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South-South Cooperation?
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Gustavo de L. T. Oliveira[1]

Abstract

Since the Chinese government began encouraging outward investments in 1999 and the leftwing Workers' Party came to power in Brazil in 2003, new foreign policy dynamics emerged and were promoted as "South-South cooperation" between these countries. Brazilian agricultural exports to China rapidly became vital for both countries, constituting one of the world's largest and fastest growing commodity flows. Unsurprisingly, Chinese investments in Brazilian agribusiness also became an important touchstone for South-South cooperation, particularly in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 food price and financial crises, and the establishment of the BRICs group in 2009. Policy-makers in China hoped these investments would help secure agricultural imports from Brazil, breaking the oligopoly of agribusinesses from the Global North that control technologies and international trade. In turn, policy-makers in Brazil hoped Chinese capital would assist infrastructure development and technological upgrading. When Chinese investments finally surged in Brazil in 2010, however, they became ensnared with concerns over "land grabbing" and the "deindustrialization" of Brazil, and it soon became clear that most direct investments announced by Chinese agribusinesses in Brazil never even materialized. Since this was also taking place elsewhere, the Chinese government tightened regulations and finance for outward direct investments, even while the leading state-owned enterprises (SOEs) acquired transnational agribusiness companies with important operations in Brazil and beyond. Simultaneously, South-South cooperation policies in Brazil were slashed with the onset of a deep economic and political crisis, culminating with the impeachment of the Workers' Party president in 2016. As the favorable moment for direct Chinese investments in Brazilian agribusiness wanes, we may evaluate the accomplishments, failures, and opportunities of Brazil-China agroindustrial partnerships as a form of South-South cooperation. Mainstream scholars and policy-makers in China lament the troubled and slow pace of direct investments, and celebrate the acquisitions by Chinese SOEs of transnational agribusinesses as positive developments even though they flout the framework of South-South cooperation. Meanwhile, their peers in Brazil either lament lost opportunities for infrastructure/technological upgrading, or dismiss South-South cooperation as a politically-motivated effort to sustain the Workers' Party administrations with a misguided geopolitical approach. Drawing on 27 months of fieldwork across 9 provinces of China and 14 states in Brazil, I undertook a comprehensive examination of Chinese investments Brazilian agribusiness from 2003 to 2016. Contrary to mainstream debates across both China and Brazil, I argue we should not lament the slow pace and troubled situation of most direct investments attempted so far, since they would strengthen emergent elites from the Global South, but undermine food sovereignty and reproduce the socio-ecological pitfalls of North-South agribusiness investments. Rather than a positive development, moreover, the Chinese SOE take-overs of transnational companies from the Global North illustrates this distortion of South-South cooperation taken to its logical extreme. Nevertheless, I also identify agroecological alternatives that could strengthen food sovereignty, reduce inequality, and liberate people in the Global South from the socio-ecological exploitation that has characterized agribusiness development controlled by the Global North thus far, and argue these are the real lost opportunities of South-South cooperation through Brazil-China agroindustrial partnerships.

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1 Introduction

Since neoliberal reforms unfolded in Brazil and China during the 1990s, the dynamism of the Brazilian economy shifted from import-substitution industrialization to agricultural and other resource extraction and exports, while the drivers of the new market economy in China shifted in parallel from relatively decentralized and rural-based industrialization (in township and village enterprises) to more centralized export-oriented industrialization in coastal cities. Consequently, a massive rural exodus began to take place in China, and some agricultural sectors—primarily grain and soybean production—collapsed in lock-step with a spectacular growth of imports (Yan, Chen, and Ku 2016) and the associated shift from labor-intensive and decentralized livestock production to concentrated animal feeding operations (Schneider 2011). In turn, Brazilian agricultural exports to China grew rapidly during the 2000s, particularly since the soy sector consolidated its position as the crown-jewel of Brazilian agribusiness and state-led agricultural development (Oliveira 2016), producing a transnational soy-livestock nexus that has quickly become one of the world's largest and fastest growing commodity flows (Peine 2013; Wilkinson and Wesz Jr 2013; Schneider 2014; Oliveira and Schneider 2016; Oliveira and Hecht 2016). While not reducible to this particular agroindustrial transformation, the Chinese government recognized that its growing dependence of international trade for manufactured exports and natural resource imports would require Chinese companies to launch foreign investments to secure markets and resources abroad—developing the "going out" policy (走出去) since 1999 to support these initiatives. While Brazil and Latin America as a whole are relatively recent destinations for sustained and large-scale efforts by Chinese companies to establish foreign investments, the growing importance of Brazilian markets for Chinese products and its crucial role providing natural resources—especially after the commodity price spike and global financial crisis of 2007-2008—ultimately placed Brazil as a high-priority strategic target for foreign investments (Zou, Long, and Hu 2010; Armony and Strauss 2012; Xinhua 2015; Ellis 2017), particularly in its petroleum, iron ore, soy, and a few other mineral and agroindustrial sectors (CEBC 2011, 2013, 2014; Oliveira 2017a, 2017b).

This spectacular expansion of trade and investment flows were overlaid on a much longer history of diplomatic relations between Brazil and China (Biato Jr 2010), and forms of anti-colonial political-economic partnerships and cooperation that hearken back to the Bandung conference of non-aligned nations during the onset of the so-called Cold War[2] (Milani and Carvalho 2013; Sommerville et al. 2014). Brazil became China's first "strategic partner" in 1993, a moment when both countries were undergoing dramatic transformations in their domestic political and economic arrangements; transformations that thwarted the incipient forms of technological transfer and attempted investments in which Brazil was the "more developed partner" exporting industrial products and seeking a market in China for its infrastructure investments, particularly hydroelectric dams (Biato Jr 2010). When Brazilian foreign policy and commercial relations pursued "diversification strategies" during the 1990s, therefore, these were limited to its South American neighbors through the formation of the Mercosul (Saraiva 2007; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007). China in turn refined its new diplomatic and commercial relations as the "more developed partner" with its own neighbors in Asia and its longstanding partners in anti-colonial struggle from Africa, where discourses of "South-South Cooperation" (SSC) were more strongly rooted in multiple forms of political and economic exchanges (Chin and Thomas 2005; Brautigam 2009). The possibility for significant rapprochement between Brazil and China only emerged after 2003 when the Workers' Party gained control of the federal government in Brazil, and the newly installed president Lula brought the career diplomat Celso Amorim to lead the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with his vision of a more globally "active and assertive" foreign policy.[3]

[2] "So-called Cold War" because wars in this period were only "cold" in the US, Europe, and the rest of the Global North, while the Global South suffered continuous proxy wars and other forms of neo-colonial interventions ranging from KGB- and CIA-backed coups to outright military intervention.

[3] Minister Amorim's own translation of his Portuguese expression "política externa ativa e altiva" (active and assertive foreign policy) is rendered simply as "assertive foreign policy" (Amorim 2017), but the key term "altiva"

This more globally “active and assertive” Brazilian foreign policy not only reinvigorated discourses and practices of SSC in Brazil—foreclosing thereby US-led efforts to expand the North American Free Trade Agreement to a continent-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas—but also catapulted SSC from strengthening the Mercosul and South American integration to increasing trade, investment and diplomatic ties with other developing countries in the rest of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and above all China (Boito Jr and Berringer 2013; Oliveira 2016; Amorim 2017). The strategic place of China in this new framework for Brazilian foreign policy was already evident merely four months into Lula’s administration, when the Brazilian national development bank (BNDES) hosted a Brazil-China Seminar entitled “A Necessary Leap”, and president Lula stated in the opening address:

> South America will be a priority in my administration, since I am convinced that Brazil’s full development will only be possible as part of the integration of the continent as a whole. (…) And as we have a regional vocation, we are also a global country. The same manner that national integration goes through regional integration, I am convinced that our approximation with Asia, particularly with China, will be decisive for Brazil to realize this greater destiny. (Quoted in H. Oliveira 2010: 90-91)

The pursuit of closer relations with China as essential to the new Brazilian drive for SSC was not mere bluster, as powerfully illustrated in the sustained exchange of high-profile state visits by the presidents of Brazil and China since 2004, and the establishment of the BRICs group in 2009 when both countries sustained economic growth through bilateral trade even while the Global North’s economy collapsed in the aftermath of the US-centered global financial crisis. Both moments stoked enthusiasm for commercial relations and possible investment partnerships between China and Brazil, as well as a protectionist backlash in Brazil associated with concerns over Chinese “land grabbing” that would further confine the Brazilian economy to raw commodity exports and thereby “deindustrialize” Brazil (Oliveira 2017a; cf. Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010; Leão, Pinto, and Acioly 2011; Jenkins and Barbosa 2012; Faleiros et al. 2014; Guo and Myers 2017; Powell 2017). This tension of sinomania and sinophobia (Anderson 2010) still informs mainstream debates about SSC in Brazil, and will be discussed in the next section.

It is necessary to highlight first, however, that the main vehicles for Brazil-China diplomatic and corporate partnerships—respectively, the China-Brazil High-Level Coordination and Cooperation Committee (COSBAN), and the Brazil-China Business Council (CEBC)—relegated agribusiness investments and cooperation to the backburner of their agendas: although some very limited bilateral agronomic research exchanges were initiated (Monte 2011), the Chinese side pushed agribusiness cooperation towards the ill-fitting mechanism of the China-Latin America and Caribbean Forum (CEPAL 2013), while the Brazilian side prioritized the commercial opening of the Chinese market for Brazilian beef and other meat exports over investment coordination, and sought to shift the perceived Chinese investment interest from farmland to agribusiness-related infrastructure, railroads and ports above all.[4] Consequently, the growth and character of Chinese agribusiness investments in Brazil since 2003 has taken place quite independently from the notable expansion of government and corporate diplomatic relations between both countries, an argument that I develop more fully elsewhere (Oliveira 2017a, 2017b, 2017c).

also suggests the foreign policy is more “elevated”, “dignified”, “generous”, and “magnanimous,” or perhaps inadvertently even “haughty”, “arrogant”, and “presumptuous.” As I argue below, this inadvertent connotation may apply even more clearly to the characterization of Chinese foreign policy as a form of SSC than to Brazilian foreign policy itself.

[4] This observation is triangulated from public documents at the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; personal interviews with the Brazilian ambassador to China (2008-2013) Clodoaldo Hugueney, São Paulo, May 21, 2014; the Chinese ambassador to Brazil (2006 – 2009) Chen Duqing, Brasília, July 18, 2014, and Beijing, March, 2015; the directors of the CEBC in Rio de Janeiro (2012 and 2014); and about a dozen other Brazilian and Chinese diplomats working in Brasília and Beijing from 2011 to 2015; as well as participant observation of the CEBC-organized corporate seminars that took place during the state visits of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang to Brazil (July 2014 and May 2015).

2 Mainstream Debates (Literature Review)

A fuller, better referenced, and more polished literature review of mainstream debates will be produced subsequently, when this working paper is prepared for publication. For now, however, I simply sketch the following account of the mainstream debates. Agribusiness executives and policy-makers in China hoped these investments would help secure agricultural imports from Brazil, breaking the oligopoly of agribusinesses from the Global North that control technologies and international trade. In turn, most agribusiness executives and policy-makers in Brazil hoped Chinese capital would assist infrastructure development and technological upgrading. When Chinese investments finally surged in Brazil in 2010, however, they became ensnared with concerns over "land grabbing" and the "deindustrialization" of Brazil, and it soon became clear that most direct investments announced by Chinese agribusinesses in Brazil never even materialized. This was particularly the case for the investments by the Chongqing Grain Group, which were originally announced as an acquisition of 200,000 ha for soy production, and then expanding to include a large-scale soybean processing facility; and the high-profile negotiations pursued by the Goiás state government with the CNADG and Sanhe Hopeful for investments in the expansion of soybean production and infrastructure in that state (Oliveira 2017b).

Since push-back and failed negotiations like these were also taking place elsewhere in Brazil and beyond, the Chinese government tightened regulations and finance for outward direct investments, even while the leading state-owned enterprises (SOEs) acquired transnational agribusiness companies with important operations in Brazil and beyond. The most prominent examples of the latter, as will be detailed below, are COFCO and ChemChina. In addition to tighter restrictions at the point of origin, the impetus for SSC policies in Brazil evaporated with the onset of a deep economic and political crisis, culminating with the parliamentary coup against the Workers' Party, via the impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff from 2015 to 2016: the Temer administration has shifted its foreign policy priorities from SSC back to neoliberal-era preference for free trade agreements and reliance upon investments from the Global North (Stuenkel 2016). At present, therefore, there is a widespread sense that the favorable moment for Chinese investments in Brazilian agribusiness as a form of SSC has passed.

Mainstream debates on Chinese agribusiness investments in Brazil as SSC, therefore, grapple with the apparent demise of the process that had been unfolding since 2003. The predominant feeling among academic and policy makers in China is that Chinese foreign direct investments were "too slow" to take advantage of the window of opportunity created by high commodity prices from 2003 to 2013, and the favorable Workers' Party administration in Brazil until it fell into crisis after 2014. Their analysis and efforts focus, therefore, on trying to improve corporate management and streamline governance impediments to "speed up" Chinese agroindustrial FDI in Brazil and beyond in the future, and thereby make greater strides during favorable moments.[5] These debates ignore, however, that "speeding up" Chinese agroindustrial investments without revising significantly their character and manner of operation could in fact *aggravate* challenges for Chinese FDI by stoking further sinophobia and push-back against their participation in agribusiness expansion in Brazil, as I demonstrate below. These debates also tend to celebrate successful M&As from China's major state-owned companies, but in turn they also serve to undermine the discourse of SSC – after all, when Chinese capital simply incorporates transnational companies from the Global North and sustains their same character and manner of operations in the Global South, Chinese transnational corporations effectively join the ranks

[5] This characterization will be better grounded with references to the literature in the subsequent version of this working paper, but for now I rest this claim on multiple interviews undertaken with Chinese agribusiness executives and government officials from 2011 to 2016 in several locations in China and Brazil; and participant observation of debates at the conference on *Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Latin America and the Caribbean*, Renmin University, Beijing, October 20–21, 2016; and during discussion of a lecture I was invited to deliver at the Institute for Latin American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, October 27, 2016.

of the Global North by placing themselves in highly uneven political economic relations with other countries where these multinational companies operate, including Brazil.

Mainstream debates in Brazil might be more polarized between those who, similar to their mainstream Chinese interlocutors, lament the "lost opportunities" for infrastructure investment and technological upgrading during the past several years, and those who accuse SSC as a "politically-motivated" effort of Workers' Party administrations to sustain a misguided geopolitics. The latter group was firmly associated with the Brazilian industrial elite, organized in the powerful São Paulo State Federation of Industries (FIESP) and finding in the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) its political expression, and united behind demands for protectionist policies against Chinese competitors (Cunha 2011; Diniz and Bresser-Pereira 2013; Sônego 2013). With the undemocratic transition from the Dilma Rousseff to the Michel Temer administration in 2016, this group went from a civil society and parliamentary opposition to the center of the government itself, as evidenced by Temer's appointment of José Serra from the PSDB as the new minister of foreign affair's. Serra immediately vowed to reverse the "ideology-driven foreign policy" of the Workers' Party (José Serra, quoted in Stuenkel 2016), and Temer's own diplomatic efforts demonstrated in tandem the return of attention not only from the Global South towards the Global North, but more specifically in Asia from China back towards Japan as Brazil's preferred partner. This was notably illustrated by the fact that during Temer's first foreign travel as president, which happened to be the pre-scheduled participation at the G20 meeting in China, Temer broke with recent tradition and snubbed the Chinese government by holding bi-lateral meetings on the sidelines of the G20 in Hangzhou with the *Japanese* government instead, and then counterbalanced his participation at the 2016 BRICS Summit in India with a state visit to Japan once again (Branco and Chagas 2016). According to them, the debate about Chinese investments in Brazilian agribusiness and infrastructure is ultimately a debate about the geopolitical alliances and strategic economic partnerships that Brazil should pursue, arguing Japan and the Global North rather than China provide the best opportunities for Brazil's own economic development.

On the other hand, the predominant debate within the Brazilian government during the Workers Party administrations, and still to this day among many agribusiness elites and various sectors of Brazilian civil society, largely mirrors the debate in China. This debate pertains to the governance priorities and mechanisms for "capturing" Chinese investments for infrastructure development and technological upgrading in Brazil, seeing China as a strategic partner and investor with robust capacity for investments in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis rooted in the US and EU, and which may then enable key Brazilian sectors to challenge competitors from the Global North. Proponents of this view are particularly well organized in agribusiness associations and lobbies, Brazil-China chambers and boosters, and key sectors of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade.[6] These build upon the rationale that the fast growing and high-volume Chinese demand for Brazilian agroindustrial and mineral commodities could be leveraged—through fiscal, commercial, financial, and industrial policies—to direct investments into infrastructure bottlenecks and strategic industrial sectors with significant backward and forward linkages with agricultural and mineral production (Pereira and Castro Neves 2011; Monte 2011; Leão, Pinto, and Acioly 2011; Jenkins and Barbosa 2012; Barros de Castro 2012). As in the Chinese debate this discussion mirrors, its major limitation lies in its insufficient engagement with the nature and dynamics of the sorts of investments pursued and hoped for, particularly neglecting a more critical engagement with the class politics its presupposes and reproduces. As I will argue below, simply leveraging Chinese agroindustrial and infrastructure investments for Brazil would benefit primarily a relatively small elite, and aggravate socio-ecological exploitation of the majority and the relations of dependence and subordination that similarly characterize North-South relations historically. In the next section, therefore, I turn to my dataset and analysis if Chinese agribusiness investments in Brazil from 2003 to 2016 to criticize the very terms presupposed by all these mainstream debates.

[6] Various personal interviews in Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Beijing, from 2011 to 2016.

3 Dataset and Analysis

I provide a comprehensive account of Chinese agribusiness investments in Brazil elsewhere (Oliveira 2017a), and simply outline here (Table 1) the main deals that took place since 2003, including also failed negotiations for farmland acquisition, agroindustrial projects, agribusiness related infrastructure, as well as the indirect but successful entrance of Chinese agribusiness capital in Brazil through global-level mergers and acquisitions (M&As).

Table 1. Selected Chinese agribusiness and infrastructure investments in Brazil, 2003–2016

Companies involved	Investment project/negotiation	Status
Chinatex	Commercial office; port terminals; and joint-ventures with grain traders	Commercial office est. 2003, all other negotiations stalled
Lu Weiguang (Shanghai Anxin)	Timberland; and joint-venture for timber processing and exports	Timber processing established circa 2004; faked acquisition of 100,000 ha circa 2004
Fuhua Group	Registration and commercialization of pesticides	Began seeking product registrations around 2006-8, still waiting for product registrations in 2015
Zhejiang Fudi and Beidahuang	Farmland for soy production	Acquired 16,749 ha in 2007-8 (sought as much as 150,000ha) sold operations around 2011
Pacific Century Group (PCG)	Farmland for soy, maize, and cotton production; brokering financial investments into farmland	The PCG purchased 37% of CalyxAgro with 27,398 ha in 2008, hoping to reach 100,000 ha in total, but expansion halted since 2010
Raymond Kwok and Adrian Fu (Agrifirma)	Farmland for soy, maize, and cotton production; brokering financial investments into farmland	Kwok and Fu made minority investments in 2008 in Agrifirma's 42,000 ha; assets expanded to 71,276 ha but plans for a Hong Kong IPO collapsed after 2010
Shandong Rainbow	Registration and commercialization of pesticides	Established paper company in 2008, obtained first product registration in 2015
Zhongshan Chemical Industries	Registration and commercialization of pesticides	Began seeking product registrations around 2008-10, still waiting for product registrations in 2015
Suli Group	Registration and commercialization of pesticides	Began seeking product registrations around 2008-10, still waiting for product registrations in 2015
Shandong Dong'e E'jiao	Exports of donkey hides; processing donkey meat and leather	Sought exports independently from 2008 to 2013; negotiated for partnerships with slaughterhouses from 2014 to 2016 with no success
CNADG	Agricultural demonstration farm, unspecified agricultural cooperation projects for finance and infrastructure	Negotiations held in 2009 and 2010, then abandoned

Sustainable Forest Holdings	Timberland, timber extraction, processing, and exports	Acquired about 44,500 ha of timberland and a local mill in 2009; negotiated for acquisition of additional 235,000 ha and contract extraction over another 200,000 ha in 2010, but negotiations collapsed in 2011
Bank of China	Financial credit for production and import/export, currency exchange services	Subsidiary established in 2009, operational since 2010 (55% of loan portfolio for agribusiness in 2015)
Sanhe Hopeful	Finance, warehouse, and port construction for soy exports	Finance and warehouse negotiations attempted from 2009 to 2010; participation in port construction since 2010
Chongqing Grain Group (CGG)	Farmland for soy production; soy processing; port terminals	Sought 200,000 ha in 2009, acquired 51,821 ha in 2011, then incorporated operations of Zhejiang Fudi-Beidahuang. Soy processing and port terminal projects abandoned circa 2014
Pallas International	Farmland for soy production	Negotiations announced for 250,000 ha in 2010, but no records of any follow-up
Jiusan (Beidahuang)	Commercial office, port terminals	Port negotiations attempted but failed circa 2010-2013
Shandong Guanfeng	Oil palm plantation and processing; biodiesel production; manioc plantation and flour production	Sought 50,000 ha for oil palm, acquired about 6,000 ha circa 2010; palm oil and biodiesel processing abandoned c. 2015; manioc project attempted and failed c. 2015
BBCA Group	Maize processing and citric acid production facility, sugarcane processing and ethanol production, participation in port and railroad construction	Sugarcane/ethanol projects abandoned in 2010, maize/citric acid project began construction in 2015-6, participation in infrastructure projects stalled
Ningbo Tide	Registration and commercialization of pesticides; production of pesticides	Established paper company in 2010; acquired Brazilian company with two production facilities in 2014
ChemChina (Syngenta, Adama)	Commercial offices for pesticide and seed trading; pesticide and seed R&D and production facilities; warehouses	Global-level M&As launched in 2011 (Adama) and 2016 (Syngenta)
Nutrichem-Huapont Pharm	Registration and commercialization of pesticides	Subsidiary in 2011; made minority-share investment in CCAB Agro in 2012, but divested from 2013 to 2017; obtained first independent product registration in 2017

China Railway Construction Company	Railroad construction	Pursued investment partnership with Brazilian construction company around 2012-2015, stalled since
China Tobacco International	Contract farming and tobacco exports; further investment in processing and warehouses	Joint-venture with US company, operational since 2012 with procurement from estimated 12,000 farmers on about 22,000 ha; additional investments in processing and warehouses stalled
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)	Financial credit for production and import/export, currency exchange services	Subsidiary established in 2013 (agribusiness likely to be significant in its portfolio)
Yuan Longping High-Tech	Cooperation for hybrid rice development	Small-scale experiments led by Brazilian entrepreneur in 2013 and 2014
COFCO (Noble Agri, Nidera)	Commercial offices for soy, maize, cotton, sugar, ethanol, coffee, and fertilizer trading; sugar and ethanol processing; soy and maize seed production; warehouses and port terminals; waterway navigation	Global-level M&As launched in early 2014, consolidated by early 2017. Major new warehouses and port projects starting operation in 2016
China Construction Bank	Financial credit for production and import/export, currency exchange services	Acquired Brazilian bank in 2014 (20% of loan portfolio for agribusiness in 2015)
Bank of Communications	Financial credit for production and import/export, currency exchange services	Acquired a Brazilian bank in 2015 (41% of loan portfolio for agribusiness in 2016)
Pengxin Group	Commercial offices, warehouses, and leased port terminals for soy and maize	Acquisition of local Brazilian company Fiagril in 2016

Source: Oliveira 2017a

A full account of the origins, development, and denouement of each of these negotiations and investments far transcends the scope of this paper, where I simply group these deals into various categories for analysis of this specific question about the character of Chinese agribusiness investments in Brazil in terms of SSC. I identify and discuss in turn seven distinct sets of deals for analysis: (1) investments focused in agricultural commodity exports from Brazil and directly associated infrastructure such as warehouses and ports, (2) investments focused on farmland and agricultural production, (3) investments focused on agroindustrial processing, including agrochemical production, (4) investments focused on agrochemical imports to Brazil, (5) investments focused on technological transfer or cooperation, (6) investments focused on infrastructure indirectly associated with agribusiness exports, primarily railroads, and (7) establishment of financial operations for which agribusiness lending is significant. Of course, as evident in the table above, several companies pursued multiple types of investments in different times or simultaneously, and this categorization does not differentiate between direct investments and indirect investments through M&As of transnational or Brazilian companies.

1 Agroindustrial export-oriented investments. Attempts at direct investments in this category were largely unsuccessful in the soy sector, where Chinatex took the lead but failed to establish more than a commercial office, and Sanhe Hopeful became the only Chinese company to establish direct participation in a new port construction project for soy exports in 2010, but the project has languished for years in a troubled environmental licensing process. Beidahuang/Jiusan, the

Chongqing Grain Group (CGG), and a few other smaller companies not listed on this table attempted but failed to establish similar projects beyond commercial offices. Major successes only emerged in 2014 with COFCO's indirect entrance through its global-level acquisitions of Noble and Nidera, and at a far smaller scale with the Pengxin Group's partial acquisition of Fiagril in 2016. Given how central the soy sector has been for Brazil-China agroindustrial trade, this represents a very significant "disappointment" for agribusinesses on both ends of the anticipated partnership. A few companies successfully established operations in the Brazilian timber sector (Shanghai Anxin and Sustainable Forest Holdings, in addition to the continuation of operations by other companies established in Brazil prior to 2003), but they all became highly troubled with social and environmental conflicts and largely ceased operations in Brazil. The highly differentiated negotiations by Shandong Dong'e E'jiao—which will be further discussed below—also failed entirely, while the only other example of successful operations in this category, the China Tobacco International joint-venture with Alliance One in Brazil, also illustrates how transnational M&As are the most effective means for Chinese agribusiness capital to establish itself in Brazil. In short, there is no evidence that concerted efforts by the Brazilian federal and state governments alongside Brazilian agribusinesses successfully leveraged Chinese investments to its high-priority corridors and chokepoints (like the port of Itaqui), while the more effective Chinese M&As in turn demonstrate how Chinese agribusiness capital is becoming successful in Brazil not through SSC strategies, but rather by incorporating transnational corporations from the Global North and reproducing North-South dynamics of asymmetric and uncoordinated investment.

2 Farmland and agricultural production. This is the category that drew most attention across media, policy, and academic circles as "land grabs", and also where negotiations and attempted investments failed most spectacularly—not only high-profile negotiations like those by the CNADG and Sanhe Hopeful, which were frequently mischaracterized as land grabs (Oliveira 2017a, 2017c), and the CGG, which did succeed in acquiring a significant amount of farmland directly and through the incorporation of an earlier Chinese investment, but also and perhaps even more importantly regarding the Chinese participation in new corporate vehicles for channeling financial capital into farmland and agricultural production (as was the case of Kwok and Fu's investments in Agrifirma, and the Pacific Century Group's in CalyxAgro). As I discuss further elsewhere (Oliveira 2017a, 2017c, and in another paper currently being co-written with Xu Siyuan), even those investments that did take place in this category became largely unprofitable and highly troubled by socio-environmental conflicts, as evident in the cases of Fudi-Beidahuang, CGG, Shandong Guanfeng, Shanhai Anxin, and Sustainable Forestry Holdings. Once again, there is evidence that M&As have also been more effective in acquiring farmland itself, given the fact that COFCO's acquisition of Noble also incorporates four sugar mills and their associated farmland, which I estimate at around 120,000 ha between owned and leased sugarcane fields. Contrasting the exorbitant amount of farmland initially pursued with the number of hectares that actually came under Chinese (direct or indirect) ownership is one of the strongest illustrations of the limitations of all Chinese agribusiness investments in Brazil. Hence, this is exactly the category where Chinese observers identify their greatest failure to "move faster", while doing so would certainly aggravate their challenges and stoke greater resistance against Chinese land grabbing and associated investments across various other links of agroindustrial chains. Still, the example of COFCO's sugarcane fields acquired through M&A reinforces the critique that Chinese agroindustrial capital is indeed placing itself in a North-South relation to Brazil, even if this is not taking place through FDI mechanisms as sought by companies like Fudi-Beidahuang, Shandong Guanfeng, CGG, etc.

3 Agroindustrial processing. Although the CGG also pursued a very high profile negotiation for the construction of a soybean processing facility, Shanghai Anxin and the BBCA Group are the only successful cases of "greenfield" (i.e. new) agroindustrial projects. Existing agrochemical production facilities came under the control of Ningbo Tide and ChemChina through their acquisitions of Brazilian and transnational companies, again illustrating the contrasting dynamic between direct and indirect investment mechanisms. After the collapse of negotiations for commercial exports alone, the Shandong Dong'e E'jiao company also considered participating directly in agroindustrial processing (donkey slaughtering, meat and leather processing) for export with Brazilian partners, but the Brazilian manager of the company was unable to secure sufficient backing from headquarters without first establishing a commercial flow. Since this specific production chain of donkey ranchers and processors is basically non-existent in Brazil, and donkey populations are limited to the poor semi-arid northeastern region where poor peasants organized in agrarian reform settlements and cooperatives were the ones who stood most to benefit from the partnership with the Chinese investor, this is *one* case where I believe the successful establishment of the Chinese investment would indeed have served legitimate South-South cooperation goals. This is in contrast, however, with the successful establishment of the Shanhai Anxin lumber mill and the BBCA Group's citric acid factory—although both projects do upgrade Brazilian agroindustrial capacity, the Amazonian timber sector is among the worst in terms of generating good quality employment, environmentally sustainable production practices, and industrial linkages in Brazil, while the citric acid industry primarily supplies the highly concentrated food processing sector, particularly "soft" or sugary drinks that generate greater public health concerns than supply nutritious foods. Thus, leveraging *some* agroindustrial processing investments certainly could advance SSC, but that has not been the predominant trend.

4 Agrochemical imports. This is the most overlooked sector with substantial Chinese investments in Brazil, and also one that took off well before the 2007-2008 food price and financial crises brought Chinese agribusiness investments into the spotlight. In fact, while these investments articulate intimately with the expansion of Brazilian export-oriented agroindustrial production, they actually target Brazil as a major *market* for Chinese products. The early efforts by companies like the Fuhua Group, Shandong Rainbow, Zhongshan Chemical Industries, and the Suli Group were largely frustrated, as the Brazilian consultants and service providers they hired were unable to deliver product registrations for commercialization in Brazil as fast as promised. The alternative mechanism of entering the Brazilian market through minority share investments (Nutrichem-Huapont Pharm), acquisitions of local companies (Ningbo Tide), or transnational companies with operations in Brazil (ChemChina), once again provided faster and more successful results. Note, however, that these companies still need to undergo the same years-long process of soliciting registrations for new products they intend to ship from their headquarters in China to their new subsidiaries in Brazil. This creates a situation where Chinese headquarter strategies come into conflict with the priorities of local partners, illustrated by the collapse of Nutrichem's investment in CCAB Agro. While this is clearly a sector characterized by the "slow" entrance of Chinese capital, nonetheless it is also one that is entirely conditioned by the socio-ecological and production logics of chemical-dependent agricultural production—which has aggravated socio-ecological crises in Brazil, and perpetuated Brazilian dependence on the Global North, which now incorporates ChemChina among its leading transnational companies dominating the sector. In other words, this is a sector where lamenting that some deals have not proceeded as fast as hoped, as well as celebrating that some M&As have leapfrogged into global leadership, both illustrate how Chinese agribusiness investments in Brazil don't alter but reproduce North-South dynamics.

5 Technological transfer or cooperation. This is the set of deals that should most clearly characterize SCC, but it is also the field in which there has been least progress *because* there has been the fewest and smallest initiatives. The only two initiatives that would clearly fall into this category were the CNADG negotiations with the Goiás state government, and the much smaller scale spin-off project elaborated by a Goiás-based bureaucrat and agribusiness entrepreneur in conjunction with the Yuan Longping High-Tech company. While the CNADG considered replicating its model of agricultural demonstration farms from Africa in Brazil to encourage further production of crops desired by the Chinese market, the Goiás state government had a much more specific project in mind for financing soy expansion under the control of Brazilian soy farmers and/or cooperatives, and this mismatch—combined with the powerful push-back against Chinese farm-based investments in 2010—halted negotiations altogether. This is also a set of practices, however, where there could certainly be far more agroecological initiatives that could actually bring greater social, environmental, and economic benefits to Brazilians and Chinese actors alike, particularly with collaborations on higher value-added and less corporate-controlled production chains like bamboos, mushrooms, garlic, other fruits and vegetables, and even the donkey project pursued by the Shandong Dong'e E'jiao company mentioned above, which contemplated technological transfer and cooperation for the genetic improvement of Brazilian donkeys at a later stage of the commercial-agroindustrial cooperation pursued with Brazilian peasant cooperatives. In other words, this is likely the only set of deals where legitimate SSC opportunities have indeed been lost, and would benefit from more, deeper, faster, and better supported collaborations.

6 Infrastructure (railroads). While the attempted, stalled, and largely failed investments in farmland have been the ones more bemoaned in Chinese mainstream debates, the Brazilian mainstream debates—in line with the primary and most extensive efforts of the Brazilian government under both Workers' Party and the current administration to attract Chinese investments[7]—pertain almost entirely to this category of investments. At various moments since 2003, Brazilian public and private actors boosted for Chinese investments in various Brazilian railroad projects, such as the North-South Railroad which anchored negotiations with the CNADG and Sanhe Hopeful in Goiás state, the West-East Integration Railroad (FIOL) that motivated negotiations with the CGG in Bahia state, two railroad projects in Mato Grosso do Sul state (Ferroeste and Novoeste) that are targeted by the BBCA Group as possibly articulated with their agroindustrial investment in that state, and various other companies primarily associated with soybean crushing and trade that expressed interest in various railroad projects that intersect Mato Grosso state. Through extensive interviews with Brazilian and Chinese boosters, brokers, bureaucrats, and businessmen (mostly men) working directly on negotiations for railroad investments, however, I was only able to identify one that actually reached the level of coordinating a proposal for railroad construction with a Brazilian partner: the China Railway Construction Company's collaboration with the Brazilian construction conglomerate Camargo Corrêa for the construction of a railroad connecting the northern soy-producing region of Mato Grosso around Lucas do Rio Verde to the North-South Railroad at Campinorte (Goiás state). The negotiations collapsed for reasons that I explore in future publications, while here I merely highlight that all the infrastructure construction and upgrading that has been "brought to the table" so far pertains exclusively to the facilitation of more soybean and other corporate-dominated agribusiness exports. Thus, they only characterize SSC in so far as we ignore the manner that accelerated development of these sectors would simply deepen the ecological crises and social contradictions that continue to exist in both Brazil and China as result of North-South dynamics, that would not be transformed but simply extended with the greater integration of elites from the Global South into new transnational infrastructure and agroindustrial production networks.

7 Finance. While successful M&As in agrochemical inputs and seeds (ChemChina, Ningbo Tide), and processing and trade (COFCO, Pengxin Group, China Tobacco International) are starting to be recognized as major mechanisms through which Chinese agribusiness capital has entered Brazil (and elsewhere), far less recognized is the similar and perhaps equally strategic role of Chinese financiers in establishing roots for agribusiness lending in Brazil. Starting with the Bank of China, and followed by the ICBC, China Construction Bank, and the Bank of Communications, these major Chinese banks have either established subsidiaries or acquired local banks in Brazil to start relatively significant agribusiness lending, focused on import-export credit and currency swap mechanisms that explicitly aim to contribute to the internationalization of the renminbi. Similarly with other M&A operations up- and downstream from farming itself described above, this process outpaces the high-profile FDIs expected by the policy banks (i.e. the China Development Bank above all, but also the China Export-Import Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank of China), and reflects the transnational business logic of financiers from the Global North rather than any explicit strategy for SSC—with the sole exception, of course, of their contribution to eroding the centrality of the US dollar as the world's decisive reserve currency (cf. Oliveira 2016). What these financial deals bring to the foreground, on the other hand, is precisely how contradictory this process of expansion of Chinese

[7] As witnessed, for example, through participant observation of the CEBC-organized corporate seminars that took place during the state visits of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang to Brazil (July 2014 and May 2015).

capital for Brazilian agribusiness has become, once it is articulated primarily through transnational M&As and financial mechanisms that enable the entrance of Chinese firms into competition with the top-tier investors from the Global North, while leaving intact the North-South dynamics of asymmetric agroindustrial exploitation that has characterized Brazil and its foreign relations since colonial times.

4 No lament for the Sluggish South or celebration of the New North

My dataset and analysis above exposes fundamental contradictions in the mainstream debate in China, and the currently disfavored debate in Brazil that mirrors the Chinese lament over the fact that Chinese agribusiness investments in Brazil have proceeded "too slowly", and opportunities for more SSC have been lost with the onset of political and economic crisis in Brazil. Whether it was through large-scale farmland acquisitions, extensive railroad construction projects, agrochemical imports, and finance, the vast majority of faltering Chinese FDIs would strengthen the sectors of Brazilian society most intimately associated with neo-colonial conditions: export-oriented, 'green revolution'-style agribusiness elites who are the modern equivalent of colonial merchant elites (the "comprador" class). This dovetails with early critiques of the fundamental political economic "instability" of most Brazil-China agroindustrial partnerships pursued (Ferchen 2011), as well as the broader set of denouncements of SSC as a façade for transnational capitalist development unfolding from and through the Global South in way that integrate Southern elites yet remain under the hegemony of the Global North (Prashad 2013; Zibechi 2014; Warner 2015; Oliveira and Schneider 2016; Oliveira 2016).

There were a few agroindustrial investment negotiations pursued (e.g. by the Shandong Dong'e E'jiao) that could legitimately transform these dynamics by empowering peasant cooperatives in Brazil, and various other sectors that have not been prioritized for state and corporate negotiations but that could provide similar agroecological and social benefits. But the successful entrance of Chinese agribusiness capital into Brazil through transnational M&As, celebrated in China and even by some in Brazil as illustration of the triumph of Southern capital, illustrates in fact how SSC is reduced to a mere smokescreen to disarticulate resistance against Chinese neo-colonial incursions into Brazil and the rest of the Global South, while positioning itself more competitively against the Global North.

With this critique, therefore, what I challenge is the very terms in which most mainstream debates have taken place in China and in the "developmentalist" camp (as opposed to the neoliberal camp) in Brazil: the problem for SSC between Brazil and China hasn't been that Chinese investments in Brazilian agribusiness have been too sluggish (regarding the companies that elsewhere I call "Paper Tigers", Oliveira 2017a), or in turn that transnational M&As illustrate successful strategies for such investments (by companies that I call "Dragon Heads" in that same text). The problem has been that most Brazil-China agroindustrial partnerships continue to be directed towards and limited by the existing corporate-controlled agribusiness production system, which is in turn embedded in and reproduces the unequal class and international dynamics characteristic of North-South relations and the agribusiness sector it has produced in Brazil.

5 Misguided geopolitics or misguided class politics?

My argument above also translates into a critique of the mainstream position currently dominant in the Brazilian government, that SSC is based upon misguided geopolitics, by shifting the debate from the terrain of inter-state relations to the class politics that undergirds different foreign policy approaches. The problem at hand is not that SSC may or may not be misguided geopolitically, if we understand SSC to be the encouragement of the majority of Chinese agribusiness and infrastructure investments pursued over the last fourteen years. After all, the geopolitics of diversifying commercial partners, investors, and diplomatic allies from the Global North has not weakened, but in fact strengthened Chinese and Brazilian agribusiness actors (Saraiva 2007; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007; Wilkinson 2009; Wilkinson and Wesz Jr 2013; Sommerville et al. 2014; Warner 2015; Hopewell 2013, 2015;

Oliveira and Schneider 2016; Oliveira 2016), so the characterization of its negative effects "for Brazil" actually refers to an inter-sectorial and intra-elite conflict between those state agents and agribusiness (and mineral sector) executives and managers who have benefitted from closer relations with China, and the other state and government agents and manufacturing-based industrialists who have been outcompeted by Chinese imports.

"Breaking open" the black-box of "Brazil's geopolitical interests" in terms of class relations, moreover, also exposes an even more blatant contradiction between the discourse of SSC pursued by the Workers' Party and its strategy of class-compromise that incorporated those sectors of the Brazilian elite who stood to make the greatest gains from Chinese investments and closer cooperation. After all, were SSC policies articulated with a socialist class politics, whereby the Brazilian and Chinese states coordinate agroindustrial investments, technological transfer, and agroecological collaborations with the goal of eliminating export-oriented/import-dependent production systems—that have emerged as a consequence of, and still continue to reproduce international inequalities—SSC cooperation would not be "geopolitically misguided" at all, but quite essential for socialist redistribution and development within both China and Brazil.

What we witness with the class-compromise politics that the Workers' Party attempted to sustain, and that collapsed spectacularly when Temer and his bureaucratic-oriented Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) shifted from the largest coalition partner of the Workers' Party to its undertaker, is the fundamental contradiction that explains both the "sluggishness" of SSC efforts and also the reason why the Chinese M&As that went furthest have been the ones pursued independently of Brazilian governmental collaboration. In attempting to sustain a misguided class politics of compromise with the elites, the Workers' Party disabled itself from taking full advantage of the opportunities that emerged from Chinese interest and capacity for investments, since propelling peasant- and working-class-oriented investments would have undermined the power of Brazilian elites, and even coordinating effective integration of Chinese capital for agroindustrial and infrastructure expansion that benefits primarily Brazilian agribusiness elites would also require effectively nationalizing the powerful construction conglomerates that failed to secure effective cooperation with Chinese counterparts. We must conclude, therefore, that underlying the debate about the geopolitical basis and implications of SSC is actually a more fundamental debate about class politics, to which I turn in the next, concluding section.

6 The South-South Question

My critique of the terms in which mainstream debates are carried out about Chinese agribusiness investments in Brazil as a form of SSC is rooted in my analysis of the most extensive dataset assembled to date on Chinese negotiations and investments across all sectors of Brazilian agribusiness (Oliveira 2017a), which is simply sketched out in this working paper. But this schematic analysis may already suffice to bring the reader to consider what I call the "South-South Question:" a discussion that builds upon Antonio Gramsci's classic engagement with the Southern Question, and provides a fruitful framework with which to engage the intersection of geopolitics and class politics, industrial and agricultural articulation, and the role of agrarian elites and social movements in the struggles for democracy and greater inter-regional equality.[8]

Fist, I explain my parallel with Antonio Gramsci's famous engagement with the "southern question" about how the "backwards" and agrarian region of southern Italy could be effectively integrated with the more "advanced" industrialized region to the north of the country (Gramsci 2000). Since the unification of Italy in 1871 and through the time Gramsci's work on this essay was interrupted by his

[8] The remainder of this section is a revised section of my introduction in Oliveira 2017a.

arrest at the hands of fascist policemen in 1926, industrial capitalists and financiers from northern Italy had allied with the southern landed elite to ruthlessly exploit southern peasants, many of whom fled landlessness, unemployment, and extreme poverty in their homeland to seek a new life in Brazil and the rest of the Americas. Gramsci argued that a peculiar class of *"intellectuals"* from rural middle classes (such as the clergy, lawyers and other liberal professionals, and politicians who come from and advance the interests of medium- and large-scale land owners in southern Italy) play the pivotal role in producing the *hegemony* of the capitalist elite over peasants in the south and industrial workers in the north (ibid.; emphases added). That is, these mid-level rural intellectuals are the key actors who assemble the specific mixture of coercion and consent among the working classes that secures their adverse integration into the capitalist structure of society and sustains inter-regional inequalities. Consequently, Gramsci argued, peasants and workers must cultivate their own "organic intellectuals" who can expose and contest the injustices of this capitalist hegemony and uneven development, and construct thereby an effective alliance between industrial workers from the north and peasants from the south in their common struggle for a revolutionary transformation of society (ibid.).

What I call the "South-South question" reconstructs Gramsci's own question and argument at the global scale and in contemporary terms. I anchor this analysis in Brazil and China as the most important new hubs of agroindustrial expansion worldwide, taking them as the most advanced regions of a Global South that remains deeply agrarian and exploited by (agro)industrialist and financial elites from the Global North. Thus, the hegemonic agrarian questions of our age pertain to how peasants, agroindustrial workers, and agribusiness corporations from Brazil and China – still marred by the "backwardness" of their colonial and semi-colonial legacies – may "catch up" and/or become integrated with the the more "advanced" and industrialized capitalist world economy still rooted in the Global North, particularly the United States (Graziano da Silva 1980; Jales et al. 2006; Castro 2008; Huang, Otsuka, and Rozelle 2008; Barros 2009; Deininger et al. 2010; Liversage 2011; State Council 2012; Lin 2012; Woo 2012; Nassif et al. 2014). Like Gramsci, I also argue that a particular set of middle class intellectuals hailing from China and Brazil – boosters, brokers, bureaucrats, and agribusiness managers and executives, who I collectively call *agribusiness professionals* – play the key role in reproducing the hegemony of agroindustrial elites over peasants and workers across their own countries and the rest of the Global South. In examining the conditions of possibility for Chinese agroindustrial investments in Brazil, I reveal that these agribusiness professionals are the ones who essentially assemble Chinese agroindustrial capital with Brazilian land, labor, and expertise. Furthermore, to accomplish this they must also assemble the necessary discursive, institutional, and political instruments for competing against established agribusiness elites and corporations from the Global North, and subjecting the marginalized peasants and exploited workers across the Global South to their own agroindustrial projects through a mixture of coercion and consent.

Although the argument I develop elsewhere does not pertain primarily to SSC or postconolial discourses (Oliveira 2017a; for a good outline of those, see Cesarino 2013, 2017), but rather to transnational class formation, class struggle and resistance to agroindustrial exploitation, my conclusion also follows Gramsci's argument that "organic intellectuals" from among the peasantry and working classes of the Global South are the ones best positioned to contest these new forms of capitalist hegemony emerging through transnational partnerships between Brazilian and Chinese agribusiness professionals. They have already effectively led a cross-class and transnational coalition that successfully imposed restrictions on acquisition of farmland by foreigners in Brazil since 2010, coordinated the high-profile land occupation of a Chinese-owned farms in Brazil in 2015, and even attempted to cultivate transnational alliances between Brazilian and Chinese peasants and peasant-oriented and cooperatively–managed partnerships with Chinese agribusinesses. Yet their efforts have been largely overshadowed, outmaneuvered, and outpaced by the agroindustrial projects that reproduce the hegemony of transnational agribusiness elites (including those emerging from China, Brazil, and the rest of the Global South), especially through transnational M&As that bypass the framework of "land grabs" in their entirety.

The challenge for anti-capitalist intellectuals emerging organically from peasant and working class movements in Brazil and China, therefore, turns on the necessity of reframing mainstream agrarian questions from "catching up" with the Global North through capitalist agroindustrial partnerships, to the agroecological needs and political imperatives of a revolutionary transformation of our societies.

Rather than simply reforming state institutions and capitalist markets to better include agribusiness professionals from China and Brazil among transnational elites, therefore, our task at hand is threefold. We need to begin with a fundamental critique of the discourses of agroindustrial modernization that underpin the mainstream South-South question and the promotion of "national development" through capitalist elites and agribusiness professionals. Then we must work through an analysis of contemporary South-South flows of agroindustrial capital and commodities that goes deeper than land grabs and foreignization. However, given the (agro)ecological dimensions of the contemporary crisis and the critique that I have outlined (cf. Oliveira 2009, 2010), I must part ways with Gramsci and other early 20th century socialist revolutionaries in their belief that it is the proletariat, the industrial working class, that can "become the leading [*dirigente*] and the dominant class to the extent that it success in in creating a system of class alliances which allows it to mobilize the majority of the working population [i.e. the peasantry and both urban and rural middle classes] against capitalism and the bourgeois state" (Gramsci 2000: 173). What the major socialist revolutions of the 20th century demonstrated in Russia, China, Cuba, and several other largely agrarian countries, and what we witness in the contemporary rekindling of indigenous and peasant resistance to (agroindustrial) capitalism that has become expressed by the international umbrella of rural social movements named *La Via Campesina* (Desmarais 2007; Borras and Franco 2010), is the fact that the *peasantry* rather than the industrial proletariat is leading *and needs to lead* the organization of the masses of industrial workers and both urban and rural middle classes into anti-capitalist struggles for agrarian reform, rooted in agroecology, and oriented towards food sovereignty. Still, I remain in agreement with Gramsci that this peasant-led alliance's "greater or lesser success in this necessary task will also depend upon its ability to break up the intellectual bloc," i.e. the influential middling agribusiness professionals who assemble Chinese capital with Brazilian agribusiness, serving as "the flexible, but extremely resistant, armour of the agrarian bloc" (Gramsci 2000: 185), the increasingly integrated and transnational landed, agroindustrial, and financial elites from across the Global North and South.

Note on citation: Please make reference to Oliveira (2017a) rather than this conference paper, as the key arguments here are developed more fully in my doctoral dissertation.

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