



AN EXERCISE IN WORLDMAKING

THE INSTITUTE OF
SOCIAL STUDIES
BEST STUDENT ESSAYS OF
2005/06



EVALUATED AND PUBLISHED BY STUDENTS FROM THE CLASS OF 2006

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BEST STUDENT ESSAYS OF
2005/06

A PARTICIPATORY AND STUDENT DRIVEN ACADEMIC
EXCHANGE AND REFERENCE TOOL CREATED FOR
THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES MA STUDENTS
OF 2006 & THE FUTURE

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F OREWARD: THE WAYS OF WORLDMAKING¹

“Facts...are theory-laden; they are as theory-laden as we hope our theories are fact-laden. Or in other words, facts are small theories, and true theories are big facts. This does not mean...that right versions can be arrived at casually, or that worlds are built from scratch. We start, on any occasion, with some old version or world that we have on hand and that we are stuck with until we have the determination and skill to remake it into a new one. Some of the felt stubbornness of fact is the grip of habit: our firm foundation is indeed stolid. Worldmaking begins with one version and ends with another.” (Goodman, 1978: 96-97)

THE VISION

During discussions with the students at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) this year and among ourselves, we found that the most remarkable element of our experience here, outside of the lectures and academic readings, was the sharing of ideas, identities, culture, ambitions, concerns and experiences with our fellow students. Where and when would we be in a position like this again, able to speak so fluidly, freely, candidly and without (as much) pretence with peers who represent more than 60 nations? Where else would we have this opportunity to see our own reflections in the actions, emotions, behaviours and eyes of others with whom we may not have initially believed we shared certain characteristics? Perhaps to an even greater extent, we began to value the characteristics we do not share and learned from them as well.

Most of us realize that we can never fully encapsulate or articulate what this experience was for each of us. And perhaps it would ruin the mystique that surrounds academia coupled with human cultural exchange if we tried. However, when we consider that we all came to ISS for the same reason, to understand, in greater depth, the processes behind the development of a globalizing world and its effect on human well-being; and to consider the theories that have contributed to development transformations, the changing of minds and thereby, “the facts”, then it is not grandiose to explain the process and experiences of the last 15 months as “worldmaking”.

¹ Nelson Goodman (1978)

Every human being is a “worldmaker.” The opportunity to be a responsible worldmaker is up to us to grab and fly with during our lifetimes. Sensory experiences, memory, communication and empathy are each stepping-stones toward achieving this. While it might be said that the sensory experiences and empathy are outside the scope of this book, memory and communication are not. And in sparking memory and facilitating communication our goal is to create more sensory experiences and more empathy.

THE PROCESS

This book was created in a participatory process, involving the entire student body of the ISS class of 2005/06. We chose the best 16 essays from a pool of 80 based on five areas of student-driven criteria:

- Research
- Analysis
- Presentation
- Knowledge Creation
- Practicality

To be considered for the book, the essays must have received a grade of 85 or higher, meaning that they met the Institute’s criteria for a “distinctive” essay. To be chosen for the book, the essays had to receive the highest score in the second process of evaluation: the reading and scoring by a 41-student evaluative team according to the student-driven criteria listed above.

The core editorial team, Jessica, Rina, Tibor, Carlos, Siddharth and Catherine, chose a widely distributive group of volunteer evaluators based on gender, program and world region. Each evaluator read 3-4 essays, and each essay was read and scored by two different evaluators to create an average score. The process was completely confidential. We only knew the course and student numbers. The evaluators did not know whose essay they were reading, and the essay writers did not know who was evaluating their work.

In the end, there were 16 essays that held the top scores. As we had foreseen, there were some authors who had more than one essay in this tier. You will find that we let the participatory selection of the process determine who was published without constraints. Three authors have two essays in this publication.

THE RESULT

The body of this publication reflects contemporary development by highlighting the theories, cognitive exercises, practical relationships, interlinking concepts and discovered facts of the more than 180 students who made up the Masters Degree in International Development Studies programme at ISS in 2005/06.

It is intended to be a tool of reference for responsible worldmaking. As our class departs this campus and begins the next stage of our own personal and professional development we can open the pages of this book and remember not only what we as individuals were learning, talking and thinking about in this year but also what others of us were learning, talking and thinking about and how they articulated and made tangible this process. And so we will continue to learn from each other, even after we are gone from here. In addition, this book will be shelved in the ISS library so that future students can learn how to write successfully, eloquently and above all, critically about contemporary development theories, practice and programme design.

Last, this book is a first volume in what we hope will be an extended series of worldmaking books by the future students of ISS, because responsible worldmaking cannot take place individualistically. A conscious and consistent dialogue must continue so that we understand the trends of development and continue to work toward achieving complete global human well-being; together and always with empathy. Because, worldmaking begins with a vision of the old world and the creation a new one with the skills, knowledge and experiences that we gain over a lifetime, no small part of which came to us in these last fifteen months at ISS.

Scholas Editorial Committee
2005/06

1



DEVELOPMENT NGOS OR DEUS EX MACHINA? NEO-LIBERAL CO-OPTATION TACTICS IN SALVADOREAN NGO-GOVERNMENT POWER RELATIONS

One morning, when Gregor Samsa woke from troubled dreams, he found himself transformed in his bed into a horrible vermin. He lay on his armour-like back, and if he lifted his head a little he could see his brown belly, slightly domed and divided by arches into stiff sections. The bedding was hardly able to cover it and seemed ready to slide off any moment. His many legs, pitifully thin compared with the size of the rest of him, waved about helplessly as he looked. 'What's happened to me?' he thought. It wasn't a dream.

—Kafka 1915/1930

INTRODUCTION

In the contemporary scenario of development practice, civil society has woken up to a harsh *Kafkaian* reality. Some of the main actors of development praxis (development, NGOs, governments and donors) appear the last two decades to have played a rather *metamorphic* but hopeless 'theater script' scenario of development interventions, by repeatedly failing to bring development where it is most needed (Ferrero y de Loma-Osorio, 2003; Kortén, 1980). Yet in this drama play of development, the narrative has an internal logic: the 'actors' (a) are all *interdependent and connected* (Biekart, 1999; 2005), (b) function in what could

be called a 'system' of [*donor-state-non-government organization*] or 'DOSTANGO' (Tvedt, 2002), and (c) seek an ideal 'heaven' of development: multidimensional 'human flourishing' (Alkire, 2002; Annan, 2005; Sen, 1999), empowered participation and people centeredness (Chambers, 1997; 2005; Korten and Klaus, 1984)¹. This system, so will be this essay's early provocation, maintains intact a configuration of power relations *within* mainstream development by preserving the status quo of the winners (the ones who intervene) and the losers (the intervened) and thus the structural factors that cause poverty, inequality and deprivation of human basic rights.

In this context, the scope of this essay is a limited attempt to deconstruct development NGO-Government power relations in the particular realm of El Salvador's civil society. The structure of the essay is as follows:

In the first block, a theoretical framework will be made in order to situate development NGOs (NGDOs) as particular building blocks of a larger body, *within* civil society & *outside* the governmental sphere.

In the second block, using the theoretical background as framework, empirical examples in civil society building processes of El Salvador will be made to illustrate the role and interactions of development NGOs in relation to the government.


Lastly, a critical reflection will approximate an answer to this essay's background question: are Salvadorian NGDOs really achieving social change and bringing development to the poor and marginalized in its wider *empowering* sense or are they simply the *deus ex machina* or the 'angels that save the show' of the government in relation to civil society building processes?

SITUATING NGDOs AS BUILDING BLOCKS OF A LARGER BODY: WITHIN CIVIL SOCIETY & OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENTAL SPHERE

NGOs are part of the building blocks that make up a larger body: civil society. (See figure 1) A particular type of NGO is that of the NGDOs, the Non Governmental Development Organizations. In order to understand the genealogy that defines an NGDO one must first address the *macro* body they constitute part of. As the concepts of 'NGO', 'civil society' and 'democracy' are all contested (Smillie, 1995), this essay will endorse the definitions that fit the following criteria: (a) serves as a holistic or operational concept, (b) has endured the evolving debate in the theoretical streams, and most importantly (c) fits best to the reality experienced in developing countries which are the concern of this essay. Going from the macro concepts to the more micro units, (see figure 1) it is possible to clarify the 'fuzzy' concepts of democracy, the government/state,

¹ An example of this 'script playing escenario' in development practice is the so called 'global compact' that gave rise to the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) which are now supposed to be a consensus and a 'blueprint' for development worldwide. This point will be discussed in further detail in the second section of this article.

Figure 1: Situating NGOs in the larger map



Source: Own construction based on (Willetts, 2002) and (Biekart, 1999)

citizenship and civil society, to finally address the concept of NGOs and their particular variety centered in development (NGDOs).

In the first place, democracy is essentially a particular manner of governing a society² (system of governance), ‘a rule by the people’ or more specifically ‘by the majority’ (McLean and McMillan, 2003), where ‘rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives’ (Schmitter and Karl, 1993 quoted in Biekart, 1999). Within this definition it is possible to distinguish two central elements: (1) firstly, the rulers are the ones who govern, and require a machinery of government (Heywood, 2002); and (2) secondly, under democratic rule the governed are identified as citizens.

Looking from the perspective of the ruler (see Foucault³), the broad notion of government is rooted on an idea that inter-relates power and knowledge in ‘a complex set of processes through which human behavior is systematically con-

² As (McLean and McMillan, 2003) state the notion of ‘society’ can be ‘stretched or narrowed to cover almost any form of association of persons possessing any degree of common interests, values or goals.’

³ See the key works of Michel Foucault on power-knowledge and his notion of governmentality (Foucault, Faubion, and Hurley, 2000; Foucault and Gordon, 1980; Foucault and Smith, 1995)

trolled in ever wider areas of social and personal life.’ (Scott and Marshall, 2005) The concrete form to exercise this ‘control’ is the ‘state’, which is a distinct set of political institutions whose specific concern is with the organization of domination, in the name of the common interest, within a delimited territory. (McLean and McMillan, 2003) The institutions that compose the state consist of five bodies that work as a machinery of government: (1) Constitutions, law and judiciaries, (2) Assemblies, (3) political executives (4) bureaucracies and (5) militaries and police forces. These institutions are entrusted to exercise legitimate power by making collective decisions on behalf of citizens and enforce them. Thus some of the functions of the state are to: make law (legislation), interpret law (adjudication) and implement law and policy (execution). (Heywood, 2002)

Looking from the perspective of the governed, the notion of citizenship is a conferred status that asserts usually by law that an individual is part of a political community whereby he/she participates in a common life and has rights and duties as a consequence. (McLean and McMillan, 2003) In this sense, all regimes have rulers and a public realm, but only to the extent that they are democratic do they have citizens. (Schmitter and Karl, 1993)


The above notions are useful to engage with the concept of civil society and decompose its main elements. Accordingly, this essay supports a pluralist alternative genealogy of understanding civil society by arguing that every civil society is unique (a non-universalist notion); that it is a product of processes of struggle and conflict, and consequently; that political action is central to its understanding. (Howell and Pearce, 2001) The latter reasons can be justified with the Gramscian notion that contemporary civil societies, especially in developing countries, have social institutions that serve the hegemonic function of justifying state domination. (Bratton, 1994) In this sense, an operational working definition is given by White (1994) who defines civil society as ‘an intermediate associational realm between state and family’ which has three key features: 1) it is populated by organizations which are separate from the state, 2) these organizations enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and 3) they are ‘formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values’. (See figure 2 and table 1)

Furthermore, according to Biekart (1999), civil society is notably an organizational *realm* that is not isolated, but on the contrary necessarily engages with the state in power relations. The bridge that serves to ‘mediate by’ and ‘organize within’ civil society and the state is political *society*. For this reason, Biekart recognizes in a normative sense that any analysis of the power balance between the state and civil society ‘should consider the composition and the strength of political society, in order to assess the potential for political change towards democratic government’ (The particular balances of power are represented in Biekart’s simple model seen in figure 1, and summarized in table 1) In a similar account, Najam (2000) builds a framework that could comply with the notions given by Biekart, which are ‘the four C’s of government-Third Sector Relations’

Neo-Liberal Cooptation Tactics

categorized as: a) Cooperation, b) Confrontation, c) Complementarity, and d) Co-optation.

Figure 2: Struggles of power between Civil Society and the State



Source: (Biekart, 1999, p. 42)

It is in this framework then, that the concept of ‘non-governmental organization’ (NGO) can finally be described. According to some scholars, the name itself⁴ is not very evocative and gives a poor picture of its nature, not just because of its wide variety of synonyms found in the jargon of development praxis but because of its heterogeneous characteristics and many genealogies; (Biekart, 1999; Edwards and Fowler, 2002; Korten, 1990; Smillie, 1995) (see figure 1). Moreover, they have multiple faces, not all of them necessarily good, a characteristic that, Tvedt (2002) acknowledges, has been completely missed out (or avoided) by scholars on the field like Korten (1980; 1990; 2000) and Dhanapala (2002). For this reason, ideological generalizations of the ‘good’, ‘progressive,’ and ‘humanitarian’ NGOs must be aborted on the grounds that

⁴ Interestingly, according to Willetts (2002) the term, ‘non-governmental organization’ or NGO, came into currency in 1945 because of the need for the UN to ‘to differentiate in its Charter between participation rights for intergovernmental specialized agencies and those for international private organizations.’

this vision is ‘totalitarian’ and gives a false image of the NGO scene either seen as part of a transnational or global civil society.

Table 1: Balance of power between the state and civil society

The balance between the state and civil society		Power in Relation to the State	Strength in Civil Society
Organizations part of <u>civil society</u> (i.e. Dev.NGOs) mostly located in . . .	Area ‘A’	Co-opted by the state (authoritarian state)	Weak
	Area ‘B’	Full autonomy from the state (autonomous association)	Strong
Associations in civil society performing an <i>intermediary role</i> during transition stages become active in (and part of) <u>political society</u> . (i.e. political parties or coalitions of social organizations)	Move from Area ‘C’ to ‘D’	Political change towards democratic government	Transitional (increasing participation and accountability)
	Area ‘D’	Political society has strong position in regard to the state generally manifested by efforts for political and social reform	Strong


Source: Based on (Biekart, 1999, p. 43)

As Willetts (2002) accounts *l’essence* of what defines an NGO contains some common normative characteristics by which the organization must be: 1) independent from the direct control of any government; 2) not acting as a political party; 3) non-profit-making; 4) not a criminal group; and 5) non-violent. Development NGOs (NGDOs) are organizations that comply with the above elements, and dedicate their efforts to seeking ‘social change as the ultimate goal of their activities, defined very broadly to mean a world without poverty, violence, injustice and discrimination.’(Edwards and Fowler, 2002, p.5)

Taking into account the particular reality of developing countries and within the domain of NGDOs, a particular feature that should not be ‘out of the map’ and implies power relations that impact the nexus *NGO—Civil Society—Political Society—State*, is the emergence of an extra development actor: donors. This essay draws on the ‘river system’ analogy of the aid chain that Tvedt (2002) develops, and which complements the work of Biekart (1999). For Tvedt, the correct way to approach development power relations in developing countries within the international system should be one that embraces all actors including donors. He categorizes this system as the *Donor-State-NGO* system or ‘DOSTANGO’ (Tvedt, 2002, p.372) This implies that in this framework must

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
Figure 3: Situating NGOs in the wide spectrum of jargon in development



Source: own construction based on (Biekart, 2006)


be included ‘not only the NGOs attached to the aid system, but also the donor offices that provide funds and assess their performance and the research milieus that for various reasons serve NGO interests.’ The particular components of the river system analogy are summarized in figure 4 and incorporated in Biekart’s framework in figure 4.1. The strength of the DOSTANGO system analogy is that it has a structural and wide approach as it sees its components inevitably connected in a system. Moreover, it provides a useful way to think about ‘the history and character of the NGO landscape in any particular country – of how it is connected to, and impacted by, global developments and state power, of the potential for and limits of action.’ (Ibid.)

Figure 4: River system analogy of power relations to situate NGOs/NGDOs



Source: Own construction based on Tvedt (2002)

Figure 4.1: Tvedt's river system analogy incorporated in Biekart's (1999) representation



Source: own construction based on (Tvedt, 2002) and (Biekart, 1999)

ANALYZING SCRIPTS OF ACTION: NGDOS VIS-À-VIS THE STATE IN EL SALVADOR

In a Kafkaian sense, Salvadorians have had *troubled dreams* for more than two decades. After the bloody civil war that beset the country for twelve years (1980-1992) destroying lives, social relations and social networks, El Salvador woke up to a rather ambiguous, yet long desired, *peace*. (Samayoa, 2002) This was the opportunity for the reflourishing of civil society and reconstruction of long eroded networks of citizen organizations that had been withstanding repression and censorship, a process, but political polarization was inherited as a sad legacy of the war (a process that is described historically by Biekart (1999, p.161). Thus, this context was one of a germinal civil society building process, but also of a new setting for power struggle. In this sense, the wake of civil society was not necessarily a smooth process and the people that walked along this path of reconstructing the Salvadorian social landscape of NGOs discovered their limitations very soon: they were a scattered and weak set of organizations for a daunting task of facing up the challenges and needs of a new El Salvador: little, weak and *pitifully thin* legs of a larger body, like Kafka's vermin. The immediate struggle was to get this civil society body into its upright position and make society walk towards 'good change', yet the continuous efforts to do this have been undermined in the DOSTANGO system relations of El Salvador. Recent accounts on this contextual transition of power relations in the NGO arena of EL Salvador also fit in with the analysis of (Rubio Fabián, 2004; and Segovia, 2002).

Neo-Liberal Cooptation Tactics

Using the theoretical background as framework, three empirical examples of civil society building processes in the recent history of El Salvador may illustrate the role and interactions of development NGOs in relation to the government. In all of these, the background question pops up: Are Salvadorian NGDOs achieving social change to bring development to the poor and marginalized in its wider *empowering* sense or are they simply the *deus ex machina* of the government in relation to civil society building processes?

THE USAID DOSTANGO SUBSYSTEM

The setting that will be put forward is structured around three examples that together compose what may be seen as a *structural chain of cooptation*, in which the most visible link is the state's co-optation of key development NGOs of Salvadorian civil society (area 'A' in Biekart's framework). How this may be seen in historical accounts from a systemic perspective in Tvedt's DOSTANGO framework by the influential role of donors in the realm of development aid vis-à-vis the state, civil society and political society. The specific case is an NGDO connection to a subsystem of development aid and the different actors attached to it, which are:


- A donor: USAID
- Civil society represented by an NGDO: FUSADES, and ANEP (National Enterprise Association)
- The state: the right-wing political party heading the state, ARENA, and
- Political society: the main left wing political party, FMLN.

This DOSTANGO subsystem has been one of the one of the strongest chains that has impacted the country's policy-making and outcomes during the 1990s. The influence may be seen in following three examples.

1. THE NEO-LIBERAL WASHINGTON CONSENSUS CONNECTION

Evidence indicates how the Salvadorian government's development planning has been highly influenced and cooptated through visible pressure of the international financial institutions (World Bank and IMF) with the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). (Acevedo and Romano, 2001; Montoya, 1995; Rivera Campos, 1996; Roggenbuck and Konrad Adenauer, 1996) What has not been so visible, but is nevertheless highly important to explain, are the interactions of power and civil society in relation to the state with the particular undercover help of the DOSTANGO subsystem of the USAID donor aid chain. This particular problem was highlighted by Alexander Segovia (2002) and informs the background of this analysis.

Figure 5



It is important to see is that in the systems seen in figure 5, all the actors interact and have a particular role to play. In first place, within civil society the key actor that influenced the neo-liberal transfer of policies was the neo-liberal 'epistemic community' (see Haas, 1992), which was constituted as a network of professional economists, managers, lawyers and policy makers affiliated and agglomerated in two highly recognized organizations: the NGDO known as FUSADES (the Salvadorian Foundation for Social and Economic Development) and the organization ANEP (National Association of the Private Enterprise)⁵.

As Tved's river analogy may show, the NGDO FUSADES was created and 'breast-fed' from USAID funds and the river connection that this has implied is that there has been not just a transfer of money, but also of language, values and ideology, from the donor to the recipient NGDO. This ideological stream basically is a consensus on the supremacy of the role of free market 'laissez-faire' and the 'methodological individualism' perspective in their understanding of *how it all works*.⁶ Moreover, the people in these organizations rotate down and

⁵ See their official websites: FUSADES, <http://www.fusades.com.sv> and ANEP <http://www.anep.org.sv/>

⁶ This neo-liberal transnational epistemic community exists under the same definition given by (Haas, 1992) but also can be seen in (Bislev, Salskov-Iversen, and Hansen, 2002). The neo-liberal transnational and epistemic 'currents' that have dominated the Salvadorean neoliberal agenda and discourse have been lead primarily by two universi-

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upstream *the river*, through workshops, inter-exchange of professionals, and other mechanisms that shaped FUSADES' identity. In this sense, the academics in the NGDO FUSADES became the supporting pillars of 'theoretical' and technocratic counseling of the political party in power, ARENA. Coming with education degrees from Anglo-Saxon universities (American universities like Vanderbilt, Ohio, Oklahoma, New York or British ones like Warwick University or the London School of Economics)⁷, they have had a profound impact in the policy-making arena. It is widely recognized how they have helped to shape and translate the 'mestizo recipe' of neo-liberal policies that came with the SAPs (CIDAI, 1996; Segovia, 2002). Nevertheless, they regard themselves (the whole subsystem that goes from USAID to FUSADES) as neutral⁸. This is how FUSADES defines itself: as a 'a research think-tank that promotes the economic and social *progress* of the Salvadorians through sustainable development under a system of democratic and individual freedoms'⁹ (FUSADES, 2006b) It is this support for 'progress' and 'individual freedoms' which has become a common denominator or trade-mark, not only of FUSADES but also of ANEP (who also feeds on the influential thinking of FUSADES's network of academics) and which can be seen in the reports that this organization produces.

The creation of FUSADES as an institution was not only made with private capital support but with the strong USAID investment. (Segovia, 2002). As a result, their policy documents, policy analysis and proposals have a similar focus;¹⁰ for example the professionals in ANEP think they have the mission of 'developing and strengthening the system of free enterprise in El Salvador'(ANEP, 1966) as ANEP indicates in article 4 of its constitution, and this seems to be the rationale of FUSADES as well. (FUSADES, 2006b)

This USAID DOSTANGO subsystem has been a transnational neo-liberal transfer of policy making with fairly surgical precision, which has also impacted

ties and scholars: throughout the eighties from scholars in Chicago University lead by Milton Friedman et al.; and more recently by Harvard University with Ricardo Hausman et al., which can be seen in the intellectual credits of FUSADES 'Economic and Social Strategy 2004-2009',(FUSADES, 2003) document that served as a 'copy-paste' platform for ARENA's political and economic strategy for the 2005 elections.

⁷ For example, read the curriculum vitas of the professionals in the Economics and Social Studies Department of FUSADES at www.fusades.com.sv/general.asp?id=151 (FUSADES, 2006a)

⁸ In the case of FUSADES, an institution born in 1983, it also defines itself as an 'a non-profit-seeking and apolitical private organization'. Arguably, their 'apolitical' characteristic is fundamentally flawed in the sense that it is impossible to be 'apolitical' by embracing a particular model of 'democratic and individual freedoms'. This deterministic option for individual freedoms excludes other models based on collectivism or solidarity communities; thereby it is making a political statement.

⁹ The italics have been added.

¹⁰ Compare FUSADES and ANEP's annual reports in '*How is our economy*' (1996-2005) and 'ENADE' (2000-2005).

the hegemony of the state upon other actors of civil society, making a more homogenous chorus of ideological and discursive power. In this sense, the dominant groups in political society have used this subsystem as support to legitimize and create a 'socially constructed' knowledge production to reinforce the status quo: a high concentration of power in a few hands of an agro-industrial and later on, financial elite. (Paniagua Serrano, 2002)

2. THE NEO-LIBERAL FAST-TRACK: FROM TURBO-LIBERALIZATION TO TURBO-DOLLARIZATION

The shadow behind the curtains of the USAID DOSTANGO subsystem also directly and indirectly influenced the policies of turbo dollarization and turbo liberalization that reached a peak in the 2000s. For instance, in 2001, the year in which El Salvador dollarized its economy, the Salvadorian economist Francisco J. Ibisate stated (Ibisate, 2001) that the strategy of neo-liberalization in El Salvador resembled very much the one described by (Luttwak, 1998) of 'turbo capitalism'. The idea was not crazy: behind the strategy of neo-liberalism was a *raison d'être* that complied with the USAID subsystem river's paths: both processes were characterized by a sense that the United States was the symbol of 'progress' and that imitating was a panacea for development; thus, this logic followed, Salvadorians could benefit of a speedy and high shock therapy of neo-liberal reforms that could integrate them with the leader's utopia. The central idea of 'success' became as (Rap, 2003) argues a 'powerful mobilizing metaphor' which explains why these reforms were generated, proposed, and legitimized in 'no-time'. Power relations between the state and civil society were permeated by the whole USAID subsystem, a subject that should be further studied. Furthermore, this is how, the law that legitimized the process of dollarization was not only admitted but also *implemented* in record time, even before the political opposition could make a valid counter-argument. Speechless and marginalized from the process, the political opposition was caught by a speedy ambush of technocratic arguments on how there was the need for an 'innovative' initiative to follow the trend of success ['getting the fundamentals right'] in an increasingly 'globalized world'.(Ibisate, 2001)¹¹

¹² What was striking at the time was that the technocratic law was generated and presented to the public scrutiny not as a 'dollarization' process but rather as a 'Law of Monetary Integration' (LIM), evidently not stating the word 'dollarization' in any line of the actual policy document and thereby generating confusion about what the policy really was about. This generated a divided opposition and the divide et impera process soon proved to be effective. (Ibisate, 2001) The rough idea was that there would be two currencies at the same time at a fixed rate, and that gradually this would make El Salvador a more attractive and competitive country for private investment. The IMF and the World Bank only indirectly supported the idea of macro-stability about the dollarization strategy, although with skepticism about the actual results. Nevertheless, this rapid swing of the pendulum to 'macro' stability fundamentals provoked a faddish cycle of processes of dollarization in countries like Latin America (Hira and Dean, 2004)

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The classic *turbo-liberalization* example was the accelerated adoption of the free trade agreement between El Salvador (including its Central American partner countries) and the United States (the CAFTA Agreements). What usually took five to ten years to plan, discuss and implement when compared with other free trade agreements done within the region took only one year to negotiate and sign. The pressures were, once again, reinforced with the interplay of the media and power structures channeled through US intervention. (CIDAI, 2003) but also with the help of the Salvadorian FUSADES-ANEP-ARENA trinity which has in turn been fed by USAID and shaped the realm of interactions in the political and civil society.

3. THE MANUFACTURING OF CONSENT & THE UN-MDG

The last example of this essay are ongoing, shaping the interactions of the power play between government and civil society. These are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)(United Nations Millennium Project, 2006) and the DOSTANGO subsystem generated by the machinery of the United Nations network. This case is one of a larger system than the one described above, and much more complex (see figure 6). Basically, the flux of the UN DOSTANGO river now directly shapes the policies that the Salvadorian government should follow in order to reduce poverty in its multidimensional sense.

The problem here is that the UN approach to development is framing, with an overwhelmingly top-down approach, the whole pattern of aid allocation and the evaluation of its effectiveness by concentrating the actors' accountabilities in the lower end of the chain (primarily governments but also NGDOs). This logic is based on Results Based Management and explains why this logic may be so widely popular from the donor's perspective. (White, E.M., Kusek, and Rist, 2004) This particular approach also influences power relations in the sense of Gramsci, Bourdieu and Foucault¹², because it promotes a discursively 'neutral' and depoliticizing approach to deactivating civil society's efforts to change the structure of injustice in El Salvador. Now there are targets to meet and 'good governance' to follow that does not capture the developing countries' own reality. (Antrobus, 2003) Hence, in the DOSTANGO realm its influence in political actions and interactions between civil society and the state are evident. For instance, the local Salvadorian NGDOs, which want to function as such, now *have to* connect to the system's dominating rationale, because if not they will not be able to survive. As a consequence, to succeed they now have to follow the script given and serve as watchdogs of the UN's eight goals towards the government and political society. This is not to say, that this is necessarily 'bad' or a 'wrong' way to approach development, but what is important is to unveil the impact that this is having in the realm of civil society building, and the power relations that they have vis-à-vis the state and the donor aid chain.

¹⁵ See (Bourdieu, 1998, 2005; Bourdieu and Thompson, 2001; Foucault, 1974; Foucault, Faubion, and Hurley, 2000; Gramsci and Henderson, 1996).

Figure 6



CONCLUSION: WAKING UP IN THE REALM OF POWER

In this attempt to engage with the power interactions between civil society and the state, NGOs are only part of larger structural system. Any attempt to engage and explain their power relations and their effectiveness toward the goal stated by Edwards and Fowler (2002) of reducing poverty and achieving social justice, must incorporate the wider, systemic notion put forward by authors like Tvedt (2002), Biekart (1999; 2005) or Najam (2000). The DOSTANGO-Biekart approach may certainly be a useful framework to approach this reality in a systemic way, but the notion must be limited to a specific civil society and not generalized, not even in the realm of NGOs, because within them there are a number of varieties and differences. With this theoretical and empirical account, what now is clear is that the question of whether the NGOs have been the *deus ex machina* or saviors of the state is too wide to be answered in a homogenous way, even for a case like the NGOs of El Salvador where there is high evidence of their interactions with the state. It must be answered with a careful analysis which this essay can only approximate by highlighting the key areas and a style of approach that understanding co-optation of NGOs by the state requires. In any case, NGOs are neither angels nor gods.

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2 MOVING BEYOND THE POVERTY DEBATE: STRATEGIES TO ERADICATE CHILD LABOUR

I brought excuses that it [child labour and being out of school] was because of poverty, because of this or that. But in just these few days I have been persuaded that it is not about poverty. If anything, it is the other way around; we have been approaching the debate from the wrong end. Child labour perpetuates poverty so all my excuses have been destroyed.

– Nduta Kweberia, *Legal Resources Foundation, Kenya (Wazira, MV Foundation Report, 2004)*

INTRODUCTION

This paper argues that while it is necessary to acknowledge the role of poverty as a cause of child labour, the poverty excuse used in the debates on child labour is not only an insufficient explanation, but in fact damaging and detrimental in perpetuating child labour and thus poverty itself, trapping child labourers and their societies at large in the poverty – child labour cycle. Instead, this paper puts forward the argument that formal education is a key strategy in combating child labour, and also a way of addressing poverty in the long run. This is not to suggest that education is merely regarded as a strategy, but is rather seen as an inherent right of every human being hindered by conditions such as child labour. Therefore eliminating child labour is a strategy in securing and ensuring the right of educational opportunities for all, since it promotes democracy and equal opportunities.

I will therefore begin by looking at what child labour is perceived to be and then providing a definition to inform the understanding on which the argument in this paper is based. Secondly this paper turns to the arguments put forward for poverty as the essential explanation of child labour. This leads to the strategies and their implications for education and government responsibility.

DEFINING CHILD LABOUR

Attempts at defining child labour take into consideration aspects such as age levels and appropriate work forms. It distinguishes between ‘labour’ at the negative end of the spectrum and ‘work’ at the positive end, and within these classifications further differentiating between hazardous, exploitative, and harmful forms in determining what is acceptable and what needs to be addressed immediately as in the ILO declaration. The discourse on child labour that includes intergovernmental organizations (ILO, UNICEF, and World

Bank among others) has also been critiqued by some as perpetuating confusion with its multiple and contradictory meanings, resulting in unnecessary polarization between the opposing views of the abolitionist and protectionist discourses (White, 2005:322). While those more aligned with the 'protectionist camp' regard these distinctions as extremely important and valuable in determining what is to be addressed or addressed with a sense of urgency, others (as put forward in this paper) regard such distinctions as deflecting attention from the issue at hand, since the protectionist arguments are limited to narrow intervention strategies rather than campaigning for the total eradication of child labour. The stance taken in this paper (for purposes of clarification on the one hand, but more so to pursue and forward ideological and political commitment) is the broader view that all forms of work that interfere with formal schooling and thus keep children out of school are regarded as child labour. This view has been strongly promoted by the MV Foundation in India and serves as the basis of their work to ensure formal, full-time school attendance for all children until age 14 as indicated by their concrete, clear and uncompromising non-negotiable item that '[a]ny child out of school is a child labourer' further qualifying the definition of child labour as '[encompassing] every non-school going child – irrespective of whether the child is engaged in wage or non-wage work, or whether he or she is working for the family or for others, employed in hazardous or non-hazardous occupations, employed on a daily wage or on contract basis as a bonded labourer' (www.mvfindia.org/aboutmvf1.htm). The MV Foundation also goes further to clarify that this does not mean that work around the home, over weekends which does not interfere with education is included as child labour. I would take this a step further to add that the package of leisure, learning, education, work and age range needs to be considered in relation to effective elimination of child labour.

THE POVERTY ARGUMENT

Many people think that there is nothing wrong if children work to help their families. Most employers feel that they are doing a favour to these children by giving them work, as they feel that without this they would starve. (Wazir, 2004)

Vast amounts of literature (see for example the publication edited by Leiten and White, 2001) seem to put forward the argument that poverty as in poor or dire economic circumstances is the 'real cause' of child labour. Those who put forward the poverty argument insist that children work so that their families can survive and that the alternatives such as schooling may further contribute to a rise in their poverty levels, thus regarding child labour as inevitable in the current circumstances. This argument implies or rather makes convenient a defeatist attitude that child labour cannot be solved without first addressing (resolving) economic poverty. While it is true that the large majority of working children are part of families in poor economic circumstances, research indicates that there is no direct correlation between poverty levels and sending children

to school and that literacy rates vary between groups with different income levels.

These arguments add that if child labour is to be eliminated then compensatory measures such as cash incentives are required to make up for the loss of income. Alternatively, to address the right to education, non-formal education systems are argued for which will allow children to continue working and thus not exacerbate the family's poverty situation. Yet by limiting the issue to poverty alone, other factors are overlooked which may serve to lead us into directions out of poverty rather than perpetuate poverty through child labour practices.

So what are the other factors if economic poverty is merely one of the factors and perhaps a debilitating argument and thus an obstacle to eliminating child labour? The other factors as identified by the MV Foundation include the role of governments and social systems, culture and tradition, and the school system including its accessibility, fees and bureaucratic procedures such as registration paperwork. In addition parent's literacy status, levels of motivation, social background are also cited as factors reinforcing/leading to child labour.

There is also a view put forward that children simply want to work as framed within the 'rights based', children's agency perspective (within the culture of consumerism), 'The right to work carries with it a right to receive, personally, the pay for that work' says Ben White of children in Indonesia, 'Today's rural children want to have money for their own use; this is the main reason behind the preference for wage employment outside the home' (Leiten and White, 2001:24) In addition, labour-market conditions have been put forward as an explanation for child labour, as Nicola Ansel saw in Brazil, where child employment rates increase as opportunities in the labour-market expand (Ansel, 2005: 170). Beyond economic reasons, the value of work is related to notions of children's autonomy, self reliance, self respect, greater cognitive development, and resilience (Ansell, 2005:174)

However these arguments, which by their nature lend support to the persistence of child labour, do not weigh up against the value of education in the formal schooling system and its long-term benefits. As Wazir points out, 'the argument that poor children must work to survive became inadequate as it was shown that within an enabling environment the poor can assert themselves and bring about permanent change for their children' (Wazir, 2004)

STRATEGIES

Consensus

In its 2000 publication, *Action against child labour*, the International Labour Office (ILO) proposes as a first step addressing the problem of the worst forms of labour including hazardous and exploitative work. It draws on the protectionist approach of protecting working children with various regulations for the workplace environment and employment conditions. It acknowledges that if

not linked to concrete measures for children's removal from hazardous work, 'protective measures tend to perpetuate the practice' (ILO: 2000: 5). The problem here is that in focusing on one aspect, albeit the worst form, it hinders progress on the total elimination of all forms of child labour and opens cracks for time delaying terminology debates which provide companies with leegroom to manipulate child labour situations at workplace inspection time and avoid immediate compliance while still reaping profits off the backs of these children.

Therefore I would argue that we need to reach consensus on the objective of eradication of all forms of child labour (defined as labour which keeps children from school) with all stakeholders (and especially those responsible for international and national legislation and policy) working towards this end. To some extent the different organizations are working in this direction, but the emphases show variations that require greater convergence towards the clear objective of the eradication of child labour. The intergovernmental organizations have reached some of the following agreements and goalposts such as the ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, the ILO Convention 138 on the Minimum Working Age, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Millennium Development Goals on education. But for these agreements to work in practice, as Wazir out, needs 'political will, concerted action and financial resources' (2004).

Education

Education and child labour are intrinsically related and can thus not be treated separately. The call for one policy to deal with these interrelated issues, as emphasized by Saith (2004) is therefore supported. Child labour prohibits children from fully accessing their right to education. Therefore support is required for those initiatives already working in this direction, mobilizing proactively as in the drives to understand child labour as any child out of school (MV Foundation) towards promoting formal school and campaigns such as the 'School is the best place to work' campaign run by the Alliance 2015 Partners (www.schoolisthebestplacetowork.org).

The value and strategy of education in the form of formal schooling cannot be overstressed, as it underlies the need, and at the same time provides the strongest rationale and precondition for, abolishing child labour. Education has important social and political dimensions in that it can break down oppression and economic inequality, which can counter the poverty argument and show that the eradication of child labour and attending school instead can lead to paths out of poverty, since a lack of education is poverty itself (Saith). Education is a public good in the spin-off effect sense that if one person is educated, others can also benefit. This is also true in the simple effect that one child's schooling in the family often leads to other children also receiving schooling.

Yet we cannot simply argue that formal schooling in itself is required, since many arguments against the focus on schooling refer to poor quality education rather than demanding quality education. The International Conference on

'Out of Work and Into School – Children's Right to Education as a Non-negotiable' Conference report points to the importance of the emphasis on quality: '[G]ood quality education and good quality food in full day formal school can help break the cycle of poverty' (Wazir, 2004). The MV Foundation's successful model to include bridging educational programmes to re-orient and prepare former working children is also essential, in acknowledging that separate approaches are required for different age groups. Additional strategies within the domain of the formal school requires that teachers are invested in and mobilized and sensitized to work effectively towards quality education and ultimately to work towards the universalisation of primary education, as is already evident in work undertaken by teachers associations and reported by the MV Foundation.

A major strategic area involves the motivation of parents and involvement in the school system. This requires ways to raise awareness around making school rather than work the norm, drawing attention to the long term benefits of education and also making the transition from work to school a smoother process, since current obstacles include intimidating bureaucratic procedures such as registration documents and so on. In addition, school fees are seen as a stumbling block (thus the need to universalize and operationalize free full-time, formal education). The broader community needs to buy into the idea to make schooling the norm and thus create a broad-based demand for schooling, which would bring with it the eradication of child labour. The conference report referred to earlier concludes that the poverty argument, that children work to support their families' survival, becomes redundant in view of new ethics and morals and initiatives supporting children's educational rights.

This situation therefore points to the need to address a change in attitude and social norms for education to receive priority attention.

Government Commitment

The role of government in developing and implementing policy around child labour and education is also a key strategic factor, since without legislation enforcing the eradication of child labour and compulsory primary schooling, there can be little hope of compliance. The Government of India, for example, states within its constitution that '[no] child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or employed in any hazardous employment' (Article 14) and 'the health and strength of workers ... and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter a vocation unsuited to their age or strength' (Article 39e). Yet this form of government legislation has been criticized for not showing a sense of determination to deal with the issue more firmly referring largely to hazardous forms of labour rather than directly to the total elimination of child labour within its legal and institutional frameworks (Wazir, 2002). Furthermore governments have to take responsibility for financing free compulsory education as an investment into the country at large for the human development of its citi-

zens since education is a basic need and right. If we are to bring in the poverty argument, the burden of poverty reduction as in the form of child labour cannot be placed on the child. Poverty itself is a societal and political problem with the state as bearer of responsibility. If the poverty burden is left to the child in this way then the state has failed in its role to secure the rights of the child.

Some arguments go as far as to minimize the reality so that the problem of child labour will appear more manageable to those charged with the responsibility for its eradication as in state governments indicated by the statement that, 'advocacy statistics which purposely dramatize the magnitude of child labour can have an unexpected negative effect on government commitment in eliminating child labour' (Leiten and White, 2001: 4-5). Is this not then relieving rather than holding government responsible in terms of their designated duties to protect its citizens? Why should governments be protected from realities of this nature? Instead, governments need to be awakened to the state of affairs as a matter of urgency, to realize and acknowledge that every child out of school is a child labourer and thus to combine approaches to meet the magnitude of the child labour problem as it negatively affects children's right to education. Governments also need to work towards quality education and financial cover stipulated in their budgets in this regard, rather than relying on external aid.

The NGO Sector

As referred to throughout this paper, NGOs such as the MV Foundation are leading examples, demonstrating that the poverty argument does not hold weight since their work shows considerable success in removing children from child labour and encouraging and making possible their entrance into formal education. The varied NGO approaches are informed by different emphases and practices related to their definitions of child labour, and as Wazir (2002) shows, this exacerbates the problem, with NGOs going in several different directions rather than toward a consensus on eliminating child labour in its totality and calling for formal school attendance instead. While the work of these NGOs is highly valued in protecting the rights of children, their strategy would be even more effective if consensus could be reached in this arena, as well in how to pressurize governments to take the urgent actions required.

CONCLUSION

This paper has emphasised consensus on definitions of child labour, moving beyond the poverty argument, and focusing on strategies including consensus, education initiatives, government responsibility, and the work of NGOs more briefly, but these are not the only strategies available.

A point of concern, which should also be raised, includes practices against a universal application of arguments. It is interesting to note that those who seem to speak in favour of the protectionist approach and rights based agency approaches speak from locations in the North, where schooling is entrenched in

laws, with fines for those non-compliance. The poverty argument for the inevitable conditions of child labour in locations in the developing world is then put forward even within the framework of strong lobbying for years against child labour in the North. All children, regardless of where they find themselves, should have access to compulsory education and be protected from all forms of child labour that prevents education. ‘There cannot be made any distinction between children of Western nations and children of developing nations, therefore we cannot plead compulsory education in the first and tolerate child labour in the latter.’ (Wazir, 2004). If this policy underlies our actions, the problem of child labour will receive the urgent attention it deserves, and strategies of consensus from all stakeholders towards this end are essential. In the words of a participant at the International Conference on ‘Out of Work and Into School – Children’s Right to Education as a Non-negotiable’, which summarizes the main feature of any strategy in eradicating child labour and promoting education for all: ‘it concerns a political decision, in favour of children, in favour of education, in favour of the future’(Wazir, 2004).

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3 ALTERNATIVES TO THE “STATE AS ACTOR” DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Major trends are presently remodelling the way states undertake their duties and functioning, mainly the simultaneous processes of decentralisation and increased participation in governance. These new spaces for action give ground to new strategies for poverty alleviation, especially after the great loss of confidence in the state as the major developmental agent. This paper alleges that a panel constituted by governmental agencies, non-governmental organisations, community groups and for-profit private sector agents is potentially more suitable to focus and contribute actors' diverse capacities to a commonly envisioned development process. This makes sense by the fact that the one element common to all models developed over the last twenty years is the recognition that the government is no longer the only player. The various modalities to coordinate the governance process tested over the last two decades have also been marked by concerns such as increased democratic participation, empowerment of the poor and accountability mechanisms, among others.

Particularly interesting in developing countries is urban governance. Urban governance refers to 'the complex set of values, norms, processes and institutions by which cities are managed' (Helmsing, 2000 cited in van Dijk, 2001:45). Most developing countries' cities are characterized by rapid urbanization and increasing population pressure along with poverty growth, adding a new equity dimension to urban strategy considerations (Wegelin, 2002:81). Increased attention is being given to urban management in order to foster 'a more competitive, equitable and sustainable city' (van Dijk, 2000:23 cited in van Dijk, 2001:39). Hence, new priorities are emerging, such as 'the need to formulate and implement economic policies at the city level, to promote local economic development, to address urban poverty reduction actions at the local government level, and to design new forms of urban governance' (van Dijk, 2001:40).

In India, decentralisation of urban management was pushed in 1992 with the 74th Constitutional Amendment. This amendment led to the creation of 'ward committees' within the boundaries of the municipal authorities, each committee representing about 40-50,000 people in the urban governance system. Wit (1997) characterizes this decentralization as a successful example of large scale devolution.

It is here relevant to know that urban poverty alleviation strategies and slum upgrading responsibilities have been devolved to the municipal governments.

In Bangalore, an interesting structure for decision-making and implementation was introduced in 1993 in the slum upgrading policy for fourteen of Bangalore's slums.

This paper explores the practical aspects of the multi-actors framework in the case of the Bangalore Urban Poverty Programme (BUPP) which took place from 1993 to 1999. The paper will start by discussing concepts and rationales for participatory governance (and its corollary of institutional development in the perspective of poverty alleviation). It will then present the BUPP programme, the main actors involved and modalities of their partnership. Lastly, it will analyse outputs and outcomes of the programme, identify reasons for failure and conclude with suggestions to improve strategies of participatory governance.

EVOLVING GOVERNANCE PRACTICES

Helmsing (2002) describes decentralisation as happening in two waves, with at first a re-organisation of the public sector with transfers of public power and responsibilities within public sector from central to local government. Based on subsidiarity principles this brings about reforms necessary for autonomous policies at lower levels of government. A subsequent dimension of decentralisation is the market and the communities, with the underlying idea that public goals may be achieved through non-public means. Claims by civil society groups wishing to participate in decision-making, and recognition that non-governmental actors may add resources and capabilities into the local governance process are contributing to a shift in the governments' role. 'With "horizontal restructuring" and the scope of participation widening to include actors who were not always a part of local government decision-making and service provision' (Aworti, 2003:82).

This second wave of horizontal decentralisation opened new areas of investigation where promising potentials are expected to be fulfilled with the practice of participatory governance. According to Schneider (1999), the rationale for participatory governance rests on three main arguments: information asymmetry, commitment of government bodies and effectiveness of policy.

Firstly, he talks about government's lack of information about 'existing resources, needs, and ways and means for meeting those needs' (1999: 522). Actors outside government may have more information to inform policy making. Community-based organisations (CBOs) are formed by citizens intending to use collective action as a tool to achieve local needs through direct intervention or through demand articulation towards government officials who can address their needs. Integrating these into the decision-making process is a means to convey information on specific local needs to unaware policy makers. Consequently, participatory governance overcomes information asymmetry problems by introducing transparency and information sharing in a process that includes all stakeholders.

Secondly, the commitment of policy makers and bureaucracy is enhanced by increased partners' scrutiny of resource allocation and results of specific actions. Accountability is a crucial element for effective commitment, and relies on clear rules of transparency and on the threat of legal, administrative or political sanctions in case of non-compliance (Schneider, 1999). In participatory governance, commitment is also higher for actors out of government who get the opportunity to advocate for their interests and who take part in decisions. If participation is effective, all actors feel ownership of negotiated decision outcomes; this enhances the chances of sustainability of the decisions.

Thirdly, participatory governance has also the potential to convey more efficient policy making and service provision through enhanced social responsibility, risk sharing and the combination of various skills of the partners. The private sector is, for example, often more advanced in terms of technological change whereas NGOs are in some cases more successful in providing adequate services in difficult areas of a city (Schneider, 1999). When government entrusts the most qualified actor to perform particular public tasks, the expected result is an enhanced efficiency of governance.

As Aworti indicates, involving citizens is 'unlikely to be a smooth process and a range of practical difficulties will need to be confronted in establishing effective community participation' (2003:90). For durable and predictable participatory practices it is important to make sure that a proper institutional setting is available. A legal framework needs to be there to regulate the relations between the actors. Here applies the concept of the government as enabler. In order to facilitate the performance of various actors in public service delivery or market operations, the government sets flexible and supporting rules and procedures. 'The enabling framework lays an institutional base for community initiative, incorporating it at various levels in the public system and procedures' (Aworti, 2003:88). But legal dimensions are not enough; institutions here take a broader sense to include cooperation norms and values, and specific organizational locations. 'In the end the interaction between actors and their institutions determines the final result of governance' (van Dijk, 2001:50). Thus, according to Helmsing, government enablement of communities may be defined as 'government creating appropriate legal, administrative, financial and public-planning frameworks to facilitate neighbourhood communities to organise into CBOs, to manage community-level affairs, and to undertake community collective action' (2002:323).

After all, it is important to bear in mind that any kind of institutional rearrangement is a long term process that is subject to a number of difficulties sourcing mainly from the social structures of the society in question. It may for instance take time for government officials realize the advantages of increased information and communication stemming from participatory governance. It may also take time until the need for legitimacy leads them to commit to poverty reduction and to consider other stakeholders on an equal footing (Schneider, 1999).

For non-governmental stakeholders to be motivated to participate in governance, they need to see that their voice is heard, that they have the power to influence outcomes of policy (for this power structures need to be changed) and they need to see medium-term benefits. Especially poor members of society have no time to lose if their efforts are not leading to best results for themselves. A strong vision is required to engage in participation and start institutional restructuring but also tenacity, resources and capacity are necessary ingredients to sustain it.

A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER FRAMEWORK IN BANGALORE

In the beginning of the nineties a new department for urban issues was created in the Dutch Ministry for Development Cooperation; it was considering to approach urban poverty alleviation with partnership strategies. The Indian authorities expressed their interest for such a programme in Bangalore, the main city of Karnataka State in the South of India. Bangalore's population at that time was of about five million inhabitants; thereof one million were slum dwellers. (Wit, 2002:130) A two years pilot project starting in 1993 was agreed with a financial contribution of about \$500,000 from the Dutch side. The Bangalore Urban Poverty Alleviation Programme (BUPP) was meant to serve as a 'model building programme' with the aim to develop innovative urban poverty alleviation approaches.

Its goals were ambitious, and had two dimensions. Firstly, BUPP aimed at regular urban poverty alleviation, especially addressed to women and children, and secondly the programme aimed at popular participation in the urban poverty alleviation effort through the setting up of a new institutional structure to empower the poor (Wit, 2002). Actually, the partners recognized that decentralization does not have a straightforward impact on poverty alleviation and that there is the need to combine it with empowerment to increase the poor's chances to participate in policy formulation and implementation. In the words of the project document, empowerment was seen as 'a means to enhance the countervailing and claim making power of the poor to match the overriding influence of political and other elites in the planning and development process' (BUPP Project Document 1992:29 cited in de Wit, 2001:7).

Concretely, the new institutional structure integrated community organizations, four NGOs working in the slums and local government departments concerned with poverty alleviation and urban planning (the municipality, Karnataka Slum Clearance Board and the Land Magistrate Office). Three institutional bodies were created in the new structure and were meant to cooperate. The Steering Committee (SC) was an independent structure which decided on the utilisation of the programme funds. It selected the slums to integrate into the programme and took all administrative and financial decisions. It was chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development of Karnataka State and its members included five government representatives, four NGO focal points, one member representing a federation of slum

CBOs and a member nominated by the Royal Netherlands Embassy in New Delhi (de Wit, 2001, 2002).

The secretariat and executive wing of the SC was the Programme Support Unit (PSU). It provided expertise in social sciences, income generation and habitat improvement and its main task was the facilitation of policy implementation. The PSU did the monitoring of the programme progress and suggested strategy adjustments when needed (de Wit, 2001:8).

Finally, the Slum Development Teams (SDTs) formed in each slum were responsible to identify and prioritize local needs and for drafting action plans. Furthermore, after the approval of the plans by the SC, SDTs were the ones who implemented them or supervised their implementation. The project funds were transferred by the SC to SDTs bank account, which they managed jointly with the PSU.

NGOs were involved in the SC's deliberations and decision making, and at slum level they assisted SDTs formation and provided their support.

There was a relatively radical decentralization in decision-making and implementation as well as financial powers.

ASSESSMENT OF BUPP'S RESULTS

BUPP reached fourteen slums in Bangalore, touching the lives of 13,000 inhabitants. It undeniably achieved a number of good things in terms of poverty alleviation. Basic infrastructure such as community halls, drinking water provision and toilet blocks were constructed.

A self-help housing programme in a resettlement area permitted 112 households to build for themselves solid houses with concrete roofs. They contributed their work and the project provided the construction material. In addition, a savings and credit scheme was set up, and counted a thousand members by the end of BUPP, mostly women.

Furthermore a big issue was successfully addressed: the problem of illegal settlements. The very lucrative land market had resulted in increasing evictions and resettlements (van Dijk, 2001:45). Many slum inhabitants placed high expectations on the BUPP to deal with this crucial issue for them. Procedures were engaged in this, resulting in long delays in the BUPP implementation. After a number of frustrations and some despair, seven illegal settlements were legalized, contributing to increasing the assets of the poor.

Regarding the second goal of the programme, developing new participatory institutions for urban poverty alleviation, the results were less encouraging. The Review Mission reported that despite initially lively and constructive discussions of the Steering Committee, the primary enthusiasm by the actors to attend all sessions rapidly dropped, especially among government officials (Wit, 2002:136). High level officials judged it too time consuming to participate in such a small programme, which could not fully justify an elaborate new institutional structure, and their participation faded away (Wit, 2002:139).

A number of further obstacles hindered the functioning of the SC. First of all, partners lacked confidence in each other. A culture of cooperation was totally absent in a society deeply marked by social stratification and where the so called untouchables are not considered as equals. There was particularly reluctance by officials to channel funds to newly created slum organizations whose capacity and trustworthiness was not yet proved. Moreover, the frequent transfers of government officials affected the continuity of the process and new officials had time and again to be convinced of the value of the programme. In addition, inflexible procedures were confronting routines and accepted practices to different practical needs, demonstrating a lack of enabling environment (de Wit, 2002:13).

The PSU did not succeed to be the facilitator between the partners because of two main reasons. During the first half of the program the PSU was facing a lack of capacity with problems to appoint well qualified senior managers (de Wit, 2002:140). According to de Wit (2002) there was a lack of specialists in the relatively new field of urban poverty alleviation, even more a lack of specialists speaking the local Kannada language. Secondly, the institutional location of the PSU and the SC was placed outside of the Bangalore City Corporation, the agency which had already implemented other urban poverty programmes. The disconnect with government departments contributed to a lack of ownership by government officials for whom the institutional location of the programme was ambivalent (de Wit, 1997).

Concerning the NGOs, it proved difficult for them to contribute to the programme with no compensation. They already had a big workload and lacked the resources to assign enough workforces in order to perform fully their tasks of assistance to the five SDTs and attendance to the SC meetings. This was addressed during the programme and consequently a focal staff member was trained and remunerated by the programme. Some reluctance to cooperate did also occur between NGOs working in the same slum.

As a result, once the BUPP finished the new institutions were not sustained and the old patronage structures re-emerged. Again cooperation between government, NGOs and community organizations was left to ad hoc incidental agreements. Regarding empowerment, de Wit depicts mixed findings. He argues that:

BUPP encouraged processes of increased organisation and cooperation in most programme slums. (...) Many have become more assertive in demanding vis-à-vis especially Government agencies, but also as regards NGOs, the PSU and even their 'own' SDTs. (de Wit, 2001:19)

However few women were represented in SDTs. And considering the available mechanisms to convey the poors' claims to governance spheres, the breakdown of a sustained participatory institutional setting led to the failure of the first objective of empowerment, the one of increased countervailing powers of the poor.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In conclusion, the BUPP model building programme did not succeed to set up a Steering Committee that could play the policy role it was intended to do (de Wit, 2002:136). Major constraints were the incompatibility of a programme with such a small size and limited duration, with the intended re-organisation of the institutional structure. Certainly, the limited duration of the BUPP was a weak point. The two years initially planned for the conduct of the programme were not sufficient to root new cooperation practices in the behaviour of the actors. It is doubtful in any case that a short-term program could have been the right framework to initiate such a structural and durable change in the governance practice. Reforms are painful and will always find losers trying to fight them. If the reform does not enjoy a strong commitment by public leaders and a good part of the administration concerned, it is very unlikely that it will succeed. In other words, participatory governance is not a straightforward process.

In terms of incentives for cooperation it appeared that the degree of participation of the poor in the SDTs was strongly related to the provision of tangible benefits. It is understandable that people struggling to fulfil their basic needs give priority to activities that will help them to improve their situation. Government officials lacked the incentives to engage in a process that was probably perceived more as an (other) experiment than as a new organizational and governance mode to adopt for the long term. It is necessary in our opinion that at least small benefits occur along the process in order for the stakeholders to be motivated to continue and to see the use of the cooperation. No one of the stakeholders in Bangalore had time to lose in 'workshopping' for the sake of it. With time proven advantages of cooperation it is expected that partners show more commitment and trust that forthcoming benefits and predictable constructive cooperation will be occurring. Slum citizens and government officials need to identify shared interests and build trust to achieve them in partnership.

In addition, the societal challenge was partly recognised by the project document that acknowledged the difficulties of a hierarchical Indian social structure characterized by strong patronage relationships (de Wit, 2002:130). The BUPP cannot be blamed for failing to overcome them; it is with gradual attempts to deal with this situation that the structure will ultimately be altered.

Wegelin emphasises the need for continuing critical reviews of experiences that applied the new paradigm of consultative, multi-actor, stakeholder approaches to urban management. The practical lessons of experience will help to answer the question of whether this paradigm has contributed to an improved urban environment and how experiences may clarify the conditions for sensible urban management practices in the twenty-first century (Wegelin, 2002:90).

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4 Going Nuts...

INTRODUCTION

Bertholletia Excelsa... the nut.

Bertholletia Excelsa is normally known as the brazil nut in English (*castaña* in Spanish) and can be found in 30% of Madre de Dios' territory in Peru. It is estimated that 4500 families (30% of Madre de Dios' population) is directly or indirectly involved in brazil nut activity (Diagnóstico de la Cadena Productiva de la Castaña, 2006). Since its production does not harm the environment, it has great potential as an alternative to timber, mining, agriculture and other negative-impact-on-forests activities.

THE LOCAL ARENA

Madre de Dios (MdD) is known as the capital of biodiversity in Peru. It is at the heart of the southern Amazon and borders with Bolivia and Brazil. The economy of the region is weak and most economic activities are for own or local consumption.

MdD established in 2001 its Concerted Development Plan as a region. In this plan, with the participation of different actors of regional development, its commitment to sustainable development through integration of economic growth, equity and environment sustainability is a clear priority. The Plan includes as one of its four goals one specifically related to economic development: *In the year 2021, Madre de Dios has established a sustainable development model, based on an economy of solidarity, self-centered, open and integrated to the local, regional and national markets, generating employment, increasing production and competitiveness, and positioning the region in the world market.* (Plan de Desarrollo MdD, 2001)

To achieve these goals, the development plan specifies the promotion of the MAP initiative (see Regional Arena), establishing production chains and articulation to local, regional and national markets. It also mentions the implementation of a program for quality control of the region's products. The brazil nut is mentioned in the plan among the region's products. However, the specific strategy for its development is not identified.

VIS-A-VIS THE NATIONAL ARENA

In Peru, beginning in 2002, a decentralization process has been taking place. This coincides with the creation of citizen participation mechanisms at the dif-

ferent government levels. The process of decentralization has involved the creation of regional governments. The decentralization of functions, responsibilities and programmes aims to create synergy among local and regional actors, and make governments more responsive to local needs. The governments are encouraged to assume a more enabling role for their territory's development. This is an opportunity for economic development strategies to become more localized and competitive.

VIS-A-VIS THE REGIONAL ARENA

There is a tri-national initiative called MAP in the southwestern Amazon, formed by Peruvian Madre de Dios, Brazilian Acre and Bolivian Pando. All three sub-national territories are in a situation of exclusion, not only from global markets but also from their national economies, in great part due to their geographical isolation.

The MAP initiative seeks to develop bi-national and tri-national collaborations in search of solutions for common regional problems, and comes together every year in a meeting where four main dimensions are discussed: economic development, social equity, environmental conservation and public policies. (MAP, 2006)

The Economic Development dimension identifies common products with potential to elicit local economic development, on the basis of local territory management, sustainable development and added value to production. One of the products identified as a major product is the brazil nut, due among other things to the fact that it is only in this region that it is produced.

VIS-A-VIS THE GLOBAL ARENA

Ethical Trade is the trade in goods produced under conditions that are socially and/or environmentally as well as economically responsible. (NRET, 2002). Given its principles, it is not only concerned with economic development, but also with the wellbeing of producers and the conservation of the environment, which matches the concern of Mdd's development plan.

Ethical Trade is considered a main development strategy for non-timber forest activities. Since the brazil nut production is environmentally friendly and the producers are small and live in poor conditions, this activity has the perfect conditions to be part of the Ethical Trade framework and benefit from its specialized markets.

There are three main functioning ethical initiatives relevant to natural resources: fair trade, organic agriculture and forest certification. Fair Trade addresses trading relations per se, with assistance in accessing the export market an integral component of all fair trade schemes. (NRET, 2002). 'It is a critique of structures and systems governing the market relations which may increase poverty, social injustice and harm the environment' (Mayoux, 2001).

According to the Brazil Nut Value Chain Assessment being formulated, Fair Trade, in the case of brazil nuts, involves the identification of a 'fair price' for producers, which may allow them to cover production costs and generate revenue. It also has established the standards for the product, and involves certification of small producers associations to access fair trade markets.

Organic agriculture refers to the sustainable management in the process of production. Their market has increased significantly in Europe and USA the last years, due to the increasing awareness of consumers concerning food-related health issues and environment sustainability. Moreover, in many European countries, government policies that favour organic production exist. Organic certification is now required to prove the production is truly organic. The demand of this kind of production is larger than the supply, which constitutes an important opportunity that must be seized.

Forest Certification refers to the sustainable management of the forest. Though it developed in the timber sector, it is now used for non-timber forest products. There is still not a market for forest certified brazil nuts, so it is a challenge to work towards its creation.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR LED: ENTERPRISE AND COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Local Economic Development is a 'process in which partnerships between local governments, community-based groups and the private sector are established to manage existing resources to create jobs and stimulate the economy of a well-defined territory' (Helmsing, 2005). Based on Blakely and his own work, Helmsing (2005; 2003; 2002) identifies three broad categories of LED interventions: enterprise development, community-based economic development and locality development.

The major challenge of local economic development in the case of the brazil nut activity is its dilemma between promoting Community Economic Development and Enterprise Development.

The initiatives that promote Brazil nut production usually have a sustainable livelihood approach. The Brazil nut not only does not have a great negative environmental impact on the forest, it constitutes one of several economic activities in a household (since the time to collect brazil nut is only three months per year on average). However, it is an activity where the whole family is involved. The workers that help collect the nuts are in most cases family members. Workers are usually only hired when the members of the family cannot collect all the production. Thus, the brazil nut activity is important part of a household's range of livelihood strategies.

Nevertheless, even when a Sustainable Livelihoods Framework or the understanding of a solidarity economy can lie behind the economic development of MdD, in order 'to be truly sustainable, ethical trade must compete in a global market' (FRP, 2003). Ethical Trade's contribution to sustainable rural liveli-

hoods depends on increasing efficiency, improving targeting of socially differentiated actors, increasing developing country stakeholder involvement in development initiatives, ensuring commercial viability of key organizations, increasing western consumer awareness, and adopting sustainable marketing systems. (NRET 2002)

The need to combine enterprise development with community development, represents a major challenge for MdD. These two approaches answer to different priorities in local economic development and their specific strategies may even sometimes contradict, or clash (in the sense that by developing one more, the other is left aside). However, to be a sustainable yet economic base for MdD, a strategy that is able to reconcile these approaches is necessary.

THE GOALS...

Economic Development in MdD of the Brazil Nut activity would have the following objectives:

1. Competitiveness in global markets.
2. Equity in the distribution of revenue.
3. Environmental sustainability.

THE STRATEGIES...

Develop additional sources of territorial competitive advantage

It is imperative for the brazil nut activity to consolidate *association* among producers; increase *networking* among the different actors involved; promote collective *innovation* for product, process and functional upgrading; create *institutions* that allow the cooperation and innovation to occur and strengthen the regional *government's role as enablers and regulators* of the local economic development process.

All these will help create competitiveness. The role of the regional government as enabler and regulator will contribute to the achievement of the second and third goal, since the government will supervise, for example, the compliance of environmental regulation. Meanwhile the consolidation of associations will contribute to increased equity in the distribution of the benefits, since it implies more negotiation power and more opportunities to access ethical trade markets.

Most importantly, as the competitiveness is oriented towards ethical trade markets, all three goals must be addressed in the development of each one of the additional sources of competitive advantage.

Promote vertical as well as horizontal linkages

To become competitive, the brazil nut activity must place special attention on developing horizontal and vertical linkages. The horizontal linkages are related to the cooperation among the actors at local level. The promotion of active

collective efficiency, as well as specialization, part of the cluster development strategy may allow the brazil nut activity to become more competitive in ethical trade markets as partnership is acknowledged to be a necessary condition for ethical trade initiatives (NRET, 2002)

The vertical linkages are related to the processes of upgrading of the brazil nut activity. Upgrading in the processing of brazil nuts and in the quality and productivity is important for the activity to compete with other nut production territories. However, the vertical linkages also involve functional and intersectorial upgrading, becoming part of alternative value chains, such as the fair trade, organic or forest-certified chains, and adding value to the product locally to move up in the value chain.

THE STAGES...

Cooperation

There are several initiatives in MdD focused on strengthening the brazil nut agglomeration economy, which show a clear movement towards cluster development.

The initiatives include the creation of a brazil nut working group, as part of the MAP Initiative, where experiences have been shared concerning legal, land, marketing and research issues. They also include 2 summits of brazil nut collectors from MdD, held in 2001 and 2005, and organized by the local associations of producers and other international workshops related to the brazil nut activity.

Producer associations

Though quite a few associations of producers exist (ASECAMP, ASCART, FEDECAMP, RONAP, ASCA), these associations, with certain exceptions, have not yet included all producers, nor do they produce significant benefits for their members. Therefore, important effort should continue to be invested in strengthening the producers' organizational capacities. This requires identifying and promoting the advantages and benefits from collective action. In the case of brazil nut, producer associations should control the quality standards of production and therefore receive higher prices. Producer associations should also increase the possibility of accessing fair trade markets, as certification is only given to organized producers. Finally, better prices would be negotiated with their buyers as producer associations can have more bargaining power.

Association of firms

There are six brazil nut processing firms in MdD and seventeen exporting firms that work with brazil nuts in Peru.

As part of the process of value chain assessment currently taking place, the actors have pointed out that it would be beneficial to create an association or

chamber of brazil nut related firms. (Diagnóstico de la Cadena Productiva de la Castaña, 2006)

Such an association could allow the improvement of certain procedures such as risk centers that provide information for credit programmes. It would also become a space where information and markets would be shared. This last point is very important to increase the share of production oriented towards specialized markets (see stage three).

Role of the regional government

The state has had traditionally a neutral role in promoting non-timber forest activities in the past. However, the recently created regional government can play an important role in providing the framework and regulations for the activity, and mechanisms to support and ensure that the legal framework and regulations are respected. Their participation in the value chain assessment and strategic planning taking place is an important step towards their inclusion in the sector.

Brazil Nut Working Group

This year, producers, firms, regional government, public institutions and NGOs are coming together to elaborate an assessment of the Peruvian Amazon nut value chain and their strategic plan. This process should strengthen the interaction and trust among the actors, in order to truly develop the cluster.

Innovation

To become more competitive, the brazil nut activity must prove its ability to continuously innovate in several areas:

Knowledge Institutions

An important step would be the creation of a Research and Development Center that would focus on studying the upgrading possibilities of the brazil nut production, deepen the development of different sub-products of the brazil nut, such as oil and flour, and explore other industries that use the nuts as input. This research center should be promoted by the regional government and be in close coordination and cooperation with associations of producers as well as the association or chamber of firms. It must use the local resources and partner with knowledge institutions such as local or national universities.

Product and Process Upgrading

In the race to remain competitive, the brazil nut sector must permanently upgrade its product and process. To do this, the research center is of main importance. As it researches good practices in collection and processing, it also has an important role to play in the development of standards. The knowledge it produces must be shared through training producers in good collection practices and firms in good processing practices.

Supporting and Related Industry

Since brazil nut productivity cannot be greatly increased given it is a forest product, it is important to develop supported and related industries that may generate a sustainable economic development in MdD. Based on the sub-products that the research center identifies and the market assessments proves profitable, specific efforts should be made in developing such industries and promoting the generation of small enterprises that may support them.

Industries could also be developed from adding value to the nuts, not only as nuts, but as inputs for other products such as snacks. Local firms in the food industry could be developed to prepare cookies, chocolates or similar products.

Market Diversification

In the world nut market, the brazil nut has a share of only 1.17%, and 80% of the brazil nut production is sold in conventional markets. However, as I have argued before, there are specialized markets for nut production that are increasing steadily and whose demand is not being met by enough supply (Diagnóstico de la Cadena Productiva de la Castaña, 2006).

One of the main LED interventions must be focused on developing quality production that fits the demand of the specialized markets. Even if these are included as a third stage, the activities must be carried out as the other stages take place and not at the end of the process. They provide important feedback and inspiration to the research and innovation initiatives, as they explore the markets where innovation may be appreciated; or to the association of producers and firms, as they highlight the benefits of organization and cooperation.

Certification

As mentioned earlier, there are three main certifications related to ethical trade. Two of them, Fair Trade and Organic Certification, allow access to specialized markets, and both have more demand than supply for brazil nuts. According the value chain assessment being developed, in MdD, one of the processing-exporting firms and one producer association have the Organic certification, while another firm has initiated the process. Only 20% of the producers benefit from access to this market. In the case of Fair Trade, there is an alliance between a producer association and a processing-exporting firm that has FLO certification. However, this association only includes 70 producers. The FSC, forest certification for non-timber products, does not yet have markets for brazil nut but this could be developed in the future.

A main area of intervention is the promotion of these certifications among producers associations and the processing firms. The knowledge shared among the cluster is essential to allow other actors learn from the experiences that already exist.

Marketing of Peruvian Amazon Nut

In 2005, Peru accounts for 10.94% of the exports of brazil nut production. (Bolivia leads with 55.86%). An increase in this share is possible but it implies marketing the differential features of the Peruvian nut. As the low share in the past was due to perception of low quality, high quality standards must be met to change such perception.

Local Demand

In Peru there is no significant tradition of nut consumption, only 5% of the production that arrives at Lima stays at national markets. However, local demand could be encouraged as part of the 'Consume Peruvian Products' campaign, which aims at increasing local demand for national products. Market research should be carried out, before considering this a main strategy.

New Markets for Upgraded Products

The sub-products that have started to be developed must find markets to buy their products. The oil is sold mainly in the United Kingdom to the cosmetic industry, but it also has potential as an edible oil, as an alternative to olive or sunflower oils. The flour is mainly sold in the USA to the bread or animal-feed industry.

CONCLUSION

The exploration of markets where the brazil nut sub-products may have a competitive advantage is essential for the development of related and supporting industries that will allow the impact of brazil nuts on MDD' economic development to increase.

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5 CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATING PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY REFORM (PSDR) IN ETHIOPIA

ABSTRACT

This essay is a comparative analysis of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTAI) and Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses (AARH) in Addis Ababa, as an illustration to study the implementation of PSDR in Ethiopia. The context in which a reform such as PSDR is implemented, and its organizational conditions are the key determinants for its successful execution. Given deep-rooted problems in the Ethiopian Civil Service System, the introduction of the public service delivery reform is imperative, and the pressing need to improve public services cannot wait for the right conditions. However, the need to meet the preconditions proposed by New Public Management (NPM) for better performance seems to hold valid. For instance, the relatively better conditions – such as capable staff and transparent and short service procedures due to business process reengineering (BPR) – seem to be contributing to the success of the ministry.

Successful implementation of PSDR in Ethiopia seems largely dependent on specific organizational conditions. At the same time, political commitment and accountability are not essentially shaping the outcome of the reform implementation in the organizations.

INTRODUCTION

The context in which any reform is implemented and the organizational conditions around it are the key determinants for successful execution of a reform (Polidano, 1999:5). In Ethiopia, the political commitment to reform is often criticized as inadequate, since many institutions are lacking visionary leadership, organizations are operating under very poor conditions, the staff in many organizations are not consulted and motivated when they should be, clients' interests are not consulted, and the accountability relationship between government and public service providers has not been clarified, etc (See Paulos, 2000: 23)

In Africa, there appears to be a view that the implementation of any reform will be entirely a story of failure. The few studies that have been conducted on the Ethiopian civil service reform programme seem to fit this pattern, highlighting the irrelevance and potential failure of this reform (Ibid). While identifying potential problems may alarm those who want only to see continuous

learning and improvement, ignoring success stories equally hinders the potential for continuous lesson drawing from experience.

In Ethiopia, the Service Delivery Survey (SDS) conducted in 2004 revealed that the government's success in the implementation (and hence improvement) of service delivery remains different from organization to organization. Moreover, the conventional assumption that NPM-type organizations (public enterprises like corporations and agencies) could perform better than public ones does not seem to hold true in the Ethiopian case. Therefore, this merits research to analyze the factors (beyond the conventional ones) that contribute to the variation in the success of implementing the public service delivery reform.

This essay is a contribution to such research, comparing the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTAI) (which is doing well) with the Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses (AARH) in Addis (which is doing poorly). This essay seeks to explore how and why the success of implementing public service delivery reform in these public institutions is so variable. It will also assess the relevance of recent reforms in these bodies to national and organizational settings. The analysis will be made mainly based on data from the SDS, policy documents, theories, and related studies. The essay will briefly answer the following questions:

- How has the political context of SDS reform affected its implementation?
- How do organizational conditions explain the variation between the organizations in the implementation of the reform?
- Has the accountability relationship between the politicians and the implementing organizations been effective?

Working Hypotheses

1. The political situation in Ethiopia contributes to the variation in performance in the implementation of the PSDR for ideological reasons.
2. Successful implementation of PSDR in Ethiopia largely lies in the specific organizational conditions.
3. The accountability relationship between politicians and implementing institutions varies from organization to organization leading to variation in organizational performance.

BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

General

The Ethiopian civil service has had a tradition and experience of serving various governments for over 100 years. However, it has been until recently given little attention to improving public service delivery. Unfortunately, the idea that the civil service exists to serve the public good has been neglected and/or misunderstood in Ethiopian public institutions.

Right after coming to power, the current government of Ethiopia (EPRDF) initiated a first phase (1991-1996) to overhaul and enhance the civil service system through a retrenchment and redeployment programme.

In 1996, the government established a task force aiming to assess problems in the civil service system. The task force found that the orientation, attitude and work practices of the bureaucratic machinery were ill-suited to the needs of the new policy environment of the country. Some of the problems included: lack of clear national service delivery policy, attitudinal problems; insufficient recognition of citizens' rights; lack of accountability; excessively hierarchical organizations; giving priority to the convenience of providers, not users; more concern on inputs and routine activities, less on achieving tangible outputs; lack of consultation with clients, and lack of complaint handling mechanism. (Government of Ethiopia, 2001: 5-24).

Consequently, the government initiated its second phase (1996-2003) programme in the form of comprehensive Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRPF) that included five major sub-programs: top management system reform, human resource management reform, expenditure management and control reform, ethics reform sub-programs, and public service delivery reform (SDR). Of particular interest here is the service delivery reform sub-programme. In May 2003, the Government commenced the third phase of its reform agenda in the form of the five-year Public Service Delivery Capacity Building Program.

The comparison in this paper relies on a statistical data from clients' responses to assess the quality of services in relation to a number of different indicators. (see Table 1).

Looking at the price for service and quality (but not coverage, as needs in general and particularly for housing are never met in Ethiopia), MOTAI is performing well (See table 1). Considering the overall level of improvement in service quality of the two organizations based on the variables give in table 1, on average, only 23.5% of the clients' respondents of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTAI) responded by saying that they are not satisfied in relation to each of the variables. At the same time, 46.9% of the clients' responses regarding the Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses (AARH) expressed dissatisfaction with regard to the same parameters. This shows a big disparity (around double) in the perceived service quality of the two organizations, in connection to these variables. (taken from the SDS, 2004)

Table 1: Clients' assessment of the quality of services and staff attitudes by organization (% of respondents)

Indicators	% respondents not satisfied or agreed	
	Ministry of Trade & Industry (MOTAI)	Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses (AARH)
A. The length of time staff took to serve clients	21.5	32.8
B. Courteousness and helpfulness of staff	12	31.6
C. Efficiency and hard work of staff	16.6	36.6
D. Sensitivity of staff to clients' feelings	17.2	41.8
E. Honesty and integrity of staff	34.9	65.9
F. Knowledge levels of staff about their work	30.7	60.8
G. Promptness of staff in serving clients	18.8	36.2
H. Availability of staff in the office to serve clients	8.2	33.5
I. Adherence to official opening times	31.5	56.1
J. Appropriate channels for communication & information dissemination to the clients (Consultative meetings with customers)	92.9	95.7
K. Fees levied matched the quality and value of the services provided	13.8	37.6
L. There are no perceptions & experiences of corruption in return for services -bribes, nepotism or favoritism	2.1	24.5
M. Service delivery had improved during the previous 24 months	5.0	56.2

Source: Service delivery survey (2004)

Figure1: Clients' assessment of the quality of services and staff attitudes by organization



Source: Own computation from the SDS (2006)

Mandate of the Ministry of Trade and Industry

The Ministry of Trade and Industry derives its mandate from Proclamation No.4 of 1995. Its duties, as provided under this proclamation, are many. The following are relevant here:

- issuing licenses to, and supervising, investors engaged in foreign trade as well as foreign investors engaged in trade or industry within the country;
- organizing and administering a central commercial register.

Mandate of the Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses

The Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses derives its mandate from Proclamation No.59 of 1975, as amended under Proclamation No.133 of 1998. Its main responsibilities are:

- to manage the government's urban rental housing stock through the collection of rents,
- to maintain such government houses,
- and to provide related services to tenants.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

For this essay, public service may refer to any act or performance that public institutions provide to fulfill social needs. This entails a dynamic interaction between service providers and recipients that operate in a changing environment that may shape the outcome of the implementation of Service Delivery Reforms. This essay will use new public management (NPM), public choice theory, public accountability, and agent theory and their logical links to analyze the implementation of the service delivery reform sub-programme in the organizations.

New Public Management

There is an argument that the concept of new public management (NPM) has inspired the initiation of many reforms to improve public service delivery (Polidano, 1999: 1). The underlining essence of NPM can be explained by the new trend in public administration to transfer some important insights and values from the private sector to the public arena, values like efficiency, effectiveness, flexibility, responsiveness, competition, result oriented management, more explicit and measurable performance standards, more active control based on pre-set output indicators, accountability etc. This should improve customer-oriented services (Hood, 1995; Pollitt, 1993; Rouse,1999; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Polidano,1999; Lane, 1997). However, NPM success and failure stories suggest that the outcome of the implementation of reforms to improve service delivery depends on the general context and mainly on organizational (local) contingency factors (Polidano, 1999:5). Moreover, success requires:

New legislation, analyzing the status quo, and subsequently to design, formulate and refine new operating procedures, train staff how to work with them, define new roles and appropriate reward and appraisal systems, set new measurement system in place, inform service users and other stakeholders and work hard to reduce the anxiety all these novelties have probably caused, both among users and among staff (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000:7-8).

The success of a reform can also be shaped by the complex nature of any principal-agent relationship involved, and the self-interested behavior of the actors explained by the public choice theory.

Public Choice Theory

The conventional assumption that the civil servant is a benevolent social guardian committed to achieving the common good is questionable. This traditional view has been critiqued by public choice theory from a perspective of self-interest (Das, 1998:2). This theory, which was formulated by James M. Buchanan (1919), assumes that civil servants pursue their self-interest rather than that of the public. It argues that like the individuals in the private sector, civil servants are also rational maximizers of their own self-interest. This theory explains why clientelistic practices are rampant and how government policies create opportunities for rent-seeking (Das, 1998: 2).

Public Accountability

In the case of the private sector as a service provider, accountability is essentially based on competition ruled by customer choice. Accountability in the public sector is different, and the conventional assumption that politicians make policy and their appointees execute it loyally and obediently does not seem valid any more. (See Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980:7-8). Here the Weberian prescription of rule-based bureaucracy is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for restraining the self-interested behavior of the civil servant (Das, 1998:8). For countries like Ethiopia, which do not possess a civil service embedded in the surrounding social structure, establishing formal structure of clarified accountability could perhaps be a solution to restrain the opportunistic behavior of the civil servant (Das, 1998:9). But, how and under what framework should this be dealt with? In this essay, the accountability relationship is conceptualized in the principal-agent framework.

Agent Theory

Agent theory helps to examine organizational relationships as a tension between the service recipients (principal) and service providers (agents) (Batley, 2004: 38). Embodied in agent theory is the problem of controlling the agent's opportunistic behavior and enforcing performance standards. In the public service provision, we can have two forms of accountability relationships: one, the short route accountability – client power connecting clients and providers; sec-


ond, the long route accountability – when the client power is weak or not possible to use, clients instead hold politicians accountable and politicians in turn use a compact to do the same with providers (WB, 2004: 48). (See Figure 3). However, in practice, the people lack real power to control and influence the politicians; the politicians in turn are principals only nominally as the civil servants have information and knowledge advantages to divert benefits opportunistically to their direction (Batley, 2004: 41).

Thus, the civil servants (the agents) comply with organizational goals only if they can also advance their self interest. Once we accept that one of the problems with the civil service is a problem of agency, the challenge for the implementation of public service reform is to design an efficient contract between the minister and the civil servant. In so doing, Das (1998: 12) has identified two points that can make the civil service both efficient and accountable.

1. The relationship between both of the contracting parties, particularly the accountability relationship needs to be explicitly clarified.
2. Performance expectations (result-based) have to be clearly defined in advance as to what is expected, and structure the incentives embodied in the relationship.

In this respect, the WB (2004) report clearly defines accountability in terms of five features, and weakness in any of these aspects of accountability can cause failure.


Figure 2: Five features of accountability relationships



Source: WB (2004)

The analytical framework (Figure 3) below is the mirror image of the preceding theoretical framework. Nonetheless, for clarity, I will briefly describe it here. NPM is said to be inspiring many (but not all) reforms around the world making citizens in developing countries aware of improved public service due to knowledge transfer. In Ethiopia, more now than any time before, citizens (principals) are pressing the government (their agent) claiming the right to better public service. In response to this, the government (in turn the principal)

Figure 3: Analytical framework for public service delivery reform in Ethiopia



Source: Own work combined with WB'S (2004) key relationships of accountability.

has introduced the PSDR to be implemented by the public institutions (the agents). In practice, the relationship between the government and public service

providers has been characterized by patron-client relation, the former motivated to stay in power and the latter inspired to maximize self interest.

Therefore, in the implementation of the PSDR, action of the providers is insulated from the need of the citizens; and government coordination and political control over the implementation goal is weak. This leads to mixed results in PSDR implementation, failure and success mainly shaped by other organizational conditions. Moreover, the direct client power (short route accountability) to influence providers is in reality weak, so citizens instead voice their complaints to the government so that the government in turn may pressurize the providers to meet clients' interest – the so-called long route accountability. However, the accountability relationship has also inherent problems, which necessitate introducing clarified accountability in order to overcome them. Clarified accountability, if attained, may help to create providers to have embedded autonomy in the societal structure. This in turn can also help to sustain improved public service delivery contributing to the resurrection of the failed state model through votes from satisfied citizens.

ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY REFORM IN BOTH ORGANIZATIONS

Organizational Setting

Beyond the context of policy implementation, reform success and failure stories suggest that the outcome of the implementation of reforms to improve service delivery depends largely on the localized contingency factors (Polidano, 1999:5). Management reforms frequently entail changes to the systems by which public servants themselves are recruited, trained, appraised, promoted, motivated and disciplined (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000: 8). So, assessing the organizational setting would much help in identifying factors that influence the success of reform execution. Among the many organizational factors, this essay will focus on key factors that probably touch on most other organizational elements, too.

Management Practices of the Organizations

At the center of organizational success is always the leadership capacity of organizations. Do they favor strategic management practices? NPM concepts suggest that autonomous decision making of organizational leaders matter in implementing public service reform. Accordingly, proponents of NPM suggest introducing business-like autonomous government institutions with less political intervention. These include contracting out, agencification, corporatization, etc. Of the two organizations considered here, the agency is supposed to have autonomous leadership, and the Ministry is not praised by proponents of NPM.

In this respect, the lack of dynamic leadership style in both organizations is evident from their skepticism about assessing changing customer needs through participatory approaches (See table 1). In an interview in the SDS, customers were asked about the information dissemination mechanisms they had used.

Table 2: Summary of the staff's assessment of their work environment within their organizations (% of respondents to each item/statement); A=AARH, & M=MOTAI

	Strongly agree		Agree		Neither agree or disagree		Disagree		Strongly disagree	
	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M	A	M
There is a good working relationship between my supervisor and myself	53.4	50.5	38.7	31.7	3.9	9.1	2.2	4.8	1.8	3.8
Management motivates staff	27.0	15.3	34.4	20.8	13.3	24.6	15.4	18.6	9.8	20.8
Good or hard work is recognized by management	7.2	7.8	8.6	14.0	19.4	22.9	31.2	28.5	33.7	26.8
Good or hard work is rewarded	14.7	4.1	7.0	3.5	14.7	20.9	28.9	29.1	34.8	42.4
Management delegates decision making to subordinate staff	8.5	6.0	12.4	12.6	25.2	26.9	27.3	31.1	26.6	23.4
Management disseminates information on time	18.0	14.3	31.6	34.5	22.4	22.6	21.0	16.7	7.0	11.9
Management provides opportunities for staff to go for short training courses	33.3	10.2	33.0	29.6	10.4	21.6	13.2	19.3	10.1	19.3
Management provides opportunities for staff to go for long-term training	13.7	6.9	14.1	12.6	23.8	25.1	28.2	31.4	20.2	24.0
Selection for staff training is done in a fair and transparent manner	14.7	9.9	20.9	22.7	29.1	33.1	20.5	20.3	14.7	14.0
I have attended meetings, workshops and seminars on the public service reforms	36.8	27.3	36.0	40.9	6.0	6.3	9.9	15.3	11.3	10.2
Evaluation of staff performance is done in a fair and transparent manner	34.2	17.9	35.2	16.2	15.1	33.5	9.5	21.6	6.0	10.8
Promotion & recruitment are done on merit	12.8	21.1	17.4	21.7	29.9	32.0	21.0	12.6	18.9	12.6

Source: SDS (2004)

The commonest mechanism used by customers was suggestion box, while almost all respondents revealed that they are far remote from consultative meetings. In fact, high-level use of suggestion box may partly indicate the prevalence of customer problems, which consultative meetings with customers are used as

a proactive tool to assess the changing customer needs to provide customer-oriented services. Unfortunately, almost all respondents from the Ministry (92.9%) and the Agency (95.7%) replied that such meetings are either not provided or entirely outside their knowledge.

Further, the top management of government organizations is also expected to create a customer-oriented organizational structure which puts customers at the top, front line people at the next important stage (to serve and satisfy customers); the middle managers under them (to support the front line people); and top management at the base (to provide effective leadership); customer along the sides of the figure below indicates that the employees at all level of an organization must personally be involved in determining, meeting and serving customers (Kotler, 2003).

To achieve effective, efficient and economic utilization of the scarce organizational resources, managers should motivate and involve the staff in the decision-making process and create favorable working conditions to their staff. Table 2 helps to analyze this situation.

Generally, staff from both organizations had agreed on the existence of good work relation and attendance of meeting about public sector reform. The responses of the staff from the agency tends to agree with many of the variables in table1 despite their responses are not consistent for reasons at best known to them. For example, while 61.4% of them at least agreed that the management motivates staff, majority of them did not agree with issues like rewarding of hard work by management; on the selection of staff for training; on information dissemination; delegation of decision making power; and on promotion and recruitment. Therefore, it is not clear how the management had motivated them. This necessitates a critical scrutiny, which follows below.

The agency's staff witnessed that they had good relationship with their supervisors. On the other hand, poor service delivery, lack of staff courteousness, and problems of integrity like corruption in the organization are witnessed by considerable respondents from clients (See table 1). Furthermore, 69.4% of the agent's respondents at least agreed that evaluation of staff was made fairly and transparently. Therefore, for corrupted civil servants who perform very poorly, an evaluation that failed to take corrective action on the staff may be considered as fair by the rational staff. This in turn may also foster the possible coalition between the staff and the supervisors to maximize their self-interest. Besides, this fact is reinforced by the weak management control to reduce high rate of staff failure to adhere to official opening hours and availability in their offices (See table 1). Moreover, it seems the staff to respond positively for some general terms like 'management motivation' for possible reasons of fear of firing by the management as most of them (according to the SDS) are with low level of education and old-aged probably administering large family. But when it comes to their specific self benefit like promotion and training, the staff demonstrates the rational man behavior, responding negatively. This may also question the confidential administration of the data collection process of the

SDS itself. Considering the responses of the staff of the ministry, they consistently disagreed with the above factors. This proves the existence of authoritative management style incapable to discharge its responsibility and to create favorable working atmosphere for the staff in both organizations.

Staff Capacity and Commitment

Organizational performance in the implementation of the service delivery reform is also affected by the experience, skill and educational level of the human resource of the organizations.

Experience

In theory, as staff experience increases, individual performance is expected to improve. In practice however, this may not hold true always.

Table 3: Length of employment in the civil service and in the organizations (% of respondents)

Length of employment	In the civil service in general		In the Organizations		In the particular department within the organization	
	AARH	MOTAI	AARH	MOTAI	AARH	MOTAI
Up to 12 months	0.0	5.7	1.0	15.8	2.7	26.6
More than 1 year but less than 2 years	0.0	3.1	1.0	1.6	7.1	7.8
More than 2 years but less than 5 years	0.7	7.3	3.7	10.6	16.7	15.6
Between 5 and 10 years	1.7	6.8	6.3	21.2	21.8	21.9
Between 10 and 15 years	16.8	16.7	21.6	13.2	18.7	9.4
Over 15 years	80.9	60.4	66.4	37.6	33.0	18.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: SDS (2004)

Of the respondents, only 8.8% of the agency’s employees had been working for less than two years in a particular department within the organization. At the same time, 16.7% of agency employees had been 2-5 years in their department. Moreover, these percentages increased as time employed increased: from 21.8%, (5-10 years) to 18.7% (10-15 years), to 33.0% of the employees of the organization had been working in the same department for over 15 years. This shows that majority (73.5%) of the employees had a work experience of at least 5 years during the interview, showing a staff rich in experience. In contrast, in the ministry 50 % of employees had worked there for fewer than 5 years (and of these, 34.4% less than 2 years). In theory, the agency is expected to perform better than the ministry, as it had employees with relatively rich work of experience. In practice however (See table 1), the correlation between work experience and better performance is invalid for the agency.

This variation can be explained on at least three levels. One, from the above analysis, there seems lack of job rotation to motivate staff by allowing them to face new challenges and learn new skills. This reveals that the type of management proposed by NPM, which motivates staff by employing such techniques, is absent in the agency. Second, such employees with long years of work experience are also most likely have been influenced by the unresponsive orientation, attitude and work practices of the old bureaucratic machinery of the country. That is why NPM advocates for new blood in organizations. Third, noting the age of the employees where 51% them were aged 36-45 years and 31% of them aged 46 years and above (SDS, 2004), this high proportion of older employees may foster resistive behavior against the radical changes envisaged to be achieved by the reform, as some features of a reform (like early retirement and retrenchment may) seem to be applied primarily to them. The assumption of career-based public service with semi-automatic promotion on the basis of time served has recently weakened (Paulos, 200:5).

Education

As regard to the education status of the employees of the Ministry, the SDS (2004) has indicated that 14% of the respondents had received only primary schooling while 17% had a secondary school education. Almost 39% of the respondents had a technical or vocational qualification or a college diploma. Some 30% of the employees had at least a university degree, and 8% had a postgraduate qualification. This indicates that the Ministry possesses a pool of potential candidates with which to transform it self. The educational status of the Agency however, is generally low (See table 4).

**Table 4: Educational qualifications of the agency’s respondents
(% of respondents by sex)**

	% of male respondents	% of female respondents	% of all respondents
Never attended school	0.5	0.0	0.3
Attended up elementary/primary school	9.7	6.4	8.7
Attended up to 12 th grade/high school	37.4	43.6	38.8
Technical or vocational training	23.8	29.5	26.3
College diploma	17.9	14.1	16.6
University graduate – first degree	10.2	6.4	9.0
University graduate – postgraduate	0.5	0.0	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: SDS (2004)

Table 4 indicates a serious shortage of educated personnel within the Agency even in the Ethiopian scenario. The relatively high level education of the staff of the Ministry obviously would help the organization to properly carry out its mandate, as partly proved by its service improvement. The oppo-

site could apply to the Agency. Besides, the commitment and attitude of the staff of the Agency towards customer-focused service is proven by far lower than that of the ministry's (see table 1). Low level of education, coupled with lack of appropriate training (see table 2) and with majority of very long-term staff (SDS, 2004) could obviously negatively affect the effective implementation of the reform programme aimed to improve public service delivery of the agency. Here, it is evident that the recommendations of the proponents of NPM for fresh blood and for competent staff to improve performance have been missed.

Political Context and Accountability in Implementing the Service Delivery Reform in Ethiopia

Increasingly, there is recognition that public service reform cannot be treated merely as a technocratic exercise, but as part of political process that demands political support (Corkery et al 1998: 13). Ideally, reform should have also a broad measure of support from the public, interest groups and the media; the politician has a role to play in selling reform to different interest groups. (Corkery et al. 1998: 14).

The Ethiopian reform design process, as a platform for action, does not really recognize the importance of consulting different actors in the policy arena. There is no institutionalized mechanism for discussing or debating development policy proposals between government and the various implementing institutions, business and civic organizations (Berhanu, 1999:30). It would appear from interview data that the various middle-level officials of the ministries and other actors and stakeholders have not been actively and adequately involved in the drawing-up of the reform projects or in the modalities of their implementation (Paulos, 2000:19). As opposed to having an influential role in the actual policy design, the Ethiopian civil service has been identified as merely executor of policies designed by the government (Government of Ethiopia, 2002: 78). This is contrary to the importance of participatory policy design as a tool to reach consensus, where participation in reform enforces systemic changes in power relations, and lessons eventual resistance to change (Therkildsen, 2001: 33). Public exclusion from political and bureaucratic decision making may indicate lack of public appreciation of the role of government and the importance of fairness, consistency and adherence to democratic principles (Kaul, 1998: 3). Thus, this validates the W. I. Thomas' dictum that "what is perceived to be real is more than what is real" (in Bjorkman, 1994: 140).

Political commitment beyond rhetoric should also be supported by practical actions to facilitate the working conditions of the implementing organizations. Looking at the practices of pay, there has been a public debate because the government has officially banned annual salary increments in the civil service, claiming for better service, which was not in the first place standardized. This ban was relaxed after three years due to the strong pressure in the previous (May 7, 2005) election, which has frustrated the ruling party. This seems strictly

against the NPM's recommendation for better pay and employee motivation as a pre-requisite for better performance. Here, it emerges that the so-called public choice theory is manifested through clientelism for votes.

Given the self-interested behavior of both politicians and civil servants, and the inherent problems of the principal-agent relationship, the state of accountability between the politicians and civil service organizations inevitably affects the implementation of the reform. The effectiveness of the clarified accountability as a solution for this problem, depends on the extent to which expected results are explicitly specified and agreed upon, on the extent to which top positions of the public organizations have been staffed on merit basis, on how and to what extent real decision making power is delegated to the implementing institutions, the extent to which government resources are deployed to them, on the mechanisms of control, on how objectively and consistently the politicians control the implementing organizations, on the strength and strictness of the incentives (reward or penalty), on how citizen-customers are empowered, and above all on the strength of the framework of institutional structure for follow up. Coordination and active control are needed to solve these problems (Das, 1998; WB, 2004; Corkery, et al. 1998; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000).

The task of analyzing the situation of accountability may necessitate comparing the content of the existing policy on service delivery reform and the actual situation at the ground. First the policy content: how is accountability manifested in the policy? Normatively speaking, the policy document is well written comprehending many issues. Its objectives are very broad, like efficiency, effectiveness, etc; it has devised broad policy instruments such as formulating organizational mission statements, improving access for users, establishing complaints handling mechanisms, consulting with service users, etc; it has devised implementation strategies like establishing a central executive, creating awareness, capacity building, employee participation, and rewarding exemplary performance. Moreover, it has approved a 'directive for handling service users' complaints in the civil service' (Government of Ethiopia, 2001: 58-69). Of course, policies are often good in paper. The problem lies in the implementation.

In actual practice, the accountability relationship between the government and the implementing institutions has not been based on clearly specified expected results from the organizations. The relationship is merely broad, long-term, and sometimes vague (WB report, 2004: 48). Public institutions have often derived their mandate and main responsibilities from a single proclamation of the council of ministers, which has essentially not been followed by specific directives to clarify the contract between the government and the implementing institutions. For instance, one can see how both of the organizations under study were given their responsibilities (See section 2.2). Such broad terms of agreement really provide enough room for the exercise of the opportunistic behavior of both politicians and the top bureaucrats.

In Ethiopia, it is becoming common practice that politicians appear to show concern about the misuse of authority by senior bureaucrats only during political conflicts, and forget this thereafter. Top bureaucrats are also often excused for their shoddy performance as long as they have sufficient support from one or more top politicians (See Paulos: 19). Under such circumstances, public choice theory operates effectively; the ministers and top civil servants can form coalition for mutual benefit. The prevalence of maximizing mutual benefits between the politicians and bureaucrats can be partly seen in the high expenditure for purchasing European style office equipment and very expensive automobiles such as Land Cruisers and Mercedes Benz. One can wonder if he/she is really in a very poor country looking at the many expensive, 4-coded government automobiles at a single traffic light stop.

Implementing reform programmes in the public service is a complex process requiring practical support at the highest levels and great internal management confidence and skill (Corkery, et al. 1998: 1). In Ethiopia however, the government does not seem to dare to clearly delegate adequate authority to managers in public institutions. This problem is aggravated by the prevailing patron-client relationship between politicians and top bureaucrats. People for managerial posts are selected based on their strong family ties and their loyalty to the politicians. Studies have confirmed the prevalence of nepotism and favoritism in recruitment. Political patronage in appointment and promotions, and ministerial interferences in matters of administration, have been rampant (Paulos, 2000:19). In this respect, the Prime Minister Meles himself (in a televised talk) has been observed declaring, 'It is immaterial to consider the skill and knowledge of appointees as long as they are loyal to the political party'. One can see that minimal weight has been given to the importance of competence of top bureaucrats as a tool for successful implementation of government policies.

While lack of clarified accountability may contribute to non-merit selection of managers, the effect of such selection on accountability is furthered by inadequate, passive control and enforcement by the government for poor performance on the part of senior public servants, simply on account of their ties to the existing government (Ibid). This leads to a vicious circle that sustains the problem of accountability. Therefore, the essence of result-based performance management advocated by NPM cannot work effectively in such a situation. Even the politically driven actions, seemingly penalties for poor performance are only focusing on committed errors; omissions are not usually brought to account in the Ethiopian case.

Further, although customer empowerment is important for achieving clarified accountability, at first it depends on the context of the reform itself. Based on experiences in New Zealand and the UK, elements of the reform of customer empowerment include: (a) defining, as unambiguously and quantitatively as possible, the outputs which are expected from government departments, and incorporating these definitions into formal contractual agreements, to be used

as the basis for evaluating departmental and individual performance; (b) opening initially senior, and later all positions in the civil service to outside competition; (c) eliminating rights of tenure for the civil service; and (d) a clear link between achievement of targets and rewards and penalties (Ayeni, 2001: 5). These elements are essentially missing in Ethiopia, and hence the service delivery reform seems of little interest to users or citizens. In reality, therefore, the policy directive on 'customer complaint handling' is of little use and merely rhetoric.

In short, the government and its bureaucracy seems well insulated from the surrounding social structure and the implementing institutions with regard to the reform design and its implementation. Actual decision making power is still concentrated in the politicians (mainly the executive), lacks input from the public (no/little support) and hence its results are unpredictable. There is no forum for policy debate, clients' needs have not been assessed, employees have not been consulted, political control and enforcement has been lacking, etc. This form of government shares the main features of a patrimonial form of state where, power is vested in a few groups of people who are individually connected; thus, Evans's (1992: 149) embedded bureaucratic autonomy that characterizes developmental state seems far from reality in Ethiopia.

If the overall situation of accountability in Ethiopia looks poor, how does the accountability relationship appear in the organizations under study? One year before the SDS was conducted, the Ministry of Trade and Industry had undertaken a business process re-engineering (BPR) to assess the existing work processes, in order to clarify, cut waste, and make the work process transparent. According to the SDS (2004), previously, clients used to move up and down at least three floors and were in and out of several offices that housed the Registration and Licensing Department. Today, all applications are processed in one large room (one stop shopping) on the ground floor. The layout of the room has been designed to maximize visibility of staff to clients, in order to ensure transparency and to reduce possible corruption.

Apparently, service has been improved because of the BPR. For example, before the BPR, to get an operational license, on average, a customer needed to pass through a 14-steps work process as a precondition, and then was supposed to pass through a 26-steps work process to obtain a completed license in 225 days. After BPR, the process improved to 4-step preconditions, and 4-steps to get the license within only 2 days (Ministry of Trade and Industry, Dec. 2004). This is a big stride forward achieved by the Ministry, while the Agency has been doing its business as usual. The short work process (defining and clarifying the expected steps and service time to customers) together with the introduction of the one stop shopping (promoting transparency, customer empowerment and close supervision by supervisors) and probably the proximity of the department heads to the close supervision of the minister's officials (providing intact political support and confidence) are possible explanations of the presence of the default accountability which has contributed to better performance of the Min-

istry. This is different from genuine political commitment in action and deliberate efforts for clarified accountability, which are essentially absent in Ethiopia.

WAYS FORWARD / POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The following points are worth mentioning as possible ways of improving the implementation of the service delivery reform in Ethiopia:

- Policy design should consider the implementation context, which in the end is affected by the actors involved. It should be noted that a system in which politicians are policy makers and the civil service are a benevolent implementer does not function in practice. An institutionalized forum for policy debate is essential;
- Citizens need to be empowered by a citizen charter at government level, and a users' charter at organizational level;
- The broad and long-term relationship of accountability (the compact) connecting policy makers to organizational providers should be replaced by clear contractual agreement based on results to ensure deliberate accountability;
- Competent and visionary managers should be hired on the basis of merit, for posts in the public organizations;
- Clear and adequate autonomy should be given to the providing organizations. However, this autonomy does not mean insulation: instead providers should be embedded in their surrounding social structure to provide customer-driven services;
- Politicians should strictly follow up, control, and enforce measures to ensure sound implementation of the reform;
- Managers of service providers should give strategic leadership, motivate their staff and create favorable working environments. Clear incentive mechanisms should be put in place, so that hard work and innovation are rewarded; recruitment, training, evaluation and promotion policies are transparent; adequate decision making authority is delegated to front line employees; working facilities are accessible; staff needs are consulted and client need is assessed continuously;
- Clear complaint handling mechanisms should be established by the public providers. Separate office can be established with clear systems and procedures;
- Business process re-engineering (BPR) should be conducted by all public service providers in order to reduce the number of steps and time spent in providing service;
- Contracting out activities like issuing licenses to, and supervising, investors (which is currently handled by the Ministry) can be considered; and

- Further and detailed study needs to be conducted in order to analyze and investigate the real image of the implementation of the service delivery reform in Ethiopia.

CONCLUSION

The importance of the political context in which reform is implemented is found to be essential although this context has been largely similar in Ethiopia. Good political intentions and policy amendments are not enough for effective service delivery reform implementation. Instead, the need for forum for policy debates, capable administration and staff, improved pay, merit based recruitment, real managerial autonomy, avoiding political interference, clear performance standards, result oriented and active control, avoiding tenure, clear reward mechanisms, clarified accountability, etc yet to be met demands genuine political commitment in action, 'for a goal without action (work) is dead' (Bjorkman, 1994:135).

The lack of genuine political commitment of the government was manifested by its failure to ensure clarified accountability to overcome the inherent problems of the principal-agent relationships in the implementing organizations. This problem has been compounded by the self interested behavior of the civil servants of the organizations, which was fostered by perceptions of corruption, nepotism, favoritism and poor service in both organizations (but with a lower rate in the Ministry).

Among the important conditions suggested by NPM like changing and moving individuals in the organization (Ingraham and Rosenbloom, 1992: 35) and staffing with skilled and capable workers, are relatively fulfilled in the Ministry but not in the Agency. Moreover, the accountability relationship between the frontline workers and administrators seems improved in the Ministry because of the BPR and the subsequent one-stop shopping setup, which in turn has improved transparency, close supervision, and customer empowerment. These are some of the possible factors explaining the better performance of the Ministry

The use of different forms of service delivery such as corporation, agency, contracting out, and privatization are part of a NPM paradigm aimed at fostering a performance-oriented culture and a less centralized public sector (Kaul, 1998: 6). However, from the analysis it emerges that the mere introduction of NPM-like organizations may not actually contribute to the success of the reform implementation and improvement of public service delivery unless the underlining requirements of NPM are met. The success of implementing service delivery reform according to this study is mainly explained by the organizational contingency factors, not by being in the Agency or Ministry.

To sum up, given the deep-rooted problems in the Ethiopian Civil Service System, the introduction of the public service delivery reform is imperative and indispensable. The always pressing improvement of public service cannot wait

for the right conditions (WB, 2004: 61). 'Success may not entirely depend on what we have, but on how we use what we have'. However, the fulfillment of preconditions proposed by NPM for better performance seems to produce at least partly the desired result. The relatively better conditions such as capable staff and transparent and short service procedures due to BPR seem to contribute to the success of the Ministry.

Therefore, the hypothesis that successful implementation of public service delivery reform in Ethiopia largely lies in the specific organizational conditions seems true. On the other hand, political commitment and accountability (even if accountability in the minister due to the BPR may seem to help) are not essentially shaping the outcome of the reform implementation in the organizations. The analysis thus revealed the need for more efforts to ensure the necessary conditions in both the context and implementing organizations, and for clarified accountability at large. Being optimistic, this calls for transforming the patrimonial state in Ethiopia into Evan's type of developmental state, with a bureaucracy enjoying embedded autonomy that is capable of using clients' responses as in-built self correcting mechanisms within the social structure by working together with the citizens, for the citizens.

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6 IDP'S RIGHT TO HOUSING: HOW THIS RIGHT IS TRANSLATED INTO POLICY

INTRODUCTION

It is widely recognized that 'there is a crisis in housing in the Third World. Large increases in the urban population of Third World countries have dramatically increased the demand for housing' (Aldrich, B and Sandhu R 1995: 17). In Latin America, this process of rapid urbanization has been coupled with sharp increases in land prices (Everett, M., 2001: 454) which makes particularly difficult for the urban poor to access adequate housing.

If one considers the situation of Colombia and its biggest cities (Bogotá, Medellín, Cali) the picture is no different. However, the situation in the country has an additional characteristic to bear in mind; that is, the forced migration of thousands of people who are fleeing their homes to safeguard their lives from the constant threats of the armed conflict. The situation certainly represents a humanitarian crisis of exceptional magnitude, as the internally displaced people (IDP hereafter) are 'cut off from their land, traditional livelihood and means of generating income, and compelled to leave all but a few possessions behind.' (Mooney, E., 2005: 7)

The question of forced displacement is closely related to the problem of housing in developing countries for two main reasons. First of all, as people are forcibly evicted from their homes, there is a clear violation of their right to adequate housing. In Colombia, (as in many other Latin American countries) this right is incorporated in the Constitution¹. (Balchin, P and Stewart, J., 2001: 335) and consequently the nation ought to act upon that principle when addressing the rights and needs of IDPs.

It has been observed that the journey of IDP go through consists of 'various though not necessarily sequential phases' (Muggah, R. 2000a: 204) before they reach urban centers. It is said that once this happens, their displacement acquires a permanent character (Ibid: 205). Yet in urban environments displaced households or individuals find it very difficult to secure a means of living, and even more difficult to afford a house with the amenities required for human development. (Aldrich and Sandhu 1995: 17)

¹ Article 51. All Colombian citizens are entitled to live in dignity. The state will determine the conditions necessary to give effect to this right and will promote plans for public housing, appropriate systems of long-term financing, and community plans for the execution of these housing programs. Constitution of Colombia.

With this in mind, the main concern of this essay is to critically analyse the housing policy that the government has designed exclusively for IDPs as a means to assert their right to housing. It first introduces some background information regarding the current situation of IDPs in urban areas, in particular the situation of Bogota – the capital district. Then it will describe both the Colombian policy of social housing and the IDP housing policy, since the former constitutes the legal backbone for the latter. At the end, this essay will suggest possible alternatives to the crisis, that could be implemented to effectively realize the right to housing.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE IN THE CITIES: DISPLACEMENT WITH A PERMANENT CHARACTER

Regardless the disagreement on the figures, both governmental and NGO sources account for a massive influx of IDPs to urban centres (Global IDP Project, 2005). Their journey usually starts from their place of origin where they flee to a nearby village, moving then to a town or small urban centre to then to capitals of departments (Ibid: 106). This pattern of migration is clearly reflected in the government and NGO statistics, where Bogotá stands not only as the most preferred urban reception centre for IDPs, but also as the place that is receiving the largest number of displaced population². As people's journeys are determined by their search for security and means of survival, 'the city becomes for many the opportunity to restore their life project; the place where they can engage in various productive activities as a means of living in order to access basic services or minimum conditions for survival' (Proyecto Bogotá Como Vamos, 2003: 17)

In the case of Bogotá, the absolute number of IDPs has been growing systematically since 1999³, reaching a peak between 2000 and 2002 when figures increased almost four times (SUR, 2006). The situation is even more troublesome when one takes into consideration the permanency of displacement once IDPs arrive at cities (See Muggah, 2000a). From surveys conducted, it is clear that IDPs want to stay in Bogotá: return is not an option for them. For instance, by 2003 more than half of the population officially registered confirmed their desire to stay permanently in Bogotá (Proyecto Bogotá Como Vamos, 2003: 35). Also, a recent survey conducted on 2,322 displaced households revealed that only 12% of the households were considering return as a possible alternative (Ibañez and Moya, 2006: 24).

It is not only that displaced households or individuals demonstrate unwillingness to return to their home places, but it is also that 'return to their original

² According to the System for Registration of Displaced Population (Government), Bogota stands out as the first reception centre of IDPs from 1995 onwards with 7% of the total population officially registered.

³ Although NGOs start counting since 1985

home may be a solution beset by many obstacles' (Refslund, 1998). Under a context of ongoing conflict, such the case of Colombia, questions of security, protection, land availability and government financing and sustained support (Muggah 2000b: 140) raise serious doubts of whether the option of return can be considered as a definitive solution for those IDPs settled in urban centres.

The situation just portrayed is troublesome because when IDPs arrive in the cities, they usually 'take refuge in urban peripheries' (Global IDP Project, 2005: 74) joining the urban poor in slums and squatter settlement. It is important to signal that their situation is even more precarious than the one of the urban poor. As studies demonstrate (See Ibañez and Moya 2006; Perez, 2004) they exhibit higher unemployment rates, higher dependency ratios (bigger family size), lower education levels and in general higher levels of vulnerability and disadvantage.

Especially in urban contexts, where 'people are reliant on market exchange to buy basic goods and services and to earn money' (Wratten, 1995: 22), IDPs find it very difficult to make a living. They are constrained on 'their access to basic necessities such as food, housing, education, and health services' (WFP and ICRC, 2005: 3).

Specifically on the issue of housing, they experience serious difficulties to access adequate housing provided that the capacity of the cities to shelter an increasing number of people is limited. 'In most developing countries the formal market mechanism has systematically failed to satisfy the rapidly increasing housing needs of the population' (Berner, 2001: 293). This certainly applies to Latin America in general and to Colombia in particular, where the cities and especially Bogotá have proven unable to satisfy this growing demand and are finding it ever more difficult to guarantee the legitimate claim of housing of the thousands of IDPs arriving every day to the urban settings.

Consequently, if 'the only way in which most poor families can attain owner-occupation in Latin American cities is through self-help construction' (Gilbert, A., 1991:94), there are not many options left for those IDPs who decide to take refuge in the cities. The situation is critical, if one adds the fact that in some cities in Latin America like Bogotá, land is no longer easily available even for self-help housing (Ibid: 95). 'As the possibilities for low-income households of acquiring a land plot for housing – by purchase or illegal occupation – are likely to diminish' (Habitat, 1996: 213), IDPs are confined to shelter in the most dangerous and unsuitable places that remain available in the city. But even these locations are not just there to be taken by IDPs. On the contrary, it is now very common to see illegal private developers buy land in these places anticipating the arrival of new displaced households (Hernandez, E., and Laegreid, T., 2001: 217). Their profits are not only derived from the rents or sales that they make out of these plots, but also from the incremental improvements made by the displaced families that increase the value of the land (Berner, 2001: 298).

It is widely acknowledged that there is neglect on the part of the authorities in assisting IDPs when they resettle after conflict (Muggah, 2000a: 202). They are left with no other choice but to rely on 'their own support mechanisms and resources' (Vincent, 2001: 4). However, the precarious conditions in which they arrive already demonstrate that they have a limited capacity to access by their own means adequate housing solutions and no matter how resourceful they can be, their response strategies might not always entail positive outcomes (Refslund and Vincent, 2001: 275).

In the particular case of Bogotá, the majority of IDPs are living on rental housing (Proyecto Bogotá Como Vamos, 2003: 30), as they cannot afford home ownership. The problem with such kind of accommodation is that they usually cannot even afford the rents and thus 'they [...] become rental nomads [...] remaining in a dwelling for three forms before being evicted [...] then move on to another place, stay for a few months, be expelled, and so on' (Hernandez, E. and Laegrid, T, 2001: 217).

Evidently, the capacity to access adequate and secure forms of accommodation is beyond the means of IDPs, and that is the reason why they often end up living 'in poor quality, overcrowded and insecure accommodation with inadequate provision for basic services' (Satterhwaite, 1997: 10). Under such circumstances the question of housing acquires more relevance in the debate on how to find long-lasting solutions for displaced that would allow them 'to get back on their feet, both economically and socially' (WFP & ICRC 2005: 9).

Aside from the rights-based perspective, housing is recognized as a vital ingredient that could provide IDPs with a capital asset, with a value that can increase over time and can offer them the security and stability they need to regain their livelihoods (See Berner, 2001; HABITAT, 1996). As they cannot afford by their own means this kind of asset, then 'active policies are required in the provision and distribution of this vital ingredient' (Berner, 2001:295).

THE HOUSING POLICY IN COLOMBIA FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: AN EXTENSION TO IDP'S

Like many other developing countries, the state in Colombia shifted from being a direct provider of public housing to just a facilitator in access to housing. This shift was justified on the grounds that 'public housing was unavailable and unaffordable to most of the urban poor, while maintenance – because of its cost and because of rent arrears – was largely neglected by government' (Balchin and Stewart, 2001: 335).

Therefore, as the direct provision of housing proved to be ineffective, Colombia adopted a new approach for the provision of social housing at the beginning of the nineties (See Chiappe, M.L, 1999). The new policy consisted principally of demand-side subsidies to facilitate the access to housing for low-income population. As it was originally designed, the resources were allocated to benefit the lowest-income segment of the population; that is those 'earning

less than four minimum salaries, those without their own home, and those whose accommodation was poorly constructed or overcrowded, or lacked a title deed or services' (Gilbert, 2000:174).

Basically, the social housing system works as a mixture of subsidies, credit and savings from the beneficiaries. The grants are allocated either to purchase new and second-hand houses, or to improve the infrastructure of an accommodation or to legalize the land tenure status of a house (See Chiappe, 1999).

The premise of the policy is that its design guarantees that even the poorest segment of the population could access the housing market (Chiappe, 1999: 5). The argument just responds to the 'conventional wisdom [...] the poor are capable of improving their own housing providing they have access to resources and some support from the state' (Gilbert, 2000: 184)

However, the policy has showed meagre results in facilitating the access to housing for the low-income population. Various obstacles came into play, but principally there was the lack of access to credit, the element that prevented many poor households from being able to 'convert their right to a subsidy into a housing solution' (Ibid: 175). As the subsidies do not cover the whole amount of the accommodation, people need to request credit to cover the totality of the costs. Yet, as it has been documented, the formal banking system is reluctant to lend to the poor (Ibid: 179)

Therefore, although not intentionally, the policy ends up benefiting the not-so poor households mainly because the 'products offered were unaffordable for the poor' (Berner, 2001: 96). It is not only that the banking system is biased against the poor, but also that the policy itself implicitly excludes the people it intends to help. For instance, the institutional setting⁴ put in place to deliver the subsidies privileged those workers affiliated to the social security system⁵. 'Since the latter mainly covers formal sector workers and small groups of informal workers, [...] most unaffiliated workers are ineligible for credit' (Gilbert, 2000: 176). Also, the system requires a contribution from the households through saving schemes, which works as a screening-out mechanism of clients who lack the financial discipline to save; most of the times the poorest of the poor (Ibid: 181)

THE POLICY FOR IDP: POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION

With regard to housing for IDPs, the government released in 2001 a decree to regulate all the issues concerning housing for this population. This particular

⁴ The subsidies were granted by National Institute for Social Interest Housing and Urban Reform (INURBE) and Family Assistance Funds. The latter provides subsidies mainly to its associates who are formal workers affiliated to the social security system (See Chiappe, M.L., 1999)

⁵ Although some changes have been introduced lately to include unaffiliated informal workers.

legal framework, like many others related to displacement, is specific in the sense that it is supposed to regard the distinct needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs as the starting point to design the required interventions. In that sense, the decree states that its aim is to regulate and adjust the existing law on housing to adequately address the special needs of the displaced population.

The discussion about housing for displaced population goes around the prescription contained in domestic and international legal instruments in regards to ‘their rights to adequate housing, to be protected from forced eviction, and to restitution of housing and property’ (COHRE, 2005: 7). In this respect, the law about displacement clearly asserts the responsibility of the state to provide assistance to displaced households and individuals in the areas of urban and rural housing as part of their medium and long-term actions aiming at the socio-economic stabilization of displaced population (Law 387 1997, Article 17).

Despite the announced efforts of the policy to positively discriminate in favor of the displaced population, the resulting social housing system is just a replication of the existing housing policy for low-income households; that is still designed on the principle of demand-side subsidies, with the provision of just few exemptions from the regular procedures and requirements. Evidently, this raises serious doubts on whether the IDPs are able to claim their right to adequate housing through the legal instruments provided.

In principle, all IDPs officially included in the Government Registration System are potential beneficiaries of the subsidy⁶. However, the allocation is granted exclusively to IDPs participating in return and resettlement programmes. This point already sets a screening mechanism that excludes those IDPs who for a variety of reasons are not included in the Registration System. The anonymity of these IDPs certainly leaves them with no choice but to resort to self-help mechanisms as a ‘default strategy’ (Berner and Phillips, 2003: 2)

In addition, there are different modalities to which the IDPs can apply depending on whether it is for return or resettlement in rural or urban areas. As the case for this essay is obviously resettlement in urban areas, only those options will be considered. Basically, for resettlement there are three options, which in order of priority are: (a) housing rental, (b) dwelling improvement or self-help building and (c) purchase of new and second hand housing. The last two options are restricted to those families who at the moment of displacement legally owned a house⁷.

Regardless of the modality chosen, in all the cases the applicant needs to demonstrate that the dwelling is not located in a high-risk area or in illegal settlements. In addition to this, the question of land tenure must be clearly answered and the dwelling must comply with the existing building regulations.

⁶ Decree 951 of 2001

⁷ This point has been criticized by different agencies (See UNHCR, 2005 and CCJ, 2004) because it does consider that many displaced people were de facto owner-occupiers in their home places.

For that purpose, the candidate for the subsidy must submit the necessary documentation to prove these conditions.

At first glance, it is possible to detect two types of problems. First, there are clear barriers to access to the subsidy and second there are biases that prevent the households to effectively convert their right to a subsidy – when this is granted – into a housing solution.

In terms of barriers of access, there are several factors contributing to this problem. For instance, the allocation of subsidies is based on the calculation of a formula that privileges return over resettlement. Actually the priority given to rental housing and not to home ownership in cases of urban resettlement corroborates this fact, because people are expected to return to their home places. Therefore, those families that do not want to return are already at disadvantage.

Adding to this, the distribution of subsidies among municipalities is biased against urban centres (UNHCR, 2005: 255), limiting the options available for people residing in these areas. According to UNHCR, the procedure favours municipalities with less than 500,000 inhabitants, which obviously restricts the number of subsidies allocated to Bogotá, where most of the displaced are living. Furthermore in the case of other cities where there are no projects of social housing, the displaced households do not have chances to access the subsidy.

Also, the access to the grants is restricted by the lack of resources committed by the government. The policy proves to be very limited in terms of coverage and just confirms the fact that 'governments are unable to fund and manage a sizeable social housing sector' (Balchin and Stewart, 2001: 340). For instance, by the year 2003 the government was just able to reach 4.7% of the total number of officially registered households (UNHCR, 2005: 249) and by the year 2004 of 45,000 applications, only 3,100 were financed (CCJ, 2004: 3). Moreover, it has been observed that the government has been progressively cutting off the funds specifically allocated for IDPs subsidies. In consequence, the displaced population are left to compete against the urban poor for the already scarce resources that are devoted to subsidies (UNHCR, 2005: 251).

There are also barriers within the system that impede attempts by displaced households to assert their right to housing through these subsidies. First of all, the amount of the subsidy is not enough to cover the cost of housing (CCJ, 2004: 6). This is especially troublesome in the case of Bogotá, where 'land is normally only available at a considerable price' (Gilbert, 1991: 96). If one adds to this the fact that subsidies only cover the cost of formal housing, it is evident that this type of asset is still unaffordable for IDPs, who usually do not have a stable source of income.

As the total costs of housing are not covered by the subsidy, displaced households need to resort to additional financing to afford the costs of housing. However, if for the urban poor the access to credit is restricted; it is even more restricted for displaced households, who are in a more vulnerable position. Therefore, 'the need to cover the total cost of housing with credit is the

reason why the majority of the subsidies allocated cannot be realized' (UNHCR, 2005: 253).

Moreover, even if IDPs are granted the subsidy, they can still fail to find a housing solution because there is no guarantee on the disbursement of the funds from the part of the government. In this respect, it has been observed that vendors of second-hand dwellings are reluctant to negotiate with displaced households because the government fails to disburse the funds on time (CCJ, 2004: 8). There are documented cases in which displaced households are asked to vacate the dwelling – even when the deal is closed – because the government does not pay out the instalments (Ibid: 9)

Finally, it has been observed that the requirements and administrative procedures are cumbersome (See CCJ, 2004; UNHCR, 2005) for IDPs. They find it very difficult to comply with the legal requirements, in terms of proving the legal status of the dwelling (ownership and building license) for which they are asking the subsidy. The illegal status and unsuitable conditions of the dwellings they can afford already excludes them from asserting their right to housing through the assistance programmes from the government.

CONCLUSIONS: POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

It is clear the IDP policy on housing is very limited in coverage and results. Even when subsidies are granted, displaced households cannot convert them into housing solutions, not only because of the cumbersome procedures and administrative costs, but also because the options available in the formal market are out of their reach. Therefore, the failure of the policy in achieving its goal gives room to suggest possible alternatives to the current approach.

Upgrading and legalizing informal settlements:

First of all, the current policy has been criticized for not considering alternative options such as slum upgrading and legalization of the settlements where the displaced families are already living. The government relies entirely on the formal market to provide housing solutions for the IDPs but fails to recognize that this is not an option for everyone. In Bogotá the situation is critical because less than half of the total units built by legal developers are for social housing purposes, and these far exceed the creditworthiness of displaced population (Nagy, n.d.: 5).

Instead, much more can be done outside the realm of the formal housing market by recognizing the 'economic value of the existing housing stock' (Berner, 2001: 303). In that sense, experiences exist on upgrading and legalization of informal settlements. They start from what people have already built and provide them with security in order for them to enjoy the improvements undertaken. However, there are some critical issues that must be taken into account before engaging in this kind of projects.

The first issue to be considered is that upgrading programmes should be careful not set 'standards unrealistically high; [otherwise they could run the risk] of uprooting considerable parts of the population' (Ibid: 296). In this particular case, it is problematic if those evicted by the rising costs of living are the ones that the programme intends to benefit; the displaced population has already been uprooted from its original places. Even more, it is important to evaluate past experiences in cities like Bogotá in order to improve future interventions. The upgrading and legalizations projects from past administrations in the city have heavily relied on massive public investment on physical infrastructure and have not conferred 'legal tenure and ownership of the land, [...]. It] just provided for the incorporation of the settlement into city regulations and services' (Nagy, n.d.: 16). Although there is not much information regarding the impact of the project on the residents, it might be possible to argue that these past interventions ended up rising the living costs of the area because 'as land is improved, it will almost certainly go up in value' (Werlin, 1999: 1528).

Another element that must be taken into account is the question of community participation. According to Werlin (1999), slum upgrading is difficult without community participation. In this respect, possibilities might be open for the displaced population to intervene directly in the programme along with members of the host community, because both could benefit from improvements in their area. However, given the circumstances surrounding displaced people's lives, one cannot be too naïve about the possibility of encouraging community participation. 'Displacement generally implies a disruption of social services and social relations, [... and this] puts severe constraints on existing forms of cooperation' (Refslund, 1998:3). Furthermore, displaced population does not represent a homogeneous mass. On the contrary, they 'constitute a heterogeneous group with competing interest and with different goals and ambitions in mind' (Vincent, 2001: 6). Therefore, with these limitations in mind, the government could take into consideration designing projects that would be more suitable for IDPs needs and certainly could be more at their reach.

An integral approach: Support and complement of IDPs response strategies

The current IDP housing policy designed by the government is circumscribed exclusively to the area of housing and has not included other important measures such as 'income and employment generation and human resource development' (Berner, 2001: 303). As is widely acknowledged, IDPs experience serious difficulties in making a living in urban environments, mainly because they are removed from their traditional livelihoods and their skills are not easily transferable to urban settings (See Ibañez et al., 2006; Hines et.al., 2002).

In that sense, any policy intending to provide shelter to this population must go beyond the issue of 'homemaking to include issues like employment generation, gender needs, housing rights and sustainable urban development' (Ghafur, 2001: 111). The aim of such a comprehensive approach would be to provide

displaced households with an opportunity to secure their livelihoods and ultimately to improve their well being.

For instance, as was explained in the previous sections for cases of resettlement, the government gives priority to subsidies directed towards covering the costs of rental payments for a maximum period of 24 months (Article 5 and 11). If the policy is completely disconnected from employment generation activities, the IDPs are forced to remain as 'rental nomads' that cannot afford the costs of formal renting housing. Regardless on the motives of the government, rental accommodation could be an alternative for displaced people who are constantly in the move and cannot afford owner-occupation. Therefore, the issue at stake here is the option available for IDPs to find adequate alternatives within the rental markets coupled with opportunities to access a means of living.

Furthermore, implementing an integral approach could also complement the component of self-help building that is covered by the decree. Even more, if the government decides to reframe the policy to include slum upgrading projects, there could be a room for employment creation through public works. The literature recognizes that 'a policy that focuses on the economic role of shelter vis-à-vis low-income settlement improvement is a way to promote household livelihoods [...] and so increase household income (Ghafur, 2001: 113). In fact, the government is already implementing this kind of labour-based approach for displaced population through its programs of food and training for work. Unfortunately they are completely disconnected from shelter provision policies and limit only to a role of emergency relief.

The advantage of this comprehensive approach is that it brings together issues that are closely interrelated, such as housing and income generation; thus increasing the chances to make a difference for displaced population livelihoods. However, it is important to consider that improvements in the area of income generation might be limited. As Anzorena et al. (1998) wisely suggest, when a 'high proportion of the population have inadequate incomes and where a large, diverse informal economy exists, it is difficult to find niches for new micro-enterprises that could help to increase income or employment for low-income groups' (p. 169). This is very relevant for the case of displaced population who are often engaged in low paid and precarious informal activities.

Land swapping: Abandoned property for unoccupied property

Recently, policy-makers and development agencies in Colombia have discussed the implications of regulating and putting in practice the article about land swapping included in the Displacement Law (Article 19 - Law 387, 1997). The article in question refers to the possibility of receiving the land of displaced persons in exchange for other properties with similar characteristics in other areas of the country. Although in different circumstances this kind of arrangement have worked out (in other places like the Philippines) where the government

intervenes to arrange the 'exchange of occupied property with another unoccupied property with equivalent value' (UNHCS and CityNet, 1997: 69).

In the case of Colombia, this land swapping is intended to work for cases of rural resettlement. Nevertheless, it could be also considered as an alternative for urban settings, when displaced households decide to move definitively into the cities. The main problem here is to find 'unoccupied land suitable for self-help building' (Werlin, H. 1999: 1523); that is, land that is close to sources of income and that is affordable for the displaced population. If such land is not available, it is very difficult even in rural cases for land swapping to work as an alternative housing strategy.

FINAL REMARKS

All the alternatives proposed here have their own limitations that must be considered before intervening in the sector. However, together they may provide a more realistic scenario for displaced households to access a housing solution in urban settings than the formal housing offered to them. Otherwise, they are just left with no choice but to rely on their own strategies to find shelter that suits their circumstances, which does not imply an optimum solution.

For many authors, the strategies IDPs use just demonstrate their 'resilience, perseverance, inventiveness and capacity to adjust to very difficult circumstances' (Refslund, 1998: 12). However if one takes a closer look to the vulnerabilities they are subjected to in urban environments, the situation that for many represents the abilities and resources of displaced population, for others just reflect the result of government negligence and unconcern.

In this sense, what this essay would like to stress out is that without the continued support from the government and other agencies, displaced people are unable to overcome their vulnerabilities and deprivations. As Ghafur (2001) clearly puts it, 'the urban poor [and even more the IDPs] lack the minimum funds necessary to step on the progressive ladder of self-help housing'. In other words, IDPs are not capable to prevent for themselves that displacement becomes a 'structurally enforced plummet to the bottom of society' (Refslund, 2001: 276).

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7 NATIONALIZING COMMUNITY SPACE OR COMMUNITY SELF-MANAGEMENT? THE FOREST MANAGEMENT IN POST-INDEPENDENCE MEGHALAYA, INDIA

INTRODUCTION

The contested domain of community self-management of forest

For many years the conventional thinking was that forest could be best managed by national legislation. But inadequacy of this top down approach led policy makers, practitioners and donors to turn to communities for better management of natural resources. Their effort is backed by a policy shift that advocates participation. According to a recent survey, more than fifty countries have one form of partnership or the other with the communities in the forestry sector alone (Agrawal and Gibson, 2001:1-2) Communities are now the locus of conservationist thinking. International donor agencies like World Bank and ADB have all 'discovered' community. Large amounts of money have been directed towards community-based conservation. The centrality of community is also visible in the plethora of policy documents that feature community-based management.

Efforts to include people in the management of forest have received attention in India also. An innovative approach is the protection of forest by the local community in return for free usufruct of minor forest produce. This concept, called joint forest management (JFM),¹ has been extended to many states and has the support of donors like the World Bank, who are advocating more rights to the community in the form of revenue sharing arrangements and proprietary rights in the forest in the long run. (Revised Forest Strategy for the World Bank Group, 2002:443-457)

Both as a cause and consequence of this policy shift, a new discourse on forestry has emerged which celebrates community and its virtues. While there is plenty of literature enumerating advantages of community management, the viability of this project alongside powerful discourses of modernization and development, mostly promoted by the state and the market, has not received critical attention.

¹ There is no dearth of literature on JF M. However for a critical look see Jeffery and Sundar(eds), „A New moral economy of community participation, discourses of community and participation,Sage,1999

To elaborate: the state's vision of modernization and progress usually entails notions of industrialization, commercialization of agriculture or extraction of natural resources. Conventional, subsistence-based natural resource management, for which community self-management stands, is mostly out of step and in many cases an antithesis of such visions of development. At the same time, since the discourse on modernity is powerful and usually pan-nationalist; it not only weakens community management but also, through the institutions and policies at its command, encroaches upon the community space – the nationalization of community space.²

Therefore the realization of a community management project within or along side the modernization discourse of the state seems to be a difficult proposition.

This paper takes a hard look at the community management of forest in Meghalaya, a northeastern state in India, where people are legally in control of the forests, to demonstrate the fields of power within which the discourse on community self-management is taking place, focusing upon the ways in which both state and non-state through their 'modernization' discourses seek to transform the people and weaken community control.

MEGHALAYA: THE 'PROMISED' LAND OF COMMUNITY FOREST MANAGEMENT?

This paper deals with Meghalaya, a small state in northeast India with a population of two million, primarily inhabited by three tribes: Khasi, Jaintia and Garo. Unlike most other parts of India, where forest is owned by the state, more than 90% of forest is under the community ownership (www.meghalaya.nic.in).

Thus the ultimate goal of giving the control of forest to the community, which is popular thinking now both amongst state and non-state entities, seems to have reached fruition here.

The community control of forest in modern times in Meghalaya partly owes its origin to the British colonial rule. Due to the limited reach of the British administration in this difficult and inaccessible terrain, the British presence in Meghalaya (erstwhile Assam) remained weak and the local institutions were allowed to continue and govern. Thus the community continued to have control over its natural resources, including forest. After independence, the early policy of community management of natural resources was not altered fundamentally, but in order to give it institutional support, elected bodies of the tribes at the district level, known as District Councils, were created. (Phira, 1991) In the wake of growing demand for a tribal state by the tribes of Meghalaya, it was separated from Assam and became an independent state in 1972.

² I have borrowed this term from Baruah,2005,used in a slightly different context.

Ideally speaking Meghalaya seems to be a classic case of community management, undisrupted by colonialism, ‘communities in the state of nature’ managing their resources sustainably and harmoniously. But Meghalaya is often cited as a ‘failed’ case of community forest management, as deforestation and unsustainable forest practices have become an everyday sight, forcing the highest court in the country recently to ban logging there, as it did in other parts of India. (Nongbri, 2001),

If the largely held view is that the major reason for deforestation in other parts of the country is coercive conservation (command and control regime of the state), which excludes actual resource users from resource and community management is seen as a solution, this theory does not seem to hold for Meghalaya.

The indigenous community has predictably but erroneously been blamed for the state of affairs, providing support for the ‘Tragedy of Commons’ (Hardin, 1968) discourse which reframes the issue of deforestation by endorsing more administrative intervention, state control and questioning those who celebrate community. Such a narrative of deforestation has serious policy implication, and if not challenged has the potential to dislodge the community, making way for tighter state control over forest. The idea behind this paper therefore, is to place deforestation in the larger context of state, market and civil society. It will do so by analyzing various discourses on the people-forest-state in India with Meghalaya in mind: the arena of power and institutions within which they interact, strengthen or weaken each other and impact policy.

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Discourse is a shared way of apprehending the world – the way we define, interpret and address a particular, event, phenomenon or text. There could be several discourses around a single subject, depending on interest and power. Each discourse rests on assumptions, judgments and contestations that provide the basic terms for analysis and debates and has its own problem-solving device.

In the context of this paper, one can see the changing meaning of forest through discourses. Forest has emerged as an area of contention, heated debates and disputes. Depending primarily on how they see forest, different discourses on forest management have assigned roles to state and community. It will be useful to see how powerful they are and how have they influenced public policy.

The concept of discourse owes much to Michel Foucault and Foucauldians are committed to the idea that individuals are for the most part subject to the discourses in which they move and thus are not able to make comparative assessment and choices across different discourses. (Dryzek, 1997:1-20)

But, as Dryzek argues, while discourses are powerful they are not permanent or impenetrable. A variety of discourses may exist, sometimes complementing each other but often competing, accommodating, appropriating and modifying

each other. Actors who see an established or emerging discourse as threatening can attempt to override it or perhaps more often simply resisting it; they may even try to cloak themselves in suitable language. Alternatively actors can sponsor discourses more conducive to their own interests. The influence of a particular discourse may also be limited, if several competing interest are to be harmonized and prioritized. For instance given the multiplicity of functions that a government has to perform – foremost ensuring continued economic growth – they need to be acceptable to corporations, and since environmental policies may not be liked by corporations they thus can find themselves relegated to an insignificant place (Dryzek: 10.)³

Lastly the impact of discourse can be felt in the policies of the government in several ways. For instance discourses can become embedded in institutions. In such a case while the discourse can be institutional software; formal rules constitute institutional hardware. (Dryzek): 18-19)

CLASSIFYING THE DISCOURSES ON FOREST IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMUNITY

Using the above mentioned framework, we have tried to identify several discourses on forest management or discourses that influence forest management⁴ with the specific concern as to how they visualize community's role in the management of forest. A short description of such discourses and their implications for policy, is as follows:

Colonial discourse on forest: exclusion of the community

The main focus of this discourse is on colonial policies that led to the exclusion of the community from the management of the forest. Its story line runs like this:

Initially, princes and local chiefs owned the forests, but local communities enjoyed unhindered access to the forests for their uses.

With the growing demand of timber, the British began to take note of the potential of India's forests as a source of revenue. The culmination was the Forest Acts of 1878 and 1927 by which the British invoked the rights of the conqueror, who obtained automatically all rights as the sovereign from the ori-

³ The example that comes to mind immediately is the USA's withdrawal from Kyoto in its larger economic interest, despite it avowed commitment to environment. However since environment is a powerful discourse USA has been cautious enough to cloak its economic interest in the garb of scientific uncertainty in the area of climate change, rather than denouncing environment for economic growth.

⁴ It is crucial to draw this line of distinction as certain discourses may not directly talk about community's role in the management on forest and yet they may have a powerful influence on the outcome e.g.the indigenous people discourse on autonomy may sound more political, but its implication will be to hand over the control of forest to the indigenous people.

ental sovereigns, the native chiefs. They set aside the law that property could not be taken from the citizens by the state.

Thus the rights of the communities were taken away, alienating them from forest management (Guha, R, 1998:95). The British policy led to the creation of reserve forests (complete alienation), protected forests (rights were recorded but not settled, and which were gradually converted to reserve forests) and village forests (these were to meet the needs of local communities, but largely remained only on paper). Colonial appropriation of forests and revenue wastelands seriously undermined the existing community –based management systems for a wide variety of livelihood rooted in local system and bio diversity. Forest reservation artificially fragmented people’s holistically livelihood resource base into different legal categories of forest and non-forest lands, largely making customary use of forest illegal even though people’s dependence on them continued. This resulted in widespread protests in many parts of the country, which enabled communities to recover some common lands in the form of community forests (Hardiman, 1992, Guha, 1989 and 2001 and Buchy, 1996). But the centralized forest administration based on exclusion remained intact in the post-colonial period as the same legislation with minor modifications is still in existence today.

Colonial discourse is important not only as a reference point which helps us understand the evolution of forest policy, but as mentioned above, more because forest management in the post-colonial period is marked by continuity with the colonial period. Thus the discourses advocating community rights to the forest refer to the present policy as ‘colonial’ and demand its abolition as the starting point. In fact it is amazing just how often the colonial era figures in debate: as an example to emulate or as a heritage to be renounced.

The ‘deep ecologists’: putting the forest first and community last

The discourse on industrialization was so hegemonic that environment was hardly conceptualized prior to 1960s. However, slowly this hegemony began to disintegrate, yielding to wide ranging environmental discourses (Dryzek, 1997:20). The seventies saw the rise of the environmental discourse among the urban middle class in India, mainly around wilderness conservationists, an interest group small in number but with a strong influence on policy. Defenders of preservation, they have consolidated their stand on moral and scientific grounds, while their practical emphasis concerns the preservation of unspoiled nature. Their influence on state policy is manifest in large net works of national parks, virtually extinguishing all legal rights of the community (Gadgil-Guha, 95:149-151). Peluso (1993:201) has an interesting explanation for the state support for conservation – When state’s incomplete hegemony hinders it from controlling people’s claim over resources, it uses economic arguments and conservation to justify the coercive exclusion of certain groups from resources. In certain cases the conservation rhetoric of external environmental groups may also come to the rescue of the state.

In practice this has severely impacted on existing land users and customary forest rights in regions with a large percentage of the total area declared as national parks and sanctuaries.

Development discourse: industrialization and extractive reserves sans community

This discourse is used by those who view forests as a source of industrial raw material. In terms of their management preferences, timber harvesters are diametrically opposite to wilderness pursuits. While the latter stands for hands off management style that brooks no interference with natural processes, industrial demands on the forest often involve substantial and even irreversible modification of natural ecosystems. (Gadgil and Guha⁵: 151)

The industrialist view of nature is simply instrumental. The forest is a source of raw material for processing factories, and the pursuit of profit dictates pragmatic and flexible attitudes towards its management. In their scheme of the use of forest, community has a peripheral or no place. In the past timber harvesters in India have been content with the state management of forests along as they were assured of abundant raw material and low prices, now with the increasing deforestation and withdrawal of subsidies, wood base industry has been lobbying for the release of the degraded land as captive plantation.

In order to justify their claim on public land, they invoke the conventional development linking of industrialization with progress and prosperity.

They also argue that captive plantations will lessen the pressures on natural forests which are primarily responsible for destruction of forest. The consequence of this discourse is nationalization of land and declaration of more commons as protected areas which included village grazing lands, natural grass lands and alpine pastures, further reducing community access to forest (Gadgil and Guha, 95:151-152)⁵

The ‘social ecologists and romantics’: Return the forest to the community

A strong constituency, consisting mainly of civil society groups, taking their cue from colonial discourse of appropriation of forest, advocate restoration of forest to the community. The community consists of large proportion of the people who live close to the forest and close to subsistence margin and access to

⁵ The authors have show that dominated by the development and industrialization discourses ,immediately after independence , a new strategy of intensive commercial forestry was adopted from the sixties onwards. Large areas, usually the most productive areas, were brought under plantation working circles where all trees were clear felled to replace them with artificial plantations of fast growing and high yielding teak species. Thus the system of selective felling was replaced by clear cutting of all trees in selected coupes that were to be replaced by teak plantations. As a result, thousands of hectares of natural forests were clear felled during the sixties, seventies and early eighties

fuel, fodder, small timber and non-timber products is critical to their livelihood. It is argued that they have lived there for centuries and that collective consciousness of their residency stretches back into the past to pre-date state usurpation. In their polemic against state forest management, they call for a radical reorientation of forest policy, towards more directly serving the interest of subsistence tribal. Others go further in asking for a total state withdrawal from forest areas. This can then revert to the control of village communities, which they claim have the wherewithal to manage these areas sustainably, and without friction (Gadgil-Guha, 1995:148).

They also receive support from a new breed of first world citizens who are making a reverse journey to remote fourth world (indigenous) communities, seeking partners for the global eco-village. (Conklin and Graham, 1995:696-697)⁶

Ironically much of this rhetoric has been appropriated by the state agents. A document of the Ministry of Tribal Affairs in India for instance reads:

It is well known that the forest dwelling scheduled tribes are residing on their ancestral lands and their habitat for generations and from times immemorial and there exists a spatial relationship between the forest dwelling scheduled tribes and the biological resources in India. They are integral to the very survival and sustainability of the forest eco systems, including wildlife. In fact, the tribal people are inseparable with the ecosystem, including wildlife, and cannot survive in isolation. (Draft Tribal Bill, Government of India, 2003)

Then it goes on to say that the rights of these people are not adequately recognized and forest land should be returned to the tribe

The basic assumptions made in this discourse are that communities are homogenous, by nature conservationists, that their basic economic drive is subsistence based and that communities are capable of managing their resources sustainably⁷. Many of these assumptions are questionable. The larger question is whether the conditions that in the past often favored collective management exist or can be created.

Forest department: The administrative rationalists and primacy of power and knowledge over community

State control over forest varies from country to country, which also in way defines its relation with the community.

In independent India, the Forest Department continues to be the biggest landlord, controlling over one fifth of the country's area, backed by impressive

⁶ The global eco-village, the authors argue is primarily a first world construct, created and recreated through media which reinforces the image of 'Ecologically Noble Savage' so vital for the survival of the eco-global village.

⁷ The example of sacred grove, wherein community sanctions are used to conserve biodiversity, is often cited as an example of successful community conservation, but these 'islands of salvation are too few and far between to draw any generalization.

administrative and legal frame work. In what is still a bio-mass based economy, all segments of Indian society – peasants, tribal, pastoralists and industrialists – have a heavy dependence on the produce of the forest sources fuel, fodder, construction timber or industrial raw material. (Gadgil and Guha, 1992:148-49)

The brief of the Forest Department is adjudication of the different claims in a scientific and objective manner. Historically the scientific foresters saw themselves as harbingers of the state-directed modernization, in which they were, along with other groups, the leading agent of economic development. Their approach however, depoliticizes the issue and reconstructs them as purely technical issue amenable to technical solutions, which they are themselves able to provide (Bryant, 1997)

Conservation is for them the gospel of efficiency and scientific expertise and state control is its pre-requisite. (Gadgil and Guha, 1995:153)

The growing depletion of forest resources and the increasing deforestation, led to the realization that active and willing participation of forest fringe communities is necessary for any forest regeneration program to succeed. It was also realized that village communities will have little incentive to participate unless they benefit directly and have sufficient authority to be effective. Therefore a new strategy, called Joint Forest Management (JFM) based on partnership with the community was adopted to protect and regenerate degraded forests and giving them certain rights over minor forest produce. There are several loopholes in JFM both at the formulation and implementation levels (Sundar et al, 2001, Ostrom, 1999). There is little evidence of the JFM framework being adapted in response to local voices and demands of organized, self initiated forest protection grass root initiatives. In central India, tribal organizations have demanded that JFM should be preceded by land reforms. In the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh the village level committees that are supposed to draw up micro-plans based on minor forest produce (MFP), have been appropriated by the dominant people, in some cases led by commercial considerations and replacing MFP with logging.⁸

Does the JFM process provide an opportunity for community self management if the 'loopholes' are plugged? The question is important. But even more important is – will the Landlord (the Forest Department) ever agreeing to a re-allocation of its property? Equally significant is – will the 'scientific' forestry discourses of forest department ever recognize local knowledge and make way

⁸ While the present policy of JFM encourages participation of local communities in forest management, it falters badly in assuring long-term stake to communities in the improvement of forests (Access to a little amount of minor forest produce is unlikely to elicit the kind of intensive and sustained effort necessary to nurse the forests back to good health. Besides, the promised sharing of revenues is rarely enforceable. This engenders perverse behavior on the part of communities to grab as much as possible now since the future benefits are uncertain

for it?⁹ These questions have important implications for success of JFM and community control of forest and need to be pursued.

The autonomy discourse-indigenous community as natural claimant to forest

The basic premise of this discourse is that tribes are autochthones who have a primary claim over the natural resources of the state. It focuses on cultural features that confirm the uniqueness of the tribal people, their environmental wisdom and their spiritual attachment to the landscapes. Though this western popular imagination of the tribe, fed by *National Geographic*, is hard to find, the indigenous identity is often invoked in opposition to the state, to get more local control over natural resources.

Thus autonomy discourse is not merely a struggle over resources but struggle over meaning and it demonstrates the way contests over control of resources are articulated in terms of competing representation of community at a range of levels and sites.

In day to day practical politics, a particular representation of the community has been used strategically to strengthen its claim over natural resources like forest. In policy documents, advocates of community based resource management have often represented the community as a site of consensus and sustainability. Though idealized, such representations have provided a vocabulary with which to defend the rights of the community vis-à-vis state. They share with social ecologists and the development planners the notion of traditional community in harmony with the environment. They provide a counter not only to the tragedy of common approach but also to the discourses on managerial capacity of the government and scientific management.

The state development discourse-simplifying state and community

The state has a vision of modernization, mostly in line with the national vision of development.

The state wants to catch up with the other states – modern industries, mining, means of communication, commercialized agriculture, education, health. etc. The ethnic identities, ancient ties to places, livelihood practices are often presented as problems in its documents. It shares many common elements with development discourse including equating industrialization with progress.

Once the industry is identified with progress, its absence by definition becomes an element of backwardness. In such a situation, a vision of the future which incorporates more and more industries and the displacement of local

⁹ The power of knowledge based on science may provide legitimacy for many of their interventions like initiating JFM where management of forest is already with the community, by branding the community management as ‘unscientific’, as in Meghalaya recently.

resource regime by national and global resource use regime is only the natural corollary (Baruah, 2005:33-58).

Engagement between the state and the people has been framed within, rather than outside or in opposition to, the state discourse of development.¹⁰

INTERACTION AND COALITION BETWEEN DISCOURSES

Having identified various discourses in relation to natural resource management and community, it is not difficult to further narrow the classification by looking for some kind of coalition between them

Broadly speaking, in terms of community-state relationship the discourses can be divided in two categories – the ones that support a more interventionist state and the ones that support empowerment of the community. Seen in this light the discourses B, C, F and G above visualize more powers for the state for development or conservation, while the discourses at A, D and E have a story line which talks about marginalization of the people, advocates more autonomy and is for a policy which has a primacy of community over state. Thus there are two broad discourse coalitions.

Discourse coalitions are defined as ensembles of (1) a set of story lines, (2) the actors who utter these story lines and (3) the practices in which this discursive activity is based. Story lines are the discursive cement that keeps a discourse coalition together. (Hajer, 1995: 40-72)¹¹. Discourse-coalitions are formed if previously independent practices are being actively related to one another and if a common discourse is created in which several practices get a meaning in a common political project.

The relative strength of the discourses or coalition of discourses depends on its institutionalization. A discourse is institutionalized if it is translated into institutional arrangements and concrete policies. If these two conditions are satisfied, a discourse can be said to be hegemonic in a given domain (Ibid. Hajer)

Against this backdrop although the second coalition of discourses on autonomy and community control over local resource use were powerful initially at the time of independence, soon they were taken over by imperatives of a standard vision of the pan-India discourse of development, which started a process of nationalization of community space. Thus the first coalition of discourses which has a vision of modernization and conservation through state intervention have assumed discursive domination, weakening the second coali-

¹⁰ Though this does not mean that there is consensus on whom or what needs to be developed.

¹¹ The author uses ecological modernization to illustrate this concept. The environmental issues potentially raise rather substantial question about the social order, yet ecological modernization suggests that the environmental issues can be remedied without having to completely redirect the course of social development.

tion and the project of community management of natural resources in the process (Ibid, Hajer).¹²

The beginning: Achieving the ideal of community self management of resources through the Sixth Schedule

During the colonial period most of the tribal areas were only partially or indirectly administered and thus they enjoyed fair amount of autonomy. At the time of independence the tribal area were apprehensive that a centralized regime might harm their culture, custom and economy. To allay such fears a policy of non-interference was envisaged known as Panch-sheel or Five Principles. Elaborating on it, J.L. Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India said in 1958

‘People (tribes) should develop along the lines of their own genius and we should avoid imposing any thing on them. We should try to encourage in every way their own traditional art and culture. Tribal right in land and forest should be protected.

‘We should try to train and build a team of their own people to do the work of administration and development. Some technical personnel from outside will, no doubt, are needed, especially in the beginning. But we should avoid introducing too many outsiders into tribal territory.

‘We should not over administer these areas or overwhelm them with a multiplicity of schemes. We should rather work through but not in rivalry to, their own social and cultural institutions.’

This vision was echoed in Sixth Schedule of the constitution, which provided for the administration of the tribal population of the India’s north-east by autonomous, elected District Councils. The Councils became operational in the 1950s in Meghalaya and were given wideranging powers of land allotment, management of forest and mines, to impose taxes, to constitute courts for administering justice and make laws on various subjects (Barua: 2005).

Nationalization of community space

As mentioned earlier, Meghalaya became a separate state of India in 1972. However, in his inaugural speech to celebrate Meghalaya’s statehood, its first Governor BK Nehru (not to be confused with J.L. Nehru) however spoke a language which was in sharp contrast to the spirit of Sixth Schedule. He said –

‘This State is largely populated by the Scheduled Tribes who are economically behind their brethren in other parts of the Country. My Government intends to embark on a programmed of development for the new State of Meghalaya. This programmed will cover the development of Agriculture, improvement of means of communications, judicious exploitation of natural resources and improvement of employment opportunities. We would like to

¹² Hajer argues that in practical politics hegemony is only the case to a certain degree. Such a weaker form of hegemony might be called discursive domination.

wear away the people from destructive exploitations of available resources such as the practice of jhumming (shifting-cultivation), which destroys our forest wealth. We have to demonstrate the advantage of settled modes of cultivation, which help to conserve forest wealth and generally improve the face of the countryside. Meghalaya is especially suitable for the development of animal husbandry, poultry farming, horticulture and fishing.

‘A certain amount of re-organization of settlements appears necessary for the introduction of modern methods of Agriculture. This would be particularly so if we have to mechanize our farming. In the Garo Hills, in particular there is an urgent need to re-group villages in order to introduce viable farming units, and for provision of Water Supply, Public Health, Education and other facilities. This programme for re-grouping will have to be undertaken after carefully considering the feasibilities and the interests of the local people concerned.

‘Meghalaya has abundant forest and mineral resources. This wealth should be tapped and industries based on forest and mineral raw materials should be set up. A diversified economy and optimum use of resources will help to raise the standard of living of the people. My Government will work for the creation of the necessary infra-structure so that industries are attracted to Meghalaya. To enable a proper plan of utilization to be drawn up, it will be necessary to undertake a comprehensive survey of the whole State with a view to locating deposits of minerals and the extent thereof. A Directorate of Mining and Geology will have to be organized to undertake this work, if necessary in collaboration with the Geological Survey of India. We have extensive sal forests and vast tracts of bamboo and pine on the higher altitudes. The suitability of the area for raising plantations of fast-growing pulp wood species indicates potential for starting a paper mill in Garo Hills and newsprint mill in Khasi Hills.

‘The possibility of forest development and modern forestry practices in Meghalaya are enormous; with proper management there is no reason why we should not be able to attain standard of growth and judicious exploitation comparable with some of the most advanced countries in Europe.’

The idea behind this long quote is to demonstrate how the project of modernization was being shaped that would enable penetration of pan Indian institutions. Governor’s speech was in fact an assertion that Meghalaya was to follow a conventional development trajectory based on nationalization of community space.

According to this vision, the local people were backward and in need of general developmental integration into modern mainstream of development. Thus first and foremost the people had to adopt settled agriculture, as they were responsible for destruction of their resources through shifting cultivation. This meant not only reordering of resources but also of the people – regrouping the villages to introduce viable farming units.

It is obvious from the speech that the governor wanted the power of the state to arrange the population, territories and resources in ways that aligned it to the all-India discourse on development and to enhance state’s capacity of

surveillance and control. Perhaps in such a paradigm of development there was no place for popular opinion, specifics of place and people, customs and indigenous knowledge and its first casualty was community control over forest.

In the context of working and failure of modernization projects of the present day state, Scott, J.C, (1998) has shown that these projects failed as they did not take into account local customs and practical knowledge and thus became an exercise in state 'simplification and standardization'. The governor's vision of development looked very similar.

This shift was not sudden but has been in the making all these years. In fact a development narrative about the northeast had already emerged immediately after independence, which emphasized its exclusiveness, isolation and inaccessibility. The northeast was described as a land locked state along with Bhutan and Nepal¹³ and the solution was found in the conventional development trajectory: planning and allocating funds to departments such as the Public Works department and Industries, and an inflow of capital from the entrepreneurs of industrialized regions. There exists in Meghalaya a strong resource base for creating tribal-based small scale industries such as herbal products, high value bamboo products and sericulture (raising silkworms) which could reach external markets even with limited transportation infrastructure, but little attention was paid to this in planning or resource allocation.

While a detailed analysis of the planning documents and policies is not possible here, what emerges clearly is a vision that saw large-scale industrialization and investment as the solution to backwardness, a hangover of development which persists even today. Thus a policy document of 2006 boasts that there are more than 5,000 registered industrial units in Meghalaya and it has an Export Promotion Industrial Park, a 'sine qua non' of a modern state

Another prerequisite to development, the rapid building of roads in order to connect to national and international markets, carries enormous risk. If industry is slow to take off because of lack of a local market, roads could become excellent corridors to siphon off the existing natural resources of the region: its forests and minerals. With the opening of the Indian economy, the Meghalaya government is projecting itself as investor friendly, and a state where the abundant natural resources are the major selling point. As stated in an investment prospect by the Department of Industries, Meghalaya 'with its rich and vast minerals, water and forest resources, offers tremendous opportunities for investment' (Karlsson, 2003:19-20). Development in this vision is to be achieved through further extraction of the 'untapped resources' including the forest.

Lastly, given that governor's idea of forest management aimed to achieve a level 'comparable with some of the most advanced countries of Europe', sub-

¹³.A scenario similar to Bhutan, mentioned by Pain, A. in his article 'Rereading "mountainous", "isolated" "inaccessible" and "small": the case of Bhutan', in *European Journal of Development Research*, 1996(1), pp63-76

sistence based community management was at the most naïve or even wishful thinking.

Contradictions of modernity in the tribal self management 'zone' of forest

Nongbri (2001) has shown that the indigenous community forest was an important source of livelihood providing them food, fodder, fuel but also timber, fruit and medicine in Meghalaya. For many hundreds of years, people had subsisted on forest produce. With knowledge gained through their interactions with nature, they had learnt how to adapt new methods of production. Shifting cultivation and horticulture are two examples of such adaptation where in tribal use the basic skills of agriculture to grow food crops and fruit plants on the forest lands.

While the poor subsisted on shifting cultivation and the bounties of forest, the landed farmers engaged in sedentary agriculture, enhancing their income by selling trees. Nongbri also opines that many farmers sold their trees not only to buy seeds, fertilisers or try new crops but also to invest in construction of house, enhancing their living standard.

Nongbri then goes on to show that while rural farmers had earlier successfully integrated timber into their agricultural economy, deployment of its forest for the pan-Indian industrial development opened the door to non-tribal businessmen who have leased forest on contract basis from private landowners and sold or transported the timber outside the state. Catering to a larger market most of the contractors are indulging in clear felling of the forest under their lease. This has marked a turning point in the tribal economy, where a class of local contractors, besides felling trees on their own land, are purchasing trees from poor farmers. Those who are rich have also set up their own sawmills, thus bringing the industry into the village with assistance from state-owned Meghalaya Industrial Development Corporation.

Thus the imperatives for development have not only sanctioned the indiscriminate destruction of forests but have also converted them in an important source of raw material for the national industry.

[T]here are hundreds or perhaps thousands of trucks that daily carry the natural resources of the Meghalay's hills down to the plains in Assam and further to the Indian mainland, or are going directly to Bangladesh'. The outflow of timber has been reduced due to a recent ban on logging by the country's apex court, and the trucks are now mainly loaded with coal, limestone, granite, clay and even ordinary soil. To this we can add hydroelectric energy and various forest products that are being transported out of the state.¹⁴ The environmental costs of following a de-

¹⁴ The same development rhetoric can be identified for the other north-eastern states. Hydro-power is one of the major fields through which the un-exploited potential of the region is expected to bring about development. As much as 35,000 megawatt is esti-

velopment trajectory based on resource extraction are obviously phenomenal, not least in terms of deforestation. Karlsson (2003)

This is a common consequence of, for example, mining and the construction of dams. It will further damage subsistence-based livelihoods, and such a strategy implies further a strengthening of the existing structural relations of external dominance, popularly perceived as exploitative and the very cause of the region's under-development (ibid, 2003).

The timber trade, causing most of the destruction of the forest in the region, is a capitalistic business undertaken where communities have little or no say. The main players running the show, are 'mill owners, forest contractors, forest and other government officials and the politicians in the North Eastern Region' (ibid, 2003).

This nexus consists of people from the elite group of the hill society and well-placed 'non-tribal exploiters from outside', as Nongbri puts it (2003:158). There are huge sums of money involved and there is always a traditional chief, clan elder, headman or landowner who is willing to part with trees to make easy money. This is enabled by a historical process of increasing privatisation at the expense of the earlier communal institutions of land management related to swidden or *jhum* cultivation. Put differently one could say that we have a bifurcated set-up of, on the one hand, eroding communal institutions relating to land and resource management and, on the other, a very significant development of individual ownership and exploitation of forest and other natural resources. Deforestation has thus taken place in a situation of multiple and changing property regimes where communities play a significantly diminishing role as resource managers (Karlsson, 2003).

District Councils: Indigenous institutions or entry points for nationalisation of community space?

The indigenous, decentralized institutions that are created by the state may become important device of boundary making or entry points for the modernist discourses. Tania Murray Li's (2001:161-162) has shown that effects of decentralization measures proposed by community advocates to limit state actually have the capacity to further state territorialization project.

As and when it happens, its immediate victim is likely to be the projects on community self-management. The point made by Li in the context of Indonesia approximates to the District Councils of Meghalaya.

The analysis of laws made by the District Council for the management of forests under its control to a large extent explains the destruction of forests. For instance, practically all the laws enacted by the District Council view forests as means for earning revenue. Similarly in most of the forest laws enacted by the three District Councils in Meghalaya there is complete absence of any

mated to be the total potential of Northeast India, which is said to be about 40 percent of the potential of the entire country, says Karlsson.

statement regarding the 'social objectives' which such legislation aims to achieve. On the contrary, they seem to have internalized the modernist discourse that equates progress with sedentary agriculture and seeks to eliminate the 'backward' practice of shifting cultivation. Thus the Council spends considerable time, effort and money in controlling or regulating shifting cultivation under the 'scientific' guidance of the two government departments (Soil Conservation and Forestry). While the 'merits' or 'demerits' of shifting cultivation cannot be discussed here due to limited scope of this paper, the uncritical acceptance of its premise that such cultivation degrades land, a discourse that has its origin in colonial rule, by an indigenous institution shows the power of knowledge it is subjected to, through the modernist discourses.

Also, even though the District Council had a more or less supreme authority to make laws on the subjects allotted to it, after the formation of the state of Meghalaya the power of District Council has been severely curtailed as the State Legislature in Meghalaya can make laws, if it so desires, on subjects allotted to the District Council, and if there is any conflict between the state law and the District Council law, the state law will prevail. Thus in practice the District Councils have not only become entry points but also a fertile ground for the modernist discourses. This trend has been further strengthened because it lacks finances and is heavily dependent on budgetary support from the State.

Wildlife management: responsibility without power

Community space has been further constrained by enactment of the Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972, which virtually extinguishes all legal rights in the national parks while severely restricting them in sanctuaries. The Forest Conservation Act of 1980, which made central permission mandatory for converting even small parcels of forestland to non-forest use irrespective of the diversity of context, affected entire country. Despite the constitution empowering the President and state governors to bar the application of such laws to tribal majority Schedule Six areas, these areas were not spared and the District Councils have not been given the power to make laws with regard to the protection of wildlife for some inexplicable reason. They cannot set up any protected areas such as National Parks and Sanctuaries for the protection of wildlife. But ironically the District Councils are often blamed for decimation of the wildlife.

CONCLUSION

Crisis narratives and search for technical solution

The 'failed' community self-management in Meghalaya has given birth to a crisis narrative that often blames the indigenous people and their institutions.

This in fact is a major reason why there is a demand by environmental and other groups that the District Council forests be handed over to the Forest Department which 'alone has the expertise and administrative organization to manage these forests'. Among forest officers, the most common claim is that

deforestation is largely a problem in the privately or community owned forests and that most of the still dense forest would be those under their management.

It is not surprising therefore that the Forest Department, backed by its power of 'scientific forestry' has started looking for means to create room for itself in community space. Thus in 2003 it introduced Joint Forest Management in Meghalaya, with the 'aim to halt the degradation of the forest and improve these be protecting forest' (Government of Meghalaya, JFM circular, 2003). But the claim that they can protect the forest best does not explain degradation of reserved forest under their control due to unregulated logging. One of the largest scams in Meghalaya relates in fact to the illegal felling of trees in two reserved forests in southern Garo Hills in the 1990s. An independent commission set to investigate the matter found that about 45 000 trees had been illegally cut inside the reserves (Dutta 1997:107-108, cited in Karlsson, 2003). The Commission further points to a 'systemic collapse' of the forest administration as the main factor behind the illegal felling and claims that responsibility has to be shared by all officers in the 'entire chain of command' (ibid: 59-60). Dutta was right in fixing the responsibility for deforestation on corrupt forest officials, but the buck does not stop there, as establishing community control goes beyond solutions based on administrative rationalism.

Lastly, it may appear from all of this that the state development discourse is always opposed to the discourses claiming autonomy or more community control over the natural resources. However, in practice engagement between the state and the people has often been framed within, rather than outside or in opposition to, the state discourse on development, though this does not mean that there is consensus on whom or what needs to be developed. This is a complex process of appropriation, resistance, co-option and co-operation, which is not linear. In such a process, indigenous identity is not only invoked but also revoked by the tribal people themselves, depending on the opportunities and circumstances.

But further discussion on it is something, which is not in the realm of this paper.

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8 LINKING POLITICAL THEORY TO RECENT EU AND US POLICIES ON BIOFUELS: REALISM AND LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

INTRODUCTION

In the last few years there has been a renewed interest to biofuels as an alternative to fossil fuels for transportation. Global changes have been the main driver behind the interest. Both the EU and the US are facing two major fuel related global threats: the decrease in the supply security of fossil fuel and the effect of fossil fuels on global warming causing climate change. Both the EU and the US have made an economically inefficient choice, meaning they are using significant government resources, with the introduction of biofuels in their economies (Slingerland 2005). But the EU mainly explains this choice as fighting climate change, and the US mainly focuses on fuel supply security as the main argument that legitimizes the step to biofuels. Can theories of global governance explain the different priorities and the outcomes?

This essay will apply the liberal institutionalist and the realist argument to understand the introduction of biofuels to see which theory will best describe the actions and reasons behind the decisions of the EU and the US. This essay will start with an introduction to the two theories of global governance, realism and liberal institutionalism. It will proceed with the background of the introduction of biofuels in the EU and the US to see what the main differences in the approach are. The theories and the biofuels actions will be matched in an analytical model. The conclusion will show how the two theories of global governance describe the actions of the US and the EU. Because reality as well as theories consist of core reasoning with many deviations, applying theory to practice can be difficult. In this essay in order to get sound results only the core reasoning of the theories is applied to an archetypal description of the US and EU behavior.

INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL THEORIES

Realism

Realism is one of the dominant theories of international relations. Most other theories are critiques to realism and can only be understood as deviations to realist fundamentals. Realism sees sovereign states as the most important actors in international affairs in contrast to other theories that see a prominent role for international institutions, the private sector or civil society organizations. Realists see the international arena as a 'state of war' or anarchy in which self-interested

states use the power they get from military, economic, production and technology capabilities (Strange 1994) to either do what they want (freedom of action) or get others to do what they want (power over). Historically the role of military force was the most important but recently more dimensions of power are added to the realist argument. States are actors that put most emphasis on relative gains vis-à-vis other states in their decisions in international affairs. Security is the most valuable good for the rational acting states and is the only good reason to give up relative gain to other states. Realists see changes in the balance of power between states as the main cause of war. (Gilpin 2001) On economic issues realists or statisticians see an international instead of a global economy. This means that nations are the principal entities of the international economy (and not transnational corporations). They see reactions to international events as a billiard ball reaction bouncing against the state that translates the event to the national economy. This is in contrast to many neo-liberal scholars who see transnational corporations and the markets as the main international actors and see most international economic events having impact directly on the national economies (Hirst and Thompson 1999).

Liberal institutionalism

Liberal institutionalism is the most influential liberal internationalist theory explaining why and how governance beyond the state is such a dominant feature of the current global landscape. Coming from the liberal school liberal institutionalists believe that on one hand rational choice is leading the behavior of states and other actors when they cooperate. (McGrew 2002) They use the prisoners dilemma to show that states do not only react to relative advantages like the realists would argue, but are also comfortable with absolute gains. This means that they are also fine ensuring they improve their own position even if others gain more. On the other hand there is a more constructivist angle that shows how convergence on knowledge, norms and beliefs are leading for the convergence on governance issues. Adhering to the widely accepted and appreciated norms will make those actors more attractive and gives them 'soft power'. Furthermore they see not only the state as an actor in international affairs. NGO's Multinational corporations together with states form networks of agents that form institutions. International institutions are created to achieve purpose for the creating actors (Keohane & Nye 2000).

The core reasoning used for the analytical framework

To see if realism of liberal institutionalism apply to the behavior of the US and the EU we will ask the following question about the biofuel policies of US and the EU:

Does the switch to biofuels increase or decrease state sovereignty?

Does the switch to biofuels increase or decrease international economic competitiveness?

Does the switch to biofuels increase or decrease homeland security?

Does the switch to biofuels give relative or absolute gains?

To what extent are norms convergence on knowledge of importance for the actions?

THE BACKGROUND OF THE BIOFUEL INTEREST

There are two types of biofuels, alcohol or ethanol produced out of grain or sugar cane and biodiesel produced out of bio oils like rapeseed and palm oil. Ethanol is a good replacement of gasoline and biodiesel is a good replacement for diesel. The environmental effect of these fuels is the net lowering of carbon dioxide emission. The plants adsorb carbon dioxide out of the air when they grow and that same carbon is emitted again when it is burned in a car engine. The supply security effect is reached by having these fuels produced by home-land farmers or by diversifying the countries that supply fuels from the existing crude oil suppliers.

The US uses ethanol to reduce international oil supply vulnerability

In the US gasoline has a market share of about 70% (RFA 2006). This gives a bigger focus on ethanol in the US. The most important federal policy for the uptake in demand to biofuels is the renewable fuel standard in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. It states that in 2010 25,8 billion liters of biofuels have to be used to fuel vehicles. On state level there are more and less ambitious plans for biofuels. The corn-belt states are the most progressive in pushing for biofuels.

The two main reason for the US to start with the production of biofuels is the increasing disturbances in refining and crude oil supply and the strong agricultural lobby. The stance of the US on biofuels is best reflected in the state of the union that Bush gave on 31st of January in 2006.

'Keeping America competitive requires affordable energy. And here we have a serious problem: America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world. The best way to break this addiction is through technology. Since 2001, we have spent nearly \$10 billion to develop cleaner, cheaper, and more reliable alternative energy sources -- and we are on the threshold of incredible advances...

.... We must also change how we power our automobiles. We will increase our research in better batteries for hybrid and electric cars, and in pollution-free cars that run on hydrogen. We'll also fund additional research in cutting-edge methods of producing ethanol, not just from corn, but from wood chips and stalks, or switch grass. Our goal is to make this new kind of ethanol practical and competitive within six years.

Breakthroughs on this and other new technologies will help us reach another great goal: to replace more than 75 percent of our oil imports from the Middle East by 2025. By applying the talent and technology of America, this country can dramatically improve our environment, move beyond a petroleum-based econ-

omy, and make our dependence on Middle Eastern oil a thing of the past.' (Bush 2006)

The depletion of US oil fields in combination with the increase in fuel use has increased the level of import of oil to above 50% (EIA 2006). This has made the US vulnerable to oil imports. The resurgence of the Islam in most Middle East countries and the ongoing unrest in Iraq has led too less favorable regimes in the oil producing countries. The troubles in Nigeria and Venezuela show how national troubles cause vulnerabilities in international oil supplies. This combined with the appearance of China and India as big new oil demanders result in a modified oil market. Many oil-producing countries have gained more control over oil resources and are less dependent on the US for oil revenues (Slingerland 2005).

Historically the agriculture lobby has been very strong in the US. Biofuels are a major new product for corn (ethanol) and soy (biodiesel) producers in the US. By lobbying for subsidies and high tariffs on imports they create opportunities for expansion. The combination of the capabilities and the capacity of the US agriculture sector make is a formidable combination to reduce oil import vulnerability and solve the problem of agriculture overproduction.

This has resulted in a major governmental and private technology push by giving subsidies and investments to ethanol production research and the federal mandate for biofuel usage. Until now it looks like the US, in line with their independence strategy, will be growing all their biofuels themselves for the near future.

On a higher abstraction level the cause for the political drive for biofuels in the US can be explained along two lines. The first is the line of the difference between markets for basic needs (water, food, energy) and markets for luxury goods (computers, cars, clothing). Markets for basic needs are always tuned towards supply security. Non-regulated markets do not deliver the wished level of supply security because of volatile market behavior. Markets for basic needs will for that reason be highly regulated and political. Fuel has become a basic need in the US. This will bring economically non-viable regulation to markets if they fail to deliver.

The second line of reasoning is the one of international political power. We are living in a 50-year period of more or less US hegemonic power. There is a trend of revived national interest of using the oil supplies to gain international political power. The worst recent example is the non-intervention of the UN in the Sudan massacre because China vetoed the intervention. Sudan is a major oil supplier to China. This in combination with the vulnerability to one of the US' mayor imports means they have to make concessions so they loose power. This will be resisted in economical non-viable ways.

To match the US reasoning behind their biofuels initiative to the theories the US will be framed as switching to biofuels for the sake of oil supply security and not caring about the environment will be framed as not signing the Kyoto Protocol. Reality is a bit more nuanced but by not signing the Kyoto protocol

the US gives a clear sign that for their decision to switch to introduce biofuels the environment is not high on the agenda.

The EU uses biofuels to reach Kyoto greenhouse emission targets

Europe's fuel consumption is the opposite of the US with a market share of 70% for diesel (IEA 2006). The focus in Europe is for that reason more on biodiesel. The start of the European policy on biofuels started in 2003 with the directive 2003/30/EC that formulated the plan to for biofuel use in the EU. This has resulted in the 2005 biomass action plan in which gives the concrete ways to achieve the goal of 5.75% biofuel usage (in energy terms means 8% in volume terms for ethanol and 5.75% for biodiesel). Biofuel blending, tax incentives and B100 and E85 initiatives are seen as the routes to the combined target.

The EU as one of the major forces behind the Kyoto protocol sees biofuels as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The standpoint of the EU is best reflected in the presentation the DGtren (highest EU official for transport and energy) gave on a seminar in Brussels on June 2006. The three main points in order of relevance (Hodson 2006):

Although biofuels are not the cheapest way to reach the Kyoto protocol targets the transport sector is the largest carbon dioxide producing sector and is the only sector in the EU that did not stabilize its carbon emission in the last 10 years. Next to that biofuels are one of the few large-scale solutions to reduction of carbon emissions.

Insecurity of energy supply is worst for oil compared to coal and natural gas. The EU produces only 7% of its own oil consumption and biofuels are a possibility to diversify suppliers and grow some at home.

Biofuels offer a new outlet for agriculture.

By signing this protocol the EU committed it self to 8% decrease in emissions from the base year 1990. To reach that goal in the period of 2008-2012 serious action has to be taken. Next to biofuels renewable energy and biomass for electricity generation have the same kind of mandates.

Europe's strategy is to grow 50% of the biofuels in Europe and to import 50% of biofuels preferably from developing countries (EU commission 2005). This will lead to a higher worldwide usage of biofuels because the growing countries will be adopting biofuels themselves too and it will broaden the base of energy sources. This policy will be enforced via subsidies on ethanol and technical standards for biodiesel. For ethanol this will lead to happy sugar beet farmers that lost their sugar subsidies recently and for biodiesel it will lead to a major push for rural Middle and Eastern Europe.

On a higher abstraction level the major political drive can be found in a global governance issue. The environment is clearly a global public good. This good has to be maintained and managed. The Kyoto protocol is one of most important declarations to manage and maintain the global environment. Sup-

porting this and getting countries onboard to achieve the global movement towards a less carbon intensive future may cost a dime. The extra cost for biofuels is only a small part of the extra cost the whole Kyoto commitment for Europe. The complete Kyoto protocol commitment cost can probably be neglected compared to the costs of the future effects of the greenhouse effect. These long-term externalities are badly priced by the market and for that reason have to be priced by regulation.

To match the EU reasoning behind their biofuels initiative to the theories the EU will be framed as switching to biofuels for environmental reasons depicted by signing the Kyoto protocol and not caring about oil supply security. Reality is a bit more nuanced but this reasoning is historically correct because in contrast to the US the EU was already making biofuel policies before the oil supply issues were raised.

Core analyses: matching the drivers behind the biofuel policy to the theories of global governance

The goal of this essay is to find out which theoretical description suits the EU and US political behavior best in their decision to introduce biofuels. The questions raised in the introduction to the theories of global governance will be answered for the EU and US biofuel strategies

Does the switch to biofuels increase or decrease state sovereignty?

For the US increase in sovereignty is obvious the one of the main drivers. Explicitly stating that with the introduction of biofuels they try to turn the tide of increasing dependence on Middle East oil and calling their oil use an addiction are clear indicators for this conclusion. The decision to grow most of the biofuels in the US also clearly points in the direction of preference to be sovereign. One of the drivers for repudiating the Kyoto protocol was the reluctance to lose sovereignty to an international institution (Lisowski 2002).

The EU on the contrary loses sovereignty in their ratification of the Kyoto protocol. The international institution that is responsible for reaching the targets of the protocol has power over the EU via the legally binding targets. The minor role of oil supply security also indicates that the EU accepts that it lives in an interdependent world in which sovereignty is an unachievable or at least very expensive goal.

Does the switch to biofuels increase or decrease international economic competitiveness?

In his state of the union, President Bush starts with the argument 'Keeping America competitive requires affordable energy'. If biofuels really make the US economy more competitive can be doubted because imported biofuels are much cheaper than the homegrown varieties in the US (Walter et al. 2006). But at least the US bases its policy on a perception that the international economic competitiveness will increase.

The EU bases its environmental policies on the precautionary principle. This principle applies to scientific uncertainty and risk regulation. It permits the EU's regulatory authorities to take action to avoid, eliminate or reduce risk to the environment at a point in time when it is not completely clear what the consequences of that risk are. The US on the contrary takes a more market-based and cost benefit analyses approach to environmental regulation (Schreurs 2004). The clear divide along international competitiveness lines between the US and the EU becomes clear. The EU is less concerned with international competitiveness and more with environmental risk reduction and the US will only start to act if it is clear that no loss is created. In president Bush's explanation why the US will not ratify the Kyoto protocol he stated as one of the reasons that the protocol would impose unacceptable cost on the US economy while exempting developing countries from taking action (Schreurs 2004). This statement gives a good indication that international competition was a driver for the US not to sign the protocol.

Does the switch to biofuels increase or decrease the homeland security?

In its war against terror the Middle East states are the main threat. Being dependent on their oil causes homeland insecurity because the US' hands are tight in acting against these breeding spots of terror. So lower dependence on Middle East oil leads in US perception to higher homeland security. The EU perception towards the Middle Eastern states hasn't changed as profoundly as in the US. This makes homeland security less of an issue in the decision for biofuels in the EU

For the EU and the US signing, or not signing, the Kyoto protocol doesn't have any implications for homeland security.

Does the switch to biofuels give relative or absolute gains?

The costs of biofuels are higher than fossil fuels (Slingerland 2005). So the US loses money by switching to biofuels. This means they are having an absolute loss now over not switching to biofuels. By producing these biofuels in the US they have an even bigger money loss because homegrown biofuels are more expensive than imported biofuels (Walter 2006). So the reasoning of the US cannot be based on absolute gain it has to be on relative gain. The reasoning of the US is more or less as follows, by lowering the dependence on Middle Eastern oil the power the oil states lose over the US is bigger than the power they lose by having more expensive energy.

When the decision was made not to ratify the Kyoto protocol the US expected that Kyoto was dead (Schreurs 2004). This means that instead of entering an agreement in which they had to pay relatively more than others, they tried to blow up the whole agreement. Meaning that the absolute gain they could get out of the Kyoto protocol, a cleaner environment, having influence on the environmental agenda and enforcing many of their own ideas that were

adapted in the protocol would be lost. Here again the US decides on relative gains instead of absolute gains.

For the EU ratifying the Kyoto protocol has everything to do with solving the prisoners' dilemma. Either every body takes some costs for a better environment or some take the full cost of the climate change that results from the greenhouse effect and others free ride because the impact is less in certain regions. It can be clearly stated that this is absolute gain cooperation. The fact that the EU doesn't put oil supply security not as high on the agenda is an example that the EU is not willing to take absolute loss to gain relatively.

To what extent are norms and convergence on knowledge of importance for the actions?

For the oil supply security driver there is not yet a convergence on the matter when oil will be depleted. Peak oil theories saying oil will run out from now on still compete with the oil industry that states that there are still enough reserves and enough new oil is still being found. The concerns in the US are more along the fear if other nations are willing to sell than if other nations will have enough oil to sell. From this we draw that the importance of norms or convergence on knowledge is not dominant for the oil supply security argument.

For the environmental driver behind the introduction of biofuel there has clearly been a convergence on the knowledge about the consequences of increased carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere. Further more environmental norms of good behavior around energy efficiency and fuel efficiency of cars have gained a broad acceptance. The convergence of knowledge of the greenhouse effect has been a dominant aspect of getting the Kyoto protocol getting ratified.

CONCLUSIONS

As a conclusion the results of the discussion above are tabulated to see to what extent the US' policies and the EUs policies are compatible with one of the theories of global governance.

Having plotted the US and the EU in a more archetypal way than they are in reality makes the outcomes of this analysis rather straightforward. The US complies with all the realist arguments of global governance in their decisions and does not comply with the Liberal institutionalist argumentation. On the contrary the EU does not comply or is agnostic about the views of the realist theory and does comply with the liberal institutionalist theory. These results clearly show the value of these two theoretical perspectives. It also shows that in political science it is not a matter of one theory is correct and the other one is false but there are different situations, countries and global governance situations that can be explained by different theories.

	US		EU	
Drivers of biofuel introduction and contrary decision	Oil supply security	Not Kyoto	Kyoto	Not oil supply security
Realist questions				
Does the switch to biofuels increase or decrease state sovereignty?	Increase	Increase	Decrease	Decrease
Does the switch to biofuels increase or decrease international economic competitiveness?	Increase	Increase	Decrease	No issue
Does the switch to biofuels increase or decrease the homeland security?	Increase	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral
Liberal institutionalist questions				
Does the switch to biofuels give relative or absolute gains?	Relative	Relative	Absolute	Absolute
To what extent are norms convergence on knowledge of importance for the actions?	Not important	No issue	Very important	Not important

Reality unfortunately is not as clear-cut as the archetypal reality as this essay has posed it. Although to understand the two main geopolitical drivers behind the introduction of biofuels by the US and the EU this method has given a very solid analytical framework. The growing importance of oil supply security in the EU has to be understood as a shift to a more realist way of conducting global governance and if the US reconsiders to enter the Kyoto protocol we might conclude that a more liberal internationalist stance on global governance is gaining ground in the US.

For understanding the drivers behind the introduction of biofuels this analysis is very useful. The expectation of the future uptake in biofuel usage has now been linked to the main two drivers that are solidly tied to a broader theoretical perspective. This theoretical perspective has a predictive value and links the decisions of the actors to the underlying values they adhere to.

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9 PUBLIC COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS FOR WASTE COLLECTION IN THREE INDIAN CITIES

INTRODUCTION

In 1995, almost half of the world's population lived in cities. Increasing population pressure and rapid urbanization confront most metropolitan cities in developing countries and make them extremely difficult to manage.

In India, some 300 million people live currently in cities (van Dijk, 2001:39) and even if this constitutes only thirty percent of the Indian population, the burden on city management is considerable. Overwhelmed municipalities cannot address urban services adequately.

The solid waste management (SWM) sector is an important specialised sector for keeping cities healthy and liveable. Moreover, the impacts of environmental degradation on the lives of the most vulnerable urban groups, as well as the impact on the resources available for future generations are both emphasized by the sustainable development and brown agenda approaches. A report by the World Bank estimates that solid wastes in urban areas of East Asia alone will increase from 760,000 tonnes/day to 1.8 m tonnes/day within 25 years, while waste management costs will almost double from US\$ 25 billion to US\$ 47 billion by 2025 (Urban Age, 1999). SWM will hence consume a considerable proportion of city budgets (Ahmed & Ali, 2004:474).

Considered as a problem of urban planning and a public health issue, SWM in Indian cities falls under the responsibility of municipal authorities, the main actors for its provision. Traditionally the responsibilities of public health departments, separate waste management departments are being established in all mega cities (Ali, 1999:208). However, only selected parts of the cities benefit from waste collection services provided by the municipality. The situation in the rest of the areas ranges from private provision of SWM services paid for by relatively wealthy residents, to some recycling done by informal waste pickers and itinerant waste buyers while major amounts of waste remain in the streets and water drains. Improper handling of waste can pose substantial threats of epidemics, increased diseases, and environmental degradation. This highly unsatisfactory situation raises questions on new strategies to address SWM provision more effectively.

Against the general decline in the provision of public services (Batley, 2004; Beall, 1997; Karanja, 2004) the debate increasingly considers realignment between government, the private sector, and civil society (Baud & Post, 2001:131; van Dijk, 2001:47). Influenced by the trend of new management, Ahmed and

Ali assert, 'alternatives to the present mode of delivering service by the public and private sector working in isolation may become imperative to maintain a minimum quality of service' (2004:474). In order to achieve 'best value', municipalities have to analyse all available choices for service delivery (Nemec et al., 2005). Modalities of synergetic operations in an integrated approach to urban services are increasingly proposed as an answer to the waste problem (Ahmed & Ali, 2004; Ali et al., 1999; Baud & Post, 2001; Rakodi, 1999). Arguments for this include exploiting comparative advantages of the different actors, mobilising community-wide resources to meet waste management service needs and creating community ownership of proposed solutions. In India to date private sector involvement in SWM is very limited and is concentrated at the secondary collection level. Actually, 'municipal bodies still carry out all solid waste management tasks in 98% of cities in India' (Bhatia & Gurnani, 1996 cited in Ali, 1999:505).

This paper rests on the proposition that participation of the communities in an integrated approach to SWM has the potential to convey an effective service provision through added resources, the combination of various skills of the partners and an enhanced social responsibility. Moreover, involving the communities might have additional benefits regarding the sustainability of the service provision, employment creation for poor people and a change in the attitude of households towards their consumption and habits to deal with their waste. However, before claiming that the appropriate solution has been identified, participation modalities have to be tested against concerns of transaction costs, sustainability and potential impacts on the most vulnerable groups of population.

The following illustration of participatory modalities for SWM provision in different Indian cities will give an insight in the potential benefits, barriers and difficulties in establishing them. PCP modalities will be assessed in three Indian mega-cities: Mumbai, Hyderabad and Chennai. The cases concern the first stage in the SWM system, which is primary waste collection and street cleaning services. Stage two is secondary waste collection and transportation, and stage three, waste treatment and disposal, are still provided by the municipal corporations. This raises issues of coordination between the various actors acting at those three levels.

The rationale behind such partnerships will be explained with an emphasis on capacity and regulatory needs. Recurrent hindering factors are also identified. Then, the cases will be presented and subsequently assessed along the criteria of effectiveness, sustainability, employment creation and contribution to attitudinal change. Concluding remarks will summarise major findings revealed by the assessment.

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN BASIC SERVICE DELIVERY

Participation of poor communities has been advocated by bilateral and multilateral development organizations and has gradually entered into the rhetoric of

developing countries' policies. Its promotion is advocated based on values of democratization and empowerment, where the targeted populations have a voice in what is being undertaken to improve their livelihoods. Participation is also favoured based on rational arguments of potential increased action. In 1983, Moser distinguished between participation visualized as a means, and participation as an end. As a means, participation mobilises people with the aim of achieving a desired outcome (for instance improved SWM). Its success is regarded in terms of outcome progress. Whereas, as an end, participation is measured as a transfer of power. The pursued outcome is increased participation in the development process itself. A dynamic process has the potential to convey participation-as-a-means to develop and bring the desired outcomes of participation-as-an-end (Plummer, 2000:3). This paper looks mainly at participation as a means to improve effectiveness of SWM provision and will not focus on its empowering effects. Participation in policy-making is less of a concern in SWM, because local needs are easily understood by local authorities; the most important problem will be a lack in the actual provision of the basic service. As Baud and Post indicate, 'in the domain of urban basic services the core objective of partnerships is to provide these in a more efficient and effective way' (2001:132).

As pointed out earlier, in the arena of urban management, it is necessary to develop more integrated solutions to service delivery. SWM services are under-supplied and a concerted action of public with community actors may bring about greater results. Public community partnership is a pertinent concept for SWM, as 'SWM is a basic service that must be provided to all citizens and profit cannot be the main motive. The government and public agencies cannot completely withdraw from this sector because this has a public health and public good dimension' (Ahmed & Ali, 2004:474). In addition, according to Baud and Post their contribution either directly or indirectly to a public goal, linking them to governance, distinguishes them from exclusively commercial relationships (2001:132). Involving community organizations is believed to bring benefits in terms of employment access to vulnerable groups and influence citizens' behaviour in a way that a partnership with the conventional private sector would not achieve.

Comparative advantages and incentives

The debate on partnerships stresses the fact that cooperation among organisations can exploit the comparative advantage of each partner (Ahmed and Ali, 2004). Under favourable circumstances and provided that objectives match, it is advantageous to have both the public and the communities play active roles, thus each capitalises on the strengths of the other.

Hence, public authorities are generally recognised for, or at least held responsible for, social responsibility. They strive to guarantee access and ensure affordability of basic services. Other comparative advantages of the public sphere are its role in the provision of a regulatory framework that ensures

minimum standards of quality and prevents fraud. Environmental awareness and broader vision for planning can be added to the list.

The community in its organized form is represented by community-based organizations (CBOs) formed by community members intending to use collective action as a tool to achieve local needs through direct intervention or through demand articulation towards government officials. CBOs considered for partnership are motivated by the desire to improve the environment of the community. In many cases this involves cleaning up the neighbourhood. Comparative advantages of CBOs include their access, recognition and influence in the community, which potentially facilitate tasks of monitoring and user-charge collection. But, most importantly, their main contribution is their ability to mobilize locals for action.

Voluntary work by community members to improve their situation means that public resources can be 'saved' on the tasks performed by the community. Hence a partnership would link local self-help projects with public resources. It would also make self-help actions enter in a more stable institutionalised framework and hence linked to the broader coordination of the waste sector in the city. Indeed, within the SWM chain, a partnership allows primary waste collection by the community and public involvement entering in matter for secondary transportation and disposal tasks. Hence local action is linked to the wider urban system of waste handling. If well coordinated, limited public resources can in that way result in broader city coverage for SWM. The question of a proper logistical organization of the SWM chain is crucial to determine if the waste flows through the steps of collection, primary and secondary transportation and disposal. If service provision actors do not collaborate in this regard, the chain of waste handling breaks and the garbage accumulates at a waste collection point without reaching the end-stage of the process. The pollution problem is then simply displaced without being solved.

However, partnerships are not easy to sustain. A number of necessary conditions must be met in order to extract optimal benefits from this arrangement. There are two crucial elements in such a partnership. Firstly, actors need to respect and recognise each other as a capable and proper partners to perform their roles in an agreed division of tasks. Without trust and voluntary engagement into collaboration, the situation can result in wasted resources and worse service provision. Secondly, each actor needs strong incentives to contribute and to cooperate in the partnership so that there is mutual commitment to agreed objectives. In that regard, community members are assumed to be interested in seeing their streets free of waste and their garbage collected. According to Ahmed and Ali (2004) this has been seen in a number of situations, and even in poor areas, provided that the service is performed, households are ready to contribute user charges. It may be, as Colon and Fawcett (2005:12) observed, that concerns for the environment tend to develop after basic needs are satisfied, but this surely varies with the context. In the cases analysed below, for

instance the aim of a clean environment has been able to mobilize a number of citizens.

As explained earlier, incentives for the municipality to provide SWM are based on issues of public health. Consequently, as both actors proved unable to carry out the huge task of SWM alone, they have reasons to coordinate activities with each other. The participatory arrangement should be considered dynamically as various factors like population growth, new regulations and acquisition of new skills will necessitate change in the arrangement.

Municipal and community capacity

For municipalities to change their practices, they need management skills and capacity to fulfil a new role of service partner and regulator. This is in many cases a major challenge, considering that municipalities are often hierarchically structured and tend to take hierarchical, prescriptive approaches. In addition, they have limited strengths in terms of finance and also in skilled staff and training opportunities.

Furthermore, municipalities have a big role to play by creating an enabling environment necessary to foster trust and good working relationships. 'Conducive policies and institutional frameworks are necessary' for the above change to take place (Ahmed & Ali, 2004:477). Considering this, it is necessary to 'unpack the rhetoric of participation into elements which are tangible and achievable within the scope of the municipality' (Plummer, 2000:3). Plummer (2000) explains some elements for municipal staff to consider. In her opinion, municipal officials need to build an understanding of the factors that affect participation in service delivery (geographical levels of service delivery, stages of service delivery, quality and technology involved). They also need to identify constraints and opportunities of existing municipal vehicles for participation and develop effective fieldwork interface. After that, they should identify appropriate organisational options for participatory service delivery and reform their procedures in order to fit to their new managerial role.

Similarly, in the side of CBOs institutional constraints play also an important role. Partnerships require 'strong local organizations within settlements that are not dominated by community leaders serving their own self-interest and that have a capacity for financial management' (Hardoy et al., 2001:250). The CBOs also need to ensure that all community interests are represented, this is far from straightforward. Indeed, poor settlements are heterogeneous and have a complex mix of different interests and often power struggles for 'community leadership'. 'Oppression, discrimination and years of politicians' broken promises have not been conducive to the development of representative community organizations' (Hardoy et al., 2001:257). Finally, for entering into a partnership with the local authorities, the CBO leaders need a minimum level of education in order to be able to deal with the regulatory framework set up around the partnership.

Regulatory framework

For durable and predictable participatory practices it is important to make sure that a proper institutional setting is available. A legal framework needs to be in place to regulate the relations and to reduce risks for actors investing resources. In addition, various facilitating measures are desirable in order to support the non-government sector in its contribution to socio-economic development. Here applies the concept of the government as enabler. This means that in order to facilitate the performance of various actors in private and public service delivery, the government sets flexible and supporting rules and procedures. According to Helmsing (2002:323), government enablement of communities may be defined as ‘government creating appropriate legal, administrative, financial and public-planning frameworks to facilitate neighbourhood communities to organise into CBOs, to manage community-level affairs, and to undertake community collective action’.

Central in regulatory reform are the objectives of improved accountability and transparency. ‘Traditional forms of accountability essentially take three forms: financial accountability, to ensure efficiency and probity, usually secured by a system of public audit; procedural accountability, so that bureaucratic actions operate in fair, transparent and equitable ways, usually secured by appropriate rules, including law; and substantive accountability, which ensures that actions are justifiable by reference to some criterion of public interest. This last type is usually secured through political mechanisms (Ogus, 2002 cited in Minogue, 2002:20). Minogue comments, however, that accountability is guaranteed less by formal institutions than by relations of trust. In the case of partnerships with very different actors such as CBOs both regulations and trust must underpin the relationship if it is to foster increased effectiveness and efficiency.

Meine Pieter van Dijk uses the examples of slum development processes in Mumbai and Bangalore to show that ‘poorly defined roles of the various actors and institutions within a highly political environment are a major component of failure’. Furthermore existing institutions might obstruct the process of newly created special authorities to deal with urban problems (2001:45). According to Baud and Post, there is in India ‘little development of regulatory frameworks and human capacities within local government bodies to facilitate partnerships in SWM and to adequately perform their remaining monitoring and control functions’ (2001:148). Ali explains this as resulting from rapidly changing conditions in terms of responsibilities allocated to municipal corporation, the latter not being able to adapt their regulatory framework to the new conditions (Ali et al., 1999:496).

Hindering factors

Partnerships also cannot succeed if no proper incentives are built into their design and if clear task attributions, communication channels, transparency and monitoring procedures are missing. Ahmed and Ali comment that ‘poorly de-

signed attempts for partnership may actually worsen the situation by opening new avenues of inefficiency and corruption, hitting hard the livelihoods of the most vulnerable people' (2004:467). The initial stages of designing and setting up a partnership are hence crucial and need to be carefully thought of in order to overcome practical difficulties.

Nevertheless, for all these conditions to be fulfilled the transaction costs of partnership appear to be relatively high. Moreover, a fragmented provision of service with a large number of different partners at neighbourhood level raises problems of coordination and coherence at the city level. Economies of scale concerns need to be taken into consideration. Hence, there is a danger that efficiency gains be overtaken by high transaction costs for partners' coordination.

Those who lose out of the new procedures for service provision pose another threat to successful partnerships. Basic service provision is often regarded as a favour that is granted in exchange of political support, a kind of incentive to remember when elections take place. The patronage basis of service provision is a major obstacle to management reform (Batley, 2004:47). Based on this fact, a reform which would affect such arrangements will very probably not be pursued by government officials. They are not motivated to cooperate in dismantling their own power.

CASES IN URBAN INDIA

Mumbai Slum Adoption Programme

Half of Mumbai's population lives in slum settlements; this means from six to eight million people. The illegal status of slum settlements means that they are not covered by the civic tax net. It is thus difficult for them to claim solid waste management services. SWM is, however, officially recognised as a public good falling under the responsibility of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM).

The extremely narrow by-lanes and streets of the slums exacerbate the access problem still further, posing a technical problem as vehicles cannot enter slum areas. Yet, SWM needs to be dealt with and so adapted means to enter the physical environment of the slums developed. In 1998, a cleanliness drive was undertaken in a slum (Prem Nagar) with the active participation of a local CBO (Suruchi Mahila Mandal). After this successful experiment the municipality of Mumbai came to the concept of the Slum Adoption Programme (SAP). In order 'to arrest the garbage at the generation stage' SAP was envisioned as a community-led program, in that primary collection tasks of SWM would be handled by CBOs without depending on the municipality. Initial support through certain financial incentives was planned to help CBOs organize slum population and motivate them to involve themselves in what had yet to be adopted as their slum.

Starting in 2000, subsidies have been granted for the purchase of material and the payment of the workers for a number of projects in various pockets of

Mumbai's slums. The CBOs were expected to be self-sustainable within three years, using monthly fees for the financing of the waste collection services.

According to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, SAP is a huge success. To date, approximately one million people are covered in 87 slum pockets. However, no systematic evaluation of the programme was undertaken before the extension to further slum areas in 2005.

Six locations sanctioned for SAP between 2001 and 2005 were examined by Desai and Nutan (2006) in terms of how the CBOs were selected and SAP was operationalized. For all of them, the CBO leader was the major motor for application to the Slum Adoption Program, backed by his strong ties to the ward officials and his prominent status in the community. All six CBO leaders were aware of other schemes organized by the municipality and had easy access to ward officers and information. CBO selection was not objective but reflected formal and informal links established between the local corporator, the CBO leader and ward officers (Assistant Head Supervisor, Junior Overseers). The role of the (elected) corporator was a crucial one as CBOs needed to be recommended by him to the corporation level official (Assistant Municipal Commissioner) responsible to take decisions. As the corporation official was overloaded with the task of deciding for the entire city, the support of the local corporator can be considered as equal to the decision making power. The Junior Overseers carried out the monitoring of the CBOs at the ward level.

The relations between CBO leaders and the local corporator have been identified as one of the most crucial linkages. Often the CBO leader belonged to the same political party as the corporator. In a relationship of mutual dependence, the SAP mandate was granted to CBO leaders affiliated to the same political party as the corporator and ensuring the political support of the community (Desai and Nutan, 2006:34). In one case this was very obvious considering that monthly taxes were waved by the corporator because of forthcoming elections.

The ability of the corporator to sanction SAP can be illustrated by the following example. In ward R-south Mr Wankhede, a fieldworker of the political party Congress-I, founded two CBOs (Krantiveer Mahila Mandal and Suraj Kiran Education Society). He submitted separate proposals for SAP and was granted the mandate for both his CBOs. Later he registered two more CBOs in the name of his wife and his brother, which he submitted and got the sanction for two more SAP in adjoining areas. Community members were not involved in the functioning of the CBOs and the concerns of local residents were not reflected by these CBOs. Regular complaints by residents were expressed and many households were reluctant to pay the monthly contribution. Despite the obvious bad performance of the CBOs and the rent-seeking behaviour by Mr Wankhede, the CBOs got suspended from the programme only at the moment that Mr Wankhede changed his political party affiliation to the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP). At that moment Mr Wankhede lost the support of the cor-

porator who blocked the mandate of the CBO to undertake the SAP in his ward. His CBO was blacklisted.

EXNORA's zero waste management model

EXNORA is a local non-governmental organization that has promoted among Indian citizens the LIASE (Local Initiative and Self Help) concept in areas of environmental management and pollution control, with specific reference to Municipal Solid Waste Management. A number of area-based organizations motivated to solve common issues and using the example of EXNORA have been set up in various middle class neighbourhoods in India; they are called Civic Exnoras (CEs). EXNORA acts as a facilitator and provides technical support to them. (Colon & Fawcett, 2005:3)

For SWM, EXNORA launched its own model for solid waste management in 1989. The zero waste management model, a neighbourhood waste collection service, was first implemented in Chennai, capital city of the State of Tamil Nadu. The model has spread rapidly across India and has about 5,000 branches across the country. The newspaper Indian Express considered with great optimism the spread of this environmentalist movement: 'Exnora must be the fastest growing service organisation in the world.'

The zero waste management model aims to clean a neighbourhood by organising door-to-door collection service of domestic waste and street sweeping. In addition, public education campaigns are an integral part of CEs' work. CEs coordinate with municipal authorities for secondary transport and disposal after segregation of the collected waste. Former informal workers or street children are employed to perform the work; they are in that way integrated into a more formal setting. In the individual neighbourhoods, the scheme is set up, run and financed by the CE through the collection of monthly fees and potential revenues from compost sales. Residents are expected to segregate their waste (organic/inorganic) and stop littering on the streets. An important feature of the model is that it has a strong awareness and civic responsibility aspect, which was new to India, waste matters being considered as a taboo and unscheduled, cast matters.

Civic Exnoras in Chennai

In terms of performance, Colon and Fawcett evaluated the work of CEs in Chennai and Hyderabad and showed good results in terms of improved cleanliness of the environment. After initiation of the program, about 25% of the waste was segregated at the source. Littering in the streets stopped and households generally contributed their monthly fee. Nevertheless, sustainability of the CE structure is of larger concern. Firstly, financial sustainability was not self-sustaining in Chennai, as insufficient segregation did not allow generating money from the sale of recyclables and compost. In addition, the scale of operation was found to be too small. Finally, the sustainability of the Civic

EXNORA itself has proved to be uncertain as mobilization for replacing committee members was weak and unsecured.

The PCP is an efficient addition to the primary collection of waste carried out by the Corporation. To collect half a ton daily, EXNORA charges households 120 Roupies per year. The costs the Corporation would incur for the same service have been calculated at 496 Rupees (Baud & Post, 2001:145). This is due to lower wages paid to waste collectors than those paid by the Corporation and to the 'free time' put in by EXNORA organizers. Hence the arrangement has helped to enhance productive and allocative efficiency. Monitoring was carried out by the local committees and according to Baud and Post the effectiveness of the service was related to the strength of the monitoring involved (Baud & Post, 2001:147).

Civic Exnoras in Hyderabad

Hyderabad presented features similar to Chennai. General public awareness for a clean environment and waste segregation was also enhanced in Hyderabad, with good visibility of the project in the media. Financial sustainability was possible in Hyderabad as the composting component (through vermiculture) of their program was generating the expected resources to complement user-charge revenues.

It is important to distinguish that CEs have emerged uniquely in middle-class to wealthy areas, leaving slum pockets outside the reach of neighbourhood mobilization. According to Colon and Fawcett, 'concern for the state of the environment tends to develop after the basic needs are satisfied' (2005:12). The poorer groups of society don't have the education, time and resources to engage in such civic mobilization. Furthermore, the informal status of their settlements makes complementary provision by municipalities problematic as property tax is not received from them. Consequently, the EXNORA model could not address the social barriers in society.

NGOs supporting street youngsters in Chennai

Other local level civil society groups (Asian Youth Centre, Nesaharam, Asha Nivas and a religious order) have been engaged in waste collection in Chennai with a different perspective than the CEs. These organizations had the ambition to provide training and legalized employment opportunities to waste-picking youngsters (Baud & Post, 2001:144). They engaged in a one-year contract with the city corporation under the Clean and Green Madras City Project to cover a number of neighbourhoods. Following their arrangement the Corporation provided clothing, equipment and for the salaries of about 250 youngsters who supplied house-to-house collection services. However, after one year the contract was not renewed as conflict occurred in the financial dealings. Suspicions of corruption suggest a higher transaction cost for this arrangement.

Employment opportunities offered to former waste pickers were however a positive outcome. Although the contracts were less favourable than those of

community sweepers, this aspect can still be considered positive as for the people involved the legalized labour conditions were better than their previous informal and insecure status. Moreover the NGOs offered technical training and saving schemes in order to insert the youngsters into employment markets. The NGOs also encouraged the youngsters to sort wastes and resell them in order to increase the incomes derived from their work. This resulted in an increase in reuse and recycling, hence reducing the amounts of waste to manage and contributing to ecological sustainability.

CASES ASSESSMENT

Effectiveness

As indicated earlier, the Civic EXNORAs in Chennai and Hyderabad were successful in organizing waste collection and street sweeping in areas where the municipality was providing much poorer services. The satisfaction with local cleanliness expressed by residents testifies this fact (Baud & Post, 2001:146). With the group of NGOs included in the Clean and Green Madras City Project of Chennai the process did not happen so smoothly, with relations between citizens and the youngsters employed being sometimes difficult as the citizen did not trust the youngsters for the collection of the monthly fees. During the year of implementation, garbage was however collected and youngsters trained. Finally, the SAP scheme in Mumbai was generally a successful mean to provide waste collection services in slum areas non-covered in the past, despite varying quality among the various slum pockets and CBOs involved.

In all partnership arrangements, community members, CBO leaders and NGO personnel on a voluntary basis undertook the organization and management of waste collection activities. These added resources constitute the main and major contribution to the arrangement and is probably the main reason why the municipality committed to provide financial support to an arrangement that with limited resource allocation could cover increased parts of the city with service provision.

Sustainability

Sustainability is however a major concern in Public Community Partnerships. In all cases presented the sustainability of the local organizations cannot be ensured as it remains unknown if voluntary work will continue to be provided by community members in the long term. In terms of financial sustainability the Civic Exnora in Hyderabad could ensure self-sustainability, the other cases continued to rely on municipal subsidies. This is not necessarily a problem as this arrangement is still more cost-effective than municipal provision. The corporation has the responsibility to keep access to the service affordable for the poor and this might imply a need to subsidize community provision.

Attitudinal change

Citizens in all the areas covered stopped littering streets, and in the case of the Civic Exnoras in Hyderabad and Chennai some separation between wet and dry waste was introduced to households, a behaviour contributing to improving environmental health. This is an important change considering that waste matters in India are traditionally dedicated to outcast people (Colon and Fawcett, 2005:11). Citizen awareness has thus been raised on the importance of the sector for public health and the environment. Moreover, by taking co-responsibility with the municipal corporation, people concerned showed a greater involvement in the community and the will to take some citizenship responsibility.

Employment

In terms of employment, the partnerships were sensitive to include informal workers, youth and generally marginalized groups of society in the provision of the service. This gave them an improved situation and increased job security relative to their previous status, although the wages and conditions were inferior to those of municipal sweepers. In other words, their interventions were sensitive to realities of informal work taking place and contributing to the survival of particular groups.

CONCLUSIONS

It is important to keep in mind that the cases presented above cannot be taken as representative of the strengths and weaknesses of PCP modalities. They rather illustrate a few cases in India. Contextual differences would be an interesting way to go forward in the exploration of the performance of the PCP option for waste collection services in the urban area.

The case of SAP in Mumbai illustrated the difficulty of breaking the pattern of patronage relations embedded in the interface between the public sector and its constituency. Inhabitants' previous experience with external agencies has often been anything but participatory. And even where municipal authorities are committed to more participatory engagements, they too have many internal constraints inhibiting their capacity to do so (Hardoy et al., 2001:257). This phenomenon underlines the importance of established regulation and coercive mechanisms to keep the partnerships on the right path.

Another consideration to add regarding the assessment of PCPs is that beyond effectiveness and cost-efficiency criteria, one must look at the broader impact of provision modalities on society. Baud and Post remind us to 'avoid the danger of sweeping away those activities whose contributions cannot, and should not, be judged in purely economic terms only' (Baud & Post, 2001:149). The PCPs, although being weak on aspects of sustainability and transaction costs, contributed to an important attitudinal change of the people as citizen contributing to the maintenance of their environment and as consumers re-

sponsible of their acts. Finally, they proved sensitive to the most vulnerable, trying to give them more secure employment and social integration.

Service provision by others should not result in municipalities abandoning its primary responsibility, there must be 'the political willingness to pay the price of adequate servicing' (Baud & Post, 2001:136).

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10 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH, POVERTY REDUCTION AND INEQUALITY

INTRODUCTION

The proposition that relates poverty reduction to economic growth is virtually always accepted. Unless economic growth is achieved in poor countries, poverty reduction is practically impossible (Rodrik 2005), and there is empirical evidence that allows other authors to maintain that ‘it is difficult to argue that poverty reduction can be achieved through redistributive policies in the absence of economic growth’ (Lopez, 2004). This was tempered by the development of the concept of *pro poor growth* in the 1990s, which basically introduced conditions that economic growth must meet to reduce poverty (Kakwani & Pernia, 2004).

The second proposition, relating inequality to economic growth, seems to have generated more controversy. The hypothesis that growth and inequality are related in an inverted U shaped function, because at early stages of growth inequality increases, reaches a maximum and then starts to decline (Kuznets Hypothesis, formulated in 1955). Kaldor (in the 1970s) asserted that a certain level of inequality was necessary for achieving economic growth.

Different contributions at different moments of time have emphasized that equality is favorable for economic growth. In this tradition are numbered Keynes, Prebisch, Alesina, Rodrik, Sen, etc. Finally, today the World Bank and other institutions highlight the mutually reinforcing character of both variables. (Perez Moreno, 2001). Thus, the economic profession has approached these propositions from very different views.

In the next paragraphs I approach the question of growth and poverty by decomposing a change in the poverty rate into its two components. Secondly I discuss the issue of inequality and growth, using the models of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1996), which seem most suited to showing how inequality may affect economic growth. Next I include examples of inter-temporal trade-offs in the economy. I conclude with a country case study of inter-temporal trade-offs.

DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSITION

1) Economic growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduction.

Poverty reduction depends on the rate of economic growth as well as on changes in income distribution (Kakwani et al, 2000). The distinction arises in

the context of the discussion of the concept of *pro poor growth*. The idea behind this concept is that a change in poverty can be decomposed into its two components: the effect of growth when the distribution of income does not change, and the effect of income distribution when total income does not change.

Using the notation suggested by the original authors, the percentage change in poverty that follows an increase in the GDP can be expressed as follows:

$$\eta = \eta_g + \eta_I$$

Where η is the proportional change in poverty, η_g is the pure growth effect and η_I is the inequality effect.

The component η_g is always negative, because keeping the distribution unchanged, the incidence of poverty will always decrease with an increase in the GDP. The reason is that for any reference threshold or poverty line, the share of the population under this threshold will diminish if incomes are augmented uniformly for all the people, while the distribution remains unchanged.

On the other hand, the sign of η_I could be either negative, when the economic growth is accompanied by a decrease in inequality, or positive, which means that inequality increases with the economic growth.

The pure growth effect and the pure inequality effect can be graphically seen in the following scheme drawn from World Bank (2002):

Figure 1.5. Effect of Income/Consumption Growth and Inequality Changes on Poverty Levels

Figure 1.5a. Effect of Growth (higher mean)





Figure 1.5b. Effect of Reduced Inequality



Source: World Bank (2002)

The figure on the left represents the impact of uniform growth, keeping distribution constant. In this case the entire distribution shifts to the right, leading to a higher income mean. The figure in the right represents the inequality effect. In the absence of economic growth or with a constant income mean, the im-

pact of a decrease (increase) in inequality will lower (raise) the dispersion of the distribution, bringing nearer (pushing further) the extreme percentiles of the distribution.

The decomposition of the change in poverty into its two components shows that because η_g is always negative, the key factor to determine whether economic growth will lead to a poverty reduction is the sign and size of η_I .

The argument recently formulated shows that economic growth is not always accompanied by a reduction in the incidence of poverty. It still remains to be seen whether it is necessary to have economic growth in order to reduce poverty. (The answer is no, because a reduction in poverty can be achieved by redistributing incomes even in the absence of economic growth)¹.

To summarize, while economic growth has an undoubtedly significant role as the main way to reduce poverty and deprivation, **technically speaking** there is no reason to expect that economic growth *per se* will bring about a decrease in the incidence of poverty. Furthermore, a reduction in the incidence of poverty can be achieved even in the absence of economic growth, simply by redistributing incomes.

2) A reduction in inequality is a precondition for sustained growth.

Within the tradition of endogenous growth models, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) provide a framework that links initial distribution of income to growth rate. They ‘reverse the question and ask how distribution affects growth’. Including the theorem of the median voter and with neoclassical assumptions, they conclude that the more unequal the access to the factors of production, the lower will be the growth rate of the economy. The transmission channel is through fiscal taxation.

The argument can be summarized as follows.

Society is composed of individuals *unequally* endowed with two factors of production – labor and capital – and a government that provides certain goods g that benefits all of society. The government finances this provision with the revenues coming from tax collection. The tax rate τ affects capital and not labor. As individuals possess different endowments of capital, they are affected differently by the tax rate.

Growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock, which results from individual saving decisions. According to this pattern of accumulation, the tax on capital determines the growth rate in the economy. This relationship is such that as the tax rate increases, the growth rate first increases and then decreases, describing an inverse U shape curve. So, there is a level of taxation τ^* that maximizes the growth rate.

¹ Unless all the population is below the poverty line.

The theorem of the median voter enters into the model to determine the tax rate eventually imposed by authorities. This tax will be the tax preferred by the median voter.

If the median voter is a pure capitalist, such that his index of relative endowments labor/capital σ^i equals zero², the voter will prefer the rate of taxation τ^k that maximizes the rate of growth of the economy. That is, $\tau^k = \tau^*$. This is because as an owner of capital, his consumption is increasing in the stock of capital.

However, if the share of the median voter in the stock of capital tends to zero, such that his index of relative endowment σ^i tends to infinity, he will prefer a rate of taxation τ^m higher than the rate that maximizes the growth of the economy. He will choose $\tau^m > \tau^*$. Moreover, τ^m increases in σ^i , which implies that the more capital-poor is the individual, the higher his ideal tax on capital. This is because the less he depends, relatively, on capital income, the less he is hit by the tax, but he gets the full benefit from the public service (Groth, 2004).

The last is the situation that characterizes unequal societies, reflecting the fact that the means of production are concentrated in few hands and the average voter does not have access to capital and must rely on personal labor capacity. The more unequal is the distribution of income and wealth, the lower the rate of growth. In other words, inequality retards economic growth.

Using the same line of reasoning, Alesina and Perotti (1996) postulate that it is through the effect on investment that aggregate demand is affected by high levels of inequality, leading to lower economic growth rates. The transmission channel is the political instability. They support this hypothesis by regressing a model that explains investment (public and private) with a set of variables representing political instability. To measure political instability they construct an index based on different variables related to social unrest. These variables range from the level of per capita (GDP) to a dummy variable indicating whether the country is democratic or not. Other variables capture different measures of social welfare, such as size of the middle class, number of violent deaths, etc.

After analyzing 71 countries, their conclusion is that investment is negatively correlated to political instability. From this result, they predict that more egalitarian societies will have lower levels of social conflict. This in turn will create a better investment environment — giving rise to higher growth rates.

² The individual i^b is characterized by the following relative factor endowment:

$$\sigma^i = \frac{l^i}{k^i / k}, \quad \sigma^i \in [0, \infty)$$

Where σ^i is the ratio between the share of the individual in the stock of labor (l^i) and the share of the individual in the stock of capital (k^i/k).

In sum, as regards to the relationship between inequality and sustained growth, these models show that either through a high level of taxation or through a low level of investment, inequality harms growth. **This evidence is not enough** to support the notion that inequality is a *precondition* for growth, although it is strong enough to argue that inequality may be an obstacle for economic growth.

INTER-TEMPORAL TRADEOFFS

An inter-temporal trade-off occurs when the economy cannot achieve two results simultaneously and in consequence it has to privilege one and retard the other. In the context of the relationships under analysis, one example of trade-off arises when a society has to sacrifice economic growth to achieve a reduction in inequality.

The models discussed provide examples of inter-temporal trade-offs in the economy. The model of Alesina and Rodrik suggests that when the initial situation is of inequality, it will be necessary to sacrifice economic growth to achieve higher levels of equality via redistribution of incomes. In subsequent periods, with more homogeneous endowments of factors, the economy will exhibit greater growth rates.

From the model of Alesina and Perotti (1996), fiscal taxation may reduce the propensity to invest, because it extracts resources from investors and capitalists. However, a proper distribution of income reduces the social unrest and contributes to create peaceful societies. Again, the society will have to resign economic growth in early stages, achieve a more egalitarian distribution, and then it can aspire to greater growth in a society free of tensions.

Another type of trade-off is present in the case of poverty reduction. As noted above, this reduction can be achieved either by an increase in the growth rate or by improving the distribution of incomes. The next country case study illustrates this.

COUNTRY CASE STUDY: POVERTY REDUCTION IN ARGENTINA: REDISTRIBUTION OR GROWTH?

What follows is an example of inter-temporal trade-off between the changes in income distribution and economic growth that an economy has to perform to achieve a reduction in the incidence of poverty rate. It is based on Cepal³, Ipea⁴ and UNDP (2003).

Within the framework of the Millennium Development Goals, and taking 1999 as the starting point, the conditions under which some Latin American and Caribbean countries could individually accomplish the objective of halving extreme poverty rate by 2015 were estimated.

³ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.

⁴ Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA – Brazil)

The general conclusions are that that even reducing the Gini coefficient in small amounts (one or two points) it is possible to achieve a reduction in the incidence of poverty equivalent to the reduction to which several years' of economic growth would lead.

The analysis forecasted two scenarios. The first one is based on historical trends and extrapolates the dynamics that the countries showed during the 1990s in terms of growth and inequality. The second on (an alternative scenario) is constructed under the assumption that the countries will advance towards richer and more egalitarian stages. It is simulated by a procedure that generates income distributions with higher means and lower inequality levels than those observed in 1999.

The incidence of extreme poverty is evaluated with respect to two different thresholds; an international poverty line, based on a threshold of one dollar per day, and a country specific poverty line, calculated in terms of the own poverty parameters of each country.

The questions addressed in the work are:

How much is it necessary to grow, and how much inequality is it necessary to reduce in order to meet the objective?

The following table summarizes the findings.

	PL, in US\$ at PPP	Target	α	β
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) International poverty line	37.2	0.1	2.0	41.0
(2) Argentinian poverty line	88.1	3.2	4.0	40.0

Source: Cepal, Ipea, UNDP (2000)

For each poverty line: international (first row) and specific (second row), there exists an entire set of inequality reduction rates and rates of accumulated economic growth (α , β) pairs which result in distributions with a poverty incidence exactly equal to the target. These sets are known as iso poverty sets. When plotted in a diagram with economic growth rates on the horizontal axis and rates of inequality reduction on the vertical axis ((β, α) -space), these sets are downward sloping convex curves, known as iso poverty curves. (Cepal, op cit).


Column 1 shows the respective thresholds for the two poverty lines considered. Column 2 is the target of poverty; it reflects the incidence that poverty should have in 2015 to consider that the objective has been met.

Columns 3 and 4 are the intersections of the iso poverty curves with the vertical and the horizontal axes. The coefficient α is the intersection of the iso poverty curve with the vertical axis that measures reduction in inequality. The coefficient β is the intersection of the iso poverty curve with the horizontal axis that measures economic growth.

So, from the numbers it is clear that 0.2% of the Argentinean population lived on less than one dollar per day in 1999. To meet the MDG it is necessary to bring this share to 0.1% in 2015, as shown in column 2. How can this target be achieved?

If inequality doesn't change, Argentina should accumulate a growth of 41% in 15 years (which represents an annual rate of 2.3% during 15 years). Alternatively, if the economy doesn't grow, to halve the incidence of poverty the value of the Gini coefficient should fall 2 percentage points to meet the poverty target in 2015. In the middle of these two extreme hypotheses, they lay the infinite combinations of rates of growth and reductions in inequality – pairs (α, β) – that lead to the same poverty rate.

The graph drawn from the paper clarifies the notions described. It shows the iso poverty curves for Argentina.



Source: Cepal, Ipea, UNDP

The same analysis can be made for the specific poverty line, in second row of the table. According to Argentinean historical trends, is it possible to meet the objective?

	PL, in US\$, at PPP (1)	Target (2)	α (3)	β (4)	Years (5)	α (6)	β (7)
International poverty line	37.2	0.1	1.0	15.0	7	2.0	5.0
Specific poverty line	88.1	3.2	2.0	20.0	8	4.5	20.0

Source: Cepal, Ipea, UNDP.

If the trends observed in the 1990s continue, Argentina will need seven years to halve the incidence of extreme poverty with respect to the one dollar per day threshold. This result would be achieved with a combination of an accumulated growth of 15% (2.02% per year) and a reduction in Gini coefficient of 1 percentage point.

Finally, if Argentina hypothetically had a higher mean income and lower inequality, it would need to accumulate 5% of economic growth and reduce the Gini coefficient in 2 points to reduce 50% the share of the extreme poverty.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this work was to analyze the relationship between growth, inequality and poverty. By decomposing the change in poverty into the pure growth effect and the inequality effect, it was seen that it is not true that economic growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduction, from the moment that economic growth can be accompanied by an increase in inequality. Besides, although empirically difficult to support, it is true that a poverty reduction can be achieved without a previous process of growth.

Likewise, with the Alesina and Rodrik and Alesina and Perotti models it was showed how inequality can affect economic growth. This shows that under certain circumstances it could be true that a reduction in inequality would be a precondition for sustained economic growth.

These models also provided examples of inter-temporal trade-offs in the economy. The country case study presented was an attempt to complete the analysis of the inter-temporal trade-offs.

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11 DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES OR ALTERNATIVES TO DEVELOPMENT:¹ THE CREATIVE WHIRLWINDS OF THE ALTERNATIVES

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this essay is to make an inquiry as to what alternative development really is. To do this, the focus of this essay will be centered on deconstructing the concept to its roots, in order to clarify its true meaning. (See Figure 1)

The first part of the essay will be dedicated to the task of conceptualizing alternative development. This will be done by critically answering questions such as what is development and what do we mean by alternative? (Alternative to what?; Alternative to whom?; Why and how is alternative development made?) In doing so, it will give readers a clearer idea of the rationale of the concept of alternative development.

Plausibly, the question ‘alternative to what’ will require the analysis of at least some of the present trends in development thinking, such as: (a) mainstream conventional development, (b) people-centered development and (c) post development. Is alternative development the simple dialectical opposition to conventional development? Is post-development an alternative development trend? In this section of the essay, three elements will be of interest in each trend analyzed: the particular features that identify it; its relationship with ‘alternative development’, and a case example which illustrates it.

Finally, in the third part of the essay, a comparison matrix of these development trends will be discussed. This matrix will give a bird’s eye view of each trend’s main objectives, principles, actors and practice (synoptic case studies). This corpus of theory and empirical evidence will serve as a critical source to discuss the future of alternative development.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT

When we look into a mirror we think the image that confronts us is accurate. But move a millimetre and the image changes. We are actually looking at a never-ending

¹ The title is based on the criticisms Nederveen Pieterse (2001:108) does to representatives of the Post-development current way of thinking,

range of reflections. But sometimes a writer has to smash the mirror for it is on the other side of that mirror that the truth stares at us.'

– Harold Pinter, Nobel Prizewinner in Literature 2005.²

What is alternative development? What are its objectives and key features? Reflecting on Pinter's allegoric insight, could we say that alternative development is just an *inverted mirror* of conventional, mainstream development? If so, is alternative development a 'never-ending range of reflections' on the concept of development? What are its objectives, methods and why does it claim to be 'alternative'? Alternative to *what*, to *whom*? In order to investigate the real meaning of alternative development, it might be necessary to 'smash the mirror' and look beyond the concept. We should be asking ourselves more radical questions: instead of theorising about what alternative development is or is not, and whether actual development is failing to bring welfare, agency and human rights to people, ask why we need and how should we make alternative development.

Alternative development could be defined in simple terms as an 'ideology that argues for the rectification of existing imbalances in social, economic, and political power.' (Friedmann, 1992:9). Distorted or not, alternative development may be argued to be more than just a critical-creative-mirror of responses to conventional development 'shifting in position as mainstream development shifts' (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2001:74). From Friedman's point of view, it is clear that alternative development goes beyond the status quo of conventional development discourse. Alternative development is inevitably centered in the 'politics of claiming' because it seeks to be the intellectual voice of the disempowered by trying to put forward in the development agenda their moral claims as a response to the hegemonic powers that oppress them. Thus, alternative development could be seen as 'the champion of the poor' in that it advocates for their social and political empowerment. How does alternative development do that? Friedmann argues that in order to obtain local empowering beyond the typical grass roots empowerment, the key role of the state is vital because communities are not *gemeinschaftlich*.³

On the other hand, alternative development may be seen as a different, creative way of constructing development. Different to what? Different to mainstream or conventional development. From Nederveen-Pieterse's (2001: 73-74) perspective, alternative development constructs its identity upon its relationship with its dialectical 'nemesis', conventional development, and can be seen as (a) a

² The text has been emphasized in bold by the author of this essay.

³ See Friedmann, (1992:7) This term refers to the idea that communities are not always harmonious spaces of solidarity and unified goals. Communities are not always 'morally right' because social tensions do exist in territorial communities and also in political communities. Power struggles may be seen because of religious, ethnic, social class, caste, linguistic and gender differences.

loose profile trend in development theory and practice, (b) a paradigm, or (c) a post-paradigmatic way of thinking about alternative development.

CONVENTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PREDATOR OF ALTERNATIVES?

Nederveen-Pieterse (2001: 73) also states, that the core problem in trying to identify alternative development as a unit is that what defines it, namely its concerns on introducing alternative practices⁴ and redefining the goals of development⁵; has been continuously incorporated as 'add-on features' and co-opted by conventional development. In other words, conventional development has been a mimetic 'alternatives predator' and thus also the greatest challenge for constructing a concise definition of alternative development, because it necessarily implies a convergence between alternative and conventional development discourse and practice. Evidence on this issue is provided by the fact that participation is now a 'mainstream' development discourse. Yet there is a disclaimer: mainstream development does not truly practice *real* participation, but rather, '*participation*' (Carmen, 1996: 42), because mainstream development uses it only as a means to manipulate consent rather than empowering the people. This is the real world of development and its alternatives: if a practice does not question and address power relations, most surely it will not be a real alternative for development but rather for the maintenance of the status quo: 'The most fundamental issues of development are, at their core, issues of power.' (Korten, 1990:214)

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT AS LOOSE PROFILE?

Alternative development as an ideology is in continuous dialectic opposition to mainstream, growth-maximizing strategies, and the individualistic-positivistic rationale of modernization; inevitably it features a 'loose profile' which gives it a certain heterogeneous nature. Hitherto, it is also this dialectic process which confers alternative development its own distinct rationale and also a certain degree of homogeneity: a moral justification centered in claiming for the expansion and defense of (a) human rights, (b) citizen rights and (c) the flourishing of the people. (Friedman, 1992: 9-11)

But if conventional development is *mainstreaming* alternative development and incorporating its concerns and goals into actual development practice and discourse (for example, the World Bank now incorporates participatory initiatives in every development intervention it undertakes) then why do we need alternative development? Furthermore, is alternative development a real 'alternative' that goes beyond the failures of development? Has alternative develop-

⁴ Ie. community participation

⁵ ie. shifting development goals from GDP growth to human development)

ment been able to offer an alternative scope to the end-of-the-road crisis of conventional development?

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND ITS MORAL JUSTIFICATION

Nederveen-Pieterse (2001) argues that while alternative development has had major merit and success (it has developed several perspectives on the agency, methods and objectives of development) this is counterbalanced by the fact that alternative development has failed to (a) build a clear perspective on micro-macro relations, (b) construct a truly macro-approach of development, and (c) develop a coherent theoretical position.

What makes it more difficult is that alternative development *necessarily* has to go beyond the failures of conventional development, and differentiate itself from conventional development if it wants to be 'alternative' and survive. 'Development' as a concept is confronted with the fact that the development strategies that have been followed to date have been incapable of overcoming poverty, social exclusion and defending the human rights of the people. (Korten, 1992; Parfitt, 2002:1-11) Inevitably then, 'alternative development' will have to build upon new morally suitable grounds, and that is why it is also consolidating a good trend, as scholars are now concerned with the 'ethics of development' (Des Gasper, 2004:1-14), and why development should be different from how it is now conceived. As Chambers (1983) states, at the end all our efforts should be centered on the people and how to bring about 'good change', for them.

TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES

So what is alternative? According to Nederveen-Pieterse, (2001:75), 'alternative' generally refers to three spheres: those of agents, methods and objectives (or values) of development. This is the thread in the next part of this essay: the actual development trends in development perspectives.

Conventional or mainstream development

Conventional development could be defined as a 'growth-centered development' (Korten, 1992: 61). This view basically purports that 'poverty and underdevelopment result from inadequate capital investment to overcome low levels of productivity and employment.' In this trend in development, individualism and the supposed utility maximizing behavior of individuals occupy the centre stage of its rationale, theory and practice, which has led scholars to call it the 'economic approach' (Becker, 1992).

The favored strategy in this kind of approach has been to focus on capital investment in order to stimulate economic growth. So, if the recipe for growth is to invest, from where does the capital come? It may come from 'domestic savings, foreign assistance, or foreign investment' (Korten, 1992) So the expected output is, in other words, a typical case of a 'let's wait and see' promise

that the resulting growth in economic output will extend and trickle down benefits to the poor. In other words, growth-centered development is always trying to focus on the expansion of the 'economic pie' with a promise of automatic benefits for all thanks to the 'invisible hands' of the market. What is excluded from this analysis is, inevitably, the issue of political resistance. This is best avoided by preventing redistribution efforts or claims in the development policy agenda. Their best defense is the slogan that 'if one looks after growth, equity will take care of itself.' (Korten, 1992)

It is in this approach where development transforms itself into 'creative destruction', (Schumpeter, 1947) because this economic *laissez faire* leaves the market unbridled and the state becomes co-opted by powerful interest groups. The holders of power (entrepreneurs) are not accountable to the state, and rather use power to preserve their privileged individual freedom, property rights and the entrepreneurial private interest which seeks to maximize its profit in a *laissez faire* market-centered society. This is commonly referred to as the 'neoliberal framework' of thought. (Hinkelammert, 2002:133)

Currently, the characteristics that identify conventional or mainstream development are associated with those of modernism and its main arguments, namely that 'the basis of solidarity becomes weaker and more abstract, allowing for the growth of individuality and freedom (...) the dominance of rational calculation (...) the progressive disenchantment of the social world.' (*Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*, 2005).

Synoptic case studies included in conventional development are found in the type of development favored in all the countries affected by the Washington Consensus in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes, particularly in Latin America, where the IMF and the World Bank have been the key actors in pushing this trend into the development agenda. It is a known fact that conventional development in the body of mainstream neoliberal policies has been a total failure in bringing development. For example, just by checking the online news of 2006, one can see these examples in the headlines: Ines Bustillo, director of the Washington office of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has recently stated that in 2005 Latin America had a third year of straight economic growth (4.3%) but still 40.6% of the whole population in the region (213 million people) lives in poverty and 16% of them in extreme poverty. Conventional development has not been helping the poor in countries like Peru, a neo-liberal's dream where it has been estimated that GDP growth has been 6%, private investment has risen in 10%, debt status has ameliorated in the international markets, and has an expected inflation rate of 1.1% throughout the year.

The other side of the story is one of injustice, exclusion and concentration of power: more than half of Peruvians are in poverty (51.6%), Peru occupies the 79th place (of 177) in human development according to the UNDP, and 10% of Peruvian society has the accumulated wealth of almost 40% of Peru's income (BBC Mundo, 10 January 2006). The same story repeats itself through-

out the majority of Latin American countries and other regions that have followed this neoliberal recipe in their development policies.

Lastly, more recent accounts on development as growth-centered have been favored, namely, models of development though growth with equity, but still they have not made explicit efforts to explain why growth does not end poverty, and leaves the structural causes behind.

People-centred development

In people-centered development, the contrast with conventional development is remarkable. People-centered development seeks to put the table the other way around and instead of putting growth as the priority, the urge is to '*place economics at the service of people, a direct reversal of existing practice.*' (Korten, 1992: 65) In other words, policies directed to the people's welfare and agencies are the most important ones. The crucial idea is to:

reverse the tendency toward concentrating power in impersonal and unaccountable institutions, returning it to people and communities and ensuring its equitable distribution. (Korten, 1992)

But what will it take to do such a big task? Basically people-centered development implies that there must be an empowerment process of the people and that empowering should be done by constructing the appropriate 'member accountable institutions' and strengthening 'local resource control and ownership.'

Furthermore, to follow a people-centered development approach is not to say that economic growth is abolished altogether but rather that it has to be the 'right-kind of growth'. It puts economics to the service of people, so its call is not for a limitless unbridled growth, but growth that takes into account that the Earth is finite and that it requires a sustainable management of its resources in order to improve human well being (Ibid: 66).

The requirements of a people-centered approach are basically to put forward three aspects: (a) *justice*: where the idea would be to have a fundamental restructuring of the economic and social system in order to empower the disempowered and thus, provide them with the means to expand their agency and welfare; (b) *sustainability*: where the disparities of unsustainable growth must be dealt with, and (c) *inclusiveness*: where the issue of real participation through empowerment of the people is the main issue at stake.

The elements that compose the people-centered approach are easy to understand and remember: the protagonists are the people and the beneficiaries of the policies are also the people. Hence, means and ends are people-centered and so are all the policies. For instance, it is argued that local organizing needs to link with structural reforms from the local to the national and global levels by breaking down and providing alternatives to 'dualistic economic structures, integrating the modern and traditional sectors, and melding, redistributing, and reallocating the use of their assets' (Ibid). People become emancipated. The

same is true if we examine what people-centered development seeks at the global level:

Breaking the unchallenged and unaccountable power of transnational capital and bringing transnational corporations under a system of controls and incentives that make them useful, accountable contributors to the creation of a just, sustainable and inclusive human society.' (Ibid: 66)

Synoptic case studies exist but do not yet match the ideal of a people-centered approach, something acknowledged by Korten: 'That no models of a people-centered sustainable society exist seriously limits the credibility of our proposals' Yet for him, this approach is 'idealistic only if one views survival as an idealistic goal in our contemporary world.'

In reality, one could draw links with alternative grass roots movements – solidarity economics alternatives with this kind of approach. To be exact, a group of organized communities in San Vicente, El Salvador called Grupo Bajo Lempa have developed a 'people-centered development approach' which puts its focus on the empowerment and welfare of the people in the participant communities. Moreover, they have developed more than 13 economic initiatives that are environmentally friendly, that do not seek growth maximization but are oriented towards an equitable redistribution of resources, etc. (see www.gbajolempa.net)

Post-development

*What is needed is not 'development alternatives', but 'alternatives to development'.
(...) 'Not more Development but a different regime of truth and perception'
(Nederveen-Pieterse 2000) from Escobar, 1992b:412-414)*

For post-development, the issue at hand is that development has failed structurally as a concept and as a practice. The problem is not resuscitating development or seeking more 'alternatives of development' within it. As Nederveen-Pieterse (2000: 99-100) says, it is:

not that development strategies or projects could or should have been better planned or implemented. It is that development, as it imposed itself on its 'target populations', was basically the wrong answer to their true needs and aspirations. It was an ideology that was born and refined in the North, mainly to meet the needs of the dominant powers of a more 'appropriate' tool to their economic and geopolitical expansion.

For the Post-development trend, the key to give real solutions to the negative effects of development and structural social and economical injustice, by searching for new, radical ways of thinking. That is, abolishing the quest for searching alternatives *in* development, and looking instead for alternatives *to* development.

For Rahnema (1997:391), solidarity is the key fuel for thinking of new ways to bring more positive realities to people. Likewise, the end of development for

Rahnema 'should not be an end to the search for new possibilities of change, for a relational world of friendship, or for genuine processes of regeneration able to give birth to new forms of solidarity'. On the contrary, a new kind of trust can be built and the call is for 'a genuine work of self knowledge and 'self-polishing' in order to create a 'new aesthetic order'.

This ideology is critical and reactive to the following elements. It: (a) knows that poverty is not to be taken for granted, (b) knows that, in the end, Development = Westernization, (c) builds upon a radical critique of Modernism, (d) sees development as a manipulation of discourse, and (e) draws upon anti-managerialists insights and dichotomous thinking in the politics of post-development (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2000: 99-110)

Synoptic case studies in post development can be found in Gandhism and Buddhist economics. The idea of a reaction to Western know-how and ways of doing things is certainly present in this way of conceiving development. The radical notion of trying to find the ultimate 'truth' through new ways of solidarity is certainly a key feature in the politics expressed in Gandhism and Buddhist, and post-development even has Confucianist roots. (See Rahnema, 2000: 377)

CONCLUSIONS

Death

Where was the dead body found?

Who found the dead body?

Was the dead body dead when found?

How was the dead body found?

Who was the dead body?

Who was the father or daughter or brother

Or uncle or sister or mother or son

Of the dead and abandoned body?

Was the body dead when abandoned?

Was the body abandoned?

By whom had it been abandoned?

Was the dead body naked or dressed for a journey?

What made you declare the dead body dead?

Did you declare the dead body dead?

How well did you know the dead body?

How did you know the dead body was dead?

Did you wash the dead body

Did you close both its eyes

Did you bury the body

Did you leave it abandoned

Did you kiss the dead body

– Harold Pinter (2005)

Development may not be declared dead as long as there are development alternatives and dialectical, creative ideologies and critical ways of conceiving reality. Development alternatives or alternatives to development, either of these ways at looking at the problem of the struggle of life vs. death, may lead to the search for new utopias (Franz Hinkelammert, 2001). Alternatives are not one but many, and all that they have in common is that their search for 'good change' (Chambers, 1983) should lead to the expansion, the 'flourishing of human life'. (Radin, 1987; Sen, 1999; Alkire, 2001)

APPENDIX


Comparison matrix of development

Alternative Development			
Conventional Development	People Centered	Post Development	Alternative Modernities
Rationale			
<p>Growth centered, individualism.</p> <p>Knowledge is not indigenous and does not create knowledge points to connect the new knowledge with the conventional knowledge, it creates a hierarchy of knowledge instead.</p> <p>Development is a professional pursuit, you need to have the right skills to participate, which many people are lacking</p> <p>It is institutionalized, not based on people's lives</p>	<p>People Centered, solidarity knowledge may be provided by the people (locals, indigenous, etc.) No hierarchy</p> <p>Not a professional pursuit</p> <p>Not institutionalized but rather based on people's lives</p>	<p>Against development, conventional development has failed,</p> <p>Solidarity needed not more development but a different regime of truth and perception</p>	<p>Different idea of modernity, attitude of questioning the present but one which puts the human beings first, rationale of creative adaptation. (Modernity is not one)</p>
Objective			
<p>Maximize laissez faire, that is, maximize profit within unregulated markets.</p>	<p>Empowerment of the people through access to resource control. Self reliance, diversification</p>	<p>Not development alternatives but alternatives to development. Anti capitalist, anti-imperialist, anti-productivist, anti-market</p>	<p>Think with a difference to Western discourse on modernity. Not rationalistic but different principles: i.e. Solidarity, friendship, etc.</p>

DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES OR ALTERNATIVES TO DEVELOPMENT

Principles			
Free market, individual freedom, respect property rights,	Self-reliance, diversification, economies of community, sharing of information and technology	Think reality differently, and find the archaeology of development in order to change the discourse. Essentially local, self-organizing capacity of the poor	Privilege culture specific knowledge Specific national/cultural site
Actors			
IMF, World Bank, market	The community, people, Grass roots movements	Grass roots movements, peasants, urban marginals, deprofessionalized intellectuals	Local societies in general, people
Practice & Case Studies			
USA capitalism	Landless Movements in Brazil	Swadhyaya in India, and Sarvodaya in Sri Lank (p.400)	Example in Bali 6 star hotel remote no phone, no television Peru: Oxapampa (example) of modern place Saudi Arabia

Figure 1 Analytical Mind map: Development alternatives or alternatives to development



Source: own analytical work done mainly on the basis of Friedmann (1992), Korten (1992), Nederveen-Pieterse (2001).

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12 PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT: VIABLE APPROACH FOR EMPLOYEE EMPOWERMENT?

INTRODUCTION

One of the main characteristics of human resource management practice is the focus on the employee as a valuable asset. Today, the employee is no longer viewed as collective and dispensable but is increasingly viewed as an individual with proactive inputs to the production processes, the source of the organization's competitive advantage (Bacon 2003, Legge 2005, Ramaswamy 2000). In line with this view, emphasis now has been placed on raising commitment in employees through their involvement (Bacon 2003). Participative Management (herein after will be referred to as PM) has gained the currency as a way of ensuring employee's involvement, and consequently, the optimal use of the human resources. PM is being recognized as the new approach that takes the place of the old notion of worker's participation and industrial democracy (Marchington 2001, Hyman and Mason 1995).

As the name implies, PM aims to gain the optimal use of human resources by allowing employees to be involved more, which can be achieved through upward and downward communication, financial involvement, task-based participation and team working (Marchington 2001: 235-7). These practices have been praised as a major step towards employee's empowerment, because with PM the 'sources of powerlessness' of the employee can be eliminated¹. As a result, the optimal use of the employees can be gained. Thus employee empowerment is something that is important not only for the interest of the worker, but also for the management. As Foy (1994: xvii) has articulated, *empowering* people is as important today as *involving* them in 1980s and getting them to *participate* in the 1970s' (cited in Holden 2001: 559, emphasis added).

Numerous studies have been done to examine the effect of participative management toward the employee's empowerment, and the results are showing that it has positive implications. However, there are also many competing studies which show that the idea of PM is not as good in practice as it is on paper. Despite its beautiful scheme of involving employees more, PM actually does

¹ Employee' empowerment is '... a process of enhancing feelings of self-efficacy among organizational members through the identification of conditions that foster powerlessness and through their removal by both formal organizational practices and informal techniques of providing efficacy information' (Conger and Kanungo 1988: 474, cited in Styhre 2004: 1445).

not contribute much to the employee's empowerment. This conflict in views raises the question of the viability this particular scheme, which holds the notion that its practices should be directed to the 'empowerment of people'.

This essay will try to bring together the two different discourses on the viability or unviability of PM and whether it really does establish employee empowerment. It also argues that there are different routes to empowerment, which should not only be assessed from direct and tangible outcomes, but also on the basis of indirect and intangible outcomes. I will also try to identify the conditions under which PM may face difficulties in empowering the workers. It is argued that ideally PM can be a vehicle for bringing in the employee's empowerment into the workplace, but for PM to bring the desired outcome there are also other 'ingredients' that deserve attention.

PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT'S ROLE IN CREATING AN EMPOWERING CONTEXT

Referring back to the definition of employee's empowerment as specified by Conger and Kanungo (1998) that empowerment is the 'removal of the powerlessness', the way PM brought empowerment can be traced as follows. Firstly, PM as a part of soft HR practices is connected with the deliberately above-average pay, availability of promotion ladders, intensive methods of communication, more training, etc. Thus companies adopting this particular style are empowering their employees because they are removing the 'powerlessness' of employees by investing more in them. For example, extensive downward and upward communication, which is one of the main characteristics of PM, is seen as empowering acts because it removes communication barriers. The 'powerlessness' of the employees where they do not have voices in the working place is being removed through the practice of PM. With PM the employees will be involved in the decision-making, and they will be having more autonomy in their work (Marchington 2001).

Secondly, employees show significantly positive responses to the implementation of various forms of PM such as the Team Briefing², Quality Circles³, and Employee Share Ownership Plan⁴ (see Marchington, 2001, a study of Employee Involvement, a different name for PM). From the Marchington survey it

² Team briefing (a part of downward communication practices) refers to 'the short meeting with the team of workers based around common service area to cascade information or managerial messages throughout the organization' (Holden 2001: 570).

³ Quality Circle means 'a small group of volunteers who are engaged in work and who meets regularly to discuss and propose ways of improving working methods or arrangements under a trained leader' (Armstrong 2001: 789).

⁴ Employee Share Ownership Plan (ESOP) is 'a program under which employees regularly accumulate shares and may ultimately assume control of the company' (<http://www.wordnet.princeton.edu/per/web>)

is indicated that employee wished the team briefing to continue at their place of work (95%), quality circles (80%), and employee share ownership/ profit sharing (85%). Although Marchington mainly shows that employees feel a positive impact on their attitudes and commitment, it also shows how in this sense PM is an empowering approach. For example, the team briefing practice can be seen as an empowering act because it helps the employees in doing their job and to have a clearer goal. The Ownership Plan can also be seen as empowering since it provides both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. It works as an extrinsic motivator in a way that it gives monetary or ownership reward for the employee. As a consequence, employees have the sense of belonging to the company (Kato 2003, Poutsma 2003).

PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT: JUST ANOTHER NEW NAME?

On the other side of the coin, there is a pessimistic view of the viability of PM in delivering empowerment. One argument is that though it looks good on paper, the program is actually not being designed to offer opportunities for employers to gain or consolidate control over the broader environment in which their work is located (Hyman and Mason 1995: 192). Another is that PM practices are 'purposefully designed not to give workers a very significant role in decision making but rather to secure or enhanced employee contribution to the organization' (Wilkinson 1998: 40 in Holden 2001). From this perspective, PM is perceived only as the manager's way to gain optimal use of the employees, without any intention to empower them (Holden, 2001: 577-8). Thus according to this discourse, PM is just an old practice with a new name.

If one wants to traced back the reason why this phenomenon happens, it can be argued that it is the consequence of the nature of PM, which relies heavily on the initiatives and commitment of managers (Marchington 2001: 238-41). In most cases, managers are likely to have limited commitment in implementing the scheme since it requires that they give up a portion of control. For example, some managers were found to indeed be engaging employees in the decision-making process, but at the same time limiting the scope of choices (Marchington and Grugulis 2000, cited in Gould-Williams 2004: 78). This show how in reality, PM can be merely a cosmetic practices, an artificial offer from the management:

Employee participation, in its diverse forms, is under threat as an increasingly impotent counter to management initiatives and strategies. Employees are increasingly being left with management – inspired and –controlled involvement as their main, or even sole, source of information, communication and action. In an increasingly individualized and deregulated labour market, with global competitiveness acting as the prime motor for management practice, it seems likely that the bulk of employees will be left with few resources either to query or to contest the directions taken by management control despite the rhetoric of empowerment....' (Hyman and Mason, 1995: 193).

Another problem relies on PM' assumption that employee and employer will share common interest (Marchington 2001, Hyman and Mason 1995: 25). In reality, this is not always the case because what is seen as empowering from the perspective of the managers may not be seen as empowering from the employees' point of view. As pointed out by Hanold (1997: 204 in Holden 2001: 575), if power is not taken by those it is bestowed upon them, there is no empowerment. In other words, introducing a new form of involvement scheme which is not part of the employees' interest will not bring any effect for them. On the contrary, if the employees see that it is a worthwhile process for them, then the new initiatives is likely to be an empowering process.

THE WAY FORWARD

There are two distinct opinions about PM; first is the optimistic view that PM is a good approach that indeed is viable to empower the employees, and the second is the pessimistic view that says this approach is unviable mainly because it does not intend to empower employees. Overall, I argue that PM is neither good or bad per se, because it is neutral in nature. Under ideal conditions, it will deliver the desired outcome: the empowerment of the employee. But I am also certain that in the absence of these ideal conditions, it does not necessarily mean that PM will then disempower the employee.

Suppose the claim that the ultimate goal of PM is merely to gain the optimal use of employees is true. In the process of 'optimizing' the use of employees through various forms of participation, however, there are potential forms of indirect effects that are empowering the employees. Let us take an example from the one of PM' practices. To enable employees to participate more by having multi-skills, PM provides intensive training for them. However, from the perspectives of the 'pessimistic discourses' this multi-skilling process is usually interpreted as 'a camouflage for "multi-tasking"' (Ramaswamy and Schiphorst 2000: 665). It is seen as 'work intensification in the name of empowerment' (ibid). Although this might be true, I would argue that in the process of 'multi-tasking', there is a space where the employees might feel empowered. This is because, being able to perform 'multi-tasks' means that they are now able to have more responsibility toward tasks that previously, due to the limited skills that they had, were beyond their responsibility. To have more skills that enable them to have more responsibilities might be empowering for the employees. It might stimulate the feeling of how meaningful they are for the company, thus providing them intrinsic motivation. Therefore, training – be it aimed at multi-skilling or multi-tasking – is something worthwhile and empowering for the employees.

The lesson that can be drawn from this example is, one should not define empowerment or disempowerment only based on the tangible product of the process, like (for this particular case) having more tasks. Empowerment processes should also be measured by looking at the intangible outcomes, such as the feeling of making an important contribution to the company, the feeling of

being in control, and many other intrinsic motivations. This reflects how PM is working on psychological level, and this is indeed has an important role for the employee' empowerment. However, because it is intangible, this indirect effect is rarely being acknowledged – making PM seem not to have any empowering effect for the employees.

Therefore, I suggest that the discussion should go beyond whether PM is indeed empowering employees or not. The focus should be on how to be aware of conditions that should be taken into account for PM to work as expected. This is because I believe that PM is a tool that works not within a vacuum but in a very dynamic organizational setting. It deals with different people that may have different interest, and works through different corporate and/or management goals. Let us look at these elements one by one.

Firstly, in line with the HRM notion that the manager is a strategic actor, the nature of PM is that the initiative comes from the management. Instead of workers demanding to be given right to participate, in PM it is the managers who allow the employees to become involved (Hyman and Mason, 1995: 25). However, the thing that should not be forgotten is that managers are also human and may have a different interest. For instance, first line managers and supervisors may not share same interest in the idea of PM. While for the first line managers the interest may be to empower the employee, for the supervisor it could be seen as something that is threatening their authority, since empowerment implies giving power from managers to employees. If introducing PM is seen as something not beneficial for them, it is more likely that supervisors will not show a commitment in implementing the scheme (Marchington 2001: 238). Therefore, before being asked to initiate any form of PM scheme, managers have to be 'empowered' first. It could be done by for example providing them with necessary and relevant knowledge about the scheme, and by communicating the benefit of implementing such a scheme. Moreover, in addition to considering the interest of the managers, the interest of the employee should also be the part of the picture. Participation should be made available to get the views on what kind of involvement that the employees want or need. It should be done before introducing a scheme of employee involvement, because assuming that employees will have the same interest as managers is risky. It may lead to an introduction of a scheme that is not representing the interest of the employee and thus, as a consequence, fails to create empowerment. It may also lead to conflicting interest between the managers and the employee. To avoid this, a more intense participation and two-ways of communication should be ensured.

Secondly, often there are problems in the implementation of PM due to the competing initiatives and goals within the organization. Marchington (2001: 239) points out how the multiplicity of different arrangement of PM can result in different practices competing with each other. Power and departmental politics within organization can heavily influence the outcome of any initiatives, leading to failure to continue an implementation. As an example, he shows that

there might be major tensions between a suggestion scheme that pays for employee ideas and a TQM initiative in which employees are expected to undertake continuous improvement as part of their normal duties. Competing goals like this may lead to the condition where employees are being trapped into difficult situation and as a consequence, the environment is not conducive for growing the empowerment. Therefore, creating synergetic goals within the company is crucial to avoid such situation.

CONCLUSION

By looking at the two different clusters of discourses about PM, there are at least two important lessons that can be drawn. First is that PM should be seen as neither empowering or disempowering. This essay has shown that even though the main goal of PM may not be to empower the employees, in its process, there are indirect effects that indeed create empowerment. Therefore, if the ultimate goal of PM is not to empower employees, it can still bring empowerment. Empowerment should not be valued only in the tangible forms, but also in intangible forms as well – which is equally important.

Second, rather than being easy to implement, PM is actually a complex approach that should be implemented carefully in order to avoid the possibility of being trapped into the rhetoric. In order to locate in which particular area that this scheme is unable to bring the desired outcome, PM should not be seen in a vacuum but should be placed within the intersection of various interests of people as well as competing goals within particular organization. PM must always be examined within its context. Thus, for PM practices to succeed in delivering employee empowerment, it needs to be placed in relation to other elements within the organizations, such as different interests and competing goals, and these forces must be taken into account in the planning of new involvement initiative.

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13 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN COLLAPSED STATES: THE ETHICAL QUESTION

ABSTRACT

Conceptualizing electoral systems as a set of rules that govern the conduct of elections, this essay will argue that from the theoretical viewpoint, electoral systems have concrete purposes in a certain polity – country – under certain circumstances. These purposes might range from ensuring a representative government or an effective government or it might be in favour of compromise and consensus over a conviction or principle. This essay will argue that from the practical view point, normative approaches – this is the ‘best electoral system’ – are neither constructive nor functional, given that electoral systems merit only a qualified endorsement, reflecting a balance of advantages over disadvantages and their strength relative to other systems. Moreover, the essay will argue that electoral systems are not necessarily neutral devices that are put in place by people to rule elections; in reality and especially in developing countries, the engineering of electoral systems is a politically-driven process; oriented to political agendas and, sometimes, it involves political horse trading.

INTRODUCTION

The complexities of the modern societies make almost impossible the flourishing of direct democracy, where the people – *demos* – participate in the everyday life of the governance process as in the ideal Athenian city-state. Modern politics, chiefly in democracies, is about representation¹, which is set through electoral mechanisms, with elections are often thought of as the heart of the democratic politics. Perhaps no questions in politics are as crucial as do we elect the politicians who rule over us, and under which rules are these elections held (Heywood, 2002:223). Elections may not in themselves be a sufficient condition for political representation, but there is little doubt that they are a necessary condition.

¹ As political principle, representation is a relationship through which an individual or group stands for, or acts on behalf, a large number of people. Representative democracy nevertheless constituted a limited and indirect form of democratic rule, provided that the representation links government and the governed in such a way that the people’s views are articulated or their interests are secured (Heywood, 2002: 224).

Thus, the study of electoral systems is of vital importance to democratic politics, to the quality of governance (also governability) and representation. Motivated by the importance of electoral systems in democratic politics, this essay will problematise the rules under which elections are held, focusing mainly on two, namely the Majoritarian and Proportional Representation. The essay will use examples from Mozambique, in a form of case study.

The essay will argue that normative approaches – like this is ‘the best electoral system’ – are neither constructive nor functional, since electoral systems merit only a qualified endorsement, reflecting a balance of advantages over disadvantages and their strength relative to other systems. The debate about the advantages and disadvantages of electoral systems ranges from considerations related to the quality of representation (elected people – electorate) and the effectiveness of government.

THE THEORETICAL DEBATE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

An electoral system is a set of rules that governs the conduct of an election (Heywood, 2002:234). Not only do these rules vary across the world, but they are also, in many countries, the subject of fierce political debate and argument. According to Heywood (2002:232) these rules vary in a number of ways, most notably:

- Voters may be asked to choose between candidates or between political parties;
- Voters may either select a single candidate, or vote preferentially, ranking the candidates they wish to support in order of preference;
- The electorate may or may not be grouped into electoral constituencies;
- Constituencies may return a single member or a number of members; and
- The level of support needed to elect a candidate varies from a plurality (the largest single number of votes or a ‘relative’ majority) to an overall or ‘absolute’ majority or a quota of some kind.

For general purposes, the systems available can be divided into two broad categories on the basis of how they convert votes into seats. On the one hand, there are majoritarian systems, in which larger parties typically win a higher proportion of seats than the proportion of votes they gain in the election. This increases the chances of a single party gaining a parliamentary majority and being able to govern on its own (Heywood 2002:232). In the UK, for example, single-party government is very firmly established despite the fact that no political party has achieved an electoral majority since 1935 (*idem*).

On the other hand, there are proportional systems, which guarantee an equal or, at least, more equal relationship between the seats won by a party and the votes gained in the election. In a pure system of proportional representation (PR), a party that gains 45 per cent of the votes would win exactly 45 percent of the seats. PR systems therefore make single-party majority rule less likely, and

are commonly associated with multiparty system and coalition governments (idem).

Electoral systems attract attention, in part, because they have a crucial impact on party performance, and particularly on their prospects of winning (or at least sharing) power and, more importantly, that attitudes towards the electoral systems are largely shaped by party advantage (idem). Electoral engineering can combine the above electoral systems in variety of manners depending on the particular political, economic, social context of the polity and, more importantly, on prospects for winning or sharing political power. This is to argue that political actors engage most of the time in electoral engineering or reforms of electoral systems to safeguard or, at least, when their political interest is not threatened (Heywood 2002:235).

The above two major electoral systems are umbrella systems, as they enable several sets of combinations to be operationalized depending on the context or specificity of the polity or country. Under the two major electoral systems above tabled there are, *inter alia*, the following possible combinations:

Majoritarian System

- Single-member plurality system (SMP) ('first past the post');
- Second ballot system;
- Alternative vote system (AV); supplementary vote (SV)

Proportional System

- Additional member system (AMS);
- Single-transferable-vote system (STV);
- Party-list system

For the present purposes, the essay will discuss the features, advantages and disadvantages of the following combinations:

Majoritarian System

(Single-member plurality–SMP–'first past the post') This system is more predominant in countries like: the UK, USA, Canada, India, etc.

Features:

- The country is divided into single-member constituencies, usually of equal size;
- Voters select a single candidate, usually marking his/her name with a cross on the ballot paper;
- The winning candidate need only achieve a plurality of votes ('first past the post').

Advantages:

- System establishes a clear link between representatives and constituencies, ensuring that constituency duties are carried out;
- It offers the electorate a clear choice of potential parties of government;
- It allows governments to be formed that a clear mandate from the electorate, albeit often on basis of plurality support amongst the electorate;
- It keeps extremism at bay by making it more difficult for small radical parties to gain seats and credibility;
- It makes for strong and effective government in that a single party usually has majority control of the assembly;
- It produces stable government in that single-party governments rarely collapse as a result of disunity and internal friction.

Disadvantages:

- The system 'wastes' many (perhaps most) votes, those cast for losing candidates and those cast for winning ones over the plurality mark;
- It distorts electoral preferences by 'under-representing' small parties and ones with geographical evenly distributed support (the 'third-party effect');
- It offers only limited choices because of its duopolistic (two-major-parties) tendencies;
- It undermines the legitimacy of government in that governments often enjoy only minority support, producing a system of plurality rule;
- It creates instability because a change in government can lead to a radical shift of policies and direction;
- It leads to unaccountable government in that the legislature is usually subordinate to the executive, because the majority of its members are supporters of the governing party;
- It discourages the selection of a socially broad spread of candidates in favour of those who are attractive to a large body of voters.

Proportional System (party-list system)

(This system is predominant in countries throughout Europe, including Belgium and Luxembourg, Switzerland and the European Parliament)

Features:

- Either the entire country is treated as a single constituency, or, in the case of regional party lists, there are a number of large multimember constituencies;
- Political parties compile lists of candidates to place before the electorate, in descending order of preferences;
- Electors vote for political parties, not for candidates;
- Political parties are allocated seats in direct proportion to the votes they gain in the election. They fill seats from their party list;
- A 'threshold' may be imposed to exclude small, possibly extremist, political parties from representation.

Advantages:

- This is the only potentially pure system of proportional representation, and is therefore fair to all parties;
- The system promotes unity by encouraging electors to identify with their nation or region rather than with a particular constituency;
- The system makes it easier for women and minority candidates to be elected, provided, of course, they feature on party lists;
- The representation of a large number of small parties ensures that there is an emphasis upon negotiation, bargaining and consensus.

Disadvantages:

- The existence of many small parties can lead to weak and unstable government;
- The link between representatives and constituencies is entirely broken;
- Unpopular candidates who are well placed on a party list cannot be removed from office;
- Parties become heavily centralized, because leaders draw up party lists, and junior members have an incentive to be loyal in the hope of moving up the list.

Looking at the above electoral systems from the perspective of democratization processes, it becomes clear that electoral systems play a salient role in the heart of democratic governance. Defining democratization, according to Przeworski (1988) in Potter et al. (1997: 535), as a process of the institutionalization of uncertainty, of subjecting all interests to uncertainty, it means that electoral systems (or, at least, their designing) will be a conflict ridden process, where all those involved in the process, mainly the ruling parties, want to minimise the uncertainty. Seeing democratization as the institutionalization of uncertainty means that, because democratic politics involve open competition for power, no group can be certain of winning political power. Indeed, the shift from authoritarian rule to democracy means precisely that the group that has held power abandons effective control over outcomes and, thus, has to embrace 'uncertainty'. Unfortunately, the reality of the developing countries suggests that the above assertion is easier said than done.

The above means that the people holding power may try to craft the institutions of electoral governance, chiefly the electoral systems, so that the electoral process will bring the results they wish or, at least it will minimize the uncertainty. For example, the ruling party in a certain country may, in a particular context of certainty or uncertainty; choose a particular type of proportional or majoritarian system (from the several possible combinations) given a certain context; it can choose a certain way of designing constituencies given certain conditions (ethnic, religious politics, etc); it can choose a particular method of converting votes into seats, given particular objective or interest, etc. The argument being made is that electoral systems are not neutral devices that are put

in place just to rule the elections; they are very political and they evolve though a lot of *political horse-trading*.

The theories around electoral systems confirm the above analysis. In fact, Heywood (2002:233) argues that the legislator, before approving a certain electoral system, has to answer certain questions on what is the objective, such as: 'Is representative government more important than an effective government? Is a bias in favour of compromise and consensus preferable to one that favours conviction and principle?' For Heywood, the preferences of the legislator in one of the above dimensions, will determine the choice of the electoral system to be put in place as a regulatory mechanism in elections (Heywood, 2002:229). In this essay, elections are considered to be a device for filling an office or post through choices made by a designed body of people: the electorate.

Mozambique case study

After 10 years of liberation struggle, Mozambique gained its political independence from its Portuguese colonial regime in 1975. The Liberation Movement Front (Frelimo) turned into a Marxist-Leninist political party in its third congress in 1977. Defined as the vanguard of the revolution, it built a mono-party socialist state where activities of political parties were banned by the Constitution. Almost five years after independence, a rebel movement – Mozambique National Resistance – backed by the apartheid South African and Rhodesian regimes – started a war against the state. This bloody civil war lasted for 16 years.

In 1984 Mozambique joined the World Bank Group and in 1987 the country started a Bank-led Structural Adjustment Program (SAP/PRE). The SAP/PRE was followed by political liberalization in 1990, with the mono-party People's Assembly approving the first multiparty Constitution in the history of the country, though the country was still at war. The political liberalization also meant the end of the first and inauguration of the second Republic and with it the political landscape changed: dozens of tiny political parties emerged. These tiny parties were called emerging or non-armed opposition political parties, just to distinguish them from the rebel movement.

The first multiparty constitution in Mozambique provided the (i) freedom of expression and assembly; (ii) civil and political rights and the right to form and join political parties; and more importantly for the purposes of this essay, in its article 107(1) stated that 'the representative bodies are chosen through elections where all citizens enjoy the right to participate' and further in its article 107(3) that 'the election of deputies obeys the Majoritarian Principle'. According to this principle, the winner in each of the 11 constituencies (administrative provinces) would take up all the parliamentary seats allocated to that particular constituency.

At the time, it was argued that the one-party People's Parliament adopted the Majoritarian system in order to give the country a non-fragmented parliament and, more importantly, a very cohesive executive which would be strong

and in position to commit itself to the difficult task of reconstructing the nation from the ruins of the war.

Two years later, in 1992, during the talks aimed at reaching the cease-fire, the rebels rejected the Majoritarian principle and defended the application of Proportional Representation (PR), apparently because it might have thought that the 'winner-takes-all' system would benefit Frelimo, the ruling party. On top of the Proportional System, a 5% threshold was fixed. Again this was demanded by the former rebels who wanted to get rid of the tiny political parties that had emerged between the approval of the first multiparty Constitution in 1990 and the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992 in Rome. The argument was twofold: on the one hand the former rebels thought that the tiny parties were creations of the ruling party aiming at weakening the opposition (as the former rebels would not longer be 'the opposition' but one party amongst the several opposition political parties), and a sort of 'we fought alone during 16 years, so let us also be alone harvest the fruit of our straggle'.

The Hond't Method was set as mechanism for the conversion of votes into seats. The country was divided into 11 constituencies (the administrative provinces) and using the number of electoral population (adult people registered, 18 years) each constituency had a number of seats to elect to the parliament (the parliament consists of 250 seats). Using the Proportional System, in 1994, the democracy founding elections were held. The former party-state won both presidential and parliamentary elections. Interestingly, if the Majoritarian (winner-takes-all) Principle had been in force, Renamo (the former rebel movement) would have had the majority in the 1994 parliament with 152 seats compared to Frelimo's 98. This is because, although Renamo won fewer constituencies than Frelimo, it won the three constituencies that elect the highest number of seats to the parliament (because of population density, there are three constituencies that elect 50% plus 2 seats, which means majority and those constituencies are Renamo's stronghold).

But because the system in force is a Proportional System, Frelimo, the ruling party, got 133 seats and Renamo got 108 seats. That was also a big surprise for the ruling party that had made wrong choice in 1990 when it approved the first multiparty Constitution. If the winner-takes-all system had been used, the third bench (Democratic Union – which had nine seats in 1994 parliament) would have not existed at all, as it would have had no seats, because it did not win in any constituency. The electoral system is therefore not a neutral mathematical instrument, but plays a crucial part in the electoral results/outcomes and, therefore, in the democratic landscape/picture of a country, in this case Mozambique.

For the above, one can see that the PR system tends to reward the votes of the small political parties that would not win an entire constituency. This happened in the case of the Democratic Union (the third bench in the parliament) – a coalition of three small parties, which in 1994 received 245,793 votes, or about 5.2% of the total, giving it nine parliamentary seats.

The feeling that all people and interests in the society had an opportunity to participate or at least a chance to participate in the political realm was fundamental in easing post-war tensions and, more importantly, in rebuilding trust in the war-torn context. This is to argue that the PR system guarantees representation or at least a sense of it; its main significance is in allowing minorities to feel that their votes can make difference and that it is better to vote and struggle for change within the legal system than to resort to non-democratic means which lead to social destabilisation.

In the 1999 and 2004 elections several problems were put on table of discussion aiming at electoral reform, namely:

- The 5% threshold was severely penalizing the small parties;
- The Hond't method acts in favour of big parties; and
- The list system combined with big constituencies and party discipline acts against representation, etc.

Apart from Renamo (the major opposition political party) there are about 45 tiny political parties mushrooming in the political landscape. In the 1999 and 2004 parliaments, neither a single small party nor a coalition of small parties managed to overcome the 5% threshold of the vote cast and enter the parliament, the best record coming from one of the tiny parties was about 2% of the vote cast. The small parties started to cry out, alleging that the 5% threshold was a legal barrier to prevent them from entering the parliament and therefore preventing them from representing their electorate. The challenge always posed to the small parties was to make coalitions which it seems very difficult to do, because (i) the tiny political parties are created through personal ambitions; and (ii) political parties are not more than a single family and couple of friends coming together and registering as political parties (the political parties law makes the requirements to register as political party very easy to meet).

Not all people agreed to remove the threshold, arguing that the removal of the barrier would mean that the parliament would lose its prestige or it would become commonplace. However, recalculating or redistributing the electoral outcomes without the threshold, it was proved that the 5% threshold was not the centre of the problem. The centre of the problem was the Hond't method, which benefits the big political parties (those getting large number of votes), to the detriment of the tiny parties. Recalculating the electoral results from 1994, 1999 to 2004, without the threshold but using the Hond't method, there was only one difference (in the 2004 elections) which was a third bench in the parliament with only two seats.

The major problem is that the threshold was set by the Constitution and no amendment can be made to it until 2012, as agreed when the new Constitution was approved in 2004. To have a clear idea, the party that would have had two seats in the 2004 elections (if there was no threshold) got about 330,000 votes spread all over the country, but because of the threshold and notably because of the Hond't method, elected no MP to the parliament. The second bench in

parliament got about 2 million votes (which is only 6 times more the votes received by the above party) and elected 98 seats in the parliament.

In its turn the civil society, chiefly academia, claimed that the **list system** combined with big constituencies and the party discipline act against representation. The issue is that according to the Electoral Act, no individual candidates are accepted to parliament elections, meaning that the only legal mechanism to be a Member of Parliament is a political party. Each party has to present to the Electoral Commission the lists of its candidates per constituency and the order of the candidates indicates the party preferences. In other words, being in the bottom of the list means that the person is likely to enter the Parliament only if the party wins all seats available in that specific constituency, which is easier said than done.

The most important is the place in the list not how known or popular a certain candidate is in relation to the voters of that specific constituency, since electors vote for political parties and not for a particular candidate. This makes those who have political ambitions loyal to the bosses. Making the things worse is the fact that constituencies are very big (entire administrative provinces) and some of these constituencies due to sparse population have fewer seats than others (11 seats compared to 54 seats in other constituencies). The result is that the link between the MPs and the constituencies is very weak; the link is very weak because the people (voters) will learn after the electoral outcomes who will be their MPs in the parliament and not before, even during the electoral campaigns. Even after being elected, they hardly spend time in their constituencies in order to find out what problems are upsetting their electorate. Instead, they are busy trying to please or satisfy their political parties, mainly the bosses of the political parties, since any kind of disagreement with the party leaders would mean exclusion from the list in the following elections.

The list system also encourages the exchange of favours in return for a high position on the lists. People interested in entering the Parliament as MP have to engage in dirty politics, even paying the party bosses to secure a top position in the list. These people know that being in a high position on the list is half way to entering the parliament, because even if voters do not like the person, nothing can be done, as they will vote the list. The list system is therefore more important to political parties than it is to the voters.

From the theoretical view point, the PR system guarantees representation and therefore promotes respect for the democratic institutions by allowing minorities to feel that their votes make a difference and that it is better to fight for change within the law than to try to use non-democratic means that can cause political, economic and social instability. However, when combined with the other aspects mentioned above, it ends up not ensuring this assumption: in Mozambique, the result was that people felt less motivated to participate in the electoral process. For instance, in 1994 the vote turn out was 89% of the registered voters; in 1999 elections it was 78% of the registered voters and in 2004 elections it was not more than 36.4% of the registered voters. Taking into ac-

count those who did not even register (passive abstention) the number is be scary.

CONCLUSION

It was argued that modern politics, chiefly in democracies, is about representation, which is set through electoral mechanisms, and that elections may not in themselves be a sufficient condition for political representation, although there is little doubt that they are a necessary condition. It was also argued that electoral systems as a set of rules that govern the conduct of elections play a very important role in modern politics. The electoral systems do not only vary across the world and time but they are also, in many countries, the subject of fierce political debate and argument. It was argued that electoral systems vary in a number of ways, most notably:

- Voters may be asked to choose between candidates or between political parties;
- Voters may either select a single candidate, or vote preferentially, ranking the candidate's they wish to support in order;
- The electorate may or may not be grouped into electoral units or constituencies;
- Constituencies may return a single member or a number of members; and
- The level of support needed to elect a candidate varies from a plurality (the largest single number of votes or a 'relative' majority) to an overall or 'absolute' majority or a quota of some kind.

The essay also argued that from the theoretical viewpoint, electoral systems have concrete purposes in a certain polity under certain circumstances. These purposes might include ensuring a representative government or might favour compromise and consensus rather than conviction and principle. In particular, the essay argued that the Majoritarian systems (which are usually defended on the grounds that they offer the electorate a clear choice of potential governments) invest winning parties with a policy mandate, and help to promote strong and stable government. Proportional systems usually give government a broader electoral base, promote consensus and cooperation amongst a number of parties, and establish a healthy balance between the executive and the assembly. So, normative approach – like this is the 'best electoral system' – is neither constructive nor functional.

The essay also argued that electoral systems are not neutral devices that are put in place to rule elections, in fact, the engineering of electoral systems is politically-driven process; oriented to political agendas and sometimes involves political horse trading.

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NGO ADVOCACY: WHY THE SHIFT, AND HOW IT AFFECTS NGO PROGRAMMING

INTRODUCTION

Ideally, NGO advocacy give the poor and disadvantaged groups the tools to influence public policies and their implementation practices, to challenge the status quo by addressing social injustice issues and structural causes of inequality, to defend human rights and to promote democracy (ibid; Coates and David, 2002:530, Jordan and Tuijl, 2000). Therefore, being part of an NGO advocacy campaign will enhance the self-respect of these generally unheard and marginalized groups, and empower them in claiming their space in the political arena. These are all very idealistic and normative views that will look very good on the marketing materials of NGOs. However, an advocacy program is much harder to implement successfully, and it is not easy to measure impacts to report to donors as compared to the traditional humanitarian and service provisions projects. Thus, in engaging in advocacy, the NGOs' risks of failure are higher, so future funding might not be guaranteed.

Nevertheless, although the bigger slice of aid spending is still on addressing the symptoms of poverty, more resources have been put aside for advocacy

1 Picture downloaded from <http://www.dnhas.state.ct.us/images/j01977531.gif>, accessed on 20/06/06

programs conducted by NGOs in the North and the South (Biekart, 1999:14). There are numerous reasons put forward concerning the shift of NGO work from service provision to advocacy. Some argue that this is a survival tactic of Northern NGOs or a tool for international recognition. Others see NGO advocacy as the results of the dawning realization that the traditional NGO programming done these last fifty years failed in delivering significant change in the lives of the underprivileged people they served. Hence, their involvement in advocacy is a strategic decision to achieve long-term structural change that benefits the people. Advocacy is often seen as a project that fits in the larger democratization process and good governance framework, so funding is widely available from the liberal democracies of the North. Would this motivate the NGOs in getting involved in the messy world of politics instead of continuing with the old-fashioned programming that are more tangible and measurable?

This essay will look at how various academics have distinguished the reasons behind the shift of Northern NGOs engagement in advocacy work. Furthermore, deciding and announcing to become more politically active is one thing, but translating it into programming strategies that need staff capacity building or new staff with different sets of skills, political commitments to partners and also has budget implications. The dilemma between the immediate needs and long-term strategic change will be discussed and its reflection to the changes made in the NGOs programming and budgeting will be illustrated using the case of Catholic Relief Services.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE MULTIPLE ORIGINS OF NGO ADVOCACY

Many academics have illustrated and analyzed the more political role that Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) take in fighting the root causes of injustice and bringing significant change through their advocacy works. Advocacy in this essay is defined as a process where individuals and organizations try to influence public policies – and their practices – through the strategic use of information to democratize unequal power relations (Edwards and Hulme, 1996 as cited in Jordan and Tuijl, 2000:2052). While Anna Vakil's definition of an NGO – 'self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared toward improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people' – is used as it highlights the NGO's normative quality and its inherent advocacy potentials², Jordan and van Tuijl claim that there are discrepancies between how governments, the World Bank and other United Nations (UN) agencies see NGOs' role as service providers, while NGOs see themselves in 'a more politicized role' in advocating social changes (2000: 2051).

James Petras believes that NGO advocacy is not really addressing the deepest roots of injustice, but merely bringing the struggle to the local or national level, instead of tackling the bigger structural problem caused by the Interna-

² Vakil, 1997:2060, as cited in Jordan and Tuijl, 2000:2052 in 'Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO advocacy', World Development, Vol. 28, No 12

tional Financial Institutes (IFIs). While structural adjustment programs created havoc by reducing governments' ability to serve the people, at the same time, the IFIs provided support for NGOs to ease the pain they created. This created the perception that the government is evil while NGO is the saviour (1997:1). Petras believes that NGOs have been 'depoliticized'; they seldom take part in the struggle of the communities in preventing the government to cut down their welfare systems. Moreover, they even drafted in those local leaders into their self-help projects that reduce the importance of government (Petras, 1997).

Yet, it cannot be denied that various campaigns conducted by NGOs networks have achieved recognized successes in influencing public policies in the north and the south. Ian Anderson listed accomplishments ranging from a baby milk marketing code, to emergency food reserve for famine relief, rain forest protection, debt relief for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), raising the profile of global warming, sustainable development, and so on and so forth (2000:445, John Clark, 1992:197 as cited in Edwards, 1993:166). Furthermore, NGOs have become more important players in international politics, as shown by invitations to be part of major UN conferences; 1500 NGO representatives were present in the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and the Seattle World Trade Organization meeting had NGOs both inside as invited participants, and at the same time outside, where other NGOs were protesting and claiming their own political space (*ibid*, 446). This shows that the shift has been made.

How can this shift of focus in NGO's roles be explained? Coates and David claim that the most important reason for this change is that the NGOs realize that even the most sophisticated aid strategies will not help the poor and marginalized people, as they only treat the symptoms and not the root cause, namely: 'social exclusion' (2002:530). Some claim that globalization, with its modern information and communication technologies, has been the major drive of the growth of transnational advocacy networks, but Kathryn Sikkink argues that although they might be crucial in sustaining accelerating factors for the networks, they are not 'the engine' (2000). 'New ideas, ideologies and norms and the struggle to get them into policy agenda, and trust between the actors involved is the engine of this transnational advocacy networks.

Furthermore, decades of capacity building in southern NGOs have borne fruits with their increase in size, capacity and skills that make their mentors – the northern counterparts – no longer needed in the implementation of projects. Thus, the northern NGOs require a new purpose for their existence, namely as an advocate for the poor and marginalized in the international forum, together with their southern counterparts (Coates and David, 2002:530). 'The increasing recognition that the southern NGOs are more suitable in carrying out projects on the ground goes hand-in-hand with the growth of northern NGOs engagement in advocacy works' (*ibid*; Chapman and Fisher, 2000:151). In addition, human rights can no longer be separated from development, and there is pressure from the South for the northern NGOs to do more advocacy

campaign and policy work. In addition; successful advocacy campaigns will improve public profile for the NGOs, southern and northern, who are involved in it (Chapman and Fisher 2000:151). Thus, more support from the public, recognition from the donors and respects from governments.

How then is the motivation to do advocacy translated into programming and budgeting by NGOs? Michael Edwards use the metaphor of NGOs as doormats: they can be relied on heavily, but cannot possibly change the boots (1993). Thus, NGOs should play it safe and not make too much noise, or find alternative source of funding. Furthermore, advocacy sometimes remains mere rhetoric within the organizations; no clear strategies put in place to do advocacy either in the head office or the field offices; no strong alliances and coalitions with other actors, and failure to provide alternative solutions for the 'orthodoxies' (ibid). Instead of having advocacy as a crosscutting strategy, NGOs often put it as a separate unit detached from the other programs. Thus, those program staff and partners in the field do not really have any say about public policies in their area of work which impede it; hence the disconnect with the constituencies and the lack of capacity building for the local communities, field staff and southern NGOs in advocacy campaigning (ibid). In addition, advocacy stays quite low in the budget priority of NGOs:

Advocacy may be seen as important, but it is not urgent. Consequently, it is easily squeezed out by the day-to-day dilemmas and crises arising from the project activities, from donor pressures and from media enquiries. (Clark 1991:147 as cited in Anderson, 2000: 448).

Anderson's study shows that apart from advocacy-oriented organization like Greenpeace, NGOs spend only an average of 4% in their advocacy programs.

CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES: ADVOCACY FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE AND SOLIDARITY³

Founded in 1943 by the Catholic Bishop Conference of the United States, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) played an important role during and post world war periods in the U.S. As it is based in the U.S. and currently works in 99 countries around the world, CRS is one of the major northern NGOs. Aiding the poorest of the poor by providing humanitarian assistance, while building local capacities for self-help through economic activities, food and cash crop production, health and education services are what CRS does best. CRS has done significant work at times of disaster, man-made or natural, with their quick deliveries of humanitarian assistance even to places where other agencies do not dare to go. Even though fitting perfectly definition of an ideal NGO – serving marginalized groups, this aid and services can only be seen as putting a

³ Most data used in this section is taken from the Catholic Relief Services website <http://www.crs.org/>, and author's own experiences working for CRS Timor Leste during the period of 2002-1005

band-aid on a gaping wound, providing a temporary relief but not solving the root causes of the problem.

The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was a major turning point for CRS in reflecting on their existence and their work. Having been present in Rwanda since 1963, the CRS was shocked by the genocide. The Board Members and the Executive Management Team in CRS headquarters undertook some serious ‘soul-searching’ in trying to understand how their 40 years in Rwanda failed to address the root causes of injustice, something that could have prevented the loss of the lives of 800,000 people⁴. This led to a shift in CRS involvement in advocacy work by introducing a ‘justice lens’ to try to understand the roots of the social, economic, cultural, and political problems they addressing through their programs. Now, the challenge is how they can integrate advocacy into their programming and improve their effectiveness and impact to address the structural causes of poverty and related injustice.

CRS tried hard to put their new vision of justice on the ground by first forming a task group to see how it could be implemented in the field. In the CRS World summit in 1999, a new vision and strategy was formulated with advocacy as an important component. Advocacy guidelines and criteria were approved in 2002, and their distribution to all the country programs took a couple of months. However, their implementation did not automatically follow. In 2004, CRS started to work together with Just Associates to develop an advocacy manual and to train CRS headquarter and field staff how to use it. After this initial training of trainers, there was a ripple effect of trainings instigated from the regional and country program levels for CRS international and local staff, as well as the partners – NGOs staff and CBOs members.

Are the changes in vision and strategies, and the capacity building efforts, reflected in CRS programming? Under the ‘Advocacy’ subheading in CRS website, it is pointed out that U.S. and international policies might be the root causes of the problems in the world today:

The root causes of world poverty are often connected to international and U.S. policies that perpetuate inequity and injustice. Policies and practices related to such issues as migration, food aid, international assistance, trade, and extractive industries all make an enormous impact on the lives of poor people around the globe.

Recent CRS achievements in various international campaigns, including their involvement in negotiating better compensation for local communities in relation to the Chad and Cameron pipeline, the success of access to school for disabled children in Vietnam (now implemented nationwide), the chocolate fair trade campaign and their success in changing public policy in the Clean Diamond Act in 2003 restricting the sale of conflict diamonds. Moreover, peace

⁴ Advocacy Training Module: Making Justice and Solidarity Real, CRS, 2004: 16

building and justice have been put forward as cross-cutting themes in all the programming areas of CRS whether micro finance, agriculture, food aid, education, welfare, or health. All CRS program areas are expected to advocate for justice when the NGOs, CBOs and communities that they are working with run into structural problems.

How does this translate into their budgeting? Comparing CRS annual reports⁵ from 2002 until 2005, the funding for advocacy, which is under the 'Peace and Justice' budget line item decreased from 7.15% in 2002, to 4% in 2003 and dropped under 4% in both 2004 and 2005. At the same time, their emergency budget stay between 25% and 52%, representing the largest proportion of their total budgets. Sources of funding may limit the criticism and human rights action that NGOs can do (Petras, 1997:1, Edwards: 1993:173-174). But only around a quarter CRS income in the period of 2002-2005 came from official US government grants, and the largest proportion of income, 54% in 2003 and 51% in 2004, is in the form of 'donated agricultural and other commodities, and ocean freights'. CRS is quite fortunate to have a relatively large private income from independent donors, foundations and corporations, which gives them the potential to exert pressure on even their own government.

ANALYSIS

If CRS, like other aid agencies came to realize that traditional aid will not address the root cause of injustice, why they are not spending the largest portion of their budget to advocate social change? There are explanations for this. First, advocacy campaigns do not necessarily need as large a sum of money as humanitarian aid in tsunami-stricken-areas or war-torn-territories might. Perhaps fuel for the car to go to the senate to lobby them, or getting some staff interviewed in the national television in the U.S., or technical assistance for the southern partners in formulating their campaign strategies. Secondly, fundraising events usually rely heavily on convincing benefactors that their donations will go directly to ease suffering. Therefore, there is 'donor intent' for almost every penny donated that makes it unethical to shift the funding to other purposes.

Thirdly, on Petras' proposal that NGOs should engage in global advocacy campaigns instead of remedying the symptoms of this systemic marginalization through their aid in the local level (1997), the argument from Prof. Rema Hamami⁶ is that if all NGOs stop attending the immediate needs of the people and instead focus on challenging the government to do their job well, this will just turn people against NGOs. Worse, they will seek alternative aid, even from

⁵ CRS Annual Report 2004 and 2005 can be accessed in CRS Website, and the writer have the hard copies of the 2002 and 2003 ones.

⁶ From her presentation about NGO in a complex emergencies of conflict and post-conflict situation for 4319 class in Institute of Social Studies, 19/05/06

violent groups. Thus, CRS seeks a middle ground: advocacy in the U.S. and at the international level, and by their partners at local or national level, is a strategic move to address the root cause of injustice, complementing their work on the ground in providing direct relief to people.

Nevertheless, CRS might send mixed messages with their programming and advocacy campaigning at times. For example, while CRS initiated a fair trade campaign, they continue delivering excess US agricultural production as food aid and seed distribution for agricultural rehabilitation programs in developing countries. Furthermore, CRS commitment is not to work directly with the local communities, but only through the partners – that are usually established southern NGOs and Catholic institutions – might have its own advantages and disadvantages. It is only ethical for CRS as an international NGO not to get directly involved in the local politics, so they will only help pressure back home (on the U.S. government) or in the international community when requested by the partners. However, not all issues can be linked to international campaigns regardless of Petras' (1997) conviction that all problems in developing countries can be traced back to the rise of neo-liberalism. In addition, the voices of these partners might not necessarily reflect what the people want. Finally, not having a specific advocacy program and trusting that issues will be identified naturally though their other programs might not be the most effective advocacy strategy. The day-to-day operation might (as Clark pointed out) take the attention away from advocacy.

CONCLUSION

There are many NGOs that have attempted to have advocacy as integral part of their operation and programming by getting more politically involved, building alliances with their southern NGO counterparts and Community-based Organizations (CBOs) to bring structural change to the betterment for the poor and marginalized. While Petras (1997) provides a good illustration of how NGOs get co-opted into the neo-liberal agenda, NGO advocacy can be motivated from a genuine intention to create a more just and fair world. However, the actual implementation of the northern NGOs' intention to engage in advocacy is not always easy, as it requires a structural change within the NGO itself in terms of how they listen to the voiceless, the strategies they formulate, the technical assistance and funding provide to their southern counterparts, their budgeting as well as fundraising strategies.

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15 DIVERGENCE BETWEEN GROWTH RATES AND PER CAPITA INCOME LEVELS: A NEOCLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

According to traditional neoclassical theory, poorer countries may converge on rich countries. The Logic of convergence starts with the assumption that capital is scarce in developing countries and hence the return to capital is high there. This difference in the capital labor ratio leads to the mobility of capital from low marginal productivity (that is, the developed countries) to high marginal productivity (that is, poor countries). Accordingly, poor countries grow faster than developed countries, due to differences in the capital labor ratio. As a result the original difference in capital endowment will be equalized. Moreover the difference in technology would disappear, since technology is exogenous and accessible to everyone, everywhere, and is free of charge.

However, new neoclassical endogenous growth theories suggest that poorer countries may suffer from a technological gap and that therefore rich countries grow faster and hence the inequality increases without any bounds.

Neoclassical can be defined as including as necessary elements: a) well-behaved production and utility functions, b) rational and optimizing behavior and c) static or dynamic equilibria as the topic of analysis. This will include most of the new growth theories, as they are based on well behave production function, optimization behavior and steady state equilibrium path analysis.

This essay will discuss the possible explanations given by the neoclassical endogenous growth theories for the divergence between the rich and the poor countries.

The paper is organized as follows: Section II will present the possible explanations given by the neoclassical new growth theories to divergence and Section III will deal with alternative view and Section IV summarises the paper, and shows that neoclassical explanations are inadequate.

DIVERGENCE OF GROWTH BETWEEN COUNTRIES, FROM THE NEOCLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE

The theoretical implication of the traditional neoclassical models regarding convergence clashes with the observations, while endogenous growth models explain the lack of convergence between rich and poor countries. The source of these contrasting predictions regarding convergence is the assumptions made about production technology and the dynamics of technological progress.

The Solow growth model concludes that countries converge to the same steady state given the same level of saving rate and population growth rate.

The necessary conditions for convergence to occur are the assumption of decreasing returns to capital and free access to technology. The optimistic convergence made by this model is not observed in reality. The inability of the model to describe the actual growth condition of countries may be due to its oversimplified assumptions.

Models developed after Solow's growth model tried to explain the absence of convergence. The new growth theories criticized the assumption of diminishing returns to capital. These models differ considerably among themselves but they all agree on the abandonment of the assumption of the diminishing return to capital of traditional neoclassical growth theory. According to these newer models, there are many reasons why return to capital might not diminish, for example if capital is defined to include knowledge, information, human capital in terms of skill and training. The endogenous growth theories therefore share the common aim of explaining long-term growth of per capita income as the product of the economic system itself.

The most simple of the endogenous growth models is the Ak model. This model is associated with the name of Romer, who built upon the 'learning by doing' defined by Arrow (1962). The model includes human capital as a by-product of capital accumulation. A firm that increases its capital stock also learns to produce more efficiently a situation known as 'learning by doing'. Achieving sustained growth in this way is based on the postulate that increasing a firm's capital stock increases its stock of knowledge, which can be accessed by any firm at zero cost. The accumulated knowledge produces constant returns to scale with respect to the reproducible input capital.

According to the Ak model, steady growth and a steadily increasing capital-labor ratio are possible because of the absence of decreasing marginal productivity of capital. Constant marginal returns to capital, and therefore endogenous growth (depending on the savings rate) arises because a higher increase of the capital stock (as a result of higher savings) affects production directly and indirectly through the induced development of new ideas and therefore through the efficiency with which capital is used.

Thus difference in long run saving rates may lead to a lack of convergence between countries.

A model of technological progress through investment in research and Development (R&D), which was developed by Lucas (1988) and Robelo (1991) assumes that goods and services on one hand and investment on human capital (knowledge) on the other hand are produced by different technologies. Given this assumption the growth rate depends not only on the saving rate but also on the amount of inputs devoted to the sector of R&D. Therefore divergence between countries may be the result of underinvestment in the R&D and human capital.

Another model of growth through creative destruction, developed by Aghion & Howitt (1992) emphasizes the importance of innovation. The creative destruction of the old technologies by new inventions and the process of introducing these new inventions are considered to explain growth. There are many types of innovations that can be as source of creative destruction in an industry. These include new equipment, products, sources of labor and raw materials, new methods of organizing and inventory management, transporting, communicating, advertising and marketing and new financial instruments. Therefore growth is a function of the rate of new invention, its magnitude and the labor force devoted to research.

The Grossman and Helpman's expanding varieties model (1991) tries to explain divergence in terms of differences in R&D productivity. Their model assumes monopolistic competition as opposed to the perfect competition of Solow, and introduces the factor of 'innovating entrepreneur', who invests in R&D until the marginal benefit of doing so is the same as that of the marginal cost of adding a new variety into the market. Economic growth is then a function of R&D productivity, and convergence or divergence can be due to difference in the productivity of R&D across countries.

In sum, the neoclassicals explain the divergence in level of development between countries as a result of differences in saving rates, human capital and those parameters that are associated with the efficiency of R&D, rate of innovation and the effort and labor force allocated to research.

Therefore, for the neoclassicals, the divergence of growth rates between countries is a simple phenomenon that is derived from the internal characteristics of each country, including its decision to invest in human and physical capital, its allocation of labor in R&D and its policy with regard to trade and capital flow, and therefore it is government failure and inefficiency that leads to lower growth. They argue for openness and liberalization, as they believe it will lead to a greater possibility of attracting capital and getting skilled labor through the efficient private provision of education.

DIVERGENCE: ALTERNATIVE VIEW

The neoclassical policy failure argument is not plausible given the fact that many countries have experienced low growth rates for over a hundred years (Pritchett 1997).

The divergence that is observed between countries is a result of uneven development which is inherent in the capitalist system of production. According to John Weeks, there are primary and secondary levels of uneven development, whereby the first shows that part of unevenness resulting from the dynamic expansion of capitalist countries relative to those where capitalism is at an early stage, and the second is the kind of unevenness that occurs within the capitalist countries due to competition and adoption of technological innovations with the social relations of capital. The emergence of wage labor within commodity production, whereby workers become the instruments of capitalist

production and capital extracts the profit, leads to uneven development, which becomes dynamic given the movement of capital as it shifts its ability to buy labor and other resources among industries and regions. To overcome its constraints, capital moves and the division of the world into colonial powers and colonies and underdeveloped and advanced countries leads to dynamism in capitalist relations.

This is the primary source of uneven development. According to Marx, the competition in the capitalist system is the source of excesses and is the result of the systematic outcome of the process and it is this competition that leads to instability, crisis and uneven development at the secondary level. Moreover the technological change can create a difference in unit cost between sectors, when some capitalists are sluggish to adopt new techniques when use or non-use is decided by the profit motive.

CONCLUSION

As is clear from the discussion above, the new neoclassical growth theories are formed around the central idea that the return to capital is no longer diminishing when we accept that components other than physical capital, such as human capital, displays endogenous accumulation. This introduction of human capital helps to explain why rates of return to physical capital may not be as high in poor countries as predicted by the Solow model.

The fact that there is abundance of skilled labor in the rich countries compared to the poor countries explains the non-flow of capital to the developing countries which is assumed to exist in neoclassical models due to the diminishing marginal returns to capital. This is because the rate of return on physical capital is safeguarded by an expanding stock of human capital. The divergence between countries can also be the result of difference in long-run savings rates. As poor countries have low saving rates, they have less capital stock as well as less efficiency in ways capital can be used in production, which together result in lower growth rates in their economies.

Perpetual growth is possible due to the existence of positive externalities that offset the falling marginal return to physical capital. The positive externalities mentioned by the endogenous growth theories originate in activities such as research and development (R&D), rate and magnitude of new invention, the dissemination of knowledge, efforts devoted to R&D and effectiveness of R&D.

In this sense the neoclassical economic theory is explaining the divergence of growth rates between countries as a simple phenomenon that is derived from the internal characteristics of each country (including its decision to invest in human and physical capital, its allocation of labor in R & D and its policy with regard to trade and capital flow) and therefore neoclassicists argue that the more open a country is, the greater the possibility of attracting capital and hence the higher the growth rate will be. For them there is no theoretical base for some countries to grow faster than others, given economic conditions that

are explained by universal laws (that determines individual agents' behaviors) and universal external factors. As a consequence, they believe the role of governments should be limited and economies should liberalize, getting skilled human capital by creating efficient educational systems (that can be assured through privatization of education) and free capital flows (through liberalizing the capital flows). So it is the bad policies by governments that are the cause for the low growth rates and hence divergence.

But this policy failure argument is hardly plausible as an explanation of uneven development extended over such a long period of time and among many countries. Rather, this divergence between countries is well explained by Marx as it is a result of the system itself, which is characterized by uneven development resulting from the capital relations of production and the competition as well as difference in unit costs between sectors.

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16 GLOBALIZATION: HERE TO STAY

INTRODUCTION

Here to stay...

Globalization is a fact. The world is becoming smaller, with increasing interconnection and interdependence (Berner, 2005), and this shrinking is getting faster each day. 'Space time compression' they call it; transformation into one place, with a single social system. (Giddens, 1989)

Even though some may think globalization is a myth, they still recognize 'the consequences of its power to organize our thoughts as to how the world works has real effects'. (Chernomas and Sepehri, 2003)

Globalization is not wrong or right *per se*. It is how this process is dealt with, and the principles it may be based upon, that determines if for a certain country, community or even person, this process is perceived as negative or positive.

Therefore, understanding globalization as a 'strategic attempt to shape the world according to certain ideological principles' (Berner, 2005) is a perspective that, more than a description of a reality, gives value to the process.

The movements that have opposed globalization, such as the World Social Forum and the Global Justice and Solidarity Movement, have stated that it is not the process of globalization which they are against. They are against neoliberal – sometimes called corporate-dominated or hegemonic – globalization, against the triumph of liberal economic ideas. (Waterman, 2004; De Sousa Santos, 2004; Guerra 2001). They do not believe that neoliberalism and 'global competition will tend towards a pareto-optimal spatial distribution of economic activities in the world economy' or contribute to the development of efficiency oriented states. (Messner, 2004)

The score...

The scenario that assumes possible Pareto optimality has been largely contested. The critics of free market capitalization argue globalization is benefiting some only at the expenses of others.

Brecher and Costello (1994) point out that 'the costs of the present free market global economic system, (...) include a decline in the real value of wages and in working conditions, increases in poverty and social inequality, and environmental degradation'.

In the case of Latin America, Barkin argues the ‘neoliberal opening is a nightmare. Falling real income, increasing unemployment and the accelerated withdrawal of social safety nets leaves us with few alternatives.’ (Barkin, 2003) The strict application of such a model has only lead to impoverish several sectors of society. (Guerra, 2001; Razeto, 2001)

Some authors suggest what must be done in order to enhance local competitiveness to improve insertion into the global world economy, but as Guimaraes (1998) points out, the competitiveness approach is not applicable to ‘localities and regions that are not, and are unlikely ever to become, world class’.

Even though hegemonic globalization may be creating unprecedented opportunities for certain regions, it is at the same time aggravating ‘the problems of development in peripheral regions and localities’ (Guimaraes, 1998). In their struggle for survival within the global marketplace, many of the world’s rural populations are doomed to marginality and permanent poverty. (Barkin, 2003).

The unlucky...

If we accept there are losers in the neoliberal globalization, and they usually happen to be the already marginalized groups, of whom are we talking? People who live in rural areas are naturally the first ‘losers’ that come to mind. However, among the marginalized, I want to focus on a more specific group, with certain attributes and living conditions that may marginalize them even more: the indigenous people in Latin America.

As has been pointed out by academic researchers and indigenous organizations, the ‘market-driven global processes are increasing environmental deterioration and poverty in indigenous communities blocking the viability of sustainable indigenous communities and societies’ (Houghton and Bell, 2004).

Some authors are more radical and argue neoliberalism ‘seeks to integrate indigenous peoples for purposes of economic exploitation’ and is therefore ‘causing genocide and ethnocide’. (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003). In this context, many indigenous people perceive ‘globalization’ as a euphemism for a second colonization. (Houghton and Bell, 2004)

Indigenous people in Latin America tend to be among the most vulnerable groups in their societies. According to a study of CELADE (the Latin-American and Caribbean Center of Demography), 79% of indigenous peoples in Peru are poor and half are in extreme poverty. ‘Structural poverty affects the indigenous communities most intensely, limiting their full enjoyment of their human rights, including their economic, social, and cultural rights’ (International Commission of Human Rights, 2000).

The struggle...

Indigenous people around the world have a common claim: to achieve self-determination and fundamental rights. ‘They are fighting for the right to exist as distinct people and to prosper in their own cultures and traditions’ (Jackson et al, 1982).

As part of the global justice movement, indigenous people have come forward claiming 'recognition of collective rights, including territory, autonomy, self-determination, and the fundamental rights such as education, health and community infrastructure' (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003).

The right to self-determination was first described in the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights (1966) as a people's right to establish their own political, social, economic, and cultural development. As Carlson (2002) says, the designation of indigenous groups as 'peoples' rather than national minorities permitted, for the first time, an interpretation of self-determination that applied to subgroups within a nation and led to a new analysis of their relationship to the nation-state.

In Latin American countries local and regional indigenous movements began to strengthen in the 1970s 'around the demand for self-determination and autonomy – the latter defined as the exercise of self-determination'. This process has strengthened the advocacy skills and, at the same time, helped 'consolidate de facto autonomy within their communities'. (Carlsen, 2002?)

The recognition of self-determination and fundamental rights will only be possible if governments 'respect indigenous peoples' autonomy within their traditional territories' and 'fulfill their responsibilities, ensuring differentiated social policies, with ample participation by indigenous peoples at all stages of discussion and implementation'. (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003).

All these claims are also expressed in the ILO Convention on Indigenous Peoples and Tribes, the most important international framework supporting indigenous struggle:

The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition, they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional development which may affect them directly. (Convention 169 on Indigenous Peoples and Tribes, 1989)

Therefore, it is important to choose a strategy that reduces their further marginalization, which in general but especially with regard to indigenous peoples necessarily involves taking into consideration the context and decision making process, and where the main protagonists are the peoples themselves.

This, we understand, is not an easy task nor will it necessarily assure the best 'economic' outcome, in terms of high employment and economic growth expressed by increase in GNP per capita. However, it is consistent with a vision of development that places people's well-being in the centre of its discussion (as an end) and understands economic development as one of the processes that may help improve the quality of life of people (as a means).

Defining a strategy depends on the priorities of people and their freedom to choose, and to be able to choose involves developing capacities and providing

opportunities. The access to opportunities will allow them to have the conditions that lead them to live a flourishing life.

The case...

The Peruvian Amazon represents 60% of Peruvian territory. In it 56 indigenous peoples, from 17 ethnolinguistic families, co-exist. The indigenous peoples from the Amazon were forced in the 1970s to organize in 'native' communities, in order to be acknowledged in Peru's legislation, even though this is not their traditional organizational structure. So far, more than 1200 native communities in the Amazon have been recognized to exist.

One specific ethno linguistic family, the Arahua family, includes Ashaninka, Nomatshiguenga, Yanasha and Yine indigenous peoples. Precise statistics on the population of these indigenous people does not exist, but they are distributed in almost 500 native communities in Peru's central Amazon. Their access to basic services and the infrastructure they have access to are both very limited in these communities.

The strategies...

The Arahua family went through a process of formulating a development plan in 2002. In this process, the different communities identified their priorities and a common vision they shared for the future. As a result, they identified their main concern: the need for real self-determination and freedom in the choice of how they wished to leave their lives.

The starting point...

Among their choices, the indigenous people stated quite clearly their need for basic services such as utilities, education and health. However, these services were not privileged as a means to catch up with what they call western culture but as a means of assuring basic conditions that may allow them to exercise their right for self-determination. A strategy involving development efforts focused on infrastructure, education, health is prioritized by the indigenous people part of the Arahua family.

Having access to these services does not mean every community will have its own school or hospital, it means there should be access to education and health for them. It does not mean they will all have a highway in front of their 'maloca' or electricity in every house. It means they would like rural roads improved and access to alternative (i.e. solar) power.

This strategy will not necessarily lead towards an eventual catch-up in these communities, but can assure a more sustainable development in a fragile ecosystem like the Amazon. Even when it does not bring economic growth, providing services to the native communities for them to fulfill their self-determination right to stay in their territory and live in a quite alternative economy, results in direct benefits for Peru as a nation. After all, they are the ex-

perts, both in knowledge and in practice, on how to protect the fragile environment and therefore efficiently manage the natural resources and great biodiversity that makes the Amazon unique.

The alternative...

Even though the perspective used to address this question comes from a people-centered development approach, it demands an analysis of the economic alternative it proposes to assure the viability of such a development approach.

The main challenge for this kind of approach is to come up with solutions that are less market dependent, that:

take into account the redundancy of large portions of the population to the current framework for production and economic growth, and, therefore, provide for these people by creating a system in which communities can survive without complete integration into the global marketplace. (Barkin, 2003)

This does not mean complete isolation, but it does mean looking for alternatives to a development that privileges becoming world class. Therefore this strategy must respond to 'the dual challenges of insulating these communities from further encroachment and assuring their viability'. (Barkin)

The Arahuaac development plan faces both challenges. On one hand, the indigenous people insist on maintaining traditional economic practices and nonmarket values such as community, sustainability, cooperation and relation with their territory are mentioned (Plan de Desarrollo Arahuaac, 2002). For the indigenous people from the Amazon, economic life has a deep social purpose and does not pursue wealth accumulation (OIT Andina, 1997) It is precisely these values that have been used by Luis Razeto to develop a model called 'economy of solidarity', which acknowledges traditional economies where people with common goods work together in cooperation to satisfy common needs and achieve the well being of their local community. (Neticoop, 2002)

At the same time, the economy in the indigenous communities part of the Arahuaac family are no longer 100% subsistence-oriented. Though the percentage of subsistence crops is much higher than for non-indigenous population in the central Amazon, the indigenous people now combine their traditional productive practices with the consumption of goods from other regions, acquired in local markets with the income generated from selling some of their products, animals hunted and fish, as well as handicrafts.

The communities of the Arahuaac family found it necessary to access new markets for certain products, in particular those that are only produced in this region. Being able to understand the contrast between maintaining traditional practices and accessing new markets (even if these are local or national) is essential in order to imagine a sustainable and equitable economic future for the indigenous people.

It is not enough for economic initiatives to be economically viable; they must also be compatible with the way of life they are defending. Therefore, they

should support the patterns of social organization, the values of the community and the everyday needs of the people (OIT Andina).

Considering the little knowledge and experience Amazon indigenous people have regarding how the markets work, it is essential to assess initiatives critically and carefully, in order to ensure they are compatible with what they defend. Local capacities must be enhanced in order for indigenous peoples really to exercise self-determination and propose an alternative development that may fit best their reality.

All about priorities...

Out-migration, like globalization, is a fact and as such must be taken into consideration when formulating national development strategies. However, in the discussion concerning strategies that must respond to neoliberal globalization's tendency to further marginalize periphery regions and localities, the priorities must be set straight. Only focussed on the development of urban centers will further marginalize the localities that are already great losers of the global market game.

Improving access to opportunities and life conditions in urban areas is important, but must not be taken as the only effort to be pursued by development initiatives. Doing so will create a vicious circle, where cities are viewed as the only way out, and therefore, the out-migration rates will continue to increase.

Population in urban centers near the central Amazon has certainly increased: from 1940 to 1981 it increased from 23,000 inhabitants to approximately 213,000 inhabitants. But so far, this increase has been a direct result of 'in' migration from people of the highlands, more than a result of 'out' migration from the native communities. The easy access to land for agriculture, timber and cattle breeding in certain zones has intensified the migration processes towards the Amazon, and therefore has placed a pressure on the ecosystem.

Out-migration cannot be easily identified with the common vision the Arahuaque have. For indigenous people from the Amazon, territory is conceived as a common good, part of who they are and part of nature. They belong to it and therefore want to defend their rights to stay on it. This is another reason why the development efforts on providing education, health, infrastructure and so on, need to be part of the combination of strategies.

CONCLUSION

To conclude...

Neoliberal globalization is uneven. Inequality has grown as an effect and already marginalized 'periphery' localities and people have been further marginalized. One clear example are the indigenous people living in native communities in Peruvian's central Amazon.

Thinking of a strategy that may improve their conditions in the world system demands a decision making process guided by their own view of the world

and their future. This view has been consistently a quest for self-determination and access to fundamental rights. Therefore, concentrating development efforts in providing access to basic services and infrastructure, such as education, health and utilities, are a must. But they are not a must because the access to these services will assure an eventual catching up with the global market. Instead, it will enable them to have access to fair opportunities that may lead them to live flourishing lives.

On the other hand, being able to define an alternative development that may answer their specific view of life and future is essential, and is directly related to their struggle for self-determination. The quest for this alternative is a learning process that requires strengthening local capacities to make efficient use of their self-determination.

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