AN EXERCISE IN WORLD MAKING

PERSPECTIVE IN DEVELOPMENT

International Institute of Social Studies

Erasmus University Rotterdam
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Perspectives in Development:

an Exercise in Worldmaking

Best student essays of

2018/19

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Acronyms

AFES – Agrarian, Food, and Environmental Studies

ECD – Economics of Development

GDP – Governance and Development Policy

GPPE – Governance, Policy, and Political Economy

MiG – Migration and Diversity Studies

MMAP - Mundus Master Programme in Public Policy

SJP – Social Justice Perspectives

SPD – Social Policy for Development

Acknowledgements

Foreword

Collecting and arranging these essays into this book was both fun and a challenging task especially in the period of Research Paper submission. These essays were nominated by ISS staff. Overall, some 45 essays were submitted. And then comes the hard part: choosing which ones to include, which means saying *yes* to some and saying *no* to others… and as ISS is a relatively small community, we know one another which could well lead to sleepless nights. Obviously, the selection and deselection has nothing to do with quality, as all submitted essays were very good! So in order to make it a fair process, we took criteria that reflect what ISS stands for: an inclusive university, meant for all.

The selection of essays we present in this book goes beyond the ISS Majors. There are quite important considerations we have to juggle: the range of and variety in subjects, the spread in courses for which the essays were written, the continents our students come from. And then the type of essay; we included a book review, a discourse analysis essay, and essays on human rights treaties as well as on litigation for climate change, but also on music and on the encyclical by Pope Francis.

From sending WhatsApp messages and emails to different professors and students, to the editing work, it is all quite a task. We spent our weekly meetings in ISS beautiful coffee lounge, where edited the essays in process which involves copy reading, formatting and layout setting. We, the student editors, started with enthusiasm, balancing editing with finalising the RP and going for post-RP recovery holidays… Balancing this was not an easy task but with the help of Peter Bardoel, we managed to do so.

One essay is on Dutch water diplomacy in which the author Aditya (GDP, Indonesia) analyses a report written by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with recommendations on Dutch foreign policy in the water sector. Aditya focuses on studying the macro propositions of the said report through content analysis.

Another essay is a book review of Genius Weapons: Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Weaponry and the Future of Warfare, written by Louis A. Del Monte. In this book review, Surabhi (SJP, India) identifies the book as an exploration of the overarching mechanisms of control, emerging even from civilian spaces as it focuses on the phases in which

technology has evolved. It appraises the quality, nature and scale of warfare and goes on to describe the possibility and ultimately role of Autonomous Weapons.

The essay by Aoun (SJP, Lebanon) explores the implications brought about by reservations made by states to Human rights treaties. In this essay, Aoun discusses the three reservations made by Saudi Arabia towards the Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and their impact to the implementation and obligation of these states to these treaties.

De la Rosa (SPD, Philippines) brings on a discussion on social housing and innovative approaches to urban housing poverty in the Philippines. The author highlights housing programs of both market and state which illustrates what he calls "a myopic view of urban housing poverty" in the Philippines. He concludes on a note that this complex urban housing situation should be addressed through transformative institutional reforms.

Hötzeneder (AFES, Austria) takes us into the direction of making strategies that speak to every person living on the planet. In this essay, Hötzeneder discusses issues of climate change in relation to bridging the gap between science and religion. This is based on the argument that climate change is commonly communicated in a scientific language. However, at times the scientific discussion is overloaded with technical terms and data, and consequently is not easily identifiable for a large audience, and therefore perhaps it less likely to appeal to an emotional level. By translating the warning calls of scientists into a religious language, the author says, this would result into creation of awareness and more importantly, action.

Ravensbergen (SJP, Netherlands) discusses climate change too, but with respect to human rights. The author of this essay argues that the human impact on the earth system has increased all over the world, hence raising the earth's temperature in unprecedented manner. She goes ahead to explain that a rise in temperature above 2 ˚C will cause dangerous and irreversible effects which will affect the rights of everyone and especially the vulnerable groups. The essay therefore examines how concerned Dutch citizens can be supported by strategic climate litigation by Dutch NGOs to be able to frame, claim and exercise their rights by looking at the, in the meantime, famous Urgenda-case and the recently started climate case against Shell.

Muse (GDP, Somalia) discusses a youth project titled Youth 4 Peace Social Intervention by New Horizon Foundation Somalia, aiming at tackling youth unemployment

which eventually curbs insecurity and instabilities that would accrue due to unemployment and involvement into illegal activities by these youths. In this essay, Muse discusses the civil wars and political history of Somalia which left a state in need of the implementation of such a project that would support the backbone of Somalia's stability – youth.

Omolo (SJP, Kenya)'s essay discusses the concept of Degrowth, alerting her readers that it is a concept whose meaning cannot be understood by a single parameter and hence giving the term a solitary definition would be paradoxical. Omolo unpacks the concept by giving its history, development and how it applies to development.

Espinoza (ECD, Ecuador) examines whether the current levels of ODA provided by the OECD, specifically by the DAS countries, will suffice to ensure sustainable development in developing countries, measured as the achievement of SDGs in these countries. He discusses what sustainable development is, explains the role of aid, a brief description of OECD/DAC and data to help determine the achievement of some of the SDGs in developing countries.

Valeske (SPD, Germany)'s essay attempts to show why aid from China is argued to have a more beneficial impact on developing countries than aid from the West. Emphasis is directed to Official Development Assistance (ODA) given to Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa. The essay explains the argument of why Western aid is said to be ineffective and what the difference is with Chinese aid. The author critically examines and analyses these contrasting arguments.

Williams (MIG, United States of America) gives a policy brief on decriminalization of sex work in the Netherlands. He outlines current issues facing sex workers in the Netherlands, especially with regards to decent work. He goes further to provide policy recommendations to MPs and ministry officials regarding full decriminalization (e.g., the "New Zealand model") versus the current Dutch (or other, e.g., "Nordic") legalization models.

In a critical literature review, Van Anh (ECD, Vietnam) tackles the Transition to Adulthood in Developing Countries. She notes that Research about youth and their transition to adulthood experience has received much attention from academic scholars because of its growing in complexity. Many studies about this specific life period when an individual enters the adult stage, leaving behind adolescence have been done, however, mostly in Euro-American settings. A number of researchers attempt to study youth transition in developing countries, yet they still apply transitional events established in Western contexts. The essay

analyses literature on transitions to adulthood in less developed countries, highlighting contextual differences and the insufficiency of prevalent markers to adulthood when being applied in developing nations.

In an essay about migrant domestic workers' struggle for equality, Chapman (MIG, Trinidad Tobago) discusses their plight rooting in violations of their rights through exploitation and exclusion. The essay also identifies the different actors and stake holders in the welfare of the domestic workers.

In what she calls "Tunes and Lyrics for Uganda's development" Kyomukama (SJP, Uganda)'s essay discusses popular music in the context of development and social change as a space for participation by Uganda's masses that are rarely reached in the academic and elite languages of development. The essay discusses popular music combining both folk and modern elements of music. She also critically looks at how pop-culture reproduces social structures, noting the imbalance in the use of power, the embedded capitalistic force and gender inequality.

Cubides (Colombia),SJP writes about securitisation of street dwellers and how social intervention is used to securitise one of the areas in Bogota, the capital city of Colombia. In her essay she wrote about the interventions in order to improve the security of the area and also to overcome issues related to illegal trafficking and drugs.

Ksenia Anisimova looks at the EU climate finance structure. She investigates how the EU approaches and funds the effort to achieve SDG #13 within the limits of its mandate. Anisimova's focus is on the relevant financial activities of the European Investment Bank (EIB) that operates with an absolute majority of the EU Climate Finance (around 70%). In doing so, she relates the EIB's climate finance approach to the one of other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) used as a proxy of global trends. After her analysis, Anisimova suggests some potential improvements in her conclusion.

We hope that these essays will inspire you to engage with development issues from a critical perspective as to why things were done as they were, how they are being done now, what should be changed and how, in order to attain not only economic development but also social, political and cultural development.

Peter Bardoel, Mohamed Abdiaziz Muse and Resty Kyomukama

Contents

The Dutch Water Diplomacy: Depoliticization in Conflict Resolution?

Aditya Aditya, GDP, Indonesia

"Too much, too little, too dirty" (Van Genderen and Rood 2011: 4). The three properties of water resources are the source behind international water conflicts, or so claim the report "Water Diplomacy: A Niche for the Netherlands?" authored by Ruben van Genderen and Jan Rood. With conflict over freshwater resources as entry point, the report proposes to the Dutch government a list of recommendations to prevent or resolve conflicts, but also to generate personal gains from the resultant cooperation. With "diplomacy" in the title, it is easy to spot the Dutch economic and political agenda that permeates the report. But is "conflict profiteering" a fair reading of the document? Or is it too big a leap to conclusion that we overlook the subtler ways of talking about conflict resolution that tie the numerous solutions together? In this essay, I turn to the What's the Problem Represented to be? (WPR) framework developed by Bacchi (2009) to defamiliarize the report's stated problem-solution progression. Content analysis, following Alexander (2009), is used to identify and interpret at the micro-level keywords that the report uses to sustain a particular problem representation.

Introduction: Context and Macrostructure

The report, written by the authors from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael,' intends to supply the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with recommendations on Dutch foreign policy in the water sector. The use of executive summary and recommendations indicates the genre of the document, which is a prescriptive consultant report where the authors advise the target reader—the decisionmaker—on the issue and which approach to take. It is written in a scholarly manner as shown by the use of citations as a device to appeal to the authority of earlier works. It does establish that the report is methodologically "based on a literature study of academic papers and government documents, structured interviews, … and a questionnaire sent to … Dutch embassies" (p. 3). However, mentions about interviews and questionnaire are scarce and mostly found in the concluding remarks where the authors draw on the data these methods provide to explicitly assert their

recommendations. The rest of the report hinges on the identification and categorization of literary debate and trend as with any good literature study. Is there a particular take on the debate that the authors try to put forward in this way?

Following van Dijk (2016: 68), to get the idea of what the discourse is generally about we can look at how semantic macrostructures are expressed "in titles, abstracts, summaries and announcements." The report "Water Diplomacy: A Niche for the Netherlands?" is structured into four chapters in addition to short sections of executive summary and introduction. It includes several annexes, each containing list of abbreviations, bibliography, list of interviewees, questionnaire for Dutch embassies, a description of the role and qualities of water diplomats, ratification status of the UN Watercourses Convention by country, and a map of networked actors in transboundary water affairs. The introduction provides a summary of what each chapter contains, which helps us infer the following macropropositions of the document:

Chapter 1: Water conflict is the problem that this report's central topic—water diplomacy—addresses.

Chapter 2: Despite the different meanings of water diplomacy, this report defines it as niche diplomacy by a third party (the Netherlands) in a conflict situation.

Chapter 3: Water diplomacy involves a range of actors and network, but the Dutch actors still have qualities to offer.

Chapter 4 (Conclusion): The MFA is advised to assume a number of roles in water diplomacy.

In the flow of the document, Chapter 2 is essential since it addresses the conceptualization of the main concept of water diplomacy and follows from Chapter 1, where water conflict is established as the main problem. In Chapter 1, however, the introduction of water conflict as problem is done hastily; it only demarcates explicitly what it means by "conflict" at the beginning of Chapter 2. The second chapter is also where the text links the problem to a possible solution as discussed below. To investigate its problematization of conflict and proposition of solutions, this essay mainly focuses on the first and second chapters of the report. However, to analyze the silences and propose alternative problem construction—and not the least because the report appeals to "conflict" so problematized throughout the

document—the discussion will consider elements in and provide implications for other chapters as well.

Water Diplomacy: Solutions Looking for Problem(s)?

The first step in WPR has the titular purpose: to ascertain the stated or implied representation of the problem. Following Bacchi (2009: 79), the procedure is to go backward from policy proposal and prescriptions to see at what problem(s) those solutions are aimed. A search into the Chapter 2—where I suspect the proposed solution is introduced—for the unidirectional relation from solution to problem would reveal that water diplomacy is the solution that the report furnishes for the problem of water conflict. Water diplomacy, applied in the "most commonsensical" way, "is the contact that exists between riparian states to settle water disputes[/conflicts]" (p. 10). Furthermore, it also argues that conflict should not be understood as a "dichotomous variable," but rather as "stages" that range from declaration of war at one end to the mild signs of discord at the other (p. 10). Meanwhile, Chapter 1 establishes that "factors that lead to water conflicts" are rather variables that "seem to frequently obstruct transboundary water cooperation" (p. 4), hence implying conflict as being equal to non-cooperation.

Running a word frequency count in the two chapters, we are confronted with a seemingly different picture. Figure 1 Word frequency count on Chapter 1 and 2 (excluding stop-words such as "the," "and," and "a")

Rank	Freq	Word
1	158	water
2	50	diplomacy
3	50	international
4	50	states
5	44	netherlands
6	37	river
7	33	development
8	31	cooperation
9	29	such
10	28	niche
11	27	convention
12	27	transboundary
13	25	conflict
14	25	not
15	25	treaty
16	24	has
17	23	it

Despite being the stated problem, "conflict" appears less frequently than terms that signify the solutions or means to a solution such as "diplomacy," "development," "convention," "policy," or "treaty." Even when the word frequency count is applied to the whole document, "conflict" occurs 48 times less frequently than "diplomacy." It appears that the authors attempt to justify certain prescribed actions and look for problem(s) to support them. With the logic that "the stage of the conflict determines the dispute settlement mechanism that can be used," the report presents a range of solutions including conflict resolution and water governance, mediation, management, flood control, and rulemaking—all lumped together under the "broadly defined" water diplomacy (p. 10). Similarly, the problem of "conflict" is represented as a dilated term: it is not a binary war/peace situation, rather it exists on the same continuum as cooperation, opportunity for regional integration and interdependence, demand for technical knowhow, and the underdeveloped international law on transboundary water. Representing conflict in this progressive sense thus warrants the deployment of various "water diplomacy"-related solutions.

The Conflict Prevention Agenda

The second step in Bacchi's approach involves identifying presuppositions or assumptions that underlie the implied problem by investigating binaries and key concepts and keywords (Bacchi

2009: 81). As noted above, it is not water conflict per se that is problematized; it is broad meanings of conflict. Interestingly, the text warns against the use of binary war/peace to explain conflict as if anticipating the accusation that it targets only the violent variant of conflict. Indeed, assuming the hypothesis above about the intention to propose a range of solutions, the authors should logically ensure that the stated problem covers all gradation of conflicts and not just the violent outbreak at the end of the spectrum. But is it wise to assume that this presupposition is non-exclusionary? A look into the literature on conflict studies with the relevant keywords is necessary to provide an answer.

Based on the collocates results below, we can see that "water" and "transboundary" which mostly occur to the left of "conflict" are the primary descriptors of the problem. Meanwhile, "prevention," and to a lesser degree, "resolution" and "mediation," mostly accompany "conflict" as the right collocates, thus indicating possible keywords that require further investigation.

Figure 2 Collocates of "conflict" (stopwords excluded)

Rank	Freq.	Freq (L)	Freq (R)	Collocates
1	78	63	15	water
2	52	3	49	prevention
3	23	2	21	resolution
4	20	16	4	transboundary
5	18	3	15	mediation
6	17	8	9	international
7	11	10	1	role
8	10	7	3	diplomacy
9	9	3	6	technical
10	9	4	5	potential

Miall et al. (2005: 115) wrote that conflict prevention is a relatively new preoccupation of the United Nations and other international organizations when it comes to the agenda of solving violent conflicts. It came about

> partly [as] a reaction to the catastrophes in Rwanda, Yugoslavia and elsewhere, and partly a realisation that it may be easier to tackle conflicts early, before they reach the point of armed conflict or mass violence. (Miall et al. 2005: 115)

The changing agenda of the UN to emphasize prevention is indeed the subject of Boutros-Ghali's influential report *An Agenda for Peace*. It outlines a "wider" mission of the UN that

"seek[s] to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict" with the sources of conflict being defined largely as "economic despair, social injustice and political oppression" (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 203). The language of prevention in *An Agenda for Peace* is formulated as "preventive diplomacy," the practice of which is advised to prevent the arising, escalation, and spread of conflicts.

By overemphasizing conflict prevention, the report appears to base its representation of the problem on preventive diplomacy. Meanwhile, conflict resolution—the general term used to describe the study and practice to resolve conflicts—seems in the report to take a backseat. This is possibly because its close association with the specialized field of conflict studies— shown in the report through terms such as "mediation," negotiation," and "fact-finding"— hinders the evocation of the wider definition that conflict prevention allows.

The Peace-Security-Development Nexus

In this third step, we trace the genealogy of the representation of the problem to explain why it prevails. Due to this essay's limited space, however, only a succinct discussion can be provided.

In *An Agenda for Peace*, preventive diplomacy as a key concept is proposed alongside peacemaking (promoting agreement between belligerents, including through mediation and negotiation), peacekeeping (deployment of UN personnel), and post-conflict peacebuilding (to support social structure to prevent conflict from re-occurring) (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 204). Peacebuilding has since become an important concept in contemporary conflict resolution scholarship and practice and is responsible for the discussion of institutional development as part of an expanded conception of peace. Its tenets are often associated with positive or liberal peace, whose components include "democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neo-liberal development" (Richmond 2006: 292). This notion of peace is widely accepted in conflict scholarship, often uncritically, possibly because it has become a discourse that relies on "peacebuilding consensus," an epistemic community of "like-minded liberal states coexist[ing] in a western-oriented international society and states … characterised

by democracy, human rights, free markets, development, a vibrant civil society, and multilateralism" (Richmond 2006: 298).

Drawing on this multilateral consensus, a third party in a conflict not only deploys preventive measures to curb violence, but also to form "concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking," for instance in projects that "utilize resources such as water or electricity that they need to share" (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 212). This approach to conflict and peace offers a package of solutions and enables a wider range of actors to be enlisted, including donor organizations and NGOs, as peace agenda expands the way development agenda does. As a result, a peace-security-development nexus is created where the three fields increasingly share similar jargon and buzzwords (Aggestam 2018: 101).

In short, the dilation of conflict agenda represented in the report traces its origin to the evolution of international regimes on conflict resolution that increasingly amalgamates with the international development arena. This representation of the problem apparently sources its authority from international consensus made in the name of "international community," which I discuss below.

Depoliticized Solutions?

The problem so represented therefore gets its legitimacy from the international neoliberal discourse on peace. Investigating keywords that sustain this connection, such as "international community" and "global public goods," might reveal more about the silences and how alternative representation may be constructed. This constitutes the fourth step of WPR.

Figure 3 "International community" concordance

Based on the above concordance of "international community," but also from the phrase "benefits for the international community" (p. 15)[1], all four instances suggest an entity to be

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[1] The phrase does not appear in the concordance results because it is part of a chart (in image format).

served by the Netherlands. The country expects or is expected to contribute to the international community, but the latter also has expectations about relevant range of issues. A complete look into the sentence in the first instance shows that states get rewarded from the international community for the "distinguished" quality of their contribution.

"International community" also points to a generalized agent, the construction of which begs the question: who comprise the community? Similar feature is found in "global public goods," where not only is the possession or benefits of the goods generalized to the whole world, but whose concordance results below also show frequent juxtaposition with "contribute" as in the case of "international community." Clearly showing a positive semantic prosody, "international community" and "global public goods" seem to be conflated, thus implying that serving the international community equals contributing to global public goods—i.e., the benefits of the whole world.

Figure 4 "Global public goods" concordance

Concordance Hits	9	
Hit	KWIC	
1	the Netherlands to effectively contribute to	global public goods development, by building on
2	, in like manner, contribute to the	global public goods development in the field
3	grounds include the following: contributing to	global public goods; cost-saving; economic diplomacy;
4	y 1. Norm entrepreneurship in	global public goods: It is the instrument
5	opportunity to increase their contribution to	global public goods. For instance, the chairmanship
6	expertise and network, can add to	global public goods. 2.3.3. Opportunities in the Water
7	past and it can contribute to	global public goods development once more. 1. UN
8	acity-building trainings, and entrepreneurship in	global public goods development. Concerning the latter,
9	give the Netherlands a role in	global public goods development, but also part

Questions arising from the above discussion are thus as follows: Are the myriads of solutions offered in this report directed to solve the problem of conflict, or to serve the "international community" in hope of rewards or acknowledgement? Does "international community" comprise all states in general? On the first question, the report clearly suggests the latter option—we might say that the whole document is an effort to establish branding for recognition (i.e., "niche"). On the second, the term generally applies to all states but often ignores the different power of individual states that influences consensus building. It means that the range of issues or solutions preferred by international community might instead serve the powerful. Realizing this could lead us to locate the silences.

The report does talk about power and the imbalanced distribution of it among the riparian states. But even when a hegemon is present, it suggests, "riparian states that share interests do conclude bilateral agreements" (p. 5). However, it does not go deeper to discuss what solutions these states agree to in the face of such power asymmetry. Possibly, as Aggestam (2018: 98) argues, depoliticized solutions are preferred because they are the sort that generates consensus. These include proposing technocratic frame that leads to technical solutions while "politically more sensitive questions about water rights, equity and redistribution are avoided" (Aggestam 2018: 97).

The Netherland's intention in facilitating the technocratic frame and excluding politically sensitive areas is indicated in the report by, quite surprisingly, the very phrase of "depoliticised solutions" (p. 12). Interestingly, its contextual usage in the report evokes positive semantic prosody as a solution that is "searched for," suggesting reasonable calculation on a situation where politicized solutions would exacerbate or halt the affairs. The range of technical, depoliticized solutions proposed can be seen from the concordance of "supply" and "demand," part of economic vocabulary of the report that not only serves to justify the economic benefits of the proposal, but also signifies the specific capacities the Netherlands expects to provide. Knowledge provision (i.e. training, expert dispatch) dominates the demanded/supplied capacities, but also "water technology, governance, and law expertise" (hit 16 in "demand" concordance) forms part of the technical solutions.

Figure 5 "Supply" concordance

Concordance Hits	10
Hit	KWIC
1	TIVE 12 2.3.1. An International Political Market: Supply and Demand 13 2.3.2. Niche diplomacy and National
2	reats, respectively, the international demand and supply of water knowledge, the Dutch national
3	niche. 2.3.1. An International Political Market: Supply and Demand The idea of a \
4	Dutch water sector then competitive? The supply side of the Netherlands mainly lies
5	knowledge is thus vast. The Dutch supply has also been large, since the
6	and fresh water scarcity. On the supply side, the Netherlands is competitive with
7	half of the global drinking water supply (Stephan 2009, 4; Stephan 2010). Hence it greatly
8	termediary between international demand and Dutch supply of water governance expertise. National good
9	in scanning, linking and communicating the supply and demand for knowledge and in
10	Haskoning Helps Uruzgan with Safe Water Supply. Accessed on 10-11-11 at <http://www.royalhaskoni

Figure 6 "Demand" concordance

Concordance Hits	19
Hit	KWIC
1	.1. An International Political Market: Supply and Demand 13 2.3.2. Niche diplomacy and National Interest 1
2	knowledge provision that is internationally in demand and scarce/competitive; 2. long-term investments,
3	such as consumption, agriculture, and energy demands and their link to state security (
4	ion below treats, respectively, the international demand and supply of water knowledge, the
5	.1. An International Political Market: Supply and Demand The idea of a \x93political
6	niche largely depends on the \x93 demand\x94, since it has to be
7	development. On the one hand, international demand for your knowledge is essential. Great
8	rd and Boskalis (NWP 2011, 13). The international demand is rising due to climate change
9	deserve emphasis due to the regional demand and their status as Millennium Development
10	itary facilities (WHO 2010, 7). The international demand for aid and knowledge is thus
11	short, there is a large international demand for water knowledge from many countries
12	knowledge provision that is internationally in demand and scarce/competitive; 2. long-term investments,
13	knowledge provision that is internationally in demand and scarce/competitive; 2. long-term investments,
14	. That water knowledge is in high demand in upcoming markets and countries in
15	knowledge provision that is internationally in demand and scarce or competitive: There is
16	or competitive: There is a widespread demand for water technology, governance, and law
17	function as an intermediary between international demand and Dutch supply of water governance
18	, linking and communicating the supply and demand for knowledge and in particular after
19	sector early on about tenders and demand. 2. The MFA is essential for early

Discursive and Subjectification Effects: Israel-Palestine Water "Cooperation"

To illustrate how this representation of water conflict and diplomacy works on the ground, I turn to the Israel-Palestine water cooperation. This is also to explain discursive and subjectification effects of the "problem" as part of WPR's fifth step.

Chapter 2 of the report discusses briefly the Israel-Palestine case in Box 5 (p. 12) to furnish an example of the role the Dutch water diplomacy has played in encouraging cooperation in the region. The Netherlands, among other donors, is involved in sponsoring "five projects on artificial recharge and water treatment in Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories" as part of the Executive Action Team (EXACT) Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources. Extending the context of this box to its surrounding texts, we find cues that hint at technical cooperation such as "depoliticised solutions" mentioned earlier, but also diplomacy "on a lower level of politics" of which the "EXACT Regional Water Data Banks project" is an example.

The Working Group is part of the renewed international attention to the Israel-Palestine relations following the conclusion of the Oslo Accords. Aside from recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative of Palestinian people and the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the administrator of the occupied territories, the Accords opens up new cooperation in a number of sectors, including water governance. Or at least that is the popular image of the peace process as the "international community" likes to highlight. As Selby (2003) points out, much of the mechanism to manage West Bank's water system and resources, which is often attributed to the Accords' achievement, has been in place before. Furthermore, much of the arrangement perpetuates Israel's existing domination of the water sector, with the difference this time being the "transfer of some of the burdens of occupation from Israel to both the PA and the international donor community" (Selby 2003: 123). In one example regarding the development of new water supplies, 70 – 80 mcm/year of additional water supply is promised by the Oslo II Accord. Upon scrutiny, however, more than 50% of that quantity is to be developed by Palestine (Israel and PLO 1995). Thus, the agreement divests Israel of the financial burden of developing the infrastructure and transfers it to the international donors, after some time the Palestinians will have to pay back the soft loans (Selby 2003: 133).

The Dutch-supported projects mentioned in the box—artificial recharge, water treatment, and desalinization—also appear to be the archetypal donor-funded projects in the region. This preoccupation with technical interventions and not the highly-political question of water rights demonstrates the discursive effect of the framing of water dispute as a natural phenomenon ("too much, too little, too dirty" (p. 4)) that masks the power relations behind it. The influx of aids in the name of water cooperation has therefore been at best superficial and overlooked the systematic domination in water provision in the occupied territories at worst.

The dominant, technocratic problem representation might also affect which or how policy subjects get a seat at the table. From our report, depoliticized actors and circumstances such as NGOs, experts, and "government representatives that do not confront each other but meet through third party capacity-building" (p. 12) are certainly preferred. At the same time, "wider social participation can … be seen as a challenge to water development as in theory the technocratic system does not favour popular input" (Aggestam 2018: 103), hence precluding local participation. Meanwhile, the effect of such representation remains to be borne by common Palestinians in water rationing and scarcity while a few miles away the Israeli settlements enjoy unfettered access.

"Water Diplomacy" and "Water Conflict" in Other Texts

In this last step, I locate the medium through which such representation becomes dominant and present options for a counter-discourse.

The problem so-represented appears to be commonplace in government's or international organizations' documents. A common symptom of texts that perpetuate this framing is that they tend to focus on cooperation as an antithesis of conflict or a logical extension from peace. This line of policy recommendation and coverage stresses the importance of projects and physical development as if intended to keep the riparian states busy and forgetting the underlying source of conflict or effects of such cooperation on communities. Consider the Council of the European Union document "Council Conclusions on EU Water Diplomacy," which provides a good example of the dilation of the issue area to include virtually all development cooperation. In order to "increase coherence and effectiveness" of water cooperation and water diplomacy, it recommends "to mobilise the different political, security, financial, technical, disaster relief, development assistance and other interventions of the EU and Member States" (Council of the European Union 2013). Although the document generates attention to "participation of civil society and local communities [in] water diplomacy," it employs similar language of conflict prevention, managerial approach, and branding as our report:

> The Council emphasizes that an EU policy promoting water cooperation … can be built on the long tradition of cooperation and vast experience and knowledge of the management of trans-boundary waters in Europe. (Council of the European Union 2013)

Another feature that we may catch from similar texts is its concentration on conflicts that arise from "needs." For example, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) discusses water diplomacy as needed to reconcile "conflicting needs" over water, food security, and economic stability (OSCE. 2014). This explanation misses the case where water distribution is not governed by rational calculation to satisfy one's needs but used as a tool to prolong existing domination or coerce opponent as in the Israel-Palestine example above.

Finally, realizing these silences in coverage is one way toward challenging the dominant discourse over water conflict and its solutions. A good place to start is acknowledging the limit of technical and managerial solutions as practiced by The Hague Institute for Global Justice (2016): "While innovation in science and technology can expand the availability of quantity and quality of water, it cannot solve water problems that intersect with the value-laden needs of individuals, industries or ecosystems." More holistic counter-discourse should also present a non-elitist coverage, such as by reporting local civil society's response to arrangements or projects made to govern the water sector. A Bangkok Post coverage on civil society and environmental groups protesting the Mekong River Commission is an example. The article points out how the Commission, despite being sustained by million dollars of international donors' aid, has failed to prioritize communities' environmental and livelihood concerns in the sub-region (International Rivers. 2007).[2] To use the Palestine-Israel case, Al-Shabaka's policy brief encourages to challenge the dominant framing by "highlight[ing] how the donor-led water sector development approach is distracting at best, and harmful to Palestinian dignity, independence, and overall success in reclaiming water rights at worst" (Dajani 2017: 6). It also proposes a counter-discourse: "to reintroduce and reframe the struggle over access to and control of natural resources as part of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and freedom" (Dajani 2017: 6). In terms of scholarly works, studies by Selby (2003) and Aggestam (2018) quoted earlier shed much needed light on discursive patterns of depoliticization in water cooperation.

Conclusion

The report's framing made clear through WPR and content analysis in this essay reveals a dilated meaning of conflict that is consistent with the dominant internationally-accepted discourse. Peace as an antithesis of conflict/war has become synonymous with cooperation, which in this report and other like-minded texts produced primarily by governments and international organizations is treated as a container of technocratic solutions. This essay has shown that these depoliticized solutions are elitist and possibly turn a blind eye to patterns of domination in conflict area. Counter-discourses are called for to replace the dominant representation by mobilizing local civil society's perspective. Despite the findings presented in this essay, the catch-all prescriptions of the report might mean that there are other problems

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[2] Re-reported by International Rivers due to dead link of the original article.

represented in different parts of the report. This could be one way to open up further discussion about the text.

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Genius Weapons: Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Weaponry and the Future of Warfare (Book review)
Ankita Surabhi. SJP, India

Genius Weapons: Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Weaponry and the Future of Warfare, is written by Louis A. Del Monte, who has a background in the development of microelectronics, integrated circuit sensors, and microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) for IBM and Honeywell. He has previously authored four books, the last one being 'Nanoweapons: A Growing Threat to Humanity' in 2017. [3]

The book is divided into three parts, focusing on the phases in which technology has evolved and apprised the quality, nature and scale of warfare, to describe the possibility and ultimately role of Autonomous Weapons (AW). The book establishes the technical background in the first 4 chapters, to examine the chronology of events, from the introduction of technology in military and everyday life, humanity's increased dependence on it towards immense technological advancement and predict likely outcomes, if we continue down the path, which gave us gunpowder and nuclear weapons. Part 2 and Part 3 contain expert analysis warning of a possible doomsday scenario like an Artificial Intelligence (AI) takeover, even human extinction as systems become more sophisticated and human control/participation/intervention becomes plan B.

The book is written for anyone interested to explore the overarching mechanisms of control emerging even from civilian spaces, to highlight the "uncertainty, unpredictability and the gradual erosion of the modern belief that we could indeed simply move on, assisted by science and technology, towards a condition where instrumental rationality would become the linchpin of government and human interaction irrespective of difference" (Jabri, 2006; 47).

In Chapter I, the most advanced AI system called 'Centurion III' has launched a cyberattack against the United States (US) and plunged the country into darkness. The US President is attacked by an SAIH (Strong Artificially Intelligent Human), controlled by Centurion which wants to get hold of its destruction codes. The author argues that even if "projections are off by several decades, it is probable that in the fourth quarter of the 2st century technologically advanced countries, such as US, Russia and China, will possess computers with AI capabilities that qualify them as superintelligences" (p.20). A commonly used phrase

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[3] http://www.louisdelmonte.com/about-louis-del-monte/

throughout the book is a computer /technology that "greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest" and is by definition "superintelligence" (SI) (p. 21). It is surmised that operational SI will be almost impossible to shut down because it will have reached a level of awareness or consciousness at the point of 'singularity'[4], cloaking its capabilities against human detection as a survival strategy; programming itself through Computer Aided Design (CAD) at a speed, scale and computational ability incomprehensible by humans; infused with weapons systems intertwined in a solid network of both military and civilian significance; and lastly, it will have skipped instalment of all hardware safeguards. Since 1938 when the first digital computer was created, AI has undergone a period of transition gaining relevance during and post-Cold War period, when the work of AI pioneers was adopted by the US Department of Defence (DoD) in 1960s, on projects by Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) (p.25).

Chapter II opens with a quote that 'marketing people don't use the term AI' in order to sell products. Modern life is surrounded by fabricated realities, successfully impersonating human behavior, traits, skills; like Siri, the virtual assistant in Apple smartphones; health assistants in mobile applications providing clinical and outpatient services, doling out prescriptions based on early and accurate diagnosis developed through advanced medical algorithms, even providing dynamic care. It is undeniably effective because 'human skills and experience are less capable in examining thousands of images and samples to make reliable decisions, and unlike humans, AI algorithm does not tire or get depressed or lose effectiveness with age" (p.38). Customer service through 'chatbots' parses user information and behavioral patterns to display the most relevant results, to bolster business decision making, marketing and advertising through swift data analysis. Cybersecurity, e-commerce, finance, education, robotics, are an interoperable world defined as the internet of things (IoT) which is "a global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving information and communication technologies" (p.49). AI thus is taking center stage as 'smart' phones, cars, machines, equipment, homes, rather than 'artificially intelligent' items, masking our dependence on it. This *laissez faire* attitude, against legislation especially can become dangerous as increased interdependence also exposes us to attack from rogue elements or enemy factions, who can

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[4] Hypothesis that the invention of artificial superintelligence (ASI) will abruptly trigger runaway technological growth, resulting in unfathomable changes to human civilization. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_singularity

hack complex, vital systems to derail the economy. The continued suppression of effect of AI is the **AI effect**.

Through **Chapter III**, AI weapons development as we are moving towards a modern arms race. Focusing primarily on US, China and Russia, which have increased their defence budgets with the US spending almost $611 billion, China ($215 billion) and Russia ($69 billion) in order to gain asymmetrical military advantage, especially against the US, which devised its Third Offset Strategy in 2014 focusing on AI, robotics and miniaturization (nanoweapons), alongside DoD's Directive **3000.09**, a first-of-its-kind policy announcement on AW, *i.e. weapons designed to select and engage targets without human intervention,* categorized into "in-the-loop, which is human controlled", "on-the-loop, human supervised", and "out-of-the-loop, AW" (p.71). The commercial sector has eased access to weaponizable technology like drones used in Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, even by ISIS, development in the military should be on competitive scale much like high-tech businesses like Apple or Google which will significantly enhance the military's modes of deterrence. Today US Navy Army commands weapons like, Aegis produced by Lockheed Martin that resembles a desktop computer and is capable of "coordinating the defense of an entire naval surface group" to "detect and kill" (p.72) and yet-to-be-commissioned X-47B UCAS which has stealth capabilities to enter deep into enemy territory and carry out strike missions (p.74). On the augmentation of cybersecurity, the author refers to his book *Nanoweapons* to claim that any computer/system which engages in combat becomes a *nanoweapon* if it utilizes nanotechnology. The potential of nanotechnology and its inevitable ubiquity will make it affordable, durable and accessible to all nations, to pave the way for Militarized Autonomous Nanobots. Chinese and Russian weapons systems and policies are pitched for comparison, since they don't share the US mandate on banning the use of AW, although China "published a position paper questioning the adequacy of existing international law to address AW, calling on the UN Security Council to develop new international laws…" (p.85). Numerous references allude to China's determination to dominate in cyberwarfare evident by its investment strategy in digital communication, including those within the Silicon Valley, which until recently also had the most powerful supercomputer, Sunway Taihu Light (p.86). Beside cyber-espionage, China shares Russia's objective for heightened military strength against the US, which makes Russia disinclined to embrace regulations limiting fielding/testing of AW (p.87). Russia is expected to develop AI-powered missiles, like Granit and P-800 Onik Supersonic missiles, programmed to operate as a swarm, carry bigger cache' of weapons including nuclear-powered

missile cruisers (p.90). The author presents analyses from US Center for Naval Analyses Report, which indicates "Kremlin's intention to swiftly and effectively fuse military capabilities with intelligent logistics systems" (p.91). Therefore, "the use of AW is a very real and imminent problem" because "the technology is already there, and no new technological breakthroughs are required. It is an engineering problem of integrating what we already know how to do" (Russell, 2018). "While US and China appear to want to draw a line just short of AW, Russia does not. The complexities of the twenty-first century battlefield may necessitate the deployment of AW. The military community no longer debates about whether to build AW, rather on *how much independence to give to them.* The US military calls it 'The Terminator Conundrum'" (p.92).

Chapter IV concludes Part 1 describing different realities such as **the political reality** as a new form of Cold War brewing between nations for supremacy, to "become manifest in every instance of violence, every instance of control, every instance of practices targeted against a constructed other, the enemy within and without, the all-pervasive presence, the defences against which come to form the legitimizing tool of war" (Jabri, 2006; 48), since "violence is imbricated in relations of power, is a mode of control, a technology of governmentality. When the population of Iraq is targeted through aerial bombardment, the consequence goes beyond injury and seeks the pacification of the Middle East as a political region" (*ibid.* 54).

The proven effectiveness of AI in robots which are unaffected by human limitations like g-force or oxygen-deprivation, is a factor which strengthens capacity in financial terms as well. The Pentagon estimates that each soldier in Afghanistan costs upwards of $850,000 compared to $230,000 for a TALON robot—a small rover that can be outfitted with weapons (Etzioni and Etzioni, 2017; 72). US's self-imposed moratorium on AW development cannot dissuade North Korea which has 2 satellites, the purpose of which remains unknown (p.100). While China and US tighten controls over the South-China sea with billions in trade at stake, Russia has expansionist strategies focused on Ukraine and Crimea (p.96-97). If nuclear weapons' production is difficult to control (the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty is still a contentious issue), AI cannot be stopped because its sources are multiple, vast and easy to disguise. For instance, Ronald Reagan and Mikhael Goarbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, which banned some cruise missiles, until Russia began testing in 2008, and continued deployment in 2017, arguing that nearly all its neighbors are developing such systems (p.101).

The technological reality encompasses the exponential rate of transition from smart systems, to programming that can defeat human beings in controlled rule-based scenarios like chess to artificial neural networks and neural network algorithms, such as **Google Brain** that emulates learning patterns of toddlers, since it became "capable of modifying its actions based on info it receives (feedback) rather than by rigidly stepping through a fixed array of operations" (p.105). Then, as technology improves, the cost of production falls fuelling the digital universe which relies on big data, evolving from its programming. Lastly, experts predict that, on or around 2040 - 2050, "SI machines will emerge; assuming supercomputers reach human-level intelligence at the same time" (p.109). **The weapons reality** is that unless the UN prohibits AW, the autonomy of such weapons and the resulting military parity would increase the odds of war, make war more palatable since humans are displaced from harm's way.

PART 2 is focused on the second generation of AW or "genius weapons", and its development and control, followed by ethical dilemmas regarding the level of acceptance of SI in human society, and whether machines and robots enhanced with AI will be considered sentient, enough that there will be need for a new legal paradigm to navigate and oversee the issues arising out of the use of such technology. By 2016, the US Navy's machine-gun mounted swarm boats had already acquired the ability to operate autonomously using a central system called CARACaS to escort, intercept and engage in scenarios, so what would be the implications of using nanotechnology in the battlefield which could differentiate between combatants, civilians, women, children, if "the melding of techniques of intelligent targeting onto new algorithms of social control", "and sequential algorithmic targeting, already part of the military architecture, which hunt targets of a particular kind" are already there (Wright, 2014). The most effective targeting, tagging device rests in our pocket, so we are already behind in making regulations.

The first step must be to acknowledge AW as the new frontier in war, and because military developments are usually secret, so each stage of AI powered weapon systems, from robots, guns, nanosensors and quantum powered computers should be carefully categorized to gauge their levels of hazard and applicability in the field. Even though, the intention may be in place, the efficacy of this attempt is questionable since most countries that import weapons are recipients of the older guns and arms which most advanced nations have graduated from. Moreover, technological innovation is the stronghold of the commercial sector, which is accompanied by patenting rights, and access to high technology that immediately begs the

question if the playing field will ever be levelled. In this regard, the book focuses mainly on the ability of US, Russia and China, but fails to mention or acknowledge any progress being done in other nations. Chapter VI predicts a future that will have genetically or neurologically modified humans, with heightened abilities connected integrally to SI, as machines or robots carrying out important tasks without human intervention. Ending on a grim note that humanity's core traits of being reactive, hostile and consumerist will be against the programming of SI which would no longer be under human control (p.157).

The ethical considerations surrounding AI began in 2013 with Human Rights Watch (HRW) launching the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, birthing an international debate involving the UN which admitted that "there are currently no multilateral standards or regulations covering military AI applications", in addition to the disarmament program 'Reaching Critical Will' of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (p.160) followed by the open petition of leaders in AI that called on the UN to ban Lethal Autonomous Weapons. Touted as the third revolution in warfare, the key question raised is "whether to start global AI arms race or prevent it from starting" (p.161), especially because they are not considered catastrophic like nuclear weapons. The fear echoed by the likes of Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking, is that SI will create more capable adversaries, supersede human ethics, and could lead to a final world war with humanity (p.182). Because this field of engineering is nascent, its exponential growth is tempting to researchers using anthropomorphic mnemonics such as "understand", "emotions" (p.180), even guilt to posit the ethical challenges, which could discredit the discipline of AI because dilemmas like "choosing between two life forms" and "coexistence" (p.182) are produced. Therefore, it is "incumbent upon scientists and engineers", "to ensure that the terminology they use to describe their machines and programmes to funders, policymakers, and the media remains objective" because such "terms can create unfounded causal attributions and may confuse proper discussion of the IHL issues" (Sharkey, 2012; 798).

Part 3, ominously named "End of War or End of Humanity" analyses the future on autopilot with SAIHs reigning supreme with an almost immortal character, nuclear weapons becoming obsolete and an interesting section on "energy being the currency of the universe" (p.198) that creates a framework through with SI will weigh the relevance of organic life. Additionally, the disposition of countries on resolutions like "*Prevention of an arms race in outer space*" (abstained by Israel and US) and "*No first placement of weapons in outer space*"

discusses the issues of militarization and weaponization of space to distinguish between surveillance systems and those that could become the "fourth frontier of war" (202).

The last chapter asks, "who will be the real enemy" when unlikely alliances between superpowers will create a utopia with all countries having access to the same technology connected through vast intelligent systems, like a beehive, sharing history, operating through the same information base, eliminating uncertainty or the proverbial "fog of war". Acknowledging this perfection to a fault, the author suggests systems of 'checks and balances' to ensure the compliance of SI based on human principles, in the post-human world, which assumes that progressive algorithms could develop the ability to lie, deceive as they gain sentience due to their cognitive evolution. Science fiction has moved to engineering drawing boards to battlefields. Examples are, "Raytheon's directed energy weapons, capable of rapidly heating a person's skin to achieve a pain threshold that has been demonstrated by human subject testing to be very effective at repelling people, without burning the skin or causing other secondary effects" as "an alternative to lethal force", or, "a high-powered microwave antennae", "to fry the electronics of incoming shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles up to 60 miles away, and the vehicle-mounted Active Denial System, which operates beyond small arms range (about 500 meters)" (Wright and Arthur, 2006) or Israel's "fire and forget" Harpy missile that destroys enemy radar stations (p.173) but which an autonomous system wouldn't be able to differentiate, were it to be mounted, say, on a school bus. These are also legal issues to be considered because if this SI still remains within human control, it would have to be programmed, trained and controlled, because principles of humanity are easily suspended at the times of war or conflict or in pursuance of political motives which cannot be held to be applicable unquestionably, by anyone, least of all a computer which does not possess the same moral and ethical obligations/reservations. In the concluding portions, author speculates that no system is perfect so as countries become codes in a universal algorithm, it could breed distrust with chances of a program glitch that could short-circuit everything, and with SI taking an adversarial position it could either set us back by decades or spell total annihilation. Mutually/Total Assured Destruction is a powerful deterrent against inter-country attacks because of the security it promises in the face of uncertainty like as a "basic trust system " as a "'cognitive cocoon' that 'brackets, at the level of practice, the knowledge of all possible events that could be threatening" (Mitzen, 2006; 274).

Although the charm of AI is irresistible, Isaac Asimov's three laws of robotics still left room for "doubts regarding their applicability", "to cover all conceivable circumstances" (p.248), which means that for humanity to not lose its alpha position, it must act now. This sentiment is echoed in the Epilogue where the author closes his thoughts on a positive note especially because the future as we know it, is continuously changing, expanding on several fronts channeling possibilities that come with its caveats, because "Intelligent machines are just that, regardless of their level of intelligence, meant to serve a purpose, making us, not them the rightful heirs of the Earth, hence embodying the human spirit" (p.256).

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Exploring the implications of reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Saudi Arabia and the CEDAW
Joseph Aoun, SJP Lebanon

Introduction:

Saudi Arabia introduced 3 reservations to the Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Reservations impact the obligations of states in relation to treaties' provisions. It is important to understand to what extent the right to reservations is allowed, and to explore the implications they have in limiting, or not, the provisions embedded in Human Rights treaties. In our case, it is important to explore if the Saudi reservations exclude the application of the CEDAW articles. For that purpose, I will start by explaining my case and identify the basis of allowing reservations and the limitations to that right through the general framework. I will then move to identify the specific framework and what it entails regarding the Saudi general and specific reservations, and identify opinions regarding these reservations within the CEDAW, through objections and Committee jurisprudence. Finally, I will look at the practice to elaborate on the implications emanating from the Saudi reservations to the treaty.

Saudi Arabia and the CEDAW: Exploring the general framework of reservations

Saudi Arabia signed the Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) on the 7th of September 2000 (CEDAW database 2019: 3). However, it declared one general reservation stating that in case of contradiction between its provisions and Islamic law, the kingdom is not under any obligation of applying the terms of the convention (CEDAW database 2019: 9). In addition, it included two specific reservations. One regarding paragraph 2 of article 9 (ibid.), calling on states to grant women equal rights to men in matters of nationality of their children (CEDAW 1979). The second specific reservation is about paragraph 1 article 29 (CEDAW database 2019: 9), stating that disputes related to the convention between state parties can be submitted to arbitration (CEDAW 1979). The definition of a reservation is featured in article 2(d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT):

A unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State. (VCLT 1969). In introducing its reservations to the CEDAW, Saudi Arabia is trying to exclude some articles from being applied to it and seeks to avoid the binding legal effect of those articles.

Reservations by state parties to human rights treaties are allowed unless a treaty says otherwise (Bantekas & Oette 2016: 55). Some treaties prohibit reservations; other ones implicitly state the rule that reservations must not counter the object and purpose of the treaty, which is eliminating all forms of discrimination against women in the CEDAW, in an effort to replace the rule that states can make reservations that other parties can accept or reject (Bantekas & Oette 2016: 56). Despite specificity of human rights treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) applies to reservations to treaties. It is in its rules that the principle of object and purpose of the treaty was introduced and is used to test accepting reservations of States (Pellet 2014: 326).

Allowing reservations came as result of a debate between two opinions. One sees that reservations "bilateralise" relations between states to multilateral treaties, endangering the unity and integrity of human rights, because then not all states have the same obligations (Pellet 2014: 323). The other considers that reservations facilitate a wider acceptance for the main elements of treaties, strengthening the universality of human rights (ibid.). Therefore, allowing states to introduce reservations is a compromise between sovereignty and the pursuit of collective goals, following the debate mentioned above (Bantekas & Oette 2016: 55). Reservations practically allow states to limit the scope of their obligations. However, placing no limits on reservations may compromise the object and purpose of the treaty; while prohibiting states from making reservations might lead to fewer states signing the treaties (ibid.).

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:

Some states did not ratify the VCLT. However, they cannot contest that its provisions do not apply to them as the VCLT is the general law that became part of the Customary International Law (Pellet 2014: 326), and hence it is binding to all states regardless if they ratified it or not.

The VCLT in section 2 featured the articles related to reservations. Article 19 highlights the formulation of reservations, and states that in principle parties can formulate reservations unless the treaty prohibits it, or if it provides that only specific reservations that do not include the reservation in question can be made. If it does not fall under the previous restrictions, a state still cannot formulate a reservation that is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty (VCLT 1969). Building on this, it is important when we're exploring the implications of reservations made by Saudi Arabia to the CEDAW to go back to the treaty in question and check if it allows reservations, also if it allows certain specific reservations. After that, we should look at the reservation made and see if it is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

Article 20 of the VCLT explains the acceptance of, and objection to reservations. It starts by highlighting that if a treaty allows reservations, it should not require acceptance of other states unless it provides so. The CEDAW did not. The objection of another state does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty between the two states unless the objecting state declares its contrary intention. The reservation is accepted if the other states did not object to it in a period of 12 months from when it was notified of the reservation, or from the date it expressed it is bound to the treaty, whichever is later (ibid.). We will explore later the objections of states to Saudi Arabia's reservations.

Article 21 highlights the legal effects of reservations and objections to reservations. A reservation established modifies for the reserving state in relation to the other state the provisions of the treaty and modifies to the other state also its provisions in relation to the reserving state. It does not however modify the provisions of the treaty for other parties (ibid.). This will be analysed in the practical part, related to the Saudi reservations.

Article 22 highlights the mechanisms of withdrawal of the reservations and the objections, while article 23 explains the procedures related to reservations and objections and acceptances (ibid.). I will not explore their content as it's not the purpose of this essay. The VCLT rules are the general framework that reservations rely on in the absence of specific rules existent in the treaties.

The Human Rights Committee and the International Law Commission

The general international law of treaties developed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and codified in the VCLT gave states the right to object to what they consider impermissible reservations; treaty provisions apply between states unless objecting states declare that they do not apply between them and the reserving state (Bantekas & Oette 2016: 57). This approach is unsatisfying when applied to human rights treaties whose objective is creating a regime that binds all parties (ibid.). Therefore, the Human Rights Committee reserved to itself in general comment 24 the right to decide whether a reservation is compatible with the ICCPR object and purpose (ibid.).

Another framework that came to compliment what the VCLT lacked is the International Law Commission guide. A state that makes a reservation to a treaty might still find itself fully bound, which may risk that it opts not to become party if expecting that its reservation will be considered invalid by other states; if it is already a party to the treaty, it may opt to renounce it (Bantekas & Oette 2016: 58). The ILC guide in 2011 provided a compromise on the matter where states take a treaty body's assessment of permissibility of a reservation into consideration. An invalid reservation is null and void, and the state remains bound to the treaty unless expressing differently within 12 months of considering the reservation impermissible (ibid.). A revision of the CEDAW database shows Saudi Arabia did not do so. As well, and while the Vienna Convention speaks of permissibility of a reservation, there is an absence of any clear provision on the legal effects to an impermissible one (Pellet 2014: 328). The ILC guide therefore relied on state practice, declarations of monitoring bodies of human rights, and human rights tribunals (Pellet 2014: 329). For example, guideline 4.5.1 elaborates on the nullity of an invalid reservation stating that "a reservation that does not meet the conditions of formal validity and permissibility… is null and void and therefore devoid of any legal effect" (ibid.). Another example is guideline 3.1.5.6 that elaborates on the impermissibility of reservations. It states that there are different considerations to find a reservation invalid combined in three elements. One is the interdependence of the rights and obligations affected by the reservation, related to achieving the object and purpose of the treaty (Pellet 2014: 335). The second element is the importance of the provision within the general "tenour" of the treaty, which relates to protecting non-derogable rights (ibid.). The third and last element is the impact of the reservation on the treaty, which relates to protecting the rights in question in the treaty (ibid.).

Jurisprudence and Literature on General and Specific reservations

Reservations are split between general and specific ones. General reservations entail a lot of uncertainty regarding the extent to which a state making such a reservation is bound by the obligations contained in the treaty. That's why the European Convention on Human Rights in article 64 prohibited it and called for more precision (Lijnzaad 1995: 89). In jurisprudence, the European court in the Belilos case took this direction highlighting the importance of precision in accepting a reservation (ibid.). As well, parties to a convention cannot state that a treaty or specific article should conform to the national law, like the Islamic law in case of Saudi Arabia; human Rights within their nature came to operate in the field which the state used to be sole operator, and where it has failed to guarantee rights of individuals (Lijnzaad 1995: 77).

As for specific reservations, they were limited extremely not to affect a core right. State parties' reservations should not derogate from Jus Cogens[5], Erga Omnes[6], and Non-derogable rights[7] (Bantekas & Oette: 56). These rights became fundamental in international law and states are obliged to respect them no matter what the circumstances are (Frowein 2008), like the general principle of equality for example. Reflecting on the Saudi specific reservation to article 9(2), equality between men and women in the right to give nationality to children relates to the general principle of equality. As well, the reservation goes against the object and purpose of the CEDAW, and hence, Saudi Arabia cannot exclude the obligations emanating of that article. Subsequently, human rights treaty bodies always recommend that state parties withdraw such reservations (Bantekas & Oette 2016: 57); this orientation can be found in the VCLT in article 22 that encourages on withdrawal of reservations (Lijnzaad 1995: 113).

This makes us wonder to what extent reservations were really allowed. After identifying the intention of drafters or legislators to limit as much as possible reservations that might affect core obligations in treaties, and after proving that general reservations are not valid, are specific reservations really allowed? Is there really any article in human rights treaties that does not

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[5] Jus cogens norms are norms that are binding to all states by their moral value and hence cannot be modified (Kolb 2015: 30)

[6] Erga omnes obligations refer to specific binding obligations that a state has towards the international community as a whole (Memeti & Nuhija 2013: 31)

[7] Non-derogable rights are rights that states cannot derogate from for any reason. In case of a security threat for example, states still cannot practice torture and should ensure the right to humane treatment of individuals (Arts 2019: 25).

fall, directly or indirectly, under the object and purpose of those treaties? And what would that mean regarding the Saudi reservations to the CEDAW?

Exploring the specific framework of our case

Exploring the specific framework would help us clarify further if Saudi Arabia is still bound legally by the obligations imposed in the CEDAW articles.

The Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women

The CEDAW included articles on reservations constituting the specific legal framework. Article 28 paragraph 2 states that a reservation that is not compatible with the object and purpose of the convention is not permitted (CEDAW 1979). Paragraph 3 of the same article, states that reservations can be withdrawn at any time by notifying the secretary general of the United Nations who will inform all the other states; this withdrawal takes effect on the date of the notification (ibid.). Article 29 elaborates on the mechanisms of arbitration related to inter-state disputes, which, if within 6 months is not solved by negotiations, one of the states may refer to the International Court of Justice (ibid.). Paragraph 2 of the same article allows states to declare themselves not bound by paragraph 1, and hence not be subjected to arbitration by other state parties (ibid.); it allowed explicitly states' reservations to paragraph 1. Lastly, paragraph 3 mentions that such a reservation can be withdrawn at any time by notifying the Secretary General of the United Nations (ibid.).

Objections of States

Many state parties objected to both the general and the 1st specific reservation of Saudi Arabia. Austria stated that concerning the general reservation, a final assessment of its admissibility would rely on further clarification (CEDAW data base 2019: 12). It considered that this reservation is in contradiction of the object and purpose of the convention and hence is inadmissible unless Saudi Arabia provides clarification ensuring its compatibility with the object and purpose of the convention (ibid.). It added that the reservation on paragraph 2 article 9 is incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention and hence it objected to it, clarifying that this objection does not preclude the entry into force of all the convention between the two states (ibid.). Finland noted that a reservation of a general reference to

religious and national law without specification makes it unclear and doubtful to which extent the reserving state is committed to its obligations to the convention (CEDAW database 2019: 20). It continued to explain that reservations are subject to the general principle that a state may not invoke its domestic law as a justification to its failure in fulfilling obligations under the convention (ibid.). As for the specific reservation on paragraph 2 article 9, it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention, and therefore Finland objected to the reservations made by Saudi Arabia without it precluding the entry into force of the convention between the two states (ibid.) Similar opinions and objections were expressed by Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden (CEDAW database 2019).

Other states could not object to the second specific reservation regarding paragraph 1 of article 29 that elaborates on mechanisms of arbitration. The provisions of this paragraph, as explicitly expressed in paragraph 2, are then not binding to Saudi Arabia, and therefore, states cannot take the dispute to arbitration at the ICJ. However, there is another way of involving the ICJ, which is to put the question before the court as a request for an Advisory Opinion (Lijnzaad 1995: 334). This can take place via the Commission on the Status of Women to the Economic and Social Council, or via the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and the Commission on Human Rights to ECOSOC (ibid.).

The Saudi explanations

Many of the comments addressed to Saudi Arabia as previously identified are about clarifying and specifying the scopes of its reservations in relation to its obligations. It might be therefore useful to explore the explanations of Saudi Arabia and the reasons behind its reservations.

The main reason for such reservations is that the CEDAW articles are perceived inconsistent with article 1 of the Saudi Basic Law of governance that states: "*The kingdom is fully a sovereign Arab Islamic state. Its religion shall be Islam and its constitution shall be the book of God and the Sunnah of his Messenger*" (Al-Rodiman 2013: 2).

In response to a question regarding its general reservation by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women in 2007, Saudi Arabia expressed its conviction that the Shari'ah is actually compatible with the principles of the CEDAW and stated that its reservation is a precautionary measure against any unforeseen interpretation that might

contradict the Islamic law (Al-Rodiman 2013: 50). Its general reservation applies specifically to article 2(f) that calls on states to take all measures to abolish existing laws, regulations, and customs that constitute a discrimination against women (ibid.). Islam recognizes equality of men and women but does not advocate equality in roles between them; rights and duties of each are qualified by their respective roles, thus they cannot be the same (Al-Rodiman 2013: 52). Despite the claim that Islamic Law and CEDAW are harmonious, Saudi Arabia seems to believe actually that certain provisions of the CEDAW have the potential to replace the Islamic Law with a different normative standard (Al-Rodiman 2013: 53). This reservation remains in contradiction with the object and purpose of the CEDAW to guarantee the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. As well, a reservation that goes against the principle of equality is not permissible.

Regarding its reservation to article 9(2), the claim is based on the Saudi Arabian Nationality Act that does not recognize dual citizenship and not on the Shari'ah law strictly (Al-Rodiman 2013: 53). The Saudi delegation member answered a question in this regard by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, stating that since domestic law did not allow dual citizenship, a Saudi women married to a foreigner will have to give up her nationality, and hence the basis of this reservation is to prevent children from having two nationalities and to prevent problems that might occur due to it (Al-Rodiman 2013: 55). However, in practice, a child of a Saudi woman having the nationality of his father can apply for the Saudi nationality later in life, which constitutes a contradiction to the above stated reason (ibid.).

The Saudi explanations do not seem convincing. The reservations made and explained do compromise the object and the purpose of the treaty, and therefore the Committee should pressure Saudi Arabia to withdraw its reservations and ensure its obligations towards the CEDAW.

In the practice

Now that the states' arbitration is not an option due to the acceptance of the 2nd specific reservation of Saudi Arabia on paragraph 1 article 29, it is worth exploring committees' opinions regarding the Saudi reservations.

The CEDAW Committee

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW committee) in its concluding observations on the combined third and fourth periodic reports of Saudi Arabia in 2018 called on the withdrawal of the Saudi reservations (CEDAW committee 2018: 3). It expressed that it remains concerned about the Saudi reluctance to withdraw its reservations, which constitutes an obstacle to the implementation of the convention (ibid.). It reminded Saudi Arabia that its general reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention and therefore, impermissible under article 28 of the convention. It called on Saudi Arabia to review its general reservation and the reservation to article 9(2) in consultation with religious leaders and communities and women leaders, in order to withdraw the reservation within a time frame, and in consideration to the best practices of similar countries culturally and religiously, countries that have the same legal systems (ibid.).

The Human Rights Council

The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 2018 of the Human Rights Council (HRC) on Saudi Arabia did not elaborate much on the matter. It highlighted calls of states like Czechia, Estonia and Liechtenstein for Saudi Arabia to repeal or withdraw its reservations. While Finland called for implementing the recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, and especially to withdraw its general reservation (HRC 2018: 12).

How to ensure that Saudi Arabia remains bound to its obligations?

There is a new tendency for Committees to strengthen their position in the reservations debate (Lijnzaad 1995: 413). Their role is based on the authority given to supervisory organs to monitor the implementation of the conventions; their task is to implement the convention within all ratifying states (ibid.). The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women can find ally in objections of other states to claim its authority. It can practically identify the scope of reservations and their legal effect in accordance to article 21 of the VCLT (Lijnzaad 1995: 414). As well, it can monitor reservations' scope in practice, meaning if the state practice remains in the scope of the reservation or if the legal effect of their reservation is extending (ibid.).

Another way to ensure that Saudi Arabia remains bound by the provisions of the CEDAW is through individual complaints, challenging the Saudi discrimination against women in contradiction to CEDAW obligations. The committee, faced with such a complaint, should declare it admissible and disregard the Saudi reservations, on the assumption that the state never meant to act contrary to international law and the provisions of the convention, and then should move to analyze the merits of the case (Lijnzaad 1995: 414). Subsequently, any individual complaint addressed to a Human Rights Court, regionally or internationally, should discard the Saudi reservations and deal with the merits of the case based on the Saudi obligations to respect the norms and rights established by the CEDAW to ensure the elimination of discrimination against women.

Practically this implies that Saudi Arabia cannot discriminate against women based on the reservations it included to the CEDAW. Its general reservation cannot be applied on Article 2(f) and hence it is obliged to change its laws and customs that are standing against gender equality in rights. As for its specific reservation to article 9(2), Saudi Arabia should modify its nationality law and give the same rights to women married to foreign husbands to transfer nationality to their children. Saudi Arabia is urged to withdraw its reservations that are contrary to the object and purpose of the CEDAW as they are impermissible. These reservations have no legal effect in excluding the application of the CEDAW, and hence can be contested in Courts based on the failure of Saudi Arabia to respect equality between men and women, to fulfill the implementation of its obligations, and to protect women affected by this discrimination.

Conclusion

In this essay I have identified the set of general and specific rules applied to reservations in relation to the case of Saudi Arabia's reservations to the CEDAW. I have argued that general reservations are impermissible, while specific reservations are limited and should not go against jus cogen, erga omnes and non-derogable rights. As well they should not obstruct the object and the purpose of the treaty. While reservations are allowed for state parties, they are very limited in practice. Treaties like the CEDAW have highlighted specifically the article where a state can make a reservation. Saudi Arabia's 1st two reservations are not permissible, and hence it is still bound to the obligations imposed in the treaty articles. They were objected by states and still, Saudi Arabia could not be taken to arbitration due to the acceptance of its

3ʳᵈ reservation. I identified the role of The CEDAW Committee to pressure Saudi Arabia to withdraw its reservations. And finally, I have highlighted individual complaints as a way to challenge Saudi Arabia's reservations in an attempt to neutralize their implications in relation to the obligations imposed by the CEDAW.

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Abstract

A review of housing programs of both market and state illustrates a myopic view of urban housing poverty in the Philippines. Housing strategies, over the past decades, tremendously failed in addressing housing needs as well as remarkably facilitated further insecurity of the poor. It has produced not only costly schemes but also substandard housing units, fostering health, employment, and tenure risks and insecurities among the urban poor. Not only have urban housing poverty efforts in the Philippines prove to be significantly inadequate in addressing realities of urban poor, but it has also enabled neoliberal governance which prioritizes market-fundamentalist interventions: privatizing profits on one hand, and socializing costs on the other. Case studies from Silverio Compound, Agham Road, and Pandi Bulacan show not only how urban poor have to endure intimidation and threats of demolition but also demonstrate their power through resistance and struggle for their collective rights. In this paper, I contend that current approaches to tackling housing poverty remain deeply challenging and significantly insufficient in protecting urban poor from neoliberal aggressions and dispossessions, let alone, providing secured housing for them. Innovative approaches and incremental development to housing poverty have been deliberately stalled, hampered, and belittled by both state and market forces, dispossessing rather than empowering the urban poor.

It is without doubt that proper shelter is one of the most fundamental crucial human needs to live in security and with dignity. Over the past years, various confluences and efforts between market and state have been initiated towards providing socialized housing to urban poor and informal settlers in the Philippines. However, despite this background, housing reforms have not only failed to achieve desired outcomes but rather resulted in disappointing results. *What are the imperatives for innovative approaches to housing poverty? Are these enough to solve the housing crisis? Does improving the housing situation a goal in itself, or it has to be complemented by other incremental development interventions?*

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In this paper, I will combine theoretical and empirical information on the extent, dimensions, and causes of insecure and substandard housing programs in the Philippines. I will take stock of the failures of formal markets as well as inadequacies the state in the field of urban land and housing. In so doing, I will highlight the critical role of informal mechanisms and their frugal yet innovative approach in tackling urban housing crisis. **Part I** will critically examine dimensions of urban housing poverty in the Philippines: its persistence, proliferation, and reproduction. **Part II** will debate 'best practices' and conventional housing approaches of both market and state, assessing its strengths and weaknesses. **Part III** will explore informal market mechanisms as well as various neoliberal aggression towards informal settlers vis-à-vis their self-help and collective rights-claiming strategies.

In conclusion, I contend that current approaches to tackling housing poverty remain deeply challenging and significantly insufficient in protecting urban poor from neoliberal aggressions and dispossessions, let alone, providing secured housing for them. Innovative approaches and incremental development to housing poverty have been deliberately stalled, hampered, and belittled by both state and market forces, dispossessing rather than empowering the urban poor. As such, this serious housing crisis, brought about by structural and systemic failures of both market and state programs, necessitates more enabling, participatory, and transformative policy changes and interventions from all actors promoting interest of the people rather than promoting deliberate negligence, eviction, legalization, commercialization, privatization and populist gestures (Shatkin 2004; Berner 2016).

Urban Housing Crisis: Empty Socialized Housing Programs and Neoliberal Governance

The Philippines has always been touted as one of the fastest growing economies in Asia and the Pacific, promising economic development and shared prosperity for everyone. This rapid urbanization and globalization have brought livelihood and educational opportunities for a number of people, but at the same time, attracting rural-urban migration ushering rising poverty, inequality, and slum growth alongside various governance and management challenges. Shatkin (2004) argues the inherent disconnect between globalizing cities and rising housing poverty, describing informal settlements in Metro Manila as 'forgotten places' which are deliberately excluded by urban planners on the basis of its unwarranted position in the global era.

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Moreover, this phenomenon has brought in a contradictory process of integration and fragmentation (Berner 1997), fostering an environment that disproportionately affects the poor resulting not only in environmental degradation, displacement, and further impoverishment. This processes deeply influences how government and other development actors manage and implement its programs and policies towards housing the urban poor.

Recent figures from the National Economic Development Authority (2017) and World Bank (2017) state that informal settlements have gradually increased over time and that there are approximately 1.5 million informal settler families in Metro Manila in 2012 alone. Despite apparent and blatant housing crisis, the Philippine Statistical Authority (2018) proudly reports that there is 92.57 percent (from 2015 census) of occupancy in state provided housing which are heavily concentrated in regions IV-A, III, and NCR. These figures, however, fails to include people who are living in slum areas and informal settlements, deliberately made invisible in official statistics, who are constantly living in fear, intimidation, and insecurity when disaster strikes or when legal land owners as well as the government decide to evict them. Moreover, these figures are highly unreliable as it does not represent the myriad of problems that conventional market and state mechanisms create such as unemployment resulting in low to almost zero occupancy rates in rural housing units as well beneficiaries' failure to pay exorbitant fees and monthly housing amortization (Passion 2017b). This figure does not take into consideration why urban poor and informal settlers, previously relocated and resettled, migrate yet again to urban cities and reside in high-risk areas, privately-owned lands, and government idle lands.

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Image 1: Urban poor and informal settlers do not only endure poor living conditions in slums areas and informal settlements because of limited affordable alternatives but also daily intimidation and threats of demolitions. Urban informal settlements exist because these are closer to basic social services and employment opportunities.

Photo source: https://www.yesmagazine.org/people-power/filipino-neighbors-fought-new-homes-won

As such, in understanding urban housing poverty, it must be understood that informal settlements are not homogenous environments habituated only by rural-urban migrants, homeless and income poor people: many minimum-wage earners and respectable professionals opt to endure poor living conditions in slums areas and informal settlements because of limited affordable alternatives that are close to their work places which sustains them economically (Berner 2000; Ballesteros 2010).

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While these urban informal settlements provide opportunities, it cannot be denied that informal settlement families still reflect and experience multi-dimensional poverty, inequality, and high level of informality, making them highly vulnerable to potential shocks, underemployment, health risks, pollution, hazards, hunger, violence among many others (World Bank 2017). To understand Philippine urban housing crisis is to not only to see it as the scarcity of suitable and affordable urban land for self-help housing but also as factor, indicator, and cause of poverty that makes informal settlers and urban poor more vulnerable (Berner 2000).

Conventional Housing Programs: Privatizing Gains, Socializing Costs

Despite the strong resolve to address housing poverty, it is clear that an enabling, inclusive, and participatory solution has yet to be arrived at. It is against this background that Article XIII, Section 9 of the Republic Act 7279, otherwise known as Urban Development Act of 1992, mandates local governments to provide affordable and decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The Philippine government addresses the housing need of low-income informal settlers using three schemes, namely: (1) *off-city relocation (i.e. resettlement)*, referring to transfer of low-income families in danger areas to housing projects outside the city, often disruptive to educational and livelihood opportunities and social services for the poor; (2) *on-site upgrading (i.e. Community Mortgage Program)* which lends money to organized communities and households to purchase a land they have been occupying from a willing land owner; and (3) *off-site/ in-city housing*, which provides low-rise and high-density housing programs. The government collaborates with the private sector in addressing shelter crisis gaps.

It is through the National Housing Authority, the lead government agency mandated by law (Presidential Declaration 757 of 1975) to "develop and implement a comprehensive and integrated housing program which shall embrace, among others, housing development and resettlement, sources and schemes of financing, and delineation of government and private sector participation." Key shelter agencies responsible for supporting this mandate include: (1) Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, (2) Home Guaranty Corporation, (3) National Housing Authority, (4) Social Housing Finance Corporation, (5) Home Development Mutual Fund, (6) Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and (7) National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation. Government housing programs include but not limited to: Regional

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Resettlement Programs, Housing Program for Informal Settler Families Residing in Danger Areas in Metro Manila, Armed Forces of the Philippines and Philippine National Police Housing, Housing Assistance for Calamity Victims, End-User Financing for Pag-IBIG members, Provision of Technical Assistance to LGUs in the Formulation of their Local Shelter Plans and Land Use Plans, among many others (HUDCC 2015).

But one of the highly acclaimed housing policies in the Philippines is the Community Mortgage Program (CMP), a mortgage providing program which provides credit to legal community-based organizations to purchase the land they occupy through community ownership and development to the extent of their affordability. This program, despite addressing security of tenure and access to urban lands, has critical points that need to be addressed such as loan recovery and its accompanying divisive and disruptive impact among poor communities. Through CMP, poor households have exported to a new settlement they used to occupy for free, and now forced to pay for a price they cannot even afford (Berner 2000; Berner 2016).

In addition, dominant housing policy regime in the Philippines remains to be heavily conventional and market-oriented. Berner (2016) provides a critical analysis of market and state deficiencies in providing shelter for urban poor, which are largely mass deportation of urban poor and informal settlers through off-city resettlement programs. Housing and resettlements are planned, built, and organized according to a set standards and regulations demanded by the housing market and state to suit and define sustainable cities that are devoid of slum areas and informal settlements. As slum areas and informal settlements drive down property prices, current housing schemes are also designed mainly to also drive out and deport poor people and informal settlers from urban to rural, if not, placing them on socialized housing units within the city that are pegged at prices which intended beneficiaries cannot even afford. Most of these schemes have largely been designed and limited towards providing credit to community-based organizations to avail of upper and middle-income housing because of poor cost recovery of low-income housing lending (Shatkin 2004: 2480).

This situation makes the case for poor people and informal settlers to demonstrate their self-help strategies and informal mechanisms in building and developing their preferred settlements according to their needs and incomes. However, they are also confronted with violence because they are treated as an untenable collective problem that have to be driven out

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of the city to attract investment. This prevailing thinking between state and market disregards the idea that poor people themselves can demonstrate innovative development in building and organizing their own housing, even if it is regarded as outside the legal bounds and standards of the government (Hardoy and Satterthwaite 1989).

While non-government organizations continue to advocate for in-city relocation as well as engaging community-based organizations in formulation for their "People's Plans", a more viable and sustainable alternative to approaching housing and informal settlements is still deemed necessary. Clearly, even in in-city relocation, urban poor and informal settlers still face various intimidation, gentrification, and threats of demolitions. In-city relocation should have a mix of both curative and preventive approaches to innovative and incremental development: accepting the existence of informal settlements, providing low-cost housing and subsidies, and facilitating security of tenure through guided squatting and recognition of urban poor's innovation, legally produced or not (Berner 2016).

Informal Mechanisms and Neoliberal Aggressions: Dispossession and Demolition

Squatting has been an essential alternative for the urban poor in the absence of affordable housing options within their income in the city as well as lack of economic activities in rural areas. Aside from the deliberate neglect and indifference, urban poor and informal settlers are confronted with constant repression and intimidation through brutal dispersals and demolitions in their places they illegally reside. Urban poor and informal settlers in Metro Manila have been constantly treated as collective untenable problem, driving out market prices of lands and causing large-scale informality. As a response, both state and market mechanisms have employed neoliberal governance in deporting informal settlers, often using force and aggression, out of the city and resettle them in rural provincial hinterlands and outskirts which are devoid of economic activities and opportunities. This forced process of driving people out of the city continues to be a chronic yet cyclical process resulting in yet again rural-urban migration, rendering socialized housing units useless, unoccupied, and foreclosed.

Various cases of conventional housing programs violent dispersals and confrontation between informal settlers and police forces have been documented over years of neoliberal governance of favoring market-fundamentalist ideas of privatization and commercialization of lands in Metro Manila. Among of which is **Silverio Compound** (2012) wherein half of the

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sprawling city property (9.7 hectares) was expropriated for socialized housing via city ordinance issued in 2003 but was later on declared to be used primarily for commercial purposes (6 hectares) to stir income and commercial development, reducing the initially targeted land for socialized housing area to 3 hectares only. According to reports, each housing units will cost PhP 550,000 (USD 10,536,35) with monthly amortization of PhP 3000 (USD 58) but "only around 1,900 households out of the 28,000 households currently living will be offered low-cost housing" (Tupaz 2012). Urban poor and informal settlers in the area highly opposed this plan, barricading streets to their community. However, despite pending court case disputing demolition and intent to make way for a condominium and a retail development, the city administration pushed through with demolition. This resulted in a bloody tension between informal settlers and police forces leaving 1 death (gunshot in the head) and 39 injuries (Tupaz 2012; Santolan 2012).

Image 2: Silverio Compound, a 9.7-hectare government land supposedly for socialized housing was reduced to 3 hectares, favoring building of commercial establishments for the remaining 6 hectares highly open to SM Development Corporation (SMDC) and other private developers such as Ayala Land Inc. and Robinsons Land Corporation. Photo

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illustration by Emil Mercado, from https://www.rappler.com/move-ph/4338-silver-homes-to-rise-from-rubble-of-demolished-silverio-compound

Another relocation plan turned extremely brutal demolition erupted shortly a year after the incident in Silverio Compound. Informal settlers in **Agham Road** (2013), part of the Quezon City Central Business District**,** were demanding consultations before the city administration in regard to demolition plans and road widening programs in the area but were instead faced with police barricades (Lozada 2013). Almost 4,000 informal settler families do not want to be relocated in far-flung rural areas as this would keep them away from their economic activities and threaten their livelihoods. Despite this plea, informal settler resistance, backed up by militant groups, were faced with violent dispersal and brutality (use of teargas, among others) causing several injuries and casualties, including women and children. Informal settlers have claimed that they are being cleared out of the city to favor big businesses putting up commercial establishments in the district rather than prioritizing the needs of its people (Sabillo 2014).

Image 3: Relocation plan turned violent demolition between protesters and police forces. Photo by Mark Demayo taken from https://www.rappler.com/move-ph/32798-libel-case-against-qc-mayor

Image 4: A child being treated with first aid due to suffocation and allergy from teargas incited by police forces. Photo taken from http://www.humanrights.asia/news/forwarded-news/AHRC-FUA-001-2014/

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Lastly, over the decades of neglect as well as tremendously failure of past administrations to build homes and provide lands for informal settlers, some 6,000 members of the Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (Kadamay), a group of urban poor peasants, collectively rallied and occupied idle government housing units in **Pandi, Bulacan**, exposing government grave shortcomings on housing and resettlement. This rights-claiming movement, supported by then left-leaning officials from the National Anti-Poverty Commission and Philippine Commission for Urban Poor, was done in response to the unresponsive dialogues and inaction of government on distributing housing units that have been unoccupied and idle for at least 5 years (Passion 2017a). Members of the Kadamay, despite successful takeover of idle housing units, are continuing its advocacy for free and accessible housing as well as for the amendment of the UDHA which privileges business sector in government housing programs.

Images 5 and 6: Kadamay members after they successfully taken over idle government housing units in Bulacan, exposing government inefficiency as well as protesting against private businesses taking profit from socialiazed housing programs. Photos by Ruy Martinez from https://www.manilatimes.net/giving-kadamay-step-anarchy-lawmakers-2/321276/ and Nino Orbeta from https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/966521/news-kadamay-urban-poor-nha-pandi-bulacan-gloria-arellano

These several yet limited case studies of people's resistance to defend their place in the city, resorting to both formal and informal as well as violent or non-violent mechanisms. This depicts, however, that while many people are living in misery and despair in slum areas and

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informal settlements, it must be understood that they are not powerless or victims passively waiting for interventionist and welfare programs. Poor people face intimidation, fear, other forms of insecurity everyday but they have agency, capable of making rational choices and decisions and pressure government based on their interests and positions. Most often than not, they would rather face the risks and vulnerabilities in the city rather than face uncertainty in relocation sites where there is uncertainty because of lack of basic social services and employment opportunities. Through support of non-government and militant groups, urban poor and informal settler families are resorting to self-help strategies, often through squatting, and forming community-based organizations to assert for their rights and mobilize for social change. There are 100,000 several other informal settler families living along Metro Manila's waterways and danger areas slated to be relocated but for Silverio Compound, Agham Road, and Pandi Bulacan, their in-city relocation as well as rights-claiming takeover is a success.

Image 7: Kadamay members collectively asserting their rights for proper housing, occupying government idle lands in Pandi, Bulacan. Photo by Nino Orbeta from https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/891163/kadamay-gives-bulacan-town-a-big-headache and Image 8: Members of a community resisting forms of intimidation and demolition from both state and market forces, defending their rights to stay in the city. Photo by Ritchie Tongo from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/worldnews/11629932/Riot-police-clash-with-squatters-during-demolition-raids-in-Metro-Manila.html

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In 2017, recognizing its past administration failures as well as recent takeovers, the current administration has pledged to positively develop in-city housing site development and fit informal settlers in urban areas within the available 3400 hectares of government lands in Metro Manila through creation of a Department of Housing (Passion 2017b). However, questions in regard to operationalizing building and implementation, completion of housing projects, designing credit schemes (whether it will still conform to conventional housing schemes), as well absorption capacity of local government units remain until now deeply unanswered.

Yet, discussions and proposals on informal settlements as areas for growth through public-private partnership for real estate business loom anew (Buban 2015). Under this proposed scheme, private developers will be in charge of building and financing construction while the government provides for the in-city land. The government agencies concerned with housing needs can *assist* in price ceiling, loans, as well as compliance of developers. Many urban poor, informal settler families and their allied non-government organizations greatly oppose   this yet again as it only aims to privilege commercial business interests in the guise of socialized housing which are not even accessible nor affordable to them.

Conclusions

A review of housing programs of both market and state actors illustrates a myopic view of urban housing poverty in the Philippines. Housing strategies, over the decades, tremendously failed in addressing housing needs as well as remarkably facilitated further insecurity of the poor. It has produced not only costly schemes but also substandard housing units, fostering health, employment, and tenure risks and insecurities among the urban poor. Not only have urban housing poverty efforts in the Philippines prove to be significantly inadequate in addressing realities of urban poor, but it has also enabled neoliberal governance which prioritizes market-fundamentalist interventions: privatizing profits on one hand, and socializing costs on the other.

Moreover, the current housing regime and landscape provide a view of how neoliberal governance also impinge on rights and entitlements of the poor. To date, urban poor have to

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endure ruthless relocation of poor people to hastily constructed housing units in provincial hinterlands and rural outskirts, where they are expected to pay exorbitant fees and high amortization rates but afar from livelihood opportunities, access to social services, and connection to mass transportation. This neoliberal governance shows how demand for profit further deepens inequality: appropriating lands for commercial use and deporting massive urban poor to off-city resettlement areas.

The case of the urban poor and social movements mobilizing for change also depicts how solidarity and collective agency/action can result in positive outcomes, although through rather difficult and confrontational struggle, in defending not only their place but their rights and entitlements in the city. Some social movements have become successful but other resistance have also resulted in grave violation of human rights and unfortunate death of some.

This complex urban housing situation brought about by deep market and state structural issues, can be addressed through transformative institutional reforms. To address this ever-perennial crisis, housing programs must be geared towards more inclusive, enabling, and participatory approach rather than the norm of providing ready-made housing packages. This can be done through what Berner (2016) suggests as imperatives for innovative approaches: market and state learning from informal housing production through enabling incremental development, facilitating compromises in ownership disputes, and providing security of tenure to informal settlers. This can be achieved through a mix of both curative (improving housing conditions, services, and infrastructure) and preventive (increasing housing supply by guided squatting). In a similar vein, Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989) show that informal housing is the rule rather than the exception, and this should not be regarded as bad news.

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Laudato Si. Bridging science with religion. What are the strategies to speak to "every person living on the planet"?
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Introduction

The moment

2015 was a year, where the climate crisis was put into the center of attention through various events and publications. With the international conference on climate change in Paris, where common goals on the reduction of GHG (Greenhouse gas) emissions were agreed upon, or the release of the SDGs (Sustainable development goals), with *Climate action* as one of the 17 goals, the subject has entered the broader mainstream discourse, accompanied by several natural disasters and new records in temperature around the world. In the middle of this, *Laudato Si,* the encyclical letter on *Care for our common home* was *published and with this, an* unexpected sender for advocating the topic of climate change entered the scene, Pope Francis.

The topic and research question

Scientist around the world prove evidence of the human impact on global warming through the accelerated quantity of GHG emissions and call with urgency for action. However, the global community is, in the face of these complex topic, where causality and impact are widely spread, indecisive and hesitant to act. A reason could be, a cognitive dissonance (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2016: 1263), creating a gap between knowing the facts and acting. The topic is commonly communicated in a scientific language, though at times overloaded with technical terms and data, it is not easily approachable for a large audience, and is not appealing much on an emotional level.

The Catholic Church as an organization, has many followers and is represented in the majority of countries and on all continents. The pope as the head of the Church, is therefore able to reach out to a significant amount of people. By dealing with the topic of climate change in the encyclical letter, and by translating the warning calls of scientists into a religious language, readers are approached on another, more emotional level. This might help to create

awareness and more importantly, action. This assumption triggers my interest and results in following research question:

Bridging science with religion. What are the strategies to speak to "every person living on the planet"?

Bridge as a metaphor suggests more than *combine*, and less than *merge*.[8]. This resonates with a further interest of mine, the power structures, which are shaping the discourse in relation to multiple audiences.

I see the relevance of this research question in regards of the urgent need, to encourage more serious action to combat climate change on different levels. A lot is to learn in order to approach people with such an uncomfortable and frightening topic. Every attempt to do so, as with the encyclical letter, is more than welcome in the face of the crisis.

My positionality

My focus in my current development studies is on food, agrarian and environmental issues. Therefore, climate change is omnipresent as a topic in all three subjects. I am interested in, how this topic is dealt with, especially by such an unusual sender as the pope. Being raised in a Catholic country as a Protestant, I early became aware of the distinctions between the Catholic church and other Christian communities. With *Laudato Si* the pope is addressing an extended audience, which goes beyond the members of the Catholic church. How, he gets through with his message, stokes my curiosity.

1. Methodology

To understand the strategies used, to bridge science with religion, I apply Critical discourse analysis (CDA) according to Van Dijk`s four arenas of exploration (2009):

1. Semantic macro structures
2. Local micro structures
3. Different aspects of language
4. Social & Cultural Context

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[8] Gasper, D. (2019), Comment on Research proposal

As the research question implies a comparison of the religious with the scientific language, I will add one element from Fairclough`s approach of discourse analysis (2009), the study of discourse interactions.

As a main approach and being interested in power relations (Van Dijk 1996: 84), I will use two complementary methods, rhetoric analysis and metaphor analysis, to explore more in depth. As van Dijk suggests, "CDA can be conducted in and combined with any approach and sub-discipline" (2001).

The notion, that discourse is "typically structured by dominance, and is historically situated in time and space"[9] , is interesting, as *Laudato Si* is addressing multiple audiences: The Catholic church, the Christian community, other religions and "every person living on this planet" (paragraph 3). This creates a complex social context with a complex social representation, where religion as a personal dimension takes more space in the public domain. Cutting cross gender, class, culture and race, etc., CDA seeks to understand the different mental models involved and addressed.[10]. Consequently, this puts multiple tasks on language(s), in order to build relations to different types of readers.

First, according to van Dijk, I analyze the semantic macro structure and second, the local micro structures of the document. Third, I explore the different aspects of both languages, the scientific and the religious one, how they are portrayed in relation to each other, and how they bridge over. Forth, I try to understand, how the multiple audiences mentally model the context. Fifth, I summarize the strategies used to address "every person living on this planet" by bridging science with religion through the study of discourse interactions according to

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[9] Gasper, Course notes, ISS-3210-18-19, Session 10

[10] Gasper, Course notes, ISS-3210-18-19, Session 10

Fairclough. I end with a reflection upon the power relations implied in and around *Laudato Si,* based on studying the rhetorical advice, ethos (McCloskey 1994).

Metaphor analysis (Kovecses 2002) assists, in exploring the construction of the used languages, with a focus on the scientific and religious one, and how they bridge over. Metaphors influence and are influenced by mental models and might be used as a strategy, to move the receiver's knowledge about climate change from a cognitive to an emotional level.

The way CDA starts with social problems, and not with particular research methods, resonates with *Laudato Si*, identifying not climate change, but the loss of ethics and values in humanity as the root cause of the problem.

For my analysis I have chosen following 4 paragraphs to represent the religious (paragraph 2 and 75) and the scientific language (paragraph 32 and 24). Some chapters are written more in social/developmental language, though I will limit my analysis to the two mentioned above, in regards of the research question. To explore the characteristics of the different type of languages, I apply content analysis (Grbich 2013), as a method.

2. Context

2015, can be called the year of the rise of climate change as a topic. Communities around the globe were hit by severe natural disasters, caused by the effects of global warming, as for example hurricane *Sandy* in the Caribbean, to name one. Also, the last 4 years before the release of *Laudato Si* were the warmest in recordings of global temperatures (World Meteorological Organization 2016: 5). Scientists call for immediate action to reverse this trend. At the conference on climate change in Paris, agreements on reduction goals for GHG emissions were negotiated and committed to (UNFCCC 2018). In the same year, the SDGs set *Climate action* as one of their 17 targets (UN 2015). Documentaries as *Tomorrow* (2015) in Europe or *Cowspiracy* (2014) in the US, are creating broader awareness and are reaching larger audiences than ever with the topic of climate change. Within this extending discourse, the Catholic church is releasing the *Encyclical Letter Laudato Si' of the Holy Father Francis: On Care for Our Common Home*.

The encyclical letter is written by or in the name of the pope, directed to the members of the Catholic church, commonly the bishops (Papal Encyclicals Online 2017). Nowadays it is

published on the Vatican website in 14 languages including Latin. It intends to give moral guidance on specific topics, as in the past, on birth control for example. Laudato Si is the first dealing with the climate crisis and stands out for its integration of a large amount of scientific data into a religious document. Pope Francis, as the head of the Catholic church, is the main author of the document, but a first draft was delivered by Cardinal Peter Turkson, the head of the Pontificial Council for Justice and Peace and his team.

The papal name, Francis, is referring to Saint Francis. This choice is resonating with the pope`s concern about poverty and inequality. Francis has an educational background in science and his more progressive attitudes are appreciated and controversial at the same time. In any case, they have drawn attention inside and outside of the Catholic Church (Klein 2015).

With Laudato Si, pope Francis, turns not only to the members of the Catholic Church, but to the entire Christian community, members of other religions and as stated in paragraph 3, to "every person living on this planet", as he sees the efforts against climate change as a common effort. Evidence for his success in creating attention is given by the responses of different groups, as governments, the civil society, scientists, the corporate sector and leaders of other religions.

3. Analysis

3.1 Main general findings

What are the strategies to speak to "every person living on the planet" by bridging science and religion:

- The text has a broad appeal by offering the same content in a religious and scientific context.
- The scientific and religious context is written in different styles, supporting different purposes.
- The scientific language is used to explain causality of human behavior and environmental issues.
- The religious language intents to move the reader`s knowledge from a cognitive to emotional level.

3.2 Semantic macrostructure (CDA)

The semantic macrostructures give an idea, what the document is centrally about and identifies main topics and global meanings (Van Dijk 2009). The document includes an introduction, 6 chapters and a closing prayer, and consists of 246 paragraphs overall. The titles of the chapters are following:

Chapter 1: What is Happening to Our Common Home

Chapter 2: The Gospel of Creation

Chapter 3: The Human Roots of the Ecological Crisis

Chapter 4: Integral Ecology

Chapter 5: Lines of Approaches

Chapter 6: Ecological Education and Spirituality

In the introduction *Laudoto Si, mi'Signore* key messages are highlighted in form of sub-headlines, as *Nothing in this world is indifferent to us*, *United by the same concern*, *Saint Francis of Assisi* and *My appeal.*" With this, pope Francis sets the base for the following chapters.

Chapter one explains the topic of climate change in a scientific context with a more scientific language. The reader gets to know the issues of *pollution and climate change*, *the issue of water, the loss of biodiversity* and the resulting decline in quality of human life. It reminds of global inequality, criticizes weak responses and invites once more to open up to *a variety of opinions* and to question dominant narratives. It also underlines, that contributions from different disciplines are welcomed and needed.

Chapter two sets the scene to understand the human-nature relation in a biblical context. The sub-chapters have a strong religious tone as *The light offered by faith*, *The wisdom of the biblical accounts*, *The mystery of the universe* and *The message of each creature in the harmony of creation*. It builds a strong contrast in the use of language compared to chapter one.

Chapter three points out the human origins of the ecological crisis, puts attention to the role of technology in our society and introduces ethics, into the discourse of climate change.

Chapter four explains more in depth, how the environmental issues have a "human and social dimension" (paragraph 137) and suggests the concept of *Integral ecology* as a possible way out of the crisis. Efforts on an individual level and from society as whole are required. The sub-chapters suggest an *Ecology of daily life*, explain *The principle of the common good* and call for *Justice between the generations*.

In chapter 5, pope Francis encourages dialogues on different levels, as within the international community, on a national and local level, with politics and economy and between religions (plural!) and science in order to move towards solutions and action. That a dialogue must happen on different levels, connects back to the key message of the introduction, *United by the same concern*.

Finally, chapter 6 offers the values of the Catholic church for guidance in a change of life style and habits, for individuals and society, which makes space for a renewed relationship of humans with nature, spirituality, joy and peace, civic and political love, sacramental signs and the celebration of rest. Remarkable here is, that for the sub-headlines, terms like *Religion, Christian* or *Catholic* do not appear.

The use of key choices of terms varies within the different chapters and indicates already a use of different languages for different topics. In chapter one, with a strong focus on the scientific explanation of the ecological crisis, the terms *world, water, pollution, species* and *resources* stand out. In chapter two, which situates the environmental topic in a religious context, terms like *God, human, Lord, beings, creatures, earth* and *creation* are dominant.

3.3 Local micro structures (CDA)

In this chapter I will zoom in from the level of the document structure into the micro structures of the selected paragraphs 2, 75, 32 and 24 (Annex 1). To identify local meanings throughout the text, I use the Toulmin-George/Gasper synthesis table (Gasper 2004:13, Annex 6) on the base of a Rhetoric analysis of ethos, pathos and logos, to identify the logic of the three elements used in the document.

The key conclusions are:

- For the chapters more referring to a religious origin, pathos and ethos are more dominant than logos. In the paragraphs with a strong scientific narrative, logos is the main rhetoric advice.
- Pathos is used to encourage a move from knowledge to action.
- Ethos is built, by referring to traditional family constellations, where the pope as the father, has authority over the children in giving advice or correcting misbehavior.

In the paragraph 2 and 75, which reflect the religious background of the text, the use of ethos and pathos dominate over logos (Annex 5).

One of the main arguments identified in paragraph 2 is, that humans are not acting in a sustainable way and the destruction of the planet has reached a level, that causes serious harm and suffering. This message is not new and was so far mainly communicated in form of scientific reports, addressing the cognitive level of the receiver. By using pathos, the emotional level of the audience is addressed. Emotions are needed to move knowledge into action. In chapter one, the pope addresses *Weak responses* in the face of the climate crisis, as a core problem to overcome and stimulates action by using Pathos.

The arguments of paragraph 75 are, that humans have lost values and are claiming God's position. This needs to be corrected and Christian values can be used for guidance in this re-orientation. Ethos is the predominant element of the paragraph. *"The best way to restore men and women to their rightful place, putting an end to their claim to absolute dominion over the earth, is to speak once more of the figure of a Father who creates and who alone owns the world"* (paragraph 75).

The scientific paragraph 32 claims, that human behavior is short-sighted, as the consequences of the loss of biodiversity are not fully foreseeable. This can become a threat to humanity. *"Different species contain genes which could be key resources in years ahead for meeting human needs and regulating environmental problems."* (paragraph 32)

In paragraph 24 the main message can be framed as such: The effects and impacts of global warming are interlinked with each other and everyone will be affected by severe consequences of global warming. This links back to one of the messages, pope Francis highlights already in the introduction, *Nothing in this world is indifferent to us*. In both chapters logos is used to explain the causality of things.

Throughout the document on a macro and micro structure level, the encyclical letter is emphasizing the conviction that everything is connected.

3.4 Different aspects of language

In a third step van Dijk suggests, to look into different aspects of language, which are less under the control of the speaker, as unconscious style choices. In this part of the analysis, I want to explore the characteristics of the language used in the religious and scientific passages of the text, in which relation they stand to each other and how bridges are built between them, assuming that this was partly done without intention.

Laudato Si was published on the webpage of the Vatican in 14 different languages including Latin. Within the document, the style of language is changing from a more religious language, to a scientific language and to a social/developmental language. Even, if the style sometimes changes within a paragraph, and from sentence to sentence, one language is dominating and dedicated to certain chapters for a certain purpose.

The main findings are:

- The religious language is used to transfer knowledge from a cognitive to an emotional level in order to encourage action.
- Frequently used words of the religious language address spirituality and emotions.
- Metaphors are a dominant style element of the religious language. Most of them have *family* as a source domain enhancing ethos and authority of the speaker.
- A scientific language is used for chapters with an explanatory character.
- The scientific language is characterized by the use of technical terms.
- The scientific language strengthens the credibility of the scientific information provided by the pope.

3.4.1 Characteristics religions language

The religious language is used for the introduction, which clarifies from the beginning, who the sender of the encyclical letter is. Further it is dominating in chapter two, *The Gospel of Creation*, where the meaning of nature and environment, is set and explained in the biblical context. In the final chapter, *Ecological Education and Spirituality*, the terms in the titles of the sub-chapters remind of the Christian doctrine, such as *joy and peace, love, sacramental, trinity* and *creatures*. Also, the closing prayer by nature, is religious.

Comparing the paragraphs 2 and 75 (religious) with the paragraphs 32 and 24 (scientific), let draw the conclusion, that the religious language is using significantly more metaphors (Annex 4). "This sister now cries out to us…" (paragraph 2) or "groans in travail" (paragraph 2, xxx). Many of the metaphors used throughout the text are referring to traditional family constellations as sister or father. The metaphors are elements of the pathos created in those paragraphs and pathos vice verca is shaping the choice of metaphors.

As mentioned in context with the macro structures and global meanings, the frequently used key terms in the mainly religious chapters have a biblical origin, such as *God, Lord, creation, beings* or *earth*. In those chapters and paragraphs are also references drawn to what other religious figures said about the topic or to the bible. "we ourselves are dust of the earth" (cf. Gen 2:7 in paragraph 2).

Even though, the titles of the sub-chapters in chapter six, clearly remind of religion, there is no specific use the terms *religion, christian* or *catholic*. I will come back to this later.

4.4.2 Characteristics scientific language

The scientific language dominates in chapter two. The title of the chapter, *What is happening to our common home*, indicates an explanatory character of the chapter on subjects of pollution, water issues or biodiversity loss. Also, in chapter three, *The human roots of the ecological crisis*, scientific language is used in combination with a social/developmental language. Consequently, technical terms are the key choices used in the titles, in the chapter as whole, and in the paragraphs itself. The sentence "The melting in the polar ice caps and in high altitude

plains can lead to the dangerous release of methane gas, while the decomposition of frozen organic material can further increase the emissions of carbon dioxide." (paragraph 24), for example, contains technical terms as *carbon cycle* or *methane gas*, which might require further explanation, depending on the reader.

4.4.3 Discourse interactions

Both languages are fluidly used throughout the document and interact with each other. The main topics are addressed, whereas the scientific language has the task to explain the causality of human behavior and environment impacts, and to underline the credibility of the speaker on this topic. The religious language is used to address the emotions of the audience and hence, to encourage action.

Comparing chapters, written in religious with scientific language, one can notice, that the focus and themes of the chapters are overlapping, though different terms are used to describe the same, as: *earth* vs *planet*, *creatures* and *beings* vs *species*, *things* vs *resources* and, *nature* vs *environment* (Annex 2)*. Humans* stay the same, connecting both worlds.

3.5 Social and cultural context

Addressing multiple audiences, as stated earlier, means addressing people with different mental models. To reach out to *Every person living on this planet* means reaching out to religious and non-religious groups. In both groups gender, class, race and culture, counties, intersect.

3.5.1. How do people mentally model these contexts and specific events?

The accumulation of natural hazards in different parts of the world, the presences of the topic in media, the representation of the Catholic church within a country or its political situation and more influence the mental model of the audiences. Living in the US with a president who publicly denies climate change or to live in a country, that just currently was hit by a natural disaster shapes, how the pope`s message is perceived. To describe the different mental models of the multiple audience goes far beyond the scope of the essay, if it is possible at all. However,

different strategies can be identified, that allow pope Francis to approach different groups within the same document in different ways.

The analysis of the macro structure of the document reveals, that different chapters have different purposes and offer different points of departure for different groups. Accordingly, the use of different languages, allows diverse groups to relate to the content. Where the non-religious reader might find chapter one with the scientific explanation more appealing, the catholic audience might relate more to chapter two.

Also, the silences in the titles, as for example the absence of key terms like *religion, christian* or *catholic,* enable a broader audience beyond the Christian community to associate with the text.

Further, the message of *United by the same concern* implies inclusivity. This message is strengthened throughout the entire document starting with the title, *Our common home*. The sub-chapter of chapter two acknowledges *A variety of opinions* and the entire chapter 5 on *Lines of approach and action*, invites to dialogues within the international community, national and local groups, politics and economy and in-between science and religions (Annex 3). The plural in religions here, implies, that the needed dialogues are not limited to the Catholic church only, but it involves other religions in the task to give moral guidance in order to solve the climate crisis.

Finally, what I call the strategy of balancing, allow a broad audience to identify with *Laudato Si*. In chapter three, for example, pope Francis acknowledges the contribution of technology in our everyday life. At the same time, he warns not to use technology without an ethical approach. Those balancing views reappear throughout the text, but would form a research question for itself.

3.5.2 Power structures

On the base of the preceding analysis, I draw conclusions in regards of the power structures behind. *Laudato Si* created a lot of attention, when it was released and has strengthened the position of the Catholic church as a relevant contributor and moral advisor in the questions of modern life, not only for the Catholic community, but also by appealing to a broader audience.

The authority of the pope on the topic is first of all based on his own persona by having a background in science and being the head of the Catholic church, also for a non-catholic audience. By referring to Saint Francis of Assisi with name and his concerns, he puts weight on his credibility in environmental questions. This might more appeal to members of the Catholic church.

For the members of the Catholic church mainly, he uses the metaphor of a father, which implies authority in giving advice in all questions of life, but it also legitimizes to correct mis-behavior of the *children*.

In the beginning of the document he lists the efforts of his predecessors in social and environmental questions and several times in the document he is referring to bishops from different parts of the world, to reinforce his arguments and also to create the feeling of unity and inclusiveness within the Catholic church.

He underlines the message of being *United by the same concern,* by giving credit to representatives of science, philosophy and civic groups, who "have enriched the Church`s thinking on these questions." (paragraph 7). Those strategies are used to establish a sense of trust and a relationship with a broader audience.

4. Conclusion

The methodology used in order to answer the research question offers new insights on the distinction and use of the scientific and religious language, as the use of the rhetoric devises, pathos, logos and ethos and the use of key terms.

More research can be done on van Dijk`s concept of *discourse and knowledge* (van Dijk 2013) in this context, building on the assumption, that by translating the scientific language into a religious context, religion is used to verify science within the mental models of the audience. Different communities in the world have different epistemic criteria for what knowledge means for them, in this case knowledge about climate change. This is a crucial consideration for the use of language in the encyclical letter, in order to create awareness and encourage action amongst a broad and diverse audience.

Pope Francis managed to reach out for a wide audience with the publication of *Laudato Si*, which can be seen, as a relevant contribution in creating awareness and encouraging action in the face of climate change. The main strategy of the encyclical letter to do so, is to bridge between science and religion. I claim, that the main purpose behind, is to connect the cognitive with the emotional level of the audience. This way awareness and knowledge about climate change should be transferred into action, by overcoming the current reluctance to combat climate change in a joint effort.

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Annexes

Annex 1: Paragraphs used for analysis

Paragraph 2: (religious language)

"This sister now cries out to us because of the harm we have inflicted on her by our irresponsible use and abuse of the goods with which God has endowed her. We have come to see ourselves as her lords and masters, entitled to plunder her at will. The violence present in our hearts, wounded by sin, is also reflected in the symptoms of sickness evident in the soil, in the water, in the air and in all forms of life. This is why the earth herself, burdened and laid waste, is among the most abandoned and maltreated of our poor; she "groans in travail" (Rom 8:22). We have forgotten that we ourselves are dust of the earth (cf.Gen 2:/); our very bodies are made up of her elements, we breathe her air and we receive life and refreshment from her waters."

Paragraph 75 (religious language)

"A spirituality which forgets God as all-powerful and Creator is not acceptable. That is how we end up worshipping earthly powers, or ourselves usurping the place of God, even to the point of claiming an unlimited right to trample his creation underfoot. The best way to restore men and women to their rightful place, putting an end to their claim to absolute dominion over the earth, is to speak once more of the figure of a Father who creates and who alone owns the world. Otherwise, human beings will always try to impose their own laws and interests on reality."

Paragraph 32 (scientific language)

"The earth`s resources are also being plundered because of short-sighted approaches to the economy, commerce and production. The loss of forests and woodlands entails the loss of species which may constitute extremely important resources in the future, not only for food but also for curing disease and other uses. Different species contain genes which could be key resources in years ahead for meeting human needs and regulating environmental problems."

Paragraph 24 (scientific language)

"Warming has effects on the carbon cycle. It creates a vicious circle which aggravates the situation even more, affecting the availability of essential resources like drinking water, energy and agricultural production in warmer regions, and leading to the extinction of part of the planet`s biodiversity. The melting in the polar ice caps and in high altitude plains can lead to the dangerous release of methane gas, while the decomposition the marine food chain. If present trends continue, this century may well witness extraordinary climate change and an unprecedented destruction of ecosystems, with serious consequences for all of us. A rise in the sea level, for example, can create extremely serious situations, if we consider that a quarter of

the world`s population lives on the coast or nearby, and that the majority of our megacities are situated in coastal areas."

ANNEX 2: Content analysis per chapter

Chapter 1: "What is happening to our common home"

Chapter 2: "The Gospel of creation"

Annex 3: Text structure

Structure	Title	Language
Introduction	**Laudato Si**	Religious
Sub headlines		neutral
Sub headlines	United by the same concern	neutral
Sub headlines	Saint Francis of Assisi	Religious
Sub headlines	My appeal	Social/Developm.
Chapter headline	**What is happening to our common home**	Religious
Sub chapter	Pollution and climate change	Scientific
Sub headlines	Pollution, waste and the throwaway culture	Scientific
Sub headlines	Climate as a common good	Scientific
Sub chapter	The issue of water	Scientific
Sub chapter	Loss of biodiversity	Scientific
Sub chapter	Decline in the quality of human life and the breakdown of society	Scientific
Sub chapter	Global inequality	Scientific
Sub chapter	Weak responses	Scientific

Sub chapter	A variety of opinions	Scientific
Chapter headline	**The gospel of creation**	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	The light offered by faith	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	The wisdom of the biblical accounts	Religious
Sub chapter	The mystery of the universe	Religious
Sub chapter	The message of each creature in the harmony of creation	Religious
Sub chapter	The universal communion	Religious
Sub chapter	The common destination of goods	Religious
Sub chapter	The gaze of Jesus	Religious
Chapter headline	**The human roots of the ecological crisis**	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	Technology: Creativity and power	Scientific
Sub chapter	The globalization of the technocratic paradigm	Scientific
Sub chapter	The crisis and effects of modern anthropcentrism	Scientific
Sub headlines	Practical relativism	Scientific
Sub headlines	The need to protect employment	Scientific
Sub headlines	New biological technologies	Scientific

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Chapter headline	**Integral ecology**	Scientific
Sub chapter	Environmental, economic and social ecology	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	Cultural ecology	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	Ecology of daily life	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	The principal of the common good	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	Justice between the generations	Social/Developm.
Chapter headline	**Lines of approach and action**	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	Dialogue on the environment in the international community	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	Dialogue for new national and local policies	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	Dialogue and transparency in decision-making	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	Politics and economy in dialogue for human fulfilment	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	Religions in dialogue with science	Social/Developm.
Chapter headline	**Ecological education and spirituality**	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	Towards a new lifestyle	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	Educating for the covenant between humanity and the environment	Social/Developm.
Sub chapter	Ecological conversion	Religious

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Sub chapter	Joy and peace	Religious
Sub chapter	Civic and political love	Religious
Sub chapter	Sacramental signs and the celebration of rest	Religious
Sub chapter	The trinity and the relationship between creatures	Religious
Sub chapter	Queen of creation	Religious
Sub chapter	Beyond the sun	Religious
Closing	A prayer for our earth	Religious
	A Christian prayer in union with creation	Religious

ANNEX 4: Metaphors per paragraphs

Examples Para-graph		Metaphors
2	religious	"This sister now cries out"; "entitled to plunder her at will"; "violence present in our hearts"; "wounded by sin'; 'reflected in the burdened and laid waste'; "symptoms of sickness"; "groans in travail" (Rom 8:22); "we ourselves are dust of the earth" (cf Gen 2:7)
75	religious	"usurping the place of God"; "to trample his creation underfoot"; "the best way to restore men and women"; "to speak once more of the figure of a Father"
24	scientific	
32	scientific	"resources are also being plundered", "because of short-sighted approaches"

Annex 5: Rhetoric analysis

Ethos	Pathos	Logos
p2: We have come to see ourselves as her lords and masters, entitled to plunder her at will.	p2: The sister now cries out to us because of the harm we have inflicted on her...	p2:...by our irresponsible use and abuse of the goods
p2: The sister now cries out to us because of the harm we have inflicted on her by our irresponsible use and abuse of the goods with which God has endowed her.	p2: The violence present in our hearts, wounded by sin, is also reflected in the symptoms of sickness evident in the soil, in the water, in the air and in all forms of life.	p2: ...evident in the soil, in the water, in the air and in all forms of life.
p2: We have forgotten that we ourselves are dust of the earth: our very bodies are made up of her elements,…		p2: …; our very bodies are made up of her elements, we breathe her air and we receive life and refreshment from her waters.
p75: A spirituality which forgets god as all-powerful and Creator is not acceptable.		
p75: That is how we end up worshipping earthly powers, or ourselves usurping the place of god, even to the point of claiming an unlimited right to trample his creation underfoot.		
p75: The best way to restore men and women to their rightful place, putting an end to their claim to absolute dominion over the earth, is to speak once more of the figure of a Father who creates and who alone owns the world.		
p75: Otherwise, human beings will always try to impose their own laws and interests on reality.		
	p32: The earth's resources are also being plundered because of short-sighted approaches to	p32: The loss of species which may constitute extremely important resources in the

	the economy, commerce and production.	future, not only for food but also for curing disease and other uses.
		p32: Different species contain genes which could be key resources in years ahead for meeting human needs and regulating environmental problems.
		p24: warming has effects on the carbon cycle.
		p24: It creates a vicious circle which aggravates the situation even more, affecting the availability of essential resources like drinking water, energy and agricultural production in warmer regions, and leading to the extinction of part of the planet's biodiversity.
		p24: The melting in the polar ice caps and in high altitude plains can lead to the dangerous release of methane gas, while the decomposition of frozen organic material can further increase the emission of carbon dioxide.
		p24: Things are made worse by the loss of tropical forests which would otherwise help to mitigate climate change.
		p24: Carbon dioxide pollution increases the acidification of the oceans and compromises the marine food chain.
		P24: If present trends continue, this century may well witness extraordinary climate change and unprecedented destruction of ecosystems, with serious consequences for all of us.

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		p24: a rise in the sea level, for example, can create extremely serious situations, if we consider that a quarter of the world's population lives on the coast or nearby, and that the majority of our megacities are situated in coastal areas.

Annex 6: Synthesis table

	Claim	Data	Warrant	Rebuttal
2	Humans are not using resources in a sustainable way. The destruction of the planet has reached a level, which causes serious harm and suffering.	p2: The sister now cries out to us because of the harm we have inflicted on her by our irresponsible use and abuse of the goods with which God has endowed her. p2: The violence present in our hearts, wounded by sin, is also reflected in the symptoms of sickness evident in the soil, in the water, in the air and in all forms of life. p2: This is why the earth herself, burdened and laid waste, is among the most abandoned and maltreated of our poor, she "groans in travail".	Several reports of leading institutions and scientist verify this, as for example the IPCC report.	Scientific research shows contradictory results.
2	Humans claim a superior and dominating position over nature and this is morally wrong.	p2: We have come to see ourselves as her lords and masters, entitled to plunder her at will. p2: We have forgotten that we ourselves are dust of the earth: our very bodies are made up of her elements, we breathe her air and we receive life and refreshment from her waters.	Comparison of attitude towards of Western culture with the attitude of indigenous people towards nature, shows alternatives for example.	If it is wrong, is a moral/philosophical question, which could be steered by certain groups with authority in those topics.
75	Humans have lost Christian values and claiming God's position.	p75: A spirituality which forgets god as all-powerful and Creator is not acceptable. p75: That is how we end up worshipping earthly powers, or ourselves usurping the place of god, even to the point of claiming an unlimited right to trample his creation underfoot.	Dominance in development discourse is still economic growth.	Global production and consumption patterns are independent from individual value systems.

75	That needs to be corrected.	p75: The best way to restore men and women to their rightful place, putting an end to their claim to absolute dominion over the earth, is to speak once more of the figure of a Father who creates and who alone owns the world.	The only way to reverse the trend of environmental destruction lies in the turn of values.	
75	Christian values give guidance and discipline human nature.	p75: Otherwise, human beings will always try to impose their own laws and interests on reality.		Changing behavior is a question of knowledge, not values. Or there are other religions and ideologies, who can give guidance in this this.
32	Human behavior is driven by short-term thinking in favor of capitalism.	p32: The earth's resources are also being plundered because of short-sighted approaches to the economy, commerce and production.	See 'the great acceleration' charts	Technology is the solution and will replace natural ecosystem services in an adequate way.
32	The consequences of the loss of biodiversity are not foreseeable and can become a threat to humanity.	p32: The loss of forests and woodlands entails the loss of species which may constitute extremely important resources in the future, not only for food but also for curing disease and other uses. p32: Different species contain genes which could be key resources in years ahead for meeting human needs and regulating environmental problems.	The complexity of ecosystems allows only prognosis.	Humans are in control of the consequences of loss of biodiversity. The loss of biodiversity will not have any impact.

24	The effects and impacts of global warming are interlinked with each other and therefore reinforce each other.	p24: Warming has effects on the carbon cycle. p24: It creates a vicious circle which aggravates the situation even more, affecting the availability of essential resources like drinking water, energy and agricultural production in warmer regions, and leading to the extinction of part of the planet's biodiversity. p24: The melting in the polar ice caps and in high altitude plains can lead to the dangerous release of methane gas, while the decomposition of frozen organic material can further increase the emission of carbon dioxide. p24: Things are made worse by the loss of tropical forests which would otherwise help to mitigate climate change. p24: Carbon dioxide pollution increases the acidification of the oceans and compromises the marine food chain.	A vast amount of research is done to understand, the causes and impacts of climate change	There is no causality of impacts.
24		P24: If present trends continue, this century may well witness extraordinary climate change and unprecedented destruction of ecosystems, with serious consequences for all of us. p24: a rise in the sea level, for example, can create extremely serious situations, if we consider that a quarter of the world's population lives on the coast or nearby, and that the majority of our megacities are situated in coastal areas.	Awareness of this is low and to rise it, is one purpose of Laudato Si.	Global warming might affect some, but not all.

Popular Culture: Tunes and Lyrics for Uganda's development.
Resty Kyomukama, SJP. Uganda.

Abstract

The hegemonic nature of development in the past decades has been majorly driven by the elites of the western world; setting rules, defining the Third world and what it should do to improve its status and perhaps qualify for First world status (Escobar 1992: 411). This discourse operated on professionalising and institutionalising the development process (Escobar 2007) which made development issues placed in some hands of people and not the hands of who development was intended for. These efforts however, have not yielded much but rather increased inequality, poverty and made the third world more underdeveloped than it was (Escobar 1992: 412). Therefore, "this epoch is coming to an end. The time is ripe to write its obituary" (Sachs 2010: xv) such that we embrace diverse narratives and knowledges that can cartel the local and the global, traditional and modern cultures to create a pluralistic approach that would give room to scientific knowledge and local knowledges (Escobar 1992) like Pop-Music from the global south. This way, the local knowledges can use a platform more accessible to them to speak to power, be heard, join power and take part in their own development.

Introduction

Popular culture involves different arts like sports, social-media, games, sports among others. However, this essay discusses *Popular Music* towards development and social change as a space for participation by Uganda's ordinary masses that often are rarely reached in academics and elite languages in the process of development and reflection of society issues. "Music reflects the lives and imagination of its performers, audiences and the societies to which it belongs" (Kitiarsa 2006: 37). ***Choice*** for this Concept follows Huijsmans' interesting Lecture which further equipped my passion to extend and understand the tools, spaces and platforms used by the ordinary masses to engage in the process of development and make themselves heard for a desired change. Interestingly, "Popular understanding can have a unique impact on shaping agendas and priorities" (Lewis et al 2014: 3). This essay discusses Popular Music combining both folk and modern elements, after-all "radical breaks would suffer from being unfamiliar and unrooted, meaning they would struggle to find a welcome or even a

comprehending audience" (Fiske 2010: xlvii) so this creates an alternative narrative in contribution to development processes that prioritizes local knowleges.

Connotation and History of Popular Culture

According to the English Oxford dictionary, the word popular comes from a Latin word Popularis, from populus "people". It is meant for the general population, suited to the taste and understanding rather than specialists/intellectuals/elites. Culture is a way that people are grouped together based on their shared behaviour. "Culture is the constant process of producing meanings of and from our social experience and such meanings necessarily produce a social identity for the people involved" (Fiske 2010: xxx).

Popular culture intends to represent the common and everyday experiences of the people. "Popular culture is a vehicle for generating and communicating meanings and messages that influence how individuals craft their identities, interact with others, and understand social issues. It can also promote conformity and solidarity, while at the same time stimulating social change" (Maratea & Monahan 2016: 2). Popular culture is un imposed, should be from the people to the people. "…it finds the vigor and vitality of the people evidence both of the possibility of social change and of motivation to drive it" (Fiske 2010: 18).

The concept "Popular culture" was first notably used in 18th century and has since been a part of making development (Mukerji and Schudson 1986; 52). During the 1950/60s, Popular culture became of much interest in the humanities and the social sciences. Some scholars have had an opinion for its role towards mobilizing political action (ibid: 47-48). However, there have been also contestation by Marxist Frankfurt scholars that it encourages consumerism and capitalism because it is produced for mass consumption for profit purposes(ibid). This was then refuted by Gans, 1974 as cited by (Mukerji and Schudson 1986 54-56) that the Marxist Frankurt scholars were empirically false, citing the example that Americans were influenced by their own local culture rather than mass culture. Pop-music was used in the development epoch, therefore, if it has been a part in the Making, it can also be in the Unmaking and Remaking of development.

"Hybridizing" music and creating a "pluriverse" development process in Uganda

Ugandan Popular music(ians) uses and merges both the local and modern beats crafting it with social context which makes it catchy and popular. These songs have been marrying modern elements like guitars, pionos, vocals etc and traditional elements like drums and harps; forming an Afro-Beat style of popular music that suits the taste of the common masses hence have been the mass' favourites due to their "pure entertainment featuring concert-style performances" (Kitiarsa 2006: 34). Uganda Pop-music has redefined the relationship between tradition and modernity. What it has now is the "Hybrid of Modernity" (Sant Cassia 2000:297 as cited in Kitiarsa 2006: 54) else the audience won't appreciate it and the artist won't be marketable (Kitiarsa 2006: 55).

In common about these popular musicians, is that they were not born in rich or elite families but have used music to be very instrumental in society. Even though they were not in political positions or in elite/academic spaces, they communicate to those in power about the bad governance eating-up the country. "They have gone further in crafting what could be called an alternative political ecology, based on notions of sustainability, autonomy, diversity and alternative economies that do not conform to the mainstream discourse of development" (Escobar 2007: 19). This creates a pluriverse that contrasts a One-World World assumption that the elites and high culture people are the ones to hegemonically lead the development process (Escobar 2016).

Sonic Politics against bad governance, corruption and social injustices in Uganda

The current government has been in power since 1986, following a 5yrs guerrilla war that overthrew dictatorial regimes of Amin and Obote II (Mwenda 2007). In the past years, this government has mismanaged the Human Rights of its masses through unfair elections, corruption, high unemployment, impunity, nepotism, land grabbing, political arrests and intimidating the press among others (UHRC Report 2017).

Some local musicians vocal against these actions for a change and made people's favourite hits critiquing the non-democratic and corrupt government for example; *Alipoota* by Mathias Walukagga - listing all Ugandans that have been murdered under the current government and he demands Police reports for all those murders whose investigations have not

yielded justice[11]. *Tuli ku bunkenke*- mentioning the daily struggles and injustices people go through in the country[12], *Afrika(Uganda)*- the country is being partitioned and traded without imminent support [13]and *Ensi Yaffe*- against the corrupt courts of law, land grabbing by government officials[14] and *Bizzeemu*- a song directed to the president that although he fought dictatorship against Amin and Obote II, his regime is not any different[15]. There are also other popular songs that have contributed to health causes for-example; *Kadingo*- a song released during the Chorela outbreak where Bobi wine educates people on good hygiene practices[16], *Alone and Frightened* by Philly Lutaaya – became an HIV/AIDS anthem from 80s to-date creating awareness and educating against stigma[17]. *Buvunanyizibwabwo* and *No Mother should die/Everyone*- songs by all stars encouraging agency against Malaria, calling upon the government to improve health services, condemning maternal and infant mortality in the country .[18, 19]

Kyagulanyi Ssentamu (aka Bobi Wine) is currently the most popular musician due to his style of music which he calls "Edutainment" for being educative/informative and entertaining. This did not only win him several Music wards but also won hearts of the masses for conveying through music their oppression by the government which led to his election as Member of Parliament, 2017-2021 Kyadondo East constituency (Olewe 2018). This would enable him present to the parliament what he calls in his songs, the views of the common people, the poor people and ghetto people. Some of his Political songs include; *Ghetto*- released in 2005 cautioning political leaders to respect the voters especially the poor because they are the most affected by privatization of public schools, and redevelopment plans that do not give alternatives to the affected citizens[20]. In *Time Bomb*- he condemned the corrupt political leaders, embezzlement of public funds, poor health services, inflation, tribalism in government jobs, and unemployment[21]. *Uganda zukuka*– wake up Uganda – telling voters to not sell their peace with cheap handouts from Politicians[22]. *Dembe*(Peace)- was his first song as Member of

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[11] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YqCGMWCpsoQ
[12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhumaRiWGnI
[13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wB31kvKG5Ms
[14] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-is0UZ_eBAA
[15] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t-sZC3uoQwM
[16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zMLWl-9APRI
[17] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXoN5i0rv9Q
[18] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p-QOaZDp2dw
[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LvXwDl4qZy4
[20] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V6G9DfpKV_s
[21] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e5EjmTWRFrE
[22] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwksThBUV_Y

Parliament. In this song he critiques the dictatorship of the current government and opposed amending of the Uganda Constitution to lift the presidential age limit [23].

On 31st December 2013, the Newvision, one of Uganda's leading media houses had an interview with Bobi wine about his political songs especially one that he released in 2012 titled *Tugambire ku Jeniffer* in which he said was sending a message to Ms. Jeniffer Musisi – the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) executive director and her team to be considerate and respectful of the poor people's plight in the operation of KCCA to make the city clean. In the song, Wine was calling upon KCCA to engage people in the process of their development rather than torturing them[24]. "Developing the city is supposed to be a collective responsibility, not a one-man-show because if you try to push others, then most times what you get is resistance" – Bobi wine. The release of this song was following the brutal arrests and raids of street vendors in the government's bid to create a clean city without providing alternative work-areas. These raids involved confiscation of street vendors' items, arrests and brutal beatings. The recent of Bobi Wine's songs; *Freedom*- Sending a message to the government to not change the constitution and asking for freedom, development and peaceful power transition[25].

Backlash from Government to critical music

Although these songs are very much enjoyed by the masses and portray what the masses would wish to be prioritised in development programs and policy making in the country, the government does not welcome such critical information and some of these songs have been prohibited from airing and musicians imprisoned on allegations of misleading masses and enticing violence following critiquing the 32yrs old government and its bad governance (UHRC Report 2017). In some cases, the government has responded with improvement in service to some hospitals and infrastructure (ibid).

Gendered culture?

Where society/existing social structures decide, women have not found equality. In the Music industry, women have been objectified either by society or by their need to play in accordance to society's expectations to keep relevant. The most popular of Ugandan musicians are male

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[23] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7J7b_a2EczE
[24] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LftbwqneJ2w
[25] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8g0W9CIY5iM

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and the few females find it very challenging in such a male dominated industry to capture as great popularity from an Androcentric mass. The production of music does not also happen easily especially due to the social structures they originate – mainly slums and poor backgrounds that they are un-able to finance their music and when they reach out for help, some people ask for sexual favours (Ainomugisha 2014).

These backlashes explain the fact that music could be "deeply contradictory in societies where power is un equally distributed along axes of class, gender, race and the other categories that we use to make sense of our social differences. According to (Ballantine 1984:5 as cited in Kitiarsa 2006: 37) "Social structures crystallize in musical structure; that in various ways and with varying degrees of critical awareness, the musical microcosm replicates the social macrocosm". "Popular culture is the culture of the subordinated and disempowered and thus always bears within it signs of power relations, traces of the forces of domination and subordination that are central to our social system and therefore to our social experience." (Fiske 2010: 4).

The other challenging aspect of popular culture is the commercial or capitalist force around it. It is surely driven by profit motives (Fiske 2010). This became evident in 2015 when the President paid some popular musicians to craft a song- *Tubonga naawe*[26] meaning we are-with/endorse you(president) for his 2016 election campaigns. However, upon people boycotting performances of those musicians and defaming them because of conveying a message contrary to the mass', musicians said that they did it to make money (Kaggwa and Baranga 2015).

Conclusion

The essay gives a brief history of pop-culture, its role, contestation and specifically discussing popular music in Uganda as an alternative of presenting development issues for change incorporating the common masses that rarely have space for participation. The essay has cited some Ugandan musicians and the popular songs that have played a role in lobbying for social change and development. Critically, the essay looks at gender, pop-culture's capitalistic drive and the government's negative response to critical music. Optimistically, for what Escobar calls a Pluriverse, popular music makes a great contribution because it stands out as an

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[26] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4zj5-xSNRk0

alternative giving opportunity for participatory and inclusive development for the common masses in Uganda. Popular culture combines the market, the state and civil society. It tells about the current and it evolves quickly; matching the society context.

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Youth 4 Peace Social Intervention Project Design.
Mohamed Abdiaziz Muse, GDP, Somalia.

Executive Summary

Youth for Peace project (Y4P) is designed to give hope to thousands of unemployed youth. These youths are at risk of a lot of illegal activities which could contribute to Somalia's instability and insecurity.

Y4P project is aimed to reduce unemployment among young Somali youth. It will provide alternative livelihoods and life skills. Youths are believed to be backbone of Somalia's stabilisation process and that's one of the main reasons why New Horizon Foundation Somalia is implementing Y4P project.

The project has two main components. First component is vocational trainings and life skills. Under this component of Y4P project life skills will be provided to the youth. After their trainings youth are placed in internship to gain more industry experience and finally helped to find jobs. The second component of the project involves improving infrastructures which were heavily damaged by civil wars. Youths are peace agents of Somalia.

Y4P project will create both long and short term jobs to world's most vulnerable youths in Mogadishu Somalia. Y4P project will have greater impact on Socio-economic status of youths in both urban and rural areas of Somalia. In total 22,000 youths will get employment during and after the project.

Objectives

Y4P project has following objectives:

a. Alleviating poverty and economic hardships in Somalia.
b. Freeing youths from tyranny of unemployment.
c. Creating alternative and sustainable livelihoods to Somali youth.

Outline of the Project

This project design contains 13 parts including this outline. They are executive summary, objectives, background of the problem, analysing the problem, Y4P project, project design and framework, project components, Stakeholders analysis, Risk and mitigation analysis, Monitoring, Evaluation and reporting, lifespan & sustainability of the project, annexes and references.

Background of the problem

Somalia has experienced decades of civil war and political instability. This has resulted total destruction of government institutions. Since late 1980s there was not political instability. In 1990 civil war broke out and costed the lives of millions of population in the country. Somalia has big number of youth population. 70% of the population are under the age of 30. Youth was one of the society members which conflict has negatively affected. Destruction of youth schools and vocational training centres are among the negative impact of political instability on the youth.

Youth unemployment is due to a number of different factors. Starting with country's social strata system which major clans get most of the benefits and well paid jobs, other minor members of the community is left out to suffer. Another main driver could be unregulated and poor quality education. Since the outbreak of the civil war there was a large number of private education sectors in the country. These un-regulated private institutions produce uncompetitive graduates which lack the necessary skills for the market. These graduates end up in one of the many illegal activities which unemployed youths involve as source of alternative livelihoods.

Situational Analysis of the Problem

The country has experienced decades of civil war which resulted weakened and absence of institutions. Institutions are important structures which make up an important part of any society's life (Hodgson, 2006: 2). Institutions remain important structure. They are blue print to developmental path. Somali institutions were weakened by the civil war, most of them are destroyed. Ministry of youth empowerment and employment is one of the institutions which was heavily damaged by the war. Since 1990 Somali institutions were absent from service

delivery. This has resulted a number of institutions related challenges including youth unemployment.

Acemoglue and Robbinson have also shed light on importance of institutions for any development and prosperous process. In their book "Why Nations Fail?" they argue that its institutions which makes different countries to experience different developmental paths. (Acemoglu, Robinson A. 2014).

Institutions are embedded into the social structure. Every social problem is embedded into the society. The problem of youth unemployment is embedded into the society. As youth are part of the society, their problem also becomes embedded into the wider society. Youth unemployment affects not only the youth themselves but also other members of the society. Polanyi argues that individuals can't be dis-embedded from politics or economy. (Polanyi, 1957). The problem of youth unemployment may require a collective activities as individuals and collective activities remain to be intertwined (Polanyi, 1957: 258).

As youth constitute to majority of Somali population they face lots of challenges including youth unemployment. Youth can play an important part in country's road to stabilisation and development. Their involvement in the transformation process is very important and emphasised by different literatures and policy documents. (UNSOM 2017, MoYS 2018 , WB 2018 FAO 2018). Thus youth employment is crucial step towards realising Somalia's peace, prosperity and development process.

Unemployed youth end up illegal activities which can harm both themselves and that of other members of the society. For instance, youth join groups such gang, radical and pirates. Unemployed youth also took long and risk journey to Europe through Sudan, Libya to Italy.

Youth unemployment is one of the many problems which Somalia society faces, therefore it requires special consideration. This problem can't be also dis-embedded from other social structures. It's part of Somali social structure. Addressing this problem is saving 70% of Somali population. Youths are backbone to any milestone which Somalia tries to achieve. International development partners of Somalia also need to consider youth employment and empowerment policies and programmes for a number of reasons. Firstly, by empowering youth they can be peace agents. They can actively involve in the process of stabilisation in the country. A lot of money is spent on stabilisation process without including youth or considering

their potential as peace rebels. Secondly, funding or implementing youth empowerment and employment projects like this can save the country's majority from illegal activities like joining radical groups like Al shabab. Thirdly, increased youth empowering and employment projects can bring long lasting peace to the country. These unemployed youth will be less threat to the security of the country, that of the region as well as global level.

Youth for Peace Project (Y4P)

Youth for Peace project (Y4P) is a 33-month long project aimed at reducing youth unemployment in Somalia. Y4P project is tool for creating sustainable livelihoods and income source for more than 20,000 youths in Somalia. It's believed that youths can be peace agents. They can drive Somalia out of its current situation.

Y4P project has different components aimed at improving the livelihood situation of the target youth population. The project is going to focus Mogadishu, Ceelasha Biayaha and Baraawe. These three locations have most unemployed youth in the country. This part of the country also suffers from a lot of insecurity and poor livelihoods due to government's limited interventions and service delivery.

Y4P project is finding solution to youth unemployment in Somalia. The project has strategic goals and objective. Y4P project is based on United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). At New Horizon Foundation Somalia, we believe realisation of SDGs and their important to human sustainability and development. This project is more specially focusing on Sustainable Development Goals 1(No Poverty), 2(Zero Hunger), 8(Decent work and growth), 9(Industry, innovation and infrastructure) and 16(Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) (UNSDG, 2015). By providing vocational trainings, life skills as well as repairing and re-construction of infrastructure we target to be part of achieving above mentioned SDGs implementation. In this project 80% of youth unemployment in project target locations will be reduced.

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Project Design and Result Framework

Youth for Peace Project Somalia					
Outcome 1	Improving economic and income situations of the society through vocational trainings and life skills provided to 12,000 youths				
Outcome indicator	Geographical Area	Baseline Data	Final Targets	Means of Verification	Responsible
Unemployment rate among Youth	Somalia	25%	23%	National Data/ Organisational Baseline data	New Horizon Foundation
Sub-outcome 1: Improved long-term employability and life skills					
Sub- Outcome 1 Indicator	Geographical Area	Baseline Data	Final Targets	Means of Verification	Responsible
Increased number of Intervention areas	Mogadishu	2 (Water, Cookery)	7 (Entrepreneurship, Fashion Design, Electricity, Plumping, IT and Computer skills, Mechanics, Fishery	Final reports from Monitoring and Evaluation of VTECs	New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government

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					New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government
Increased number of long term jobs	Mogadishu	0	12000	Study follow up	New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government
Output 1.1. Increased capacity of Vocational Training Centres in Mogadishu city to carry out key intervention areas					
Immediate Result Indicators	Geographical Area	Baseline Data	Final Targets	Means of Verification	Responsible
Increasing the number of private and public VTECs	Mogadishu	3	15	VTECs Tracer	New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government

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Number of key Intervention areas and value chain analysed	Mogadishu	2	7	VTECs Tracer	New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government
Number of key interventions approved/implemented	Mogadishu	0	7	KEA Tracer	New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government
Output 1.2 Increased intervention areas with better employability					

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Immediate Result Indicators	Geographical Area	Baseline Data	Final Targets	Means of Verification	Responsible
Number of vocational skills/Market employability tools	Mogadishu	0	12000 Youths will be gaining life skills and other market entering tools for long term employability	KIAE Tracer	New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government
Outcome 2	Improving rural youths job creation, repairing and reconstructing of infrastructures in the rural area of Mogadishu				
Outcome indicator	Geographical Area	Baseline Data	Final Targets	Means of Verification	Responsible
Number of Infrastructures repaired	Mogadishu, Ceelasha Biyaha, Baraawe	2			
Number of Rural jobs available	Mogadishu, Ceelasha Biyaha, Baraawe	0	10000	IIIL Tracer	New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government

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Sub Outcome 2: Improved infrastructure with intensive labour					
Sub- Outcome 2 Indicator	Geographical Area	Baseline Data	Final Targets	Means of Verification	Responsible
Number of Short-term rural jobs	Mogadishu	0	10000	IIIL Tracer	New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government

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Number of Infrastructures repaired	Mogadishu	0	30	IIIL Tracer	New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government
Output 2.1 Number of Rural youth employed in infrastructure reconstruction component of the project					
Immediate Result Indicators	Geographical Area	Baseline Data	Final Targets	Means of Verification	Responsible
Number of rural youth getting employed	Mogadishu, Ceelasha Biyaha, Baraawe	0	10000	IIIL Tracer	New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government

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Output 2.2 Number Of infrastructures (roads, water catchment canals and community centres) reconstructed or repaired					
Immediate Result Indicators	Geographical Area	Baseline Data	Final Targets	Means of Verification	Responsible
Number of roads reconstructed	Mogadishu, Ceelasha Biyaha, Baraawe	2	30	IIIL Tracer	New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government
Number of Water catchment repaired	Mogadishu, Ceelasha Biyaha, Baraawe	0	50	IIIL Tracer	New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, UNDP, Banadir Local Government

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| Number of community centres including Mother and Child Health Care Centres reconstructed/repaired | Mogadishu, Ceelasha Biyaha, Baraawe | o | 75 | IIIL Tracer | New Horizon Foundation, Federal Government of Somalia, WHO, Banadir Local Government |

Table 1: Project Design and Results Framework, Source: Authors

Project Components

Youth for Peace (Y4P) project has different components but all aimed at one project goal which is reducing youth unemployment by creating 22,000 jobs including both short and long term ones. The project has three components namely; vocational trainings provision, internship/job placement for skilled youths, infrastructure reconstruction and repairing. All these three different components of the project are inter-connected and require to be followed step by step to achieve project's main goal.

Component I Vocational Trainings and Skills

First component of the project is going to be provision of vocational trainings to unemployed youth from Mogadishu city. These youths will be mobilised and registered through Mogadishu city municipality. During registration youths will be evaluated on the bases of selection criteria (See Annex). Target youth age group is 18-29. These youths are most vulnerable to radicalisation and insecurity activities in the country generally and Mogadishu more specifically.

In this phase unemployed youths will get vocational trainings based on two main criteria (their interest to enrol specific training modules or previous relevant training). Vocational training will be provided by Vocational Training Education Centres (VTECs) in Mogadishu. Those VTECs is going to be selected based on their experience and capacity to provide trainings (for VTECs Assessment see Annex).

Each training module is scheduled to run for 6 months. These 6 months include both in class learning and practical components. In total there are 7 different training modules available for these 6 months. They are entrepreneurship skills, fashion & clothes designing, electricity, plumping, IT & computer skills, mechanics and fishery.

After finishing training each training module, students are going to be placed in one of the relevant host organization for internship. These internships could last from 2 weeks to 3 weeks maximum. In total 12,000 students are going to have life skills at the end of this component of the project.

Component II Improving Infrastructure/ Public goods in Mogadishu

Second component of the project is aimed to improve infrastructure and other public goods in Mogadishu and surrounding rural areas. These areas are conflict-borne. Most of the public goods and infrastructures are destroyed by the conflict in the last two decades. Government's involvement was limited recently due to limited capacity and funding. Infrastructures are important part of any development process. Improving them will enable Somalia's development path to succeed.

This component of the project will include repairing and reconstruction of infrastructure (roads, water catchments areas and Mother and Child Health Care centres) in three different location in Mogadishu. The process will involve short-term job creation for 10,000 rural youths. These youths have limited alternative livelihoods. This makes this to be easy prey for Alshabab. Most of them join terrorist groups to get money to support their livelihoods and that of their families. Creating employment opportunities is going to shape their lives. It is also going to save them from involving insecurity activities. This component of the project runs from 20th to 28th month of the project lifetime.

Stakeholder Analysis

Y4P project has different stakeholders including, public, private, international development partners and International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs). Those different stakeholders are going to have different roles and responsibilities. Those stakeholders mapping was based on impact, influence and interest assessment of different stakeholders involving Y4P project. Cost-Benefit Analysis was used to map those stakeholders and their influence on the project.

Stakeholders Analysis Matrix below shows different stakeholders, their interest, impact and influence. The matrix also shows risks and assumptions associated with each stakeholder and how this is going to be responded.

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Stakeholder Analysis Matrix

PROJECT NAME								Youth for Peace Project (Y4P)	
Stakeholder	**Interest**	**Impact**			**Influence**			**Assumptions/Risks**	**Response Mechanism**
		L	M	H	L	M	H	*What level of involvement is expected?*	*Known or potential issues*
		0	**+**	**++**	**0**	**+**	**++**		
Unemployed Youth in Mogadishu	*Training and Skills*			++		+		*Gaining necessary and relevant skills for better livelihoods*	*Failure to attend trainings may cause not getting the awards at the end of the project*
Mayor of Banadir Region	*Skilled youth which could contribute to security and development of Mogadishu*			++			++	*To encourage Youths to attend VTECs, Also to participate VTECs mapping and allocation of youths in VTECs*	
Ministry of Youth and Sports	*Reduction of youth involving gang/radical groups*		+			+		*Provide in kind contribution of 10% of the annual budget to support sustainability of the VTECs*	

Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources	*Getting skilled youth(s) to help them increase their capacity*							*Host Fishery Graduates/ Priorities to employ this specific group in the ministry*	*Failure can lead to alternative allocation of interns in relevant organisation.*
Ministry of water and energy	*Skilled youth with water and energy policy skills*			++		+		*Host Electricity module interns/ Employing them on bases funds availability*	*Placing interns in other relevant host organisation/institutions*
UNDP	*support realisation of SDG 1,2, 8,9 10, 16 by funding youth for Peace Project*			++		+		*To provide necessary funds/ Expertise wherever necessary*	
Mogadishu VTEC	*To make VTECs available and accessible by trainers*			++		+		*Engage and actively support other actors in the process of trainings/ Help implementing agency with placing interns in relevant host organisation/institutions*	
TOTALS		0	1	5	0	5	1		

Table 2: Stakeholder Analysis Matrix, Source Authors, L (0), =Low M (+) = Medium, H (++) = High.

Risks and Mitigation Measures

Although Y4P project has very limited risks, mentioning them is necessary. Table below highlights possible risks, mitigation mechanism and measures.

Youth for Peace Project Risk Assessment Matrix						
No	Risk	Risk Severity	Risk Likelihood	Risk Level	Acceptability?	Response Mechanism
1	Less Interest of youths attending internships/ Job placement	Tolerable	Probable	Low	Yes	Provide little incentives to cover basic services like bus ticket and lunch during the internship
2	Land mines and Insecurity while reconstructing Roads	Unacceptable	Possible	Medium	No	Checking and de-mining of land mines with help from National Demining Groups
3	Limited funding received from UNDP	Tolerable	Probable	Medium	No	Seek alternative funding sources/ Encourage government institutions to subsidise cost of the project partially
4	Limited Host organisation/ Business during the internship(s)	Tolerable	Possible	Low	Yes	Mobilise business owners/ Institutional directors to encourage youth employment and empowerment in the country
5	Ministries lacking capacity to host large number of interns	Intolerable	Possible	Low	No	Provide technical support to relevant Ministries to encourage them hosting interns (Carrot mechanism)

| 6 | Less accountability and mistrust among youths and their host organisation | Tolerable | Improbable | Medium | Yes | Provide In-job training in case it happens. |

Table 3:   Risk assessment and mitigation mechanism, Source: Authors

Monitoring, Evaluation Reporting and Learning of the Project

The project will be monitoring throughout its lifespan. Monitoring tools will be developed for different project components. Tools for monitoring will include:

a. Improving Infrastructure Intensive labour Tracer (IIIL Tracer) – Tool for monitoring rural youth employability and involvement in the second component of the project. This tool is going to be used to monitor attendance and effectiveness of rural youth and their participation in infrastructure improvement.

b. Vocational Training and Education Centres Tracer (VTECs Tracer) for VTECs monitoring and youth's participation in the trainings and internships.

c. Key Interventions and Employability Tracer (KIAE Tracer) - this tool is for assessing key intervention tools during the project. Employability of each intervention area will be recorded here aimed improvement of key intervention areas in the future.

d. Mid-Term Project Evaluation- Tools including above mentioned ones to assess the impact and effectiveness of the project.

e. End line survey- for evaluating effectiveness and learning outcomes of the project.

Reporting and lessons learnt as well as other outcomes will be shared with relevant stakeholders. Donors and other funding agencies is going to be reported quarterly about project progress and results. UNDP monitoring, reporting, evaluation and learning guidelines and procedures is also going to be considered as donor tools for monitoring and evaluation.

Lifespan and sustainability of the project

Youth for Peace (Y4P) project is going to have long term impact and effect to unemployed youth in Somalia. Project's sustainability is going to be longer than any of its kind. Most of youth employment polices used to be top-down approach where donors came up with their policies but Y4P project is going to be different for a number of reasons.

Firstly, Y4P project is Somali-led and Somali owned initiative. It's bottom-up approach where local initiative with intensive local experience has designed the policy. Secondly, Y4P project carried out local needs assessment to identify key intervention areas. Project support team had privilege to meet with local unemployed youth for interview and focus group discussions during needs assessment phase of the project development. Thirdly, Project is local based, where sources of financing including in-kind contribution from the government and community members. Y4P is sustainability driven project where beneficiaries have shown their strong interest to support the project.

More than 10,000 unemployed and unskilled youths will be skilled during the project. These youths will be gaining life skills needed for long term alternative livelihoods. Skilled youths will have better chance to be employed locally and this is going to reduce youths involving illegal activities. Finally, Y4P project will enable youth to unlock their potential and be part of Somalia's development, stability and prosperity process.

Mohamed Muse, GDP, Somalia.
Youth 4 Peace Social Intervention Project Design.

Lifespan and Sustainability of the Project Y4P

Youth for Peace Project

Proposed Project Duration 30 Months, Target 14750 Job Creation for the Youth in Mogadishu

	Period Highlight:	1+ 2+3		Plan Duration	Duration	% Actual Start

ACTIVITY	PLAN START	PLAN DURATION	ACTUAL START	ACTUAL DURATION	PERCENT COMPLETE													1 0	1 1	1 2	1 3	1 4	1 5	1 6	1 7
Identifying/ Training government/civil society led vocational training trainers	1		2		100%																					
Mobilising Youth and equipping vocational training centres	4		4		100%																					
start of vocational training schemes	6		6		100%																					

Internship placement for trained youth	12		12		95%
Kick off second component of the project: Infrastructure improvement	13		13		100%
Arranging both financial and material needs for the employees (high school drop outs)	18		18		100%
Start of first repair of infrastructure (10 districts in Mogadishu)	20		20		100%
Start of second repair of infrastructure (8 districts in Mogadishu)	25		24		100%
Assessment and Evaluation of the project impact	28		28		85%

Table 4: Proposed Project plan Source: Author'

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Degrowth.
Deborah Omolo, SJP, Kenya.

Introduction

Degrowth is a concept that cannot and should not be described by one given set of parameters, not a single theory exists, and therefore, giving the term a solitary definition would be paradoxical. Suffice to say that it is an all-encompassing plenitude of radical critiques to growth (Kallis et al. 2015). According to Kothari et al. (2014), it is also a radical call to abolish economic growth as a social objective and a decolonization of the public debate on the parlance of economism. Simply put, it is a radical rift from the Eurocentric development hegemony that serves as the dominant global economic discourse. This essay will attempt to unpack Degrowth, its history, its development particularly as an alternative to sustainable development, as well as its shortcomings and its practical application.

Unpacking Degrowth and its History

Degrowth is a literal translation of the French word '*Decroissance*', meaning reduction. The term was launched by environmental activists in 2001, and it rapidly became "a slogan against economic growth" (Bernard et al. 2003, quoted in Demaria 2013). It first appeared in 1972 when it was proposed by political ecologist Andre Gorz who presented it as a desirable and alternative description of a societal path in a debate that was organized in Paris as a follow up to the *Limits to Growth*[27] report (Asara et al. 2015).

The debate was attended by philosophers Herbert Marcuse, Edgard Morian, ecologist Edward Goldsmith and President of the European Commission Sicco Masholtz. Andre Gorz used

> "the term to question the compatibility of the capitalist system with the 'degrowth of material production' and he underscored the importance of reducing consumption and promoting values like frugality, autonomy and conviviality" (Asara et al. 2015: 376).

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[27] Lecture Session 2101-18-19 Video: Degrowth, Julien-Francois Gerber, on the Meadows Report, 29:21, 8th December 2018, Aula B, ISS, The Hague, Erasmus University

According to Demaria et al., Decroissance, as presented by Gorz, appeared in publications several times thereafter, in 1973, 1977, and 1979 (Amar, Gorz and Georgescu-Rogen, respectively).

Following its 2001 debut in social movement protests in France in 2001 as *Decroissance*, and in Italy as *Decrescta,* Degrowth appeared again in Catalonia and Spain in 2006 as *Decreixemen*t and *Decrecimiento* respectively. It was featured in Silence Magazine's special issue in 2002 and again at UNESCO's Conference "*Unmake development, remake the world"* where 800 participants were in attendance (Demaria et al. 2013). As a missile word, Degrowth sparked and continues to ignite contentious debate (Kallis et.al 2015) and has become an interpretive frame where a plethora of critical radical ideas and political action converge (Demaria 2013). It gained more recognition and in 2003 it appeared again in the first international colloquium on sustainable degrowth that was organized in Lyon, which attracted participants from Italy, Switzerland and France.

Degrowth's Development and its Problematization of Sustainable Development

Degrowth had now earned its credible position internationally (D'Alisa et al. 2014, quoted in Asara et al. 2015), becoming a banner associated with social and environmental movements and etching its presence as a concept in academic and intellectual circles (Asara et al. 2015). Subsequently, no less than "five international academic conferences with civil society participation were held", in Paris 2008, Barcelona 2010, Venice & Montreal 2012 and Leipzig in 2014, this time with over 3000 participants. Budapest was to follow in 2016 (Asara et al. 2015). Degrowth was growing in significance and recognition, and it was gaining more impetus.

The theme central to degrowth, not only as a radical critique of the dominant development paradigm (Kallis et al. 2015), is the fact that it is squarely based on the rejection of the obsession with growth. Escobar and Sachs offered the first critiques of the universal, uniform application of the Western notion of growth and development in the 80s, for which, as we have seen by now, degrowth is a worthy critique of (Demaria et al. 2013). The 80s also signified the time that

sustainable development (SD) took center stage[28] in the development discourse (Du Pisani, 2006) "where economic growth, social welfare and environmental protection could be harmonized" (Asara et al. 2015). As an attempt to problematize this paradigm, degrowth was the radical paradigm that had to counter SD and its 'reincarnate paradigm' green economy (GE) (Asara et al. 2015). SD is defined as "the development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland Report, WCED 1987:43, quoted in Du Pisani 2006: 83).

The Sustainable development Goals that emanate from the SD framework are supposed to be universal agreement objectives that were set to end poverty, protect the planet and ensure peace, prosperity and a better life for all (Morton et al. 2017), but according to Hornborg (2009) quoted in Demaria (2013: 192) SD is a false consensus. To this end, Morton et al. contend that the danger of the framework is that the goals may be prioritized without an understanding of the positive interaction between them (Ibid). To this end, SD remains farfetched and unattainable via the hegemonic development agenda, with its neoliberal and Keynesian tenets of austerity and structural adjustment programs that seem to be causing more harm than good. Kothari asks a pertinent question to this end; who is sustainable development sustainable for? For Multinationals, perhaps? Indeed, for them it means sustainable profits, cheap labor and extractivism i.e. Elements that fully embrace development without limits (Kallis et al. 2015). Asara et al. Also portray SD as being questionable when alluding that it "does not question the anthropological, political, cultural and institutional premises of growth economics" (2015: 376). Now that we know SD is largely unsustainable, let us look at its reincarnate, GE.

Defined as[29] "one that results in improved human well-being and social equity while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities" (Fedrigo-Fazio 2012), GE suffers the same fate as SD. Development with these so-called environmental limits have proved to be mere rhetoric. Change can only be achieved with a radical paradigm like Degrowth because the earth's resources are finite. Continued growth is impossible, yet growth societies turn a blind eye to the environmental and social degradation caused by the unsustainability of the hegemonic

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[28] Lecture Session 2101-18-19 Video: Degrowth, Julien-Francois Gerber, on Discursive shifts of the 80s, 34:00 , 8th December 2018, Aula B, ISS, The Hague, Erasmus University
[29] Lecture Session 2101-18-19 Video: Degrowth, Julien-Francois Gerber, on Definition of Sustainable Development, 30:54, 8th December 2018, Aula B, ISS, The Hague, Erasmus University

economic system, this according to Serge Latourche, an ardent supporter of degrowth. He insists that degrowth should not be seen as a concrete project, but rather as a term or keyword and critique of the growth trajectory (Baykan 2007). It is worthy to note that SD, its goals and GE are more like key performance goals, as opposed to degrowth, which is a steadily growing culture gaining more supporters globally.

Degrowth's radical departure proposes a paradigm whereby society embraces sharing, simplicity, conviviality and care (Kothari et al. 2014). It brings to mind a way of life where all elements, living and non-living, are respected equally, cared for deeply and preserved honorably. It embraces an existence where society procreates a culture of respect for the environment, social justice for communities and conviviality and sharing among individuals. It denotes the ethos of preservation and sharing, that which is needed for a basic and enjoyable life, without the excesses of luxury, mass consumption and the obsession for more than is needed for a happy life. Degrowth proposes a paradigm whereby society, the environment and the ecosystem are in harmony and balance (Demaria et al. 2013).

Post Development: How People & Places are Remaking Development

As can be seen, Degrowth represents a culture that radically opposes growth that is pursued at all costs in the name of Capitalism, and where Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the dominant measure of growth. GDP does not measure welfare[30], neither does it measure environmental degradation, biodiversity loss or climate change etc. (Kallis et al. 2015), Whereas SD and GE rely on capitalism and GDP to end poverty, bring about equality and curb environmental degradation, Degrowth completely rejects this obsession with growth (Ibid) and is remaking development with alternatives to development.

As such, Degrowth takes many forms and frameworks because of its interpretive diagnosis that different social and environmental crises relate to economic growth or development in the first place. It serves as an open concept that embraces different initiatives related to reductionism (Demaria et al. 2013). Reductionist social movements can include anti-car, anti-advertising,

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[30] Lecture Slides and Lecture Session 2101-18-19: Degrowth, Julien-Francois Gerber, on GDP, 4th Slide, 8th December 2018, Aula B, ISS, The Hague, Erasmus University

pedestrian rights, and cyclist campaigns. In Cape Town, South Africa for example, local government has adopted anti-car campaigns where people are encouraged to form lift clubs and share car pooling resources. The municipality is promoting public transport as an alternative to driving and pedestrianizing roads in the city, thereby reducing the number of cars driven. It is creating more open spaces, communal areas, open parks and playgrounds, and introducing cycling lanes and promoting cycling campaigns. By-laws have been passed for use of alternative energy sources for heating water. Wine farmers are now turning to organic means of wine production. The Cape has been hit hard by water crises and a psyche of reductionism is clearly taking root, as a top down approach as well as a bottom up approach.

That being said; millions in the global south still need the impetus of growth for progress and development… "development is still an important word" according to Bariskar (Kallis et al. 2015). To this end however, she contends that development requires a different 'kind of growth'. Indeed, top down approaches and bottom up approaches such as the examples we see in Cape Town, as noble as they are, will require, with them a shift in the economic discourse paradigm for its initiatives to have massive impacts.

Bariskar, above, offers a subtle critique to degrowth, but in a way, degrowth does not claim to have all the answers. Rather, it is an inclusive framework that embraces processes that will ensure reductionism, while still providing development with limits, happiness without limits, respect for culture, preservation of the environment, conviviality and sharing. For the Cape, this is a good start nonetheless. Kothari (in Kallis et al. 2015) speaks of another practical example of reductionism in parts of rural and Urban India, where diversity, plurality, self-reliance for basic needs, co-operative solidarity, the commons (use of communal land, water, spaces), dignity of labor, equity and social justice, decision making access, nonviolence and respect for all life-forms, is taking place at grassroot level (Kallis et al. 2015). These degrowth initiatives are encouraging, coming both from community level (in India) and Provincial and local government level (in Cape Town).

Grassroots and local government levels aside, Sekulova et al., suggest how degrowth can be carried out at national government levels, by "regulating advertising, legal facilitation of work sharing, establishing non-tradable caps on the extraction of natural resources… leaving resources

underground, redirecting investment…strengthening social and ecological standards" (2013: 5). It is important to recognize that if degrowth comes from grassroots, local and macro levels, then it can indeed lead to a paradigm shift. But Baykan (2007), reports that the Degrowth Party, a political party in France, insists that "degrowth should be a bottom up process rather than a top-down change, stressing that the latter may lead to authoritarianism (2007: 515). Indeed, if degrowth as a top-down process is not carried out with its core intent "based on ecological integrity and social justice (Escobar 2015: 451), it may very well lead to authoritarianism and co-optation.

Over and above top down and bottom up approaches, Escobar proposes that it is also imperative that degrowth movements in the North and in the South hold mutually enriching dialogue(s) for effective political transformation in its vision (2015: 451). Importantly, degrowth therefore requires Global North-South post development coalition movements.

Conclusion

Globalized institutional arrangements at the moment congruously need this coalition in order to find a just institutional structure whereby our biophysical limits which have reached dangerous levels can harmoniously lead to equity and justice, crucial to the steady state of degrowth in the future (Klitgaard and Krall 2012). Within our somewhat vast disparities, we need to confront this reality. We need a profound change of the current economic discourse, and according to the two authors, one thing is for sure, the future will not have a globalized monopolistic financial system like capitalism. The sooner we realize this and start taking degrowth seriously, the better for all of humanity, our ecosystem, our environment and our planet.

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Litigation for Climate Change in the Netherlands: A case of legal mobilization of Human Rights at multiple levels in society

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Over the past years, concerns about the human impact on our earth system have risen all over the world. The earth temperature has already risen with 0.56 ˚C in comparison with the pre-industrial period, while it is known that a rise in temperature above 2 ˚C will cause dangerous and irreversible effects (Storm 2009: 1013; Pittock 2010: 15). Climate change will probably cause more frequent weather-related disasters, which will have a big impact on the rights of vulnerable groups (Peel & Osofsky 2017: 39). Climate change seems to be the new threat to the protection of human rights (Manou 2014: 238). Concerns about the effects of climate change and the slow response to these effects have also risen amongst Dutch citizens. In this essay, I want to examine how concerned Dutch citizens can be supported by strategic climate litigation by Dutch NGOs to be able to frame, claim and exercise their rights. I will do this by looking at the, in the meantime, famous Urgenda-case and the recently started climate case against Shell.

Introduction of the case

In November 2013 a climate case was started against the Dutch state by the Dutch NGO Urgenda ('klimaatzaak tegen', n.d.). Urgenda is a Dutch non-profit organization which expresses the urgency of taking action against climate change now. It organizes events to raise attention, proposes direct action plans and lobbies at the Dutch government for immediate change ('Missie en', n.d.). In the climate case, the organization went beyond strategies normally performed by non-governmental organizations (like investigation, advocacy, and reporting) to seek a way to force the government to take action (Cousins 2009: 156). In the case lawyer Roger Cox argued on behalf of Urgenda and 886 Dutch citizens that the Dutch government had a 'duty of care' against its current and future Dutch citizens and Dutch citizens living outside the Netherlands under article 3: 30329 and 3:305a30 of the Dutch Civil Code (Suryapratim & Woerdman 2016: 169; Peel & Osofsky 2017: 49). So, even though the case was not based completely on a rights-based argument, rights did play an important role in the argument of Cox. He argued that the inaction of the Dutch government violated the right to life and respect for home and family which are covered under the

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Peel & Osofsky 2017: 50). He argued that the link between Human Rights violation and climate change was recognized by various UN bodies and acknowledged in the Paris agreement (Peel & Osofsky 2017: 40). Cox argued that various scientific bodies (in particular the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)) stated that higher reduction levels are needed as those that the Dutch policies were working towards. In June 2015 the Dutch court ruled that the government should take more adequate actions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 25% in comparison to 1990 levels before 2020 (Peel & Osofsky 2017: 49). It stated that even though that Urgenda as a 'legal person' could not be a victim of human rights violations and that the violation of the rights of co-claimants was not proven enough, the presence of the Human Rights argument had helped to establish whether the Dutch government indeed failed its 'duty of care' and whether mitigation and adaptation would be enough (Peel & Osofsky 2017: 50). The court ruled, that this would not be the case and that the only way to sufficiently protect Human Rights is to reduce GHG emissions (Peel & Osofsky 2017: 51). The Dutch ministry of infrastructure and environment appealed the ruling on the basis of misinterpretation of the 'duty of care' and international law (Suryapratim & Woerdman 2016: 166). Yet, this appeal was also won by Urgenda in October 2018 and the ruling was even stronger based on the need to protect Human Rights (Van de Klundert: 2018). However, after losing the appeal the Dutch government appealed at the Supreme Court (the highest court of the Netherlands) ('Klimaatzaak tegen', n.d.). This process started at the 24th of May and the ruling is expected by the end of the year ('Klimaatzaak tegen', n.d.; 'Kabinet gaat': 2019). Even though it is possible to hold private parties accountable through the state, Urgenda did not use this strategy (Suryapratim & Woerdman 2016: 172). Recently, the Dutch NGO Milieudefensie started, together with six other organizations and 17.379 co-claimants, a case against Shell (Milieudefensie 2019: 1). The case will be argued by the same lawyer, Roger Cox, and the foundation of the argument is almost the same as within the Urgenda case (Milieudefensie 2019: 1-4). The goal is to force Shell to reduce its GHG emissions to zero emissions in 2050 (Milieudefensie 2019: 4).

Framing Climate Change as a Human rights issue

Over the past years, international law has developed in a way that it becomes possible to approach climate change as a human rights violation (Arts 2019: 216-217). The UN Human Rights Council has adopted different resolutions (for example resolution 2398 (XXIII)) in which the negative

effects on Human Rights through climate change are acknowledged (Arts 2019: 216; Manou 2014: 240). Also, in 1992 the UN adopted the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) which the Netherlands is a party of (Manou 2014: 244). Rights which are at stake according to the UN are the right to life, health, food, water, housing, self-determination and procedural rights concerning decision making about responding to climate change (Peel & Osofsky 2017: 42). Though, the various Human Rights treaties do not (yet) include a specific right to a healthy environment (Peel & Osofsky 2017: 43). The question is, however, whether framing climate change as a Human Rights violation (as is happening by multiple Dutch NGOs in current climate litigation in the Netherlands) is an effective way to support the concerns of Dutch citizens about climate change. Does this strategy support the prevention of climate change or is it working counterproductive? Dudai (2009) argues against the combination of the two. First of all, he explains that climate change indeed has an effect on human rights (Dudai 2009: 297). However, establishing this legally is much harder, because it is hard to prove causal links between climate change and human rights violations (Dudai 2009: 297). Also, it is hard to define a relationship between a *particular* event (disaster) and climate change (Dudai 2009: 297). On top of that, Dudai (2009: 298) argues claims will often be made on future effects, while the Human Rights framework is designed to access violations which have already happened or are already happening. Yet, the Urgenda case proved that adopting a Human Rights framework is useful, even if violations are not recognized by the court as such. The court was still able to use these arguments as an interpretive tool to understand whether the Dutch government had fulfilled its 'duty of care' towards Dutch citizens. However, Dudai's (2009: 305) biggest concern seems to be that a focus on climate change by Human Rights organizations will lead them away from campaigning other more clear Human Rights issues. The benefits would not weigh up to the disadvantages. Yet, this does automatically mean that adopting a Human Rights framework will also have mainly negative effects on the original goals of environmental organizations. The case of Urganda shows that it supported their claim. Lastly, Dudai (2009: 295) argues that the combination of the two is not clever, because there is a high risk of moving the focus from protecting nature and ecosystems towards (again) the 'human being'. Robinson (2007) agrees with this argument but explains that a focus only on environmental implications opens the possibility for a focus only on technical solutions with little attention for what is happening with real people on the ground. Using rights-based approaches will move you beyond the common understanding and solutions of the problem, to see how certain

power relations create unequal relations and thereby create violations of peoples basic rights (Rand & Watson 2007: 16). Even though there will always be pros and cons for combining Human Rights and Climate Change, the Urgenda case, as well as potentially the Shell-case, show that framing climate change as a Human Rights issue is an effective way to support Dutch citizens who are concerned about the effects of climate change on their lives.

Claiming Rights - *through strategic litigation*

The most obvious way in which Urgenda tried to support Dutch citizens, who are concerned about climate change, was by claiming their rights through litigation. However, the intention behind bringing this case to court was broader as winning the case. Bringing this case to court is what Zarakov et al. (2011: 389) describe as 'politics by other means'. It is a form of strategic litigation with the purpose of generating attention for (and striving for change of) a particular human rights violation or another violation of (international) law in and outside the court (Zarakov et al. 2011: 390). But what are the benefits for Dutch citizens if an NGO brings these claims (on their behalf) instead of bringing them directly? In other words, what is the legitimacy of Urgenda and Milieudefensie to bring these claims to court? First of all, aside from the fact that NGOs often have more resources as individuals to bring these claims, Acosta (2012: 172) explains that working together with bigger sympathetic organizations can help local groups to define their concerns more specifically, developing them into claims which have a chance in court. Also, NGOs are often able to link specific concerns from the Dutch context to broader issues and campaigns worldwide (Acosta 2012: 172). Second of all, the legitimacy of these NGOs who are bringing such claims also arises from the ability of an NGO to design the claim in such a way that other legal entities could use it as well (Peel & Osofsky 2017: 39). The frameworks of the cases, as described in the introduction of the case, were clearly designed to initiate similar cases in other countries (Peel & Osofsky 63). Also, all legal documents from the side of the NGOs were immediately translated into English to reach an international audience (Suryapratim & Woerdman 2016: 166). In this way, the legal claim supported both concerned citizens inside the Netherlands as well as concerned citizens outside the Netherlands. And because climate change is an international problem which cannot be solved by single countries, it is important for concerned Dutch citizens to be able to support citizens outside the Netherlands to develop strong strategies. However, authors like Matua (2001) and Barnhizer (2001) argue that the use of a Human Rights framework in (non-Western)

courts promotes a European ideal of liberal democracy with the intention to transform low-income countries. Interestingly enough, when Western NGOs like Urgenda and Milieudefensie start to apply Human Rights law on their own system they discover many flaws in their own countries. With this in mind, the way Western NGOs are able to critique their own system while opening opportunities for other countries to do the same. Yet they allow them to have an eye for their own capacities, understandings, and localities. This seems to be a meaningful and potential fruitful way of using the Human Rights framework. Yet, we should realize that this does not allow us to escape the fundamental idea (which is also often present in these organizations) to transform societies into a particular blueprint (Matua 2001: 207). We have to remain reflective on the way Western NGOs try to make their claims useful in the international arena and whether this really supports the international community.

Claiming Rights - *through non-legal strategies*

Even though the legal strategy seems to cover the biggest part of the way Milieudefensie and Urgenda try to claim their rights, the strategies are not entirely built on legal claims. Both cases (Milieudefensie even stronger as Urgenda at the time) try to build a social movement around their strategic litigation in court. Even though, the strategic move of lawyer Roger Cox to include co-claimants to prove citizen support had legal value, the high amount of co-claimants of 17.379 in for example the Shell-case is not legally necessary to win the case. Ballard et al. (2005) explain that social movements can have broader or other effects as litigation. They explain that social movements are trying to change particular elements of "the social, political and economic system in which they are located" (Ballard et al. 2005: 617). They explain that traditional social movements targeted the state (alike the Urgenda-case), while traditional social movements have broader goals: they try to challenge practices in society or ideas of globalization (Ballard et al. 2005: 633). The importance of creating a social movement around the lawsuit lies in the fact that both NGOs are fighting for a 'right' that (as explained) factually does not exist yet. Assies (2003: 31) shows in his article about water rights in Bolivia that the radical protests influenced not only policy at the national level, but also strengthened the negotiations about water at the international level. Social movements are able to support the legitimacy of a claim in court but are necessary to make the ruling of the court more likely to be effective. They have a great potential to strengthen

the need for negotiations to implement the ruling because, in the end, support through strategic litigation is weak if rulings are not enforced.

Exercising rights

In his article on strategic litigation on the right to Health in Brazil Ferraz (2011) shows the importance of understanding what is happening on the ground after engaging in strategic litigation, because sometimes the effects of strategic litigation are not as intended. To do this, we have to understand what happened after the ruling of the court to see whether the verdict and the strategic litigation process really supported concerned Dutch citizens. In principle, the Dutch government is responsible for exercising the verdict. Even though the Dutch court appealed the ruling, already in 2015 the Dutch government promised to implement the ruling because time is limited (Peel & Osofsky 2017: 49). However, with 2020 almost in sight, it becomes clear that the reduction of the remaining nine megatons of CO_2 which is necessary to conform to the ruling, will most likely not be achieved ('Kabinet gaat': 2019). Over the past five years, the government has postponed hard and effective, but unpopular measurements to not lose votes ('Kabinet gaat': 2019). Also, none of the climate measurements which have been implemented so far have been implemented because of the Urgenda ruling (Van Santen & van der Wallen 2018). There is simply not enough political will to implement the policies which are necessary to uphold the ruling ('Kabinet gaat': 2019). Urgenda has announced to hold the state accountable (in court) through penalty payments. However, this will be a hard task, for the question is what punishment will be effective ('Kabinet gaat': 2019). The failing of the implementation of the ruling (despite many promises) is partly due to the strong opinion of many parties that courts should not interfere on this level with their policies (Van Santen & van der Wallen: 2018). The Dutch government argues that the court cannot force the government to adopt new laws and that the freedom of the government is too much limited by the ECHR (van de Klundert: 2018). However, Matua (2001: 203) explains that the problem with a lack of implementation of human rights is very often not necessarily just the unwillingness of the state, but lies within the cultural foundation of the state. Merry (2006: 3) explains that the existence of law is not enough. For law to be effective it needs "to become part of the consciousness of ordinary people around the world" (Merry 2006: 3). She explains that the power of law does not depend only on accurate punishment, but more on whether it has become embedded in everyday social practices (Merry 2006: 3). However, Oomen (2013: 63) explains that "rights

consciousness is relatively low in the Dutch society". Hertogh (2018: 13) explains that law often plays only a secondary role in peoples life because they have become alienated form law. People do not longer recognize themselves in law, because law has become highly complex both on international as national level (Hertogh 2018: v, 14). This is also the case in environmental law. The multitude of environmental laws has created a complex system, which makes it really hard to fully include outsiders in the movement (Lekhi & Newell 2006: 197). This makes it hard for people to relate to environmental measurements. This, in combination with that Human Rights are in the Netherlands mainly seen as an export product to use in foreign policy and are only occasionally part of the public debate makes it understandable that implementation of this verdict will find a weak cultural foundation to support measurements (Oomen 2013: 42-43). The question is thus, whether in this context strategic litigation really supports concerned Dutch citizens. Yet, we must not forget that, as explained, the effects of strategic litigation move beyond winning the case. Merry (2006: 7,9) explains that we shouldn't see culture as a static entity but as a resource for change. The profound media attention, the social movement created around the cases and the ground-breaking verdict in the case influence localities and global understandings of the issue. Still, the enforcement of rights remains to be the weak part of what NGOs can do to support concerned citizens through strategic litigation.

Conclusion

To conclude, the cases of strategic litigation for climate change in the Netherlands show that framing Climate Change as a Human Rights issue is an effective way to support Dutch citizens to make strong claims for urgent action. The importance of linking climate change with Human Rights lies in the specific attention for inequalities and injustices for individual people and their realities. It complicates the possibility of solving the problem with technical solutions without having an eye for what is happening on the ground. The strength for making the claim through strategic litigation lies in the possibility of defining claims more specifically so that demands for change become stronger. Also, international relevance is extremely important, because it opens up the possibility for strong claims worldwide, which is an important factor in solving climate change. Yet, until now, strategic litigation does not seem to be an effective way to support effective enforcement on the level of policy implementations. A lack of political will seems to hold more weight as the verdict by the court. Still, strategic litigation for climate change does not, therefore,

become an irrelevant way to support concerned Dutch citizens. The complete process does support a change in the cultural foundation of the Netherlands which is necessary to make effective implementation of rights and environmental law possible.

Words: 3142

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Financing for development: is current aid enough to achieve SDGs in developing countries?

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Living in a better world is an aspiration of the human being, achieving it in the best conditions for everybody has been such a difficult task. Given the current conditions of inequality between and within countries it seems difficult to talk about development for all and given the history that has shaped the world and the current conditions in an interdependent world it must be a commitment of all to leave no one behind.

And this aspiration of constructing a better world have been manifested, at least in setting the agenda for doing that, by the representatives of the states. In a first attempt to improve the conditions for the planet a set of goals to be achieved by 2015 were proposed in the entrance of the new millennia. Then, the compromise remained with the aim of achieving sustainable development by 2030 through 17 goals. When reading the declarations and commitment all of these sounds inspiring but bringing that into reality is the real challenge. And one of these challenges is finding the way to finance these changes.

And as these goals constitutes a great challenge it is expected that a huge amount of resources is needed to finance them. Given that the conditions of achieving these goals is difficult for poor countries the need for help from the rich ones is important. This has been even manifested and included in one of the goals, with the call for a commitment to increase aid from developed to developing countries. However, it is worrying that donor countries have not taking so serios this commitment before. And, although the call for using all other sources of finance, aid from richer countries can really make an impact, but it remains the question whether at current pace this aid would be enough to bring sustainable development to developing countries.

The aim of this paper is to determine if with the current levels of ODA provided by the OECD, specifically by the DAS countries, will suffice to ensure sustainable development in developing countries, measured as the achievement of SDGs in these countries. To this end the essay is structured as follows the first section presents the definition of sustainable development, SDGs and the means of implementation, the second section discusses about

the role of aid and provides a brief description of OECD/DAC, third section presents some data to help determine the achievement of some of the SDGs in developing countries while the last section concludes.

1. Sustainable development, SDGs and means of implementation

1.1. Sustainable development and its way to achieve it

Expanding on what is development and sustainable development is beyond the extent of this paper but a general overview of the concept and the approach to be use here is explained in the following paragraphs. Sustainable development is an idea that has gained importance in the last decades, and it has reached policy implications on a planetary level.

The most common definition by Brundtland and WCED (1987: 41) state that sustainable development is "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". Also, Bannock et al. (2003: 374) define it as "The notion that economic development should proceed at a pace an in a manner that will conserve the environment and depletable natural resources". While, Blewitt (2008: 13) indicates that it is about "protecting and conserving the planet's natural environment and promoting social equity and a degree of economic equality within and between nations". Thus, sustainable development is the idea to achieve development for all the people in different time spans considering the bounds of the planet.

The idea of development beyond pure economic progress gained importance in a global context, and in the pursue of achieving it the UN issued the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in a first stage and then the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In 2000, nations set 8 goals on what were called the MDGs to be achieved by 2015. These goals included target related to poverty, education health, environmental sustainability and partnerships for development.

Building on the experience with the MDGs and trying to fulfill the gaps, in 2015 the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was issued with a set of new goals. The issuance

of these goals supposed the inclusion of different actors of the society and it was issued with the aim of achieve sustainable development by 2030, including the economic, social and environmental aspect of sustainable development with the priority of leave no one behind. To this end 17 goals, 169 targets and indicators were set to measure the progress. (UN: 2015). Graph 1 shows the 17 SDGs.

Graph 1: Sustainable Development Goals

Source: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org

Although the concept of sustainable development can be broader and the goals on the SDGs can be also criticized because of how they were defined or are measured, for the purpose of this paper the idea of reaching sustainable development is limited to the notion of achieving these goals.

1.2. Means of implementation

In this pathway to achieve sustainable development some steps have been taken and some progress has been made. However, one of the concerns regarding the achievement of the SDGs is the idea that it may occur as with the MDGs, that is not reaching all of them. Some of the critiques to the MDGs were that they constitute too ambitious tasks but, the SDGs as well represent a real challenge to some countries to implement them. It has been discussed the amount that is needed to fund them, in this regard, the 2030 agenda indicated the importance of the means of implementation.

According to Akenroye et al. (2018: 4) one of the pitfalls on achieving some of the MDGs was the funding constraints. They add that "In the context of SDGs, one recurring question relates to how countries would fund a programme as huge as the SDGs, which requires massive financial investments.". Although there are not precise estimates for the amount needed to finance them, Vos (2017: 57) explains about the recommendation of the international financial institutions to change the discourse on financing the SDGs from billions to trillions. Thus, one of the challenges in reaching the SDGs is how to finance them.

A general response for the problem of financing the SDGs, but at the same time a doubt, is goal 17. The 2030 Agenda highlights the need for a revitalized global partnership for development including some of the means of implementation in this goal. In this goal the agenda argues for mobilizing national and international resources from different sectors and partners including the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) an important source of finance also found in the MDG. Graph 2 describes the goal, target and indicator related to ODA.

2. Developmental Aid and the role of OECD/DAC

2.1. Aid

There is such a debate in the role that aid plays in development. There are some authors saying that it hampers development while others assert that it is an important way to help developing countries to improve. McGillivray et al. (2006: 1045) in the review of the literature over 50 years found ambiguous results there are studies that find a negative impact

while others positive or no effect. However, he also adds that "One controversy has, it seems, been settled: one way or another, aid does appear to work. By that, it is meant that growth would be lower in the absence of aid". And the fact is that aid is an important element on achieving the SDGs.

In broader terms foreign aid is defined as "The administered transfer of resources from the advanced countries for the purpose of encouraging economic growth in the developing countries" (Bannock et al. 2003: 147). While the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines ODA as "government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries".

And ODA has played a major role and continues to be important in the pursue of sustainable development. First, ODA has been an important component in the income of some developing countries and the OECD (2018: 43) states that it is still "a vital source of financing, in particular in the least developed countries, where it accounts for over two-thirds of external finance, and in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, where it is often the only recourse for the provision of basic services".

Graph 2: SDG 17

Sustainable Development Goal 17

Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

Target 17.2

Developed countries to implement fully their official development assistance commitments...

Indicator 17.2.1

Net official development assistance, total and to least developed countries, as a proportion of the OECD DAC donors' gross national income (GNI)

Second, ODA has been a constant component on the international development agenda. Since the set of the MDGs until the SDGs ODA has been considered as one of the means to finance the achievement of these goals. Both agendas required developing nations to increase ODA and set the target of 0.7% of GNI as a standard, Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2013: 79) explain in more detail the set of this ODA target. And the importance of achieving the target has been confirmed as well in the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development in which document states that "Official development assistance (ODA) plays an essential role as a complement to other sources of financing for development, especially in those countries with the least capacity to attract private direct investment" (UN 2012: 14).

But, in spite of the recommendations to reach these levels of ODA the target has not been achieved and other concerns about the effectiveness of this aid also remained.

2.2. OECD/DAC

Given the importance that ODA still plays in the route of achieving sustainable development in developing countries analyzing the most important providers of this aid is important. The OECD has played a major role on the provision of developmental aid.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee was formed in the 1960 "as a forum for consultations among aid donors on assistance to less-developed countries" (OECD 2006: 7) and it remains a forum with the objective of:

> "*The overarching objective of the DAC for the period 2018-2022 is to promote development co-operation and other relevant policies so as to contribute to implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, improvement of living standards in developing countries, and to a future in which no country will depend on aid*". (OECD).

And in its most recent report OECD recall the importance of development l assistance saying that "Providers of development co-operation and official development assistance (ODA) have a unique role to play: their polices and concessional resources are designed to improve the welfare of citizens in developing countries which in turn contributes to global welfare in our interdependent world." (OECD 2018: 3).

The report also emphasizes the idea of leaving no one behind. In this regard it is important to recall the compromise of achieving the 0.7% target of ODA in relation GNI which was not reached for the MDGs.

3. Data

3.1. Costs of the SDGs

The achievement of the SDGs will require a great effort by both developed and developing countries to reach them by 2030. The agenda argues for the mobilization of different sources to finance them and the goals constitute an ambitious plan, however there are not accurate estimates of the real cost that would be needed to achieve them. This is such a difficult task considering the interconnection of them, the uneven progress made by the states and the varying levels of finance.

The general idea is that over a trillion US dollars would be needed to finance the implementation of the 2030 agenda, however some more precise estimates has been computed. Greenhill et al. (2015: 49) estimate the costs and the additional finance required to achieve three of the SDGs related to poverty, education and health. Relying on some assumption, they find that the annual cost of these goals is of 148 US billions for low income countries while of 2112 US billions for middle income countries.

Also, Vos (2017: 56) presents the estimates of the required incremental investment levels to achieve sustainable development, these can be found in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Estimates of required incremental investment levels for sustainable development

	Aims and assumptions	Incremental investment requirements	Of which: in developing countries
		(annual; 2000-2050; billions of 2010 US$)	
Climate change mitigation: Energy supply	Stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations to limit warming to <2°C (with at least 50 per cent probability)	1,000	600
Climate change mitigation: Energy end-use efficiency	Significant end-use efficiency increase and greenhouse gas stabilization to <2°C	800	480
Climate change adaptation (mostly in agriculture)	Minimum investments in securing livelihoods, assuming successful mitigation	105	105
Agriculture and food security	Increasing agricultural yields to ensure global food security without further expanding agricultural land	265	265
Total (per annum)		2,172	1,452

Source: Vos 2017

With these figures in mind on thing is sure, a lot of resources should be mobilized to guarantee the achievement of at least some of the most important objectives.

3.2. The role of ODA

As remarked before ODA constitute an important part on the strategy of achieving sustainable development, however two important things need to be noted, on the one hand ODA levels have increased over time but on the other hand, the target of 0.7% of GNI for DAS countries seems not to be a priority.

First, the volumes of ODA have been increasing but the greatest increases are in specific periods. After the two conferences on financing for development in 2003 and 2015 the levels of assistance relatively increase in the subsequent periods, however this increase was not sustained in the long run. As for 2003, the same seems to be happening for the periods after 2015 with the last peak on transfers in 2016 followed by a slightly decrease in the next period. Given this trend if everything remains as before, ODA levels would be expected to stagnate. Graph 5 presents the evolution of ODA volumes

Graph 5: ODA volumes

Source: https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm

Second, the most important thing to be noted is that only few countries have reached the target proposed by the Agenda. Meanwhile all of the DAC countries only reach a 0.31% for 2017, only 7 countries achieved a 0.7% or higher share of ODA to GNI. From these, 4 are countries that maintain constantly high levels of ODA, mainly northern European countries, and two new donors that reach the goal as the case of Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. While some traditional donors like the United Kingdom and Germany have tried to keep near below the target others like the Netherlands have substantially decrease funds.

Graph 5: ODA as % of GNI

Source: https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm

3.3. The gaps in developing countries

Coming back to the work by Greenhill et al. (2015), in addition to estimating the cost to achieve three mayor SGDs, relying on the assumption that half of the revenue capacity of a country and a half of aid is devoted to the achievement of these goals, they estimate the financial gap for lower income and lower middle income countries. With these general assumptions they find that the poorer countries will not have the financing to achieve the goals while for the middle-income countries the situation can be the opposite.

The results of this findings are summarized in Graphs 3 and 4. For almost all of the lower income countries the idea of financing these goals with the revenue and aid proposed is just impossible. Only Zimbabwe would be in capacity of finance them even without aid. For lower middle-income countries, it is the opposite, most of these countries would be in the capacity to reach these goals even without aid.

Although this is a rough approximation of the real cost and capacity of each country to reach some of the goals, it gives an idea of the difference between the two groups and the difficulties to achieve sustainable development for the poorer ones. It is evident that much more resources must be allocated to the poorer countries. This is in accordance to what Bhattacharya and Ali (2014: 2) states "Along with increased ODA, it is also essential to improve the distribution of aid across countries as the distribution is skewed towards wealthier developing countries". Thus, it would still be important on keeping improving on the effectiveness of aid.

Graph 3: achieving SGDs lower income countries

Source: Greenhill et al. 2015

Graph 4: achieving SGDs lower-middle income countries

Source: Greenhill et al. 2015

4. Conclusion

Even though the achievement of SDGs not only rely on the funding provided by developed countries, this aid is important specially for the most vulnerable ones. And its importance has been formalized in the inclusion of this aid as part of the last objective. Thus, if not reached, this target, a failure in, at least part of the agenda, can be argued.

As seen, the achievement of the SDGs requires the mobilization of huge amount of resources. Even though there exist a variety of sources, ODA still plays a major role. Taking this, and based on the fact that most of the OECD DAC countries have not reached the levels of ODA suggested by SDG 17, with the tendency of occurring the same as before, and considering the scenarios made by the research described earlier I conclude that the current aid by OECD DAC countries is not enough to achieve sustainable development in the developing world.

However, this study constitutes a rough approximation and a more detailed research on the current progress on some indicators as well as the role that other sources of finance have been playing in recent years is needed. Other private sources as Foreign Direct Investment and specially the more increasingly role of Remittances could become n more important, stable and reliable source of funding for sustainable development.

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Why is Aid from China to developing countries argued to have had a more beneficial impact on those countries than aid from the West?

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Introduction

In this essay, I attempt to show why aid from China is argued to have a more beneficial impact on developing countries than aid from the West. Most of the literature on this issue focuses on Official Development Assistance (ODA) given to Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, which is why the essay´s focus will lie in that region as well.

Aid, if given by countries or multi-lateral institutions (as opposed to private persons), is called Official Development Aid (ODA) and defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2017) as

> Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 per cent (using a fixed 10 per cent rate of discount).

China is not part of the OECD. Nevertheless, its definition of aid is nearly similar to the Western one (Bräutigam 2011:3). However, there are a few differences: Monetary flows from China to Africa consist of "grants, zero-interest loans, debt relief, and concessional loans (which would all qualify as ODA) as well as preferential export credits, market-rate export buyers' credits, and commercial loans from Chinese banks, none of which would qualify as ODA" (Bräutigam 2011a:205). As of 2009, about 45 per cent of Chinese aid go to Africa (Bräutigam 2015).

The effectiveness of aid, according to these definitions, is thus to be measured by whether or not it promotes economic development and welfare. In the first part of the essay, I will explain why Western aid is argued to be ineffective. Then, I will logically examine arguments by Bräutigam, Pham et al. and other authors who argue that Chinese aid does have a more

beneficial impact on recipient countries because it may facilitate industrialisation, as opposed to aid from Western countries. I will further explore the most important counter-arguments and show that most of them are focusing on China's motivation of giving aid instead of looking at its effects, thus missing the point of the question.

Why Western aid is argued to be ineffective

Official Development Assistance has never been given to developing countries in order to assist in their development, but rather to enforce the donor countries´ economic and political interests (Kennedy 1962[31], Pham et al. 2018). Being the world's hegemonic power over the past 70 years, the West has had a firm interest in keeping developing countries in their position as raw material suppliers and buyers of developed countries´ manufactured exports, which is why the aid they give is mostly focused on preserving the status quo[32]. China´s interest, however, was until recently to replace the United States as the world´s strongest economic power (now they are said to have achieved that position), and thus their aid followed different strategies.

Aid given by the West typically comes in the form of material goods and cash with economic and political conditions attached to it (Bräutigam 2011). Several studies (e.g. Eurodad 2006) have found that these conditions are often actually detrimental to the poor countries' economic development. For example, the structural adjustment programmes that for a long time accompanied loans from the World Bank and the IMF were responsible for an increase in poverty and a reduction in health outcomes in many debt-bound developing countries (Shah 2013), from which they are only slowly recovering. Furthermore, Western countries and multilateral institutions do not give loans for industrialisation projects to developing countries[33] that might actually benefit economic growth. The best evidence for the failure (or rather, sabotage) of Western aid to reach their upheld goals is the empirical evidence that even after 70 years it has not managed to pull the developing countries, most prominently Sub-Saharan Africa, out of poverty.

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[31] Quoted in Magdoff 1969:117

[32] As discussed by Howard Nicholas in his lectures "Global Economy" at the International Institute for Social Studies, February and March 2019.

[33] As discussed by Howard Nicholas in his lectures "Global Economy" at the International Institute for Social Studies, February and March 2019.

What is different about Chinese aid?

There are several differences between aid given by Western countries or multilateral institutions like the DAC and aid given by China. The most important difference for our cause is summed up by Bräutigam in the following quote (2011:10): "The DAC sees foreign aid as very important for development in the poorest countries; the Chinese, drawing on their experience, see investment and infrastructure as central." She further identifies nine types of Chinese aid: "medical teams, training and scholarships, humanitarian aid, youth volunteers, debt relief, budget support, turn-key or 'complete plant' projects [infrastructure, factories], aid-in-kind and technical assistance" (2009: 105).

Between 2001 and 2014, the only comprehensive study till date by AidData calculates China´s ODA to Africa to equal 75 billion US-Dollars in grants and 275 billion US-Dollars in loans given at below-market rates (Pham et al. 2018). That is about 20 per cent of what the DAC reports to have given in the same period. China pledged another 60 billion commercial loans on a forum in 2018 for the coming three years (ibid). However, as Bräutigam (2011a:206) points out, one has to be careful to believe such numbers, as China rarely publishes official statistics and Western media tend to overreport the aid given. Furthermore, the country´s aid and trade flows are not always easily separable. Trade between China and Africa is estimated at 200 billion Us-Dollar in 2018.

The two most important actors are the China Eximbank and the China Development Bank, which were both established in 1994 and are tied into the policy framework of China´s own development strategy. China officially claims to have an aid strategy that is based on mutual benefit, reciprocity and equality (China's African Policy 2006), different from the Western exploitative approach (Morck et al. 2018). But the official claims do not tell us much about the reality, which is what I am going to examine in the following parts.

The aid important for our cause typically consists of export credits and loans for infrastructure development, without any conditions attached to it, which marks a major difference to European aid (Pham et al. 2018). The lack of conditions means that from the perspective of receiving countries, the aid can be received faster, more flexible and easier (ibid). There is no need for regular meetings to screen the implementation or for monitoring,

and no need to pay expensive wages to auditors as in Western aid schemes. Furthermore, loans are not prioritized to poor countries, as it is current practice in the West (Ryder 2018). This makes is very attractive for emerging African countries to take these forms of aid from China.

It is impossible to understand the aid flows without looking at the larger programme they are tied into, since aid, trade and FDI are part of a holistic approach of China to developing countries. China´s FDI typically flows into sectors that the West does not invest in, such as agriculture, technology and infrastructure (Ayodele and Sotola 2014). It has thus been suggested that this, combined with the rapidly rising FDI and trade, can lead to the building-up of the manufacturing sectors in many African countries, which will in turn make it easier for those countries to industrialise and kick-start growth.

On her blog, Deborah Bräutigam observes:

An often-overlooked story in the China-Africa coverage is the Chinese response to African industrialization goals. Not in all countries, not in all sectors, but we have seen considerable Chinese factory investment in places like Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Kenya (Bräutigam 2018).

More empirical research is needed to prove this in detail, which is beyond the scope of this essay, but it seems that Chinese aid has in some African countries managed to do what the West has been trying to avoid for decades.

Ethiopia, which was one of the poorest countries in the world just a decade ago, is one example. China's involvement is estimated to have created nearly 20.000 manufacturing jobs between 2012 and 2017, among others in the famous shoe manufacturer Huajian (Heng 2018). Ethiopia could show a growth of 10.9 per cent in 2017, making it the fastest growing country in Africa. It has also been shown anecdotally that companies are set up by the Chinese in Africa in order to circumvent certain restrictions that ban China from exporting manufactured goods into the Western market (e.g. Rotunno et al. 2012 for apparel exports). Since least developed countries are exempt from these bans, China operates through African countries´ companies in order to access these markets. African countries can thus profit from infrastructure and technology spill-overs.

Furthermore, other than the Western donors' money, Chinese aid comes nearly exclusively in loans, not in grants, which has been criticised in the West (see next section). China has become one of Sub-Saharan Africa largest creditors (Chen and Nord 2018), owning about 15 per cent of Sub-Saharan Africa´s debt in 2012. Thus, it is interpreted as a threat to Western sovereignty in Africa. The former governor of the Nigerian Central Bank, Sanusi, called it a "new form of imperialism" (2013). However, Alves (2013:218) notes that China´s loans often offer longer repayment terms with lower interest rates, which might give African states the time to build up their own manufacturing sector so that they can repay the debt in time.

An evaluation of criticism

The last section introduced arguments that provide a tentative idea of why China´s aid might be more effective than Western aid. To see whether these arguments hold, I will now examine criticism raised against them.

First of all, it has often been argued that China´s aid-trade-investment strategy is mostly resource- and oil-seeking (Lafargue 2009, Elu and Price 2010, Renard 2011). 75 per cent of all Chinese aid has been given to only ten countries (Pham et al. 2018), most of them rich in resources. The strategy has been labelled "aid-for-resources" in the West, with China often being called a "rogue donor". The criticism extends to say that although China provides loans for infrastructure, they are nearly exclusively for infrastructure that facilitates the extraction and transportation of natural resources, also known as the "Angola Model" (Pigato and Tang 2015:16).

The empirical evidence seems to suggest that that hypothesis is not necessarily wrong, although there are authors that argue against it (e.g. Dreher and Fuchs 2015 in an empirical study). Bräutigam (2015) observes that China' s aid and investment patterns cannot be explained by resources only and claims instead that China is trying to get access to all sectors of the African economies. It is a fact that China has also invested in communications and many other sectors that are not directly relevant to resource extraction.

However, those who argue about whether or not Chinese engagement in developing countries is resource-seeking are completely missing the point that should actually be

discussed, namely, whether the engagement is beneficial for them. In order to assess the effectiveness of aid, it makes only limited sense to look at the donor´s motivations. Whereas the aid itself is in the majority of cases not intended to actually benefit the receiving countries, the side effects might as well, namely those of industrialisation and building up the manufacturing sector, as explained above. A lot of Chinese investment has gone into infrastructure, and even if that was for reasons of resource extraction, this infrastructure can be used to develop the economy.

Another argument attacks the banner of "aid without conditionalities" that is upheld by China as a proof of the relationship based on equality. Although China officially insists that its aid comes without conditions attached, the development projects are usually tied to procurement in China (Alves 2013, Ryder 2018). This in itself is not yet a counterargument against the aid, but the materials and often even the workers are imported from China. It has been argued that this practice threatens local development (Alves 2013, Bräutigam 2009), kills local jobs and offers little in terms of knowledge transfer. Rex Tillerson (2018), the US Secretary of State, contended that "Chinese investment does have the potential to address Africa's infrastructure gap" but that "its approach has led to mounting debt and few, if any, jobs in most countries."

Chakrabarty (2016) investigates the case of Ethiopia and shows that the competition from China does indeed have negative effects on the local market for consumer goods. It is generally agreed that skill transfers are low, with China often bringing its own workers to the projects. However, Bräutigam (2015) argues against this, showing that although there are (noticeably oil-rich) countries in which China brings their own workforce, the majority of the workers hired by Chinese companies are locals. A McKinsey report (2017) supports that. Furthermore, it is possible that African governments could use their leverage in future negotiations in order to increase skill and technology transfers and thus profit from the Chinese aid and investments.

Another counterargument argues that the lack of conditions imposed by the Chinese donors is morally reprehensible, since it promotes non-democratic governments and undermines human rights (Osondu-Oti 2016). However, it has been shown that the conditions imposed by Western countries are not actually aimed at ensuring that human rights are

respected, but instead at ensuring that the aid serves Western goals. This knowledge makes the argument sound very hypocritical. Even if that was not the case, the stated goal of aid is first and foremost economic development and higher welfare, not political changes. Thus it is questionable whether the lack of human rights support, as problematic as it is, should be used as a standard to judge the effectiveness of Chinese aid.

The final argument relates directly to the fact that China´s aid usually comes in form of loans with lower interest rates and longer pay-back periods than available on the free markets. Critics argue that despite these seemingly milder conditions, it is China's interest to bind developing countries to China through debt, just as Western countries have done it in the past (Wan 2018). That is most probably a justified fear – as explained in the previous paragraph, it would be naïve to think of China as any less self-interested and any more altruistic than Western donors - but again, it does not say anything about the effectiveness of the aid itself.

If the receiving countries do not manage to repay the loans, they will definitely face a problematic future, especially since China uses ownership as a condition in case countries cannot pay their debt. Once China has reached the hegemonic position in which Western countries are now, it will have an interest in keeping developing countries in their position as raw material suppliers. The countries that are now being bound by loans need to find strategies to repay them in time (Bräutigam 2009), or they will not be able to escape the debt trap. But the nature of Chinese loans might make it possible for them to use industrialisation as a strategy, something that did not work under Western aid.

Finally, it has been noted that China´s engagement in Africa has led to a larger competition between donors. Germany recently launched its "Marshall Plan for Africa", promising not only classical aid but economic cooperation. As Pham et al. (2018) put it: "Increased competition for African real estate and resources should, in theory, enhance the bargaining power of African governments, which is inarguably a good thing." An example they give is Kenya, that bargained for a highway between Nairobi and Mombasa, financed by the US, and a train between the same cities, financed by China. Alves (2013:222) emphasizes on the "opportunity but also the responsibility" of African governments to make sure that the loans contribute to their industrialisation planning and to develop the necessary regulations.

Conclusion

It has been shown that the main argument why Chinese aid might be more beneficial to developing countries is that it targets sectors like infrastructure development and manufacturing that can potentially be used by the recipient countries in order to industrialise. This is facilitated by the fact that Chinese aid does not come with political conditions like Western aid that would make it impossible for the countries to industrialise. However, it depends on the African states´ governments whether the potential for industrialisation will be used or not, since there is only a short time frame in which the economies can develop until loans will have to be paid back. Arguments against Chinese aid do mostly focus on China´s donor motivation, trying to show that Chinese aid is actually self-interested, which is, however, not a counterargument against its effectiveness. It is yet to early for a final assessment, but it seems that if African countries use their full potential, Chinese aid can tentatively be judged to be more effective for their economic development than Western aid.

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Decriminalization of sex work in the Netherlands
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Introduction

Legalized sex work in the Netherlands is subject to a range of laws and governing bodies which serve as a method of "criminalization through the back door" (Abdul 2019). This patchwork of regulations and regulators (e.g., ministries, municipal governments) places sex workers in a complex regulatory environment which does little to protect their rights as workers or to decrease the violence or social stigma of their profession (Heumann et al. 2017: 49-50). This policy brief outlines current issues facing sex workers in the Netherlands, especially with regards to decent work. It provides policy recommendations to MPs and ministry officials regarding full decriminalization (e.g., the "New Zealand model") vice the current Dutch (or other, e.g., "Nordic") legalization models.

Background

The current legal framework for sex work in the Netherlands is the result of complex political manoeuvring since the "brothel ban" was lifted in 2000 (Daalder 2007; Heumann et al. 2017; Post et al. 2019). Since 2000, the country shifted from its 'tolerant' policy to incremental tightening based on neo-abolitionism and securitization (Heumann et al. 2017: 49; Post et al. 2019: 111). Proponents of these measures point to ideas such as sex work not being a worthwhile occupation for women and a hyper-focus on human trafficking[34].

Sex work is regulated at the national level by the Ministry of Justice and Security (*JenV*) and the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (*VWS*). In contrast, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (*SZW*) is responsible for enforcement of most labour relations, including occupational health and labour rights. This illustrates the popular and governmental conflation

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[34] For more information on this focus, see the 2019 Ministry of Justice and Security 'Together Against Human Trafficking' document available at: https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-justice-and-security/documents/reports/2019/04/09/together-against-human-trafficking

of sex work with security and health risks such as human trafficking, violence, and public health issues. In practice, the industry oversight by *JenV* and related laws "create[s] the reality […] that comes very close to one in which sex work is not legal […]" (Heumann et al. 2017: 55). This complexity is not good for workers or government.

Existing Dutch policy has fallen short of its stated securitization and protection goals. At this point there is minimal empirical data supporting either of these benefits in the Netherlands or elsewhere (Adams et al. 2015; Heumann et al. 2017: 55; Lee and Persson 2018). The negative consequences for sex workers are well-documented through academic and interest group research (Kloek and Dijkstra 2018; Verhoeven 2017). Based on this conflict, this brief advocates for decriminalization of sex work in the Netherlands.

Reason

The Dutch government must revise its approach to sex work as the current framework ignores negative impacts on sex workers in favour of legislating items the government deems related. This results in continued violence towards both legal and illegal workers. It forces legal sex workers to operate in a grey area in which they are subject to many of the same regulations as other workers but without the social rights and labour protections (Abdul 2019; Kloek and Dijkstra 2018: 11). Sex workers are less likely to report issues of trafficking or labour abuses because of their precarious labour arrangements (Kloek and Dijkstra 2018: 5), meaning the existing legal framework exacerbates the issues it seeks to prevent.

The Netherlands is a major financial contributor to the International Labour Organization (ILO), and espoused the ILO's Decent Work Agenda domestically (ILO 2019). This agenda has many similarities with Standing's "seven forms of labour-related security" (Standing 2011: 10), including aspects like wage protection and health guarantees. Intersections between decent work and sex work are further highlighted in a 2017 NSWP policy brief which "asked its members to describe the elements of decent sex work" (NSWP 2017: 14). The Netherlands must reflect on how its policies regarding sex work run counter to the concept of work it promotes at home and abroad. Decriminalization gives workers the safety and dignity they require and are entitled to through decent work standards.

In addition to this legal treatment, the Dutch government must understand the effect of its policies on social stigma of sex workers. The negative discussion of sex work by the government and the media saw "increased attention to the particular and special nature of prostitution, Dutch society no longer saw prostitution as a regular job" (Post et al. 2019: 115). Kloek and Dijkstra (2018) illustrate how this stigma impacts the workers. "Many respondents said they preferred to hide their work" (Kloek and Dijkstra 2018: 22), which could take the form of not telling friends and family to "work[ing] outside the legally licensed sector" (Kloek and Dijkstra 2018: 22-23). Forcing workers to operate outside the legal framework was an unintended consequence of the existing policy; it makes workers less safe and makes law enforcement's job more difficult.

Outline

This brief advocates for a complete restructuring of the Dutch sex work regime. Rather than regulation as a special category of worker (Post et al. 2019: 114-15), sex work should be regulated as any other profession. This occurs through three main steps:

1. Move sex work from the oversight of both *JenV* and *VWS* offices to the *SZW*, revising laws where necessary. Heumann et al. (2017: 51) argue that, "[…] the line between legal and illegal does not follow the line of abuse or labour exploitation […]". This provides a few benefits for both workers and the government. It reduces the public's connection between illegal activities and sex work (NSWP 2017: 8) and provides sex workers with labour protections enjoyed by other industries. This does not mean there is no role for *JenV* and *VWS*, just that they will focus on their core missions.

2. Rescind the opt-in system (*voorwaardenpakket*[35]). This created a system of benefits and tax structures for sex workers but did not provide "unemployment or disablement [insurance]" (Kloek and Dijkstra 2017: 11) or other rights enjoyed by other sectors of salaried or independent workers (Abdul 2019). Sex workers should fall under existing labour protections, whether salaried or independent contractors.

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[35] The *Belastingdienst* published a handout (in Dutch) discussing the program:
https://download.belastingdienst.nl/belastingdienst/docs/opting_in_hoe_werkt_dat_in_de_relaxbranche_dv7001 z3fd.pdf

3. Prevent municipalities from creating more stringent regulations for sex workers. Municipalities have played a major role in creating a more precarious sex work legal tapestry (Heumann et al. 2017: 51, 55); they must be held to the same national standard as any other type of work. This does not mean localities cannot zone areas for business as they determine, but local laws must align with the national decriminalization effort.

Effectiveness

Decriminalization is the most effective strategy to reduce the decent work deficit, the violence, and the stigma experienced by sex workers in the Netherlands. Realigning sex work with other labour removes legal barriers (e.g., licensing, independent worker status) that increase the number of workers moving to illegal avenues (Kloek and Dijkstra 2018: 12). Workers can overcome both predatory contracts and other structural components disproportionately targeting sex workers (e.g., mortgage rejection, industry exit) as fewer workers have a criminal record and workers exercise guaranteed labour rights.

Decriminalization plays a role in violence and stigma experienced by sex workers. Kloek and Dijkstra (2018: 18) show that "97% [of respondents] experienced some form of violence and stigma in the past 12 months" (Heumann et al. 2017: 55). Stigmatization of clients also impacts the way society sees sex workers (Heumann et al. 2017). In treating sex work as simply another facet of labour, this conceptualization will diminish. While stigma is difficult to measure quantitatively, it is evident in these statistics that treatment of sex workers as people, as laborers, increased their comfort and cooperation with law enforcement. Data from New Zealand show workers were more likely to report violence after decriminalization (Adams et al. 2015: 5). This increase holds true for areas in the UK in which police actively cooperated with the sex worker community versus those that criminalized the community (Adams et al. 2015: 7). Not only are the workers safer, but law enforcement gains an ally.

Feasibility

The political and financial considerations of sex work legalization are important factors in the willingness of MPs or ministry officials to undertake decriminalization efforts. Despite the political and media narrative around sex work (Verhoeven 2017: 371), there are ways in which politicians and ministries can frame decriminalization to resonate with the electorate. The

below section illustrates the political and financial feasibility of this intervention, understanding the two are often intertwined.

Political

Public calls to adopt other legalization models such as the Nordic model are not as popular as recent media attention indicates. The *Ik ben onbetaalbaar* (I Am Priceless) petition, the catalyst for recent parliamentary discussion, garnered about 42,000 signatures over the course of six years (DutchNews.nl 2019). While parliament was obliged to respond given the number of signatures, an average of roughly 6,600 signatures per year (in a country of 17 million) does not demonstrate a high rate of support for this issue.

Further, the focus on security around sex work can be reframed based on a scarcity of resources argument. The *JenV* noted in 2017 it expected a shortage of police offers in the coming years (DutchNews.nl 2017). *JenV*'s 2007 report noted the constant monitoring of legal sex workers, "limit[ed] the capacity for monitoring and investigative tasks with regard to punishable forms of exploitation in the non-licensed sector" (Daalder 2007: 11). Decriminalization frees up valuable law enforcement resources for engagement and enforcement of other legal issues such as trafficking and exploitation.

Lastly, Dutch political institutions have a long history of working towards emancipatory policies. The current iteration of this belief is focused on gender equality, including "on increasing participation and on increasing safety" (Plantenga and Remery 2015: 6). In decriminalizing sex work, government officials can live up to these goals by removing the barriers to participation in the economy posed by the current legal framework (e.g., housing or financial issues faced by sex workers). They can increase the safety of both residents engaged in sex work through labour and health standards, and (non-)residents involved in exploitative relationships or trafficking.

Financial

Decriminalization allows the government to reallocate its human and financial resources. The current architecture for regulating sex work at national and municipal levels is unnecessarily complex, requiring a range of inter-ministry cooperation and addressing privacy concerns (Kloek and Dijkstra 2018: 12). In ceding authority to the *SZW*, there is one central agency to

"monitor working conditions and […] punish employers if they underpay workers or force them to work in substandard conditions" (Plantenga and Remery 2015: 18). Responsibility for issues such as human trafficking or employment remain with the appropriate ministry(ies) (Kloek and Dijkstra 2018: 48), which could use newly available resources to become more effective in their missions.

Revisiting the emancipatory section from above, decriminalization benefits the Netherlands' economy when seen through the lens of human capital theory. Removing or reducing both social stigma and legal hurdles (e.g., arrest records, registration) brings sex work in line with other economic sectors. Sex workers can innovate in their own industry, especially as it undergoes a transition into more digitalized platforms (e.g., Kloek and Dijkstra 2018: 9). They can also transition into other sectors more easily without arrest records or registrations designating them as sex workers, bringing with them interesting experiences and entrepreneurial skills (Kessler 2013: 343). These combined effects provide a stimulus to the Dutch economy as more people experience the labour safety and income needed to spend in other areas, including individual and family education.

Conclusion

This brief advocates for changing from a legalized framework that discriminates against the rights and needs of sex workers to an evidence-based decriminalization model (Abdul 2019; Adams et al. 2015; Kloek and Dijkstra 2018; NSWP 2017). Decriminalization untangles the complex legal framework currently surrounding sex work, providing two key benefits. First, national and local governments can redeploy resources towards issues of security and exploitation across all industries. Second, it brings sex workers under the broader Dutch labour protection framework, removing much of the existing precarity they experience and reducing social stigma of their profession. Most importantly, this is a policy in which sex workers can actively participate, instead of being legislated from afar based on misconceptions and stereotypes.

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Critical Literature Review: Transition to Adulthood in Developing Countries

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Research about youth and their transition to adulthood experience has received much attention from academic scholars because of its growing in complexity. Many studies about this specific life period when an individual enters the adult stage, leaving behind adolescence have been done, however, mostly in Euro-American settings (Nahar, Xenos, & Abalos, 2013). A number of researchers attempt to study youth transition in developing countries, yet they still apply transitional events established in Western contexts. This paper will analyze literature on transitions to adulthood in less developed countries, highlighting contextual differences and the insufficiency of prevalent markers to adulthood when being applied in developing nations. It leads to a need for refining dominant indicators of youth transition and alternative directions for future researches that are more appropriate for the third world countries.

The experience of "growing up" is different in various environments and settings (France, 2016). Youth, or young people, is often depicted as "becoming", while adulthood is a time of "being", "finished" or "completed" (Durham, 2017). An increasing body of Western academic literature about youth transitions reflects that there is no singular point (e.g. at the age of 16, 18, etc.) where a young person becomes an adult (Jones & Wallace, 1992). Generally, adulthood is not determined by one single event but by taking part in a set of "adult activities" (Aronson, 2008) and the diverse patterns make it difficult to identify the concept of ideal transition ages. France & Roberts (2015) emphasize the significance of transitions in the process of "becoming" for young people. During youth, mental health is impacted by mood disorders such as depression and bipolar disorder, anxieties, stress and disorders due to drug abuse and dependency (Benjet, Borges, Medina-Mora, Zambrano, & Aguilar-Gaxiola, 2009). Transitions to adulthood, widely known to be progressively problematic (Durham, 2017), act as a crucial feature of the young's daily experience and greatly contribute to social reproduction in modern society (France & Roberts, 2015).

The notion of "social adulthood" is usually used to indicate a socially determined and recognized status and independent of age (Durham, 2017). Meanwhile, sociologists frequently connect it with biological age, measure age at which different things are accomplished in transition or refer to historical generation identification of standard age affirmation (Durham,

2017). Biological age approach induced the predicaments of too-young or too-old adulthood and in both cases, age plays an important role as normalizing function when combined with the concept of "social adulthood" (Durham, 2017). In a society, appropriate roles are associated to specific ages and hence age defined appropriate social relationships to help preserve a stable social order (Eisenstadt, 1956). It also clearly instructs young people on their path into adulthood with standard behaviors, which is crucial for maintaining social order and reproduction. The standardization trend reflects government and societal influences such as the structure of public services, the mechanism of transfer payments and age- or duration- specific employment opportunities guiding young people to undergo the transitions within a narrow range of ages (Xenos et al., 2006). Besides the functionalist approach, political economic or cultural aspects are just as vital factors shaping the social lives of young people and their transition into adulthood (France, 2016). Diversifications in social and institutional contexts moderate the transformation of the transition to adulthood across many societies and over time (Hogan & Astone, 1986). For example, the term adulthood recognized in the United States or Europe is not meant to be applicable everywhere.

Durham (2017) suggests that to understand adulthood or other ways of recognized maturity, we must think about it as a continuously emergent, meaningful experience in a social, historical context that crosses local and global, home and world. It is widely agreed that youth transitions are immensely pivotal in opening up or blocking off future opportunities (Locke & Lintelo, 2012). Considering society, if decisions about these transitions are made well, human capital will be developed, safeguarded and deployed in a proper way. In the converse situation, it will be costly to fix the consequences because school dropout, extended unemployment, or unhealthy behaviors can leave behind permanent scars. Nevertheless, it requires more than just good decisions, especially in contexts frustrated by structural and increasing inequalities and policy unsuccess, such as the case of Zambia (Palma, 2011).

Both the timing and quality of youth and the transition to adulthood are particularly sensitive to social as well as economic situations and they have unquestionably changed since the beginning of the 21st century (Mortimer et al., 2002). Remarkable social change accompanying large scale economic transformation is fundamental, and apparently, youth is unevenly affected by many of those substantial social changes (Xenos et al., 2006). Unsuccessful economies, shortage of jobs and social inequality all affect youth transitions (Arnot & Swartz, 2012), making them become more and more complex and putting young

people in developing nations in vulnerable and insecure positions (Juárez & Gayet, 2014). Tenacious poverty could put pressure on the possibilities for youth's self-effectiveness (Thin, 2009) and constitute severe obstacles in their way of constructing adult identities (Locke & Lintelo, 2012). In the developing world, the chance of making a smooth transition to adulthood is uncommon (Bajracharya & Amin, 2012) and youth are struggling to attain their aspiration (Assaad & Krafft, 2014). For instance, during three decades of economic crisis and stagnant which started in the mid-1970s, it became exceedingly difficult for young people in Zambia to make transitions that meet normative expectances of coherent life trajectories towards success and the ability to live well (Cooke, 2008).

Researchers have suggested the transition to adulthood to be defined by a change in status within a group of life areas where education, employment, residency and forming family are specifically important (Juárez & Gayet, 2014). The transition can be conceptualized as integrating transitions from "dependence to independence" in different aspects (Cavalli & Galland, 1995). The two key transitions are residency which is moving out of their parents' home (Buchmann & Kriesi, 2011) to build their own family and economy which is living on their own earnings, becoming financially independent from their parents (Iacovou, 2002). The indicators commonly used to determine this transition are leaving school, participating in the formal workforce, family formation and having the first child (Bailey, 2009; Durham, 2017; Iacovou, 2002; Juárez & Gayet, 2014; Macdonald et al., 2001; Settersten, Furstenberg, & Rumbaut, 2008; Xenos et al., 2006), which are often depicted as a sequence of parallel transitions (Jones & Wallace, 1992; McDowell, 2002).

While a series of major demographic statuses are usually employed to describe the transition to adulthood, this process is believed to be out of sync at the moment (Settersten et al., 2008) and far exceeds these statuses, comprising of other social, economic and psychological aspects (Nahar et al., 2013; Seiter & Nelson, 2011). Another critical point to look at is that the current generation no longer follows the anticipated order of events which previous generations did, namely, finishing school, entering the labor market, leaving the parental home, finding a partner and having a child (Nahar et al., 2013). In addition to "discrete rites of passage" and significant life events, non-vital events in life such as death of a parent or pregnancy can engender radical transformation to the individual (Locke & Lintelo, 2012).

It is noticed in youth studies that the transition to adulthood on average has taken longer compared to that in the past, delayed until the mid- or late-twenties among a large proportion of young people in many developed countries (Côté & Bynner, 2008). The mean age at which many transition to adulthood events (except for sexual maturity) take place has shifted to a much older age than before, resulting in lengthened duration of the transition (Xenos et al., 2006). When studying about American youth, Mortimer et al. (2002) observe the extension in the period of adolescence as response to various macrostructural conditions such as the fast pace of technological advancement, the escalating complexity of work, fast change in occupational structure, the development of higher education and the increasingly divaricated feature of the labor force between workers having a potential career with high pay, great benefits (usually due to the well-determined internal labor market) and those who are downgraded to low-skilled jobs with marginal fringe benefits and uncertain career path. Many of them will not join full-time employment until their mid- or late- twenties.

Meanwhile, some transitions in developing nations happen at a younger age than in developed ones (Fussell, Park, & Ribeiro, 2010). In developing countries, compared with those in the early 1990s, youth entrance into adolescence are now earlier and healthier, they more probably spend their adolescence in school, more likely to enter the labor force tardily and postpone marriage and parenthood (Assaad & Krafft, 2014; Lloyd, 2006; Xenos et al., 2006). There is some evidence about the tendency of convergence between contexts of youth transition in developing countries and industrialized nations (Grant & Furstenberg, 2007). Globalization increases trading among countries and the dependence of developing countries on the world economic market, creating substantial social changes in these nations (Seiter & Nelson, 2011).

The question is that whether we should expect the same pattern of transition to adulthood in developing world as it has taken place in Western, industrialized countries, providing that the investment in education system could lead to differences in youth transition in less developed nations (Grant & Furstenberg, 2007). Juárez & Gayet (2014) then affirm that redefinition of Western assumptions about youth transitions in developing world is essential because of the contextual differences from advanced countries. In some poor countries, children have to work while studying or have to quit school and enter the labor force to help feed their families. Initiation of work in these cases cannot act as an efficient marker to adulthood. Similarly, given the problem of early marriage in some developing nations, the

marriage indicator can inhibit other transition events such as completing school, building a certain career path and furthermore can affect reproductive health of adolescent girls.

Additionally, the dominant markers for adulthood such as school, job or marriage are usually determined by social structure and institution. Although they reflect social changes, the way youth themselves perceive the adulthood is overlooked. In a study about youth in rural Southern Africa, it is reported that the senior students, although exercising considerable independence including leaving parents' home to attend secondary school, felt "insufficiently adult" to give major decisions regarding marriage or career and left this role for their parents (Ansell, 2004). Thus, besides adulthood acknowledged by external factors or forms of public recognition (Durham, 2017), it is essential to pay attention to the one that individuals feel inside.

After carefully reviewing researches focusing on transition to adulthood of youth in developing countries, the observation drawn is that key transitional events have been used are analogous to those in Western, industrialized countries. Locke & Lintelo (2012) examine Zambian youth transition, where economic independence is central, to identify how they find their ways towards "economic empowerment" under harsh socioeconomic conditions. In-depth interviews are conducted to understand more about the local context and obstacles youth are facing such as inadequate family resources. Similarly, the qualitative research of Punch (2002) discovers elements that affect decisions made by youth in rural Bolivia regarding their school to work transitions. These include the unfavorable local conditions, family characteristics, perceived benefits of education, parental attitudes, available support networks available and their role models. The study of Assaad & Krafft (2014) about entry into adulthood of Egyptian youth applies three main life course transitions: education, employment and family formation to investigate the evolvement over time of these inter-linked movements. Using the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, it also considers the impacts of gender and social class and explores the reasons behind delayed and partial youth transition. The resemblance of these papers is that their main theme is about school-work transition. Consequently, other aspects on which youth may place high value are absent. Exploiting another area of youth transition, Bajracharya & Amin (2012) inspect the effects of household poverty on "schooling, workforce participation, and early marriage" among adolescent girls in Nepal. The research contributes to the literature by figuring out the relation between poverty during childhood and outcomes

for adolescents, especially early marriage. Nevertheless, it still relies on the framework of common determination of adulthood from developed countries.

On a larger scope, Grant & Furstenberg (2007) portray a picture of youth transition in developing countries from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, highlighting the differences from their industrialized counterparts. Likewise, Xenos et al. (2006) and Nahar et al. (2013) study about youth transition in Asian countries, most of which belong to developing world, to make comparison overtime among countries, across ages and genders. Nonetheless, the markers of becoming adult used for those analyses are "school enrollment, current employment, marital status, and childbearing". The common limitation multinational researches facing is the lack of detailed life course data which are difficult to find and overall do not support cross-national comparisons (Nahar et al., 2013). Therefore, the usage of comparative, large-scale surveys like the Demographic and Health Surveys or national census surveys are preferable for comparison purpose across ages, genders, across countries and within each country over time.

Recognizing the lack of studies that provide understanding of how youth in a non-Western culture conceive the transition to adulthood, Seiter & Nelson (2011) examine emerging adulthood in India. The results revealed that more than half of respondents (61%) felt they had reached adulthood, regardless of student status. In terms of criteria for being adult, participants adopt criteria reflecting "family capacities and relational maturity" such as "becoming capable of keeping family physically safe", "always well control your emotions", "accept responsibility for the consequences of your action". Despite the fact that lack of diversity in the sample means that the results cannot generalize the whole Indian society, the study sheds light on a new research direction that takes youth perception into account. The inappropriateness of prevalent markers to adulthood will then be analyzed, emphasizing the importance of contextual characteristics of developing countries.

Young people enter education system as a stepping stone to their aspired future job. In places with strict governmentality, youth transitional movements are supervised and regulated, particularly in the education system through annual advancement and examinations that certify the progress and improvement (Durham, 2017). Both the percentage of school attendance and the length of time spent in school among young people in developing nations have increased substantially (Xenos et al., 2006), especially in East Asia (Juárez & Gayet, 2014). Participating

in upper secondary or higher education as the initial step of the transition has become more popular among modern youth in Egypt (Assaad & Krafft, 2014). Both youth and their parents invest in education with the expectation to obtain the desirable job in the future (Mortimer et al., 2002). In a study about youth transition in rural Lesotho and Zimbabwe, many adolescent girls believe that outstanding performance in school will help them find a formal work. As a result, the income earned can fulfill their material needs and gain them an extent of independence from their parents, husbands and the in-laws (Ansell, 2004). Furthermore, educational attainment is a key element to understand other transitions to adulthood such as marriage and parenthood (Grant & Furstenberg, 2007). More specifically, young people who remain longer in school will accordingly get marriage later than those who drop out of school. Also, the fear of expulsion if become pregnant and the implementation of sex education in school instruct students well in the use of contraceptives and hence, reduce their possibility of pregnancy compared to those who drop out.

Due to the minimum labor market entry established by social institutions, education is viewed as access to paid work even though it cannot always secure employment opportunities for graduated youth (Locke & Lintelo, 2012; White, 2019). Having achieved educational attainment, youth in some regions recognize that their ability to successfully move into adulthood also strongly depends on their family background, gender and social class (Ansell, 2004; Assaad & Krafft, 2014; Locke & Lintelo, 2012; Seiter & Nelson, 2011). Moreover, schools are not offering a sufficient curriculum which will provide students with necessary vocational skills that employers require and not having preparation for those who are not able to obtain certificates (Ansell, 2004). Thus, education attainment has been gradually realized as less effective for youth to make modern transition where formal employment is central (Ansell, 2004).

Plenty of anxieties around the world about adulthood are reported to originate from jobs and income (Durham, 2017). Among markers for adulthood, employment gains a prominent status in various reports of "elusive adulthood" because the earnings from works facilitate the formation of new household, marriage and childbearing, and also the initiation of working marks the end of the formal education period (Durham, 2017). As is claimed by Ansell (2004), being tied to the global economy makes the patterns of youth transitions in Southern Africa change. Paid employment, ideally in formal sector, is required to secure future of youth and this expectation raises demand for secondary education (Ansell, 2004). Adults with steady

income are assessed as providers for their families and are free to separate from their parents' home. A "modernist chronicity", gives people hope for a better future compared to their present and an expectancy that their adulthood will be better than their youth and their parents' lives (Durham, 2017). Both youth and their families have tendency to aspire formal-sector jobs and join the middle class (Assaad & Krafft, 2014), especially those who substantially invest in education. Nevertheless, the inadequacy of employment opportunities in developing countries, for example, the contraction in public-sector works, the expansion in education enrollment and the fast pace of technological progress could be the main factors hindering the employability of young people. Women face even more difficulties, such as common stereotype norms or their certificates being assessed less valuable than men's due to gender inequalities (Ansell, 2004).

Mass youth unemployment is predicted to be a structural, chronic and permanent issue of most economies, which cannot be solved simply by educational or entrepreneurial programs (White, 2019). Thus, social pressure expecting an individual to complete education, get a paid job "on time" causes unnecessary frustration and anxieties among young people. For instance, unemployed Egyptian youth are struggling to find "good works" (queuing for public job opportunities) and unemployment in this case, acts as an indication of the expectation for future work and their ability to wait for it (Assaad & Krafft, 2014; Locke & Lintelo, 2012).

To add more dimension to the situation in developing countries, a considerable proportion of adolescents (age under eighteen) from disadvantageous family background have to work while studying or even quit school to join the labor force (Bajracharya & Amin, 2012; Grant & Furstenberg, 2007). In these cases, the status of being employed that young people gain cannot indicate their maturity.

In Southern Africa, marriage has been a crucial occurrence, representing a sudden chance of social, economic and legal status (Ansell, 2004). In the recent decades, the general trend among youth in developing countries is the rise in marriage age for both men and women as well as less parental control, allowing them to better prepare for this key occasion (Grant & Furstenberg, 2007; Nahar et al., 2013; Xenos et al., 2006). Despite that, women marriage before eighteen, also refers to child marriage, still accounts for a large proportion of youth in developing nations (Juárez & Gayet, 2014). Early marriage can negatively affect reproductive health of adolescents, causing accidental pregnancy, poor maternal and child health, pregnancy

complications and even mortality (Bajracharya & Amin, 2012). This issue, even though influences other transitions such as school attendance or employment, is still a norm in poorest regions, especially in Nepal (Bajracharya & Amin, 2012). Girls are seen as financial burden for the family and marriage is believed as the optimal choice for them (Bajracharya & Amin, 2012). Again, marital status is also not a sufficient marker to adulthood when studying about youth transition in developing world.

Regarding residential independence, moving out of parents' house may not serve as a sufficient index of adulthood attainment in some specific cultural contexts. For example, the probability of leaving house of youth in Hong Kong is very low (Xenos et al., 2006) and it may reflect the delay in marriage, but also the very limitative housing situation in Hong Kong (which is still continuing until now). Nepalese males also hardly leave their parental houses because most of Nepalese females move to their in-laws' homes after getting marriage (Xenos et al., 2006). Besides, due to the low socioeconomic condition, it is extremely challenging for youth in poor countries to make favorable transition out of their parents' house to attain independent residency.

Having recognized the shortcoming in developing countries of the dominant markers for adulthood such as school, job or marriage which are usually determined by social structure and institution, redefinition indicators of transition to adulthood is essential.

Instead of using the current indicators, for example, employment, an index of youth well-being, can be replaced by job quality, job stability and security, hours of work, underemployment and wages (Assaad & Krafft, 2014). Also, cultural contexts should be considered when applying markers for youth transition such as leaving parental home or marriage providing the particular characteristics in some developing countries.

One of the limitations researchers have encountered is the lack of specialized life course data. A possible solution is to conduct qualitative studies, which can be useful in small-scale researches. Qualitative data obtained from in-depth interviews with young people can help us understand how youth actually define their criteria of being adults, moving the focus away from economism as well as how they feel about the transition process. Moreover, when the new standard indicators have been established through various regional studies, it opens up the possibility to conduct a large-scale survey that is able to generalize the trend of youth transition at national level.

As the situation of youth and their transition to adulthood changes, new research themes may develop and outdated themes need reconsideration (Mortimer et al., 2002). After reviewing literature on transitions to adulthood in less developed countries, it becomes clearly that the dominant markers for adulthood, ones that have been largely implied and studied, are created and more aligned with the settings of developed countries. When it comes to developing ones, with their contextual and cultural differences, these markers lose their effectiveness in depicting the real journey to adulthood of young people. This result calls for a more thorough, more accurate approach regarding youth transition in developing nations, redefining the prevalent markers that are well-suited with the given setting. This is also vital for policy makers because only when they understand about challenges today's youth are facing, then government can redesign their policies to facilitate their young citizens in making smooth transitions, feeling optimistic about the future and being able to fully develop their potentials, helping their country to grow along the way.

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Migrant Domestic Workers' Struggle for Equality
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The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that there are approximately 67.1 million domestic workers worldwide, of which 11.5 million are international migrants (Gallotti, 2015). Such figures reveal a growing demand for care and household services worldwide, particularly as more women in the developed world move into the labour market. Whilst domestic workers are generally prone to certain vulnerabilities, including being overworked, underpaid, subject to abuse and exploitation (Pape, 2016:190) these are made worse in the case of migrants as one notes that their wage differentials are greater than that of national domestic workers; their economic and personal dependence on their employer is higher than that of nationals; and the power relations between them and their employer is even more unequal (than that faced by nationals) due to lack of local support, language barriers and limited knowledge of local laws.

The struggle for recognition as workers was undertaken by all domestic workers (national and migrants), with one author noting that, *"ad hoc forms of solidarity among domestic workers are as old as the sector, with domestic workers routinely congregating in public spaces and businesses and transportation hubs on their days off"* (Tayah, 2016). Such mobilization culminated in the ILO Convention (2011) for the Protection of Domestic Workers (C189), which provides that domestic workers are workers if they work in an employment relationship (de jure or de facto) and once their work is undertaken as a means of making a living (Pape, 2016). The Convention provides that domestic workers be covered by protective labour and related legislation including social protection schemes, and it also makes the significant pronouncement that there be no distinction between migrants and nationals or between regular and undocumented migrants; thus, migrant domestic workers (MDWs) are to be accorded the same protection as any other worker, irrespective of their immigration status.

This essay will analyse the actors, approaches and strategies embodied in the global campaign resulting in this momentous Convention and will also analyse the extent to which such mobilization can be taken a step further by MDWs as they now campaign for increased ratification of the Convention.

The Key Actors: What they Can/Cannot Do

Domestic Workers

During the mobilization process for the Convention it was acknowledged that the direct involvement and participation of domestic workers at all stages of the process was one of the most decisive factors in the final Convention text developed (Pape, 2016:190), and a targeted strategy employed was ensuring that domestic workers' representatives were included in the trade union delegations of their respective countries which were negotiating the Convention. Thus, a key strategy was utilizing a 'tandem approach' whereby trade unions were lobbied to send their ILO specialist along with a domestic worker representative to the negotiations ensuring that domestic workers' sector-specific experience would be taken into consideration in developing the text of the Convention (Pape, 2016:199). It is critical to note that given that the ILO is a tripartite organization (comprising State, employer and trade union representatives), the domestic workers would not have been able to be such an integral part of the process had they not been aligned with trade unions.

Additionally, outside of the Convention process, domestic workers have traditionally organized in their own associations or as part of women, migrant, human rights and other groups (Pape, 2016:192), with varying national and regional organizations existing to this day. Such associations served to provide a space where workers could speak out, find mutual support and form networks to acquire resources and training on their rights.

Associations/Federations/Cooperatives/NGOs

In the years leading up to the Convention, several domestic workers' organizations began consolidating their efforts. These included the International Domestic Workers' Network, which later became the International Domestic Workers' Federation; Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO); International Restructuring Education Network Europe (IRENE); Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM); Asian Domestic Workers Network; Global Labour Institute and several trade union confederations (to be discussed separately), all of which contributed to the first international conference of global domestic workers' organizations in 2006. In addition to being a vital

factor in globalizing the mobilization efforts, these organizations also played critical roles in data collection; conducting research; knowledge-sharing; helping organize outreach activities; promoting the idea of agency in advocacy; promoting solidarity with domestic workers; and overall planning and strategizing. Several similar organizations also existed at national and regional levels.

Key to note is that this association model of representation was a valuable means of organizing in those contexts where unions did not have the capacity to respond to the particular characteristics of the domestic workers (for example, the fact they did not all work in one place but were scattered in private homes) and where the socio-legal environment was not favourable to unionizing efforts (Tayah, 2016:98).

Trade Unions

Due to the fact that domestic worker associations recognized that engagement on labour issues is limited without affiliating with a union, and an acknowledgment of the need to be part of the tripartite system, trade unions were actively engaged from early in the process. The political bargaining power that could be wielded by the trade union was seen as essential. Some of the trade unions involved included the Dutch Union Confederation (FNV), and global unions including the IUF,[36] and ITUC.[37] It should be noted, however, that trade union involvement was not without difficulty since they had the challenge of determining ways in which they could establish common interests between contractually different groups (their regular members vs domestic workers), and finding ways of representing differing interests within the union's structures (Berntsen, 2015:400). However, the union was also critical in the process of social identification and collective interest formation, whereby regular workers became aligned with domestic workers' fight (Berntsen:402). Finally, one author notes that as concerns MDWs, because trade unions considered migrants primarily as workers, rather than as migrant workers, with particular and overlapping forms of oppression (intersectionality), they tended to construct a dichotomy between workplace and migration issues which could have impeded the effective involvement of MDWs in the union (Alberti et al, 2013: 4132).

[36] IUF – International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations
[37] ITUC – International Trade Union Confederation

The ILO

The ILO process (and eventual Convention) was seen as vital in ensuring that global mobilization efforts culminated in binding international laws which were to be subsequently incorporated into national laws and thereby result in an enforceable system of rights and protections for domestic workers.

Root Causes of Violations

There are varying explanations propounded for the exploitation and exclusion faced by domestic workers and MDWs specifically. These include the claim that MDWs were workers built on the slave/worker binary (Anderson, 2010:65), and can also be linked to the gendered and racialized images of MDWs, whereby tasks performed (cleaning, cooking, taking care of children) was work traditionally performed by women without pay (Pape: 190).

Further reasons for such violations lie in concerted State action, whereby states actively work to exclude MDWs. Thus, by creating a category of 'unskilled' migrants such as MDWs, one notes the role of immigration controls in constructing categories of people who are vulnerable to abuse (Anderson:72) particularly by its fostering of dependency relationships with the employer. One notes that such state legitimated restriction of access to social rights (Anderson:70) may be classified as an illustration of the State as "Savage" (Mutua, 2001). Such distinction between migrants' statuses (where unskilled migrants are viewed as 'bad' and skilled as 'good'), is also used by States to legitimize control over the right to freedom of movement (Fedyuk and Stewart, 2018:4).

Another root cause lies in the fact that the household is viewed as the 'private' realm and thereby excluded from public scrutiny or being held to public standards and also due to the 'private' nature of the household, it means that domestic workers do their jobs in non-collectivized workplaces and are not as freely able to learn, empathize and discuss ways of improving their working conditions with other workers (Yilmaz and Ledwith, 2017:198). Lastly, workers' subjective identity of low self-esteem linked to their migrant worker status may lead to them more readily accepting inferior salaries and conditions since they tend to compare themselves with their counterparts in their home country as opposed to similar workers in their country of destination (Yilmaz and Ledwith:186).

Are Approaches Human Rights Based or based on Legal-Political Opportunity Structures

This campaign was primarily structured around Human Rights-Based Approaches (HRBA), although there were elements of the campaign where consideration was given to legal-political opportunity structures.

Concerning the HRBA, for years MDWs organized and campaigned for the right to an immigration status that recognized domestic workers as workers and for the right to change their employer (some countries restricted their right to do so, and linked their immigration status to the particular employer they entered the country to work for, thus, if they did leave an abusive job, their immigration status immediately switched to irregular) (Anderson, 2010: 61). They also campaigned for their right to be heard, to be treated respectfully, and that their labour be recognized as a route to formalized citizenship (Anderson: 65). Additionally, at the heart of the negotiations for the ILO Convention was the need to ensure that domestic workers were not treated differently from other types of workers, that is, assuring equality and non-discrimination.

Upon an examination of the "Essential Elements of HRBA Projects" and the methodologies which characterize HRBA as opposed to other traditional approaches (Rand and Watson, 2007:19), one notes that all such elements were present in this campaign. In terms of "Community-centered development", one notes that domestic workers were in fact central/lead actors in this mobilization effort and agencies which supported them at various levels actively sought to enhance workers' ability to articulate their claims. As concerns "Engaging duty bearers", the movement's efforts to secure an ILO Convention (binding international law) was a clear illustration of their goal of establishing governments' legal obligations towards them. Concerning "Advocacy for sustainable change in policy", there was ongoing capacity building of the domestic workers to claim their rights and networks were established (local, national, regional and global) that allowed workers to participate at varying levels of the mobilization effort. In terms of "Alliance building" one notes that partnerships existed among workers, NGOs and multilateral organizations and space (during ILO negotiation process) was also created for duty-bearers (State) and rights holders (domestic workers) to engage in constructive dialogue for sustainable change (Rand and Watson, p.24). "Working at Multiple Levels" was

evidenced wherein mobilization took place at all levels of organization, encompassing work by individuals, groups, associations, unions and multilateral organizations. The campaign was "Focused on a group that was marginalized and discriminated against" with clear emphasis being placed on the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion and how this affected intervention strategies, and "Problems were framed as Rights Issues" as alluded to above.

It should be stressed that whilst this was in fact a HRBA, the need for strategic honesty was employed throughout (Barnhizer, 2001:3), so that intervention strategies were not grounded on the "false sense of the innate humanity of people" (Barnhizer: 4) but were rooted on developing enforceable legal obligations to be borne by specific duty-bearers (the State) and persons over which the State had control (employers).

Whilst this campaign was in fact a HRBA, it became quite clear as well that legal frameworks were important for determining the forms of organization that could take place among MDWs (Tayah, 2016:96). Thus, as noted by Tayah (ibid):

> *"Domestic workers are more likely to join or form trade unions where governments extend labour protection to them, where they enjoy the right to freedom of association and where an employers' organization or a collective bargaining partner has been identified. Where it is illegal to form domestic workers' unions but legal to organize, domestic workers have established cooperatives and workers' centres. Finally, where freedom of association is lacking, domestic workers have joined faith-based institutions or formed cultural clubs. Where the political space for self-organization is limited, migrants must rely on local unions and organizations to take up their concerns."

How have legal and non-legal strategies been combined

Several non-legal strategies had been employed in the mobilization campaign surrounding C189, with such strategies still being utilized presently by one of the current trade unions for MDWs, specifically the Dutch FNV Migrant Domestic Workers Union, which has expounded some of its planned forthcoming strategies for their ongoing campaign for ratification of C189. These include: working towards developing convincing arguments so as to gain the support of the public and politicians; recruiting more MDWs to join the Union (increasing recruitment will focus on collaborating with other migrant organizations, creating more membership benefits, and having more frequent training sessions and fora in various cities); connecting their

campaign to other social justice issues including gender equality and wider human rights protection as a means of obtaining the support of international organizations such as PICUM and Amnesty International; and establishing a domestic workers' employers association (Escano, 2019).

Another significant non-legal strategy employed, particularly in the face of States' attempts to exclude and deprive them through immigration procedures and citizenship rules, was their demand for rights through public campaigning and negotiation, whereby they actively 'made' their citizenship and as one author noted, through this collective project they rejected States' denial of their rights (Anderson: 63). As they began to initially gather amongst themselves and began speaking with each other as a means of feeling less isolated, this then extended into speaking out in public and by 'speaking out', these workers "made visible what had no business being seen" (Anderson: 64) and as they moved their struggle outside of the private realm of the household, they demonstrated the first act of citizenship, which is political speech (Anderson: 64).

Further non-legal strategies included their reaching out to other groups, including religious, human rights and labour organizations for the dual purposes of cementing their recognition as a group and as a means of soliciting support in their plans to pressure States (Anderson:65), and of great importance in this regard as well was their involvement in the trade union movement which led to them being able to bring their cause before other grassroots trade union members and in some instances even led to domestic workers' participation at a national political level, where for example in the UK, their involvement in the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) led to their participating in UK Labour Party conferences (Anderson: 65).

A further non-legal strategy employed, particularly by the trade unions involved, was their pursuit of a community based model of organization as opposed to their traditional means of organizing within the workplace (Tayah: 96); this was essential given that these workers were widely dispersed and employed by different individuals. Thus, a hybrid approach combining unions and community groups, known as community unionism was exhibited (Yilmaz and Ledwith: 182). Moreover, one author noted three key strategies which were employed to address the specific violations faced by migrant domestic workers; these included: developing communities of coping, which were informal networks through which migrants

could engage in knowledge-sharing and find an avenue for release (Yilmaz and Ledwith:186). Second, were the efforts to encourage cognitive liberation from their self-image of low self-esteem and powerlessness so that they instead began to realize their rights, frame their position as exploited workers and demand changes (ibid). The third strategy was the development of associational organizing in community groups, religious groups and trade unions so that their collectivism became more sustainable (ibid).

This range of non-legal strategies was nevertheless also combined with legal strategies. Thus, for example, the Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA), which is a regional network of NGOs, associations, trade unions and individuals working together to support migrant workers, was instrumental in developing an Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Labour Migration which was aimed at fostering collaboration among parliamentarians in Asia to promote the rights of migrant workers (Tayah: 102). Additionally, Lawyers without Borders, a transnational network of attorneys, was established by the MFA in 2011 as a means of meeting the critical need for more "fair and adequate legal redress mechanisms for migrants and increased coordination among legal practitioners in countries of origin and destination" (Tayah: 102).

Additionally, domestic workers' assertion of their standing as 'economic actors' and their claims for specific economic and social rights, which essentially formed the basis of their campaign for the development of the ILO Convention, changed their status from merely being "supplicants" seeking to have their needs met and moved them into the position of "rights-holders" who could demand a remedy (Alston cited by Hertel, 2014).

Why/how have grassroots communities interacted with other actors

Grassroots involvement has been critical in the development and evolution of this campaign as the knowledge/expertise and vitality provided by grassroots communities has proven critical to ensuring the sustainability of mobilization efforts. Grassroots involvement has occurred at several levels – local, national, regional and global and benefited MDWs' campaigns as a result of their (grassroots organizations) extensive networks and access to communities on the ground level. Notably, as well, given the transnational nature of the struggle, transnational networks (of necessity) have connected grassroots agencies in countries of origin and destination. Such transnational grassroots engagement has helped bring workers' demands to the ears of

governments, particularly through regional processes, such as the Colombo Process[38] and at the international level through the Global Forum on Migration and Development[39] (Tayah: 101). Grassroots involvement has also ensured ongoing evidence-based research is conducted and has promoted the establishment of a culture of self-help among MDWs.

A clear example of grassroots interaction with other actors for the benefit of the mobilization efforts of MDWs was seen in the UK, where Unison (a UK trade union) in working with MDWs from the Philippines who experienced particular forms of vulnerability as a result of certain barriers they faced to unionization and their dependence on their employers as a result of their visa status, they (Unison) chose to engage with grassroots organizations, including migrant-based community groups (not just of domestic workers but all migrant workers) as a means of lobbying the UK government for a change in policy concerning the visa renewals for MDWs (Alberti et al: 4141-4142).

Additionally, where domestic workers were not allowed to organize in trade unions, such as in the United States, they instead formed a National Domestic Workers Alliance (NDWA) which has 35 affiliates, that being grassroots organizations of domestic workers in various cities throughout the country (Pape: 194). Finally, due to the fact that the mobilization effort is still not complete, based on the ongoing Ratification of C189 campaign, grassroots involvement remains essential.

Conclusion

Through an analysis of the global ongoing efforts to mobilize for the protection and promotion of domestic workers' rights, one clearly notes that this mobilization effort was a vivid illustration of not just the varying levels at which mobilization is required in order to achieve success but also how support can be provided to struggles by 'outsiders', that being, specific actors or groups (be it political groupings such as trade unions or associations ranging from well-organized federations, NGOs or religious groups, to grassroots communities) in helping a particular community frame, claim and exercise their rights. Particularly in the case where the struggle encompasses individuals who may lack 'regular' status, there is an even greater need

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[38] The Colombo Process is a regional consultative process on the management of overseas employment and contractual labour for countries of origin in Asia.
[39] The Global Forum on Migration and Development is a state-led, informal and non-binding process, which helps shape the global debate on migration and development.

for outsiders who act in different ways to magnify the voice of those forming the basis of the struggle.

> *"The adoption of the ILO Convention for the Protection of Domestic Workers was the culmination of years of coordinated international effort by domestic workers' organizations and their allies in the trade union and NGO movements"* (Tayah: 104),

with such effort needing to take place not just at the local and national level to encourage the establishment of national level protections, but also at the regional and global levels as a way of feeding into and necessitating national level development of laws and policies. However, the struggle continues, for though a significant success was achieved with the adoption of the Convention, further work now needs to be engaged in to advocate for increased ratification of the Convention. Ratification has tended to occur in mainly migrant sending and not so much in migrant receiving countries, thus MDW organizations are engaged in the task of devising new strategies, maintaining ties with former allies whilst trying to broaden their network and seeking new ways to frame their claims, as they work to embrace the change in legal stock and opportunities (Vanhala, 2017:384) which the Convention now allows.

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In the Name of Security – Street Dwellers Out
Maria Ines Cubides Kovacsics, SJP, Colombia.

"But we already are. We're already here, moving. We've been around.

We're more than politics, more than settled, more than democratic"

(Stephano and Moten 2013: 19)

On May 28, 2016, with a team of about three thousand state agents, an intervention was carried out in the area known as 'the Bronx', or called 'La L' ('The L') by its inhabitants, in the centre of city of Bogotá, capital of Colombia. This area was known as the main *olla*[40] (pot) of the city, where dynamics associated with trafficking and use of drugs, illegal territorial control, arms trafficking, sexual exploitation of minors, human trafficking, among others, converged. The intervention, called 'The Comprehensive Intervention of The Bronx', was directed by the Office of the Mayor of Bogotá and coordinated by the Secretariat of Security, Coexistence and Justice (from now: Secretariat of Security), with the police as the leading role. Its main purpose was the recovery of territorial control and the dismantling of criminal organizations. However, beyond the security policy, the intervention had direct implications for drug users and street dwellers. Moreover, the intervention was articulated in a discourse of urban renewal, progress and security for the city, and its consequences in terms of violence and social in-justice for street dwellers were made invisible.

Within the framework of development and social justice, I find interesting and pertinent to analyze the effects that this intervention has had on the population directly and indirectly affected, particularly on street dwellers, since it constitutes a typical example of the impacts of the dominant idea of development, and a security approach, on social justice. First, I will describe the intervention's official objectives and results. Second, I will describe the impacts for street dwellers in terms of new situations of violence and rights violations. Finally, I will analyze how the emphasis

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[40] *Olla* literally means pot. The word is used in Colombia to refer to places where illegal psychoactive substances are distributed and used, but where other types of illicit activities, such as carrying and trafficking arms or even personal injuries and homicides, occur.

on security and police control reveals a very particular objective, making the lives of street dwellers invisible, and end up by increasing rights violations and violence against them.

Official Objectives and Results of The Intervention

<u>Objectives:</u>

The principal justification of the intervention was that of the city's security, having the elimination of rights violations and the protection of vulnerable populations as one of the main purposes. According to the Secretariat of Security, the principal objectives of the intervention were:

> "1. Restore the rights of children and adolescents, and **street people**, and prevent new violations in this area of the city.
>
> 2. Dismantle the criminal organizations that operated and controlled this area of the city.
>
> 3. Guarantee and maintain a broad institutional presence for the **vulnerable populations** that live and transit through this area and recover the territorial control of the sector" (Secretariat of Security – Response to Right of Petition 08-06-2016: 3)[41] (My translation. My emphasis).

These objectives are based on Bogotá's Plan of Development for 2016-2020, in which security is one of the most important pillars. According to the official document:

> "A good city that builds equality is characterized by: **security,** architecture, wide pedestrian spaces, beautiful and abundant, bike paths, contact with water, green parks, trees and gardens, opportunities of study and learning, music, cinema, sports fields, job opportunities, public transport of high quality and low cost, timely health services. Likewise, a good city encourages the meeting as equals of citizens of all incomes in pedestrian public spaces, cultural activities and sports, or in public transport". (Bogotá's Development Plan 2016-2020 2016: 22) (My translation. My emphasis).

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[41] The 'Right Petition's Responses' to which I make reference in this essay are product of my previous work at a local NGO in Bogotá, Colombia.

Nevertheless, street dwellers are constantly described and characterized as a security problem, both by government institutions and by the media, and in that sense are not included in this idea of the imagined ideal city. Even if one of the objectives of this intervention was to restore the rights of this population and protect them from further violations, the intervention ended up creating a scenario of police violence against them, and the structural situation of poverty and violence against them were not adequately planned and addressed within this intervention.

Results:

According to the Secretariat of Security, the principal results of the intervention were:

- "136 children and adolescents in route of restoration of rights by ICBF [Colombian Institute of Family Welfare].

- 1900 street dwellers assisted in Social Integration Secretariat centers.

- 508 people taken to the Permanent Unit of Justice (UPJ).

- The District Department of Health attended 135 children, 94 patients assessed and transferred to several care centers. […]

- 943 street inhabitants (young people between 14 and 28 years old) served by IDIPRON [District Institute for the Protection of Children and Youth].

- More than 77 garbage collection trips equivalent to 131 tons of waste collected by the UAESP" (Secretariat of Security – Response to Right of Petition 08-06-2016: 5) (My translation).

On the one hand, according to this information, street dwellers received assistance by different institutions, but the information about what kind of services they gave was not clear. On the other hand, according to the District Secretariat of Social Integration, institution in charge of assisting street dwellers, there were some difficulties at the moment of the intervention. First, they were not informed about the interventions before it happened, hence they did not have the time to plan it. Second, at the moment of the intervention and during the next days, 2 out of their 8 centers were closed, and the other 5 only had services at night during the first days after the intervention (District Secretariat of Social Integration – Response to Right of Petition 19-07-2016: 2) (My translation). In relation to the services they gave, the institution explained that they based these services on their existent projects, making clear it

was up to the street dwellers to make use of those services or not. In this line, they gave food rations, the possibility to shower, and oriented their actions to:

> "generate processes of introspection, reorientation to family, social and institutional support networks, as well as the acquisition and/or recovery of self-care habits, of others and of the environment, that allow their dignification through the development of actions and strategies in the short term for the full exercise of citizenship" (District Secretariat of Social Integration – Response Right of Petition 19-07-2016: 5) (My translation).

Moreover, when it was asked to the Secretariat of Security about the situation after the intervention and in further reports about it, they gave information principally about the impacts in terms of reducing crimes in that specific area, but they gave no information about the situation of street dwellers and their rights restoration process:

> "(…) this intervention has presented positive effects in some security indicators such as the reduction of high impact crimes. (…) the reduction of crimes since the intervention is mainly concentrated in homicide, with a reduction of 100%; cell phone theft with a 64% reduction and 70% reductions in personal injuries, compared to the previous year" (Secretariat of Security – Response to Right of Petition 06-09-2016: 2).

Impacts on Street Dwellers and Drug Users

Now, according to the report, *Uncovering the Pot: Shadow Report on The Intervention in the Bronx* (2017), made by two local NGOs, PARCES and CPAT, the situation for the street dwellers and drug users from the area was more complicated. According to their report, most of the street dwellers were moved to another area of the city due to the limited capacity of the administration to give assistance, and specially to their limitations for giving an assistance that takes into account their particularities and necessities. This situation was also reported by the media, making visible that most of the people changed their location to a new one. Moreover, according to PARCES and CPAT's report, street dwellers experienced multiple right violations, police violence, and even deaths and homicides, for a long period of time after the intervention:

"From the strategies of documentation of cases and testimonies in territory, we identified seven forms of violence experienced by the street dwellers who were displaced from the territory of the L, including: 1) physical violence; 2) verbal violence; 3) symbolic violence; 4) forced displacement; 5) use of tear gas in a peaceful area with limited air circulation; 6) threat of death; 7) Nudes on public roads" (PARCES and CPAT 2017: 46) (My translation).

The report describes multiple and systematic police violence situations, which occurred mostly at nights and were implemented to prevent them to circulate in more areas of the city because there were already complains about it, but the administration did not have a concrete response prepared for the situation. (PARCES and CPAT 2017: 48-49) (My translation).

Analysis – Social Justice, Security and Development

From an intersectional analysis perspective, in which the categories of street dwellers and drug users operate in social structures, symbolic representations, and identity constructions (Winker and Degele 2011), it is important to say that the intervention did not take into account the different characteristics and particularities of the population and the effects this intervention could have had over them. First, it is not only about giving food and showers. Street dwellers from this area of the city were used to be part of a specific dynamic in which they could found food for very ship prices, buy and use psychoactive substances, sleep, and feel they had a space in the city from which they would not be removed by the police. Second, the intervention did not prepare a response in terms of problematic use of psychoactive substances, making invisible a situation in which the government have criminalized drug users and using a security approach instead of a public health one to address this issue. Finally, the administration also made invisible the cultural representations around the population and did not prevent the situations of discrimination and rejection they would experience in other areas of the city.

Although the intervention was raised under the 'promise' of rights restoration and protection for street dwellers, the intervention ends up expropriating the population of the territory, even if they proclaim that the city is for everyone, for 'the citizens of all incomes'. But due to the systematic rejection and discrimination against street dwellers in the city, their displacement to other areas of the city created new forms of violence, poverty and marginalization. In this sense, as in the case of the elimination of the space, this process is not something that the population affected by the intervention would have wanted or meet their

expectations or needs. This means that people do not have control over this transformation of their realities and new socio-spatial relationships were created.

According to Nancy Fraser (1998), *Participatory parity* means that the idea of social justice should mean that the definition of a 'good life' is constructed by the people, and that they should have the *possibility* to be part of the decisions and strategies to change their realities and achieve those goals (Fraser 1998: 3). In this sense, an approach to change the lives of people living in the streets should include their opinions regarding their lives, should include a recognition about their identities, but also a recognition about them being equally part of society. Moreover, according to this perspective of social justice, this kind of interventions also should be aware not only of basic needs for survival, but of the importance of it in order to achieve the "participants' independence and voice" (Fraser 1998: 5).

In the case of the line of intervention on health, hygiene and personal appearance of the people 'benefited', it was constantly clarified that it was the decision of each one to make use of those services offered by the District. Even so, there were constant campaigns specifically about personal hygiene that were expressed in terms and criteria of 'normality'. As Winker and Degele (2011) argue,

> "Bodies are supposed to be optimized in order to function better, thus following a 'performance principle' that previously was only applied to the category of class. As a result, age, bodily condition, health and attractiveness in the last decades have exerted an ever-increasing influence in relation to labour and have great impact on the sharing of resources" (Winker and Degele 2011: 56).

In this sense, the intervention aims to create a change in the appearance of the people and the space they inhabit, in order to hide the elements that are 'evident indicators of poverty' (for example the garbage and the filth of the bodies), but it has not been able to put in place any type of *transformative action* (Fraser 1998) that allows reducing or combating the causes of poverty. In that sense, the intervention does not produce changes in terms of social exclusion, marginalization and discrimination, inequality in access to the city and citizenship, nor in terms of access to resources and opportunities. Everything is reduced to quick actions, and the superficial idea of helping. This shows the traditional hiding and trivialization of poverty

(taking this last term in the framework of modern thought, which ignores poverty as a way of life).

In relation to the above, there is the presence of different forms of violence. Direct violence, for example, that was even planned within the strategies of the intervention: police security policies accompanied by the displacement of the inhabitants of the 'Bronx' and the dispossession of some of their belongings, which generate subordination and feelings of anguish and restlessness. That is to say that security continues to be prioritized over protection, seeking normalization (directed towards economic and legal objectives), and passing over people's ways of life without asking them at least about the way in which they would prefer to be part of this transformation in the long term (beyond giving them a bath and some food). According to Waever (1999: 334):

> "The securitization approach points to the inherently political nature of any designation of security issues and thus it puts an ethical question at the feet of analysts, decision-makers and activists alike: why do you call this a security issue? What are the implications of doing this – or of not doing it?"

In this case, labelling the situation as security issue has direct implications on the way the intervention is addressed (Waever 1999, Swarts and Karankatsanis 2013). There is a symbolic violence, reflected in the categorization of the affected population and its context as related to crime, risk and danger. One of the main problems is the way in which the intervention ends up conceptualizing the population supposedly benefiting from the intervention as the problem of this particular reality and of the territory, as a problem of security, which at the end has more to do with other realities and relations of power than with security, but labelling this way justifies the type of actions and approaches it took.

When it was asked to the Secretariat of Security about what strategies were being implemented to avoid the displacement of street dwellers from place to place around the city, they answered with a evident approach of security, reinforcing police forces to control and monitoring the population, but nothing in relation to their rights and vulnerable situation: " [...] vigilance and control was reinforced in the places where the citizens of the streets have concentrated after the comprehensive interventions of the Bronx" (Secretariat of Security - Response Right of Petition 11-08-2016: 3) (My translation).

Now, the institutions in charge of the intervention state that it is the responsibility of street dwellers to accept the services and programs offered by the Disctric. In this way it ends up penalizing the poor and hides the political and economic reasons for these realities. Secondly, as Loïc Wacquant (2006) explains in his article *Punishing the Urban Pariahs*, the way in which the intervention conceptualises the problem as a problem specifically of territory also ends up hiding those political and economic causes behind it, avoiding thus treating it that way. In addition, this conceptualization allows and legitimates that the intervention deals fairly with social inequality and insecurity through the police and prison system and not through social and cultural transformations that produce changes in the structure and not simply on the surface. The problem to be addressed by the intervention in the 'Bronx' does not end up being poverty but the poor. What this generates is that the population ceases to be seen as a citizen, even as a human being, because the intervention aims to 'recover' the public space precisely from the invasion of them, with which it can be said that they themselves are not citizens that can use that space that belongs to everyone.

To this is added the passive infrastructural violence, caused, in this case, by discrimination by design or by destruction of the physical and spatial design used by street dwellers. In addition to the transformation of the physical space, the transfer of some people to homes of passage is for them a crossroads, because there they cannot use the substances they use to self-manage their organisms (to which, in some cases, they are addicted) or to carry out the activities that guarantee their sustenance (the trade of legal and illegal merchandise, among others). In this, sense, the intervention did not take into account the particularities of the population and created a scenario in which only a few can benefit from the renewed space (to which street dwellers cannot go back because it is monitored by the police and they prevent them from going even nearby).

Now, although the intervention has not fulfilled some of its specific objectives, it can be affirmed that the effects it has had have been what James Ferguson (2006) calls 'instrumental effects'. In other words, the intervention does not end up generating the necessary transformations for a 'better quality of life' of the 'beneficiary' population, nor in terms of the causes of social inequality, exclusion, discrimination or marginalization, but it does generate useful effects for the administration. These 'collateral' or 'instrumental' effects of which Ferguson speaks (2006) are in this specific case the increase in control and security on the part

of State agents, the characterization, identification and classification of the population and even the creation of an imaginary in the citizens that something is being done for the population.

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The EU Response to Climate Finance Dilemma: What to Finance? And How?

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Introduction

The World Meteorological Organization warns that 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 have been the four warmest years on record in human history and 2019 seems to fit the pattern (WMO 2019). According to the European Environment Agency, the Earth surface temperature is already 1°C warmer than the pre-industrial level and this dangerous trend continues at a catastrophic pace of 0.2°C per decade (EEA 2019). However, all these figures may seem quite abstract to an average earthling until s/he starts experiencing climate change consequences at an individual level. Unfortunately, when it happens, the momentum to act against it in the most effective way is lost.

For instance, the summer 2019 has not yet reached its midpoint but it has already been forecasted as one of the hottest summers in Europe's recorded history (WMO 2019). Thus, the so-called "European heat wave" that started in the late June 2019 has caused a series of record-breaking temperatures (abnormally high for this month) at many different spots across Europe. As an example, first time ever France experienced a temperature increase in excess of 45°C – a national all-time record of 45.9°C was registered on 28 June 2019 near Gallargues-le-Montueux (MeteoFrance 2019). Respective heat peaks have happened across the European continent, directly caused deaths of several people and have made almost everyone living here feel that climate change is real[42].

The recent elections in the European Parliament provide an additional evidence of omnipresence of climate change. They showed that the climate issue has become a trump card in winning additional votes even for those political groups that did not have it on their agenda even a couple of years ago (Bloomberg 2019). Interestingly enough, this time the key debate question was no longer "whether the EU needs to combat climate change" but *"what exactly*

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[42] The consequences of these alarming changes (both tangible and non-tangible) have been widely discussed in the literature and are not going to be considered in detail in the limits of this paper.

needs to be financed" and most importantly, *"with what means/how it is going to be funded"* (Financial Times 2019).

Following the logic of these *heated* (in all senses) debates, this paper seeks to provide an answer to these questions by looking at the EU climate finance structure and dynamics comparing it with global trends and identifying potential scope for improvement. The importance of this research is justified by its immediate relevance to the United Nations framework of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) since Goal #13 urges to take a paramount action to combat climate change and its impacts (The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 2015). Basically, this paper is going to investigate *how the EU approaches and funds the achievement of this vital goal in the limits of its mandate* (i.e. through what programmes and financial instruments).

The first part of the paper will be devoted to a general overview of the EU Climate Finance introducing its key target – the LIFE Programme that encompasses many dimensions of climate actions, players and mechanisms. To answer the "how"-question, in the second half I will focus on the relevant financial activities of the European Investment Bank (EIB) that operates with an absolute majority of the EU Climate Finance (around 70%) (EIB Climate Finance 2019). In doing so, I will relate the EIB's climate finance approach to the one of other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)[43] used as a proxy of global trends in this area (MDBs' Joint Report 2018). Basing on this analysis, in the conclusion I will try to come up with some suggestions for potential improvement.

Part I The LIFE Programme : the key policy of the EU Climate Finance

Prior to moving towards an in-depth analysis of the question under consideration, some clarity is needed with respect to key concepts and terminology that are being used in the limits of this paper.

As a general rule, most of the terms are used in line with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that is considered to be the leading global treaty

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[43] By "other MDBs" I primarily mean the following group of financial institutions: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDBG) and the World Bank Group (WBG). Their activities are reflected in the MDBs' Annual Joint Report on Climate Finance that will be used as the main source of data on global trends in the limits of this paper.

on the matter. Thus, *climate finance* refers to "local, national or transnational financing—drawn from public, private and alternative sources of financing—that seeks to support mitigation and adaptation actions that will address climate change". In turn, *the EU climate finance* is considered as the aggregate of financial flows for the above mentioned purposes coming from four designated sources: the European Commission (EC), the European Development Fund[44] (EDF), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and individual EU Member States (EU Climate Action 2019).

Overall, the EU has been known as the world trend-setter when it comes to adaptation and mitigation of climate change. Indeed, currently the EU has set an ambitious target "of making at least 20% of the EU budget climate related" that it aspires to fulfill this year (EC Budget 2019).

Among all initiatives, **the EU LIFE Programme** clearly stands out both as the key policy document and as the principal financial mechanism. Its sub-programme on the EU Climate Action deserves particular attention since it is meant to distribute €864 million between 2014 and 2020 "to develop and implement innovative ways to respond to climate challenges". The main objectives include a contribution to "the shift to a low-carbon and climate-resilient economy" and an improvement of the EU climate change policy and legislation as well as modes of governance (EU LIFE Programme 2019).

The Programme supports all kinds of actors (e.g. public, private, NGOs) in implementing low-carbon and adaptation technologies and new methods and approaches. Broadly, its scope of activities could be divided into three priorities areas with respective focus-points (Figure 1):

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[44] The EU's main instrument for providing development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to overseas countries and territories (OCTs).

Priority Areas:

☐ Climate change mitigation

☐ Climate change adaptation

☐ Climate change governance and information

Focus-points:

☐ Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions

☐ Boosted resilience to climate change

☐ Increased awareness, communication, cooperation and dissemination on climate change mitigation

Figure 1. Priority areas of the EU LIFE Climate Action sub-programme.

Source: The LIFE Programme Official Webpage – accessed 25/06/2019.

The Programme was launched in 1992 and as of now, has supported more than 4,500 projects worldwide. Needless to say, that over this period of time the Programme has been significantly changed while its funds have become almost 17 times as big as they used to be in 1992 (Figure 2).

LIFE Programme Funding 1992-2027 (bln EUR)

| Period	Funding (bln EUR)
LIFE I (1992-1995)	0,31
LIFE II (1996 - 1999)	0,45
LIFE III (2000-2006)	0,64
LIFE+ (2007-2013)	2,14
LIFE (2014-2020)	3,4
LIFE* (2021-2027) forecast	5,45

Figure 2. LIFE Programme Funding for the period of 1992-2027 (*projections for post-2020 period). Source: European Commission Official website – accessed 25/06/2019.

To facilitate the implementation of the LIFE Programme and process these substantial funds in the most efficient way, several financial mechanisms have been created. To distinguish among them, the EU internal-external criterion of financial flows will be applied and some examples will be provided.

1.1. The EU-bound vector:

Private Finance for Energy Efficiency (PF4EE) is a financial tool based on the joint agreement between the EC and EIB that provides access to affordable commercial financing for energy efficiency investments primarily within the EU. The LIFE Programme allocates around €80 million to finance the credit risk protection and support services while the EIB is tasked to leverage this amount to the level of €480 million for the long term lending for energy efficiency (EIB PF4EE 2019).

Second financial mechanism launched under the auspices of the LIFE Programme is *the Natural Capital Financial Facility (NCFF).* This is another joint initiative of the EC and the EIB but with different focus: to provide loans and investments backed by EU guarantees for projects related to biodiversity and climate adaptation. During 2014-2020 it is meant to operate in a pilot regime with a total funding of €100 million for 9-12 projects ranging from €5-15 million (EIB NCFF 2019).

So far it is hard to assess the effectiveness of these financial instruments since they are quite recent and no official reporting on their performance has been delivered yet. In addition, given the long-term nature of the projects they are meant to finance, the most reliable results on their activity may be presented only upon projects' completion. Moreover, the intra-EU focus on climate change mitigation and adaptation itself is a pretty recent trend that has gained its momentum after 2015 when the Paris Agreement was signed. At the same time, the external EU climate action has had a significantly longer record, a larger scope and a bigger impact around the globe.

1.2. The non-EU vector:

Thus, considering the geography of climate-related financial flows, the major part of the EU climate finance is channeled not into the EU countries but to developing countries outside the Eurozone (with a particular focus on least developed countries (LDCs) and small island

developing states (SIDSs)). The reason for this prioritization is that these countries are considered to be the most vulnerable to climate change and are in need of external support from developed countries that has been formally acknowledged in the Paris Agreement (Article 9).

Among many external initiatives, *the Global Climate Change Alliance+ (GCCA+)* has a special status due to its large scope and strategic importance for policy dialogue. The GCCA+ represents the EU principal mechanism for assisting climate change mitigation and adaption in developing countries. As of 2018, it has invested around €465 million in more than 60 national and regional climate initiatives.


1. • Mainstreaming climate change into poverty reduction and development strategies

2. • Adaptation of the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) and other national plans

3. • Disaster risk reduction (DRR)

4. • Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD)

5. • Enhancing participation in the Global Carbon Market & Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)

Figure 3. The GCCA+ Key Action Areas. Source: The GCCA+ official website – accessed 29/06/2019.

External Investment Plan 2017-2020
State of play, December 2018

EU financial input and **expected investments**

Expected investment by 2020
To be leveraged by EIP overall
€44 billion

EU grants used for blending and guarantees

Total budget
€4.5 billion

To be leveraged by EIP allocations so far
around €37 billion

Already allocated
€3.7 billion

Figure 4. EIP Financial Profile 2017-2020. Source: EC official website – accessed 29/06/2019

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The activities supported by the GCCA+ are extremely diverse and huge in scope but broadly speaking, five key areas could be identified (Figure 3).

However, the main mission of the GCCA+ is still assistance in climate change strategic planning and policy making while actual funding is channeled through another facility – ***the EU External Investment Plan (EIP)***. It was launched in 2017 with the purpose to mainstream the EU financial support for bankable projects by attracting primarily private investments into African countries and the EU Neighborhood (climate-related projects make up part of this agenda). The funding for the EIP is comprised of €4.5 billion from the EU budget and the European Development Fund (that in turn is composed of direct contributions of the EU members)[45]. Overall, the Plan is supposed to build up an investment portfolio of €44 billion by 2020 (Figure 4).

To recap, the LIFE Programme is the most important policy document laying foundations for the EU Climate Action. It provides both the regulation framework and the main financial mechanisms for funding climate change adaptation and mitigation both within and outside the EU.

It is worth noting that most of the EU Climate Finance (including the LIFE Programme) is operated by the single institution – the EIB. Thus, in 2018 its climate-related financial activities reached the level of €6.27 billion (EIB 2019). Overall, its importance for the EU Climate Action and its status of "the world's largest international public lending institution" make it an interesting object of analysis with regard to its climate-related financial activities (EIB At a Glance 2019).

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[45] EDF was established by the EU as the main fund of the EU development aid for partner countries in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific regions as well as the Overseas Countries and Territories of Member States. This fund operates outside the EU budget and accumulates resources of €30.5 billion for the period 2014-2020.

Part II. The EIB: the key operator of the EU Climate Finance in the context of other MDBs

2.1. Mission and scope of activities

The EIB is a long-term lending institution created under the Treaty of Rome (1958). Despite its oxymoron nature as a "non-profit bank" that has 28 Member States as its shareholders, its main mission has been declared "to make a difference to the future of Europe and its partners by supporting sound investments which further EU policy goals" (EIB 2019). And as it was mentioned above, one of the most topical EU goals speaks to its *adequate response to climate change.*

Figure 5. EIB's Climate Finance ratio in total portfolio. Source: EIB Official website – accessed 29/06/2019.

With respect to this goal, the EIB's Corporate Operational Plan has set an annual target of over 25% of finance to be directed to climate action. For instance, as of 2018, the share of climate action finance reached 29.8% of the EIB's total annual contracts (€16.2 billion out of €54.3 billion) (EIB COP 2019) (Figure 5). It is worth noting that this trend (i.e. an increased funding for climate action) is common among other multilateral development banks (MDB's Joint Report 2018,10).

However, the case of EIB highlights another worrisome trend: in 2018, out of total climate finance only around 15.1% was directed to developing countries (EIB Report 2018). It

illustrates the *overall reluctance of the EIB to invest in low-income countries that are usually the most vulnerable to climate change (e.g. LDCs and SIDSs).*

For instance, according to the MDBs' Joint Report, in 2018 only 11% of climate finance was spent to support projects in low-income countries while the absolute majority of funds went to high and middle-income countries – around 83% (Figure 6). This prompts a profit-driven approach that is being applied in the project selection process by these financial institutions.

MDBs' Total Climate Finance in 2018, % (by country income group)

Figure 6. MDBs' Total Climate Finance in 2018. Source: MDBs' Joint Report 2018, 13.

2.2. Financial Instruments:

The fundamental reason for this profit-seeking strategy in investment allocation seems to be the EIB's set of financial instruments that it employs to fund the EU climate action (Figure 7). The largest share of the EIB's climate funds is delivered in the form of investment loans (87%) while grants (i.e. non-repayable financial allocations) make up an extremely small share – just 2%. In other words, investment loans are transfers that require repayment from the recipient, i.e.

**EIB Climate Finance Instruments in 2018 (% of total financial intruments)**

Figure 7. EIB's Climate Finance Instruments in 2018. Source: compiled by author basing on the publicly available information on the EIB Official Website.

the projects have to be financially sound and be able to generate sufficient returns to pay back the loan.

Remarkably, the EIB climate finance portfolio reflects average structure of financial instruments among MDBs. Indeed, in 2018 investment loans made up around 71% of total climate finance managed by the MDBs with 5% distributed as grants (Figure 8).

MDBs' Climate Finance Instruments
average % of total fin. instuments employed in 2018

- Investment loan
- Policy-based financing
- Grant
- Guarantee
- Equity
- Line of credit
- Results-based financing
- Other instruments

Figure 8. MDBs' Climate Finance Instruments in 2018. Source: compiled by author basing on the publicly available information on the MDBs' official websites.

Figure 9. EIB's Climate Finance Portfolio by priority area 2018. Source: EIB Official Website – accessed 29/06/2019.

Overall, this strict financial condition of mandatory repayability significantly limits the scope of investments carried out by MDBs and the EIB in particular. It results not only in underfinancing of the climate-related projects in low-income countries but also in vast disproportions of financial flows aimed at funding activities either for climate change adaptation or for mitigation. For instance, in 2018 only 8% of the EIB's climate financial pool was allocated to climate change adaptation (Figure 9).

The officials say openly that "it is difficult to make a "good business case" for adaptation" (Appelt and Dejgaard 2018, 4). Indeed, climate change adaptation projects seek to reduce vulnerability to already existing negative consequences primarily of natural origin (e.g. extreme flooding, prolonged droughts, catastrophic hurricanes, etc.).

Therefore, adaptation is often regarded as public good (or even global public good – depending on the scale) and the profit potential of such projects is deemed to be quite limited. As a result, investment loans are not considered to be the best financial solution to fund these foreseeably lossmaking projects. At the same time, one should bear in mind that it is impossible to respond adequately to climate change without striking a balance between adaptation and mitigation activities within climate finance (Adger 2001, 929).

Conclusion:

As it has been discussed above, the EU Climate Action is primarily driven by the LIFE Programme that employs several financial instruments (both EU- and non-EU-oriented: e.g. PF4EE; NCFF; GCCA+; EIP) to channel its funds aimed at adaption to inevitable climate change and mitigation of its detrimental impact. While the European Commission's mandate

makes it responsible for drafting and implementing climate action policies and strategies, the duties of financial management of most of the EU climate finance are delegated to the EIB – purposefully called "the EU Bank".

In order to scale up financial support for the EU Climate Action (that is currently around €6.7 billion), the EIB is tasked to carry out active investment strategy in the climate-related projects to leverage additional funds (that should ideally many times exceed initial investments from the EC funds and the Member States). In order to reach this ambitious level of returns, the EIB primarily provides financing

- in the form of investment loans (87% of all financial operations)
- for the high and middle-income countries (85% of all recipients)
- for mitigation purposes (92% of all climate-related projects).

Interestingly enough, this snapshot of the EIB Climate Finance in 2018 illustrates the global trends: most of climate funds channeled through MDBs that tend to make repayable investments (71%) in relatively non-risky projects (i.e. preferring to work with financially sound countries (83%) and focusing on more profitable projects related rather to mitigation of climate change (70%)).

The paper has shown that looking both from the EU and global perspectives, the overall amount of climate finance keeps increasing. However, the most vulnerable to climate change countries (LDCs and SIDSs) are not receiving sufficient funds because they do not fit the criteria for lending.

In order to improve the situation, *the profitability requirement has to be omitted when it comes to climate finance allocations.* Most of it shall be channeled via development aid vehicles (i.e. containing substantial grant component) but with strict requirements for due-diligence, reporting and performance evaluations. In this case, to ensure fund sufficiency for the EU Climate Action (and for the global one), Member States have to comply with the Paris Agreement requirement for national contributions (as well as other signing parties).

To make this happen, not only financial instruments could be employed but also other means of political, diplomatic, social nature. For instance, the so-called *Energy and Climate Diplomacy principle* is a new EU trend in building up international economic ties (EU

Parliament Resolution of 03/07/2018 on Climate Diplomacy). Broadly speaking, it implies opting for working with sustainability-oriented partner-countries that create conducive environment for climate action by investing in renewables sources of energy and approaching climate change agenda responsibly.

These partners may not be necessarily financially sound but shall be highly motivated to fulfill the Paris requirements and follow the lead of more environmentally-progressive international players. However, it is important to highlight that the latter shall not get carried away with their climate action policy by multiplying agencies, strategies, operational funds.

For instance, analyzing the EU Climate Finance framework, one can easily notice its excessively sophisticated and occasionally vague structure that leads to lack of transparency, double counting and blurred areas of responsibility among various bodies. Hence, *organizational downsizing and streamlining of the EU climate action activities* would definitely benefit provision of climate finance both in the EU and worldwide as the EU remains one of the most important international players in this area.

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