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Recognition for Justice in Post-Colonial Tropical Forests of Amazonia and West Africa

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Recognition for Justice in Post-Colonial Tropical Forests of Amazonia and West Africa

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Abstract

Most people living in tropical forests are now citizens in post-colonial nation states modelled on Western liberal democracies. Citizenship is then formally based on equal rights to property and autonomy, yet in such countries both indigenous and post-colonial forms of injustice are perpetuated in an unequal distribution of land rights and freedom for different cultural and socio-economic groups – so called “differentiated citizenship”. This paper presents a recognition-centred justice framework in order to make visible and help to understand occluded injustices in land and autonomy experienced by two very different subaltern populations, one in South America and West Africa. I ground the framework by tracing contrastive ideas behind the modern concept of the citizen in Locke (natural property rights) and Hegel (property as the means for self-realisation). Then, drawing on the work of Axel Honneth, I argue that a Hegelian notion of citizenship holds the most potential to make increased freedom through recognition possible whilst remaining within the framework of liberal states and governance. I illustrate the utility of this conceptual framework by using it to examine two ethnographic case studies. The first explores identity politics in Brazilian Amazonia, focusing in particular on the positive and negative emancipatory potential of the extension of land rights on the basis of claims to indigeneity. The second investigates the conflicts over rights to land and self-determination between Loma youth and elders in NW Liberia, and the ways in which this was transformed by youth participation in the recent (1990-2005) war. A concluding discussion draws out the lessons of the conceptual framework and case studies for governance, rights and justice in post-colonial states.
Introduction

Most people living in tropical forests are now citizens of post-colonial nation states modelled on Western liberal democracies. In theory, this should constitutionally ensure equal human and civil rights, liberties, and freedoms for all citizens. These states are often characterised by ongoing social struggles, conflict and warfare, frequently over land and resource issues, which are frequently driven by underlying historically rooted injustices, which can be indigenous (as in our Liberian example) or post-colonial (as in our Brazilian example) in origin, forming part of enduring social structures. Yet such tropical nations often do not adequately recognize either indigenous or post-colonial injustices precisely because their constitutional principles and therefore institutional framework does not adequately reflect the societies (and their particular cultures and histories) upon which are imposed. This is because, while citizenship in liberal democracies is based on equal rights to property and autonomy, these take on universalized forms that are alienated from the social contexts to which they are supposedly applicable. Moreover, for the same reasons, liberal theoretical frameworks based on abstracted forms of rights and justice have been unsuccessful in addressing both indigenous and post-colonial forms of injustice. This situation has led to an unequal distribution of land rights and freedom for different cultural and socio-economic groups – neatly captured by the concept of “differentiated citizenship” (Holston 2008) – but this is often not adequately recognised by post-colonial nation states in the South.

Global and national discourses on tropical forests citizens, however, often construct and represent such difference along simple good/bad binaries such as ‘eco-guardian’ or ‘eco-threat;’ ‘indigenous’ or ‘colonist;’ ‘sustainable’ or ‘destructive,’ ‘slash and burn’ or ‘forest extractivist.’ This form of orientalism known as ‘tropicality’ (see below) which lies behind such categories, obscures the much more multifaceted realities on the ground, which belie simplistic categorisation. These categories shape the possibilities for political action by subaltern peoples, for example, indigenous resistance to large dams in the Brazilian Amazon (e.g. the Xingu River) is more successful than resistance by Amazonian peasants known as Caboclos or Riberinhos of mixed European, Native Amazonian, and African heritage (e.g. the Madeira River). This is because the former has much greater national and international recognition than the latter. In addition, state institutions in Brazil are dominated by a European-descended elite, with almost no representation from indigenous, caboclos, or Afro-descendants, with Liberia dominated by an US-descended elite, with indigenous youth in marginal position historically. These states are based on liberal legal frameworks that both naturalize and occlude certain social structures, denying their political nature, and shutting down spaces for their contestation.

This paper asserts that both liberal states and theories of justice are inadequate to understanding justice issues and their relation to social relationships and institutions among peoples that are marginal, mixed peasantries known as Caboclos in the Brazilian case, and the Loma youth in the Liberian case. These naturalizing categories are both made possible by the liberal state and radically restrict the possibilities for democratic politics among subaltern peoples. I use these case studies to argue that liberal democratic institutions and the idea of equal rights are often ill suited to conceptualising situations of historic injustice that are effectively immanent in social structures (either indigenous, post-colonial or a mix of the two) that shape a differentiated citizenship which is effectively invisible to the liberal state.

Contemporary political philosophy tends to be purely normative, decoupled from societal analysis. The normative principles in relation to which we judge the moral legitimacy of social orders may not stem from within existing institutional structures, but must stand outside this institutional framework. Many contemporary theories of justice follow Kant in seeking abstract, trans-contextual justification of pure principles, then applied to real empirical contexts to assess injustice. For Kant, reason and morality are to be found in the minds of isolated individuals, and this forms the model currently dominant in modern western moral, economic and political theory – of rational, egoistic individual agents calculating the best means to maximise their utility. These free and rational beings, in this formulation, are radically cut off from others, from society and culture, and even from their own
biological natures. This line of thought, drawing together with liberal scholars such as Mills and Locke developed into what is today known as analytic philosophy, emphasizing universal instrumental rationality and individual subjectivity. This tradition is best embodied in the work of John Rawls (Schultz 2009; Bell 2004). Such a conceptualisation of justice is part of the liberal state, promoted as part of development and/or (post)war(reconstruction) strategies in Southern countries, resting upon of universalised western models of rationality, ontology, and the individual being applied to post-colonial contexts. Whilst such a de-embedded approach is necessary for the idea of universal human rights, this paper will argue that such approaches are wholly insufficient to understand injustices which inhere in social institutions, as characterise our cases in Brazil and Liberia.

For the purposes of understanding injustice in post-colonial nations of the tropics, perspectives from critical theory are arguably more culturally appropriate, because for scholars in this tradition a theory of justice must arise from and be realised through an analysis of actual social institutions (Zurn 2015:194). This is consistent with the ethnographic tradition long employed in anthropology, human geography, development studies and sociology in studies of the agrarian south since the founding of these disciplines. The difference is that the whilst these disciplines are primarily concerned with the description and historically informed explanation of society, critical theory, in addition to this, is oriented to the purpose of improving human freedom and wellbeing by overcoming forms of injustice. Critical theory can be described as interdisciplinary social theory with emancipatory intent and is emergent from an intellectual heritage reaching back to Hegel, through Marx, Frankfurt school, and exemplified by current critical scholars such as Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, who are discussed below.

The goal of justice as recognition is to “acknowledge people’s distinct identities and histories and eliminate cultural forms of domination of some groups over others.” (Sikor 2013:7). Justice as recognition “moves beyond a focus on the state alone for remedies, and brings justice theory squarely into the political space beyond the state.” (Schlosberg 2004). Therefore the politics of recognition necessitate a theorization of justice outside of legal and social strictures of the nation-state, which means examining how it is embedded in social institutions; in the everyday contextual ‘ethical life,’ as Hegel puts it, of different societies. Recognition, therefore, calls for rectificatory justice in response to past injustices that shape the present. Misrecognition is in this way coeval with injustice, claims for recognition must be made in justice terms, and action towards recognition is always action which seeks to overcome some identified injustice (Edwards 2015).

Recent critical scholarship has emphasized green and land-grabs by powerful state actors and multinational corporations as part of the broader critique of the environmental effects of neoliberalism in relation to the emergent green economy (Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012; Arsel and Büscher 2012; Bakker 2010; McAfee 2012; McCarthy and Prudham 2004). But as this paper reveals, both under customary law in Liberia and recent identity politics in Brazil, land and resource acquisition can occur ‘from below.’ This is to say that “land grabs” can also occur among marginalised forest inhabitants, which draws attention to their differentiation and power and politics among them, in addition to powerful state and international actors grabbing land and/or resources ‘from above.’

Such contestation is related to the property regimes particular to tropical forest regions of many states ostensibly formulated along liberal lines, including Brazil and Liberia, which have not extended formal private property regimes over the entirety of their territories. Rather, in Brazil has created a series of reserves in the Amazonian tropical forest, while much of Liberia’s Upper Guinean tropical forest is under customary land tenure. This has led to a situation where, in the former, access to land is being mediated by claims to indigenous identity amongst rural populations where the indigenous/non-indigenous divide is by no means clear, whilst for the latter, customary land tenure had up until recently excluded young men from independently owning and farming the land, and lack of state recognition was arguably a key driver in the recent (1990-2005). This creates a particular problem in relation to property rights when liberal states and liberal theory are unable to understand the reasons underlying conflicts over land and resources, and therefore unable to propose viable solutions.
I assert that liberal-distributional approaches (e.g. Locke; Rawls;) cannot grasp the historical and relational (dialectic) nature of these rights and justice, in these contexts. Rather, I propose that the theory of recognition, which has been used to critique liberal approaches to justice, is better equipped to understand the role of historical factors in conflicts over land and resources in these post-colonial states. Justice as recognition, which begins with Hegel, is an implicit challenge to the liberal-distributonal paradigm that can be traced through Rawls back to the liberal conceptualisations of the state made by Locke, Hobbes and others. Recognition is clearly not a ‘thing’ or a ‘good’ that can be distributed, but rather inheres in social relationship and norms. Within theories of distributive justice, the state acts as a neutral arbiter, but ‘recognition’ is not something that can be ‘fairly distributed’ as, for example, healthcare or welfare. A state may respond to conditions of social marginalisation by recognising a socially denigrated group (indeed the 1998 Brazilian constitution can be seen as an act of recognition of marginalised forest peoples), but recognition occurs as much in socio-cultural, symbolic and institutional realms. States can engage in affirmative action, recognition for misrecognised and politically excluded communities and/or groups and individuals within them is a much is a broader issue.

Iris Marion Young argues that while the distributional issues of goods is an important dimension of justice, social justice cannot be reduced to distribution. (Young 1990). Indeed, prior to issues of distribution, are the social, cultural, symbolic, and institutional conditions through which maldistributions are made manifest and perpetuated. This is to say that differentiated citizenship derives from, privilege and oppression, and so social justice demands an elucidation of the politics of those differences to show the underlying drivers of distributive injustice. Recognition is key here, because the lack of it, which is evident in oppression in the form of insults, degradation, and devaluation at both the individual and cultural level. This not only damages oppressed individual and communities by curtailing self-actualisation, but also and their positionality in larger cultural and political realms (Schlosberg 2004). The lack of recognition, in this view, is an injustice not only because it constrains people’s self-realization and so doing them psychological harm, but also because it is the root of distributive injustice. Moreover, distribution theories often represented goods as static, rather than the dynamic outcome of shifting social and institutional contexts. The cause of injustice, and unjust distribution, is therefore a lack of recognition of group difference. This shapes the relationship of the subject to the nation state. If the particular difference of their citizenship is not properly accounted for, that is, recognized in the institutions of the state, they end up not participating in the political and institutional order of the state. Hence, recognitionist justice seeks to reveal misrecognition and draw it into a political process that challenge institutionalised exclusion, a social culture of misrecognition, and current distributional patterns. Democratic and participatory decision-making procedures are both then a part of and a condition for, social justice, but their very possibility is made possible by way of prior recognition.

Despite increasing concern with justice issues, social science scholars working in both the North and the South, often do not seriously examine or unpack the theoretical underpinnings of the concepts of justice they are using (Edwards 2015), nor questioned the extent to which they are appropriate in the South where cultures have emerged from radically different trajectories to those that give birth to liberal notions of justice. This paper seeks to address this lacunae, and the more widely recognised need for greater reflexivity in relation to normative approaches such as justice in critical social science by elaborating an alternative conceptual framework of recognition drawing on critical and post-colonial theory – which I argue is more appropriate than the reigning liberal-positivist capabilities approach.

I bring justice as recognition to bear on two case studies, based on my field experiences, of conflicts caused by injustices in distribution, recognition, and procedure in two Southern agrarian contexts, one in Latin America and one from Sub-Saharan Africa. Taking up Honneth’s phenomenological approach, and engaging with the work in the tradition of continental philosophy, I attempt to move beyond liberal understandings of justice employed by the majority of the aforementioned studies by way of an empirically and historically rooted analysis of autochthonous and post-colonial injustices in the Agrarian South as forms of social pathology manifest in social institutions.
This paper is structured as follows: First, I examine liberal, analytic and continental, critical understandings of property by tracing their roots to the approaches of Locke and Hegel, respectively. Second, I review the arguments in favour of a recognitional over a distributional approach to justice, before sketching a theoretical framework which attempts to adapt Axel Honneth’s phenomenological theory of recognitional justice to post-Colonial contexts in the South. Third, I locate historically the formulation of the object of study – tropical forest peoples in post-colonial nations – and their relationship with justice, from beginnings of mercantilism and capitalism, explaining why I distinguish ‘indigenous’ from ‘post-colonial’ injustices. Fourth, I empirically ground the foregoing in two cases: the first focuses on issues of recognition relating to redistribution on the basis of ‘indigeneity’ amongst the *caboclo* or *riberinho* peasantry of mixed European, Amerindian and African heritage, in the municipality of Manicoré in the Brazilian Amazonia, the second on the youth contestation of a system wherein they were exploited by a few powerful chiefly individuals, in a Loma region of NW Liberia, West Africa. The former illustrates forms of injustice that are of post-colonial origin, whilst the latter exemplifies injustices of principally ‘indigenous’ origin. Finally, I conclude with some reflections on the lessons that emerge from the case studies for our understanding of justice as recognition in the agrarian South.

1. Recognition for Justice

“Much of the foundational writing on modern society and state, both within and against liberalism, derives citizenship's essential ethical and personal attributes, as well as its rights and obligations, from the right to property. The discussion generally does not limit property to land but considers rights themselves as kinds of property” (Holston 2008:114).

Both Lockean and Hegelian approaches to property rights agree on the direct relationship between inner property (the self) and outer property (i.e. lands and things), and between both of these to property and citizenship. It is this right to property above all others that ensures freedom. Thus, to be proprietor of one’s person (self- plus land/things) is to be free. This is a somewhat awkward Cartesian dualism however, and I prefer to take a Heideggerian view, wherein both inner and outer property are part of Dasein or being-in-the-world.

Both Locke’s Second Treatise and Hegel’s Philosophy of Right based on idea of property rights and owning oneself, that is, one’s person and capacities. For Locke, this is given in nature; for Hegel it is something an individual must achieve.

The most fundamental aspect of theoretical positions adopted by Locke and other early liberal theorists such as Hobbes is that they are naturalizing. This means that they base their politics from assumptions about the “state of nature” - starting from the a priori idea that people by way of their “human nature” are atomised rational individuals. They then go on to derive ideas about rights, freedom, contract, political association and law from these assumptions. For them, political organizations and state sovereignty should reflect these assumptions about the state of (human) nature, including human rights, civil society and the state. Freedom here is ‘negative’ – the simple absence of external impediments to movement, and a state which upholds private property rights and free trade.

Hegel, conversely, arguably understands freedom as retrospective self-understanding – which scales up from the individual to the social and national levels as the struggle for recognition at all levels (Krasnoff 2008). The focus is on in struggles by individuals and groups for recognition and social freedom vis-à-vis the social pathologies that constrain them. Here, individuals become who they and maintain their identity through relations of mutual recognition with others, i.e. we gain subjectivity only inter-subjectively. Social practices and institutions are integrated and reproduced through regimes of recognition that are historically constituted, and often the outcome of struggles motivated by negative experiences of misrecognition. To Hegel, political and social individualism are a serious form of alienation, which erode the unity of nation and community. Social pathologies are the factors that are understood as preventing members of society from living a good life. Freedom here is then a social freedom which can only be made manifest and sustained relations of mutual recognition upheld by
social institutions (Honneth 2014). Social freedom is expressed in the phrase “being-with-oneself-in-the-other,” which refers to the way in which the quality of social relations in existing practices and institutions is an essential precondition for the realization of freedom. To self-realise, we need recognition and positive feedback from others and society more broadly throughout our lives. I know that I am a self because I see you recognising me as a self, the opposite of Descartes’ Cogito. We recognise one another when we see and treat one another as autonomous, equal and free persons.

The state and its institutions emerge (or should emerge, according to Hegel), not as a framework for upholding ‘natural’ laws and rights, as with Locke and Hobbes, but rather as the cumulation of historical struggle for recognition, in a dialectical manner. The point for our purposes here is that neither the legal institutions of Brazil nor Liberia adequately reflect this struggle. In contrast to Liberal and Social Contract theories then, Hegel does not regard rights or deduce politics as emanating from an a priori state of eternal human nature with the same characteristics in all societies and at all times, but rather human beings have rights as a result of a historical and social struggle – the struggle for recognition - which is made manifest in a ‘historical subjectivity’ which is as true at the individual level as it is at the level of the nation state. Hegel’s account of Western history as the journey to self-knowledge of a kind of collective, historical subject, which he calls Spirit (Geist), can seem strange, but it does not if we understand Spirit simply as what a particular form of social life, a particular social practice or social group, or a particular culture or people takes to be its most important standards of value (Krasnoff 2008:68).

For Hegel the right to property is based on this idea of people and society as the outcome of a struggle for recognition, whereas property rights for Locke derive from the putative biological nature of humans. While Locke was concerned with the issue of the possession, and distribution of property, Hegel focussed on the productive activity of the subject, which was of inspiration to Marx. The subject in Locke engages nature in an instrumental and dominant manner, wherein nature is essentially there to satisfy human biological needs, but for Hegel, conversely humans and nature, or subject and object, are mutually constitutive of one other in through a dialectical process. In the Hegelian conception, the human being incorporates the outer property into their inner property by way of labour, and it is therefore labour which bridges inner and outer property, raising humans above their biological nature.

For Hegel, property is key in enabling the development of both individual and social development. Property is the basis of Hegel’s his assertion that mutual recognition, and not individual consent (as with social contract theories), is the foundation of social order. The fundamental factor distinguishing one person from another, what we could call their – ‘personality’- derives from property. Only insofar as individual’s personality or free will is embodied in things that it becomes capable of being recognised as such by others. Property owners recognise each other as persons struggling through the same processes of self-realization. The respect the property rights of the other because they want the same respect in return. As a result of such mutual recognition and respect, they regard each other as equals. For Hegel people that do not have property are unable to fully self-actualise or self-realisng, which is also the basis of their standing in the social world. As a result, those without property are not only lesser persons but also diminished as citizens (Holston 2008:115).

The concept of recognition has arguably co-opted by policies of cultural recognition (or multiculturalism), the so called culturalization of politics (Povinelli 2011:25/26). In the wake of the liberal state’s recognition of past harm, the crisis would no longer be a crisis of liberal legitimacy but a crisis of how to allow cultures a space within liberalism without rupturing the core frameworks of liberal justice. What Povinelli calls “late liberalism” is to make a space for culture to care for difference without disturbing underlying liberal ontology and its ways of configuring experience— ordinary habitual values truths. No matter how superficially they might seem the same thing, as Povinelli reminds us, the culturalization of politics is not equal to the postcolonial critique of liberalism, rather the former would appear to be a co-option of the latter. This in turn effects the ability of liberal policies of recognition to grasp realities of the agrarian south which do not conform to liberal ontology, as our Brazilian case exemplifies.
Hence, how we conceive of recognition is therefore very important. There is a debate between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth concerning the ontological foundations of and relationship between recognition and distribution (Fraser and Honneth 2003). How we conceive of these phenomena has important implications for how we understand justice as recognition for tropical forest peoples. Simply put, Nancy Fraser proposes that misrecognition and maldistribution are two distinct arenas that should be studied separately, whilst Honneth believes that economic distributions are constitutively connected to society’s recognition order (Zurn 2015:9). While Fraser is no liberal scholar, her separation of recognition and distribution leaves her approach more open to co-option than Honneths, in my view. Nancy Fraser’s approach appears to be critical realist (dualist) whilst Honneth is a Phenomenologist (monist). Schlosberg has argued that since Honneth’s approach is more psychological, whereas Fraser’s focuses on structures & relations – the two are not mutually exclusive and so there is potential for reconciliation or combination of the two approaches (Schlosberg 2007:20). However, I find Honneth more compelling for the purposes of application in tropical forests than Fraser. My reading is that Fraser’s Cartesian dualist treatment of the economy (distribution) and culture (recognition) as separate is fallacious in its reduction of recognition to identity politics, excluding, for example, the constitutive and fundamentally inalienable relationship of indigenous or peasant identity as being-in-the-world vis-à-vis the land – fundamental to spacio-temporal resource access in many agrarian societies in the South.

To risk caricature, Fraser’s approach is tantamount to proposing a cognition disembodied from the organism-environment milieu in which life is made manifest (Robertson 1996). Honneth’s phenomenological approach is rather better equipped, in my view, for dealing with the lived experiences and lifeworlds of peasants have typically been on the margins of states, who spend much of their working lives engaged in different forms of natural resource management, and for whom culture and nature are not separate (Descola 2013; Strathern 1980; Jackson 2013). For agrarian peasant and indigenous peoples, the case (for the most part Heideggerian) phenomenology over Cartesian constructivist approaches has been forcibly made by Tim Ingold (Ingold 2000), and demonstrated in various empirical studies (Harris 2005; Willerslev 2004; Roth 2009). Taking being-the-world or Daesin as a point of departure shows why Fraser’s approach is inappropriate: How do you separate land as a material object from identity as a mental construct, if the latter inheres in diachronic activity and movement in the former? The issue then, ultimately hinges on whether takes the liberal, Cartesian view that a peoples relationships with land are inherently fungible, and so they can unproblematically separated from the land they inhabit, or the phenomenological view that people and place are mutually constituted, which makes removing them from the land tantamount to removing part of their being. Critical theory is also engaging with this approach: Nikolas Kompridis has recently called for the introduction of Heidegger’s notion of “world disclosure” as way to move critical theory beyond shortcomings of Habermans’ narrow liberal approach to procedural concerns, to enable it to better engage with time and change (Kompridis 2011). Taking a Heideggerian approach to justice would bring up questions such as: How does injustice effect peoples being in the world? If most of everyday life is a pre reflexive background, what happened when the background changes?

### 2. Indigenous and post-Colonial Injustices

This paper conceives of recognition justice as an historically informed normative conceptual framework intended to help reveal, explain and transcend pathological forms of social order and their relationship to injustices in the spacio-temporality of resource access. Following critical theory, and in particular Axel Honneth, I argue that pluralized justice theorizing must arise from and be realised through an analysis of actual social institutions and the ways in which these mediate natural resource management the Agrarian South. I take up the challenge from Zurn (2015:210, to expand Honneth’s thinking to the agrarian south. I assert that different dimensions of environmental injustice exist as are forms of social pathology (i.e. social structures or institutions that limit people’s wellbeing and self-realization). This optic is necessarily and fundamentally historical, tracing layers of injustice in relation to a dialectic between two fundamental categories.
i. **Indigenous injustices**, more or less internal to societies of pre-Colonial origin in post-colonial-states, or in regions where colonialism had little effect; or current injustices that are attributable to autochthonous processes or phenomena

ii. **post-colonial injustices** that linger from colonial times, or that can be traced to phenomena attributable to colonialism, that would not have occurred without it

In both of these categories, I mean the relationship of indigenous or postcolonial ideas, practices, subjectivities, discourses, laws, institutions etc. and their relationship to spatio-temporal resource access to justice. Clearly, these two categories are not mutually exclusive, rather, they exist in dialectic relation (Obarrio 2014; Geschiere 1996; Ibhawoh 2009); indeed, indigenous peoples may choose to adopt liberal legal frameworks of their post-colonial states (Timmer 2010). However, I feel their separation is analytically useful. The two case studies, which draw on material from the author’s ethnographic fieldwork, each speaks one of the two categories. The latter, post-colonial injustices, is illustrated by a discussion issues of recognition surrounding redistribution (of land and resources) on the basis of “indigeneity” in the Brazilian Amazon. The former, indigenous injustices, is examined through a case study from Liberia, involving the misrecognition and consequent maldistribution of the social category of the youth by elders). Note that here, following Honneth and contra Fraser, I see maldistribution being a problem stemming from issues with societies’ recognition order.

Indigenous injustices, comprise inequality in access to, and/or ownership of resources, unjust customary laws, particular those that contribute to the marginalisation different social categories, such as women (Khadiagala 2001; Goebel 2005; Picq 2012) youth as in our Liberian case study, or of particular ethnic groups, including through institutions which naturalize putative essential inequalities between social groups, such as the caste system in India. The biggest challenge is how to elucidate what counts as an indigenous social pathology in Southern contexts, and to differentiate it from the (post-)colonial. There is literature on this from a variety of disciplines, including law, social anthropology and development studies, and regional literatures. In particular, studies of customary law and legal pluralism (Benda-Beckmann 2001) have demonstrated how far indigenous conceptualizations of justice and the normative ontological frameworks that sit behind them depart from liberal western justice frameworks (Corradi 2010; Locher, Steimann, and Raj Upreti 2012).

Post-colonial injustice owing to global effects begin in the colonial mercantile period European powers inflicted different kinds of domination on different populations in different places, as Post-1491 Colombian exchange moved people, animals, plants and germs around the globe, reconfiguring the fabric of many agrarian societies and laying the foundations of modern agrarian injustice (Comaroff and Comaroff 2008). Critical social sciences have revealed both the more obvious or ‘fast’ forms of colonial and post-colonial injustice (e.g. ‘accumulation by dispossession’ of land (Harvey 2003), and also subtle lingering effects of structural or ‘slow’ violence (c.f. Nixon 2011; Spinner-Halev 2012) such as the slow loss of identity, belonging and culture that comes from being forcibly removed from the land in which ones and ones ancestors inhabit. Other factors include the production of famine in colonial plantation economies through imposition of free markets or price controls and the undermining of both everyday moral economies and anti-scarcity institutions of some populations. (Nally 2011; Watts 2013; Davis 2001; Sen 1981),

3. **Case studies: Brazilian Amazonia & Liberia, West Africa**

We now move on to examine the social context of injustice issues in two very different case studies of tropical forest inhabitants in Brazilian Amazonia and Liberia, West Africa.

The cases expose just how complex and multi-dimensional justice issues are in the Agrarian South. The population of the Brazilian Amazonian was overwhelmingly created through the colonial process, and today are framed within a liberal recognition order where the extension of distributional justice based on the idea that “indigeneity” can unproblematically be determined is causing conflict around identity politics in a rural society of mixed heritage where indigenous/non-indigenous divide is by no means clear. The latter example, Liberia, West Africa, reminds us that it is important to
recognise precolonial injustices, in this case the exploitation of the youth by chiefs, as well as how misrecognition of colonialism itself drives injustice – Liberia is in fact an American colony, but because the colonists are Afro-descendent, the oppression and even slavery they inflicted on the indigenous population is not recognised internationally as such. Both of these factors were drivers in the recent war, underlining how underlying injustices can trigger conflict.

As in any post-Colonial context, the category of ‘indigenous’ comes thorough as a category problematic in each case. In Brazil, it has been transformed from the lowest position in the social hierarchy, to a valued (albeit in a highly essentialised way) identity with territorial rights. It is problematic because the division between ‘indigenous’ and ‘peasant’ is porous, and drawing a neat line on racialized grounds between them is both impracticable and morally dubious. In Liberia it is problematic in a different way: whilst it is clear who is indigenous (in the case of NW Liberia, Loma, Kpelle, Mano etc.) and who is not (a mostly Monrovia based Americo-Liberian elite occupying an upper social strata), the problems of justice originate within indigenous society, although probably exacerbated by Americo-Liberian rule, and have to do with the rights to land and marriage of young men.

4. Brazilian Amazon

In Latin America, 300 years of conquest and colonialism from 1491- to the early 1800’s decimated indigenous populations, which now form only 8% of the region’s population (World Bank). A heterogeneous mixture of ‘new peoples’ formed through miscegenation (Schwartz et al. 1999) whose existence challenged colonial hierarchies based on clear distinctions between discrete racial categories (Cañizares-Esguerra 2009). Travellers naturalists and scholars such as Jean de Léry, Raleigh, Agassiz, Herndon, Bates, Maury, Humbolt, Wallace, Darwin, de Buffon, and early geographers such as Church-Semple misrecognised forest peoples through environmental determinism and scientific racism constructing them either noble savages (the ‘edenic’ discourse,) or degenerates (the ‘bad latitude’ discourse). In terms of culture, populations were seen too innocent or too evil, too degenerate or too weak to be civilized. In terms of the environment, either “opulent nature” quelled thirst for enterprise, or “intractable nature” overwhelmed its possibility. Both discourses supported calls for large scale European migration, indigenous development of civilisation was seen as impossible (Hecht 2013:Chapter 21). After independence, such discourses continued, locating a largely European-descended elite at the top of a scale of value and development, and justified slavery & racial inequality which continues today. Dominant cultural and economic forms are European character, with indigenous, peasant and Afro-descendent people and cultures marginalised.

The majority of rural inhabitants of the Amazon today are a mixed peasantry referred to as ‘caboclos’ or ‘ribereinhos’ of heterogeneous cultural origins: the descendants of European settlers who migrated from northwestern Brazil during the rubber boom, indigenous Amazonians, and Afro-descendants. Their livelihoods typically consist in manioc cultivation, forest and river extractivism. Their worldviews, albeit diverse, are a form of Iberian folk-catholicism infused with beliefs of indigenous origin. Many of today’s communities are relics of the rubber boom, which drew large numbers of men from NE Brazil 1840-1910, working in conditions ranging from debt peonage to relative autonomy. The Amazonian peasantry have been characterised by ‘invisibility,’ a form of misrecognition, both in the media, and in anthropological scholarship, since they contradict western preconceptions (tropicality) about Amazon as place of timeless rainforest and tribal peoples since they remind us that European colonialism, and subsequently the global appetite for rubber transformed Amazonian humanity (Nugent 1993; Nugent and Harris 2004; Adams et al. 2009; Harris 1998; Harris 2000). Yet the contestation of this misrecognition goes far earlier –beginning with early nationalist Brazilian scholar Euclides da Cunha, who surveyed and mapped River Purús, inverted these discourses by representing mixed rural communities as perfectly adapted to life in the tropics . He provided an alternative to European racist essentialism, stating “those sturdy caboclos [are] the hardy nucleus of our future, the bedrock of our race.” Nevertheless, this remained a minority view. Despite only around 2% self-identifying as indigenous, Amazonia as a place of ‘tribes’ is perpetuated by both popular media and Amazonian anthropology, which continues to focus overwhelmingly on indigenous people, despite their forming only a fraction of current Amazonian humanity. This international form of
misrecognition shapes the recognition order in Amazonian society, as the following case study demonstrates.

This case study examines the way in which an attempt at procedural justice – (i.e. fair and equitable institutional processes of the state) embodied in the article 68 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution which created a legal framework and a range of institutions to support and affirm land rights of previously marginalised Amazonian populations – plays out amongst the aforementioned populations of highly heterogeneous origins. It demonstrates how attempts at recognition by the liberal state fail to grasp the complex and socially embedded nature of injustice. Historically, most Brazilian Amazonians had been excluded property ownership and political rights, making squatter status the norm and hence making people vulnerable to wholesale land usurpations of areas they had occupied for generations, as descendants of rubber boom bosses fraudulently claiming tenure. What Article 68 did was transform people once classified as “squatters” into “citizens, but demanded that they articulation of Amazonian historical identities, either around ‘indigeneity’ or historic livelihoods, i.e. rubber-tappers and Brazil-nut gatherers. (Hecht 2011). In justice terms, the outcome of recognition (as “indigenous” or “extractivist”) leads to redistribution (land and resources former, security of tenure and markets). Here we see how historic livelihoods are far less problematic a category in recognition terms than ‘indigeneity. As we see from the examples, recognition can work both positively and negatively for rural Amazonians. As the case study below, which draws on interviews conducted in 2006-7 in the municipality of Manicore, Brazilian Amazonia, illustrates, the revalorization of the previously misconceived and demigrated Indigenous category has generated a sometimes violent identity politics amongst Amazonian ‘caboclo’ or ‘riberino’ peasant populations.

*Mataura*

The river Mataura, a tributary of the river Madeira, is today the location of a large and highly contested indigenous reserve, from which several hundred ‘non-indigenous’ residents were forcibly removed. An examination of oral histories at four different communities in the region yielded the following history, which demonstrates how liberal understandings of recognition and redistribution play out in the Amazonian interior.

Carlos Martinez Lindoso or “Coronel Vencedor” was one of the many Colonels in the Army that settled along the Madeira and set up large extractive operations during the nineteenth century (Keller 1874). Colonel Vencedor had three barracões in the Mataurá River where he exchanged industrial goods for Brazil-nuts and Rubber. He started trying to obtain the rights for its historic landholdings from their long term inhabitants, apparently by falsely promising to help people register their property, only to do it in his own name, then claiming the land as his. This was the cause of a rebellion by the Caboclos and Indians of the Mataurá, who violently killed Vencedor in December 1930, and freed the river.

Despite the long history of mutually peaceful caboclo and native Amazonian inhabitation of the Mataurua, the river is now an Indigenous territory and much of its long term inhabitants have been removed. While accounts differ, they all converge on the actions of one man, Jose Leles, as being instrumental in the setting up of the reserve by FUNAI (The National Indian Foundation). By all accounts not an “Indio” himself, Leles married an Indian woman from the river, and hit on the idea of creating a reserve. He got in touch with FUNAI and a “study” was carried out, people were asked whether they were Indians or not. The implications their self-identification as indigenous or not in terms of gaining or losing land rights were not explained to the people. Many who were of Indian ancestry chose not to identify themselves as Indigenous. When the reserve was created, those who had landholdings were indemnified for their land and its natural resources, but young men with no landholdings who worked seasonally for others received nothing. They were taken by the police to an unattractive site in the floodplain close to the town of Manicoré called Sururu where, according to various informants, they were living in a wretched state. In a Heideggerian sense here, those excluded lost part of their world (i.e the landscapes that they inhabited and that formed part of their being
(Harris 2005)), but the liberal sense of recognition permits this since the material can be separated from the symbolic.

The whole lower area of the river was given to a small group of people who self-identified as Indians. Ironically, not all of the few who remained in the Matarua reserve relocated were of entirely Indian descent and some of those who self-identified as “Indians” of the Mataurá had blond hair and blue eyes. What once had been a thriving river with series of historic communities is now practically deserted. Despite gaining ownership of most productive areas of land current inhabitants of the reserve stopped farming and lived off the resources extended to them by the state. As one local put it:

“Jose Leles bought some land within Mataurá. He went to Manaus and discovered that if he created an Indigenous reserve there he would be able to gain control of its resources. So he went to Funai and made an indigenous reserve and Funai entered and said to everyone you have to sign as Indians to stay.... Before, 70 years ago it was just patrões (bosses) and fregueses (workers) and then the fregueses killed the patrões..... Antes não teve negocio de indio no Mataurá [Before there was no Indian question in Mataurá]. It was just nordestinos (migrants from North-east Brazil) and Indians all working together”

For this interlocutor then there was no issue of recognition between ‘indians’ and ‘nordestinos’ prior to the entrance of FUNAI. This case demonstrates how the extension of rights based on indigenous recognition leads to injustice when they are manipulated by individuals and groups.

Amparo

The community of Amparo is located on the high floodplain that separates Lake Genipapo from the main channel of the Madeira. The community is currently in the process of becoming a Mundurucú Indigenous territory. While some residents are clearly of Indian heritage, the impetus for creation of the reserve, according to them was land conflict with bosses. Historically the locality was dominated by the bosses Dico and Antonio Velino who controlled the extraction of Rubber and Brazil Nut in the area. Dico’s son Ze Curica inherited ownership of the locality. Conflict recently flared over the land-use rights of the long term residents of the land. Curica was demanding that residents ask permission to plant there. In the context of growing awareness of the power of asserting Indigenous rights, the community organized itself and was granted Indigenous status in 2007. Locals claim that the murder of the head of FUNAI in Manaus in the same year was Curica's response to the loss of his land. This case, in contrast to the Matuara, shows how indigenous identity can be mobilised for positive ends, i.e. the emancipation of poor inhabitants from unjust exploitation by powerful individuals.

Atininga

The community “Terra Preta da Atininga,” was established when a boss arrived from Maranhão (a state neighbouring Pará in the Brazilian Northeast) bringing his workers with him. The head of the family was also a Coronel, and the freguezia worked extracting Brazil nut, Rubber and Wood. In a 1955 election the people had supported a man called Paulo Neves, who had promised to address their land issue if elected. The bosses supported Plínio Coelho, who had promised to look after their interests. Following Plínio’s victory a boat arrived with bosses and Police and a shootout occurred between them and some of the workers who had been trying to claim some of the land as their own. Those workers who had rebelled were jailed and new workers were put in their place. The land has since changed hands, but until recently the long term residents had no legal claim to it. Residents continued to be paid a pitance for the yearly Brazil nut harvest, this was one of their main grievances. Until recently the old patrão (boss) was alive, and he allowed people to plant crops provided they did not plant “bem de raiz” that is to say perennial fruit and nut trees. But when he died, his son and grandchildren started to claim 25% of any production. As a result of this all agriculture on the best soils closely halted, and people planted bitter manioc in more distant fields not claimed by the bosses. Many people left, and in September 2006 only a few farmers remained. Thanks to the efforts of Getulio Nascimento, this situation is now being resolved. Getulio has been instrumental in setting up
the Brazil-Nut association of Manicoré. The people of Terra Preta da Atininga, instead of selling Brazil nut to the patron and receiving about £1.50 per tin of nuts now sell to the cooperative and receive £4 per tin.

The Atininga case shows that, in spite of similar histories of exploitation of poor rural Amazonians by powerful bosses, the assertion of identity in relation to extractivist rights has less emancipatory potential, in terms of land rights, than the assertion of identity on the basis of indigeneity. The people of Atininga have not been able to lay claim to the land through identifying as extractivists, rather what they have gained is a better market for their produce. The Matura and Amparo cases demonstrate what happens when rights and resources end up being extended on the basis of assertion of indigenous identity. This can have positive outcomes, as in the case of Amparo, but Matuara case underlines the problematic nature of this conceptualization of indigeneity. This raises the serious question. Is it just to exclude caboclos from redistribution? They are in terms of socio-economic or class status, indistinguishable from ‘indigenous’ people, being poor riverine inhabitants making a living from manioc cultivation, and forest and river extractives. Many have indigenous heritage, as some indigenous people have heritage from Europeans and Africans. It is therefore arguably both morally wrong and practically impossible to draw an indigenous / non-indigenous line between traditional Amazonians. All that is open to them is asserting identity on the basis of livelihoods which has limited emancipatory potential. Yet this is what happens as a consequence of the misrecognition that inheres in the procedural justice of extending resources and rights to those who fit liberal Western ideas of who are legitimate Amazonians and who are not. This shows that the 1988 Brazilian constitution failed to recognise the intermingling of peasants and indigenous people, and so only offers emancipation to certain categories of marginal forest people. This, I argue, is because it is based on abstract principles which fail to grasp the complexities of categorising forest peoples and the socially embedded nature of injustice.

5. Liberia, West Africa

European Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa, occurred later than that of the Americas, most of it happening in the so called ‘Scramble for Africa’ of 1881 to 1914, and lasting for shorter periods, with most countries gaining independence in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Apart from South Africa, Europeans did not establish permanent populations as in Latin America. In Sub-Saharan Africa, societies were not as radically reconfigured as Latin America, European colonial annexation in the late 19th century moulded the multitude of different agrarian, pastoralist and occasionally even hunter-gatherer groups into peasant producers largely through the imposition of residential hut and poll taxes. Post-colonial Africanist scholars such as W. E. B. Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, Achille Mbembe and Valentin-Yves Mudimbe have argued that the subjectivities of Africans have been colonised to some extent by an Africanized European mentality, and advocate a ‘decolonisation of thought.’ For Fanon, in the post-colonial contexts, the majority of Africans have not been emancipated but rather internalised the inferiority forced upon them, whilst the elite appropriate and imitate the culture and oppression of the former colonizers. (Fanon 1967).

Liberia in the colonial sense is a peculiar case which also suffers from a certain kind of invisibility in that it does not fit with preconceptions of what an African colony looks like. Liberia was colonised by African Americans, who under the guidance of the American Colonisation Society in 1822 settled an area of the West African coastline which was not under British or French control, becoming an independent state in 1847. Liberian government and industry is continues to be dominated by Americo-Liberians who form (2.4-5%) of the country’s population. The territory which became Liberia, was of course already occupied by speakers of Mande, Kwa and Atlantic language families. Americo-liberians have historically dominated consider themselves superior to indigenous inhabitants, considering them as backward, underdeveloped etc. (Sawyer 2005) In the 1920's Liberia, as a requirement to join the League of Nations (precursor to the United Nations), was investigated for slavery, which was found to be being perpetuated by both indigenous chiefs and settlers, (domestic servitude by the former, indentured labour by the latter). These underlying factors did not go away and contributed to the recent (1990-2005) war (Ellis 2007; Unruh 2008).
The central agrarian justice issues in the case study discussed here, however, are internal to indigenous society, and prior to Liberia’s colonialism. They centre on the struggle of youth for freedom in the face of exploitation by elder chiefs who controlled the labour of young men (indentured work) and the sexual behaviour and marriage of young women (chiefs kept most as wives for themselves). These issues are regional in scope, common to Mande speaking groups of Sierra Leone and NW Liberia. (Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010; Peters and Richards 2011; Richards 1996). This situation perpetuated lack of access to land, a key driver in the recent (1990-2005) war.

The following interviews are drawn from fieldwork in Southern Lofa county, during 2010 and 2011. The General town chief of the region, Kokulo Dorbor, seventy-four years old, also recalls how different social structure was when he was young. Family units were much fewer but much larger, each dominated by a chief and everyone else (besides his children and brothers) are slaves. The large family unit based on polygamy: Kokulo recalls that each town quarter had one headman or chief (totuo), each with many wives and children, then there were six or seven “sub” chiefs, with three wives each. Access to land and therefore property rights was restricted to these family units - only the headman and subs could farm rice, the carbohydrate staple of the region, and there were ten to fifteen farms in all. The headman draws on up to one hundred young men to labour on his farm. Food intake was also controlled, and allocated by the households units, with a few individuals cooking for everyone. Everyone sat and ate around the same bowl. He explained:

“the head of family have his own house. Then all wives and all children and head wife sleeps in another house. Head wife chooses which other wife goes with him each night, and also sometimes finds new wives for him…. Young men sleep in separate house or in the bush. Men could fence their houses to keep the young men out, but they would still have secret affairs with wives.”

Yarkpazu Siasia, ninety years old, the eldest living “landlord” of Wenwuta, the town where long-term fieldwork was based, tells a similar story. He was used to be town chief “in the Tubman era” (1941-1977), after him, Flomo Kali was chief with six or seven wives and there were two quarter chiefs. The current town chief of Wenwuta, Joseph Kalie, is Flomo’s son. He claims that Wenwuta town was established because they were getting a hard time from “slavery”. During the eighteenth century, “tribal war” slave trade, capture people. In the warfare only warriors killed one another, men, women and children were taken as slaves. In addition to the three quarters existing today, Wenwuta had a fourth Belle people were slaves.

In the past then, women were “owned” by chiefs, they had no rights to themselves as property. If the chief sees a man with one of his wives, and he likes the man, he may give her to him, instructing him “go make farm for the woman.” Whilst young men and women inevitably had affairs, this ended up reinforcing the system since the chief would then use the ‘crime’ committed by the young man indenture his labour though a debt, which could take years or even decades to ‘pay.’ This became such an issue that, according to Korkolu Dorbor Charles DB king (president 1920-1930) introduced the “woman tax,” which set the price of infidelity at ten US dollars, in an effort to stymie the exploitative control of chiefs. As Kokulo put it “Youth were leaving, owing to conflict in women business, were having to work for chiefs for 12 yrs for interfering with women.” This can be characterised as a struggle for recognition since what the (male and female) youth strove for is a new position in the order of society, not a new society as such.

According to Kokulo, it was Charles D.B. King who also “abolished slave trade in Liberia, proclaiming “everybody should go back to their parents.” Everyone left and went back to their parents, and chiefs became poor. From 1950s to the 1970s the ability of powerful men to have so many wives started to diminish due to ‘poverty’ since they were unable to support women.

Despite these changes, youth remained dominated by their elders, and this is cited as a key driver in the outbreak of the recent war (Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010; Peters and Richards 2011; Richards 1996). A youth of twenty-five, Bestman Sumo, recalls “Before the war all people lived in big family households. Children, men, wives, grandparents. Often elders, not just fathers but in my case
grandmother forbid young people [from having] relationships. Because father did not want to lose labour, or be responsible to pregnant women, so elders used to say no. My grandmother was famous for not allowing youth to form partnership, once she say no to a rich outsider! Elders would choose who they wanted youngsters to marry... I could not have women when I was young –elders threaten to put people out of the house.” An elder recalls of this period: “Young men would be breaking wood. To wear clothes, to eat, to make farm all is from the father...[you need to be] twenty five to thirty years old to get a wife...got to see that you can maintain yourself”

Our research assistant, also a Loma youth, Woulay Narmah, said “before the war people used to be afraid of their father. People would not just speak to an old person. But in the war the people travelled, went to other countries, learnt about human rights. Before war only father made a farm. After elders no longer had the assets to care for grown up women. The dowry for a woman used to be forty-eight USD. Now people don’t even pay bride price, before if you impregnate someone, you have to make farm for her and her mother while she in Sande bush. Before sons could only make their own farm once they were married. They couldn’t make their own farm when they were still living with father. Before the war no one used to travel. Now when you see the youth, they are all married, with their own house. Before you would see a big house or two houses, one for the father and the other for the family. Before the war most of the elder men had more than one wife...

Yassah Reed, a thirty two year old woman, recalls: “Before the war, elder men in Wenwuta had three or four wives. They used to cook all together in town. 1 wife cook each day, one pot for all: sons, wives, daughters, everyone ate together from big bowls. Wifes would bring new wives for their husbands, from other towns Now its hard [for a man] to have more than one wife because children have to go to school, so can’t work. My husband Sumo Reed’s father had six wives, Badema from Vologisi mountain had twenty two wives!! Before if you had wives and children you would make big farm and get money...Now as children are sent to school, more wives and children does not make sense.”

War then dramatically accelerated an already existing process of social transformation from big household units, towards smaller ones (where household resembles nuclear family), where dominant family head controlled labour. There has been a shift from once very large farming households consisting of the extended family, adult sons and wives, and dependent ‘strangers’ of powerful landholders, to smaller groups usually centred on a husband-wife unit, or sometimes an older woman and her unmarried sons (Leach 1994). Whereas large farm households would have shared a single farm kitchen in their large rice field within the bush-fallow cycle, there is now a much greater number of smaller fields, each with its own temporary farm kitchen. Education came and changed situation (i.e can’t put children to work). As Kokulo Flomo concluded “Now everyone can choose what they eat, make farm, make their own home.”

Concluding discussion

These cases taken together demonstrate that in tropical forests injustice as misrecognition is both indigenous and post-colonial in character, and while we have used one as an example of each, since each manifest the characteristics of one of these categories, most instances in tropical forests today are likely a dialectic of the two. Further, critical scholars have understandably blamed much injustice in tropical forests on different stages of capitalism, yet each of these cases were more complex in character: the Brazilian case has to do with the way the state conceives of indigeneity and the way that this mediates property rights, while the Liberian case shows how lack of property rights among indigenous youth can contribute to serious conflict. Our two case studies offer distinct lessons, however.

The Amazonian case demonstrates the potential for both injustice and emancipation caused by the extension of liberal recognition policies, but also calls into question the wisdom of applying ethnic criteria to an extremely heterogeneous population where drawing sharp indigenous/non-indigenous distinctions are practically impossible. Before 1988, to be indigenous was the lowest form in the post-
Colonial Amazonian social order. Now it has become a strategic form of identity politics through which to gain property rights. A more just way of determining indigeneity would be length of residence in a particular locale. In the Heideggerian sense losing property can also be seen as a kind of slow violence of being wrenched away from the removed from landscape of the River Mataura, and dumped on the floodplain at Sururu. If we see people in terms recognising their particular ways of being in the world, length of inhabitation of a circumscribed areas is a better way to determine whether they should have rights to it, than trying to assign a fraught ethnic category in heterogeneous populations of multiple cultural heritages.

In contrast to the Amazonian case, the recognition struggles in Liberia do not involve colonialism directly, but rather are internal to the society in question. The key injustice brought out by the Liberian case is indigenous in origins, namely the exploitation of male and female youths by elder men, which prevented their ability to gain property rights over themselves, and the land of their ancestors, and in being able to engage in sexual relations and marriage, farm rice, and cook their own food. From a Heideggarian perspective, this restricted their ability in be in the world since they could not engage in the (re)productive activities that are generative of life, or from a different view, that are necessary to be a culturally specific subject. This misrecognition and the related maldistribution was ultimately challenged by the youth themselves through the war, but it was also unsettled prior to this, by the actions of Charles D.B King and the League of Nations, and also changing economic circumstances.

In both cases, powerful individuals - bosses in the Amazonian case, chiefs in West Africa - historically exploited labour of marginalised individuals and denied them property rights. This led to social pathologies as a contributing factor in violence (localised conflicts in Brazil, a war in Liberia). Both case evidence the ways in which 'independence' may mean little change for the inhabitants, as in South America and Africa after independence colonialism turns inward can be said to be turned inward, through the reproduction of colonial class, cultural and racial hierarchies and power-relations. These two case studies demonstrate the utility of a phenomenological approach to justice as recognition in order to capture the lived experience of social pathologies by rural people in the agrarian south.

References


