOs in any particular country inevitably reflects the overall pattern of state-society relations in that country. Most developing countries do not have a strong state like China’s. This immediately makes China stand out in terms of the degree of state dominance over what might be called ‘civil society’ (recognising, of course, that civil society encompasses a broader range of organisational forms and activities than represented by NGOs). But the civil society that has developed in China is also different from what one may expect in a typical authoritarian state. Kenneth Lieberthal has aptly characterised the post-reform Chinese state as ‘fragmented authoritarianism’(1) — while the state has retained its dominant role in economic and social spheres, authority below the very peak of the system has become more fragmented and disjointed as a result of economic reform and administrative decentralization. The fragmentation of state power has created the possibility for Chinese NGOs to enjoy a much higher degree of de facto autonomy than is assumed possible when the state is clearly bent on controlling them.

In this article, autonomy is defined as NGOs’ ability to enjoy total operational freedom and make independent management decisions, including deciding what activities to undertake, without any government interference. Conventional wisdom holds that Chinese NGOs lack autonomy: one only needs to look at the ‘dual management system’ for NGOs to realize it, the argument goes. Current Chinese government regulations require every NGO to place itself under the ‘professional management’ of a state organ with responsibilities in its area of work, in addition to being registered and vetted annually by Civil Affairs departments. The professional management agency holds a wide range of responsibilities, including supervising the NGO’s ‘ideological work’, financial and personnel management, research activities, contacts with foreign organisations, and the reception and use of donations from overseas. NGOs that do not comply with the dual management requirement are outlawed. Therefore, as one Chinese researcher summarises the situation: the current legal framework ensures that no fully autonomous NGO can lawfully exist in China.(2)

Although the NGO sector as a whole lacks autonomy, researchers generally assume that at least the ‘popular NGOs’ are more autonomous than GONGOs. Chinese researchers and NGO practitioners often divide domestic NGOs into two broad categories: GONGOs and ‘popular NGOs’. Popular NGOs are initiated by private citizens and receive no government subsidies. Their staff are not government employees and they do not have officials occupying their top management positions. GONGOs are believed to be less autonomous since they are launched by the government and receive government funding, and many of their staff are seconded from government agencies or are retired officials who still maintain close contact with the agencies where they previously worked.

Careful empirical research, however, has called into question the common belief that Chinese NGOs, especially GONGOs, suffer from a lack of autonomy.(3) Through the dual management system, the intent of the Chinese state is apparently to hold the NGO sector on a tight leash, but this does not mean that the state always effectively enforces its policy. Similarly, just because an NGO is launched by a government agency with government resources does not mean that it will not find ways to pursue its own independent agenda. There have been many cases of GONGOs not only successfully evading government supervision but also engaging in illegal activities such as dodgy profit-making ventures, to benefit themselves. The Chinese state has failed to stop such activities even though they undermine its policies and harm its interest.
There are several reasons why many GONGOs have enjoyed extraordinary de facto autonomy. First, some officials have interfered in the enforcement of the government’s NGO regulations on behalf of the NGOs they patronise, which has led Civil Affairs officials in charge of NGO administration to lament that in NGO management ‘rule of men’ had been more prevalent than ‘rule of law’. Second, some GONGOs are so good at income-generation that not only do they not need government funding, but they also contribute to the coffers of their professional management agencies. As a result, they are in a strong position to negotiate autonomy for themselves. Third, some NGOs’ professional management agencies may not take their supervisory responsibilities seriously and fail to monitor the NGOs’ activities. Finally, many GONGOs enjoy a special relationship with their professional management agencies. They were in fact created by the very state agencies which serve as their supervisory bodies and their directors are former or incumbent officials in the agencies. Consequently, they are often trusted and given a free hand rather than tightly controlled by the agencies.

In comparison with GONGOs, popular NGOs often have less strong bureaucratic connections, lower status and inferior knowledge of the way the state machinery works. As a result, they are actually less able to manipulate rules and regulations in order to gain autonomy. They are also more afraid of defying the authority of government agencies. Some big GONGOs with powerful patrons have not even shied away from direct confrontation with central government agencies, such bold acts are unthinkable for small grassroots NGOs.

In short, despite the existence of a stringent regulatory regime on paper which suggests that Chinese NGOs are kept in a straitjacket, lacking autonomy may not be a big issue for many Chinese NGOs in practice. Despite their origin and ties to the government, GONGOs may actually enjoy more autonomy than popular NGOs. This does not mean that Chinese NGOs are enjoying unlimited freedom from government intervention, nor can it be said that GONGOs in general are more autonomous than popular NGOs. What is clear is that the fragmentation of state power in the reform era has created much manoeuvring space for Chinese NGOs. Those organisations that are skilled at ‘working the system’, whether they are GONGOs or popular NGOs, can in fact enjoy huge operational freedom.

The possibility for NGOs to enjoy great autonomy tells only half the story of NGO-state relations in China. The other important feature is the heavy dependence of Chinese NGOs on the state. Both GONGOs and popular NGOs, both the most and the least autonomous NGOs, both self-funded and state-subsidised NGOs, need to draw one form of support or another from the state in order to operate. Chinese NGOs’ dependence on the state can take many different forms. Some NGOs can only implement their projects in collaboration with the government as they lack the human and organisational resources to go solo. Other NGOs rely on the state for essential information, without which they cannot carry out their work. Such information may be sensitive data not released to the public, for example data on HIV/AIDS patients needed by health NGOs, or highly technical data which NGOs are unable to collect themselves, such as detailed water and air pollution data needed by environmental NGOs. Still other NGOs depend on the state for protection. NGOs are vulnerable to obstruction or predation by corrupt government agencies or officials. They need protection against such hindrances, and the protection can only come from the state itself. Without a fully established rule of law, NGOs need to counter official harassment by finding patrons in the government, so that, when one agency or official makes trouble for them, they can turn to other agencies or officials to bail them out.(4)

Since Chinese NGOs can be heavily dependent on the state, yet enjoying an enormous amount of de facto autonomy, their relationship with the state is best characterised as ‘dependent autonomy’.(5) ‘Dependent’ because, despite the decline in the power of the Chinese state and its domination over the economy and society in the reform era, bureaucratic control over the allocation of resources and opportunities remains extensive. Furthermore, many factors, such as the lack of effective checks on the predatory and arbitrary use of administrative power by state agents, an incomplete and ineffective legal system and constant fluctuations in government policies, have all contributed to an uncertain environment for NGOs. To operate in this environment, NGOs need to cultivate official patronage in order to gain access to bureaucratically-allocated resources and political protection.

‘Autonomy’, on the other hand, results from the weakening of the Chinese state’s social control mechanisms. This, in turn, reflects a weakening of the state’s ability to control its own agents, as NGOs typically rely on the assistance of their friends and contacts in the government to evade state supervision. The increased autonomy of social actors in post-reform China has gone hand-in-hand with the increased autonomy of state agencies and officials from the central state.

Insofar as the Chinese model of dependent autonomy fits neither the strong nor the weak state scenario, one may say that it is a unique case. However, this doesn’t mean that the Chinese case has proved the insights of development studies irrelevant. Many general conclusions of studies of NGOs and civil society development certainly hold true for China. For example, too much state control stifles civil society development. External donor funding runs the risk of steering NGOs towards programmes that are not suited to local needs and conditions. A close relationship with the state reduces NGOs’ accountability to their grassroots constituents. These problems can all be observed in China. Therefore, general prescriptions for ensuring the healthy development and normal functioning of civil society, such as the need to establish the rule of law, are clearly applicable to China.

Dr. Yiyi Lu is a Research Fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham and an Associate Fellow at Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs). Dr. Lu’s research interest includes state-society relations, political participation, civil society development in China, China's international image and soft power, and environmental governance in China.

Endnotes:

1. Lieberthal, K. G. (1992) ‘Introduction: The “Fragmented Authoritarianism” Model and Its Limitations’, in K. G. Lieberthal and D. M. Lampton (eds) Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

2. Kang, X. (1999) Quanli de Zhuanyi: Zhuanxing Shiqi Zhongguo Quanli Geju de Bianqian (The Transfer of Power: The Change of Power Structure in China during the Transitional Period), Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Publishing House.

3.Lu, Y. (2007) ‘The Autonomy of Chinese NGOs: A New Perspective’, China: An International Journal, 5(2): 173-203.

4.This corroborates the assertion of Civil Affairs officials mentioned above that ‘rule of men’ has been more prevalent than ‘rule of law’ in NGO management. NGOs may draw on the ‘rule of men’ for different purposes. Sometimes they use the ‘rule of men’ to undermine the ‘rule of law’, e.g., when they rely on official patrons to help them circumvent regulations to gain autonomy. Other times they use the ‘rule of men’ to deal with the lack of ‘rule of law’, e.g., when they rely on official patrons to protect them from harassment and obstruction by other officials.

5.Lu, Y. (2009) Non-Governmental Organisations in China: The Rise of Dependent Autonomy, London and New York: Routledge.