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Exodus of the ‘Surplus’: Apprehending the Mediterranean Migration Crisis

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Abstract

Duffield in “Introduction: Development and Surplus Life” succeeds in articulating the relationships between development, security and biopolitics and underscores how the concept of ‘security’ has expanded beyond its traditional concern with State security to encompass the securitization of international development phenomena such as endemic poverty, environmental stress and societal breakdown; reckoning also the growing deployment of biopolitical technologies by key actors to intervene in such events. Duffield’s introduction and other interesting papers cement the base for this paper given its ramifications on migration particularly South-North migration. I critically examine the current mass migration (via the Mediterranean) of majorly Africans to Europe from a securitized development lens. These series of development circumstances undergirding the migration and reckless loss of lives on the Mediterranean and the subsequent invocation of humanitarian as well as security concerns by State and non-State actors including the European Union in responding to the ‘crisis’ is carefully appraised from development and governance perspectives. I draw on de Vries’ notion of “Ethics of the Real” in understanding the motivations of African migrants to embark on their ‘risky’ journey to Europe via the Mediterranean. I conclude that hope and hopelessness are both involved in the Mediterranean migration situation which is (re)produced through the constant invocation of security, development and biopolitics by the West towards Africa. Subsequently, I recommend effective interventions must divorce the politics of problematization that has overly leaned towards securitized development narrative in order to unravel the challenge from its very core.

Keywords: security, development, governmentality, biopolitics, ‘surplus population’ migration, ‘ethics of the real’
Introduction

Certain events in our ‘global’ society eventually become constituted as historic events and occasionally become the organizing themes around which our future is professed and shaped. The Mediterranean migration crisis herein abbreviated MMC, its underlying causes, its humanitarian and political treatment and its multiple impressions and representations for and by diverse actors depending on their positionality, political, human, social and cultural orientations etc in society has become not just an event; it also is a spectacle and litmus test of our claimed ‘common humanity’, our rhetoric of globalization, our civilization, our measure of who is free and who must be freed from the bondage of oppression, subjugation and repressive malignment. To put it more bluntly, I consider events such as the MMC a measure of how humans make significance of constructed identities and how ultimately the political domestication of the human conscience and the apparent discrimination, segregation of who belongs and who does not rages.

It constitutes a pardonable cliché to argue that the MMC has in recent times dominated major news headlines and scientific journals as well as conferences while also capturing the usual attention of key actors including; humanitarian agencies, United Nation’s affiliate bodies, the EU and their adjunct intervention machinery including navies, paramilitary and biopolitical technologies of interventions (see Duffield 2013; Lutterbeck 2006; Pugh 2001). Beyond its near-cliché however, it almost has failed to attract needed political treatment that measures up to the magnitude of the crisis. The broad dimensions and magnitude of the crises does not make an academic endeavour such as this one irrelevant or inconclusive of need. Following from Duffield’s (2001) “Introduction: Development and the Surplus Life” Duffield (2001) in which he succinctly articulates the relationships between development, security and biopolitics, I trace and account for the Mediterranean migration crisis in close reference. The Mediterranean migration crisis not only offers bare-illustrative gateway to understanding Duffield’s theorization of the treatment of ‘surplus populations’ in liberal concessions but also offers prospects for teasing out other interesting themes on the crisis and its management.

I pursue this issue and paper under six themes; first I set the MMC in perspective by detailing its origins, migratory routes and existing approaches to intervening in the crises; in theme two I explore the dominating securitized-development narrative of the EU and its implications on the handling of the crises; in theme three, I tease out the politics of problematization as reflected in the narrowness of interventions currently applied to the MMC; in theme four, I go beyond securitized-development conceptualizations to explore further other factors undergirding the crisis and showcase why it is important to expand the arena of interventions; in theme five, I situate the MMC in human rights perspective and trace out pertinent issues that work repeatedly to give South-North migration a bad face in Eurocentric migration politicization, problematization and interventionism. In the last theme, I deploy “the ethics of the real” as propounded by de Vries to surmount migrants’ motivation to embark on the seemingly ‘risky’ Mediterranean journey to Europe. I conclude on a puzzled note to argue that hope and hopelessness are ingrained in the crises and handling it needs far-broader appreciation of the crisis that takes account of its multiple faces, its complex interplay with other crises situations - natural and human-induced; internal and external to come to justifiable, equitable and lasting solutions.

1. Contextualizing the Mediterranean Migration – Origins, Routes and Intervention approaches

Hereunder this theme, I provide a brief overview of the Mediterranean migration and how it has eventually assumed a challenge conceived in hegemonic securitized-development lens by Western and specifically many European political actors. I argue that even though there are certain levels of security concerns regarding the MMC, the hegemonic security posture adopted by European actors in intervening in the crisis downplays other equally plausible accounts of the crisis and alternative interventions flowing thereof. This invariably also makes existing interventions not responsive to the actualities on the ground and thereby producing counter and ineffective measures in resolving the crisis. I exhaust this theme under three sub-headings by first locating the origins of the MMC, major sea routes used by the would-be migrants and how Europe has responded to the crisis over the years.
2. Origins

Lutterbeck provides a brief geopolitical overview and relevance of the Mediterranean and posits that with the demise of bipolarity, it no longer remains a dividing line between the East and West but rather between the North and South. In a rather developmental sense he asserts that the Mediterranean “is a line of separation between highly industrialized, prosperous and stable countries, and countries which are plagued by poverty, demographic imbalances and various domestic and regional tensions” (Lutterbeck 2006 p. 21). This development-oriented view of the North and South however does not substantially account for all the historic and emerging circumstances that have promulgated and undergirded South-North migration even though they cannot be wholly dismissed in contributing to the MMC.

3. Mediterranean Migratory Routes

The relevance of the Mediterranean as gateway to Europe cannot be overemphasized and this is proven by the increasing spate of immigrants using the route to access Europe. Notably, the Mediterranean is considered one of the most important access points used by undocumented immigrants to reach the EU (Europol, 2005). The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) for example estimates 100,000 to 120,000 irregular migrants cross the Mediterranean each year; out of this about 35,000 arrive from sub-Saharan Africa; 55,000 from the south and east Mediterranean, and 30,000 from other countries majorly Asian and Middle Eastern (ICMPD, 2004: 8).

The MMC is noted as the traditionally and geographically most important entry points along the southern borders of the EU. Two major routes namely – the Straits of Otranto and the Straits of Gibraltar serve the migratory routes predominantly used by immigrants pursuing entry into Europe via the North African countries of Libya, Morocco among others. These traditional routes are increasingly becoming more redirected and difficult to wrestle out of immigrant activities even though there are reported frequent interceptions and increasing monitoring by EU and Mediterranean country sea patrol systems (Lutterbeck 2006). Evidence shows that the intense policing of the Mediterranean Sea routes in recent years have produced counter reaction by sparking the use of clandestine and sometimes more dangerous alternative routes by immigrant ships in order to escape capture by EU patrol teams (Lutterbeck 2006). The growing patrols although justified by the EU as saving migrants who otherwise would have drowned at sea through ‘unworthy’ and ‘overloaded’ boats is also criticised for pushing migrant ships to use more risky and long routes (Lutterbeck, 2006). In some circumstances the human traffickers manning the migrant ships/boats have reportedly forced the migrants out of the boats before actually reaching Italy’s shores in order to avoid being intercepted by the police (CENSIS, 1999).

4. Some EU Responses to the MMC

The EU’s approach towards averting the MMC takes the form of law enforcement geared towards “The need to more effectively secure the EU’s external, including its maritime frontiers to prevent illegal immigration and human smuggling”. This mission has been outlined at a number of both EU level and EU Council meetings including those of Tampere (October 1999), Laeken (December 2001), Seville (June 2002) and Thessaloniki (June 2003) (Lutterbeck 2006 p.12).

It is important to also note that some responses have been embarked solely by individual Southern European countries such as the Guardia Finanza which predominantly is charged in Italy with the prevention of illegal immigration and cross-border crime via sea. In Spain, it is the Guardia Civil which is considered the lead agency in dealing with irregular immigration across the Mediterranean (Lutterbeck 2006).

At the multilateral level, responses have involved joint operations by European naval forces. For example in January 2003, the navies of France, the UK, Spain, Portugal and Italy launched Operation Ulysses, targeted at preventing undocumented migration and human trafficking across the Straits of
Gibraltar and also from the west Sahara towards the Canary Islands (El Pais, 28 January 2003 cited in Lutterbeck, 2006 p. 16).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) naval forces have as well been on the forefront of immigration control in the Mediterranean. For example in 2002, NATO dispatched its Mediterranean fleet to the eastern Mediterranean under its “Operation Active Endeavour” primarily at combating terrorism nonetheless having the prevention of irregular migration and human trafficking across the Mediterranean as another important objective (Sanfelice di Monteforte, 2003).

Beyond these, joint cooperative policing of the Mediterranean has been undertaken usually involving Southern European countries and North African countries. For example, in December 2003, the Spanish and Moroccan governments detailed plans to embark on joint patrols along both Morocco’s Mediterranean and its Atlantic coast. The plan had three elements namely: the exchange of liaison officers in airports and border check points, the creation of joint anti-trafficking units, and the carrying out of mixed patrols along both land and maritime borders. These measures resulted in Spain granting Morocco financial aid package amounting to almost 400m Euros over a three-year period (El Mundo, 4 December 2003; El Pais, 9 December 2003 cited in Lutterbeck, 2006 p. 16).

Similarly, in July 2003, Italy and Libya entered into an agreement to jointly combat irregular immigration and human smuggling from Libya (La Repubblica, 4 July 2003 cited in Lutterbeck, 2006 p. 16). Under this cooperation, Italy lobbied for the removal of sanctions on armed embargo placed on Libya since 1986 for its supposed sponsoring of terrorist activities. The goal has been to provide Libya with the capacity to acquire military-style equipment to police its borders. Subsequently in October 2004, the EU agreed to lift these sanctions against Libya and thus paving the way for Libya to acquire such equipment as radars and night vision devices to secure its borders against irregular migrants (Lutterbeck 2006).

Importantly, these cooperative approaches to dealing with the Mediterranean migration has been criticized as attempts by the EU to ‘externalize’ immigration control beyond their borders towards southern Mediterranean countries, which are thus being co-opted into the role of ‘gatekeepers’ or ‘buffer states’ – usually in exchange for financial assistance or a closer relationship with European countries (or the EU)” (Lutterbeck 2006 p.71).

The EU’s response to the Mediterranean crises has been majorly oriented towards the securitized-development narrative than the humanitarian dimension.

5. Towards securitization of South-North immigration

There is growing securitization of South-North immigration without connections to the realities of and actualities of the factors underpinning the immigration in the first place. Of course, this is a reflective claim that stems from critics of liberal problematic views of security. In that it is argued “A liberal problematic view of security now operates unconnected with actual trends in refugee flows, asylum seekers or internal wars” (Hornqvist 2004 cited in Duffield 2001 p. 14).

Duffield’s rendition of the purpose served by Western immigration interventions is particularly of broader implications for the analysis pursued in this paper. He reiterates the fact that “Cumulative restrictions on international migration, for example, have for decades been justified as resolving the problem of the asymmetric demands made by non-insured migrants on European insurance-based welfare systems” (Duffield 2006 p.18). Such Western orientations to understanding and responding to South-North migration has also showcased broadly in the manner Western political actors handle and treat South-North immigrant crisis which has but mostly sought to “secure the Western way of life”. In that, rather than deal with the practical exigencies of South-North migration, “It has instead focused on containing and reducing the limitless risks of global instability” (Strategy Unit 2005 cited in Duffield 2001 p.16).
It is noticeable that the handling of the Mediterranean migration crises spearheaded by Western political actors orients and drifts towards the character sketch of liberal problematic security views. In that, European actors’ primary preoccupation in the management of the MMC has been “defending freedom and rights, by acting on the genuine fears of ordinary people and the possibility of multiplying risks” particularly as called forth by sections of Western populations (Duffield, 2001 italice mine).

Towards the mid 1970s, commentators note growing opposition to immigration of developing country nationals to the West. Such immigration trend has been viewed scornfully as a ‘problem’ needing control (cf. Castles, 2000:278; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002a: 35-6). This growing uneasiness around immigration by the West is attributed to factors such as economic slowdown and its significant result in unemployment (de Haas 2006). Consequently, immigration from developing countries in particular has been viewed as “a burden and even an outright threat to economic growth and the welfare state” of many European countries (de Haas, 2006 p.3). These latent feelings seem to have risen with the 9/11 event after which non-Western immigrants have been viewed as constituting “an internal threat to social cohesion, cultural coherence, and security of Western societies” at rather alarming levels (de Haas, 2006 p.3).

Lutterbeck also notes that in the 1990s forward, the Mediterranean migration began taking a serious toll on European boundaries and has since attracted security and socio-political and economic reprobation in many European countries if not all (Lutterbeck, 2006). The associated issues of human smuggling, trafficking and cross-border crimes move the issue beyond national security to constitute the perfect description of ‘human security’ by many commentators (see Pugh 2001; Duffield, 2001 de Haas 2006; Lutterbeck 2006). It also reconciles the observation by Duffield that, security in contemporary times has moved beyond its concern with State security to encompass and embody a broader securitization of development phenomena such as poverty, environmental distress etc which are constantly captured under the notions of “human security” (Duffield 2001).

It is important to note two strands of narratives at least as provided by the Copenhagen school in security studies that connect to the MMC in conceptualization and interventionism. The first ‘referent objects of security’ is operative on a humanitarian pivot and is deployed by humanitarian actors such as NGOs, medical volunteers, immigrant support organizations, human rights activists, UN humanitarian agencies and sometimes governments. The humanitarian narrative notably suggests that clandestine migration across the Mediterranean is considered a serious humanitarian challenge given the ever increasing death toll of the would-be immigrants on sea (Pugh, 2001). The aim of interventions born out of this narrative is to ensure “human security” and make immigrants ‘safe’ as far as possible. As Lutterbeck notes about the humanitarian narrative “the main imperative is not to curb migration by all possible means but rather to prevent the loss of life in the Mediterranean, protect the migrants against the human smugglers and ensure the rights of genuine refugees” (Lutterbeck 2006 p.10). The subsequent increase in patrols through the use of paramilitary police, military security forces, and military-style hardware in preventing irregular immigration and cross-border crime has become widespread for southern European countries (Lutterbeck, 2006). However, the increase in patrols has also resulted in diversion of immigrants “sea unworthy” boats through ‘dangerous’ and ‘clandestine’ routes which further increases their risk of capsizing and death of the would-be immigrants (Lutterbeck, 2006). Even though the humanitarian narrative is projected as apolitical, I argue that it practically defies apolitical characterization at least in this paper and I provide basis for this claim in subsequent themes.

The second strand of conceptualization of the Mediterranean migration crises is situated in securitized-development narrative. From this the MMC is treated both as a security threat and attributed to the causal or residual effect of underdevelopment in the countries of origins of the immigrants seeking to enter Europe (Duffield 2001). This securitized-development narrative which is considered a hegemonic discourse conceptualizes and approaches the crises differently and serves different purpose than the humanitarian narrative. According to the Copenhagen school in security studies, for the securitized-development narrative, “clandestine immigration and (supposedly) related transnational
challenges are considered a ‘threat’ to the stability and welfare of European states and societies, and the main objective is thus to deter and prevent undocumented immigration as effectively as possible” ((Waever et al., 1993; Buzan et al., 1998; Pugh, 2001).

From a biopolitical lens, I argue in this paper that the two strands of narratives are not mutually exclusive in terms of their coordination and mutual dependence of the actors treating the crises. I would elaborate this assertion in subsequent paragraphs to illustrate how both humanitarian and securitized-development apparatuses work hand-in-hand to reinforce the crises through biopolitical technologies.

The central point that this paper drives home and echoed by many other scholars cited herein is that the Mediterranean migration is for many European countries “a threat not only to national welfare systems and cultural or national identities but also to domestic peace and stability (Waever et al., 1993; Bigo, 2000; Huysmans, 2000 cited in Lutterbeck, 2006). Such a political orientation is however self-seeking and subverts the stark realities of Europe’s contributory role in setting such migration pattern in motion and sustaining it thereof. Subsequently, I proffer the argument that the ramifications of immigration consistently conceptualized in security frames and actualized through tight-knitted security interventions is both an assault on the integrity of developing country immigrants and a sham on the rhetoric of globalization of the commons spearheaded majorly by Western countries. That said, the insecurity posed by Western political interests in developing country contexts through persistent political destabilization and broad day economic malfeasance and appropriation that signals a rebirth of imperial interests cannot be made to wane away under the guise of security that only ‘sustains the Western way of life’.

The revival of European imperial interests in the South particularly Africa through government and multinational processes of “accumulation by dispossession” cannot exonerate and serve adequate justification by Europe to return to security narratives in protecting its borders, culture, identity and national welfare. The incursions by Southern immigrants on European borders I argue are partly the construction of Europe and its transnational elite political alliances in the South which in itself constitutes bigger threats on the livelihoods, security and sustained existence of many Southern populations.

6. The politics of problematization in the context of the MMC

The hegemony of Eurocentric security narratives in accounting for the MMC is not reducible to European actors’ narrow understanding of the crises; rather, I argue that it is a constitutive element of the politics of problematization. By hegemony, I rely on Gramsci’s definition that hegemony occurs when the dominant bloc “also poses the questions around which the struggle rages” (Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith 1971:182; Hall 1996:423 cited in Duffield 2001)”.

It cannot be discounted that current political theorization of the Mediterranean migration crisis is heavily Eurocentric. In that, the crises is conceptualized and analyzed from the perspective of European actors that invariably elevates European guarded interest while suppressing counter narratives and alternatives to unravelling the crises. This Eurocentric conceptualization of the crisis lends to two identifiable analytical strains and results subsequently in selective interventionism. The first account as argued elsewhere in this paper shows reliance of European political actors on structural accounts of securitized-development narratives that marginalizes counter narratives. The critic I offer to this conceptual orientation and from actor-oriented perspective is that, it misses and grosses over the actualities and practicalities of local conditions, situations and visions that stimulate and set the crisis in motion (Long 2001). Such structurally-based or grand theorizations of the MMC fail to capture the heterogeneous local circumstances that link to global processes of capital accumulation, political interest-seeking, questionable wars and natural disasters that underpin the crisis. Again, such top-down and grand narratives of conceptualizing the crises generate top-down interventions that do not basically address the core of the challenge; at best it generates what I consider to be selective interventionism wherein the crisis and its management are not per se what
address it as effectively and in mutually beneficial way to actors concerned but rather what pays off in the interest of the actor problematizing it - in this case Europe.

The second strain of conceptualizing the crises from dominant Eurocentric security perspective is wrought in the politics of problematization and is therefore questionable in the extent to which it offers critical, balanced and equitable solutions to the crisis. By politics of problematization, I rely on Max Weber’s notion of “Wertbeziehung” wherein Weber articulates the view that “differing social locations, with their distinctive interests and values will affect the selection of problems for investigation” (Weber 1992, pp 146 -214 cited in Merton 1972 p.12). In here, I lay the claim that current interventions of Europe towards mitigating and addressing the MMC are born out of the politics of problematization. Here, there is re-problematization of the crisis according to Europe’s perception of what is problematic. In the same vein, what is problematic generates questions of problematic for who, when, how, and in whose perceptive appreciation of risk and opportunities within the so-called ‘problem’. Finding answers to these questions lead to the ownership and disavowal of ‘problems’ or a section of the problem’s constituents. That is, there is selectivity of ‘the problem’ and consequently selectivity of interventions after a problem has been owned in the manner that it has been perceived to constitute a ‘problem’ by the actor(s) involved.

On the basis of this highly political problematization of the MMC thus, I argue that the yardstick for selecting interventions in response to the MMC do not necessarily respond equally to all actors’ interests including the multitudes and diversity of African migrants. Rather, Europe’s interventionism tends to safeguard European interests at the expense of desperate and Southern immigrants and their political actors.

Put vividly in the context of the politics of problematization, interventions and analysis flowing from the structurally-based securitized-development narratives are not per se based on the actualities on the ground or the problem as perceived by all actors but on the basis of what constitutes a ‘problem’ and what constitutes ‘better intervention’ by the European Community. It is similarly important to mention that in the politics of problematization powerful political actors’ interests intersect with subservient interests and problems are bounded not in their full range of appreciation and scope but in accordance with the hegemony of wishes and desires of the powerful. At best these Eurocentric, highly political and structural conceptualizations of the MMC lead to political selectivity of crises narratives that do not necessarily constitute an absolute and definitive interpretation of ‘crisis’ nor explain the ‘crisis’ adequately beyond futuristic fears and hopes of European political actors and a margin of the European citizenry.

Still within the politics of problematization, many European’s fear of the future of immigration on national identity, culture, as well as economic and political fears are represented and spoken into the current circumstance as absolute truths. Even though enormous evidence exist to suggest that places are under constant shaping and reshaping and culture is not only to be consumed but also to be produced and reproduced through constant iteration and interactions between places, time and people, it is obvious that, Europe has stagnated and buried its head in political, cultural and economic protectionism while singing the vague but enchanting chorus of globalization for the purpose of the global commons – but where is the commons if people irrespective of race, sex, religion or whatsoever cannot move towards the common?

In all this however, it must be noted that the magnitude of the European Community’s reaction towards the MMC does not constitute what basically deals with the crises in mutuallyinclusive manner but rather on the basis of what the European Commission’s interests, capacity and resources - political, economic and social represent and provide for. There is therefore the elimination of equally viable intervention strategies that could potentially address the crises such as the removal of unnecessary’ visa acquisition costs, the removal of throat-cutting financial responsibilities on would-be immigrants from Southern countries, addressing home-land constraints on migrants arriving in Europe, reducing burdensome administrative and political bureaucratic procedures of Western embassies in Africa that seeks to secure “the Western way of life” at the expense of African nationals.
In consonance with this, Lutterbeck presents the cogent assertion that “as the ‘migratory pressure’ in the countries of origin persists, and no or only very limited possibilities of legal immigration exist, any effort to render the EU’s Mediterranean (or its other) borders more impermeable will mainly produce such undesirable side effects instead of limiting the overall volume of irregular immigration” (Luttereck 2006 p. 79).

I place here the emphasis that European political actors and humanitarian actors surrounding the narratives of the MMC are prone to playing the politics of problematization in which case the ‘crisis’ is constructed to reflect and fulfil political, social and economic interests as pertained to Europe and not per se African nationals involved in the crisis. This scheme of problematization filled with political uncertainties and lopsided (re)definition of the crisis as well as the proffering of quirky interventions are in many ways sustaining the crises and producing results in unequal terms that defy international conventions on the rights of all persons to free and safe movement. The crisis, actors and the factors undergirding it are numerous to be reserved to the hegemonic synchronization of European political interests. In that sense thus, the international community must work together in close relations with diverse actors including affected migrants to develop and deploy workable interventions that defy parochial political interests and respond to the broader issues surrounding and underpinning the crisis.

7. MMC beyond the normative securitized-development conceptualizations

Following from the just-ended allusions, I re-contextualize the crisis from its multiple contributory causes. I examine the MMC from development, securitization and governance lens and assert that the securitized-development apparatus as ‘an external educative tutelage’ deploying biopolitical technologies to intervene in so-called ‘failed states’ of Africa has produced real or perceived risks for the populations that partly contributes to the growing Mediterranean migrant numbers to Europe. I argue on the lines that, Western-led development and security interventions in Africa have orientations that do not provide hopes in the potential for safe, improved and viable livelihoods. Put emphatically, Western-led development in Africa “Rather than narrowing the life-chance gulf, ... is better understood as attempting to contain the circulatory and destabilizing effects of underdevelopment’s non-insured surplus life” and the burdens they impose on Europe’s insured life and welfare states (Duffield 2006 p.19 emphasis mine).

As I have previously mentioned, the Mediterranean migration crisis is conceived in a rather hegemonic way as the offshoot of underdevelopment in the migrants’ countries of origin. In this conceptualization, underdevelopment in developing countries in the South and no more than that is mostly viewed as serving the foundational cause or catalyst for the crises. In the words of Tony Blair famines, wars and disasters “thousands of miles away lead to conflict, despair, mass migration and fanaticism that can affect us all. So for reasons of self-interest as well as morality, we can no longer turn our back on Africa” (Blair 2005 cited in Duffield 2001 p. 2). Such claims are used to justify Western recapture of Africa in what can be considered moral imperialistic stance – that is, the return of former colonial and imperial powers to former colonies under the guise and pretences of moral logics. As Duffield notes, this logic is both universalizing and ‘expansive’; one that ties development to poverty and security but more concretely aligning with ‘post-cold war phase of Western interventionism’ that are not necessarily grounded in the political, social and economic realities or interests of Africa states (Duffield 2001 emphasis mine). In Abrahamson’s view, the securitization of underdevelopment in Africa is both ‘undesirable and inadequate’ panacea given that it does not only fosters fear and unease but also “divides the continent from the rest of the world, favours policies of containment and is encouraging the militarization of the continent” (Abrahamson 2005: 61, 70 cited in Duffield 2001).

Notwithstanding these observations and critiques, the securitized-development narrative has resulted in the treatment of the MMC through a combination of security and development interventions deployed as packages to Africa countries where the migrants arrive from with the goal that curbing underdevelopment and securing the migrants’ countries of origins will bring the crises to a halt or reduce it substantially (de Haas 2006). However and as I shall elaborate in subsequent themes, such
orientation towards the crises can be considered minimalistic if not reductionistic in the appreciation and scoping of the crises. Whether or not the Mediterranean migration situations in themselves constitute security at all has raised questions for many commentators. For example the “Copenhagen School of International Relations theory has noted the exceptionality of frequent ‘securitization’ of international phenomenon; similarly, many commentators question the adequacy of deploying security narratives as the sine qua non for improving human condition and international society (Waever et al. 1993; Buzan et al. 1997; Huysmans 2000 cited in Duffield 2001). More precisely, Duffield explains that it is not a matter of whether or not there is more or less security in the world but rather, whether many of the securitized issues constitute and merit being treated as security issues at all (Duffield 2001). In Duffield’s view such a too ready orientation to draw upon security in accounting for phenomenon such as the MMC foreshadows professionals, political actors and gatekeepers’ tendency to rely on ‘security’ for the benefit of ‘institutional or group advantage’ while obliterating viable explanations and alternatives to addressing issues deemed important for human welfare and well-being (Duffield 2005 p.4 emphasis mine).

On the other hand and at the core of the securitized-development narrative sits the goal of Western development actors to disciplining the crude, barbaric and senseless Africa to effectively participate in the liberal capitalist regime and thereby become responsible, developed and self-catering society. Such a supremacist development posture of the West and its questionable development trusteeship role over Africa has altered the lives of African populations in a manner that imposes life risks in spite of opportunities (see Duffield, 2001; Escobar, 1995). Following from this postulation, two outcomes of development can be teased out to account for the mass migration of African migrants to Europe namely; the deepening perception or actuality of the risk of poverty and its consequent sense of hopelessness in Africa for Africans (what could be considered material insecurity) and secondly the destabilization of sections of Africa through the deployment of liberal problematic view of security which in the name of ‘failed states’ pursues aggressive liberal post-interventionism that defies cultural, social and political concerns of Africans. This post-interventionism in so-called ‘failed states’ has destabilized many African countries as Libya, Somalia and Burundi and resulted in what can be considered vehement insecurity. These factors leave the ‘surplus populations’ of Africa with the compelling choice of migrating from Africa to Europe in reaction to perceived or actual risks and opportunities. As Duffield notes, over historic time frame capitalism ‘disrupted and marginalized’ groups more than it could cater for; consequently, “there was a problematic and transient ‘surplus population’ that required remedial attention not only for themselves but for the stability of society as well” (Duffield 2005 p.9). Such ‘surplus population’, also referred to as ‘human debris’ (Arendt 1951:150 cited in Duffield 2005) or “waste life” (Bauman 2004 cited in Duffield 2001 p.9) is perceived in the eyes of European development trustees to abound in Africa that for the sake of arresting the danger they pose to human security must be intervened upon. This trusteeship role of Europe over Africa resonates with the fact that development in itself has historically embodied “a trusteeship of surplus life; that is, an external and educative tutelage over and otherwise superfluous and possibly dangerous population that needs help in adapting to the potential that progress brings” (Duffield 2001 p.9). Such posture by Europe in revisiting post-colonial Africa is at all cost despicable both in conception and in the ethics of cooperative development. The development apparatus conceived in the manner adopted by Europe has also fostered real and perceived threats to Africa and independently or in combination with other factors propel Africans’ migration to Europe through unapproved routes like the Mediterranean Sea.

It is worthwhile to note that there is deepening perception or actuality of poverty in Africa stemming from the Western-led development machine and this has greatly rendered the poor in Africa hopeless and instigated their urge to migrate in search of alternative livelihoods in Europe. The discovery of poverty by the World Bank has greatly influenced the daily lives of Third World populations both for good and bad. Pointedly, “Poverty’s political causes were clear ‘and the political obstacles are unhappily just as clear’ (Jones 1965: 54 quoted in Duffield, 2001).

In the name of fighting poverty, pretentiously liberal conceptions of participation and other liberal technologies of governance have been applied towards the achievement of neoliberal capitalist goals
in the South. Hegemonic power/knowledge regimes that sing praises to capitalists-led poverty reduction initiatives are channelled through the North-South technocratic alliances which have sometimes produced marring outcomes on the livelihoods of poor people in Africa (Goldman, 2005). Africa’s local technocrats trained by the World Bank’s hegemonic knowledge apparatus and tasked to administer liberal technologies of governmentality alter the local context of governance in extreme cases that are mostly anti-poor (Goldman, 2005). Western institutional arrangements informed by neoliberal capitalists’ interests and manned by sets of technocratic elites of the South have mostly deepened the woes of the poor by alienating many of them from effective participation in their own societies. Large scale multinational investment interests are upheld and used to thwart local livelihood interests. Scoones note for example that in many developing countries, “...a dominant policy focus on large-scale agricultural investment may undermine support for smallholder agriculture” (Scoones 2015 p.24). Adding to this is the fact that such large-scale agricultural narrative promoted by influential figures like Paul Collier is currently supporting a series of land grabs (Scoones 2015).

Development through the transfer of hegemonic knowledge forms from the North to the South has created a situation where majority of the population of the global South have become ‘unsuccessful’ students of the ever-changing neoliberal curriculum of development and governance. The minority technocratic elites of the South become masters of the neoliberal structures and vehemently seize opportunities to themselves and their Western development accomplices. As Goldman asserts, the World Bank apparatus expands beyond the North to touch the apexes of the South fostering its capacity to ‘embed the Banks green-neoliberal regime into the architecture of local governing institutions” (Goldman, 2005).

Third World country citizens particularly in Africa face the reality of having to learn rigorously new forms of institutions, new policies, new governance structures and new set of discourses that are handed down from the Northern development apparatus. The result of this has been the absence of the poor in their own societies and what has become known as ‘elite capture’ syndrome wherein intended development for the poor are hijacked by the Southern elites.

Many States in Africa have become ad hoc institutions and technocratic groups of elites who represent the interests of Western development organizations or political systems than they do for their local populations. As White et al. (2012) notes, there is:

“A powerful multi-scale coalition...varied according to setting but cohering around a strong expert-accredited narrative. The result as we have seen in the last few years, has been displacement of existing livelihoods, disruption of access rights and in many cases, a lack of alternative local employment and economic growth to compensate” (White et al, 2012 p.4).

It stands out clearly that claims of the North to develop the South majorly through poverty reduction initiatives have happened not without disastrous outcomes that sometimes have threatened the very livelihoods of poor people in Africa. For example under the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), many economies of Africa suffered to near-collapse, State austerity measures proposed by the World Bank including; the privatization of major life-supporting commodities such as water and massive cutting down on the size of public servants meant great cost of living and job losses for many populations of Africa. In the countryside, many of the poor have been kicked out of their lands by multinationals with claims of providing short-lived alternative livelihood forms. Many poor people have been rendered landless as multinational corporations aggressively pursue natural resource extraction following World Bank austerity advice to African states. The ever-expanding extraction of natural resources by multinational corporations in Africa thus happen side-by-side the deprivation of the very poor of their most sustainable livelihoods in what David Harvey refers to as capitalists’ “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2004 quoted in Duffield, 2001).

To be on a fairer side, arguing for a beyond-security narrative and intervention does not in any way invalidates or discounts the dangers and security experiences of some European countries. Such a beyond security proposition, consistent with the calls of other commentators however cautions against
the hegemony of security problematization and proffers multi-lens approach to apprehending the MMC including; the removal of the burdensome hurdles that seek to contain southern populations not to express their right to movement across the globalizing world. A call for beyond-security narrative again, questions the recklessness of the European Union, its NATO apparatus and other Western political actors in destabilizing the societies of Southern countries through the usually complex narrative of acting in the interest of civilians in war-torn Southern countries and averting spill over effects on the security of Western countries. This uncritical militarization stance by the European Union and its NATO apparatus have mostly been found not to have helped in preventing existing chaos of warring countries. In some instances as admitted by Tony Blair recently regarding the Iraq war, intelligence relied upon have mostly failed to appreciate the complexity and local realities underlying the instabilities of the warring countries. In many instances, it can be argued that Western militarization in war-torn countries have been pursued beyond the mantras of global peace to achieving self-seeking remissions of Western actors whose interventions also mostly lead to escalations beyond what was inherited on the ground. In many of these wars intervened upon, it has been informed or turned into a battle over Western resource interests or fighting for political ideological habitation in the countries embattled. This is no unsupported fact considering the Mozambique war experience of the 1990s as documented by Nordstrom. He reckons:

“The pictures and the stories of the displaced contained numerous references to foreigners who passed through to collect large quantities of precious gems. When one military’s control of the region was threatened, they sought to destroy the conquering side’s ability to mine the region. And when they lost control, they sought to regain it. His remote spot had seen one side and another take, lose, and retake the area in ongoing cycles, always hosting an international cast of actors, No locals were ignorant of the vast networks that kept the war afloat and the profits accrued to this” (Nordstrom p.56).

Western-led security interventionism in Africa has for the past decades created insecurity in many African countries and caused the surplus populations to combine courage with risks in search of new safe havens in different parts of the African continent and particularly in Europe through the ‘risky’ Mediterranean Sea route.

Notably, such forms of violence on societies have spill over effects as Nordstrom argues succinctly that “The idea that battlefields are self-contained zones of violence and that life proceeds normally outside these circumscribed areas is a powerful myth, but a myth nonetheless” (Nordstrom 2001 p. 5). In this regard, it is consistent to argue that Western political actors and their immigration regulations clad in security narratives are symbolic of the proverbial casting off one’s shadow or better still, running away from one’s ghosts. In that, the European Union and its Western allies turn to securitized-development narrative and argue for the security of their citizens through restrictive immigration not primarily because there are real and imminent dangers posed by developing country immigrants but on the basis that war and poverty-inflicted migrants may avenge the disaster and war incursions visited upon them by the Western parties.

Here again, I argue that the complexity of the South-North migration reflects how a singular issue such as immigration is also complexly interwoven into the broader socio-economic and political milieu of wars (provoked and planned), poverty (real and imagined), risk and opportunity (real and perceived) among actors located at different extremes. In that, what seems a straight forward discussion is rather muddied in complex current and future scenarios. In the current dimension, real or rare needs of migrants clash with real or rare fears of Western political actors. In the future scenario, real or aspired hopes of migrants clash with Westerners’ anticipated or real calculations of the benefits and disbenefits of accommodating these ‘surplus populations’ and its implications on the economy, cultural and political ambitions of European countries.

South-North immigration thus raises discomfiting questions and uncertain unsettling answers. Nonetheless, the discrepancies in the treatment of migrants that stem from negative stereotypes and prejudiced aspirations of what the future may look has favoured North-South migrants much so than South-North migrants and this raises questions.
In part thus, the Mediterranean migration crisis depicts the consequence flowing from complex interplay of events including the dispossession of many of the Southern poor from their lands and vital resources that sustains their livelihoods. The apparently ‘senseless’ immigration of African ‘surplus populations’ is in fact a response to and a search for alternative livelihoods in Europe.

8. Rescuing MMC from the Margins of Apolitical Humanitarianism

I have laid claim earlier to the fact that the humanitarian narrative is not to be viewed or analyzed through apolitical spectacles. In fact, it lies at the flip side of the securitized-development narrative and deeply engages in the constant construction and identification of ‘surplus populations’ for the benefit of liberal interventions. I must mention as preamble to my follow up arguments that “development is a regime of biopolitics that generically divides humankind into developed and underdeveloped species-life” (Duffield 2001 p.5). Biopolitics as used by Foucault, is a ‘new power’ used to “foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault 1975). It is therefore incomplete not to explore the role played by humanitarian organizations in the biopolitical regime. Duffield cleverly notes that NGOs and humanitarian organizations exercise this ‘new power’ through their ability to decide on the life to be saved and that which must be disallowed in the exercise of “non-state or petty sovereign power among the world of people” (Duffield, 2001 p. 25).

NGOs and humanitarian organizations thus constitute a central part of the liberal biopolitical regime and connect liberal imperial interests to surplus populations. Ferguson, Cooper and Coker note for example “a revival of interest in liberal imperialism” that is collaborated by biopolitical instruments (Ferguson 2003; Cooper 2002; Coker 2003 quoted in Duffield, 2005). This imperial revival to expand “the West’s external sovereign frontier” is mediated by humanitarian agencies which have become the gatekeepers of mainstream liberal governance systems. Humanitarian agencies are consistently in the business of identifying, problematizing and mobilizing surplus populations in emergencies. Georgio Agamben points out that “the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics has been the invocation of a state of emergency” (Agamben 2005:2 quoted in Duffield, 2001). In that, NGOs and their political alliances spanning the global North and South effectively employ hegemonic power/knowledge and biopolitical technologies of governance to problematize emergencies while laying apolitical claims to human security. This assertion finds solid support in the statement that “human security suggests that the NGO movement is no longer outside the state; it has reinvented itself as intrinsic to its reconstruction and power project” (Duffield, 2005). NGOs have for example failed to question the politics involved in the immigration crises even as it becomes obvious that the politics of the crisis counts in proffering viable and sustainable interventions. Rather they “infer that the emergency exists because communities and people are not self-reliant enough” (Duffield, 2001: p29). It is however not surprising given that the constant invocation of ‘human security’ and the discovery of ‘surplus populations’ rather showcase the ways and means the humanitarian and development machines align and reinvent themselves (Duffield, 2001).


The Mediterranean Migration crisis cannot be understood outside of rights and freedoms of every individual to safe and equitable movement. Similarly, it is not free from structural discrimination and negative stereotypes perpetrated against people on the basis of their race, country of origin, religion or political orientations.

For example and in the context of the many international human rights and freedoms extended to migrants and their families, it is hard to fathom and come to terms with the fact that “In countries on both sides of the Mediterranean, there has been growing concern with the rising number of deaths of would-be immigrants seeking to reach Europe via sea” and that “in countries such as Italy or Spain hardly a week goes by without reports of shipwrecks and dead bodies of migrants found in their waters and on their beaches” (Pugh, 2001).
These costs on human lives particularly resulting from preventable deaths severely muddy and mock our common humanity. It is not by accident that in this paper, I have failed to account for the number of deaths on the Mediterranean. Unquestionably, I have recoiled to the believe and near-acceptance of the fact that, inequalities in the treatment of numbers of deaths from global incidence is more than mere numerical count and mostly resonates with deep-seated discrimination and political attention giving on the basis of race, social status, country of origin, religion etc. This perhaps also signals the very fact that humanity has endless miles to go in our pursuit of equality for all men and women. It is in response to such seemingly futile endeavour to equality that I rather argue that there is perhaps more urgency to propagate love and care than equality given that equality has failed to nurture love in humans but love could potentially nurture equality, openness and care for other humans. In the world today, the need to accept and tolerate one another irrespective of race, ethnicity, and country of origin or religion has become one of our desiring yet denied needs partly for reasons of political domestication, dichotomization and divisionism. Much as such theorizations about love stand the risk of being pronounced utopian, I have never seen anything as utopian as normalized oppression and normalized inequality in the way political actors treat the issue of migration particularly South-North immigration. As a referent case, it is important to emphasize the rather subtle case with which North-South migration is facilitated and devoid of the typical negative immigrant stereotypes. It is not far-fetched to argue that North-South migration is viewed as offering investment, touristic and skilled knowledge to the South whereas South-North migrants are constantly stereotyped as a burden, risk and terrorising the welfare state of Europe and the West. Such open discrimination has almost become normalized part of the daily lives of developing country immigrants and demands critical rethinking and urgent redress in a manner consistent with the visions of equality of existence, being and movement. It is important to note that such negative Western orientations towards developing country immigrants is also a reflection of Western political will to break the South from the North developmentally. Balibar captures this critically in the statement:

“While decolonization proved an opportunity for technologies of development to penetrate the world of peoples, it also affected a world-historic reversal in global migratory dynamics (Balibar 1999) – that is from a previous North-to-South flow to the present broad South-to-North orientation”. As if that is not clear enough, Balibar complements this statement in the note that Western political actors persistently seek to “separate ‘good’ circulation – such as finance, investment, trade, information, skilled labour and tourism - from the ‘bad’ circulation associated with underdevelopment: refugees, asylum seekers, unskilled migrants, shadow economies, trafficking, drugs and terrorism” (Balibar 1999 cited in Duffield 2005 p.21). Duffield seconds these observations by Balibar and notes that the control of immigration denotes attempts to shape “race relations” and nurture “an external aid industry” (Duffield 2005). Of course these claims are not dismissible given their reflections in the way the Mediterranean migration situation is handled. In there, one notices attempts by European actors to prescribe hegemonic security interventions that prevent developing country migrants from entry into Europe while transferring aid packages in the form of finance, naval and paramilitary equipments to developing country governments in the hope of securing its borders against Southern migrants. Yet, the stark reality of the impracticability of majorly lopsided securitized interventions against South-North immigration is expressed by de Haas who argues “Trade, aid, return migration and remittances are not short-cut ‘solutions’ to migration and, therefore, sustained immigration seems to be likely” (de Haas 2006).

Unequivocally, the Mediterranean migration ‘crises’ is a test of whether humans still want to be barricaded as global citizens behind the iron curtains and boundaries of diverse national and political ideologies crafted on identity politics, developmental orientations and population ambitions.

In a world of high social interconnectivity spearheaded and facilitated by technologies such as social media, I place the case that human identities have moved beyond the static ascriptions provided by national categorizations to assume more fluid forms of identities that interconnect and tend to dissolve across boundaries. This era and its shared visions of the future as well as its interconnected and fluid identities present a challenge to humans in proving ourselves civilized than the civilization of technology such as social media that is increasingly breaking artificially-set boundaries and identities.
Humanity cannot and must not allow social media and technology to become civilized than the hands that made them. Failure to address deaths resulting in reckless migrations that are also the result of hard lined political orientations against free and safe migration will defeat our civilization, our humanity and our ability to tap into the opportunities limitless human interactions bring to our pursuit of peace, happiness and shared visions around the global commons.

There are enormous potentials in migration such as; fostering cross-cultural engagement and understanding; inspiring socio-technological innovation, promoting shared beliefs and mutual reliance needed for world peace and cooperation. Yet these obvious benefits are played down with socio-political and economic stereotyping, negative descriptors, labels and fears of the future that become constituted as homogenous truths. Labels such as ‘refugees’, ‘undocumented immigrants’, ‘expatriates’ and sometimes ‘Muslim’, ‘Christian’, etc become activated as blood-filled and breathing organisms that utterly change the treatment, guarantee and acceptability of the freedom to movement which is an inalienable right that even animals but for the domestication by men do possess. Treating people on the basis of labels such as those just-alluded to becomes a great marker of our uncommon commonness or better still our common uncommonness that indict the gossip of globalization and threaten humanity’s common causes such as climate change, HIV/AIDS, conflicts, insecurity, disaster, poverty and many other natural and human-induced calamities.

Discriminatory and restrictive migration particularly as pertaining in the case of South-North migration is in essence synonymous to the globally reprobated issues of sex selective abortion, racial discrimination, homicide and eugenics and the world must fight it together.

The urgency to step up human rights pronouncements that safeguard migrants from such reckless disappearances on the Mediterranean Sea must not be delayed further. Indeed, it is obvious that the European Community tries to circumvent Article 8 of the United Nations “International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families” under the pretext of ‘security’. However, the reckless disappearance of lives on the Mediterranean Sea is an open and viable case that calls for the application of the international human rights on ‘enforced disappearances’ as enshrined in the United Nations’ “International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance” in its resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992. Under this Article,

“‘Enforced disappearance’ is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law” (OHCHR 1992).

It needs no mentioning that this Clause must be invoked to incriminate all forms of actions, practices and pronouncements that have directly contributed to ineffective, restrictive movement of the Mediterranean migrants leading to their exposure to risk, injury to life or death. If this Clause ever falls short of providing justice to immigrants and their families then, then it is prudent to rework on the rights of all persons not to be subjected to such inhuman events in the history of mankind. This way, it is hoped that countries will be respectful and cautious in dealing with the integrity and legitimacy of all persons to exercise their freedoms of movement without the risk of intimidation on the basis of “sex, race, colour, language, religion or conviction, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age, economic position, property, marital status, birth or other status” (OHCHR 1992).

Even as human rights shown lapses in providing developing country migrants equal access to the world, it seems that the undying motivations of migrants to pursue their ‘desire’ and ‘real’ ambitions of life can best be captured in de Vries’ “Ethics of the Real” which I place in perspective below.
10. Migrants’ exploration of the ‘real’ – Applying “Ethics of the Real” to the MMC

In this paragraph I rely on De Vries’ (2007) “Ethics of the Real” to analysis the motivations of African migrants to embark on the seemingly ‘risky’ Mediterranean journey to Europe beyond the security dimensions analyzed in earlier paragraphs.

Immigration as a phenomenon has remained a long standing coping mechanism for different species to change their environments in response to or in anticipation of perceived or actual risks and/or opportunities. It is a commonsensical position that some factors do mediate the human migration phenomenon in what has popularly become known as the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors of migration. I argue that to better grasp the motivations for the Mediterranean migration crises, De Vries’ “Ethics of the Real” offers an impeccable direction to gaining such insights.

De Vries’ takes ingenious yet least explored perspectives of development by deviating from the ‘monolithic’ critiques by diverse schools of thought. In his “Ethics of the Real” de Vries’ makes the case that “…the actuality of development is supplemented by a virtual dimension, as manifested in the desire for, and imagination of, development” (de Vries, 2007).

The promise of development - from poverty reduction to reconstructing ‘failed states’ come with desires which could be ‘real’ or ‘fantasies’. Migrants from Africa seek after the ‘real’ thing promised by the developed North and desperately exercise this desire by taking all measures to acquire it. The conceptions of development bring compelling ‘desires’ which migrants seek to actualize by transgressing ‘risks’ to seek for the ‘real’ development promised by the North. The case by de Vries is that the development apparatus is “a self-propelling apparatus that produces its own motivational drives…” (de Vries, 2007). There is then the motivation of African migrants to be motivated by the constant rendition of Europe as ‘developed’ and offering better prospects of life and living.

Somehow instigating or reinforcing the ‘desire’ for ‘the real’ development by immigrants from/in Europe lies in what Duffield points as “…all sorts of images of the Third World as a phantasmic obscene space, representing everything that the West is not” (Duffield, 2004). This representation of the West as everything ‘good’ and the South as the ‘bad’ ‘other’ creates fantastic images that ‘sustain’ the capacity of Third World countries’ populations to ‘desire’ the developed North. In order to actualize this ‘desire’ African populations forcefully seek after what the development apparatus of Europe ‘promises but is not capable of delivering’ (De Vries, 2007). This is a clever way of apprehending the motivations of migrants from the ‘Ethics of the Real’ perspective – that ethics which involves the ‘taking of ‘risks’ and ‘making of radical decisions’ such as the decisions of migrants to surmount the difficulties of the Mediterranean in order not to ‘compromise’ a ‘fundamental desire’ for their development (De Vries, 2007).

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued conclusively that the complexity and interplay of multiple factors in the Mediterranean migration crisis defies the monologue of security narratives and is best apprehended through a combination of development, securitization, biopolitical, human rights and ‘Ethics of the Real’ perspectives. Liberal problematics of security and development generate the problem of surplus populations that constitutes desperate migrants; biopolitical technologies of governance are assembled for dealing with the surplus population while responding to human rights disproportionately. The motivation of surplus populations however decries promises offered by the development apparatus and rather seeks after the ‘real’ development as explained by “Ethics of the Real”.

The core message of the essay has been that, development from its very conceptions has altered the lives of African populations in a manner that imposes life risks in spite of imminent opportunities; that the securitization of South-North migration has assumed hegemonic power/knowledge dimensions inspired by liberal trusteeship over surplus lives co-existing with the desire to extend the frontiers of Western imperialism. I have also exposed the defects in human rights instruments, the open discrimination and negative stereotyping of South-North migration, and argued for their practical
addressing in the view to mitigating the MMC. I finalized the discussion by exploring how the fantastic images of development promised by the North to the South has affirmed desires in African populations for development and thus singularly or in combination with other factors resulted in compelling urge of development subjects in Africa to demand the real promise of development from Europe.

It is thus clear that hope and hopelessness are both involved in the migration situation which supports the case that meaningful interventions on the Mediterranean crisis must adopt multi-lens approaches in order to understand and effectively address the underlying factors if the ‘crisis’ is to be truly surmounted.

References


About the Author(s)

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