AN EXERCISE IN WORLDMAKING

The International Institute of Social Studies

Best Student Essays of 2013/14

PERSPECTIVES IN DEVELOPMENT
An Exercise in Worldmaking

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This book might have never come to fruition if it was not for the leadership of Yenutien Kombian. She kickstarted the Editorial Committee at a time when many were thinking they were done with ISS completely (having just completed their central Research Paper of the year). She encouraged us to follow through, and continued her support for the project through the end. Thank you, Yen!!

Special and deep thanks also go to the selection committee and all the editors who gave their time and energies to see this done, and done right!

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Thank you to the Course Administrators taking time from their busy schedule to supply the essays in the shortest possible time in order to meet the deadline.

Thanks also to Martha Jane Robbins and Tim Feodoroff for providing some insight into how previous (more organized!) batches went about this process.
Foreword

What is a ‘best essay’? Who determines what constitutes excellence, and how it compares with something that is somehow not excellent? This book is the result of a group of ISS students who grappled with these questions, on a short timeline, in order to provide the reader with content that hopefully educates, inspires, and shares something about the ISS community and its intellectual pursuits. ‘Excellence’ may not always translate into the academic essay form, from a student’s personal experience, creativity, accumulated wisdom, or embodied knowledge. It is important to acknowledge this: that school-based assessment (i.e. grading) often fails to capture the nuanced and diverse ways that people create, share, and live knowledge. Instead, such educational and pedagogical traditions can reward conformity to standards, informational regurgitation, and obsequious teacher worship. The Editorial Committee remains committed to the existence and importance of unconventional forms of knowledge that do not fit snugly into academic frames—alternative knowledges sometimes recognized in the realm of ‘decoloniality’.

As is the tradition for this collection, the Editorial Committee received from ISS Course Administrators the two highest-graded assignments from each course, with permission from the Board of Examiners. Acknowledging the above issues, we focused our efforts on selecting from these the essays that best expressed the 2013-2014 batch’s capacity to think for ourselves, to step outside of the pre given box, to think from our positionality while retaining a critical approach, and to bring up tough questions without presuming to provide perfect answers. We feel this approach could better represent the true creativity and contribution of the ISS MA community. We have also included two poems by our honorary poet laureate and positivity guru, Mawutodzi Abissath. Mawu has taught us, time and time again, that entering graduate school at any age is an experience best pursued with passion, an
open mind, humility, and a never-ending drive to understand better. It also helps to carry a smile—voila!

Because of our late start and short production timeline, we pursued a very rapid selection process. In this, teams of two volunteer editors assessed groups of up to 8 papers each (out of the 57 we received), providing their selections based on criteria—including originality, readability, and convincingness of argument—to advance to the next round. From there, we met as a group to discuss the selections as a whole, and to cut the assembled 28 papers down to a more reasonable number. Here we ran into trouble, because we realized that we had received only ONE submission from the Economics of Development (ECD) major! To rectify this imbalance and avoid underrepresenting ECD in the collection, we reached out directly to the students and requested submissions. These were of high caliber (of course!) so we ended up being able to include ECD properly, and the result is the collection of 17 that you now hold in your hand. Nick, Irene, and Prarthana of the editorial committee were driving forces in ensuring that ECD was included.

This editorial process involved *much* reading on the part of the members of the selection committee, and the capacity of these editors to think outside of their disciplines and areas of interest. We had Social Policy for Development (SPD) major students reading Agrarian and Environmental (AES) themed papers; we had Social Justice Perspectives (SJP) students reading papers about Governance, Policy, and Political Economy (GPPE), and so on. We had one ECD student help assess the first ECD paper we received, but ECD members stepped up especially in the final days of the process of editing.

“Development studies” encompasses an array of issues, theoretical traditions, conceptual frameworks, and empirical interests. As such, it would be impossible to cover all relevant topics, all the more so considering the incredible geographic and societal range of ISS’s students—and their interests. Nonetheless, a brief introduction to the range of issues the selected papers convey can provide a sense of the contribution they make to the understanding and practice of ‘development’.

The first section’s contributions bring attention to the issues outlined at the start of this introduction: the possibilities and limitations inherent in our current systems of knowledge attainment and knowledge perpetuation—that is, research (Chapter 1) and education (Chapter 2). Speaking from personal experience, and with conscious relation to others and their experienc-
es, these contributors show the value of critical reflexivity in development research.

The second section’s contributions tackle the important and contested role of the state in shaping rights and opportunities for citizens within its bounds. States—whether active contributors to dispossession (Chapter 3), or active (albeit conflicted and all too often ineffecual) builders of spaces for citizen involvement (Chapter 4)—always act in relation to civil society (Chapter 5), and so these contributions highlight the importance of an eye for dynamic state-society relations.

The third section showcases the interconnectedness of global systems—and the inescapable term of ‘globalization’. Yet truly, what we see are in fact *globalizations*, differentiated, interacting, and contingent. Chapter 6 elaborates on such iteration in an analysis of how Japan’s food systems are interlinked with global politics of aid, development, and land grabs. Chapter 7 and 8 provide macroeconomic and financial policy analyses; here, the nexus of inequality, growth, and financial reform can be seen within ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, but also between them. Though *globalizations* are not just economic phenomena (culture and values can also be *globalized*), this section shows us how central capital flows remain for understanding development.

Stepping back from the materialist direction of development research, we must not forget that humans are ‘narrative animals’, and that development processes are shaped by words and thoughts, just as they are by actions. Analyzing media coverage of terrorism in Africa (Chapter 9) shows some of the key roles played by discourse in development studies. Such analytical exercises are not just empty theorizing: as Chapter 10 shows, perceptions about the nature of “women” shape state policies, and can limit the effectiveness of NGOs trying to ‘help’ women become less ‘vulnerable’.

The next section’s papers deal with diverse aspects of the ‘rights’ that are pursued in the course of development: rights to early childhood development (Chapter 11), to food security (Chapter 12), to an uncorrupt government (Chapter 13), and to participate in policy formation, but also gain substantive rights from policy so developed (Chapter 14). Rights are a complex topic, having evolved alongside development as a field and practice, and remain a relevant discursive frame and policy tool.

The last section deals with transformations. A book review explores changes in how we see children’s roles with regards to work (Chapter 15). A multi-country project analysis looks at changes in childhood poverty conditions from one generation to the next (Chapter 16). Lastly Chapter 17 offers
a take on transforming the meaning of “work”. The essay’s ambitious re-thinking of this core concept may be a bit esoteric, but its arguments get at the core of many questions of development—how are we to build a new world, where people have what they need, have good work, and are not exploited or oppressed? Perhaps some rethinking is in order.

It has been a pleasure putting this together, and on behalf of the entire team that put efforts in to ensure its release, thank you for reading.

Antonio Roman-Alcalá
ISS, The Hague, Netherlands, 2014

P.S. to explain the back cover: These four symbols are of Ghanaian origin, though their meanings should link all human cultures: knowledge, as the never ending pursuit of learning and never a finished product; wisdom and creativity, two sides of the same coin; interdependence and cooperation, the latter which builds on the former’s unavoidability; unity, which comes from and with understanding, and democracy, the way we carry forward these principles in the ways we organize and ‘develop’ our human societies. We hope these symbols remind you that sometimes, words are not enough.
**BE USEFUL**

If you cannot be the sun  
To cast light,  
You can be the moon  
To reflect light.  
If you cannot be the sea  
To float a ship,  
You can be a river  
To ferry a canoe.  
If you cannot be a forest  
To produce timber  
You can be a bush  
to provide herbs.  
If you cannot be the grass  
To feed a cow,  
You can be a worm  
To nourish a sparrow;  
No matter your position in life,  
You can always be USEFUL;  
SO BE USEFUL!

Mawutodzo Kodzo Abissath  
(1987)
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Epistemological Reflections: The Descendents of the Kat River Valley

ZULEIKA BIBI SHEIK

This ground was washed clean by blood.
The blood comes from my grandfather.
After my grandfather, there came a war (the Second World War).
We gave three sons.
Three sons, I gave up to death.
To make this place free, that it should be a free place.
—Piet Draghoender

INTRODUCTION

The term epistemology is derived from the Greek words episteme meaning knowledge and logos meaning word or speech, as such epistemology concerns itself with the nature, origin and scope of knowledge (Web 1:2014). More specifically, Robert Audi (1998:2) defines epistemology as “the theory of knowledge and justification”. For Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (2003:18) epistemology is the evaluative mechanism through which we “conceptualise our reality and our images of the world”. From the above one can deduce epistemology to be concerned with the conceptions of reality, in relation to the justification and evaluation of knowledge. Thus, epistemology is intrinsic to the research process as it is an indication of the researcher’s view of reality and approach to knowledge production.

In accordance, this paper presents the epistemological reflections and methodological choices of my proposed study on the Kat River commu-
nity of the Eastern Cape in South Africa, who have faced systematic dispossession of their land and continuous threats of cultural assimilation. A focus of this study is on valorising the often silenced voices of this community by highlighting their potential as agents of change, enabling them to take charge of their own development (Dutta 2011; Gumucio-Dagron 2009).

The discussion begins with a brief introduction of the history of the Kat River community, this is followed by the rationale for the study, its epistemological underpinnings and the resulting methodological choices.

BACKGROUND

The history of the Coloured community of the Kat River Valley in the Eastern Cape, South Africa is one of marginality, lament and contestation (Tomaselli 2007:131-136). They have bared witness to the systematic dispossession of their land, first by colonial lawyers in the early nineteenth century (cf. Peires, 1984, 1987), then by the apartheid government in the mid-1980s and now through their trials with the land claims commission. The complexity of their conundrum was spontaneously expressed by Piet Draghoender in his ‘lament’ (Appendix 1) which was unexpectedly captured on video by the crew of the 1984 documentary Kat River—The End of Hope (Tomaselli 2007:133).

Draghoender, a Coloured illiterate peasant farmer of Khoi descent, rendered an anguished plea against the impending eviction from his place of birth. The significance of this ‘lament’ lies in it being representative of the feelings of the community as a whole (Peires, 1988). The years following the documentary saw a tirade of attention, with Draghoender’s ‘lament’ being published internationally, and translated into English and French. Soon thereafter the community was dispersed by land consolidation involving the Ciskei Bantustan. Now, nearly 30 years later the echoes of Draghoender’s ‘lament’ reverberates among the descendants of the Kat River Valley as they face contemporary issues of land restitution (Chapman 2003; Tomaselli 2007).

1 Coloured is a disputed term in South Africa. It emerged early in colonial history to identify people of mixed European and African ancestry (Crawhall 2001: 28).

2 Homelands.
The plight of the Kat River community was brought to my attention by Professor Keyan Tomaselli, who was involved in the production of Kat River—The End of Hope (Peires 1984) documentary and was present during Draghoender’s ‘lament’. Professor Tomaselli was recently approached by Deon Sydney !Khari!as Arends, custodian of the Hoengeyqua Peoples Council of the Katrivier, to provide assistance and guidance in the restoration of three historical sites which the council has identified as having significant cultural heritage value (Arends 2013). More specifically, the council asked for guidance regarding the protection and restoration of the sites, how these sites can be used as a means of development through a cultural tourism project and how to bring about awareness of the history and culture of the Kat River community. Thus, this study takes a bottom-up approach to research with the objectives of the study derived from the community itself.

RATIONAL

The rationale for this study is linked to the long tumultuous history of the Kat River community, who are at the fringes of mainstream society and whose voices are often silenced—both formally (academia) and informally. Thus this study aims to revive a narrative that has gone unwritten for the past 30 years and in doing so attempts to foster agency within the community.

As this has been a neglected research site, a starting point of the research is the Kat River communities’ understanding of development. Whilst, the rationality of development discourse holds its own merit, the purpose of this study is to investigate the latent epistemological gaps, connections and opportunities that exist between local discourses and government policy discourses. Evidence of one of the gaps can be noted in local forms of expression, as employed by Draghoender during his lament where he utilised oral tradition, emotion, spirituality and nostalgia to express his concerns, in comparison government policy documents on development are rational, judicious and incisive. During this process the characteristics of this gap will be unearthed; this will shed light on the possible barriers to development and the options, for getting the Kat River community to see themselves as agents of change who take charge of their own development. This will culminate in the Kat River community being trained to adopt rational discourses of development so they
can function dually as indigenous people and as modern citizens-in-the-making (Robins 2001: 833).

Secondly, my study seeks to explore how meaning is ascribed to the three Kat River cultural heritage sites by employing a memory studies approach that elicits how the community remembers its history. This explorative approach will be the first entry point in my methodology and will focus on interrelations between i) collective memory (Halbwachs 1992); ii) cultural memory (Assmann 1997); and iii) sites of memory (Nora 1989), each of which acknowledges the visceral and vulnerable nature of memories, thus creating an aperture for meaning, enabling the absence of an event to be experienced in the present through “sites of memory” (Nora 1989). In this way, my study will capture a specific context at a specific time.

Lastly, the focal point of this study is to develop a regulatory schematic model for the sustainable development of cultural and heritage sites for tourism. The purpose of this model will be to guide development practitioners, communities and policy-makers in considerations of government policy in the decision-and-action process of reviving a cultural heritage site for tourism purposes. This model will be based on Lauren Dyll-Myklebust’s (2012:196) Public Private Community Partnership (PPCP) model (Appendix 2) which was developed “to account for the multiple dimensions of the type of development communication strategies to be employed in establishing and starting operations of a PPCP [tourist] lodge”. In this study the use of the PPCP model will provide structure and guidelines that aid discussion and elucidate complex phenomena that is specific to development communication and tourism (Anderson et al. 2005; Keeves 1997; Schoenfeld 2000; Romberg 1992).

**Epistemological Underpinnings**

This study is informed by a Critical Indigenous Qualitative Research (Denzin and Lincoln 2008) approach which is embedded in the decolonial paradigm. It employs interpretive research practices which aim to be ethical, transformative, decolonising, participatory, and committed to both dialogue and the community.

Interpretivism seeks to study the natural contexts in which social phenomena occur. Opposing the positivist view that ‘reality’ is ‘out there’ and can be captured, interpretivist researchers “explore the ways
that people make sense of their social worlds and how they express these understandings through language, sound, imagery, personal style and social rituals (Deacon et al. 1999:5). As this research is focussed on local understandings of development and the meaning the community ascribe to their experiences, it aligns with interpretative research practices which encourage dialogue, co-production of knowledge and meaning-making (Deacon et al. 1999).

A positivist view would be unsuited to this study as it focuses on atomistic events that can be controlled in a laboratory or by closed question surveys/questionnaires which results in a one-way process (Deacon et al., 1999). This would defeat the participatory goal of this research and dismiss the voices of the community as superfluous to the research objective. Congruently, critical realism, would also fall short with regard to the research objectives. Critical realism’s agnostic approach to research can be viewed as ‘sitting on the fence’ in terms of being the bed-fellow of both positivism and interpretivism. Its strong focus on causal generative mechanisms, discovering if they have been activated, and under which conditions poses a threat to dialogue (Schostak 2002). The propensity of critical realism to focus on the underlying enabling and constraining structures, may result in diluting the meaning-making process and take attention away from the transformative potential of this research. Another concern is that critical realism’s positivist tendencies may hinder the acknowledgement and validity of local forms of expression.

As the indigeneity of the Kat River community is a focal point of this study, it is important to note that “research” has historically been associated with imperialism and colonialism, enduring as one of “dirtiest words” in the indigenous world (Smith 1999:1). Thus, there is a need to decolonise research methodologies and engage in research that is ethical, participatory, respectful and transformative. This process of decolonisation “engages with imperialism and colonialism at multiple levels. For researchers, one of those levels is concerned with having a more critical understanding of the underlying assumptions, motivations and values which inform research practices” (Smith 1999:20).

This sentiment is echoed by Ramon Grosfoguel (2007:211) who encourages researchers from the Global South to produce “radical and alternative knowledge” rather than reproducing the “epistemic schema” of the Global North. Similarly Walter Mignolo (2010) points out the need
for researchers to debunk the myth that whilst the First World (Global North) has knowledge, the Third World (Global South) has culture. In the modernisation paradigm culture is seen as a barrier to development (Rogers, 1976/2006), thus this research aims to take up Mignolo’s challenge and provide evidence for the leveraging of culture as an enabling tool in facilitating development.

**METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH**

As this study aligns with the development priorities identified by the Hoengeyqua Peoples Council, it aims to be decolonising and participatory from the onset. Thus, the interpretative research methods utilised will position research informants as co-producers of knowledge, leading to community agency and meaningful autonomous development.

My methods, fieldwork and analysis will be embedded in a constructivist grounded theory where emerging data is used to generate knowledge rather than verifying a hypothesis. Although grounded theory has its foundations in the objectivist and positivist paradigms, Glaser (1978) points out that grounded theory has evolved along with social sciences move away from positivism. The resulting constructivist grounded theory is more robust than other constructivist methodologies and places emphasis on the interaction between researcher and informants with the researcher’s perspective being part of the process (Charmaz 2000).

As a methodology, constructivist grounded theory is concerned with uncovering basic social processes and is ideal for exploring social relationships, the behaviour of groups and the contextual factors that affect their lives (Glaser 1978; Crooks 2001). Accordingly this study utilises a memory studies approach, which includes interpretive research methods such as on-the-ground research through participant observation, semi-structured in-depth, face-to-face interviews and focus groups. The data derived from the focus groups and interviews, will serve as development narratives, a method in which oral traditions of imagery and the intangible, in this case the memories of the Kat River descendants, will elucidate the meanings and expectations they attach to development thereby lending to local discourses of development (Dyll-Myklebust, forthcoming).

In this study voice plays a pivotal role in the research process. In qualitative research voice “refers to the multiple, and often conflicting,
interpretive positions that must be engaged in the representation of data” (Fabian 2008:944). In this research these interpretive positions can be identified as all research participants, including community members, government officials, industry experts and the researcher herself. Thus, for the researcher voice is the:

...struggle to figure out how to present the author’s self while simultaneously writing the respondents’ accounts and representing their selves. Voice has multiple dimensions: first there is the voice of the author. Second there is the presentation of the voices of one’s respondents within the text. A third dimension appears when the self is the subject of the inquiry (Hertz 1997:xi-xii).

This cacophony of voices and how they should be presented often mislead researchers into “simplistic treatments of voice … that beckon voices to ‘speak for themselves’ or that reduce complicated and conflicting voices to analytical ‘chunks’ that can be interpreted free of context and circumstance” (Mazzei and Jackson 2012:745). This proclivity to over-simplify the narrative will be circumvented through the utilisation of the Critical Indigenous Qualitative Research (Denzin and Lincoln 2008) approach which denounces a single-voice positivist approach.

As researchers, we are inextricably “embedded in language and culture” and as such “there is no Archimedean point outside where we can arrive at objective truth....[thus] methodological detachment is an illusion of the positivist paradigm” (Deacon et al. 1999:6). To account for my own position as researcher throughout the empirical data collection process I will reflexively develop analytical interpretations of my data to focus further data collection, which will be used to inform my developing theoretical analysis.

**TIME AND CHANGE**

Time and change are important factors to this research as there has been little to no research done in this geographical area since the late 1980’s. A focal point of this study is to return, 30 years later, to research how the community remembers its history and to map local conceptions of development. By utilising a memory studies approach, the absence of an event can be accounted for through “sites of memory”. In this way, my study will capture a specific context at a specific time.
CONCLUSION

The Kat River community is a forgotten community that falls on the way side of contemporary arguments of black and white and have subsequently been “erased from dominant discursive spaces of knowledge production” (Dutta 2011:3). With little to no research conducted in the Kat River Valley for the past 30 years let alone in the field of culture, development and tourism, this study will contribute to the history and sustainability of this marginalised community.

Epistemologically this study responds to the call for research to be unruly, critical, disruptive, decolonising and transformative in its attempt to demystify dominant western epistemologies (Denzin and Lincoln 2008; Grosfoguel 2007; Mignolo 2009; Smith 1999). This research aims to create a platform for valorising all voices in the research process such that participants experiences of their own worlds and expressions of their development needs lend to a uniquely Global South multivoiced epistemology.

REFERENCES


Appendix 1:
Piet Draghoender’s Lament (Tomaselli 2007)

Translation

the mixed war
he was then he was then taken
and he was sent away
and to fight

and when then the war was over
then he took
what is
what is he

yes! Mr. Stockmstrom

then then then he took on for him soldiers
each soldier
captain with his soldier
he takes on
and guns them like this and just sit them down

and he says: "The war is over
I now send you homewards
and I will give you pasture
now then talk Draghoender
I put you in Beadale

Beadale that side
that is your your that is your property
that is your duel that I give you
that is the inheritance that I give you
for fur for your for your death

that what you gave over for death
because the place makes free
and you made it free"
and then he give it over

then from here up it is pure Colooed people
but they are pushed out like this
out like this that they they they did not leave with their
faces first
they are out backwards
without desire
so as it went today

so as it also happens with us today
I also must go today without desire
but I say I say
Epistemological Reflections: The Descendents of the Kat River Valley

KEVAN D. TOMASELLI

I prophesy up
no-one that did evil to me to me
that did sin against me
he will not live
he will not live on the earth
and he will not have the privilege above
he will be punished above
and he will here die.
and he will be buried under the earth.
this I prophesy.

I prophesy
prophecy it
should you prophesy you should you prophesy you
say everything that you speak.
it happens as you said.

because you you ask this from your own own gun
this is what I ask say my own gun
look how weak I am.
where shall I go to
but this is what I said to the Old Man

I say: "I put up the white flag truly"
and say: "Peace,
I ask peace
for everything
that comes over me.

keep me
just as a child
just as a servant of You
let not you leave me
let you not leave me behind.

put me in a line of righteousness
all that I must speak today.
I must speak as long as I live in righteousness." This then is what I ask the Lord.
nothing I want to have from another man.
not a blue farthing.
not a blue farthing.
I don’t want.
neither a morsel of ground I want to have.
look how I worked with the children here
80  this is my uncle’s son
I sit now in my uncle’s place
just here
I have said
look here
85  come here
here’s your place
I have come
my auntie’s son
we went three then
90  I said
there’s he
sit
because I will go sit on the upper side
sit
95  because I don’t want remorse afterwards
remorse of my my now posterity
I want peace and the day
the Old Man takes me
He must take me in peace and with
so it is Sir
100  so as I stand here
I have cut off for me
that piece there
up to to the river
105  I plant it full of mealies
there stands the mealie today
for it gives its its own fruit
I give I give my sister’s se se se son this here this piece
he ploughs it over
110  he sows mealies
beans peas
potatoes
there he is
my uncle’s son
115  I give this piece
mealies
in behind ahead I am behind
but I say
I will put this in I give this in into the will of the Old Man
that he will put right such things
and he will look if he will get a place for me
or what will happen
for
but I say
the Lord there is so good
that the Lord will not take you
the Lord will not allow you to be taken so
and be thrown away
and the and the be given away from from the Lord for for
for
the enemy
put it in that pig sty
put it in the pig sty
for it belongs to nothing
what is
what is he
Appendix 2: Public Private Community Partnership Model (Dyll-Myklebust 2012).
The Public Education System of South Korea in Counteracting Private Education, and its Implications

MIN JEE PARK

INTRODUCTION

South Korea’s universal public education system has been used as one of the great examples to explain the country’s ‘success’, as some sort of ladder that transformed Korea from ‘developing’ country to ‘developed’ one. Indeed it is fairly easy to find seemingly reliable evidence to support this. According to a survey by PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) in 2012, Korea is positioned in the top 3 (after China and Singapore) in performance in mathematics, reading and science among 64 countries and economies (OECD 2012). Besides academic performance, when we look at the advancement rate into higher schooling in Korea, almost unbelievable numbers come out: 99.9% for primary school graduate, 99.6% for middle school, and 87.1% for high school graduate (MOE 2007). These are considered to be remarkable achievements for a country that started from scratch in the 1950s. On the other hand, suicide engendered by excessive education-related competition has become the single leading cause of death for youth in Korea for several years (KOSTAT 2013). It is not surprising anymore to encounter news of students jumping down from the top of an apartment building, leaving a suicide note about how competitive education was an overwhelming stress for him or her. However, can we be so quick to label such death as a suicide—or is it really more of ‘social murder’ that is somehow systematically committed? Are those that survived the system also victims, or perpetrators who present silent acceptance by ignoring these deaths? How can one system be praised so much as an exemplary model
when it literally kills the people within? This is where my questions begin.

All questions have their own roots as we dig into where they come from. Those roots are, in many cases, very personal. Here they are as well, and that is why I briefly explain my personal background here. I was born in a middle-class Korean family, got most of my education within the Korean education system, and then was trained as a teacher at a university for employment in the public education sector. However, my teaching experiences were mostly based outside of general public education. I did compulsory teaching practice in a so-called ‘alternative school’ where most of the students decide to stay out of the social norm and do not proceed to university, which is very rare in Korea. I also actively engaged myself in private education, teaching many students as their private tutor and as a lecturer at private institutes, living on the benefit of the social status that my own university has. Thus, the policies that are to be introduced in this essay are the ones that directly affected my own students as well as myself. Having a relatively superior position as a verified ‘winner’ in the education game, I also taught the students how to be ‘competitive’ and was paid by revealing this strategy. I cannot deny that I was practically a beneficiary of the system. Nonetheless, I was not able to stop being skeptical about the system that is repeatedly reproduced and taught to be ‘endured’. Therefore my questions are somehow inevitable; I cannot avoid or just pass by them.

This essay will begin by briefly mapping the Korean public education system and private education sectors, focusing on the upper secondary level due to its relatively direct connection to university entrance. Then I will look at governmental policy responses to private education, which could broadly be captured by the concept of so-called ‘normalization’ of public education. I attempt in my writing to provide a new lens to look at Korea, taking a distance from mainstream views that emphasize the numbers that Korea has achieved so far. Rather, I would like to see what is beyond numbers. It is clear that I will not be able to suggest answers due to the limits of space provided, but I would be happy as long as the essay succeeds in casting a glancing doubt on what ‘education’ means in theory and in practice, and illuminates what it might be to us social beings at the end of the day.
GENERAL PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM: FOCUS ON UPPER SECONDARY

Since the term ‘public education’ refers to education provided by public and private schools in Korea (because both of them are subsidized and regulated by government and its policies), it is reasonable to first describe the public education sector by the general schooling system. (Source: MOE)
As indicated above, Korea has a single-track 6-3-3-4 system with a single line of school levels. Upper secondary or high schools can be broadly divided into three categories: general high schools, vocational high schools, and other specialized schools such as foreign language, art and science high schools. The numbers of students attending general high schools are more than 2/3rds of the total and this is the category mostly considered in this essay. There is no entrance examination for general high school but students are randomly allocated within their residential district. Students are provided with identical courses on their first year of high school and then decide on their major areas, either humanities/social studies or sciences. Students are meant to choose majors based on their aptitude and interests, but in practice they often choose according to the best strategy of getting into prestigious universities (MOE).

For educational administration there are mainly two governmental organizations, the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Local Education Offices. MOE’s major tasks involve planning and implementing educational policies that are in accordance with the Korean educational ideology (stated in our constitution as Hongik Ingan, which translates into “a social being that benefits all humankind”), providing administrative and budgetary supports to all levels of schools within public education and reviewing textbooks used at school. Local Education Offices have gained their official autonomy since the Local Autonomy Law was adopted in 1991 and have power on local educational administration in theory (MOE). However, due to the low level of financial independence and high rate of dependence on subsidies provided by central government, actual administrative power generally leans toward MOE (Jo 2013: 77).

PRIVATE EDUCATION SECTOR

While public education generally corresponds with formal schooling, private education includes any kind of supplementary learning that takes place outside of schools. There exist various forms of private education in Korea but what I introduce on this essay will be limited to three major activities that are universally applicable to secondary level students.
Individual Tutoring: Gwaoe
The first typical form is individual tutoring, which is called gwaoe. In many cases, undergraduate students from prestigious schools provide individual tutoring, even though they are not verified in any official way for teaching. What guarantees them is indeed not any formal certification but the fact that they somehow ‘made it’ themselves in their schools. The students as well as their parents normally see the instructor as someone with a desirable status and thus do not hesitate to pay a lot of money hourly to buy the ‘strategies’ to emulate them. Graduate students and professional tutors may also provide private tutoring. However, these are generally graduates from reputable universities, have long years of teaching experience, and/or the official teaching certificate that is granted only to the students who graduated either from an education department in their bachelor’s or the Graduate School of Education with certain degree of requirements.

Private Academic Institute: Hakwon
Second, there are private academic institutes called hakwon, which are the most common way of getting private education in Korea. They are usually financially more accessible than the individual tutoring and have almost the same classroom setting as in formal school. They tend to mimic classrooms at school but normally are more strategic and focused directly on exams, which makes the students and the parents feel that these classes are more effective to achieve good marks in school exams and in CSAT (College Scholastic Ability Test).

Online Tutoring Service
Online tutoring services are relatively new forms of private education when compared to the previous two, but have been expanding rapidly due to their mobility, less-burdensome costs, and speeding up information technology in Korea. Online tutoring services are either provided by for-profit private institutes who make their offline lectures available on their website, or by the lectures that are videotaped in empty classrooms, only for online service. The online tutoring in private education sector has become so common and huge in last two decades that even the government itself began to actively provide public online tutoring, as a means to curb the demand for private education. The policy on gov-
government-funded online tutoring will be introduced further on in the essay.

**PRIVATE EDUCATION EXPENDITURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS**

In 2012, total private education expenditures recorded by KOSTAT (Statistics Korea) were 19 trillion Korean won, which is approximately 18 billion US dollars. According to Private Education Expenditure Survey, 73.0 percent of students who participated in private education learned general subjects such as English, mathematics, Korean, and essay writing, which are the subjects that directly link to CSAT and the Writing Proficiency Exams required by prominent universities (KOSTAT 2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Average monthly private education expenditure per student (10 thousand won, %)</th>
<th>Participation rate (%), %p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Percent change from the previous year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 million won</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 million to less than 2 million won</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 million to less than 3 million won</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 million to less than 4 million won</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 million to less than 5 million won</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 million to less than 6 million won</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 million to less than 7 million won</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 million won and over</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: KOSTAT)

Furthermore, when looking at the private education expenditure by household income on the table provided below, it is easily observed that the higher the household income level, the higher the average monthly expenditures and participation rate. And this is more or less the point where people perceive educational ‘inequality’, in the notion that spending more money on private education will lead to better academic results, and that the parents who have more economic resources will provide their child with more or ‘better’ education, thus fundamentally inheriting
their parents’ hierarchical social status within the system. There are studies that conclude that factors such as parents’ education level and private education expenditure do have significant influence on children’s academic success (Lee 2012: 88). Moral condemnations of private education find their essential justifications on this account. The emergence of the concept labeled as “normalization” of public education came out as a means to counteract private education effectively (Jo 2013: 82).

**NORMALIZATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION: POLICY ATTEMPTS AND IMPLICATIONS**

The term “public education normalization” came to be known in early 2000, in media and through the government speeches criticizing public education as “abnormal” and needing to be “normalized”. Since then, normalization has been broadly used to include all kinds of policy attempts to bring back educational demands to public education, from the private. This essay will present two major policy attempts that reveal the government’s perspective on the role and quality of public education in Korean society, which at the same time reflect general views of the society.

**After-School Programs**

Since “the promotion of equality in education has always been on the top of the Korean government’s education agenda” (Bae et al. 2010: 351), after-school programs were introduced as an educational policy that would provide means to expand educational opportunities for students who have limited access to ‘quality’ education, thus contribute to normalization of public education.

After-school programs are defined as “a set of formal school-based, student-oriented learning development programs that are not a part of the regular curriculum” (MOE). However, the majority of high school after-school programs are in fact “programs designed to help students prepare for college admissions” (Ham 2007 as cited in Bae et al. 2010). Thus in practice the program only works as additional classes after official school hours, and in the same teaching manner as in the formal hours.
Educational Broadcasting System (EBS)

EBS provides online tutoring service as other private online tutoring services do. The lectures are usually instructed by schoolteachers and famous tutors from the private tutoring sector, but free of charge. Since it failed to be distinctive from private online tutoring services, it did not attract tremendous demand. In order to strengthen the direct impact of EBS on CSAT, the government announced officially in 2010 that the textbooks provided by EBS would be important reference materials for CSAT (Jo 2013: 83). Han describes EBS as “a national model of private tutoring (2004)”, criticizing it as merely a substitute of private tutoring and private academic institutes.

Indeed both after-school programs and the implementation of EBS fail to win the moral battle against private education. Despite the government’s constant attempts to curb the demand for ‘evil’ private education by public education normalization policies, they never successfully achieved their goal. Instead, these policies only show that actual aim of Public Education Normalization is at creating an education system in which students can successfully enter into elite universities by public—not just private—education.

It seems that parents and students are willing to pay whatever it takes to increase the chance of success, and public education simply does not satisfy them. Why is it so important to do well on CSAT and to get into reputable universities, such that it has become almost an “educational fever” (Lee 2006)? Most Koreans regard education as the tool by which one climbs the ladder of classes, based on obsessive academic elitism, or *Hakbul*. *Hakbul* refers to “the social status given to graduates of certain universities” and it includes an ideology that “justifies discriminations of rewarding individuals based on the universities [from which] they have graduated” (Jung 2004: 93). This ideology is embedded broadly within the system, and the daily experiences of inequality based on the university label tagged on every Korean’s back has given them a desperation for any education that would secure admission to high-ranking universities (Choi and Park 2013: 116).

**CONCLUSION**

I often portray the life of Korean students as in the process of building a bridge by themselves across steep cliffs. We believe that private educa-
tion, whether qualitatively high or quantitatively massive, will make the bridge solid and strong somehow. Indeed, it is more or less a valid assumption that has been proven by those who survived the educational game. It may be true that nobody can build the bridge and cross it on behalf of you. On the other hand, it is obvious that having better quality construction materials and the strategy books sold by ‘professionals’ are a result of the financial capital you put in. On this account, educational policies that claim to normalize the public education are merely saying that they will provide quality materials and professional strategies within public education. In a system where an individual’s university will label them and determine whether this person is in or out of the boundaries of the academic elite, the number of people who manage to cross the bridge over the cliff is already fixed, say, one person out of one hundred, because the boundary works only when it is strictly exclusive. ‘Normalization’ policies avoid posing the fundamental question of why another ninety-nine people should face the brutal fate of falling through the cracks of the system, but rather promote easy and attractive slogan: “It will be you (not anyone else) who will build the brilliant bridge and become one of the very few winners who cross it successfully (if you try hard enough).”

Even those who never managed to get there still repeatedly tell their child to “first cross it whatever it takes, and then question the injustice underlying its logic” because within the system of extreme academic elitism, they were also educated to have contradictory desire: that they want to destroy the class rhetoric embedded in the system while wanting to be included in and be beneficiaries of it. This kind of desire is reflected through the generations. Unfortunately (or fortunately, for some) the individual who becomes the one out of hundred will serve the interests of the system that made him or her, the ‘one’. Thus the inequality within the structure of vested rights is reproduced, not only by the ‘ones’ who make it, but with the consent of the other ‘ninety-nine’ as well.

Therefore, attempts to replace private education by enhancing and expanding the public education system will be to no avail, because fundamentally both of them serve exactly the same role—which is to advance students into prestigious universities—and thus reproduce, regenerate and reinforce the class system of academic elitism.
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The Role of the Spanish State in Galician Peasant Differentiation in the Mid-20th Century: Forestry Policy as a Means to Modernization?

NICK BOURGUIGNON

INTRODUCTION

Galicia is a green region, with forests that cover many a tourist brochure. These belie the role they play as a link between the Galician peasantry and the Spanish State, particularly during the Franco dictatorship. This essay aims to examine how the regime’s forestry policy was used as a means of appropriating land from the peasantry and how this impacted the means of reproduction of Galician peasant society. This is a vast topic, but this essay will focus will on state-peasant relationships and the dynamic of social relations of property.

The first two sections will examine the theoretical framework to be used, discussing concepts in the first and discussing capitalist transitions and the role of the State in the second. The third section is dedicated to the Galician context, examining forestry policy and State intervention in peasant communities. The last section will draw lessons from the application of the theories. The main point being made is that the State could easily change the social relations of property. Those peasants who remained in Galicia resisted being drawn into the State’s push for differentiation by not engaging in an agrarian capitalist mode of production.

INTRODUCING MARXIAN CONCEPTS

Agrarian political economy draws upon a rich field of scholarship. Marxian theory is particularly incisive because of its central preoccupation
with the social relations of production and its role in tensions and contradictions that drive societies (Ellis 1992). This approach offers potential tools of analysis in regards to the subject of forestry policy and the Galician peasantry. A brief overview of Marxian concepts will be presented so as to frame the subsequent discussion.

Breaking down the concept of social relations of production leads to two broad processes. Ellis states: “In any society the livelihood of different groups of people is crucially determined by (a) who possesses effective control over productive resources, and (b) what happens to the output created with those resources. Productive resources … are referred to in Marxian terms as the means of production.” (Ellis 1992:47). Control and use of the means of production drive social forces, and these forces are directed by the mode of production. The mode of production is determined by how production is organised in societies across space and time. Modes of production are characterised not only by the social relations of production but also by the forces of production (technology used) and by the superstructure (the legal, institutional and cultural arrangements that enable the mode) (Ellis 1992:48). These four concepts form the bedrock of Marxian theory.

Control over productive resources brings new dynamics to what happens to output created in the productive process. This is examined through the social relations of property. Bernstein defines it as one of his four key questions of political economy (who owns what) and describes it as the distribution of the means of production and reproduction (2010:22). Within the capitalist mode of production this is defined by private ownership and property, and this, particularly in relation to land, leads to a process of commodification.

Reproduction is the concept assigned to how societies reproduce not just generationally but as a society itself (Bernstein 2010, Ellis 1992). Both Bernstein (2010) and Ellis (1992) make the distinction between a level of reproduction that keeps a society at a constant level and levels of reproduction that increase their size and complexity. Bernstein (2010) uses concepts of production funds, where the fund of rent, and how it functions, is key to expansions of output of production. He continues by explaining that, in all societies, appropriation of part of this output is used to create and replace inputs in production, to create the next generation of producers and to create and recreate superstructures. What dif-
differentiates subsistence societies from class societies is the fund of rent, and where social relations of property are established.

Agrarian class societies have a class dynamic where peasant farmers are key to supporting the system. The non-farming sector of the population is the ruling class and these engage in appropriation of the surplus production that is beyond the needs of social reproduction of the producers (Bernstein 2010, Ellis 1992). This is a characteristic of the feudal mode of production and defines the fund of rent, where appropriation of the surplus was used for consumption of the ruling classes (Bernstein 2010, Ellis 1992). The ability of the ruling classes to appropriate the surplus for their consumption depended on their control of the means of production. This takes us back to social relations of property, which in class-based societies were determined by class itself.

**TRANSITIONS TO CAPITALISM AND CLASS DIFFERENTIATION**

In the feudal mode of production serfs were the producers and the means of production that serfs depended on was the land itself (Ellis 1992). Thus the property regime revolved around control of land. During the feudal period landlord classes owned farming land outright though serfs had access to this land for productive purposes (Wood 1998). As stated by Wood: “peasants had access to the means of production, the land, without having to offer their labor-power as a market commodity. Landlords and office-holders, with the help of various “extra economic” powers and privileges, extracted surplus labor from peasants directly in the form of rent or tax” (Ibid: 15).

The transition to the capitalist mode of production signals a break from primitive accumulation to something vastly different. Accumulation takes on an expansionary role by investing the appropriated surplus into the forces of production in a manner that increases the output of the means of production, termed expanded reproduction (Ellis 1992, Bernstein 2010). Marx locates the mode’s first emergence in feudal England, through the introduction of the process of enclosures as early as the 16th Century (Wood 1998). Wood defines the process: “Enclosure is often thought of as simply the privatization and fencing in of formerly common land, or of the ‘open fields’ that characterized certain parts of the English countryside. But enclosure meant, more particularly, the extinction (with or without a physical fencing of land) of common and cus-
omary use-rights on which many people depended for their livelihood” (Ibid: 21). This in effect heralded a new regime of private, exclusionary property relations between the landlord and peasant classes that would accelerate a process of social differentiation in the latter.

The introduction of enclosures lead to processes of commodification of land, meaning that access to land was determined by ownership of the land itself; previous arrangements had been wiped away with the adoption of the notion of private property (Bernstein 2010, Wood 1998). In England, land was the focus of expanded reproduction, producing more. This was performed not by the landlords but by tenant farmers who paid landlords a rent to farm the land. They, however, invested surpluses into their rented land to increase yields in order to accumulate more (Bernstein 2010). Implications for the peasantry are twofold: on the one hand, enclosure of common access land reduced peasant access to resources that aided in simple reproduction; on the other, when payment of rent became market-driven, unproductive tenants were forced out of their leases. Changes in property regimes led to a process of denying the means of subsistence to peasants that were forced by economic coercion to sell the only thing they owned outright: their labour.

The increasing gulf between rich and poor peasantry is explained by Lenin, who proposed class differentiation of the peasantry across 3 types: rich peasantry (engaging in expanded reproduction), medium peasantry (engaging in simple reproduction) and the poor peasantry (engaging in simple reproduction squeeze) (Bernstein 2010:104). On the poor peasantry, Bernstein states: “poor farmers or peasants were ‘locked into’ commodity production by the ‘dull compulsion of economic forces’: The commodification of their subsistence” (Ibid:104). Economic coercion leads to greater stratification, determined by the social relations of property within the capitalist mode of production. This does not mean that all peasants face one of the three choices. This assumption limits the agency by individual peasants, who may decide on other ways to live that is not completely determined by the “dull compulsion of economic forces”. Bernstein (2010) mentions strategies that peasant societies utilise to maintain simple reproduction. Ellis (1992:52) refers to the internal logic of peasant society to resist capitalist production relations and to be able to reproduce itself indefinitely. Thus, differentiation needs to be approached with caution.
ROLE OF THE STATE

Orthodox Marxism generally pays little heed to the State, seeing it as part of the superstructure legitimising a class system (Ellis 1992:57). This however removes a vital actor involved in processes determining social relations of property and of peasant differentiation. Two factors in which the State is of paramount importance is in its legislative and extractive role and in being able to represent capitalist interests (Byres 2009, Ellis 1992).

In terms of its legislative and extractive role, Byres (2009) highlights the role States had in capitalist transitions in England, France and Prussia: Byres contends that in France the capitalist transition was delayed due to the State taxing the (rich) peasantry heavily enough that surplus could not be reinvested at a rate that would lead to meaningful accumulation. The landlord class was not pressured into practicing enclosure so there was little imperative for legislative changes in the social relations of property. The Prussian State abolished serf dues in the early 19th Century due to discontent from the peasant class and at the expense of the landlord class, which would lead to landlords becoming capitalist farmers and enclosing common land, initiating a new property regime and mode of production. Having already examined the English case, Byres provides a historical comparison that reminds us to pay attention to State motivations for determined policies vis-à-vis the peasantry.

In terms of the State representing capital interests Ellis (1992:57) argues that the State plays a role in favouring certain capitalist interests over others, as when pursuing an industrialisation policy rather than an agrarian one. They may act as intermediaries between peasants and industry or set prices for agricultural goods. These may have an effect on property regimes that may impact the peasantry in different ways. The desire for modernisation and development is such an example that will be explored in Galicia.

SPANISH PROPERTY REGIMES AND FORESTRY POLICY

Changes in the property relationship between the peasantry and the Spanish State can be seen initially in the 1855 Madoz Law which saw the Spanish State confiscate ecclesiastical and municipal property for sale to private owners. The appropriation of these lands, from what was then
considered ‘dead hands’, for sale to private, ‘productive’ hands was an attempt by the State to gain capital and increase productivity of the agrarian sector (Pérez-Soba Diez del Corral 2013). The new bourgeoisie justified the confiscation and sale of land on the grounds that private property was the vehicle towards wealth and progress (Nieto as cited in Artiaga Rego 1990:162). The immediate impact on the peasantry was that land which previously was of common access for peasants was enclosed and no longer accessible. The introduction of a clause in the Madoz Law in 1856 highlights how contentious the appropriation of the land would be: forested mountains that the government deemed important would not be up for sale, as well as any lands that were of communal use when notified to and accepted by the government (Pérez-Soba Diez del Corral 2013:55). Artiaga Rego states that in Galicia the forested mountains in the government’s control were sold while communal lands were maintained (1990:177).

The 19th Century backdrop leads to the 20th Century focus during the Franco dictatorship covering the years 1939-1975. The State, having made symbolic concessions to the peasantry in the 19th Century, changes its tune and embarks on a different economic programme in the Franco period. From 1939 to 1959 the State actively accesses communal lands via the national forestry service, reforesting using fast-growing species. The effects on the peasantry are two-fold: a) limitation of use of these spaces through traditional agricultural practices, where peasants were in conflict with forestry agents since traditional practices in these areas were based on mixed agriculture and cattle rearing; b) a process of alienation from the land since town councils rather than communities would be signatories of agreements with the forestry service and recipients of any profit made from reforested tree plantations, leading to interest groups in these institutions taking advantage of either managing or selling the land (Grupo de Estudio de la Propiedad Comunal 2004). In the former case peasant/State conflict over means of production resulted in the peasantry no longer being able to practice traditional methods of agriculture, thus impacting their ability to engage in simple reproduction. In the latter case social relations of property changed to the detriment of the peasants.

Another issue was the ambiguity surrounding actual ownership of land. Cadastre records from the 19th Century that maintained communal ownership of forested mountains were commoditised by the State. As
Seijo (2005:391) notes: “The peasant commons in Galicia were mostly uncultivated, partially forested, land that for a variety of historical reasons had escaped both privatisation and nationalisation. Most of them, depending on the Galician province where they were located, belonged directly to the peasant hamlets or to a series of peasant households. They were therefore beyond the control of the municipalities and the central State administration”. Further developments in the Spanish State’s legal redefinitions of property and of forests reflects the levels of appropriation of land by the State. Seijo describes the trends: from 1940 to 1959 354,240 hectares were classified as public forest land while 1,142,860 hectares were classified as private forest land. The 1957 Forest law redefined peasant commons as public forest lands, thereby changing the statistics in 1960 to there being 902,869 hectares of public utility (which were required to be reforested) and 594,231 hectares being private property. Introduction of the peasant common laws of 1968, 1980 and 1989 changed public utility lands to 64,672 hectares, peasant commons reverting back to private forest property (Fernández Laiceaga 1990 as cited in Seijo 2005:392). Seijo sums up the consequence: “with a single bold legal stroke, the State acquired plentiful land to implement its reforestation policy in Galicia” (Seijo 2005:392).

The effect on the peasantry was intensely exclusionary leading to a situation of increased hardship. The scale of the changes in the social relations of property as well as the exclusion of the peasantry from said property and thus their means of reproduction led to rural emigration in Galicia during the period. It is estimated that 40% of workers in urban areas that appeared during the 1950s and 1960s came from Galicia and other rural areas (Fusi 1986 as cited in Seijo 2005:390). State expectations resulting from this migration were to see farm size increasing, leading to an expected increase in output for those peasants who remained (Seijo 2005). In this respect increasing farm size was going to be difficult in the mountainous region. Farm sizes have been historically small, with the average farm size in 1989 being no more than 1.9 hectares and as recently as 1991 employing 26.9 of the active population (Pérez Yruela 1995). Interestingly the primary sector that increased substantially was not farm produce but cattle. This is due to loss of arable land or the conversion of the same to pasture land. The greatest increase was invariably forestry (Grupo de Estudio de la Propiedad Comunal 2004:111-115). The chang-
ing patterns of land use by the remaining peasants leads to some further questions on peasant reproduction that will be examined shortly.

Lastly, the myriad changes in definitions, laws and imposition of the State in peasant communities demands an inquiry into what were the aims of the State over the period. Paulino Martínez Hermosilla, the general director of the National Forestry Office outlined forestry policy for Spain in 1953 and his aims offer telling clues: Firstly, forest conservation of both public and private property. Secondly, direct intervention by the administration to improve public forests and aid private owners of forests who may need it. Thirdly, enact an extensive national reforestation plan that would, in 10 years’ time, fundamentally transform the country’s agricultural physiognomy (Martínez Hermosilla 1953:40). He bluntly stated what he thought was the future of the Spanish peasantry: “Modernization or immigration” (Martínez Hermosilla 1957:167 as cited in Seijo 2005:391). Immigration occurred but the modernization of Galician farming, as seen, did not turn out as planned. Likewise forestry policy, as stated, was to reforest Galicia with fast growing species. These were plantations required for Franco’s economic policy of autarky (Grupo de Estudio de la Propiedad Comunal 2004:117) and fuelled such industries as the nationalised paper mill industry (Aspichueta & de Mesanza 1968 as cited in Seijo 2005:388). Thus a heavy-handed state was deeply involved in dynamics of peasant differentiation that would fuel the urbanization of industrial centres, working with certain economic actors and establishing a broad economic and industrial plan that would empty Galicia’s rural environment.

**Ownership and Peasant Reproduction in Francoist Galicia**

The Spanish State under the Franco regime engaged in a process of enclosure in Galicia, using forestry policy as the tool of alienation. In Seijo’s study the municipality of As Nogais had 58% of the peasant commons reforested with pine trees without any compensation through forestry profits (Seijo 2005:395). The small-sized farms and limited opportunities for grazing forced a mass migration from Galicia. Farms did not become larger and peasants turned to cattle rearing rather than to commercial farming. In terms of peasant reproduction, the appropriation of large tracts of common land clearly forced many out, but to what extent did the remaining peasantry practice simple reproduction and what
strategies did they use in the face of the tree plantations? Non-farm incomes and remittances from migrant labour may be a reason as to why, as late as 1991, over a quarter of the population were classified as agrarian. The emptying of the villages also provides more space and land for peasants to engage in simple reproduction, though it may be a fine line to cross over into self-exploitation.

A recurring theme is the persistence of the peasantry. Not much information has been found regarding breakdowns of peasant incomes that could point to differentiation within the rural world. Nevertheless, social differentiation leading to emigrating wage labour certainly occurred. The social relations of property had a huge role in peasant migration, encouraging those that could not subsist to sell their labour elsewhere. If the regime wanted a supply of labour from Galicia, it got it. Nonetheless the desire to modernize the Galician agrarian world did not succeed as planned. Furthermore, property laws reverted common lands back to the peasantry, echoing the struggles and discontent a century earlier. To that extent the State partly backed off from dispossessing more land from the peasantry.

This leads to a further question: Did the State give up on seeing Galician agriculture as a profitable source of surplus, thus not spending resources on developing it? The property relations effectively limited the number of peasants who could live in the same village since much of the commons had been turned into tree plantations. The critical question can be asked the following way: If communities had been emptied (and population pressures reduced), and if traditional use of the commons is denied, and therefore so is practicing traditional agriculture because of the presence of plantations (even if the commons are nominally the community’s property), would the alternative of intensively farming arable land entice peasants who stayed to take up commercial capitalist farming and institute local peasant differentiation? Here the answer seems to be no. But this should not be inferred as the Spanish State pushing an English-style agrarian transition to capitalism. Peasants seemed to prefer to turn arable land into pastureland (Grupo de Estudio de la Propiedad Comunal 2004), and to engage in cattle rearing rather than arable farming. In this respect it can be said that in the face of physical and legal obstacles placed by the State, peasant differentiation for those peasants that remained did not proceed at the pace that the State may have desired in developing a capitalist agrarian society in Galicia.
CONCLUSION

Having used tools of agrarian political economy, namely a focus on the social relations of property and on subsequent social differentiation, analysis of forestry policy during the Spanish 1939-1975 dictatorship and its application in Galicia reveals a process of peasant differentiation that results in high emigration from Galician rural areas. However, despite the limitations imposed by property relations through the imposition of tree plantations, peasant society in Galicia remains tenaciously rooted to its traditional form of simple reproduction.

This opens avenues of investigation on both the dynamic of emigrant communities and those peasant communities that remained in Galicia. To what extent did emigrant communities aid those in Galicia with subsistence income so as to resist commodity production? What alternative surpluses do peasant communities produce to achieve the same end? Most glaringly, what role did landlord classes play in the process? What can ultimately be said about Galician peasants is that they put up a fight, whether by burning the tree plantations (Seijo 2005) or by not engaging with Martínez Hermosilla’s modernization plan for the peasant class.

REFERENCES


Cristina Medina Prado

In recent years the political ambiguities of participation have become evident. New direct forms of citizen engagement in local governance have attracted much attention in developed countries highlighting its qualities and potentials to address democratic deficits of representative democracy. The experience of participatory budgeting (PB) in Porto Alegre, Brazil has been transplanted or adapted to the eastern side of the Atlantic and many of its promising merits has been optimistically portrayed. In 2008, there were more than 100 European cities with participatory budgeting (Sintomer et al. 2008:164). Among these European cities Seville, Spain represents an interesting case because its PB model was directly influenced by Porto Alegre, and some authors even have categorized this experience as a “Porto Alegre adapted for Europe” PB ideal-type (Sintomer et al. 2008:170). However if we take a closer look at the quality of citizen engagement in Seville it becomes evident that PB in Europe has followed diverse logics and different levels of success (Sintomer et al. 2008:175).

Therefore, in order to understand these different levels of performance it might be important to understand some factors that shaped PB implementation in Seville. Three factors have been suggested in previous studies as crucial: “ruling party disposition to supporting PB; social mobilisation; and a sufficiently resourced, well-coordinated local bureaucracy” (Heller 2001; Fung and Wright 2001; Gaventa 2004). The aim of this essay is to analyse these three factors under the hypothesis that support-
ive political parties towards PB, a well-coordinated local bureaucracy, and partnerships between state actors and civil society might have improved the outcomes of PB initiative in Seville.

This essay is divided into five sections. The first presents the theoretical framework using the concept of “spatial practices” (Lefebvre and Nicholson-Smith 1991). The subsequent section presents why and how this space for engagement was created. The third section deals with the dynamics of representation within the space. Section four analyses intersections between the new spaces in relation with other spaces. Finally, in the last section some conclusions will be drawn.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Creating new institutional arrangements for participatory governance will not necessarily make better citizens, better decisions and better government (Mansbridge 1999; Warren 1992; Gaventa 2004, Cornwall 2004:1). Two theoretical streams emerge in the literature regarding direct forms of citizen engagement in governance. One, following Habermas (Habermas 1984), is concerned with the circumstances for a good participatory deliberation (Sintomer et al. 2008:165); the other incorporates a more post-Marxist approach with the perspective that new spaces enable a reconfiguration of power relationships beyond the citizen-state arena to encompass complex alliances of actors and networks across permeable institutional boundaries and an expanded vision of the public domain (Cornwall 2004:1; see also Gaventa 2004; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003).

During this essay the theoretical framework that it will be used is the concept of “spatial practices” (Lefebvre and Nicholson-Smith 1991). To think of participatory budgeting as a space opens the possibility to reflect about the interplay between three distinct types of spaces: “invited spaces” provided by the government as an attempt to increase legitimacy, “popular spaces” created by civil society to develop their agendas without control from power holders, and “closed spaces” that are controlled by an elite group (Gaventa 2006:26).

The experience of PB in Seville will be considered as an “invited space”, which according to Cornwall “offers one important vehicle through which development intervention can support more transformative participation” (Cornwall 2004:79). Furthermore Gaventa has also distinguished between participation by “invitation” and participation by
“right”. That is, invited spaces by right are those backed by a legal right to participate. He points out that “invited spaces by right” are potentially a more empowered form of engagement than “invited spaced by invitation” (Gaventa 2004:18). In this case it is important to highlight that participatory budgeting in Seville belongs to the category of “invited spaces by invitation”, as Spanish law does not include any legal provision that make participation in governance a legal right.

Thinking in terms of “spaces” provides an understanding of the three factors we have mentioned before: why and what were the political discourses that gave rise and supported this space, how was this new space negotiated between local bureaucracy and CBOs, and by whom and how it was occupied in terms of representation, inclusion and voice. In addition through this approach we also will analyse how this space was shaped and reconfigured by the connections that those who enter these “invited spaces” have with other spaces (Cornwall 2004:5).

**WHY AND HOW WAS THE SPACE OPENED?**

**Why?**

In Andalusia local elections were held on May 25th 2003 in Spain. Electoral results in Seville made necessary agreements to form a coalition government between the governing Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), and United Left (IU), a party formed by a number of left-wing political groups, but largely dominated by the Communist Party of Spain (PCE). Following the elections, PSOE and IU held various meetings to form a pact about the political configuration of the new local government. The political pact that both parties reached was made public in a political document: “Progress Pact for Seville” which included the opening of a participatory budgeting process by the Area of Citizen Participation (Pérez et al. 2009:39-40). Therefore, PB did not respond to a demand raised by civil society, but was implemented top-down as part of a political agreement between two political parties (Pérez et al. 2009:41). Moreover, PB was only part of the agenda of the IU party; in fact during negotiations PB was considered by IU as a “necessary condition” to become part of the local government (Pérez et al. 2009:40).

From this context, various implications emerge. First, it was not possible as Gaventa has suggested “to work on both sides of the equation” to create “the preconditions for voice” (building capacity to strengthen-
ing the ways local citizens exercise voice) nor was it possible at the same
time to strengthen “receptivity to voice” on the part of local government
(Gaventa 2004:18). In this case, above any methodological criteria, tight
political timing prevailed and the project was presented to the local
CBOs just a few months after the election were held (by the end of
2003). Overall, no previous participation activities neither training for
public servants was carried out which would have facilitated a much
more solid foundations to the process. The second implication is that PB
was not a priority for the main ruling party (PSOE), as some political
leaders perceived it as an imposition from IU. As some authors have ob-
served PB can hardly be successful without a strong support from insti-
tutions and political parties (Font and Galais 2011:934). Similarly, Wain-
wright argues “the feasibility and legitimacy of the participatory process
is enormously enhanced by the existence and electoral success of a party
that believes in it” (Wainwright 2003 as cited in Gaventa 2004:24). In
Seville this was a critical issue; effective PB would rely on local govern-
ment providing PB with enough human and financial resources, which
would send the symbolic message that the local government was highly
committed to PB.

Regarding the theoretical approach under which PB in Seville was
conceived it is worth noting that PSOE and IU did not share a common
approach. PSOE’s approach was more moderated and focused on ‘good
governance’, aiming to give legitimacy to local decisions, whereas IU’s
approach was more radical, oriented toward empowering citizens, demo-
cratic social transformation and social justice. Furthermore, even within
IU, there were different positions; political leaders in Seville defended
more radical positions in Seville than in Cordoba, where they were the
main ruling party (Pérez et al. 2009:92). As a result, PB in Seville was on-
ly strongly supported by a small group of people in the local govern-
ment.

How?

Gaventa noted that in order to make PB process more inclusive and par-
ticipatory new rules and roles need to be mutually agreed and openly ne-
gotiated (Gaventa 2004:22). In this case, self-regulation is one of the
basic principles of the PB in Seville. It is a “self-regulated process” in
which the citizens “establish the operating rules” (Autoreglamento Pre-
which included the organizational structure and operating rules of participatory budgeting was annually negotiated and deliberated by a citizens committee and approved in public assemblies. However, it is worth noting that citizen attendance at these ‘autoregolamento’ assemblies was very poor (see table 1). Moreover, Pérez et al. observed that a significant number of the citizens who attended those assemblies did not know exactly what issues were going to be discussed. They also noticed that the meetings were too technical and difficult to understand for common citizens and that many citizens abandoned the meeting before the end (Pérez et al. 2009:52). These problematic issues reflect that participants did not engage with the operating rules of the process, and therefore rules largely reflected the preferences of experts. Hence, one might question if public attendance to these meetings provided enough scope to legitimize the operating rules of this space.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January/February 2005</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January/February 2006</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Pérez et al. 2009:52)

The need to work on the “responsiveness” side of the equation to hold the government accountable has been mentioned; however, Heller (2001:135) discusses the dangers of the expansion of technocratic modes of accountability. In his view, the application of instrumental rational techniques has despotizing effects and is based on the utopian rationalist idea that experts have the capacity to effectively transform the world. In this sense, PB in Seville illustrates that managerial utilitarianism worked at the expense of deliberation and social transformation. Figure 1 shows and the annual cycle of PB in Seville. As can be observed, the assembly was considered “the main decision-making body...all citizens above sixteen registered in the area have the right to vote” (Autoregolamento Presupuestos Participativos 2006-2007:7). However, the deliberative character of these assemblies was very limited, and public defence of proposals
was a rapid succession of proposals to vote, without time or space for deliberative discussions and collective reflection (Pérez et al. 2009:55).

Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, there were two bodies that analysed the proposals before and after an area’s assembly. Public servants from the
Municipality collected and analysed the technical, financial and legal viability of the proposals and even if one proposal was voted favourably during the assembly, the proposal would be evaluated by the district council and city councils according its contribution to social cohesion\textsuperscript{1}, and even if a proposal had a high position in the ranking, would be incorporated or not to the Municipal Budget based on the financial percentage that each municipal body has decided to allocate to PB\textsuperscript{2} (Pérez et al. 2009:53). Bohman considers that “if a procedure is measured only in terms of the quality of the outcome, then deliberation has only instrumental value relative to epistemic ends, such as fairness or reliability” (Bohman 1998:403). As Carlos Nino noted, we encounter here the paradox of “deliberative democracy becoming a very robust device for deciding too little” (Nino 1996 as cited in Bohman 1998:404).

Finally, as can be observed in Figure 2, the process of PB included two mechanisms to assure accountability: a commission of evaluation verifying that the proposals were finally carried out by the local government and public-assemblies of ‘accountability’ to report about the issues decided over the previous year. However, control and accountability was difficult to achieve mainly due to two reasons. First, it was not easy to find candidates willing to become delegates of councils (district councils and city councils). Second, among elected delegates a high number of dropouts were registered\textsuperscript{3} (Pérez et al. 2009:53). Therefore, it might be worth to note that during the process incentives were insufficient to encourage participants to invest time and effort to become involved in holding the government accountable. As Gaventa has suggested “a citi-

\textsuperscript{1} Socio-territorial criteria to rate each proposal were included in the ‘autoregelamento’, but as has been mentioned before, the ‘autoregelamento’ reflected largely the views of the experts.

\textsuperscript{2} There was not any legal provision to assure that municipal body would include a minimum percentage to participatory budgeting (Pérez et al. 2009:33). For example, the Social Welfare Office was never part of participatory budgeting (Pérez et al. 2009:55).

\textsuperscript{3} In one of the first editions (2005) 180 delegates were elected: 78 (City Council) 102 City (District councils). Only 73 finally accepted to take part in these bodies. During that year 13 formal resignations were registered; 60 continued to be active representatives. After the period, only 38 of these delegates remained linked to the evaluation committees (Pérez et al. 2009:54).
zen must been able to see some results or some evidence that their participation matters” (Gaventa 2004:23). In this case, it is even unclear that local government considered the delegates’ high time costs and motivations when opening the space.

Tables 2 and 3 show the increased importance of PB through the years in terms of number of areas being incorporated to the process and fiscal resources allocated to the space. However, it is important to highlight that municipal enterprises were not included in the process. These enterprises manage half of the fiscal resources of the municipality (Ganuza and Gómez 2008:29); hence PB in Seville had a very limited weight in the overall municipal budget.

**Table 2**

*Participatory Budgeting in Seville: Participating Municipal Areas. Evolution 2004 to 2008*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen participation</td>
<td>Citizen participation</td>
<td>Citizen participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urbanism</td>
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<td>Employment</td>
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<td>Equality</td>
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<td>Youth</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Culture</td>
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<td>Environment</td>
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<td>Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
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<td>Environment</td>
<td>Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
<td>Transports</td>
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<td>Transports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parks and gardens</td>
<td>Parks and gardens</td>
<td>Parks and gardens</td>
<td>Parks and gardens</td>
<td>Parks and gardens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* (Pérez et al. 2009:46)
Tables 4 and 5 show annual figures of assistance and number of proposals. These data show a successful story in terms of the quantity of participation taking into account that it was the first time this space was open to citizens. Despite being relevant, in the next section we will critically analyse the quality of participation: who really participate and on behalf of whom.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Economic resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>11.180.408,60 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>10.913.382,17 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-07</td>
<td>13.038.000,00 €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>14.414.932,49 €</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Pérez et al. 2009:50)

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of proposals made</th>
<th>No. of proposals included in the MB</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>1.370</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>2.013</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-07</td>
<td>2.223</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>1.722</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Pérez et al. 2009:50)

Table 5

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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of citizens participating in the assemblies</td>
<td>2.985</td>
<td>3.346</td>
<td>4.753</td>
<td>2.896</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Pérez et al. 2009:50)
HOW WAS THE SPACE FILLED?: ISSUES OF REPRESENTATION

Habermas theorized the concept of “public sphere” (Habermas 1984) emphasising the possibilities of rational deliberation, under the assumption that such procedures can ensure an “ideal speech situation” in which voices are equally represented (Habermas 1984 cited in Cornwall 2004:79). However, some authors (Guijt and Shah 1998; Kohn 2000; Mosse 1994) have challenged Habermas’ assumptions; in their view these procedures to increase the voice of marginalized groups might not be enough. Freire for example has argued that certain marginalized groups might have internalized discourses of prejudice and discrimination, so even if they have the skills to participate they would not imagine themselves as actors (Paula and Bergman 1972, Cornwall 2004:84). In line with Freire’s argument, Seville’s PB assemblies were relatively dominated by populations of upper and middle classes and without appreciable presence of romani, immigrant populations, or other excluded social sectors—even in the neighbourhoods where these groups constitute a significant portion the population (Pérez et al. 2009:61). Furthermore research about PB experiences in Spain has found a significant bias in PB participants towards citizens that have higher education (Ganuza and Gómez 2008:40). Therefore, we might consider to what extent the processes have challenged exiting power relations or, on the contrary, have served to reproduce existing patterns of exclusion, undermining PB’s transformative potential.

LINKING SPACES

Gaventa (2004:37) has highlighted the importance of analysing the dynamics of power (hidden, visible and invisible) that shape the boundaries of participation, to exclude certain voices from entering the space. In his view, the intersections between spaces affect also the opening and closure of new chances for participation. Therefore in this section the invited space of PB in Seville will be analysed as a dynamic space, embedded in social relations, reconfigured and shaped by power relations across the intersections with three other spaces: local government, political parties and civil society organisations.
CLOSED SPACE (I): LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Among the complex challenges to make participation meaningful and real, Cornwall and Gaventa have emphasised the need to create spaces within bureaucracies in which responsiveness to community participation is valued (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001:35). Gaventa noted that one cannot assume that bureaucracies have the capabilities or williness to adapt effectively to the new environment of PB. Furthermore, PB process alters the organisational culture of bureaucracies, with regards to roles, attitudes and behaviours, from “working for the community” to “work with the community” (Gaventa 2004:21-2).

PB in Seville found little engagement among local government staff for two reasons. First PB was designed and implemented exclusively by external technical experts. Second the vast majority of municipal political leaders showed also little interest, and in some cases resistance, towards participatory budgeting. Research about PB in Spain has analysed how the way PB is inserted into the municipality influences the outcomes of PB. This research concluded that those PB spaces that are inserted the Area of Economic Affairs were more efficient than those inserted the Area of Citizen Participation, because the later has weaker links with the other municipal areas and often they do not have enough resources (human and material) to address the horizontal coordination among various municipal areas (Ganuza and Gómez 2008:30-1). In the case of Seville, this was a critical issue because the Area of Citizen Participation was the body responsible for PB design and implementation. As they did not have enough human resources, the design and the implementation was carried out exclusively by external technical experts (Pérez et al. 2009:30), resulting in two problems. First, coordination with other municipal areas suffered because technical experts lacked of an extensive knowledge of the formal and informal rules of functioning of the municipality (Pérez et al. 2009:30). Second, public servants did not take the process seriously because they did not trust the criteria of external experts, and at the same time the vast majority of municipal political leaders showed disinterest and resistance towards participatory budgeting (Pérez et al. 2009:30).

Finally, it is important to highlight that one of the main challenges of PB in Europe is connecting these processes with a broader strategy of modernization of the administration (Sintomer et al. 2008:171). In the
Participatory Budgeting in Seville

In the case of Seville, it is clear that the old rules of citizen-state engagement prevailed over a more active notion of citizenship, “one that recognises citizens as “makers and shapers” rather than “users and choosers” of services designed by others (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000:50).

**CLOSED SPACE (II): POLITICAL PARTIES**

Foucault argues that spaces are act of power (Foucault 1984:252), similarly Lefebvre emphasises the dynamic and socially constructed character of these spaces by arguing that “space is a social product...a dynamic, humanly constructed means of control and hence of domination” (Lefebvre and Nicholson-Smith 1991:24). Therefore, as Cornwall has noted the political discourse of the promoters of PB, as well as the previous experiences of the people who are invited to them shape and influence what it is said, what is can be said within these spaces (Cornwall 2004:80). PB in Seville was strongly connected to the ideological discourse of the promoters. The spaces were opened based on “redistribution of investment of resources based on principles of solidarity and social justice” (Autoreglamento Presupuestos Participativos 2006-2007:4), however, in Spain the majority of social policies are not carried out at the local level, and paradoxically, the Area of Social Welfare has never been part of participatory budgeting (Pérez, et al. 2009:53). Therefore, it might be considered that PB in Seville articulated an idealized rhetorical discourse taking as reference the developmental targets of the Porto Alegre PB experience, but without perhaps taking into close consideration the actual socio-political practicalities in the context of Seville.

Questions about the nature of representation (who speaks for whom, and how claims to represent are made and negotiated) are also a critical issue in PB. Coelho noted that representation is an essential element because in these spaces the rules of representation are often unclear and they might serve to guarantee or undermine their legitimacy (Coelho 2004 cited in Cornwall 2004:6). In the case of PB in Seville the ideology of participants is linked to the ideology of parties that have set up the process (Pérez et al. 2009:93). In fact this is something common in PB experiences in Spain, and as a result people with right-wing ideologies tend to be underrepresented in PB assemblies (Ganuza and Gómez 2008:41).
Finally, researchers observed that in several meetings people from IU spoke on behalf of their political parties and on behalf of the municipality to influence the decisions. In addition certain negotiations about the ‘autoreglamento’ took places outside the invited space. Therefore, it might be possible that PSOE and IU supporters acted as gatekeeper of power preventing other ideologies entering into the space.

**Popular Spaces: Community Based Organizations**

Several authors have emphasized the importance of a bottom-up component in these processes (Fung and Wright 2001; Boyte 2005). Similarly Font and Galais have suggested that the fact that only a limited number of the processes in Spain have incorporated civil society among its organizers or have made a clear connection between civil society and the policy process are crucial variables to explain the democratic quality of PB (Font and Galais 2011:946).

PB in Seville was oriented to individual participation, which might have encouraged participation of citizens that are not part of pre-existing civic associations, but also reduced the level of support among members of civic associations (Pérez, et al. 2009:64). It should be noted that civic organizations and influential civil associations were not involved in PB⁴, partly because these organisation considered that they could intervene through distinct channels outside the assembly process.

**Conclusion**

We have seen that opening spaces for participation (even ones replicated based on successful models) is by no means enough to ensure effective participation, as it encounters various and complex problems. This calls for attention to the importance of unpacking the surrounding social context in which invited spaces are created. During this essay we have un-

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⁴ For example in March 2008, a conference on participatory budgeting was held in Seville whose expected participants were the civic associations and organizations of the city; despite the effort of the organisers having send more than a thousand invitation letters, only forty representative of association attended the conference, and most of them were already linked to the PB process (Pérez et al. 2009:64).
packed three factors that were critical in the implementation of PB in Seville. First PB lacked of enough political support because PSOE the main ruling party was not highly committed to PB and did not shared the vision of IU. Second, as a result of the lack of political commitment PB was carried out by external experts, and consequently PB in Seville saw a low level of engagement among local government public servants, losing the chance to link PB with the modernisation of public administration (transparency, accountability, citizen-administration relations, etc). In addition the fact that PB was inserted in the Area of Citizen Participation also limited the transformative potential of the new space. Third the fact that PB was promoted top-down and that civil associations were not involved so much undermined its transformative potential to challenge patterns of dominance. Special mechanisms would have been necessary to increase disadvantaged groups’ participation, while more incentives and mechanisms could have been introduced to ensure accountability.

However, in spite of the numerous political ambiguities of participation in PB in Seville, there is still room for optimism as this space was an innovative experiment that provided new opportunities for strengthen the practice of citizenship. Citizens in Seville interacted in new ways with the local government and they were given the opportunity to give voice to their concerns. What it is true is that participation processes take time and there is much to be done before these kinds of “invited spaces” can become truly transformative, inclusive and accountable.

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Marxist and Radical Agrarian Populist Approaches to the Operationalization of ‘Sovereignty’ in Food Sovereignty

ANTONIO ROMAN-ALCALÁ

INTRODUCTION

What is the right approach for food sovereignty movements (FSMs) to take towards the ‘sites of sovereignty’ implicated in food sovereignty? I define ‘sites of sovereignty’ as the process spaces where food sovereignty can be constructed, and these range from the local/community, to the nation-state, to supranational institutions and organizations like the WTO, and the more aspirational (but still relevant) global site of human rights norms. These are areas that have historically been addressed by FSMs (see Wittman et al. 2010 for an overview). I will first analyze how the actions of FSMs relate to Marxian analyses in their approach to the sites, and then ask, what else might a Marxist advise the FSMs do? How would a Marxist—somehow finding him/herself in charge of FSMs—approach these sites to make change? Then, I will show how a ‘radical agrarian populist’ (RAP) analyst would offer a different interpretation of FSMs from the Marxist, and how they might advise the movements to approach the sites to better construct FS. In conclusion, I will assess the combination of approaches, showing how FSMs are taking hints from both approaches, and how their strategies could be made even stronger by taking critiques of both traditions seriously.

Food sovereignty may be understood as the “right of peoples and sovereign states to democratically determine their own agricultural and food policies” (IAASTD 2009:5).
FSMs AND SITES OF SOVEREIGNTY

FSMs are composed of social movement actors acting at a variety of scales and across many sectors; they include emblematic organizations like La Via Campesina (LVC) and the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC) as well as constituent and non-aligned national and local organizations. FSMs vary internally, and take ideas and strategies from these two approaches, plus other influences. The ‘sites’ framework is my attempt (in development) to refine the food sovereignty vision through a more explicit analysis of where the power to shape food systems lies, and how FSMs both address those ‘sites’ in the present and hope to shift the relations of such sites to power into the future. Marxist and RAP interpretations of how power operates—particularly in relation to agrarian structures and transformations—and how power ought to operate are thus relevant to the tactics and strategies of FSMs.

One can find reflections of RAP and Marxist analyses in FSM rhetoric and actions relating to the various sites of sovereignty, but this influence is not usually overt or straightforward, and these reflections more likely emerge from embodied positions that shape FSMs’ reactions to historical conditions than as conscious implementations of preexisting academic debates. Thus, this paper will disaggregate the Marxist/RAP aspects of FSMs in relation to the sites, for purposes of strategic analysis and to explore what the theories offer FSMs; my hope is to point out tensions in the two approaches to the sites and how these can be noted and dealt with by FSMs.

Before we examine the Marxist and RAP interpretation of the sites, we must clarify them. There are four sites of sovereignty to be addressed: local/community, nation-state, supranational, and global. All the sites should be considered as inclusive of organizations and institutions across sectors (market, government, and civil society) that interact and constitute each other—much as the four sites are inter-relationally co-constituted. That is, the distinctions made here partially based on scalar differences should be seen as dynamic; it is assumed that FSMs have a hand in forming the sites (and shifting the sites’ relations to each other) just as they act in response to the sites’ current (historically-determined) composition. Local refers to sub-national process spaces. Nation-state refers to the most prevalent and (arguably) important legitimized process space for governance. Supranational refers to process spaces that impact and are composed of social bodies that span multiple nation-states. Global refers to the aspiration to normative values that might shape behavior globally, and the process spaces wherein such
norms are contested and shaped (or whereby they ostensibly would be enforced).

**Marx on FSMs vis-à-vis Sites: How Do FSMs Look to a Marxist?**

Marxists see most human cultural phenomenon through the lens of economic class. Their unit of analysis tends to be classes ‘in themselves’ (meaning as constituted by objective conditions), and they seek to understand the relationship of resulting class-based economic structures (what Marx called the ‘base’ of social relations) to social structures (what Marx called ‘superstructure’), and the important role of the agency of classes in (re)shaping these. When dealing with agrarian change issues, Marxists often see socio-economic structures as determinants of agrarian political possibilities (see for example Paige 1975), and thus their analyses tend to focus on the potentials for changing such structures.

**Local/community**

When dealing with the *local/community* site, FSMs do not seem very Marxist, largely because they lump many types of locals together into a class (of ‘peasant producers’) and members of various economically based classes into a purportedly whole ‘community’. Marxists would find this sort of downplaying of class differences among rural populations disingenuous, especially if the goal is a pro-poor transformation of agrarian structures (Bernstein 2010:123). For example, a key Marxist concept regarding the transformation of agrarian structures of food production is Lenin’s “dispossession by differentiation” (DBD), wherein social stratification into rich peasants, surviving ‘middle’ peasants, and proletarianized workers is the inevitable outcome of the introduction of capitalist relations of production and land ownership into the countryside (Lenin 1982). Marxists usually explain such agrarian transitions in terms of how they serve capital’s needs. Paradigmatically, complete transitions create ‘doubly free’ laborers (free from feudal ties to land; free to sell their labor) who are available to become industrial workers (Bernstein 2010:28). With partial transitions, peasants retain ownership of some parcel of land but not enough to survive off of, so they still need to work part-time, but their use of land for partial subsistence lowers their wage requirements from the capitalist class, again serving capital (Kay 1997:16).
FSMs don’t tend to address DBD or how that process might pit FSMs’ ostensible constituents against each other sometimes, perhaps because FSMs emerged as a result of local food producer reactions to extra-local phenomena of neoliberalism and globalization (Martinez-Torres & Rosset 2010; Patel 2006). To a Marxist, emphasizing sovereignty at the local site isn’t wise because there has to be a broad movement, united by class interests, across society, in order to create socialism. Just empowering the ‘local’ isn’t enough to create a more just sustainable food system, either environmentally or socially (Goodman et al. 2012). Further, most Marxists would question alongside Bernstein (2014) whether local peasant production of food could ever sustain humanity’s large urban populations, and how (even if production levels were sufficient) distribution would be coordinated. Simply, how would a sovereign ‘local/community’ coordinate its production decisions with the consumption needs of other (predominately urban) local/communities? This site, thus, is problematic to Marxists, due to class issues, in ways that FSMs have yet to address.

**Nation-state**

That FSMs ask for reforms from the state (such as agrarian reform, infrastructural development, or financial and technical support for small farmers) doesn’t make sense to many Marxists, who would argue instead that real change only comes from a broad based workers movement “capturing state power, to change property relations” (Das 2007:364). That is, the nation-state as a site of sovereignty cannot be relied on as an effective vehicle for food sovereignty, because it is too implicated in supporting capitalists over workers, until it is effectively controlled by that nation-state’s working class, who can then use the state to establish a true democracy and advance non-elite ends (ibid). In order to gain this effective control, FSMs would need to have a broadly working class base of members who can capture the state through electoral or revolutionary means. Even more nuanced Marxist thinkers who believe in the state’s relative autonomy emphasize its central location as an arena of contestation (Poulantzas 1978) which must therefore be subjected to popular power. In some places, FSMs have united workers and peasants, but Marxists argue that these movements are still too-peasant based and populist, and not large, organized, or state-directed enough, to make a substantive difference (Petras & Veltmeyer 2007; Brass 2007).
The Marxist concern for the who, what, and how of capitalist accumulation of wealth has built up a literature on various forms and patterns of accumulation. A recent formulation was David Harvey’s ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (ABD). Harvey (2003) posits that ABD is capital’s way of ensuring continued accumulation during times of crisis and a lack of profitable investment opportunities. Instead, capital finds assets that have yet to be turned into commodities, such as land or labor, and by dispossessing people from these assets, realizes new, previously unimaginable profits. Marxists see the increased role of states in facilitating land access changes—such as in the land deals colloquially known as ‘land grabs’ (Peluso & Lund 2011)—as a service for ABD (for example, Makki & Geisler 2011), and the state’s support for such deals as further evidence of its capture by capital. While FSMs certainly have vociferously protested ‘land grabs’ and demanded state accountability in various ways (LVC 2012), Marxists may still argue that, without FSMs properly capturing the state, land grabs will continue.

Supranational

This site is a wide one composed of a diversity of institutions and organizations. It encompasses intergovernmental institutions (IGIs) like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN-based Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), but also private initiatives like the retail standards business consortium GlobalGAP and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) like LVC. Marxists would argue that any institution that is an extension of the state is likely to be captured by dominant class interests; all the more so when they are designed to be responsive to the needs of capitalists and less accountable to democratic oversight (such as is the case with the WTO’s tribunals, and ‘free trade’ agreements like NAFTA or the more recent Trans-Pacific Partnership). Similarly to the nation-state, then, Marxists would argue that FSMs shouldn’t expect many useful reforms from state-led or capital-serving supranational agencies. INGOs likewise would not be seen as a reliable guarantor of food sovereignty, because a workers’ state is needed to keep capital in check. Further, some Marxists see regressive “neoliberal subjectivities” in NGO-based food systems initiatives (Guthman 2008). Since there is no ‘world state’, only reflections of individual nation-state interests onto the international state system, it makes no sense (to a Marxist) for FSMs to attempt to influence global governance through their own organization or IGIs; instead, they should capture state power to make food and farming policy.
Global

Classical Marxists might see human rights as ‘bourgeois’ due to their individualist underpinning and their implication of a universal subject that denies the class-based nature of social relations. Marx himself made this critique early on in the history of the intellectual development of human rights (van Herpen 2012). Pragmatically, political rights (a central component of human rights) are important for workers’ movements in giving the leeway to organize revolutionary parties and change, but Marxists might not see it this way. Besides some Neo-Marxists who integrate more awareness of the reality-shaping nature of discourse, most Marxists’ historical materialist approach downplays the power of words and values in favor of the ‘real’ material relations underlying political possibilities. Such Marxists insist on the primacy of the ‘base’ of production to structure possibilities, rather than the likelihood that ‘superstructures’ (whether ‘hard’ laws or ‘soft’ norms like human rights) can themselves shape the ‘base’. In this way, human rights are not likely to create pro-poor agrarian change as long as the base of social relations of ownership remains the same.

A Better (Marxist) Strategy for FSMs?

Based on its views and assumptions about the nature of power and state-society relations, the Marxist suggestion to achieve change, following Engels’ (1894) suggestion, would be to unite the proletariat and peasant classes under a political party seeking state power. This revolutionary party would take over state in order to socialize command of the means of production, liberate the productive forces contained within the industrial apparatus, and redistribute the wealth produced by this apparatus: this should be the goal, even if the results displace many peasants from peasant to worker lifestyles. The strategic implications of this interpretation regarding the sites would be for FSMs to abandon the promotion of an idealized ‘peasant’ identity and their local community rights to sovereignty, and to concentrate on uniting around the state rather than the other sites. Then the state could be used to make better supranational arrangements that represent non-capitalist classes in their entirety, just as it could be used to defend true human rights, which are not universal or individual but based on class equality.
RAP CRITIQUES OF THE MARXIST TAKE

The RAP approach is noted for its concern for individual agents, households, and communities; it is less concerned with economic class than the relations between cohesive peasant communities and the forces that work against them. Those forces are treated in the RAP literature broadly, consisting of capitalism, capitalist interests, states, and state-building efforts that ‘make legible’ complex local socio-environmental systems in order to control and direct them (e.g. Scott 1999).

Local/community

Based on their interpretations of institutional and capitalist interloping into relatively self-contained and satisfied rural communities, RAP scholars might prioritize this site over all the others since they tend to see the local/community as the legitimate source of authority. Further, they would argue against the inevitability of local farmers differentiating into workers and capitalists, pointing out that in many circumstances agrarian transitions do not occur as Marxists predicted. Populists would argue instead that partial transitions show the resilience and autonomous resistance of peasantry, some arguing that there are at times even increases in peasant modes of production rather than the Marxists’ predicted ‘death of the peasantry’ (Ploeg 2008). Thus capitalism’s relationship to agrarian transition cannot be purely teleological. To populists, this shows that the local/community can be a site for food sovereignty, and that peasants should be vested with sovereignty if we are interested in transforming or overcoming capitalist logics and capitalism itself. This analysis builds off of Alexander Chayanov’s work, which posited a non-capitalist logic of family-labor-based peasant farms, based on Russian peasant communities of the early 20th century (Shanin 2009). Chayanov also directly opposed Lenin’s DBD with a theory of differentiation based on generational (rather than capitalist) processes.

Nation-state

Populists would say that the Marxist approach is too essentialist; even if the state is indeed an institution of elites, its powers can and should still be leveraged to support local communities. Reforms short of revolution are still worthy, for improving capacity for local autonomy to maintain subsistence (Ploeg 2010). The problem has been the nation-state violat-
ing the peasant ‘subsistence ethic’ or allowing it to be violated by profit-making interests (ibid). Following Chayanov, populists see at best a supportive role for the state, not a central one. State policies to support peasants and (autonomous) cooperatives are best pursued not through state capture but by ‘counter-power’ types of social movement organizing (Zibechi 2012), including efforts to retain autonomy even from ‘progressive’ or ostensibly socialist political parties, as evidenced in the at-times contentious relationship of Brazil’s Landless Worker’s Movement (MST) to the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party).

RAP supporters of FSMs argue that transnational groups like LVC are creating a workers’ movement of sorts, but one that goes beyond merely economic class associations and isn’t singularly state-oriented. These networks start with the peasant identity but link its nature and needs to those of others, including agrarian laborers, urban marginalized peoples, consumers, environmentalists, and democracy promoters (McMichael 2014). RAP would argue that this is an extension of the community orientation of peasants, writ large, and is crucial to fundamentally transform political-economic structures (Martinez-Torres & Rosset 2014:12).

Therefore, RAP analysts might argue that vanguard political parties are only beneficial to the extent that they return power to local communities; that states can be engaged for reforms but should be kept at arms’ length from movements themselves, and that the state’s collusion with capital is unsurprising but mutable (with pressure).

Supranational

Populists would likely agree with the Marxist critique about the capture of most supranational IGIs by capitalist interests, but it is difficult to predict what they would argue about how to approach these sites since RAP analyses in general are not focused on this level. LVC and FSMs seem dedicated to a mixed approach to such supranational sites: they seek to nix ‘bad’ institutions that align against peasants and their needs (WTO) and democratize those that have some existing legitimacy in order to fix them (FAO). The FAO is seen as a potential space for food sovereignty because its authority comes from the (inadequately but still nominally) democratic UN structure. The FAO’s reform in response to the 2008 food price crisis brought about a renewed engagement of civil society actors like LVC and the IPC, through the ‘Civil Society Mechanism’ of the Committee on Food Security (CFS 2010). While Marxists
wouldn’t rely on such reformist accommodation, populists might approve of this participation with the hopes that it returns some power to the communities and peasants that make up the civil society participants.

Global

Populists would not argue against ‘bourgeois’ human rights, but they may agree that they are too individually focused and too forcibly universal. Because of the RAP focus on the diversity of local varieties of peasant values and ethics, rights should be relied on only to the extent that they bolster the rights of groups (not just individuals) and help reinforce community institutions of social insurance. RAP would thus support FSMs in their pursuit of UN-recognized “rights of peasants—women and men”, which builds off the previous success in getting recognition for the group rights of Indigenous peoples (Edelman & James 2011). Further, human rights can create the legal/institutional conditions for “rightful resistance” (O’Brien 1996), so they have a practical use to peasant populist efforts.

In sum, RAP suggests that, in contrast to what would be suggested by Marxism, FSMs should pursue a number of strategies that do not expressly or only seek state power. First, FSMs should empower communities by mitigating the power of states and their representation of elite interests. Second, movements should recognize and support “everyday forms of resistance” (Scott 1976) and peasant community struggles “where there is no movement” (Malseed 2008). Third, they should unite various kinds of peasants and workers in specific places, to perform rightful or other kinds of resistances, depending on particular circumstances; FSMs should support plurality, not uniformity, of action, as they already do. An extension of FSMs’ existing work on cross-cultural dialogue to address issues within their transnational civic networks (the ‘Dialago de Saberes’ discussed in Martinez-Torres & Rosset 2014) might likewise help attend to the internal problems of constituent local communities. Lastly, FSMs should continue to fight for reforms that benefit peasant producers, communities, democracy, and/or ecology, and reduce the market and state-run aspects of economies, in favor of protection and reestablishment of ‘the commons’ (Ploeg 2013:14, 68)

CONCLUSION

As mentioned, FSMs have already been taking hints from both Marxist and RAP approaches to agrarian politics in the modern era, in many
Approaches to the Operationalization of ‘Sovereignty’ in Food Sovereignty

ways. FSMs clearly believe the idea (shared by both approaches) that the state’s responsiveness to capitalist interests requires strong counter-movements by organized ‘from below’ opposition. From the Marxist side, FSMs take strategies of vanguardist political organizing at national and international levels; at the same time, they take a RAP approach with support for local initiatives that bolster local resilience and autonomy, such as agroecology projects, seed saving networks (Da Vià 2012), and educational institutions (for example, MST rural schools and the IALA agroecology school cofounded by LVC; see Martinez-Torres & Rosset 2014: 9). While RAP analyses critique capitalism and its ordering of agrarian structures, they do so in a fully critical fashion, while Marxists take a more ambiguous view of capitalism, arguing to degrees the ultimately ‘progressive’ social function of the industrialization it engenders. FSMs are composed of diverse individuals and groups and thus their members take more and less hardline approaches to capitalism. On balance, though, FSMs are more RAP than Marxist in this respect, because they are categorically against the industrialization of farming.

Marxists have been known for their internationalist perspective (‘workers of the world, unite!’), and certainly FSMs have gained prominence by working as a transnational movement that confronts powers at supranational and global sites. LVC’s international gatherings (such as the Nyéléni Forum in 2007 and its most recent 2013 conference in Jakarta, Indonesia) have shown its strength, reach, and level of organization; when combined with a strongly class-aware rhetoric, LVC can seem like a ‘peasant international’ of sorts (Martinez-Torres & Rosset 2010). Being composed of grassroots intellectuals of many stripes, FSMs naturally accommodate a diversity of strategic opinions and engender a diversity of actions, inspired by Marxist and RAP analyses alike.

FSMs strategies could be made even stronger by taking points from both traditions seriously. From the Marxist side, these include the importance (not seen in populism’s focus on the ostensibly cohesive and autonomous local/community) of intra-community differences and nuanced understanding of extra-local forces. From the RAP side, they include rejecting the capital-centric vision of classical Marxism—a vision that leads to constrained approaches to states and capitalism and the promotion of agricultural industrialization, which in turn place limits on what agrarian ‘development’ could be.

Marxist critiques about the importance of class differences within FSMs are crucial for those organizations that form FSMs to acknowledge, in order
to debate based on, and resolve according to, the potential ramifications of those differences (Borras 2010). For example, the class-based differences between land-holding peasants and landless rural workers have repercussions for the policy orientation of the organizations in which these sectors take part, and the larger social movements these collectively form. Intra-community class differences can have effects on the ongoing processes of agrarian transformation within ‘communities’, particularly due to DBD, and if these go unaddressed by FSMs, they risk destabilizing the alliances that on the surface seem a solid foundation for effective external political work (whether that work is state-directed or autonomous). Further, Marxist critiques help place local occurrences and patterns in relation to larger structures and historical processes like neoliberalization (Harvey 2003). This can help FSMs’ analyses of policy and ‘sites of sovereignty’, for example, by seeing how in an era of neoliberalization, the decentralization of natural resource management to local control is not always wise or good (Ribot 2004). Likewise, an attention (spurred by Marxism, but also feminism; see Agarwal 2014 and Agarwal 1992) to intra-community inequalities can show how these sorts of shifts in sovereignty do not necessarily automatically result in a concomitant shift towards food sovereignty.

Though Marxism clearly has much to offer FSMs, it comes with some ideological baggage that can be shed with the help of key RAP critiques. The classical Marxist lens is one that sees capital and the state in everything, and assumes that most struggles and processes are predominantly arranged around these features. Because of its ambivalence towards capitalism and its teleological capital-centrism that sees every action with regards to its benefits to capital, Marxism cannot alone support an emancipatory vision for a future of just and ecological rural livelihoods and landscapes. Instead, such a vision must allow that there are other logics at play, as are seen in the work of RAP scholars like Chayanov and Ploeg. The RAP elaboration of the uniquely non-capitalist logics of peasant farmers needs to remain at the forefront of FSM struggles, as they offer hope for the possibility that societies need not experience a destructive (albeit ‘creative’) capitalist period in order to reach some sort of better society. RAP critiques Marxism effectively because it argues that, beyond a state and market focus, another model of development is possible (Martinez-Torres & Rosset 2010).
Referências


Analysis of Japanese Agricultural/Food Policy within the Global Food System in the Post-WWII Period

Kana Okada

INTRODUCTION

Since 1960s, increasing amount of farmland is being abandoned within Japan, while Japanese government and private corporations became actively involved in acquiring ‘arable’ farmland in the Global South. Here, we can observe an obvious “de-link” (Naylor et al. 2008) in agricultural production and land in Japanese food policy. How did such contradictory situation happen? What caused the “de-link” in agricultural production and land in Japan? What kind of discourse is used to justify such policy? To answer these questions, this paper builds on food regime studies (Friedmann and McMichael 1989) and several key concepts of agrarian political economy. Mainstream discourse explains the weakening of Japanese agricultural sector in relation to industrialization and decreasing farming population. On the other hand, food regime analytical framework sheds more light onto the political dimension of the cause of agricultural decline and growing food dependency in Japan, as well as the government’s motivation to accelerate such trend by liberalizing agricultural sector. The framework also enables us to relate regional and national agricultural problems with global food system/political dynamism. Crisis in territorality can been seen as crises of both governance and human inhabitation of land (Friedmann 2000). This paper aims to illustrate the influence of food regime to changes in both structure and agency, and changes in social relations that occurred in Japan during post-World War II period, by asking the four key questions: "Who owns what?" "Who does what?" "Who gets what?" and "What do they do with
The paper also examines the role of the state in the case of Japan’s involvement in land acquisition in Brazil and Mozambique.

Japan’s increasing domestic farmland abandonment and cases of foreign land acquisitions are often conceived as distinct problems and thus analyzed through different lenses. This paper argues that these two problems are the different sides of a same coin, which stems in the distortion of the global food system. Domestic and international political agendas during post-World War II period created the basis of current ‘food scarcity’ in Japan. Under the name of ‘food security,’ Japan liberalized its food system and became involved in foreign farmland acquisition. Nonetheless, such attitude is undermining food sovereignty both inside and outside the country. In the era of global agrarian crisis (van der Ploeg 2000), we need to rethink how we can shift the current food production system to a socially and ecologically sustainable one.

This paper is structured in five sections. The following section provides an overview of current situation of Japanese agricultural sector and mainstream explanation for increasing abandonment of farmlands. Third section describes Japanese agricultural/food policy in post-WWII era using food regime analytical framework. This section illustrates a transition process from second to third food regime when Japan liberalized food market and domestic agricultural sector started to decline sharply. Fourth section examines Japan’s involvement in foreign land acquisitions. Concluding section discusses correlation of domestic farmland abandonment and foreign land acquisition and their relation to food security/food sovereignty discourses.

**STATUS QUO OF JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR**

There has been a remarkable decline in Japanese agricultural sector in post-WWII period. Since 1960s, the ratio of agricultural production within Japanese GDP dropped from 9% to 1%. Farming population in Japan is decreasing more than 100 thousand people every year. According to the World’s Agriculture and Forestry census in 2010, current Japanese farming population in 2010 is 2.6million, which is less than 3% of whole Japanese population. More than half of this population is over 70 years old, while farmers below 35 years old remains only 5% (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2010). Japan depends more than 60%
of the food supply from imports (Kanto Regional Agricultural Administration Office 2013), which means that Japan is also importing large amount of virtual water (Ministry of the Environment 2013).

Above all, the problem of ‘abandoned farmland’ is becoming a critical issue. Definition of ‘abandoned farmland’ by Agriculture and Forestry Census (n.d.) is "the land that used to be a farmland but has not been cultivated for more than a year, and has no possibility to be cultivated again within few years." Once farmland is abandoned, soil deteriorates quickly, and it will become difficult to restore the land (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2009). Furthermore, these abandoned farmlands tend to be transacted in relatively low prices. Recent reports show that several Chinese private corporations, who seek for groundwater sources, are buying up unoccupied lands in Japan. The deals are often made under the table, which makes it difficult to know how much land has been transacted so far (Sentaku, n.d.).

Increasing farmland abandonment is often explained as a result of Japan’s industrialization since 1960s and the decrease of the farming population. Other factors such as lowering price of agricultural commodities, or difficulty of farmland management are also being counted (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2009). However, such explanations capture limited aspects of the cause of agricultural decline in Japan. Mainstream analysis often fails to situate this problem neither in broader historical context nor in global food system. The following section examines the intertwining factors that caused Japan’s farmland abandonment using food regime analytical framework.

**Japanese Food/ Agricultural Policy in the Second and Third Food Regime**

According to Harriet Friedmann, food regime is a "rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale"(1993:30-1). Food regime approach enables us to "identify significant relationships and contradictions in the political history of capital" (McMichael 2013: 84). In this framework, there are three historical parameters to define the "political construction of agri-food orders," which are: the first food regime (1870-1930s), the second food regime (1950-70s), and "possibly emergent" third food regime (McMichael 2009).
Japan has experienced a "transition from the bilateral US-centered food regime to an increasingly multilateral corporate food regime" (McMichael 1987, 2000, 2013). Since Meiji era (1862) until the time of WWII, Japan’s national development policy focused on strengthening military and promoting economic development through industrialization. As a result, agricultural sector has become relatively weaker than the other sectors by the time of WWII. To feed the population, Japan relied on offshore resource supply. In 1940s, Japan colonized Taiwan, Korean peninsula, Manchuria, and South East Asian countries to create an empire called ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.’ During the war, 80% of soybeans consumed in Japan were imported from these regions (Inyaku 2012, McMichael 2013). With the end of WWII, the colonial system collapsed and agricultural supply from the ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ has stopped. Japan was under control of US military, as a foothold of Cold War containment strategy in Asian region. During this period, Japan underwent several policy changes in food/agricultural sector. In 1954, US instituted PL-480 food aid program in order to dispose domestic surplus wheat as strategic goods to create offshore markets and to contain countries under Cold War rivalry (Friedmann 1993, McMichael 1999, 2013). Japan started to import substantial amount of grain and animal protein from the US under the food aid program, and became one of the main importers from the US (Friedmann 1994:260).

According to Philip McMichael (2013), there were three phases for Japanese dietary transformation. The first phase was anchored in US-Japan Mutual Security Act (1954). This agreement promoted increased wheat import from the US. To make the counterpart fund payments, wheat consumption was encouraged instead of rice, and this was supported by government’s propaganda. Bread replaced rice in public school meals, and the government spread rumors that wheat is better for children’s physical growth (Suzuki 2003). The second phase of transformation was increasing consumption/production of animal protein, or ‘meatification.’ Animal protein consumption boosted with the introduction of western diet, which required more grain imports for animal feeds (McMichael 2013:85). In 1961, ‘Law of Orientation of Agriculture,’ a neoliberal agricultural policy originally formed by the US, was adopted in Japan. This transformed Japanese legal system to become favorable for the US to export more crops for food and feed (JETRO, n.d.). The third phase was the "global restructuring of agriculture" (McMichael 2013: 86).
In the time of transition to third food regime (late 1980s-), Japan continued to liberalize the domestic food market, creating ‘new international division of labour’ (Raynolds et al 1993). Liberalization policy and outsourcing of agricultural supply oppressed the small-scale farmers in Japan.

Through these processes, Japan became highly food dependent on basic food commodities. In 2009, Japan relied 70% of grain from importation, including 80% of corn (99% from the US) and 94% of soy (72% from the US). The food self-sufficiency rate (calorie based) declined from 73% to 40% during 1965-2010 (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2009). As Japan became more food dependent, Japanese agricultural sector started to decline rapidly, and more farmlands became abandoned. According to the latest report by Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (2011), since 1961 to 2010, farmland in Japan has decreased from 6.09 million hectares to 4.56 million hectares. The area of abandoned farmland has tripled from 130,000ha to 396,000ha (2% of the total farmland to 8%) since 1976. In addition, introduction of monocropping, large-scale farming and new technologies have lead to degradation of rural farmlands in Japan. State promoted increased use of agricultural chemicals, while environmental and social costs were not being reflected in food prices (Sakuma 2010). Unsustainable use of water, soil, and intensive farming method has damaged the ecological basis of rural areas, which created obstacles for agricultural production.

Japan’s contribution to “global restructuring of agriculture” (McMichael 2013:86) and domestic agricultural decline has led to their involvement in global land grabbing, which will be explained in the following section.

**Japan’s involvement in global land acquisition**

Whilst more domestic farmlands were being abandoned, Japanese government became involved in ‘global land grab’ in partnership with private sector after the global food crises in 1973-4 and 2007-8. This section will analyze the cases of Japan’s land acquisition in Brazil and Mozambique.

The first case is PRODECER program in the Midwest of Brazil (Cerrado region 1974-1999). In 1973, as a response to soy embargo by the US, Japan sought for an alternative source for soybean importation. The
countries proposed were Brazil, Indonesia, and African countries. Nevertheless, in 1974 there was an anti-Japan riot in Indonesia, and African countries lacked basic social infrastructures to initiate large-scale agricultural projects. On the other hand, Brazil had agribusiness foundation (social infrastructure, farming equipment, transportation, marketing) relatively established by 1970s. Most importantly, Brazil was under military dictatorship during 1964-85, which enabled the state to suppress civil voices and to consolidate land for large-scale farming. In addition, Brazil and Japan had a long-standing relationship through national migration project since the beginning of 20th century. The institutions that supported this migration project were reformed into national bilateral agency: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 1974, as a coordination body of PRODECER, with a budget of 300 million dollars (JICA 2013). PRODECER project formed a small part of Brazil’s green revolution initiative. It developed 204 million hectares of Cerrado, which is 5.5 times larger than the whole area of Japan. It partially supported boosting soybean production in Brazil, and Japan succeeded to diversify the soybean supply zones. PRODECER was conceived in Japan as a great success, which turned a "barren land" into a world’s major granary (JICA, n.d.). However, regarding the socio-ecological impact that the project has brought to the Brazilian society, the project is far from being called as a ‘success.’ PRODECER project caused changes in social relation of labour, capital and ownership within the Brazilian society (Sakamoto 2008), and deepened the “metabolic rift” (Foster 2009). “Accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2003) has been promoted by the state; PRODECER was based on ‘colonization model,’ which hires 700 households of large and middle-scale settler farmers (colonos) from the South, who were selected by different stakeholders based on their capacity. This has displaced peasants and indigenous tribes from the region to favelas, as Green Revolution did in previous decades (Homem de Melo 1986, Schlesinger 2014). The project was based on large-scale industrial farming, which promoted ‘farming without farmers.’ International grain Majors took control over the Brazilian agricultural market, which weakened regional autonomy. It also had immense impacts on natural environment, such as deforestation, soil degradation, water pollution, and biodiversity loss (JICA 2010). Cerrado development had ignited strong social movements in Brazil, such as in 1984, landless farmers’s movement ‘Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra’ (MST),
which now became one of the largest social movements in the world. In recent years, PRODECER is being reassessed, considering its societal and environmental impacts. Cerrado area has become considered as a rich biodiversity source, not a barren, marginal wasteland. Nevertheless, there lays a huge gap between international recognition and the discourse in Japan, which has pushed JICA to carry out another agricultural development project in Mozambique.

ProSAVANA is an ongoing triangular project between Brazil, Japan and Mozambique. It aims to develop 14.5 million hectares of Northern Savannah area in Mozambique. Mozambique has a geopolitical significance that has easier access to Asian and European grain market. ProSAVANA is considered as part of other corporate-led initiatives such as ‘African Agricultural Growth Corridors’ (AAGC) or ‘G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (G8NA). Regarding ProSAVANA, Prime Minister Abe earmarked 70 billion yen (approximately 700million dollars) of ODA in January 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). The objective of this project is to contribute to global food security and national development of Mozambique, by providing a ‘new’ development model that small-scale production and large-scale commercial agriculture could coexist (JICA, n.d.). Nonetheless, large number of family farmers who depend on subsistence farming resides in the targeted region, which indicates a possibility of local population to be displaced through this program. Although JICA’s explanation emphasizes the importance of supporting small-scale farmers, current plan places more emphasis on export-oriented production, modernization of domestic agriculture and facilitation of foreign direct investment (FDI), which are favorable for large-scale farmers and transnational agribusiness. In addition, the project promotes contract-farming scheme, which places farmers in vulnerable position by ‘adversely’ incorporating them into global value chain. Farmers in Mozambique are consolidating across the country to raise their voice against the project, in partnership with international NGOs and Brazilian farmers’ organizations. In 2013, an open letter signed by 23 local communities and 43 international organizations was handed in to three governments (GRAIN 2013). The letter demanded "the immediate suspension of the program, an official dialogue with all affected segments of society, a priority on family farming and agroecology, and a policy based on food sovereignty" (The Guardian 2014).
In both cases, investors and donor countries imposed the agricultural development models to be implemented in target regions. Most of the small-scale farmers and indigenous people were not given any authority to involve in the decision-making process. By using the phrases "food security" or "feeding the world" (McMichael 2007), and setting guidelines for investments, states legitimize such contemporary enclosures as part of "globalization project" (McMichael 2013). Although the states use terms such as ‘inclusive’ or ‘pro-small-scale farmers,’ it is questionable which social group they are including, or which farmers they are supporting. It is necessary for JICA to hold more dialogue with the local farmers and to pay more attention for the social movements that are expanding in international scale. Japanese bilateral aid is historically tied with vested interests, but there are still some rooms for improving the current framework by reassessing the initial plan and working together with local farmers.

**Conclusion**

Since 19th century, Japan took first preference in developing industrial sector over agricultural sector, and started to depend on offshore food production. After the collapse of colonial system, Japan started to rely most of its food supply from the US under the postwar food regime. Since 1970s, pushed by the US soy embargo and global food crisis, Japan started to acquire foreign farmlands in order to diversify agricultural supply zones. Japan’s ‘food scarcity’ stems from its Neoliberal political agendas, which undermined domestic agricultural production and accelerated offshore sourcing. To legitimize such policy direction, government often mobilized the concept of ‘food security.’ Nonetheless, the meaning of the term, or whose security it aims for, has hardly been questioned. Indeed, Japanese food security policy has been reproducing dependencies among the other countries by expanding global accumulation chains. Alternative concepts such as ‘food sovereignty,’ or IAASTD report that criticized industrial agriculture, are still under-recognized among Japanese mainstream academia or political practitioners.

Current agricultural/food problem is inseparable from history of international relations. Issues of farmland abandonment and foreign land acquisition seem to be relatively new phenomena, but it is crucial to recognize that these problems stems in a larger trajectory of agrarian transi-
tion. By using food regime analytical framework, we could understand that Japanese food/land problems and “de-link” of land and agricultural production were constructed, rather than emerged, through the intersection of forces within global food system. Recent agrarian crisis indicates not only the flaw of domestic agricultural/food policies, but also the imbalance of global power dynamics and limitation of current accumulation scheme.

Although it is not realistic to assume that Japan could immediately become a food-sufficient country, it is too naive to think that Japan could keep on relying on importation in the future, regarding world’s ecological limit and instability of global food market. Increasing areas of domestic abandoned farmland and acceleration of foreign land investment are the different sides of a same coin. Rather than to patch over each problem temporarily by soft laws and regulations, it is time to think what are the roots of these problems. Food regime analysis indicates a possibility of creating "sustainable food regime," by "re-embedding food within locally and ecologically appropriate food systems"(McMichael 2009:159). These days, although still unremarkable, alternative food movements and agroecological production are growing in Japan. Especially after the massive earthquake and the following nuclear plant accident in 2011, more people have become involved in activisms to pursue sustainable lifestyle. Regarding the fact that social movements have played vital roles in past food regime changes, it is worthwhile to pay attention to those alternative movements, inside and outside the country. Especially since 2014 is FAO’s International Year of Family Farming (FAO 2014), it is crucial for Japan to consider which direction their domestic and foreign agricultural policy may lead to, both in short and longer term view, and to create food systems that meet the needs of each locality.

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The Interconnectedness of Economic Growth, Inequality and Poverty Reduction

HOLGER APEL

INTRODUCTION

The debate about the relationship between economic growth, poverty reduction and inequality has been at the heart of economic debate for a long time. Why are developed countries developed? Are developing countries growing faster than developed countries and through faster on average growth, will they converge in the future? These questions have been controversially discussed ever since. Scholars of economics have put forward many different growth theories. Recently, academic findings have advanced the understanding of the interrelationship between the poverty-income-inequality nexus. This essay analyses this relationship and argues that more equal societies experience more sustained economic growth and are more efficient in translating growth into a reduction in poverty. In other words, the growth elasticity of poverty is scrutinised: By how much does poverty decrease given a one percent increase in economic growth and what role does inequality play?

In order to avoid ambiguity and misunderstandings, it is important to make clear how the concepts of economic growth, poverty and inequality are interpreted. Poverty is understood as measured by the absolute Poverty-Headcount Index. People experiencing poverty are living on a daily income that is below a certain threshold (usually $1.25 or $2.5 per day). The total headcount of a population living below either threshold is considered to be living in poverty. Inequality refers to the differences in
income across any population and is measured by the Gini coefficient. Growth refers to the increase in GDP per capita.

The first section outlines the different schools of thought that have dominated the discussion ever since the end of the World War II. The second part of the essay puts forward the argument that economic growth is the main driver behind poverty reduction. However, there are other factors that determine how well economic growth translates into reducing poverty. The third part argues that inequality is among the most important and influential factors contributing to success or failure of poverty reduction. The next section provides a brief case study comparing development strategies and the success of translating economic growth into poverty reduction of East-Asia and Latin America and brings together the different arguments and sections of this essay. The final sections sums up the main argument and findings, mentions the limitations of this essay and hints at further relevant research topics.

1. Competing Schools of Thought

The relationship between poverty reduction, inequality and economic growth has been subject to intense debates even before but especially since the end of the Second World War. The debate is demarcated mainly along ideological lines, namely the mainstream or neo-classical economists and the heterodox or alternative camp. In the last 60 years the ‘right’ answer have been claimed by both sides. Both schools have been favoured by policy makers and scholars at certain times. At the core of the debate is the disagreement about whether the government should actively put forward redistribution policies as is argued by the Heterodox camp or whether market forces are the best solution to economic growth which ultimately leads to a reduction in poverty and inequality. Hence, it is important to critically assess the propositions put forward by each school, which is the aim of this chapter.

In the early 1950s (pre Washington Consensus time) the first economic growth theories were proposed by Kuznets (1955) and Solow (1956). Kuznets underpinned his theory of economic growth with a U-shaped inequality curve meaning that initially, inequality in an economically developing country needs to be high in order to provide incentives for economic activity. Additionally, the propensity of richer people to save is higher and thus leads to higher investment. It is argued that grow-
Inequality is unavoidable and necessary in stages of early development. Solow’s growth model stipulates that poorer countries would necessarily grow faster relative to richer countries and would thereby catch up with the already developed ones (convergence theory). The conclusions drawn from these two theories are that poverty and inequality would be solved by the advancement of a sophisticated economic society and ultimately be solved by the market forces that should operate without any government interference.

The apparent failure of convergence between the richer and poorer and rising inequality despite economic growth gave impetus to a new debate between the Keynesians and the Monetarists in the 1970s. The former favour an active government that implements redistribution policies to lessen inequality and poverty. Whereas the latter argued that free markets is the best solution to decrease inequality and poverty. The monetarists introduced the idea of the ‘trickle-down effect’. Monetarists used the concept to argue, in a similar approach as Kuznets and Solow, that economic growth will bit by bit also benefit the broader population. This idea is also used by the advocates of the Washington Consensus and emerges out of the Monetarists ideas of unrestrained markets in the early 1980s.

The Washington Consensus is characterised by its unconstrained commitments to the free market and is grounded in the Neo-liberal school of thought. The proponents of the Washington Consensus further develop the conclusion drawn from Kuznets and Solow and introduce new concepts and policy recommendations. Those are supposed to unleash the creative powers of capitalist production and make poorer countries embark on the route of economic growth. Next to the idea of unconstrained markets, the policy recommendations focus on financial liberalisation and argue that convergence is possible when the proposed policies are implemented. Through international financial institutions (IFI) such as the World Bank (WB) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) those policies were implemented in various countries through structural adjustment programs (SAPs).

In the early 1990s the apparent failure of the policies based on the ideas of the Washington Consensus lead to renewed criticism. Observing that economically successful countries, mainly the East-Asia region but including Japan, China and Indonesia, did not follow the policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus made the proponents reintroduce
their approach in a different manner. In the following, concepts such as pro-poor growth were developed and gained support. However, in the late 2000s mainstream economists introduced the concept of inclusive growth that stipulated once more, that poverty reduction was mainly a consequence of growth. Despite the new name the concept is an “augmented Washington consensus” (Rodrik 2005:211).

Simplified, the disagreement between the two economic schools of thought is based on one main assumption. The Heterodox camp advocates government intervention to ensure a certain minimum amount of equality and poverty reduction. On the other hand, the Liberal school of thought argues that government intervention will lead to inefficient markets and disturb the automatic redistribution through economic growth which would occur in the long-run (in the short-run redistribution measures by governments would diminish incentives to work and decrease efficiency). Based on the empirical evidence that countries in the East-Asia region were economically successful despite not having implemented the policies advocated by the Liberal faction while at the same time other countries where the SAPs were implemented performed rather poorly, the following sections will analyse the interconnections between inequality, poverty and growth through a comparison of policies of the two regions.

2. Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction

There is general agreement that economic growth is the basis for poverty reduction (Bourguignon 2003; Dollar 2002; Rodrik 2001). While most scholars agree on the fact that growth is the basis for a reduction in poverty, they disagree on several issues. First, some authors argue that growth is the only driver behind poverty reduction (Dollar 2002). The authors employ the idea of the ‘trickle-down effect’: growth will finally benefit the whole of society. Government interventions will be detrimental to growth rates and hence diminish the effect of growth. Thus, the only role of governments is to set the main framework, which allows the economy to thrive.

Others argue that only certain types of growth contribute to the reduction (e.g. labour-intensive growth in the manufacturing sector). This group distinguishes between different kinds of growth and puts forward the argument that growth that does not result in the creation of jobs will
not contribute as much to a reduction in poverty. A third group points out the importance of prevailing inequality in the country. Given high inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient or the Theil index, any economic advancement will be captured by the ones who have the means to invest most. Whereas in more equal societies, economic growth will be more equally shared among broader groups of society.

Leaving aside the disagreement about the ensuing distribution—whether the government has to engage in redistribution policies or the invisible hand will redistribute—one can draw the conclusion that economic growth matters for a reduction in poverty. There is “no doubt that faster economic growth is associated with faster poverty reduction” (Bourguignon 2003:1). Or as Rodrik (2000:1) puts it, “[G]rowth and poverty reduction go largely hand in hand”.

However, it is important to carefully assess this generalising statement. Finding a positive relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction should not be the end of the story but the beginning of a careful and thorough analysis. The distorting effect of averages should be kept in mind and hence one should pay closer attention to the more national or even regional levels when researching the impact of inequality on economic growth. Generally speaking there are “considerable disparities in terms of the ability of countries to translate growth into poverty reduction” (Fosu 2011:3). Thus, growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for sustainable reduction of poverty. There are many factors that have an impact on the ‘translation’ of economic growth into poverty reduction. Arguably one major factor is the prevailing inequality in a country, which will be discussed in the following section.

3. **Inequality Matters**

Academic literature has recently started to research the varying nature of growth. One main finding is that economic growth in developing countries is more unstable and characterised by ‘growth spells’ followed by stagnation or decline. Growth spells are defined as an “interval starting with a growth upbreak and ending with a downbreak” (Berg 2011b:3). In contrast, growth in advanced countries was more continuous and followed a linear pattern (see Graph 1 and 2, appendix). As a consequence, attention has been shifted towards identifying which factors are conducive and adverse to growth spells. Taking these findings into considera-
tion, the ‘correct’ interpretation of the role of inequality has shifted once more from the Liberal interpretation towards the Heterodox reading of being a conducive factor for sustainable growth (Pritchett 2000).

Kuznets U-curve was for a long time the prevailing idea arguing that growing inequality is necessary in order to achieve economic growth. The underpinning argument is that in order to invest there needs to be some sort of capital accumulation. Since wealthier people save more they are able to invest more. Therefore, the reasoning is that a certain degree of inequality is conducive to economic growth (Kaldor 1978). However, recently, increasing amount of studies have found a robust and positive correlation between lower inequality and the endurance of growth spells (Adams 2004; Fosu 2009; Kalwij 2007; Ravallion 1997). According to these results the conclusion can be drawn that “longer growth spells are robustly associated with more equality in the income distribution” (Berg 2011b:4).

Opponents to this view draw on the argument that governments cannot provide the policies leading to a more equal income distribution unless they can collect increasing tax revenues from economic growth. Hence, growing inequality might be necessary before the government can engage in redistribution policies. One shortcoming of this line of argumentation is the narrow interpretation of redistribution. If redistribution is considered as the actual redistribution of income through the state, the criticism is applicable. However, redistribution does not necessarily simply involve taking from the rich and giving to the poor. A broader interpretation would include policies aiming at dissolving inequalities of structural nature. For example, to provide equal access to economic resources, public education and gains from economic growth does not imply redistribution through taxes. It rather means that a fair and equal framework is established which enables the broad population to engage in and benefit from economic activity. Thus, the preliminary conclusion is that “[l]ower-inequality and higher-income countries exhibited greater abilities to transform a given growth rate to poverty reduction” (Fosu 2011:45).

Following the same reasoning, inter-temporal trade-offs do not seem to matter when redistribution is interpreted in the broader sense. By increasing equality, governments increase the chances of experiencing a longer and stronger growth spell. If structural issues are addressed the governments do not redistribute actual money. After the theoretical dis-
cussion, the following section provides two exemplary country case studies to underpin the argument that inequality matters.

4. SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: A COMPARISON OF EAST-ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA

The last chapter of this essay analyses and compares economic growth in East-Asia and Latin America. Main policy differences will be pointed out and it will be explained how those have contributed to a sustained growth in the East-Asia region, whereas countries in Latin America have experienced far less economic growth. If one looks at the long-term growth of countries or regions it is clear that there is a huge variety of factors influencing the prospects of economic growth. Due to spatial constraints, the main focus is put on what role different levels of income inequality have played in the two regions. The author is aware of the obscuring effect of averages and grouping countries in regions which among themselves have widely varying features.

However, a comparison is nevertheless justified by looking at the economic development of those regions. Table 1 (see appendix) shows that in 1960 the average GDP per capita, at purchasing power parity in 2005 constant prices, in all East-Asian countries in this sample were by 70% lower than the GDP per capita in Latin America (respectively $1.284 compared to $4.283). Quiet remarkably 50 years later the situation is reversed. The average GDP per capita income in East-Asia is 37% higher than in Latin America ($17.686 and $11.172). From 1960 to 2010 the four East-Asian countries were growing on average 4.52% whereas the countries in Latin America had an average growth rate of 2%. This shows once more that seemingly small differences in average economic growth can lead to major differences in living standards and poverty reduction (Table 3) over the long-term. This reversal of fortunes justifies a comparison to single out certain factors which had a major impact on the success (or failure) of economic policies. Another striking fact is that growth in Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s is not only slow com-

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1 In order to decrease complexity four countries per region have been chosen to serve as an example. When referring to East-Asia these countries are: Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. The region Latin America includes Chile, Brazil, Cost Rica and Argentina.
pared to other performers but even to its own growth performance in the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 4).

The first major difference is the intensity of implementation of reforms as prescribed by the IMF through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). In comparison to East-Asia, Latin America has implemented trade and financial liberalisation of their economies as prescribed by the Washington Consensus more vigorously. Referring to East-Asia, Rodrik (2005:205) notes that “policy regimes in the most successful countries have been highly unorthodox” in the sense that they did not implement trade and financial liberalisation until their economies had become strong enough. On the contrary, up until that point trade and imports barriers have been kept in place to support and let national industries grow before exposing them to international competition" (Rodrik 2005:205). As a result, the governments in East-Asian countries were able to play a more active role in implementing their development strategies.

A second major difference is the general choice of development strategies. Both regions followed an import-substituting industrialisation strategy in the period from after the Second World War until the 1960s. East-Asian countries changed and followed an export-oriented development path. Especially the control of inflation in the East-Asian case lead to smaller fluctuations in their exchange rate, thereby maintaining their international competitiveness. Whereas Latin American countries often had to cope with huge fluctuations of their exchange rates which undermined their economic development. Admittedly, there are further important factors which contributed to the success of the East-Asian countries such as their control of fiscal deficits, encouraging saving and investments, their openness to foreign technology and their rigorous supervision of the financial markets (Jaspersen 1997:58) which cannot be discussed in this paper.

The two major differences partly responsible for the different paths the two regions took in the period after the Second World War have been outlined above in order to suggest the variety of intertwined processes which determine success or failure of economic growth. However, there is a third factor which has been a main determinant to successful and equal sustained economic growth in East-Asia. Namely the differences in income inequality which are analysed in the following paragraph. The remainder of this chapter will link ideas presented in the pre-
ceeding chapters: the different schools of thought, the importance of economic growth for poverty reduction and the role that inequality plays in making economic growth sustainable.

Table 2 provides an overview of the changes in the Gini index of income inequality between 1960 and 2010 in the two regions. The four Latin American countries have an on average Gini coefficient ranging from 43.1 in Argentina to 57.9 in Brazil for the respective time span. If 1970 is taken as a baseline, the coefficient has increased except for Brazil where income inequality has decreased albeit remaining the most unequal country in this sample. Lately, the general pattern of income inequality in Latin America seems to have reversed. If Latin America is compared to the four East-Asian countries, the numbers differ starkly. Mean income inequality ranges from 31.0 in Taiwan to 43.2 in Thailand. In all East-Asian countries with the exception of Thailand—which became more equal, the Gini coefficient increased slightly if 1970 and 2010 are compared. Despite the increase, income inequality remains at low levels in 2010.

How does income inequality influence economic growth? Among others Fosu (2011) has confirmed the positive correlation between GDP per capita growth and reduction in poverty headcounts. This supports the argument put forward in chapter two, that economic growth is a necessary basis for a considerable reduction of poverty levels in any given country. However, the growth elasticity of poverty varies from region to region and even from country to country. Meaning, that the reduction in poverty per one percent of economic growth varies greatly. To quote Fosu (2011:46) again: “[T]here are substantial differences in the abilities of countries to translate economic growth into poverty reduction, based on their respective inequality and income profiles”. As has been shown in the comparison of Latin America and East-Asia, the latter was more successful in translating economic growth into a reduction in poverty levels. More egalitarian societies are one major factor influencing how equally the gain from economic growth is distributed among the citizens.

Furthermore, it has been argued that less unequal countries have experienced more sustained economic growth. This can be attributed to the fact that more egalitarian societies tend to have better public education which can be accessed by a broad range of the population and in general have policies and institutions which tend to distribute the effects of the economy more equally. “Inequality is much greater in Latin Amer-
ica than in East Asia, and it could explain differences in human resources, policies, and institutions between the two regions” (Gregorio et al 2004:69).

Certain economic schools of thought prescribing different policy approaches for development strategies seem to work out better than others. It is generally agreed that those countries which were successful used rather orthodox economic policies (e.g. not liberalising trade and keeping barriers to trade at least for a certain time period), whereas those which performed rather poorly have often followed the policy recommendations by the IMF and engaged in rapid trade liberalisation and massively eradicating barriers to trade. Considering the changing importance of human capital in the development context, one has to acknowledge that the focus of ‘traditional’ theories of inequality (Kuznets, Solow) are not up-to-date anymore. “[N]ow that human capital is scarcer than machines, widespread education has become the secret to growth. And broadly accessible education is difficult to achieve unless a society has a relatively even income distribution” (Milanovic 2011:7). When technical capital was the most important factor in economic growth, Kuznets’ reasoning that wealthy people are vital to invest in machines and factories to provide economic growth might have had more relevance than it has today.

**CONCLUSION**

This paper has critically assessed and discussed the proposition that economic growth is necessary for poverty reduction and that inequality has a major impact on how sustainable reduction of poverty is. The main argument is that growth is a necessary but not sufficient factor in reducing poverty. In addition to economic growth, income inequality within the country or regions has a major influence on success or failure of translating growth into poverty reduction. A key difference in the nature of growth in developing countries has been pointed out: In contrast to advanced countries, the pattern of economic growth in developing countries is not linear. Typically it follows an unstable pattern that is characterised by growth offshoots, followed by slower growth, stagnation or recession. The degree of income inequality in a country plays a major role in determining the longevity and sustainability of growth spells. Countries characterised by a higher degree of income equality fare better in maintaining long periods of growth. Additionally, the benefits from
Economic Growth, Inequality and Poverty Reduction

the economy are shared more equally which leads to higher growth poverty elasticity.

A brief case study of East-Asia and Latin America has confirmed the main findings of this essay. In the time frame of 1960 to 2010 East-Asia has economically outperformed Latin America in economic growth and reduction in poverty. Despite the fact that all East-Asian countries in the sample had a significantly lower GDP per capita income in 1960 than the countries in Latin America, East-Asia’s GDP per capita in 2010 is on average 37% higher. A major contributing factor, a lower level of income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, prevalent in East-Asia has been identified. It is valid to assume that more equal societies have institutions that ensure that economic growth is shared broadly among the population. Additionally, more equal societies tend to have better access to public education and other institutions, which increase human capital. This in turn leads to a higher likelihood of economic growth. In that way, a virtuous circle is set off on the basis of a more equal society. Moreover, the history of different schools of thought has been briefly outlined and connected to the different approaches of East-Asia and Latin America when applicable.

Nevertheless, this essay is subject to shortcomings in addition to the already mentioned spatial constraints. First, only very broad and general factors contributing to higher growth poverty elasticity have been outlined. Whether it is sufficient to merely imitate the policies of successful countries is highly questionable. Despite this reasoning, two regions were compared in the case study because those two regions have highly parallel patterns in terms of inequality and growth. Second, generalisation is extremely difficult. Success or failure of policies are highly country specific. Having established a general impact of inequality on the sustainability of economic growth, further research should be conducted in more country-specific contexts. Especially Latin America seems to be a very promising field of study where in many countries’ new governments have implemented reforms leading to the lessening of inequality. Measuring the impact of these reforms could help to further understand the growth-poverty-inequality nexus.
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Appendix

Graph 1
Climbing the hill

For advanced economies like the United Kingdom and the United States, income grows at a more or less steady pace over the long run.

(real GDP per capita, log)

Source: Penn World Tables Version 6.2.
Note: Real GDP per capita is measured in logarithms, which means that the straighter the line, the more constant the growth rate.

Source: (Berg 2011a:13)
Graph 2
Roller coaster

In developing and emerging markets long-run growth paths can be steady—or not so steady.

(real GDP per capita, log)

Source: Penn World Tables Version 8.2.
Note: Real GDP per capita is measured in logarithms, which means that the straighter the line, the more constant the growth rate. The vertical dashed lines represent periods when the growth rate makes a significant and persistent change up or down.

Source: (Berg 2011a:13)
Table 1
GDP per capital, 1960-2010

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<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
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<td>18,729</td>
<td>5,651</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>9,339</td>
<td>6,839</td>
<td>8,864</td>
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<td>26,693</td>
<td>22,577</td>
<td>6,966</td>
<td>3,224</td>
<td>11,068</td>
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<td>9,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>32,105</td>
<td>26,609</td>
<td>8,065</td>
<td>3,966</td>
<td>12,525</td>
<td>8,324</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>12,340</td>
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<table>
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<tbody>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (McGuire 2014:31)
Table 2
Gini Index of Income Inequality, 1960-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
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<td>income</td>
<td>income</td>
<td>income</td>
<td>income</td>
<td>income</td>
<td>income</td>
<td>income</td>
<td>income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>58.9</td>
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<td>50.4</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change 1970-2010</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (McGuire 2014:32)
Table 3  
Poverty in developing countries by region, selected years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region or country</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of people living on less than $1.25/day (millions)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>873.3</td>
<td>316.2</td>
<td>137.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>683.2</td>
<td>207.7</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>579.2</td>
<td>595.6</td>
<td>403.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>435.5</td>
<td>435.8</td>
<td>313.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>297.5</td>
<td>388.4</td>
<td>356.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,818.5</td>
<td>1,373.5</td>
<td>947.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of people living on less than $2.00/day (millions)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>1,273.7</td>
<td>728.7</td>
<td>438.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>960.8</td>
<td>473.7</td>
<td>260.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>926.0</td>
<td>1,091.5</td>
<td>959.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>701.6</td>
<td>827.7</td>
<td>714.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>393.6</td>
<td>336.7</td>
<td>585.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,733.9</td>
<td>2,361.5</td>
<td>2,115.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of the population living on less than $1.25/day</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of the population living on less than $2.00/day</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>79.8</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>21.6</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>36.3</td>
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<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
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<td>8.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>76.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (World Bank 2009:47)
Table 4

![Bar chart showing percentage changes over different decades]

Source: (Rodrik 2005:203)

**Figure 8.2** Response to reforms has been weak at best

*Notes: Regional GDP per capita. Asia includes Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. The LAC-7 (Latin America and Caribbean 7) comprise Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela.*

Source: (Rodrik 2005:203)

YULIYA BUCHIK

The imbalances facing the global economy today are not a new phenomenon and have their beginnings in the post-WWII era. Since that time, both developed and developing countries seeking to grow their exports have amassed large trade surpluses in order to keep their currencies low enough to make their exports attractive on the world market. In addition, continuous financial crises under a regime of open capital account hegemony have forced some countries to build up trade surpluses as a protective measure. This paper will argue that the majority of imbalances stem from the U.S., which through its policies and neoliberal institutions has encouraged trade surpluses and instability while over-consuming for decades, leading to a vast trade deficit. Global cooperation will be key to minimizing imbalances and the U.S. will have to face comprehensive re-adjustment, both from a fiscal and a cultural consumption perspective.

A country seeking to grow via exports in the open economy is naturally concerned with the cost competitiveness of its exports versus those of other countries. Trade provides the best promise of development for countries lacking the domestic markets to support dynamic gains in terms of growth necessary for poverty reduction. This export-led growth results in a current account surplus stemming from the trade account and denominated in the international trade currency: the U.S. dollar. Monetary authorities, aware that the export competitiveness of a country depends on a relatively devalued domestic currency, pursue reserve policies whereby they sterilize the U.S. dollars from entering the economy.
This prevents a relative appreciation of the domestic currency in a system of managed flexible exchange rates, irrespective of whether there are controls in place which limit capital mobility. The foreign exchange rate is an important policy tool in the promotion of the non-traditional tradable sector in developing countries (Murshed et al. 2011:17). Reserves also help promote import substitution, allowing the country to evolve domestic industries from labor-intensive to more sophisticated manufactures. Such reserve policies are also utilized by developed countries like Japan, who have a strong export orientation, in order to keep the value of their domestic currency low. Reserve accumulation on the part of trade surplus countries has been a move that protects and preserves their export competitiveness and economic strength.

Another cause of reserve accumulation by surplus countries has to do with the need for a ‘war chest’ to insure against future crises. Hoeven and Lübker consider this as the primary cause of reserve formation, not export promotion (Murshed et al. 2011:24). Developing countries accumulate reserves as a cushion for potential balance of payments crises, capital flight and foreign exchange volatility that has characterized financial crises in the past. During those crises, developing countries were hit harder than their wealthier counterparts and were forced to take out loans from neoliberal Bretton-Woods Institutions (BWI, thereafter) which came with conditionality in the form of adjustments and austerity. In the end, these institutions failed to protect emerging markets from the bursting of various global financial bubbles (Murshed et al. 2011:39-40). Not wanting to turn to BWIs for budgetary support in the future, countries like Brazil have built up a store of international liquidity in the form of reserves to alleviate the effects of potential capital flight or a downturn in exports (ibid). A high export dependency turns quite problematic during world trade slowdowns and reserves function as a form of insurance against this. As pointed out by Raffer, the current system of accumulating reserves may be unnecessary if IMF member countries exercised their rights to control capital flows, preventing capital flight from causing such havoc during downturns (Murshed et al. 2011:62). Since the 1970s, exchange controls have been steadily abolished and administrative controls on capital mobility have been lifted, allowing speculators to launch attacks on weak fixed exchange rates or to build up speculative bubbles that de-stabilize the world economy. It would appear that better capital controls on short-term international flows would alleviate this
“root cause of instability” (Murshed 1997:106). But this would represent a departure from the neoliberal doctrine of capital account liberalization, forced upon the entire world by BWIs. These institutions are rightly viewed by developing countries as serving “the interests of and dominated by developed countries” (Murshed et al. 2011:41). Key players such as the Asian Tigers are not conferred the proper influence in BWIs according to their roles in the global economy and make the political decision to self-insure (ibid). As a result, East Asia and India now hold 22% of the world’s currency in reserves as of August 2013. About half of these reserves are in the form of U.S. Treasury Bills and only earn a market rate of 2-3% whereas domestic government bonds have returns of 9%. Akyüz finds that to be at least a $50 billion opportunity cost (Murshed et al. 2011:66). These are the costs these countries are willing to pay to ensure their stability under the hegemony of capital account liberalization.

China is perhaps the strongest example of surplus generating export-led growth, with exports particularly targeted towards the large U.S. market. However, China’s low average household income and proclivity towards household savings has not resulted in a balance between domestic absorption and exports. China’s surpluses are not only generated by domestic industry since a majority of its exports are manufactured for or by large foreign companies such as Apple, Dell and Wal-Mart. The private equity firms who invest in these producers require such high rates of return that the corporations’ best option is to outsource to China to save money on labor costs, explains Kregel (Murshed et al. 2011:70). In addition, China’s surplus has a non-trade component in terms of direct investment and the reinvestment of retained profits by overseas firms operating in China. The U.S. has contributed to China’s surplus by encouraging capital inflows via U.S. market demand for China’s goods and U.S. firms outsourcing to China while discouraging surplus reduction by preventing China from purchasing its high-tech exports and blocking Chinese FDI from entering the U.S. (Mushed et al. 2011:72). The U.S. is able to screen all foreign capital using its Committee on Foreign Investment while the World Bank urges other countries to let capi-

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tal fly free. It is apparent that there is a strong influence of the U.S. on China’s reserve accumulation.

It’s important to note that developed countries such as Japan, Germany and the rest of the Eurozone have also amassed significant reserves and will need to take action to reduce global imbalances. However, the focus appears to be squarely on East Asia and oil producers to decrease their surpluses (Murshed et al. 2011:61). The IMF pressures on China, OPEC and middle-income growth-oriented countries to increase imports, absorption and international investment represents a complete policy shift. The same IMF decrying imbalances as the root of the current financial crisis is the one which encouraged global imbalances by making its aid recipients build up reserves. In order to get Overseas Development Assistance developing countries are forced to liberalize their capital accounts and use aid inflows to create reserves while they could be using this aid to fight poverty or encourage domestic development (Murshed et al. 2011:66-69). The IMF positions the reserves as a cushion to alleviate the effect of shocks and fight inflation, when those same shocks are caused by the liberalized capital accounts they require as a condition for aid. As many developing countries turn to export-led growth, their surpluses only increase as large capital flows from trade add to their existing reserve position. During economic booms commodity investment contributes to rising commodity prices, further increasing the reserves of even the poorest commodity exporters. These cyclical booms notwithstanding, the IMF has played a large role in requiring developing countries from Africa to Asia to contribute to global imbalances (ibid). Instead of encouraging sensible capital controls and only modest reserve positions, the IMF helped create a neoliberal recipe for a savings glut, whereas the real purpose of financial openness was to help developing countries stimulate capital formation and better utilize resources to fight poverty. Due to the increasing financialization of capital from the 1980s onward, actual productive investment in fixed capital or labor has fallen behind previous levels. Infrastructure development and the buildup of additional manufacturing capacity has taken a back seat to investment in financial instruments and M&A (Mushed et al. 2011: 28-29). This kind of financial capital formation does very little to fight poverty. The rise of the financial sector and excessive risk-taking of capital, supported by BWIs, has generally led to less stability in employment, income and growth for the global economy.
A debt-dependent trading system has emerged as a result of economic financialization, with the U.S. leading the globe as the largest deficit country using debt to finance its imports. The growing indebtedness of the U.S. household sector has been facilitated by financial innovation coupled with slack regulation which allows U.S. households to deepen consumption without corresponding income increases. Mortgage equity withdrawals, cheap finance and bad loans have accelerated the levels of household debt which has driven consumption and growth in the country for the last two decades (Murshed et al. 2011:42). This impacts the trade component of the U.S. current account deficit because easy credit and booming asset markets have led the U.S. to overspend in the world economy. This debt-based engine of growth has proven to be unstable, no longer income-constrained but asset-backed and inherently risky as testified by the current recession. U.S. borrowing on its capital account has had to increase in line with its tremendous consumption demand. This borrowing is made possible by Asian emerging economies and petrol exporters who invest their trade surpluses into U.S. financial assets (Murshed et al. 2011). Raffer shows that the excesses of the U.S. financial system have been facilitated by the BWIs who have encouraged global imbalances to allow the U.S. to continue financing its deficits (Murshed et al. 2011:69). In addition to propping up private consumption, the surplus that China has invested in U.S. Treasury Bills has also been squandered on the costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the large bank bailouts at the outset of the current recession. The period of time corresponding to the beginning of the Iraq war (2003-2004) was marked by negative private equity and FDI flows to the U.S. as well as perpetually negative trade and transfer accounts. During this time the current account deficit was financed solely via purchases of government debt securities.\(^2\) According to the findings by Edwards (2005), just before the crisis, the GDP to debt ratio in the U.S. was 6%, a very high ratio by historical standards. This figure is found to be sustainable only if foreigners would be “willing to hold (net) U.S. assets for the equivalent of 100% of GDP” (Edwards 2005:11-12) which is highly unlikely. In the past no other country has been able to run such a high deficit because the U.S. is the issuer of the world’s currency and its dollar denominated debt assets continue to be in high demand. Regardless of its privileged

\(^2\) In Edwards 2005: 9 & Table 1: 48.
position, the U.S. will need to adjust its current account as well as the value of the dollar in order to correct the mounting imbalances and must begin consuming less in order to pay off the debt. Under the logic of debt-servicing in the Mundell-Fleming model, the U.S. as a debtor economy will eventually have to develop a trade surplus, which means the U.S. must consistently absorb less than it earns in order to pay off the massive debt (Murshed 1997). As evidenced by historical trends, large current account deficits in the U.S. have been coupled with periods of dollar appreciation (Edwards 2005: 5). In order to adjust the current account deficit, the dollar will need to be devalued significantly, by as much as 28% (Edwards 2005:41). A shift away from the dollar standard is also imminent, as countries find themselves subsidizing the deficit of the U.S. at the expense of an investment opportunity cost while subject to changing U.S. policy and the macroeconomic volatility exported through contractionary capital flow activity during economic shocks. Von Arnim explains that a reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions is critical in order to avoid the ongoing Triffin’s dilemma, namely that “international liquidity needs breed a dollar devaluation, but a dollar devaluation limits international liquidity provision” (Murshed et al. 2011:42). Although the question of reserve currency is far from solved, there are some alternatives to the dollar, such as IMF’s Special Drawing Rights or a new Asian economic block currency currently in the talks.

Perhaps even more difficult than the monetary adjustments will be for the U.S. to move away from consumerism and increase household savings, drastically altering consumption patterns to be in line with what is sustainable on existing income alone. This would go a long way towards bridging absorption with income and production but would represent a cultural shift in the U.S. unheard of since wartime WWII. Mann (2004) indicates that the primary categories of the U.S trade deficit are automobiles and consumer goods, a product of family-level buying decisions. Stemming the massive public dissaving for a decade or two will be essential to cooling the flow of imports and improving the trade account, albeit at a cost of economic growth. Considering the additional GDP decline of up to 5% that will necessarily follow a current account adjustment, public spending will need to pick up in order to sustain the economy through a tough transition period (Edwards 2005: 41). This will require an improvement in the fiscal position, perhaps by cutting military spending or corporate subsidies not tied to exports, in order to avoid twin def-
icits and enable the public sector to provide the essential boost to employment and output. The export industry must receive support from the government as the U.S. will need to pick up exports in order to minimize dependency on foreign debt (Murshed et al. 2011:73). According to the twin deficits model, both public saving and a shrinking budget deficit will help improve the condition of the trade account which should be further boosted by growing exports. Depending on future demand for U.S. financial assets, the U.S economy will undoubtedly have to experience a decline in growth so it is essential that a strong government is in place to protect income and employment using counter-cyclical fiscal stimuli. Even if households cut consumption, their existing income must be protected to prevent further household debt. The government’s taxpayer revenue must be channeled away from any areas which do not support economic and social welfare. Non-essential public expenditures not tied to employment and output must be closely monitored and adjusted by the collective voting power of the U.S. people.

The imbalances we have been discussing are on a global level and will require international policy coordination beyond the adjustments the U.S. will need to make. The biggest economic players must come together to reform BWIs and create institutions that will contribute to better regulation and oversight of the fragile economy and international capital flows, in a way that is more representative of emerging economies. More international consultation and consideration can help ease the concerns that lead countries to create ‘war chests’. Policy must be shaped around increasing absorption in the developing world as well as in Europe in order to replace some of the lost consumption from the U.S. Since policies in the industrialized countries will affect the rest, there needs to be better policy cohesion between Japan, the Eurozone and the U.S. in terms of fiscal, monetary and FX policies. Countries holding U.S. debt will invariably have to take a hit on the value of those assets when the dollar declines. Asian countries may need to appreciate their currencies moderately in order to help shrink their surpluses to help support recovery. Although this is not an attractive policy for exports it should help boost domestic demand as imports become more affordable. In addition to these actions, this paper has tried to argue that much of the burden of deficit re-adjustment should fall on the U.S. The future stability of the world economy rests on comprehensive reform of the BWIs and a dismantling of the neoliberal doctrine, especially with regards to capital con-
trols. Ultimately, the necessary economic re-balancing must be undertaken in a comprehensive manner by all the players in the global economy.

REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION

The media campaign “Bring back our girls” was initiated on April 2014, after the kidnapping of around 234 Nigerian girls by the ‘subversive’ group Boko Haram in the northern region of the country. The outreach of the campaign has been worldwide, but has had a greater impact in the United States. As part of the media campaign in social media like Twitter and Facebook, public figures as the First Lady, Michelle Obama, have expressed their concern for the abducted girls and claimed for immediate action from the Nigerian government. Indeed, the participation of such personalities has increased the attention given to the situation in Nigeria.

Particularly, it is the interest of this essay to explore how the coverage of the media campaign “Bring back our girls” made by The New York Times (NYT) is framed under the metaphor savages-victims-saviours. In order to answer this question this essay is divided into five sections. First, an overview of the NYT as one of the most important media in the United States is presented. Second, the context of the kidnapping of the girls in Nigeria, the activities of Boko Haram and the media campaign are briefly outlined. Third, the media analysis tools to be used as well as the conceptual framework that informs the essay are described. Likewise, this section includes the sources for the collection of data. Fourth, by using media analysis tools the content of the selected articles is revised. Finally, a section of conclusions is provided.
THE NEW YORK TIMES: LEADING THE MAINSTREAM MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES

According to the Alliance for Audited Media,¹ the NYT is located in the second place, after the Wall Street Journal, in the list of the 25 national newspapers in the United States with more circulation, both in digital and printed versions. Being among the main printed sources of information is a trend that has marked the trajectory of the newspaper since its first edition in the year 1851. Even if founded in the city of New York its outreach is national on a basis of daily circulation.

The NYT describes itself as a medium “dedicated to providing news coverage of exceptional depth and breadth, as well as opinion that is thoughtful and stimulating” (The New York Times 2010). Likewise, they claim to be a reliable source of information that is characterized by its highest standards of trust and impartiality. The fact that it has earned more Pulitzers than any other paper is the main pride of the corporation.

Commonly known only as The Times, this medium has played a very important role as part of the mainstream media in the United States when reporting local and international events. As Lule (2002:275) indicates, the NYT represents a very interesting case for those interested in researching the influence of journalism and media in society and politics. By having established as one of the most important nationals newspapers, studies affirm that its influence is both national and international, at the point that the NYT is able to set the agenda of other media and political interest in the country. Moreover, the NYT editorial section is known for being the place of reference for politicians, academics and scholars in the United States: “because of its status in social, political, and journalism communities, the editorial page of the Times can be particularly noteworthy, especially in times of crisis” (Lule 2002:276).

Accordingly, as the NYT is increasingly related to the corporate media and the so-called ‘traditional’ media, it has also been accused of mis-

¹ Alliance for Audited Media is a non-profit organization located in Illinois, United States that connects North American media companies, advertisers and ad agencies. AAM independently verifies print and digital circulation, mobile apps, website analytics, social media, technology platforms and audience information for newspapers, magazines and digital media companies in the U.S. and Canada.
representing the news and events. Indeed, the framing of the events it is said to be spotty and limited, whereas the coverage of the news is selectively shown to the readers, especially in the online version of the NYT. The most recent salient cases that supported this criterion have been the heroic portrayal of George Bush after 9/11, the support to the Iraq War or the partiality towards Israel in the conflict with Palestine. This has meant that many people in the United States distrust this medium and look for alternative media, especially internet sources (Kim 2012:62).

Regarding the assumed readers of the newspaper, it is important to mention that both digital and printed versions of the NYT have different audiences. The first is addressed to a younger population or those in touch with the technology, such as computers, smartphones, tablets, etc. The printed version instead is part of the tradition of reading newspapers for an older population. However, as they cover a wide range of interests—economy, business, culture, religion, health, etc.—they address a varied population, as they claim: “while our readers are a diverse as the subjects we cover, one trait is common to all of them: the need to know” (The New York Times 2010).

**NIGERIA, BOKO HARAM AND THE “BRING BACK OUR GIRLS” MEDIA CAMPAIGN**

This section is aimed at contextualizing the campaign “Bring back our girls” by exploring the event that led to its spreading around the world: the kidnapping of around 234 girls in Northern Nigeria. In addition, it is important to situate the group Boko Haram and the way their ‘subversive’ activities have been destabilizing Nigeria and calling attention from the international community.

In 2013 the Islamist sect Boko Haram was declared as a foreign terrorist organization by the US Department of State due to the violent activities that they have been carrying out in Nigeria since 2002, year in which the ‘organization’ was created. They have also been linked to Al-Qaeda for conducting the same type of attacks and having the same ideal of ‘Jihad’ or war against the West. Boko Haram originated in Maidiguri, a

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2 It is important to note that the number of kidnapped girls is not unanimous in the different sources consulted. However, as a reference for this essay the number of 234 girls provided by Amnesty International is used.
city located in north-eastern Nigeria; here, it is important to note that Nigeria lives under a state of ongoing tensions between the north and south of the country, which in several times is addressed by foreign media and governments as a religious conflict between the Islamist North and the Christian South. Indeed this division is a consequence of the British colonization, during which the colonizers imposed Christianity on the population, where the local predominant religion was Islam (Council on Foreign Relations 2014; Owolade 2014).

In addition, out of dissatisfaction and neglect from the central government of Nigeria, Boko Haram was born as a fundamentalist group, who rejects the Western influence in the country and has taken the opportunity to exploit the government through a series of violent acts. Even if originally they did not use violence as a main strategy, since 2009 they began to attack the police, military, politicians, and public places like schools, religious temples and governmental institutions. In this way Boko Haram has been committing suicide attacks in many parts of the country, but specifically in the capital city of Abuja, where even the United Nations building was attacked in 2011. Recently, the radicalization of their activities shifted the targets of the violence towards civilians, including schools, villages and kidnappings (Owolade 2014; Council on Foreign Relations 2014).

According to Amnesty International (AI), only in the first three months of 2014 around 1500 people were killed in northern Nigeria by the attacks of Boko Haram. As well, the government is being accused of arbitrary detentions and executions as part of their campaign against the insurgency of Boko Haram. Moreover, AI informed that since 2012 hundreds of people have been forcibly disappeared in hands of the military and police (Amnesty International 2014).

This brief background is helpful to situate the recent kidnapping of approximately 234 girls from a government’s boarding school last 14 April in Chibok, Northern Nigeria. It is said that Boko Haram broke into the school heavily armed by night and that after shooting the guards, and setting fire to houses, they took the girls and headed into the woods. A few days later, the leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf appeared in a video in which he claimed the abduction in the name of the group and Islam and emphasized that the girls were going to be sold for sexual slavery and forced marriage. Since then very little has been known about them (Amnesty International 2014).
After this public announcement, the families of the girls began to take action by marching to Abuja and demanding concrete actions from the government. The public demonstrations showed the anger and despair from the relatives of the abducted girls, which transcended to the social media activism beyond Nigeria. Indeed, the biggest media campaign was initiated by a Nigerian through the social media Twitter with the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls. According to media sources like the Wall Street Journal, since the first tweet on April 23 the hashtag has been used 1.7 million times. Since then the campaign became very popular in rising awareness for the situation of the abducted girls and against Boko Haram, at the point that celebrities and politicians joined the cause through social media. In collaboration with Amnesty International the lead of this campaign around the world counted with Michelle Obama, John Kerry, Malala and others (Wall Street Journal 2014; Amnesty International 2014).

**DATA COLLECTION: TIMEFRAME AND METHODOLOGY**

First, this section is aimed at explaining the selection of the time-frame and articles of *The New York Times* in terms of the coverage of the media campaign “Bring back our girls”. As mentioned, the campaign was initiated on April 23th in Nigeria, and since then spread around the world through social media. However, the fact that an NGO like Amnesty International assumed the leadership of the campaign through their own web page, Facebook, Twitter and blogs signified an increasing awareness towards the cause of the kidnapping. Precisely, since May 2 the campaign was taken over by AI and diffused more significantly in the United States.

In this sense, the timeframe of the news selected is of two weeks, between May 2 and May 15. During this time the digital version of the NYT published a total of six articles regarding the “Bring back our girls” campaign. Among these, five are opinion columns, whereas only one is news. It is important to mention that the articles that referred to the general situation of Nigeria, Boko Haram and the kidnapping were excluded from the selection, as the main interest of this essay is to understand the coverage of the campaign, not of the proper event. The following table summarizes the information related to the articles selected:
Second, in terms of conceptual framework, this essay is concerned with two main issues: the metaphor savages-victims-saviours (SVS) developed by Makau Mutua (2001) and the concept of politics of representation. On the one hand, Mutua’s metaphor refers to the way a narrative is constructed in order to depict three main dimensions that justify human rights impositions and interventions. On the other hand, Hall (1997:2) suggests that the language used is able to construct meanings around cultures and share meanings. In this sense, when something or someone is represented, language is operating to through systems of representation. In this sense, this paper is interested in exploring how the NYT represents a national campaign about an event from outside the United States and how this is translated in signifying practices. Such analysis also includes the stereotyping of other cultures (in this case Muslims, Nigerians) as a signifying practice. Lastly, as part of the methodology, this paper is concerned with the use of framing as a tool for media analysis. This allows understanding how the campaign and the event are portrayed by the NYT.

**Coverage from The New York Times**

The six articles selected from the NYT present common issues around the topic of representation and use of frames. In this section the main findings of such analysis are described and incorporated into the concepts of politics of representation. It is important to mention that the findings are grouped into two subsections. First, it is analysed how the NYT uses representation of difference to depict ‘otherness’ when refer-
ring to the Nigerian context. Second, the analysis is informed by framing as a tool to identify the frames used for the coverage of the campaign, especially regarding the use of the metaphor savages-victims-saviours.

**REPRESENTATION OF OTHERS**

Firstly, it is important to recall that representation “is the process by which the members of a culture use language to produce meanings” (Hall 1997:61). This implies that things, objects, people and events do not carry meaning by themselves, but there are human beings who attach it to them. In this case, the NYT as part of the mainstream media in the United States is the one who is making meaning.

One of the common issues found in the articles of the NYT is the way Nigerians—be them the government, the abducted girls or Boko Haram—are represented as the ‘others’. For Hall (1997: 225) one of the main forms of representing other cultures is through stereotyping. In this sense, media may use stereotypes in order to reinforce practices that are inscribed by relations of power. In this case, Nigerians are portrayed by the NYT under common characteristics, such as backward, powerless, indifferent, incapable, etc., which may closely related to the notion of racial inferiority. Nonetheless, not only the issue of race is represented, but also the cultural and religious differences are highlighted.

When representing others, Hall (1997:229) argues that a division between “them” and “us” is created and expressed through a polarized form of representation. For example, the recurrent dichotomy in representation appeals at things or people being good/bad, or civilized/primitive, there are very well-fixed boundaries which divide the “us” from “them”. This is how the difference is represented both in texts and images. In the case of the articles selected from the NYT, the division is clear enough to be identified: “us” are the good and powerful Americans, while “them” are represented both by the bad terrorists that kidnapped innocent girls and the Nigerian government, which shows itself unable to rescue them.

Particularly, the coverage made by the NYT of the media campaign “Bring back our girls” shows that a representation of difference also includes the dimensions of gender. Throughout the articles it is a recurrent topic the destiny of the abducted girls. Indeed, one of the preoccupations of the authors is the way these girls sexuality could be affected by
the abduction: forced marriage, sex slavery, loss of virginity, impossibility of marrying if rescued. There is also a confusing association of Islam with terrorism (under the War on Terror frame) due to the fact that Boko Haram is an Islamist group. In this sense characteristics like terrorist, attacker, extremist, fundamentalist, militant and separatist are constantly used to describe Boko Haram.

The following quotes from two articles from May 3 and May 6 reflect how the authors are aiming at creating what Hall (1997:231) calls the “spectacle of the other”, when contextualizing the Nigerian cultural and religious reality by referring to the sexuality, purity and virginity of women:

If the missing Nigerian schoolgirls come home, their problems won’t be over. Even assuming (with ridiculous and probably unwarranted optimism) that they have been untouched during their captivity, their communities and even their male family members may regard them as damaged goods. It’s that […] attitude that led to their kidnapping; on the smaller scale, it may mean they can never regain what they have lost (Dell’Antonia 2014).

Northern Nigeria is a deeply conservative area, and if the schoolgirls are recovered, it may be difficult for them to marry because of suspicions that they are no longer virgins (Kristof 2014).

As Zarkov (1997:113) highlights in her analysis of the “media war” in Serbia during the years of violent conflict, media chooses to operate through body politics, which means that sexuality and female body become a means for politics. Indeed, media constructs narrative out of body politics in order to justify practices and political processes. In the case of the coverage of the campaign and the abduction of the girls in Nigeria, the NYT uses the victimization of women in terms of their sexuality as a way to appeal to the sensitivity of the readers, so they can claim action from the government and justify all the measures taken by political leaders in order to ‘help’ the victimized women in Nigeria. This is also contextualized under the notion of Muslim women that live under oppression because of a religious belief—which is non-acceptable for most Americans.
Framing the News Under the Metaphor ‘Savages-Victims-Saviours’

When Mutua (2001) suggested that the international human rights body was marked by a tri-dimensional metaphor, he did not contemplate the fact it could be used to explain other similar situations where it can also be suitable. In this essay, one of the main arguments is that the NYT has framed the coverage of the campaign “Bring back our girls” using the same three dimensions mentioned by Mutua.

In this sense, it is first important to consider what the meaning of each one of dimensions included in the SVS metaphor is. For Mutua (2001:202-204), the Western leaders, organizations and governments have discursively constructed each one of the dimensions in a way that they are part of the human rights narrative and practice. The first is the ‘savages’, depicted as inhuman and barbaric, who could be people or states belonging to a particular culture. The second dimension is the ‘victims’, whose rights and human dignity have been violated by the savages. Finally, the third dimension is composed by ‘saviours’, the “ones” selected to civilize and rescue the victims from the savages, frequently related to Eurocentric notions of superiority.

Precisely, each one of these dimensions is used by the NYT when covering the campaign and events taking place in Nigeria. It is argued in this paper that the SVS metaphor is used as a frame, which means the way a particular event is reported by the NYT. Papacharissi and Oliveira (2008) suggest that frames are vital to understand how individuals perceive reality and comprehend the events. In this sense, why is it important to realize the use of the SVS metaphor as a frame in the coverage made by the NYT? Evidently, the frames are increasingly having geopolitical importance and reflect the different political, economic and social perspectives and interests that media have when reporting the news (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008:53).

In addition, as frames can be located in four places within the communication process: the communicator, the receiver, the text, and the culture itself, this particular analysis situates the frame in the communicator, meaning the NYT. Again, how the SVS metaphor is used to report about the “Bring back our girls” campaign? In relation to the first dimension (savages) it has been identified that each one of the articles selected tends to associate both the Nigerian government and the group
Boko Haram with ‘savages’. Even if this framing is done at different levels, as Boko Haram is a “terrorist” group, the government is also continuously portrayed as unable to protect their citizens, corrupt and neglect. The following extract shows the different ways in which Nigerians are described as ‘savages’:

*About Nigerian government:*

While the Nigerian military has shown little interest in rescuing the girls, it has, in the last few years, presided over a brutal counterinsurgency in response to Boko Haram bombings. There is viciousness on both sides (Kristof 2014).

*About Boko Haram:*

DOZENS of heavily armed terrorists rolled into the sleepy little town one night in a convoy of trucks, buses and vans [...] the high school girls, asleep in their dormitory, awoke to gunfire. The attackers stormed the school, set it on fire [...] the girls were kidnapped by an extremist Muslim group called Boko Haram, whose name in the Hausa language means “Western education is a sin” (Kristof 2014).

Regarding the second dimension of victims, the NYT has appealed at sensitizing the readers through text that describes the critical situation of the kidnapped girls. As mentioned before, the articles use the threats to female bodies as a way to cause repulsion towards the perpetrators. In some of the articles the possibility of the girls to be raped, forcibly marriage or enslaved is often mentioned. This is a key issue to consider the importance of the campaign in the United States, due to the fact that the use of frames in political and mass communication “influence how people understand, remember, evaluate and act upon a problem” (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008:54).

The third dimension is also identified in the selected articles of the NYT, which has to do with the ‘saviours’. This role is embodied in the United States, as a society and as a global power. As Mutua (2001: 204) states the promise of the saviour is freedom, in a way the victims can be liberated from tyranny from the state, the religion, the culture that oppress them. In the United States the role of saving Nigerians is attached to a society that through social media activism is able to pressure the political leaders to take action. In the articles, the authors are emphatic when requesting immediate intervention to help the ‘incapable’ government of Nigeria to find the missing girls. As well, the United States is
portrayed as the only actor that can do something to save the victims from Boko Haram.

However, the ‘saviours’ mission is not only attached to political actors or ‘social media’ activists in the United States. A civilizing mission is also used to promote the interest of American citizens by the writers of the NYT. This means that each one of the readers can feel that there is something he/she can do to ‘save’ the girls from an unfair reality. Specifically, some of the articles suggest that there is more to do, in the sense that there are American NGOs already working for a better life for Nigerians, and it would be a good idea to also get involved is such kind of ‘good’ work:

For most of us, “real action” means continuing to financially support and push for that kind of change […] “We can fight groups like Boko Haram by doing the opposite of what it does. It kidnaps girls, and we can send them to school. Organizations like Developments in Literacy do a great job educating girls in Pakistan, or Campaign for Female Education (Camfed) does the same in Africa. In the long run, the best way to fight extremism is education, especially education for girls” (Dell’Antonia 2014).

CONCLUSION

Without denying the difficult reality of Nigeria and the increasing violence perpetrated against civilians in hands of Boko Haram, it is also necessary to understand that the way in which the events are portrayed by the mainstream media in the United States is informed by discourses of ‘heroism’, ‘salvation’ and justification for future actions in Nigeria and other countries around the world. As stated before, the aim of this essay has been to explore how the metaphor savages-victims-saviours is used as a frame by the NYT when writing about the “Bring back our girls” campaign. It is interesting to see how the role of ‘saviours’ is attached to all Americans who are committed to save the kidnapped girls through different channels. Why do Americans care? This question can be answered through the continuously used narrative by media and political leaders to create the sense of a ‘duty’ for American society to help the world.

Finally, the fact that the NYT is one of the main newspapers in the United States reflects how media can influence politics and society. By covering the campaign because important public figures demonstrated
their interest is also a way to show that also politics has a strong power over what media selects to present as primary information.

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Women and Children as the Face of Poverty: Whose Interpretation is it? Institutional and Social Norms in Perpetuating the Vulnerability of Women

Rotina Mafume

Abstract

Often in most cases where women are poor and vulnerable, it tends to trickle down to the children. What usually affects the mother affects the children as well. In a world where women are falling short in literacy and economic levels in most developing countries, especially Latin America, South Asia and Africa, it is not surprising that women are found vulnerable. While statistical information is important for us to understand the various vulnerabilities that women are going through, it is also important to look at some of the qualitative aspects that I believe have made women the face of poverty. This paper argues that women are made vulnerable by institutional and cultural factors that constrain their agency and portray women as victims without agency and voice. This paper will explore two dimensions of poverty, looking at the impact of poverty on women’s vulnerability and how women’s portrayal as victims of poverty inhibits their agency. The paper will link women and children’s vulnerabilities and also offer policy recommendations. Paul Farmer’s article ‘Women, Poverty and AIDS’ will be used to explore the vulnerability of women and children following the life history of Lata. Sylvia Chant’s ‘Exploring the feminization of Poverty in Africa, Asia and Latin America’ will also be used to explain how the victimization of women has aided to the vulnerability of poor women. This paper further questions the development agenda posing the question whether it is poor women and
children or development projects that are more vulnerable. Thus, in the name of aiding women and children, are development projects actually gaining much more sympathy from the vulnerabilities of women?

**INTRODUCTION**

While the causes of poverty have been defined to include a wide range of factors from lack of resources, conflict to hunger, the World Bank has defined poor people as those living below the threshold of 1.25 USD per day (The Hunger Notes 2013). Statistics on deprivation and poverty worldwide has shown that women suffer abject poverty relative to men. It is estimated that 70% of the 1.3 billion people living below the poverty datum line or poverty threshold are women (Johnson 2010:744). The FAO (as cited by The Hunger Notes 2013) estimates that 60% of women in the world experience hunger. Thus eradication of poverty has been at the heart of all those who are committed to seeing the advancement of poor countries. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) seek to halve poverty by 2015 (Laderchetal 2010: 244). Three of these MDGs are targeting women’s concerns. While the overall goal is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, MDG 3 aims to promote gender equality and empower women, MDG 4 aims to reduce child mortality and MDG 5 aims to improve maternal health (United Nations 2013). The MDGs already show that women are the central locus of eradicating poverty.

**POVERTY AND WOMEN**

It has been of scholarly interest in much research to show the vulnerability of women with respect to poverty. Women have been shown to be disadvantaged vis-à-vis their male counterparts. Though poverty can be measured in different aspects, a few measures indicate the disadvantages that women face, for example, school enrolment shows that on world average, 79% of women above 15 years are literate and in comparison 88% of males in the same age group are literate. Further, economic participation of women around the world is less in all countries in comparison with men. For instance, only 21% of women are engaged economically in North Africa compared to the 68% of men (Murray 2008:4). Hence it is often argued that access to resources for women is far less than their male counterparts and they are beset with various vulnerabilities that render them incapable to economically engage fully in society.
The platform for Action of the UN Fourth World Conference on Women 1995 argued “in the past decade the number of women living in poverty has increased disproportionately to the number of men particularly in developing countries” (as cited by Murray 2008:4). The Beijing Platform for Action, which sought to improve the lives of women, outlined important activities that needed to be achieved to improve the status of women. “However, the availability of gender statistics is still sporadic and weak in many countries thus limiting the comprehensive statistical analysis of social phenomenon and the status of women and men” (UNSTATS 2010). Human Rights Watch stated “millions of women throughout the world live in conditions of abject deprivation and attacks against their fundamental human rights for no other reason than that they are women…” (Murray 2008:8). The deprivation that women suffer and in which gaps continue to widen is their access to food (FAO 2013) health care, living wages and violation of human rights such as abuse.

CASE STUDY: WOMEN AND CHILDREN’S VULNERABILITIES

The case study from a chapter taken from ‘Women, Poverty and AIDS’ by Paul Farmer about Lata, a woman born in a rural village in Maharashtra, India, is going to be used to bring to light various vulnerabilities poor women and children go through. Lata was, as a baby, born in a “thatched hut lit only by lanterns” (Farmer 1996:15). Access to health is a major challenge that poor women face especially in rural areas where hospitals are far away and in most cases the poor community cannot afford to pay the service fees. Health improvements have been happening across the world partly because of the MDGs to improve maternal health, however, inequalities still exist between the rich and the poor. As echoed in Gro Brundtland’s 1998 press release, “never have so many had such broad and advanced access to healthcare. But never have so many been denied access to health care”. In the case of Lata’s mother, she had to deliver in her own home, without adequate health care and enough lighting or medical experts. In her infancy, Lata was exposed to inadequate health care because of the poor status of her mother. UNWOMEN (2011-2014) recognizes that maternal mortality has declined by 47% from 400 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 210 in 2010 but concedes “meeting the MDG target of reducing the ratio by three quarters will require accelerated intervention”.

ROTINA MAFUME
The UN-Secretary Report (2013) states that,

maternal deaths, which are largely preventable, are linked to the low status of women and inadequate health-care services in developing countries, including the lack of emergency obstetric care services as well as low skilled attendance at delivery. Globally, in 2011, out of the 135 million live births, 46 million were delivered without the care of a trained health-care professional. This situation is particularly acute in rural areas and among poor populations. In South Asia for example, urban women in the highest wealth quintile (urban rich) are six times as likely to have access to skilled attendance as rural women in the poorest quintile (rural poor). (United Nations 2013:8)

The case of Lata’s birth indicates the vulnerability of women at childbirth, the disadvantages that they go through and the risk that the child is ultimately exposed to. As Lata grew up, at the age of six, Lata’s father farmed a very small plot in Solapur, a small agricultural village, yet as she remembers it, her mother did nearly all the remaining work. I remember when my father would beat my mother for her cooking or because one of us was crying… (Farmer 1995:16, emphasis by author)

This situation explains further and explores another dimension of the vulnerabilities that poor women and children go through. Most recent studies show that poor women bear the burden of doing agricultural work and household chores yet this work is not recognized since it does not fall in the category of the economy that is postulated by the mainstream economy (Razav 2007:2). Hence in most cases women in the households are shock absorbers to a harsh and cruel economic climate and bear the brunt of working to feed their families even in the presence of a male partner (Razavi 2007:8). Lata’s father beat her mother if the child was crying, indicating that he expected her to look after the children well and if the child cried it meant she was not doing her role well enough. Scholars have argued that childcare has aided to women’s vulnerability in that women are restricted to enter the labor force yet they provide their services for free. These free services (domestic labor) then feed and provide an engine for this capitalist society. Thus Lata’s mother fell into the category of unpaid work having no extrinsic monetary value. This barrier poses a challenge to women and often puts them at a disadvantage. Hence in this case, Lata’s mother had limited bargaining options as she was under abuse and subject to cultural factors (she had to look
after the family and cook well). These became barriers that she had to contend with thus bringing in Agarwal’s (1997:4-7) argument of, to what extent societal norms affect the bargaining power of women especially women in poor households. By the age of six, Lata (who was not allowed to go to school) was tilling the land with her father and doing household chores. In poor families household chores start as early as age 5 for girls (United Nations 2010:108,110). She said “sometimes I recall him not even going out to the fields yet forcing us to go and beating us more than he ever had” (Farmer 1997:17). The Hunger Project (2013) argues that over 60% of women are in hunger even though they provide 70% of agricultural labor. Lack of gender equality at the household level results in women not having access to land, access to agricultural inputs and the income to finance their projects and they cannot bargain for credit since they don’t have any collateral. The male bread winner bias that puts the man as the head of the household often puts the man as the decision maker in the household thus the woman in the house is often left at the mercy of the man who makes decisions over how the woman is going to direct her life. This male centric patriarchal society perpetuates the vulnerabilities of women in this regard.

Though she attained school going age, Lata was never permitted to go to school by her father. Access to education still falls short among poor countries and often-poor children are rather forced to contribute to the families’ labor force in the field.

Poverty is the most important factor preventing both girls and boys from attending primary school, but gender and location also play a role: whereas for the poorest quintile, 31 per cent of girls and 28 per cent of boys of primary school age are out of school, for the richest quintile, the corresponding values are 9 per cent and 8 per cent respectively. The gaps are even greater when it comes to secondary school attendance. (United Nations 2013:6)

Children in most cases bear the brunt of the families’ economic status. Often times the choices made in infancy i.e. lack of enough health care and nutrition, permeate into the life of the child. Preferences in education such as families unfortunately favoring the male instead of the female child, also add to the problem. These are some of the vulnerabilities that poor children face. This cycle of poverty continues to form generational poverty. The table below shows the percentage of poor people out of school by gender and location.
The table shows that those who are poor often end up not going to school as a result of economic vulnerabilities that they face. The lack of education often impacts their job opportunities later in life due to lack of skills and this creates intergenerational poverty. Those who drop out of school in most instances become providers of labor to the household and quickly join the labor force. However for Lata it was a double tragedy, being in a family where being a girl was a curse (Farmer 1996:15), she had to be content living under the cultural dictates in which males were better off. The fact that she had to pay dowry if she wanted to get married made her father see her as a double burden to his life and certainly exacerbating his poverty, as he had to take credit to marry her other two sisters. Early marriages are common amongst the poorest of the poor and female children often seek early marriages as an escape route from poverty.
Table 2

Age at the time of first marriage is rising, but women in poor and rural areas continue to marry young

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location and Wealth</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-eastern Asia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (UNWOMEN 2013)

The corresponding table indicates that even though early marriages are being prevented around the world, it is still a phenomenon that young girls are subjected to as an escape route from poverty. Early marriages restrict women’s agency on top of it being a human rights violation to the sexual rights of children. Lata was sold into prostitution, though her father believed that his daughter was going to work in the big city (Farmer 1996:17-20). She later contracted AIDS and never saw her parents again. At age 28 when Farmer wrote this article, Lata was now 13 years in Bombay and serving four customers per day at the red light district (Farmer 1996:20).

It is often argued that poor women and children end up living a risky life and most times get exposed to HIV/AIDS. Lata’s experience is all
too familiar to hundreds of stories that young girls in impoverished circumstances go through. It is estimated that half of Bombay’s prostitutes are introduced to the field under trickery and false promises of a good and lucrative lifestyle, forcing them into a life of modern day slavery (Farmer 1996:22).

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? EXPLORING STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

There is need to separate being poor from being a woman or the generalization that one glides into—that all women are poor and that the poor are always more vulnerable. (Erikson and O'Brien as cited in Arora-Jonsson 2011:746)

With all these structural, cultural and institutional factors that bring out the complex vulnerabilities that women and children experience from birth, the question to ask is “where do we go from here”? How will the vulnerabilities be reduced? Is it a question of poverty or are there hidden embedded meanings in the experiences of poor women? To use Sylvia Chant’s article to analyze the vulnerabilities as indicated above, many aspects could be brought into picture. Is it just a question of feminization of poverty—which Chant challenges—or is it true that poverty has a woman’s face? Looking at Lata’s case makes one shudder at the thought of collecting data on poverty solely depending on income metrics (Chant 2007:1; Chant 2008:174). In this story alone it cannot be said that Lata’s father experienced a higher income than that of the women or children in the household yet the women and children experienced more vulnerabilities. Policy makers need to look beyond the money metric system and need to move beyond seeing women and children as victims and solutions to development progress and start to tackle fundamental inequalities that exist in the household. Chant emphasizes the recognition of diversity of women and that development practitioners need to understand that poverty is multi-faceted in order not to generalize solutions (Chant 2008:173; Chant 2007:214; Arora-Jonsson 2011:747). Women face different experiences that can lead to different deprivations. These stem from limited autonomy over their bodies to making decisions in the household, access to resources and an equal playing field in the labor market. Lata’s mother suffered abuse and later Lata was raped and forced into prostitution (Farmer 1996:19-22). Thus according to Chant,
(2007:215), “it is important to develop policies based on reality, peculiarities and individuality within each context”. States often operate within a male centric stereotype of what constitutes a family and as such most policies are developed with a male breadwinner bias. Most states see the family unit as a place of cooperation and assume household members are altruistic and seek to maximize utility of each member; this notion has been challenged by Agarwal (1997:2), as what she analyzes as ‘bargaining’ means a loss to someone (mostly women and children) to access of resources. Policy recommenders need to look at the different social norms and values that are attached to men and women in order to tackle intra household inequalities. Thus in terms of the state, development workers need to develop a gender lens program that goes beyond education and health but challenges women to speak out and claim their rights in socio and economic well being within the family context and dismissing paternalistic views of the state that promote divisions of responsibilities in the home. Women need to take more decisions in the social, familial and political arena in order to have influence in social policy that is gender sensitive and responds to the diversity of women (United Nations 2010:114; Chant 2008:174).

**WHO IS MORE VULNERABLE: POOR WOMEN, CHILDREN, OR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS?**

Poor women and children have been on the agenda of many development projects especially by INGOs and local NGOs. Poor women have been more favored because of their supposed virtuousness and maternalistic attributes that are attached to them (Arora-Jonsson 2011:747). Most agencies believe that if you work with women they will share with the whole family. The idea that a woman will never leave the children to die of hunger and such beliefs in the altruism of women make them targets of organizations who want to report success on their projects. Poor women’s time is not always counted as important and there is general belief that one can work with these women as they have ‘nothing else to do at home’, yet time for rural women is the greatest asset. Working with women has been promoted in micro finance as women ‘are more honest’; in environmental projects ‘as women are more close to nature’; in reproductive health and family interventions as ‘they understand child bearing’; in food aid programs as they will ‘feed the family’. Thus differ-
ent agencies record success of their programs at the expense of poor women and children. Hence women have been used to aid organizations to be successful at the expense of their vulnerability. This paper argues that we need a third way of dealing critically with the vulnerability of women recognizing their agency and important position in the cosmos.

**CONCLUSION**

Thus, in as much as poor women and children face multiple vulnerabilities in terms of health, education and decision-making, much attention of non-economic factors needs to be taken into account if gender equality is to be achieved. Issues such as inequalities in unpaid care work, gender based violence, violations of sexual and reproductive rights, access to resources and equality in decision making and participation in private and public roles needs to be brought to the attention of policy makers. Development programs and agencies need to be critically assessed so as to really understand who is benefiting from the programs; the poor women and children or the development agencies. Ultimately what is important is to give the voice to the poor and desist from looking at women as victims of poverty but as agents of change.

**REFERENCES**


INTRODUCTION

The period of the early 1990s marks the beginning of a renewed sense of international commitment to Early Childhood Development (ECD) or Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD). The coming into force of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the World Conference on Education for all (EFA) held in March 1990 in Thailand brought to the fore the significance of ECD as a crucial part of child development and basic education. It has been recognised largely that the early childhood phase is a critical and most important development stage throughout an individual lifespan. It is also widely recognised that ECD serves as a critical foundation for development; as appropriate policies of ECD can contribute in breaking the cycle of poverty and provides a better future for individuals and the society as a whole (Penn 2004). It is regarded as a fundamental right of the child which borders on his or her survival, growth and development as enshrined in the CRC. Seen as a right therefore, the responsibility is largely being shifted from the original understanding of early childhood care as the sole responsibility of parents or families to the shared responsibility of the state and families where governments are expected to design appropriate policies and plans to guide and direct the interventions of ECD. For instance according to UNICEF; “Early Childhood Development (ECD) is defined as a comprehensive approach to policies and programmes for children from birth to eight years of age, their parents and caregivers. Its purpose is to pro-
tect the child’s rights to develop his or her full cognitive, emotional, social and physical potential” (UNICEF 2001).

As a shared responsibility for government and families, the call for the recognition and regeneration of local knowledge in ECD and the need for ECD policies and programmes to respect context specifics are recently called for (Okwany et al. 2011; Nsamenang 2008). However, many ECD policies across the globe seem to be largely tilted towards the dominant narrative of ECD inspired by the Euro-American idea of a normative childhood.

There has also been a call for a shift from the traditional way of government interventions characterised by sector-based, fragmented and uncoordinated approach to a much more comprehensive approach that involves all sectors and stakeholders including communities, families and parents. To this end, Ghana in 2004 adopted its national policy on early childhood called “Early Childhood Care and Development Policy” (ECCDP) (MOWAC 2004).

This paper seeks to analyse the relevance and implications of the ECCDP for early childhood care and development for all children in Ghana. The paper will highlight what has been foregrounded and what relegated to the background in the discourse of the policy and what implication that has for ECD in Ghana. The paper particularly focuses on the extent to which the policy recognises and respects the knowledge of local people (parents, families and local communities) on ECD. It is particularly interested in highlighting how parents and families have been framed in the language or discourse of the policy; how childhood is framed and how this framing exclude and marginalise some group of children (particularly children from poor rural households)? The essay is structured into four parts: this introductory section is followed by a section that gives a brief background of the policy, the third section provides the main features of the policy, the fourth section offers a critical analysis of the policy—highlighting the basic underlying assumptions behind the policy discourse and the fifth section offers concluding remarks based on the discussions.

**BACKGROUND OF THE ECCDP**

Although the interest of the state in ECD dates back to the 19th century with the introduction of day nurseries into the primary school system by
the Missionaries, it was not until after 1960 that the Ghanaian government came out with directives on ECD “mainly in the forms of acts, reports of special commissions, decrees and laws that focused more on social welfare and cognitive aspects instead of the holistic development of young children” (Boakey et al 2008: 70). The 2004 national policy on ECCD was thus designed to replace “various uncoordinated, sector-based programmes developed and implemented by the Ministry of Education Youth and Sports, Ministry for Employment and Manpower Development, the Ministry of Health, and the Ghana National Commission on Children (GNCC) and other stakeholders” with its broad goal being “to promote the survival, growth and development of all children (0-8 years) in Ghana” (MOWAC 2004: n.p.). The policy development process took 10 years starting in 1993 and finally came into effect in August 2004. The long duration of the process was attributed to several reasons such as the broad range of consultations that were undertaken to ensure the participation of all relevant stakeholders, challenges associated with the difficulty on deciding the coordinating body of ECD, a change in political administration and related bureaucratic and political decisions (Aidoo 2008; Boakye et al. 2008; EdQual 2010). The need to develop a policy came about as result of the government recognition of its obligation to ensure the survival, growth, development and protection of all its children as provided for by the Republican Constitution of 1992 and the 1998 Children’s Act of Ghana as well as the commitment to meet the standards set forth in international conventions and treaties on children’s right such as the CRC and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) (Boakye et al 2008). Thus the ECCDP adopts the child rights based approach to Early Childhood Development at least by its reference to the child rights framework. It is also recognised that ECCD is a strategy for poverty reduction and a pathway to improving the standards of living of Ghanaians.

**Main Features of the ECCDP**

The key elements of the policy are: the working definition of ECCD, the policy rational, a broad policy goal and specific objectives and targets, institutional arrangements, roles and responsibilities, implementation strategies, and costs and financial implications. ECCD is defined as the “timely provision of a range of services that promote the survival,
growth, development and protection of the young child”. The policy rational as stipulated in the policy document is to provide:

a framework for the guidance of Government and all stakeholders specifically Sector Ministries, District Assemblies and its Structures, communities, families, Civil Society including Non-Governmental Organisations and the Donor Community in their effort to support the survival, protection and development of the children of Ghana in their early years. (MOWAC 2004: n.p.)

The policy broad goal as indicated above is to promote the survival, growth and development of all children (0-8 years) in Ghana. It has 21 bullet points-specific objectives that range from promoting widespread acceptance of the CRC, integration of ECD in development planning schemes at the community, district, regional and national levels to strengthening institutional capacities of those delivering ECD services at the national through to the community levels.

The institutional framework for the implementation of the policy is set up along the country’s decentralised system of programme delivery with a national ECD coordinating committee that is made up of representatives of sector ministries and other stakeholders to translate these objectives into actual programs at the national, district, and community levels.

The implementation strategy laid out in the policy include: the creation of an institutional framework at national, regional, district, and community levels; the creation of a conducive environment for developing ECD programs; the promotion of integrated services as packages that will take care of the physical, mental, social, moral, and spiritual needs of the child; the establishment of conventional and unconventional ECD systems; broadening of parent participation; assignment of roles and responsibilities to cognate sectors; provision of quality ECD services; mobilization of resources; and organization of regular research, monitoring, and evaluation to improve all aspects of ECD systems.

**DISCUSSIONS/ANALYSIS OF THE DISCOURSE OF THE POLICY**

The discussions and analysis of the policy is in relation to the discourse of the centrality of parents and families and by extension local communities in early childhood care and development. A recognition of families’ and parents’ roles in early childhood care and development involves not
only according parents (mothers) the responsibility of caregiving, but also paying critical attention to already existing indigenous relevant knowledge and practices of child care. This requires a recognition, adaptation and development of this knowledge into a broader frame of childhood care and development. For as UNICEF (n.d: 14) asserts:

ECD depends on the capacity support and opportunities for families and the caregivers of children to adequately care and nurture children. Programming must therefore be grounded in the participation of families and communities, blending what is known about the best environment for optimal development and traditional childrearing practices in order to appropriately build public awareness, strengthen demand and change behaviours surrounding ECD.

Paying attention to families and the knowledge they possess also adds a stronger focus on children in the age category of 0-3 (a stage of critical and rapid development) whose care takes place largely within the realm of the family.

A review of the ECCDP of Ghana suggests that the policy in part adopts the rights based approach to early childhood care and development emphasizing on a comprehensive and integrated approach rather than a fragmented and welfares approach that was characterised by the country’s earlier interventions on young children. It is in recognition of the child’s rights to develop his or her full cognitive, emotional, social and physical potential. It claims to recognise the role of communities, families and parents in the care and development of the young child. However, the mere recognition of the role of the parents, families and communities need not be taken on the face value of it. How families and parents are perceived influence the role expected of them in the context of the care and rearing of their children.

The basic underlying assumptions of the policy discourse are reflected in the policy objectives, roles and responsibilities of stakeholders, the strategies for implementation and the financial and cost implications of the policy. From the policy objective through to the financial and cost implications, it is clear that the policy is conceived and designed from the top to be implemented by ‘experts in ECD’ with little recognition of relevance of local knowledge of parents and families. The policy is largely focused on the formal ECCD delivery to the neglect of the informal systems—where parents, families and communities are guided by their so-
cial norms and values in the provision of early childhood care and protection for their children.

Though the policy recognises that early childhood care and development is not new in Ghana and that Ghanaians have always demonstrated devoted attention to child up-bringing, it gives little room for the pragmatic utilisation of indigenous resources and local knowledge. This is reflected in the ways families are framed in the discourse of the policy. The policy takes a compensatory approach to ECD rather than a complementary approach. It assumes that local families and parents lacks relevant knowledge necessary for the development and care of the child and thus requires an external expertise to be delivered from the top. For instance scanning through the 21 bullet point objectives one only sees emerge of families or parents as mere receivers of expert knowledge; as the only two objectives related to parents or families are “to provide information and skills to parents” and “to improve income capacities of parents.” Reference to local practices only appears as something to be gotten rid of as “enforcing existing laws to reduce all forms of child abuse and socio cultural practices which are detrimental to the wellbeing of children” (MOWAC 2004). No mention is made of utilising local existing knowledge of parents or families or ways of regenerating vital local care and parenting skills (that are almost extinct) but are relevant for the cognitive and psychosocial development of the child. The role of families only appears in a single sentence as “families shall bear the primary responsibility for the survival care and development of their children.” One is not sure what “this primary responsibility” entails.

The policy seems to have adopted the deficit model that assumes that the local families lack appropriate knowledge and skills relevant for the care and development of their young. The section on broadening parent participation seems to be a little too vague which has the tendency of being left to the interpretation and discretion of the policy implementers. It reads, “the concept of parent involvement will be broaden to embrace parent participation, which respects and strengthens the parents role in the child development and establish linkages between the home, early childhood programmes and children’s transition into the primary school.” (MOWAC 2004). It doesn’t indicate how the role of parents will be respected and strengthened. As a consequence, as observed in a policy brief on early childhood care and education by EdQual early childhood care and education “practitioners set up and run ECCE depending
on their beliefs and values and how they perceive children” (EdQual 2010) and or parents. When linked to the policy objective where no mention is made of utilising locally relevant knowledge, one is tended to assume that this kind of participation envisage in the policy is the kind that tells the parents what is appropriate for their children and then expects them to internalise it in the name of participation.

Meanwhile, one of the positive remarks about the policy by some scholars was the broad range of consultations in the policy development process (Boakye et al 2008). One thus, wonders how the policy could have missed out on the relevance of local knowledge in a ‘comprehensive early childhood care and development’ when it claims to have been in a ‘broad’ process of consultation. Or was this broad range of consultation a charade of local participation that only sees local care givers (families and parents) as epistemic objects rather than epistemic subjects in ECD research? (See Okwany et al 2011). Since, as primary caregivers, parents and families play crucial role in the development of the young, the practices and ways of caring for the child embedded in socio-cultural norms and values need to be recognised, adapted, and supported. Okwany et al (2011: 2) highlight in their study on ‘Leveraging Indigenous Knowledge for Child Care’, local families or parents employ a broad range of local indigenous ways of “child rearing practices and socialization strategies including proverbs, songs, games and other forms of participatory pedagogies as well as a resilient social protection system rooted in reciprocity, mutuality and social justice.” To assume therefore that the knowledge that local families possess has little importance to or at worse is detrimental to the appropriate development of their children is only a reflection of a deficit model that is paternalistic at best. And what it does is, it disempowers families and parents rather than empowers them since it is only looking out for what they lack so that it can be externally provided for. It thus puts the family in a subordinate position to the external caregivers.

This leaves little room for realistic and pragmatic programing and intervention especially from the reach of rural communities in a country where national program interventions are characterised with low coverage because of resource constraints. The implication of this is that the current ECD interventions envisaged in the policy will systematically replace the local culturally appropriate ECD provisioning that is at reach with rural communities (in terms of cost and coverage) rather than com-
plementing it. But at the same time these local families may not get ade-
quate access to the ‘appropriate caregiving’ envisaged in the policy. For
instance, as it is currently observed greater proportion of the ECD pro-
grammes especially early childhood education programmes are concen-
trated in the urban centres driven largely by the private sector with the
prime motivation being profit maximisation rather a genuine quest to
develop the child. ECD thus becomes an issue of who can pay rather
that an issue of right. As Nsamenang (2008:137) notes: “the gap between
African children’s conditions and the theories that interveners apply to
them persist because the field relies more on scripted new conceptualisa-
tions than on embedded contextual realities of childhood.”

The kind of framing of families in the policy is also a reflection of the
notion of childhood by the framers of the policy. Childhood is framed as
a reflection of the normative Euro-American middle class child where
the best kind of simulation and child socialisation is associated with play
(with toys and other kinds of equipment). This is clearly reflected in the
language of the policy from the institutional framework through to the
financial cost implication of the policy. From the national through to the
community level the cost implication is largely related to formal early
childhood care delivery with huge focus on equipment, facilities and in-
frastucture. To the extent that the cost to be shared by communities
relate heavily on infrastructure provision and maintenance; sponsoring
training of care-givers; contribution of equipment, toys, etc.; provision of
food for children; training of Community ECCD Committee members;
transportation; salaries of care-givers and other on-going costs. This is
problematic in that for most rural communities, toys and equipment
might never have been sighted or are seen as a luxury.

Clearly these communities already have their locally appropriate ways
of simulating and promoting socialisation of their children. To expect
them to contribute toys and equipment towards the early childhood de-
velopment of their children may be asking for the impossible. It begs the
question of what category of children is the policy having in mind? Is it
the middle class urban Ghanaian child whose parents are not troubled by
daily survival issues and whose definition of childhood has been essen-
tially casted in the image of the Euro-American middle class child? Or is
it the local rural or urban poor Ghanaian children whose parents battles
with daily survival issues and possibly have their own ways of simulating
the child? Viewing a child in a Eurocentric model excludes a wide range
of Ghanaian children living in rural communities and urban poor communities. As Nsamenang (2008:136) asserts “when Euro-American ECD programs are applied as a gold standard by which to measure forms of Africa’s ECD, they deny equity to and recognition of Africa’s ways of provisioning for its young, and thereby deprive the continent a niche in global ECD knowledge waves.” Framing communities’ role in this manner does not also recognise the diversities and different levels of capacities of various communities. This could be a daunting task or a mission impossible for most rural and urban poor communities. No mention is made of targeting poor communities and families for special assistance in this regard.

Furthermore, though the policy recognises the different conditions of children (such as children from poor homes, children in need of special attention etc), the decision of what constitute appropriate programmes is left to sector ministries and childcare practitioners. This does not completely reflect the kind of holistic approach the policy seeks to portray. With no clear guideline of what poor friendly appropriate interventions will be, and with the experience of lack of coordination among the relevant sector ministries (UNESCO 2006 cited in EdQual 2010), the possibility of fragmented programmes arising out of this approach still exist.

The notion of childhood and families inherent in the policy has tended to create a situation where it is gradually assumed that the only best way to enhance a child’s cognitive development (i.e. the best form of simulations) comes from established formal centres such as day nurseries and kindergartens. A situation that has resulted in what is referred to as the ‘schoolification’ of ECD (Beach J. and Bertrand J. 2009; Choi 2006; Vanderbroeck 2011) and thus places so much attention to children between 4-8 years to the neglect of the 0-3 cohorts.

**CONCLUSION**

Reflecting on the implication of the policy as discussed above, I argue that the policy largely adopts the dominant narrative of early childhood care and development to the neglect of relevant locally situated knowledge appropriate for the development of the child. Specifically, its approach to early childhood learning is particularly narrow concentrating on structured form of learning recognised in formal school systems to the neglect of other forms of learning that happen in the home. Hence,
though the policy seem to have adopted the holistic approach by definition, it is still fragmented in its approach at least as reflected in the discourse, where formal education is separated from informal education and from health and nutrition.

Also, normative childhood as envisaged in the policy has tended to marginalise local knowledge of childcare, socialisation and development. This is problematic in that poor rural communities turn to face dual deprivation relative to ECD. This is because with the dominant narrative of child care and development, these communities turn to abandon their way of caring and rearing children but do not also have adequate access to the one promoted by the state because of limited coverage and high costs. This leads to further exclusion and marginalisation of poor children and their families.

In a concluding remarks therefore, I re-echo the sentiments of scholars such as Nsamenang (2005 2008), Okwany et al (2011) and Penn (2004) in calling for the need to place the local people at the centre of policies on children especially on early childhood development. As Nsamenang (2008:137) argues, “culture determines the nature of many dimensions of children’s developmental niches—including daily routines and settings, parenting and child rearing arrangements—and it must be incorporated into policy development and service provision in Africa and in other parts of the world.”

Therefore, considering the varied conditions of children in the country, there is the need for a two-tier scheme—provisioning of a broad based programmes and a more targeted programmes for the most marginalised and vulnerable. The South African model of targeting families for child support grants could be worth considering.

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Zambia’s Emerging Maize Economy: An Assessment of the National Agricultural Policy and its Implications on Framing Food Security

LORRAINE MUKUKA LUPUPA

INTRODUCTION

Food security unswervingly occupies a prominent position in Zambia’s agricultural policies. Since 1964 when the country gained its independence, food policies have vehemently been focused on increased crop production to ensure household and national food security. Government policies have been oriented towards the promotion of maize production which is further stimulated by the provision of subsidized inputs under the Farmer Input Support Program (FISP), and the promotion of higher producer prices for various crops; most notably for maize—a national staple food crop, which is mostly grown by small holder farmers in every part of the country (Chizuni 1994). Increased maize production is seen as the gateway to food self-sufficiency and a strategic response to food insecurity.

INPUT SUBSIDY PROGRAMMES

Input Subsidy Programs in Zambia have played a critical role in shaping agricultural policy. While some may argue that subsidized inputs are an important factor in food production systems because of their dual role of ensuring increased crop production and creating incentives for the small scale farmers, it can also be countered that concentration on increased maize production as a single crop has promoted a monoculture and increased dependence on a single crop for food security (Kodamaya 2011).
With the ensuing maize economy supported by the resolute increase in maize production, it is necessary to question how food security in the Zambian context is framed given that government support to agriculture is categorically embedded in policies that have adopted a maize-centric approach to food security. However, despite government efforts to provide subsidies through the FISP and its initiative to introduce the maize marketing system through the country’s Food Reserve Agency (FRA), which procures maize from farmers on a government floor price, increased maize production has not resolved the problem of food insecurity among poor farmers neither has it helped to reduce poverty in the country (Jayne et al. 2011).

The transition from nationalist ideologies, which shaped policies for 27 years under a one party-state system, to economic liberalism, which emerged with the installation of a multi-party system in 1991, resulted into greater changes in agricultural policies and the impact thereof on food security. Zambia’s National Agricultural Policy (NAP) is the bloodline on which the agricultural sector thrives. Agriculture is the visionary roadmap upheld by the country’s Sixth Development Plan (SNDP) and the Vision 2030 both of which reflect increased agricultural productivity as the panacea for eliminating poverty and achieving food security among the rural poor (Jayne et al. 2011).

**Market-led Agriculture Versus Subsistence Agriculture**

The notion that mass production of maize supported by commercial and subsidized inputs is a conceivable strategy of ensuring food security and reducing poverty is much debated in various quarters of society in Zambia. In 2013, government adopted the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), a neo-liberal strategy that promotes increased usage of both commercial and subsidized fertilizer in order to improve soil fertility and increase productivity in developing countries that are burdened with the food crisis (IFDC 2013). CAADP is one of the many projects instituted under the auspices of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) that is conspicuously pushing African countries away from subsistence agriculture into a market-centric mode of agricultural production and towards the adoption of industrial agriculture (Tomlinson 2013). Current discourse on food security posits that the global food crisis experienced in 2007 and 2008 fuelled by an
unprecedented hike of food prices on the world markets, exacerbated food insecurity problems in Africa (McMichael and Schneider 2011). Philanthropists and development agencies see the food crisis as an opportunity to revolutionize agriculture and to enforce neo-liberal approaches to agricultural development with an objective of penetrating African markets to establish trans-national agribusiness industries and to strengthen the corporate food networks that dominate commodity and agricultural value chains (McMichael and Schneider 2011).

In some parts of Africa though, AGRA has scored credibly and it has manifestly helped to redress the food insecurity problem and rural poverty by promoting intensified fertilizer use and initiating the adoption of efficient technologies that boost productivity which considerably guarantees food security and reduces poverty by raising incomes and improving rural livelihoods (IFDC 2013). Malawi was among the first African countries to implement the neo-liberal agricultural policies enshrined in the African Green Revolution package, because of its susceptibility to unpredictable and unfavorable weather conditions which affected food production resulting in constant food shortages and food security uncertainties (Minot and Benson 2009).

Although Malawi’s food insecurity problem has substantively been addressed through the implementation of market-oriented neo-liberal policies, there are several problems facing the agriculture sector in the aftermath of intensified usage of commercial inputs and agro chemicals to increase productivity. Increased agricultural productivity promoted by high application of artificial fertilizers combined with increased chemical usage, has serious implications on the environment because it usually is not sustainable. There is a huge cost attached to initiatives that can be employed to somewhat help reverse environmental degradation (Minot and Benson 2009).

Furthermore, policies that promote increased uptake of chemical fertilizers need to be supported by hefty internal and external funding. Developing countries do not have readily available resources to finance the expansion of agriculture and as a result, governments are compelled to borrow from international institutions in order to meet the policy objectives of attaining food security and averting hunger. From this point of departure, it can be argued that the neo-liberal agenda of revolutionizing agriculture is a new form of imperialism that will eventually push poor
countries into the doldrums of the dependence syndrome (McMichael and Schneider 2011).

**Production Trends in Zambia**

Zambia prides itself with abundant natural resources and good climatic conditions which support rain fed agriculture widely practiced among small holder farmers. The favorable climate coupled with relatively good soils prevalent in most agro-ecological zones, supports the growth of different types of local and hybridized maize varieties, which make mono-cropping a traditionally cultivated norm. Because of its comparative advantage, Zambia is rated among the four highest net producers of maize in the Southern region, contending with Malawi, Zimbabwe and Kenya (Kassie et al. 2013). The crop forecast report of 2011/2012 compiled by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL) indicated that 2,795,483 and 3,020,380 metric tons of maize were produced correspondingly with a recorded surplus of over a million metric tons (Bhalla 2013). The exceptional bumper harvests recorded from 2000 to 2011 greatly contributed to a net surplus of the staple food which also leveraged Zambia’s position as the visionary food basket of the Southern African region (Bhalla 2013; Mason et al. 2011).

Byerlee and Eicher (1997) assert that increased food production has a significant role in enhancing food security, peace and democracy and that with this characteristic, food becomes a political, economic and social issue (Byerlee and Eicher 1997). The Zambian diet has always comprised of maize products as the main sources of carbohydrate. A survey conducted by Smale and Jayne (2003) revealed that average per capita consumption of maize as food is above 94 kilograms per annum (Smale and Jayne 2003). However, even with such a high intake of calories based on maize consumption as food, food insecurity continues to persist in the maize-based informal economies (Smale and Jayne 2003).

**The Green Revolution Agenda**

Most countries in Southern and Eastern Africa are dependent on maize crop for food security and it is no wonder the green revolution agenda is concentrated on promoting staple food production on a larger scale and
tactfully incorporating diversification into the policy instruments strategies. In this context, it is plausible to assume that national food security is defined by default as having mountains of the staple crop to feed the hungry. This constricted approach to food security premised on the surplus production of a single crop confines food self sufficiency to the availability of a single food crop and omits multiple factors such as accessibility, availability, entitlement and originality which Amartya Sen and Simon Maxwell postulate as critical elements that should underscore the multi-dimensional approach to framing food security (Crush and Frayne 2011).

The problem that permeates current global debates on the adoption of neo-liberal policies which support the expansion of agricultural production through technologically advanced methodologies and scientific innovations in the food production systems, is whether increased food production should be supported by the use of external inputs such as improved fertilizers and corporatized seed varieties, or whether poor countries should adopt alternative policy approaches that promote the adoption of new low input production systems, which support the preservation and multiplication of local open-pollinated seed varieties and internally generated sources of crop nutrients (Byerlee and Eicher 1997).

This paper will attempt to analyze the implications of the agricultural policy on framing food security and the emergence of a maize economy promoted by the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) being implemented in Zambia.

**UNPACKING THE CONCEPT OF FOOD SECURITY**

The Food Agricultural Organization defines “Food security as a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO 2003:28). According to the FAO report on Trade Reforms and Food Security, the 1996 World Food Summit adopted a more composite definition which states that “Food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels is achieved when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO 2003:28).
tious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (ibid).

The Committee on World Food Security, which was set up in 1975 by the UN World Food Conference to oversee developments in food security recognize food security as a “tripartite” concept, anchored on fundamental principles of availability, accessibility and stability (FAO 2003). In the same vein, OECD proposes that food security has three dimensions, including availability, accessibility and utilization (ibid). Different scholars and food security experts have equally developed various definitions of food security. Seshamani (1998) for instance, defines food security as “the ability of individuals and households in a country to have adequate access to food either by producing it themselves, by having enough income to buy food from outlets within the country or from abroad, or by taking advantage of a public distribution system” (Seshamani 1998: n.p.). Lack of access to food even by a combination of all of these implies food insecurity (Seshamani 1998).

Food security is a complex and vague concept, which has evolved over time and has been variously defined and interpreted (FAO 2003). At a global and national level, food security implies the availability of adequate provisions while at household level; concern is about adequate nutrition and wellbeing (FAO 2003). As such, it is difficult to explicitly define food security. The failure to derive a globally acclaimed definition of food security has catalyzed the continued pursuit of probable definitions in the midst of competing conceptions and contestations on what should be universally accepted as the ultimate and whole encompassing definition of food security (FAO 2003). The complexities inherent in the definition and description of food security at global level, poses an even greater challenge for national and country level policies. It holds true that every sovereign state has its own policy prescriptions and strategies for mitigating food insecurity. However, agricultural policies in the developing countries are implemented on the basis of global dictates which are not necessarily in harmony with prevailing food situations in poor countries. Failure by governments to adopt national policies that adequately address their local food security problems will further worsen food insecurity in the already beleaguered poor countries (De Schutter and Vanloqueren 2011). Policies need to be reframed to suit domestic needs. Developing countries must recognize the need for designing sound policies that will sustainably address food insecurity with due consideration to
agro-ecological preservation. Unless rigorous initiatives are made to develop alternative policy frameworks to respond to food security, the food crisis is here to stay (De Schutter and Vanloqueren 2011).

**FOOD SECURITY IN ZAMBIA**

Food security in Zambia gained dominance in 1992 after the devastating drought that adversely affected agricultural productivity in most parts of Southern Africa (Chizuni 1994). Although the 1992 drought aggravated the food insecurity situation, there’re several factors that have contributed to the severe deterioration of food and nutritional security in recent years (Chizuni 1994). Food insecurity and malnutrition is more prevalent in rural areas, peri-urban settlements and highly populated urban areas. Food insecurity in rural areas is associated with low productivity, poor extension services, lack of market information and accessibility and neoliberal policies adopted by government which overstate the production of hybrid maize in place of local varieties and alternative traditional crops (Chizuni 1994; Mason et al. 2013). The promotion of maize in unsuitable areas deepened the effects of climatic susceptibility. This hampered on-farm retention of food stocks due to highly subsidized mealie meal, and changed consumption patterns (Chizuni 1994). Chikuni advances that food insecurity and malnutrition in urban areas are related to the decline in the purchasing power parity due to economic stagnation, low employment rates and poor wages (Chikuni 1994).

Food security is an important aspect of human security that measures up to other aspects of economic, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (Byerlee and Eicher 1997). All these other forms of human security have a common relationship and interaction with food security because food security has a vital role to play in enhancing peace, security and democracy (Byerlee and Eicher 1997). Food self-sufficiency (in the sense of the country’s ability to produce enough food to meet all of its domestic demand) and food security have been major issues of concern in Zambia. Government’s implicit goal is to ensure national food security by providing incentives for small-scale farmers through agricultural programmes aimed at increasing the production of the staple food. However, despite achieving this explicit goal of meeting national food security targets, there are indicators of high rates of malnutrition and food insecurity at the household level (Chizuni 1994).
Attaining national food security does not necessarily guarantee household food security and therefore, indicators used to measure national food security should take into account other elements that sufficiently measure the extent of household food security or insecurity in order to generate comprehensive strategies that simultaneously address both household and national food security (Chizuni 1994).

The conception that food insecurity is a rural problem that affects poor people completely overshadows the possibility of bringing urban food insecurity to the fore yet, it is important to treat rural and urban food insecurity equally when formulating and implementing food policies aimed at averting food insecurity at household and national level. Crush and Frayne (2011) challenge the idea that food insecurity is a rural problem that affects poor households and that to avert the hunger problem; farmers should increase their productive capacity to ensure adequate food supply and household food security (Crush and Frayne 2011).

**Rural and Urban Food Security**

Food insecurity and poverty is generally wide spread in both rural and urban areas in Zambia. Although food security has emerged as a major development issue, it is assumed that food insecurity is more severe amongst rural households than in urban homesteads. This conception has misleadingly overturned initiatives to comprehensively deal with food insecurity in urban and rural areas. Contemporary discourse on food security is more pre-occupied with addressing the plight of the poor by promoting rural development, improving household food security and enhancing rural incomes (Crush and Frayne 2011). Zambia’s government policies have for a long time ignored the urban poor. Food security initiatives are more responsive to rural food insecurity because it is estimated that 80 percent of the poor people live in rural areas and that the needs of these people should be given priority when implementing poverty reduction and food security strategies (Mucavele 2013). However, urban food security is just as important when considering national policies that promote equitable development.

At the turn of the 21st century, most developing countries in Sub Saharan Africa have undergone rapid urbanization as a result of rural-urban migration such that it is no longer possible to ignore the complexity of urban food insecurity. National and sub national governments, develop-
ment agencies, regional bodies, and international organizations must recognize that urban food security is a critical issue that requires urgent attention (Crush and Frayne 2011). Crush and Frayne espouse that the food security challenges affecting the urban poor and the factors that affect urban food systems can no longer be ignored or marginalized. Global food security policies have held a rural bias which has prompted donors, development agencies, international agencies and NGOs to adopt simplistic conceptual frameworks of rural development concealed in the green revolution plans designed for small holder farmers (Crush and Frayne 2011).

The trajectory of food security and food availability in Zambia can be considered from two different perspectives. These are: the urban and rural food security dichotomy based on production and consumption. In urban areas people are not producers of food they are principally consumers who acquire food through an exchange system in the food markets. The urban poor are therefore, not food self-sufficient because they depend on the surplus food stocks produced by small-scale farmers in the countryside. In rural areas, small-scale farmers comprise the larger proportion of the population and most of these are both food-crop producers and food consumers (Kodamaya 2011). Farmers with less food to meet their subsistence needs may opt to buy their food requirements from relatively larger scale food producers or they could offer their labor in exchange for food or farm wage. Within the informal economy, some farmers may suffer from inaccessibility as a result of failure to produce enough food to ensure household food sustenance. Smallholder farmers often lack the capacity to produce on a larger scale beyond household food requirements. These farmers depend on government support in order to sustainably produce enough food to cater for household and national level consumption (Kodamaya 2011).

Urban and rural food security cannot be treated separately because they are inter-related. People in urban areas depend on the rural poor in the countryside for food provisions and food security while the rural poor depend on remittances from their relatives in urban areas to acquire farm inputs to increase food productivity. It is therefore imperative that national food policies aimed at addressing food security and reducing poverty must be operationalized within context of people-centered approaches to development. Governments must promote more pragmatic
food policy frameworks that should comprehensively forestall urban and rural food insecurity both in the short term and long term.

In the Zambian context, food security has been misconstrued to mean increased maize production. There is a problem with the manner in which food security is framed in policy documents which emphatically promote the production of a single crop to respond to food security challenges. It is important in this section of the essay to analyze some of the gaps in Zambia’s agricultural policy.

Firstly, the National Agricultural Policy has a strong inclination towards maize production such that it does not promote alternative crops that can cushion the country in times of crisis. Maize is a rain-fed seasonal crop grown mostly by smallscale farmers who do not have access to irrigation facilities. Therefore, its production is limited by unpredictable climatic conditions which lead may to crop failure. The agricultural policy has commendably achieved the objective of creating a maize economy but it has not redressed food insecurity and neither has it helped to alleviate poverty at household level. Secondly, the state-centric approach to food security has influenced consumption patterns, altered local diets and increased dependence on maize products which have an effect on nutrition especially in regions where sorghum and millet have been consumed as alternatives to maize. The third and most important point is that the Agricultural Policy Framework supports market liberalization, crop diversification, and better utilization of land and water resources yet these factors have not changed the food security situation in rural and urban areas. Economic liberalization created opportunities for new market policies, better extension services, credit and finance and infrastructure but all these benefits did not accrue to smallholder farmers. Such initiatives tend to benefit wealthier farmers who have an influence on government decisions.

**Political Economy of Maize**

There are implications with the dominant framing of food security in Zambia, premised as it is on the promotion of a maize economy. Increased maize production alone cannot resolve the problems of food insecurity because there are other critical factors in measuring food security. The emergence of a maize economy has impeded diversification and this situation may worsen with the adoption of CAADP because it en-
courages intensification to increase productivity. The adoption of CAADP is an indication that government is determined to adopt neoliberal policies to meet its development agenda. Zambia’s political economy has undergone five distinct policy regimes over the last four decades (Kodamaya 2011). These regimes have affected food security policies in various ways because of their influence on political and economic reforms. Each of these political regimes has its political agenda to pursue and as such they all variably contributed to agricultural policies in line with their political manifestos and campaign promises. In all these political eras what has remained constant and unchallenged is the promotion of a maize economy that historically pre-occupied the agricultural development plan.

The history of Maize can be traced back to the colonial era in the 1900s where it was utilized as a cheap source of food for slaves. Maize has evolved to become a contentious and most politicized staple food in Africa. Byerlee and Benson (1997) in their book “Africa’s Emerging Maize Revolution” and Smale et al. (2003), aptly summarize important factors about maize:

- Maize is the world’s most widely grown cereal, cultivated across a range of latitudes, altitudes, moisture regimes, slopes and soil types, with the simplest to the most mechanized production technologies (Smale and Jayne 2003)
- It is a home grown food that has produced compelling results for increased production among small scale farmers in Africa (Byerlee and Benson 1997)
- It is the staple food in much of Southern and Eastern Africa where its importance is equivalent to that of rice and wheat in Asia
- Maize has yielded compelling stories over the past two decades as the use of improved seed and technologies increases among small holder farmers (Byerlee and Benson 1997)
- It has a high yielding potential which can considerably help to reverse the downward spiral of food production in Africa (Byerlee and Benson 1997)
- It is a politically important crop because it is the most important staple food in Southern and Eastern Africa (Byerlee and Benson 1997)
CONCLUSION

It is apparent that food policies in Zambia are focused on promoting maize production as a way of ensuring food security. Although some food security experts and researchers have written substantially about the framing of food security in Zambia and made policy recommendations to government, it appears that agricultural policies will continue to evolve around agricultural subsidies and maize production as the panacea to food security. The Michigan State University, the Agriculture Consultative Forum and Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute have been instrumental in reviewing the agricultural policies and giving guidance to policy makers in the agricultural sector. Every government has its own mandate and it would therefore be folly to assume that the current government would back down from pursuing the maize-centric paradigm to food security when five other regimes including that of the colonial masters failed to change the course of food production systems. In the midst of all this, it important to note that food insecurity has always been worse off at household level. However, government’s adoption of crop diversification and its renewed interest towards the production of food crops in areas with agro-ecological advantage, may improve the food security situation. It can only be hoped that government through the various agricultural stakeholders can adopt more pragmatic food policies to improve food security at household and national level.

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This policy report is intended to facilitate the State Government of Tamil Nadu in India to prevent corruption through addressing gaps in Prosecution System by presenting a case of Gulf of Mannar Marine National Park of Tamil Nadu, India.

The Gulf of Mannar Marine National Park (GoMMNP) is the first marine Biosphere reserve in South East Asia situated in the southern border of India with an area of 560 km², with a huge biodiversity. Rare marine species like sea cucumber, sea horses, pipe fish, corals and reefs are abundant and there is a big criminal network working on the poaching and smuggling of these species. The wildlife crime control in this Park has been entrusted to Wildlife Department of Tamil Nadu, working under the control of Director, GoMMNP. As per the records available with the Department, the conviction rate of wildlife crimes is less than 10% of the cases registered, which is very low by all standards.

Corruption in the Wildlife Department is one of the serious reasons for increased crime rate against wildlife in the Park and very less conviction rate in the prosecution of the cases. A closer examination of the causes of corruption in the Wildlife Department will show that it is mostly, induced in the system itself due to some significant gaps in the procedures adopted for prosecution of wildlife cases. Though the same may be applicable to other parks as well, the present analysis is restricted
only to GoMMNP and while making the recommendations, the following tools and methodology were used for arriving at the conclusions.

Problem analysis involving Logical Framework Approach (LFA) is used to identify the underlying causes of corruption in the GoMMNP. In this exercise, it is observed that no special funds are being provided to the Wildlife Department officials for prosecution related activities and they have to manage all such expenses within their allotted funds. Any offence in the National Park is punishable with a minimum imprisonment of three years. Only senior judges handle such severe punishments, and the nearest court, competent to take up such cases is located in Madurai, which is around 200 kilometers away from the GoMMNP. The enforcement officials, who register a case, need to transport the accused to this Court and the prosecution requires an attendance of at least once in a week to conduct the cases. Every time, the officer has to take the accused persons from the local jail, to the Court at his own expenses, and get the medical checkup done, before returning them to jail authorities. Their transport (usually through special jeeps), food and other miscellaneous expenses become considerable and unbearable when an officer has to handle two or three cases together. The officials are therefore compelled to compromise with the accused in the initial stage itself to avoid the later hardship, which is foreseeable.

Thus, there is a clear lack of motivation among the officials to register the cases and conduct the prosecution. Even if the prosecution is conducted, the officials tend to avoid the dates of attendance, which finally results in poor conduct of the case and acquittal of the accused. Due to these additional burdens, the posting in the Park is considered an inferior one and competent people do not opt for the assignment, leaving a poor and corrupt work lot to toil. Therefore, it is an appropriate case for policy intervention of the Government to initiate, mobilize, and reallocate special funds for prosecution of wildlife cases through a Special Prosecution Cell in the Park, which will review the pending cases and the genuineness of fund requirements. A log frame matrix has been constructed using the details.

A Stakeholder Analysis in this case presents various interests involved with different stakeholders and reiterates the fact that the park officials can provide a better protection if their genuine requirements are taken care of. NGOs and wildlife enthusiasts, who are concerned with the increased poaching events and wildlife trade, possess a good field
knowledge and data on criminal network, which can be effectively utilized by the Park enforcement officials. Similarly, the local communities, for whom the fishing is the main livelihood, prefer to abide by rules and do not want to be harassed for their genuine activities. If the Park management gains the reputation, the local communities and NGOs can be wrapped into their conservation activities through appropriate participatory approach.

The Scenario Analysis is attempted to consider the various possible outcomes if the suggestions are incorporated in the policy. After the introduction of the special funds for the prosecution of wildlife offences and establishment of a prosecution cell, the first scenario is projected with a proper implementation of the act and commitment from the officials. Thus, where the crime detection rate rises, conviction rate goes up which results in reduced crime rate, finally ensuring protection to the Park and the ecosystem. However, a second scenario is depicted based on the possibility that the Park staff, still down with commitment and motivation, get lured by the additional funding and try to register fake cases to avail and misuse the funds.

This scenario will result in increase in number of cases registered with no significant increase in the convictions. Posting appropriate and committed staff and direct supervision of director of the Park for sanctions of all prosecutions coupled with a systematic review of the cases by the Prosecution Cell of the Park can be the guiding factors for review. In the third scenario ‘nothing changes’ case is projected where the outcome of the condition if the present situation continues in the same way despite intervention. This can end up with reduced convictions, increased acquittals, encouraged poachers, increased connivance of criminals with staff, institutionalized corruption in the Park, frustrated NGOs and wildlife activists, agitating local communities and degraded environment. Thus, based on the above analysis, the following policy recommendations are suggested for reducing the corruption in the GoMMNP.

- Earmark and allocate separate funds for the prosecution of wildlife cases in the GoMMNP.
- Establish a Prosecution Cell in the Park to review the trials of wildlife cases and to ensure the genuineness of the expenses involved in prosecution.
Besides the above two immediately possible policy changes through Wildlife Department, two more important proposals relating to the following two suggestions are proposed to the Departments concerned, for efficient management.

- Special incentive for wildlife staff working in remote areas.
- Establishment of Special Courts for Wildlife offences in the adjacent areas.

**INTRODUCTION**

**Gulf of Mannar Marine National Park**

Gulf of Mannar Marine National Park (GoMMNP) is one of the 98 National Parks and 4 Marine National Parks in India. This Park has a core area of around 560 sq. km and lies within the Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve, which has an area of around 10,500 sq. km. This Biosphere Reserve is the first marine Biosphere Reserve in South East Asia (Subramanian 2014) situated in the southern tip of Indian peninsular of Tamil Nadu. The Park consists of 21 small islands with estuaries, mudflats, beaches, algal communities, sea grasses, coral reefs, salt marshes and mangroves. This is one of the richest areas in the world in terms of marine biodiversity with abundant presence of rare marine species like sea cucumber, sea horses, pipefish, corals and reefs. Over 3600 species of flora and fauna are identified here with more than hundred hard coral species. Dolphins, whales, sharks, sea turtles and oysters are other important species besides the endangered species of sea cow, a large marine herbivorous mammal.

![Figure 1](image)

**Figure 1**

*Location of Gulf of Mannar Marine National Park*

The Park is strategically located as it forms the international border with Srilanka and is a main transition route for smugglers to South East Asian countries. Many enforcement departments like Customs, Marine Police, Coastal Security Group, Coast Guard, Narcotics Control Bureau, Fisheries Department, Navy, Police Department
and Wildlife Department are functioning in the area. The marine wildlife has a very popular demand in the international market and the species like sea cucumber, sea horses, pipe fish, corals, reefs, turtles, oysters and turtles are traded for meat, medicinal and ornamental purposes (UPI 2012; Abhimanyu Nagarajan 2013). The wildlife crime control of this Park area has been entrusted to Wildlife Department of State Government of Tamil Nadu, working under the control of Director, GoMMNP.

Wildlife Crime Enforcement in GoMMNP

Wildlife Crime enforcement is a challenge in this Park because of many reasons. These include: lack of funds for prosecution purposes; lack of coordination among different enforcement agencies; lack of infrastructure facilities; lack of special incentive for the wildlife department staff working in the remote areas; lack of committed and motivated staff and higher stake involved in the wildlife trade due to huge profits earned in the illegal business. Organized and professional gangs working in the area and the non-cooperation from the local communities are other obstacles in the enforcement activities (Malini 2012).

The increasing wildlife crimes in the Park results in a series of other problems—lack of trust (of the local communities and NGOs) on the park officials, degradation of the habitat, loss of crucial endangered species facing extinction, local communities facing harassment from the enforcement agencies who suspect the genuine fishermen for poachers, introduction of sophisticated technologies in the poaching activities, emergence of new generation of poachers attracted by the huge profits and less risk, etc. Inadequate enforcement has been identified as one of the barriers to addressing the threats to the Gulf of Mannar Marine National Park (Hunnam and Sankaran 2008).

The Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, has very stringent punishments for the wildlife offences, especially when they are associated with National Parks. Any poaching offence detected inside a National Park carries a minimum imprisonment of three years besides penalty. Since the punishments are higher, such cases need to be dealt only by competent

1 The author has served in the Wildlife Crime Control Bureau of Government of India for five years with jurisdiction over the Park and has practical knowledge on the ground enforcement conditions.
higher courts, which are usually located at around 100 to 200 kilometers distance from the Park, in the bigger cities like Madurai. The conviction of wildlife cases is nil during the past ten years, with more than 200 cases pending trial in the courts, as per the records available with the Department (data personally collected from the Park authorities).

The crime level in the park has seen a considerable increase in the recent years. The officials informed that there was a seizure of over 13000 Kg of sea cucumbers and sea horses during 16 months alone in 2012 (Malini 2012). This can be attributed to the encouragement received by the smugglers due to low rate of registration of cases and conviction. The recent poaching activities witnessed high profile smugglers with advanced equipment for smuggling indicating the changing trend in the illegal trade because of its low risk and high returns.

Role of NGOs and Wildlife Enthusiasts

A number of NGOs and wildlife enthusiasts operate in the region. They are good source of technical information and smuggling networks in the area. They maintain a good rapport with the local communities and working on alternative livelihood for the communities, which have been deprived partly from their fishing activities due to the protection measures enforced in the Park. The NGOs and activists are mainly focused on the conservation of marine species and ecosystem in the Park. Wildlife Trust of India, Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve Trust and Suganthi Devadasan Marine Research Institute are some of the important organizations working in the region.

Local Communities

The majority of local communities here are fishermen communities dependent upon fishing activities for their livelihood. As the demand for wildlife has increased due to large-scale smuggling, the locals try to sell their by catches to the middlemen and also face harassment during their fishing activities by the enforcement agencies.

In this paper, we are presenting the problem analysis in the second section using Stakeholder analysis and Logical Framework Approach (LFA) and in the third Section; we attempt to do the planning with different policy analysis tools like Logical Framework Matrix and Scenario
Analysis to identify the appropriate policy recommendations. Finally, we are presenting the policy recommendations.

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

In the analysis phase, following the approach of Norad (1999), the problem analysis is being done in four consecutive steps to identify the direct and essential causal relationships, viz., Participation Analysis, Problem Analysis, Objective Analysis and Strategy / alternative analysis.

Participation Analysis

As a first step, a comprehensive analysis in the form of Stakeholder analysis is done. Stakeholders are any individuals, groups of people, institutions or organizations that have specific stakes in the process and their interests, motives and expectations need to be analyzed. The problems, interests, potential (both strengths and weaknesses) and linkages are analyzed. In this, present case, one of the main stakeholders are the Park officials who get all the blame for poor enforcement. The wildlife NGOs and enthusiasts are another group of stakeholders who are keen in the conservation of the marine wildlife and wildlife habitat and having a serious concern about the rising poaching activities. They have a good technical knowledge on the subject and possess an institutional memory of the conservation systems operating in the area.

They are a good source of information about the criminal network operating on wildlife and have a good rapport with the local communities. The local communities form an important group of stakeholders who are dependent mainly on fishing activities for their livelihood. Their primary interest lies with their fishing profession and their cooperation can lead to a harmonious and healthy ecosystem in the Park area. The poachers are another group of stakeholders who receive benefits out of the lapses and loop holes in the system and they have stronger nexus with local politicians and can be a nuisance through political network in the implementation of right policies. Marine wildlife of the Park form a group of stakeholders, which face extinction if their conservation is not addressed in time. A Stakeholder analysis matrix is presented below with the basic characteristics of the stakeholders, their interest and how they are affected in the problem, their capacity and motivation to bring about the change and the possible action to address their interest.
Stakeholder Analysis Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Problem / Constraint</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Park officials entrusted with enforcement</td>
<td>Lack of funds for prosecution; Lack of a court at local area; Lack of incentive for working in a remote area</td>
<td>Wildlife conservation; Professional working environment; Incentive / Recognition for good work</td>
<td>Skilled officials with legal background, intelligence network and procedural knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife enthusiasts and NGOs in the Park region</td>
<td>Increased poaching incidents and increased trade of wildlife articles</td>
<td>Conservation of Wildlife; Better ecosystem and habitat</td>
<td>Knowledge on the eco system; Good rapport with local communities and park management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Communities in the Park area (mainly fishing communities)</td>
<td>Bad reputation due to increased poaching in the areas; difficulty in accessing the fishing areas and in business</td>
<td>Livelihood. Need access to fishing areas and free from harassment when they trade</td>
<td>Can ensure a harmonious ecosystem through participatory approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poachers</td>
<td>Enforcement and Prosecution</td>
<td>Illegal wildlife trade</td>
<td>Can flourish if the enforcement machinery is dented. Political influence is an additional advantage for some groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Wildlife</td>
<td>Facing extinction by the activities of poachers</td>
<td>Survival</td>
<td>If protected, forms a better eco system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the above analysis, it is observed that the Park officials are the group of stakeholders who need external assistance and their interests and views require priority, which in turn will ensure positive development for the interests of other groups too except the poachers who have a negative interest in the process.

**Problem Statement**

From the above details, it is apparent that there is an increase in the wildlife crime in the Park, which is not addressed adequately by the enforcement staff. The important conditions, which cause the problem, have been identified by the above analysis and are presented as below.
Lack of special provisions to meet out the prosecution related activities, which require transportation of the accused from the Park area to the Court, hospital (for medical checkup of the accused, which is mandatory before remanding them into judicial custody) and jail. The enforcement officer has to arrange for the transportation of the accused from jail to the court every time the case comes up for trial.

Lack of a Special Court for wildlife offences and lack of a Prosecution Cell in the Park for guiding and reviewing the wildlife cases.

Poor conduct of the trials and as there are no regular review of the cases and the enforcement officials are also not very keen to attend the trials properly, which results in lesser conviction of the wildlife cases.

No special incentives available for the enforcement officials who have been posted in the remote areas and with additional expenditure from their own pockets, the posting in Park becomes unattractive.

This particular issue needs to be addressed through a specific policy, as it will have the following effects in the system and society.

Institutionalization of corruption in the Park and Wildlife Department since the staff may tend to compromise with the offenders in the first instance itself foreseeing the costs and complications involved in registering the cases.

De-motivation among staff prefer to register new cases and conduct effective trials which acts as a motivation for the poachers as the illegal activity provides them less risk of being caught.

Possibility of extinction of certain endangered marine wildlife in the Park.

Degradation of the environment and marine eco system.

Frustration among NGOs and wildlife enthusiasts as the poaching rises threatening the Park biodiversity.

Frustration among local communities as they receive a bad reputation and they are deprived of their free access to fishing and receive harassment from the enforcement agencies.
Thus, after going through the above facts and the brief analysis, keeping in view of the guidelines provided in step one of Bardach (2009:1-10), the problem statement can be summarized as below.

**HOW TO REDUCE THE WILDLIFE CRIMES AND CORRUPTION IN THE GULF OF MANNAR MARINE NATIONAL PARK OF TAMIL NADU, INDIA?**

Problem Tree Analysis

As may be observed from the above Problem Tree analysis, it is clear that not all the causes for the problem can be achieved through one policy. The fund provision for prosecution related activities and establishment of a prosecution cell in the Park to review the cases and the expenditure relating to conduct of trials can be addressed through a single policy from the Department of Wildlife, Government of Tamil Nadu. It does not even need the special approval from the Finance Department, as the fund requirement in this case will be manageable in the Department through reallocation of their allotted budget. But, the formation of a special court for wildlife cases requires a special policy and acceptance from the Legal Department and High Court of Tamil Nadu. Similarly, providing a special incentive for the staff working in the wildlife areas, which are remotely located, requires another policy from the Wildlife
Department, covering the other National Parks and Sanctuaries in the State and since this requires the approval from the Finance Ministry and understandably an in-principle approval from the Personnel Department as well.

**Objective Tree Analysis**

After analyzing the above facts and perspectives, it has been identified that the main problem of corruption emerges from certain policy deficiencies in the present set up and they need to be addressed. The objective analysis process is initiated and the objective tree is created by transforming the problems tree. The objective tree thus formed is presented below in Figure 3. As has been explained above, the objective tree is restricted to the present problems relating to the provision of special funds for prosecution of wildlife cases and establishment of a prosecution cell for review of trials and monitoring the expenditure relating to prosecution activities.

*Figure 3  
Objective Tree*
PLANNING PHASE

Logical Framework Matrix

The Logical Framework Approach is a highly efficient strategic planning and project management tool with a wide range of applications. The product of the analytical approach in the Logical Framework Approach is the log frame, i.e., the matrix, which sums up the intentions of a project and the methodology (how), the key assumptions and how the inputs and outcomes will be monitored and evaluated. The logical framework matrix is created with the above inputs and analysis is presented as below (Table 1).

Table 1
Logical Framework Matrix for reducing the wildlife crimes in Gulf of Mannar Marine National Park, Tamil Nadu, and India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Source of Verification</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>• Abundance of certain species like sea cucumber and corals&lt;br&gt; • Availability of huge fish and other commercial marine stock for the local communities&lt;br&gt; • Local communities and representations</td>
<td>• Baseline survey&lt;br&gt; • Conducting the study by a competent scientific agency&lt;br&gt; • Reports of the fisheries department of the State Government&lt;br&gt; • Studies by NGOs and expert groups&lt;br&gt; • Claims of the local communities involved in the trade</td>
<td>• Enforcement efforts will yield positive results on the conservation of the marine wildlife and they will flourish&lt;br&gt; • With the improvement of the species level, the ecosystem will be restored&lt;br&gt; • With the development of the ecosystem the other commercial fish stock in the ocean will increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposes</td>
<td>• Reduction in the number of wildlife crimes in the Park&lt;br&gt; • Conviction of habitual offenders in the cases registered.&lt;br&gt; • Low motivation for new criminals to enter into the field of wildlife trade</td>
<td>• Monitoring of data base of crimes in the Park and Progress Reports&lt;br&gt; • Review of wildlife crimes and status of cases under trial on a regular basis&lt;br&gt; • Holding quarterly meeting with the stakeholders like NGOs, wildlife enthusiasts,</td>
<td>• All the stakeholders except the smugglers are interested to cooperate in the conservation process and they will come forward for a participatory approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Results

- Increase in the number of convictions in the wildlife cases
- Reduction in the wildlife crimes in the Park
- Reduction in the corruption of the Park officials

- Number of convictions in the wildlife cases
- Number of crimes registered by the park officials
- Healthy working environment

- Actual number of convictions, reviewed on a regular basis.
- Activity reports
- Official reports and diaries of the Park officials and Progress reports
- Media reports, responses from the stakeholders like local communities and NGOs and vigilance reports of Department

- Prosecution is failing mainly because of the fund related problems
- Park officials do not show interest in the cases due to lack of funds only
- Park officials will not opt for corrupt practices if their genuine requirements are taken care of

### Activities

- Allocation of special funds specifically earmarked for prosecution purposes in the budget for the Park
- Establishment of a Prosecution cell along with a Prosecution Officer to review the cases and monitor the expenses relating to prosecution activities.

- Allocation of budget resources for the purpose
- Hiring / posting consultant / officials for the functioning of the cell

- Improvement in the prosecution related activities
- Regular review by senior officials on the pending cases
- Strengthening of the cases under trial through regular monitoring
- Review of functioning of the Prosecution Cell and its achievements on annual basis

- Policy recommendation for allocation of special funds for prosecution related activities in the Park are accepted by the Government
- Policy recommendation to review the expenses relating to prosecution activities and review of wildlife cases by a special cell is accepted by the Government
SCENARIO ANALYSIS

Scenario analysis, the process of analyzing possible future events by considering possible courses of outcomes is one of the important methods of projections and shows a number of pictures of the future. Scenarios approach is an appropriate tool for the present case as there are a number of open and unsure outcomes that may result from the situation. There are three scenarios expected from the present case as we introduce the scheme of funds for the prosecution of wildlife offences and establish a prosecution cell for monitoring the trials of the cases and the expenses relating to the prosecution activities. These three scenarios are presented as under.

Scenario 1: Rosy Scenario (all well with adequate inputs)

In this scenario, we are predicting that the funds introduced for meeting out the special requirements of prosecution and establishment of a prosecution cell, with an appropriate implementation mechanism and commitment from the officials, the outcome is quite positive. Posting of appropriate and committed staff is followed up meticulously. The crime rate in the park initially increases as the officials start detecting more cases, registering new cases actively and follow up the cases dynamically in the trials. This result in higher conviction rate which a reduction in the crime rate against the wildlife of the Park. Habitual offenders are imprisoned and that sends strong signals to the new entrants. Thus, the number of wildlife crimes starts declining after a certain period, resulting in less expenditure towards prosecution related works. Eventually, the corruption practices among park officials stop totally, the Park officials regain their reputation among wildlife enthusiasts, NGOs and local communities and regular meetings with these stakeholders are held with the involvement of other enforcement agencies working in the region. A participatory approach becomes possible and local communities get their fair and free access to their fishing activities. The biodiversity of the Park is enriched over time and the ecosystem of the fragile Park is restored.
Scenario 2:
Yellow Scenario (Misuse of Special Funds Resulting in More Cases)

Another scenario is projected in which with the introduction of funds for prosecution purposes, the number of cases registered increases, but this time due to the fake cases registered by the staff to avail and misuse the available funds. In this case, the number of cases increases, prosecution expenditure keeps rising but there is no increase in the conviction rate. Therefore, there is no actual reduction in crime rates and the corruption continues in another form added to the existing ones. Wildlife trade becomes more rampant and local communities and NGOs/wildlife enthusiasts do not get any relief from the measures undertaken. Expecting this scenario, an additional safe guard is suggested that after the registering of cases, permission for all prosecutions must be sanctioned by the Park Director after satisfying himself with the genuineness of the case. This will regulate the system considerably even in this scenario.

Scenario 3: Red Scenario (Nothing Changes)

In the third scenario, ‘Nothing Changes’ case is projected. Here, despite the intervention in the form of introduction of special funds, prosecution cell and other review measures, the situation does not have any impact due to them. This could be an outcome if the staff in the Park are non-committal, incompetent, corrupt and unwilling to work. It will be a possibility if there exists a political influence and connivance between the poachers and the local political party leaders, who can influence the posting pattern in the park and affect the efficiency of the system. This situation will lead to an institutionalized system of corruption in the Department and the Park’s biodiversity and wildlife will be the first immediate victim. Local fishing communities will lose their faith in the Park management and will even start get associated with the poachers in poaching and illegal trade practices. NGOs and wildlife enthusiasts will lose their confidence in the Department and will not cooperate with the management for any active movement. The poachers will explore new market routes and smuggling of new species and new entrants will be encouraged to enter into the illegal trade.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

We have given a deeper analysis of the problem of corruption in the wildlife department enforcement of Gulf of Mannar Marine National Park. As illustrated, we have used different policy analysis tools like Stakeholder Analysis, Log Framework Approach for Problem Analysis and Objective Analysis, Logical framework matrix and Scenario Analysis for identifying various dimensions and phases of the problem and interests of the groups involved. After the analysis, we have found that the problem related to non-registration of cases, lack of commitment of the park officials to conduct the cases in the court actively and to get the culprits convicted through follow up of the cases is largely due to the lack of provisions to meet out the expenses relating to prosecution. At present, 200 cases are pending in the courts and even if an officer needs to attend the court for a minimum of two times in a week to conduct different cases, it becomes a big burden on him to manage the expenses. Though it is a possibility to form a special court meant for wildlife and forests in the nearby area, it will take a longer time and requires sanctions from different Departments and Ministries including High Court.

Therefore, in the present circumstances, an allocation from the Department’s fund for the prosecution related purpose can immediately serve the purpose and bring in desirable outcome, as analyzed. Secondly, to follow up the status and progress of the wildlife cases in the courts, there are no special set up available in the system. A periodical review by the Director needs to address important issues relating to conservation and management and does not provide much scope for reviewing the trial cases, especially so with the given circumstances of lack of special provisions for prosecution expenses. A special Prosecution Cell, to monitor the status of the trials can follow up the cases, dates, verdicts, appeals and other related aspects of the case, which can considerably help in more convictions of the cases under trial. The same cell can monitor the different expenses spent on prosecution of the cases and disburse the amount according to the requirement.

Thus, based on the above analysis, the following policy recommendations are suggested for reducing the corruption in the GoMMNP.
Earmark and allocate separate funds for the prosecution of wildlife cases in the GoMMNP.

Establish a Prosecution Cell in the Park to review the trials of wildlife cases and to ensure the genuineness of the expenses involved in the prosecution.

Besides the above two immediately possible policy changes through the Department of Wildlife, it is felt necessary to consider and initiate proposals in favor the following two suggestions to the Departments concerned, for efficient management over long term.

- Special incentive for wildlife staff working in remote areas.
- Establishment of Special Courts for Wildlife offences in the adjacent areas.

REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

In 2004 Bogotá’s District Government and the movement for the rights of Lesbian, Gay, Transexual/Transgender and Bisexual (LGBT) people initiated a dialogue to formulate strategies aimed at reducing the discrimination against this population and improving their living conditions. The process was characterized by the activism of the movement that increased its potential to voice the problems faced by LGBT people both in institutionalized and informal spaces, as well as an increased receptivity of the city’s government to the demands of these groups, which led to the adoption of the Public Policy for the Guarantee of the Rights of the LGBT population (LGBTPP) in 2009.

At first sight, this experience presents a successful case of participatory governance where the opening of spaces for citizen engagement by the government together with a strong capacity of civil society results in a win-win situation by raising the effectiveness of the State and promoting social justice for marginalized groups. Nevertheless, different scholars in the field of governance have recognized that participatory approaches are not a ‘magic bullet’ for local development and that its outcomes can be either positive or negative in varying degrees for each actor involved (Gaventa and Barrett 2012, Speer 2012). In this sense, this paper intends to problematize the results of the LGBTPP’s formulation
process by looking in depth at how it affected the external and internal dynamics of the actors that participated in it as well as its broader consequences in terms of social inclusion and construction of citizenship in Bogotá.

In this context, it is argued that the formulation of the LGBTPP implied a trade-off between the autonomy of the social movement and its capacity to influence government decision-making, which in the short term resulted in a high degree of efficacy for the expedition of the policy, but in the long run may have weakened the capacity for transformative collective action of the LGBT citizenry. In order to elaborate on this argument, the paper has been divided into four sections: the first one introduces a conceptual framework for analyzing the dynamics of participatory local governance and social movements; the second part describes the formulation process of the LGBTPP and characterizes the actors involved in it; the third section presents the analysis of the process outcomes, and the final segment summarizes the findings and draw some conclusions on the case study.

**Participatory Local Governance: the Framework for Analysis**

Before entering the description of the LGBTPP process, it is useful to present briefly a conceptual framework on participatory governance that allows for the identification of key elements and debates for the analysis. The local level of government has been one of the main focuses of attention for development thinking and practice in the last few decades, as a fundamental space where relations between state and society unfold and therefore one with great potential for transformative interventions (Mohan and Stokke 2000, Nel and Bins 2001). This realization was accompanied by the recognition that state agents are not the only actors that influence development outcomes and that understanding the relation between government, civil society and the private sector is crucial to advance development goals in the local setting, giving rise to the notion of local governance. This new focus was in part motivated by the perceived

1 According to Shah and Shah local governance refers to the “formulation and execution of collective action at the local level... it encompasses the direct and indirect roles of formal institutions of local government and government hierarchies, as well as the roles of informal norms, networks, community organizations, and neighborhood associations in pursuing collective action by defining
failure of central governments and bureaucracies to carry out developmental actions, given their alleged lack of efficiency and effectiveness, as well as the evidence that market-based approaches would not solely provide an adequate solution for development problems (Mansuri and Rao 2013, Speer 2012).

Thus, the local governance framework fostered two complementary policy recommendations to improve development outcomes and achieve good governance: democratic decentralization and participatory governance mechanisms (Hickey and Mohan 2005). The first one referred to the need to devolve power (fiscal, political, administrative) from central governments to local authorities, under the principle that decision-making should be as close as possible to the people that would be affected by it. In this sense decentralization was seen as a tool for making governments more efficient, legitimate, accountable and responsive to the demands of the citizens (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). However, it has also been argued that the effects of decentralization are uneven in different contexts and in some cases it may reinforce patterns of patronage, elite capture and corruption in the local governments (Shah and Shah 2007). Some of these problems were attributed to the absence of effective citizen participation in the formulation, execution and monitoring of public policies and programs (Shah and Shah 2007).

Consequently, participation became a central factor for development as the inclusion of citizen voices in public processes was supposed to improve government’s responsiveness and accountability, raise the quality of public goods and services, and strengthen processes of citizenship construction and inclusiveness (Speer 2012: 2379). Despite widespread agreement on the need to advance participatory mechanisms in the process of local development, prolific debates emerged among different streams of thought on the character that this participation should have and the outcomes attributed to it (Hickey and Mohan 2005). According to Mohan and Stokker (2000) at least two major strands of thinking can be identified in terms of the perceived nature of citizen participation: on one hand, a “Revisionist neo-liberal” approach in which participation is seen as a technical method to improve government’s performance, implemented in a top-down manner with little effects in terms of redistri-
bution of resources in societies; and on the other hand, a “Post-Marxist” approach that sees participation as a process emerging from below, linked to the construction of collective identities and aimed at promoting structural changes in the distribution of power in society.

Yet another debate arises from different perspectives on the outcomes of participatory mechanisms: where some scholars focus on the effects on government’s accountability and responsiveness, others exalt the outcomes for citizens’ empowerment and the possibility to contest hegemonic ideas, while some others claim that participation has proven ineffective to tackle development problems (Speer 2012). In this context, Gaventa and Barrett have mapped the “outcomes of citizen engagement” (2012: 2400) for 100 case studies identifying positive and negative effects both for governments and citizens, as showed in Table 1. This classification reveals the differential results of participation in four variables—construction of citizenship, practices of citizen participation, responsive and accountable states and inclusive and cohesive societies—and will be used to analyze the outcomes of the LGBTPP formulation for the social movement and Bogotá’s government in section three.

**Table 1**

*Outcomes of Citizen Engagement*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construction of citizenship</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased civic and political knowledge</td>
<td>Reliance on knowledge intermediaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater sense of empowerment and agency</td>
<td>Disempowerment and reduced sense of agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Practices of citizen participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased capacities for collective action</td>
<td>New capacities used for “negative” purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New forms of participation</td>
<td>Tokenistic or “captured” forms of participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deepening of networks and solidarities</td>
<td>Lack of accountability and representation in networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responsive and accountable states</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater access to state services and resources</td>
<td>Denial of state services and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater realization of rights</td>
<td>Social, economic, and political reprisals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced state responsiveness and accountability</td>
<td>Violent or coercive state response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inclusive and cohesive societies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of new actors and issues in public spaces</td>
<td>Reinforcement of social hierarchies and exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater social cohesion across groups</td>
<td>Increased horizontal conflict and violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gaventa and Barrett 2012: 2400
In addition to these debates, it has been recognized that the opening of institutional spaces for citizen participation by local governments is not a sufficient condition to trigger processes of empowerment and transformation, instead collective action and mobilization by the citizenry is seen both as a precondition to, and a result of, participatory governance (Gaventa and Barrett 2012: 2400, Speer 2012). This collective action according to Gaventa can take the form of social movements formed by non-governmental, community based organizations, groups and individuals that cooperate “to claim their rights and to assert their voice” (2010: 59) in relation to the state and/or other social groups. Hence, social movements usually form around shared identities such as gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity or class, to demand social justice and full citizenship for marginalized or subordinated groups in society (Hickey and Mohan 2005), contributing to generate “broader awareness, skills and networks…through which social citizenship is converted to political engagement” (Gaventa 2010: 65)

Moreover, the relations between social movements and the state can be complex and range from cooperation to resistance. Neocosmos (cited by Steyn 2012: 338) describes this interaction as a tension between state-centric and emancipatory politics: while the latter advocates for a radical autonomy of the movements from the state, in a permanent exercise of resistance and contestation of hegemonic powers and structures, the former represents the effort of the movements to influence the state from an integrative perspective that does not necessarily question the prevalent order. It would seem then that in a context of participatory governance social movements face the dilemma of a trade-off between autonomy and policy-incidence, as stated by Gibson ‘the more a social movement is focused on gaining access to the state, the more it subjects its autonomy and independence to the threat of co-option and professionalization’ (as cited by Steyn 2012: 337). In addition, social moments deal with other problems related to collective action as the risk of elite capture, lack of representativeness, reduced capacity to promote grassroots mobilizations and absence of accountability to its ‘constituencies’ (Houtzager and Gurza Lavalle 2010).
ASSEMBLING THE PUZZLE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LGBT PUBLIC POLICY IN BOGOTÁ

Based on the previous conceptual framework, this section provides a brief account of the process by which the LGBT Public Policy in Bogotá was formulated (see Figure 1), as well as a characterization of the main actors that took part in it. Since the ratification of the current Colombian Constitution in 1991, three elements were introduced to the dynamics of governance in the country, in line with the trends described above: first, the promotion of political, fiscal and administrative decentralization to departments, districts and municipalities, second, the introduction of participatory democracy mechanisms at every level of government, as well as the opening of the political system to allow new parties to enter the electoral competition, and third, the adoption of a rights-based approach to citizenship that recognizes the diversity of identities and cultures within the Colombian society. These changes responded to a perceived crisis of governance and legitimacy of the political system, as well as the need to include segments of the population that had been historically marginalized—mainly women, indigenous, afro-Colombians and young people—and tackle the high levels of social conflict in the country (Hernández 2010: 88-89).

The expedition of the LGBTPP in Bogotá was framed by this scenario, which triggered three parallel processes that contributed to position the demands of the LGBT population in the public agenda. Firstly, the proliferation of new instances for local participation in Bogotá including spaces dedicated to planning (participatory budgeting and planning councils), and to specific sectors (environment, social policy, culture, health and education) and population groups (children, youth, women and victims of the armed conflict) (Hernández 2010: 90). These participatory mechanisms enabled citizen engagement in public affairs and opened dialogue channels with the district government, however, they were also criticized for their lack of capacity to mobilize citizens, address power asymmetries and effectively improve the wellbeing of marginalized populations (Hernández 2010). In spite of these obstacles, the local spaces for participation played a crucial role in enhancing the ‘voice’ of the LGBT movement by giving some of its leaders the opportunity to make visible the problems faced by people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities in the city, and providing a place for learning
about political and administrative processes, as well as creating networks with other social and state actors (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C. 2009).

**Figure 1**
*Milestones in the Formulation Process of the LGBTPP in Bogotá*

Secondly, the emergence of new social movements that struggled for the rights and recognition of subordinated segments of the population, in particular the strengthening of the feminist movement and later the
creation of the LGBT movement. Although the fight for lesbian and gay people’s rights started in Colombia during the late 1970s, achieving important progress through legal mechanisms such as the abolition of discriminatory laws against homosexuals and creation of jurisprudence advocating for the respect of diverse sexual and gender identities, these efforts tended to be dispersed and fragmented (Gil Hernández 2013). It was only in 2001 when the LGBT movement was formed as a result of a project that brought together activists from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), academia and individual leaders, in order to formulate proposals for the peace process held at the time by the national government and the guerrilla FARC-EP (Aparicio Erazo 2009).

From that moment onwards the movement promoted sustained collective initiatives through the creation of the ‘LGBT Bureau of Bogotá’ that sought to bring the attention of the government and other societal groups to LGBT problems and demands. These initiatives took the form of protests, communication campaigns, demonstrations, legal advice and advocacy conducted mainly by leaders and NGOs within the movement. One of the most successful strategies was the ‘programmatic agreements’ between the movement and candidates of different political parties to Bogotá’s mayoral elections in 2003 in order to promote actions to guarantee the rights of the LGBT population in the city (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C. 2009: 22).

It is important to recognize that the movement was subject to intense internal struggles, given the diversity of actors involved. NGOs, CBOs, individual leaders, scholars, different identities represented—lesbians, gays, transgender/transsexuals and bisexuals—and intersectionalities that affected the participants’ different experiences of discrimination (such as ethnicity, class, gender, geographical position) all in part determined power asymmetries within the movement. Moreover, the perspectives on the goals of the movement were divided between two groups: the ‘integrationists’ that aimed at guaranteeing rights for the inclusion of the LGBT population in society, and the ‘transformativists’ whose interest was to promote a radical change of the heteronormative structures of society that sustained the discrimination against people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities (Gil Hernández 2013).

Thirdly, the opening of the political system allowed a left-wing party to win the elections for Bogotá’s Mayoralty in 2004 for the first time in
history. In this sense, Hickey and Mohan have recognized in cases as Brazil, India and Venezuela how “the need for parties of the left to maintain and increase their electoral constituency, provided the context within which participatory forms of governance became integrated within wider projects of redistributive politics and social justice” (2005: 243). Beyond being a leftist party, the Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) had a close relation to the feminist movement and LGBT leaders and organizations in Bogotá, reflected in the formation of a LGBT group within it called Polo de Rosa. This scenario and the agreement signed during the elections by the LGBT movement and the winning candidate for the Mayoralty guaranteed the political will of the government, providing a window of opportunity to advance the rights and inclusion of the LGBT population in the public agenda of the city (Buriticá López 2010: 41).

In this context, in 2004 the movement and the district government initiated a cooperative relationship that focused at first on the financial support of particular activities around sexual and gender diversity, such as the annual demonstration for ‘LBGT Citizenry’ and the ‘Pink Movie Cycle’. The first encounters took place in the meetings of the ‘LGBT Bureau of Bogotá’, which raised concerns among the participants about the space being co-opted by the government’s agenda and losing its autonomy. Those concerns motivated the creation of a new informal instance for the dialogue called ‘Alliance for the Full LGBT Citizenship’ (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C. 2009) which became the most important platform where the guidelines for the LGBTPP were discussed.

Alongside, the LGBT movement created a coalition with city councilors from different political parties to present a first draft ordinance to the City Council with strategies directed at guaranteeing the rights of the LGBT population in the city. However, the project was rejected by the majority of the coalition based on highly morally charged arguments which were backed by religious and conservative groups that fiercely opposed the passing of the ordinance and mobilized under the slogan ‘Bogotá in civil, moral and spiritual resistance” (Gil Hernández 2009). In view of these obstacles the Mayor Luis Eduardo Garzón decided to pass the LGBTPP by an executive decree which institutionalized four strate-
nic processes to advance and guarantee the full rights of the LGBT population in the city and created the ‘LGBT Advisory Committee’ to guide and monitor the implementation of the policy conformed to by representatives of the state agencies and non-governmental organizations (Decree 608 of 2007). The decree was widely supported by the movement and the private sector through the ADALID Foundation, an organization that gathered the owners of commercial establishments directed to the LGBT population.

The implementation of the decree began in 2008 with the creation of a special division for LGBT issues in the Government Secretary of Bogotá, the inclusion of specific items in the government’s annual budget and the creation of partnerships with LGBT-oriented NGOs and CBOs. In addition, to strengthen the execution of the strategic processes some of the activists movement’s leaders were employed by the government to orient the implementation of the policy, an action that received strong criticism from various organizations that alleged that the movement was being demobilized (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C. 2009, Guerrero and Sutachán 2012). Other critiques arose also from the more radical segments of the movement which claimed that the movement was being ‘tamed’ and depoliticized, reducing it to integrationist goals through a rights-based discourse that prevented the transformation of the prevalent heteronormative order (Gil Hernández 2009: 64).

Finally, with the reconfiguration of political forces after 2008’s local elections in favor of more progressive political forces, the policy was presented again to the City Council and was approved in the ordinance 371 of 2009, institutionalizing the strategies for the inclusion of the LGBT population that had started in 2007. This ratification marked the end of the policy formulation process and suggested the ‘victory’ of the movement in achieving its immediate goals, causing to some extent a ‘political vacuum’ and discouraging the collective initiatives.

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2 The policy was divided in four strategic processes, namely: institutional strengthening in the district and local levels, co-responsibility in the exercise of rights, communication and education for cultural change, and production and extension of knowledges. Each of these processes had different components that guided the implementation of the policy at all levels of the administration.
OUTCOMES OF PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE LGBTPP: A BALANCE

Having described the main dynamics, characteristics and strategies of the actors involved in the formulation of the LGBTPP in Bogotá, this section analyses the outcomes for the state and the LGBT movement. It is argued that the formulation of the LGBTPP as an experience of participatory governance promoted the development of citizens' capacity to influence public policy, improved the government's responsiveness and accountability, and encouraged the inclusion of the LGBT population. However, the process also had a negative impact for the movement's sustainability and its ability to promote collective initiatives given the tendency for integration and co-option by the state. In order to present this balance in a systematic manner, the four variables established by Gaventa and Barrett (2012) on outcomes of citizen engagement presented in the first section will be used as guidelines for conducting the analysis.

The first variable refers to the outcomes of the LGBTPP process for the construction of citizenship. In this sense, the review suggests that the participation of the LGBT population in the institutionalized participatory mechanisms and informal spaces promoted by the social movement allowed them to develop a collective identity, recognize themselves as rights holders and demand responses from the government while endowing them with skills to influence political and technical decision-making processes (Buriticá López 2010). Despite these achievements, a prevalence of the most educated and vocal leaders in the participatory processes can be identified, which may have led to neglect or subordination of the voices of those with less access to education and other resources as well as those that face higher levels of exclusion among the LGBT such as transgender and low-income groups, possibly leading to a dynamic of ‘stratification’ within the movement (Gil Hernández 2009).

The second analytical category is the effect on the practices of citizen participation where the analysis indicates that during the formulation process the LGBT movement exhibited a strong capacity for collective action. Indeed, the use of both formal and informal participatory mechanisms and the relatively rapid success in forming coalitions and alliances to pass the policy are evidence of this strength. Nonetheless, as suggested before, this high level of efficacy might be the effect of a
trade-off between the ability to influence policy-making and the autonomy and representativeness of the movement, as the excessive focus on the state, the co-option and professionalization of leaders, organizations and spaces by the government may have led to the demobilization of the movement and a loss of trust among its members that might affect future initiatives of collective action (Fuentes 2009).

The third variable focuses in the results in terms of increased **state responsiveness and accountability**. As it has been noted, the capacity of the state to respond to the demands of the LGBT movement was high and mechanisms for accountability were created for the civil society to monitor policy implementation. Moreover, the rights of the LGBT population were the basis for the construction of the policy and the state effectively gave steps in the direction of increasing the access of this group of citizens to public services—education, health, security, etc. Nevertheless, it has been stated that the election of a left-wing political party was highly influential in the success of the process, raising the question of how much of the responsiveness and accountability will remain with a different party in power, in other words, if these mechanisms respond only to the political will of the mayor or if they have been translated into an installed capacity of the state agencies that will endure a change of governments. Additionally, the proliferation of participatory spaces and their facilitative character may discourage citizens’ participation and turn these mechanisms into a technical procedure rather than a substantive and sustained dialogue (Hernández 2010, Fuentes 2009).

Lastly, with respect to the outcomes for **inclusion and social cohesion**, as stated above, LGBT people in Bogotá have gained access to public services and recognition by the state as legitimate stakeholders and partners in the development process. Yet, multiple voices within the movement and in academia claim that the structural causes of discrimination against LGBT people have not been addressed nor the different types of exclusionary processes that affect them because of the intersection with other identities or conditions—ethnicity, geographical position and class—leaving open the question whether the LGBTPP is a truly inclusive policy or if it mainly fits the needs of middle-class urban white gays and lesbians while leaving aside other subgroups in the movement (Aparicio Erazo 2009).
CONCLUDING REMARKS

To summarize, this essay has explored the dynamics of participatory governance through the analysis of the LGBT public policy formulation in Bogotá, motivated by the interest of understanding the different outcomes for the actors involved in it and for broader processes of social justice and construction of citizenship. In order to do so it has drawn on some of the debates present in the literature about participatory governance and social movements, bringing to the table questions about the character of participation, its positive and negative results, and the tensions in the relationships between social movements and the state that range from autonomy and contestation to dependency and integration. In this framework, this essay has presented the dynamics of the formulation process, showing the complexity of the interactions between the government and the LGBT movement, as well as the influence of other actors such as the city councilors, religious and conservative groups and the private sector.

Based on the evidence presented, the paper asserts that the participatory process for the formulation of the LGBTPP had mixed results given that, on one hand, it promoted the construction of a political identity of LGBT citizens that allowed them to demand their rights and develop their capacity to effectively influence the policy process while at the same time making the government more responsive and accountable which resulted in the adoption of strategies to promote the social inclusion of the LGBT population. On the other hand, it has led to the co-option of the movement’s agenda and leadership by the state, making further collective action difficult because of demobilization, and limiting their ability to resist and contest hegemonic structures of power by confining the movement to integrative measures—depoliticization.

In conclusion, the argument advanced at the beginning of this paper appears to be ratified in terms of the presence of a trade-off between the capacity of the LGBT movement to influence government decision-making and its autonomy to address broader issues of social justice and question the heteronormative structures that sustain discrimination based on gender identity and/or sexual orientation. Nonetheless, given the diversity of actors that constitute the movement and its fluid relations with the state and other societal agents, is possible that the emer-
gence of new leaders or external influences may trigger further processes of mobilization or radicalization of the movement in the future.

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Decree 608 of 2007, ‘Por medio del cual se establecen los lineamientos de la Política Pública para la garantía plena de los derechos de las personas lesbianas, gay, bisexuales y transgeneristas –LGBT- y sobre identidades de género y orientaciones sexuales en el Distrito Capital, y se dictan otras disposiciones’ (By which there are established the guidelines of the Public Policy for the full guarantee of the rights of the lesbians, gay, bisexuals and transgender –LGBT- persons and on gender identities and sexual orientations in the Capital District, and other measures are dictated).


The authors of the book: ‘Rights and Wrongs of Children’s Work’ (Bourdillon et al. 2010) have produced an analytical, critical, as well as practical representation of children’s lives and development. From the outset, they have highlighted that the book is not about child labour (Ibid: ix). However, as the book progresses, they argue that work is not harmful, but the conditions and associated situations related with work make it harmful. This is an exemplary, well-written book that covers all the practical facets of children in work. The book caters to a wide range of audiences, from field practitioners, activists and policy makers to academics and international donor representatives. The book is not only inspiring reading material, where one can relate with the cases and circumstances exemplified, but also challenges a reader’s pre-existing knowledge and prevalent analyses of children’s lives and development. The authors have advocated for considering the meaningful participation of children in their life decision processes.

The book starts with a case study from Morocco¹ where many child labourers were fired from a garment industry after an investigation done by Marks & Spencer (Bourdillon et al. 2010: 1-3). Here the authors raised various practical questions on the issues of child labour, seeing it through various lenses, and asked a very critical question as to how an external action can be disastrous in a local situation. In the next eight chapters, the authors present the various aspects of child labour in a systematic and organised manner. In the entire piece, they discuss the range of types

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¹ A story of girl, Amal, from Meknes, who was fired for being under-age, after a Marks & Spencer investigation of the Garment Industry.
of work, from productive to unproductive and even reproductive (Ibid: 22-35) that children are associated with, presenting a historical perspective of child labour from the period of the Industrial revolution, the pre/post-colonial period, the post-communist transition, to the formation of UNCRC (Ibid: 40-58). The book also endeavours to untie the tangled relationship between poverty and child labour (Ibid: 66-86) and in one of the chapters the authors have taken a bold step in discussing how work is psychologically, anthropologically and sociologically important for the overall cognitive development of children (Ibid: 88-105).

The chapter also presents work-related hazards for children in a very balanced way; presenting a very idealistic case of the ‘Earn and Learn’ project of Tea States in Zimbabwe, the book introduces an argumentative debate on Education, School and Work (Bourdillon et al. 2010: 109). With various progressive case stories and situations of schools and education in developing countries the authors argue how work can be an important component in the learning process. The chapter presents a cost-benefit analysis of schools in the scenario of developing nations, where quality is relatively bad, and in its relation to work (Ibid: 118-127). Children’s agency was quite impressively depicted in one of the chapters where the authors present various classic and real-world cases to support their argument for ensuring meaningful participation of children (Ibid: 133-148). In another chapter, the authors also present harms associated with work, but although in doing so the authors argue that the benefits of work are comparatively greater than the harm itself. However, the chapter also presents various examples and conditions of work that are really harmful for the development of children (Ibid: 155-178). Before the concluding chapter, where the authors make policy suggestions on the issue of good quality education and of annulling the ratification of minimum age as a standard principle and an example of good practices (Ibid: 206-207), the authors present the global political debate on the issue of child labour, and critically present the role of trade unions, labour, ILO and UNICEF. The authors present a case of child garment workers in Bangladesh, the Sialkot Football industry case and also an ideal case story from a pilot project in Egypt (Ibid: 180-200). Overall, the chapters in this book are very much synchronised, assembled, and linked with each other, producing evidence to support their arguments on children’s work.
The first key strength of the book is in its case studies and examples: they are quite methodically selected and are properly researched. Further, these case studies and examples are very much placed in the context of each chapter. The first case story of the girl ‘Amal’ sets a tone for the book, where the authors pose several critical questions to the readers, enticing the readers’ interest. Other than that, the Bangladesh case study (Bourdillon et al. 2010:181) on the child garment workers is a really classic case among the lot. The case focuses on how non-participatory external decisions can make life even worse. However, I found there are a few case stories that have been placed quite properly but are not analysed holistically. This is especially the case from ‘Earn and Learn’ from Zimbabwe (Ibid: 109) and the case from Egypt (Ibid: 194). The former case can seems to be an ideal case, but can become an exploitative case if the project is not monitored properly, which has happened in many of the states in India such as in a similar National Child labour programme (NCLP) (Mukhopadhaya 2012: 658-662). But my critical question is whether this ‘earn and learn’ education model is for every stratum of society, or if it is exclusively for poor children whose sole mistake is having been born into a poor family in a poor society. Similarly, the ‘Promoting and Protecting the Interests of Children’ (PPIC-W) case from Egypt is a donor driven project for a limited geography. It doesn’t analyse how the project would be sustainable and scalable. Furthermore, it also seems to me to indicate a donor driven agenda within the Egyptian context (Thomas 2000: 773).

The second key strength of the book is in its argumentation of the issues on the benefits of children’s work and also for ensuring the meaningful participation of children in making and taking their own decisions. The books urges that their voice needs to be heard. It goes on to subjectively disagree with connotations of minimum age, and also recommends annulling the ratification of the ILO’s minimum age convention (Bourdillon et al. 2010: 213). I found it interesting that, at one end, the authors argue on the basis of the UNCRC principle for ensuring participation, but at the other end, the authors limited their research on ‘protection’. Despite the fact that the book has a specific chapter on the assessment of the harms that are related with child work, it accentuates that certain types, such as sex work, slavery and children in armed conflict, are detrimental for children’s development. But at the same time it also argues that work can be beneficial for children. However, the authors were not
able to present the effects of exploitation on children, who work for 12 to 14 hours per day, earn one fourth of what adults earn, and other abuses and indecent work conditions that are associated with the same (Hazarika 2003: 33-35; Khan 2010). To protect their rights, no trade unions come forward and there is ineffective minimum wage regulation (Hanson 2013; Wage Indicators Foundation 2014). How do children develop to cope with these situations, or do they remain exploited? Do these have positive or negative implications on their overall cognitive development? How do these conditions impact children’s rights? Does this signify an equal and just society? These are a few tricky and debateable issues which remain untouched in this book. Here I would like to highlight that the authors have undermined the core reason behind the formulation of UNCRC, that children need special care and protection (UN General Assembly 1959; Ladd 2002: 90), i.e., why, in spite of having the UNHRC, do new conventions come into existence?

The third conspicuous strength of this book is the diverse expertise and experience of the authors. They belong to different facets of academia yet they have brought coherence to the subject and translated it into a thought provoking paperback. Yet I have few questions and suggestions for the authors. First, they could have also added a few cases where they could show how work really has psychologically and sociologically beneficial effects for child development and for becoming a successful adult. Here, they could have referred to some of the findings of any longitudinal study. Second, when the authors say that garbage collectors are self-employed children (Bourdillon et al. 2010: 86), they say so with a positive connotation, without elaborating on what determines the child to take the decision. I would like to raise a question: who in the world wants to collect garbage? There should be more emphasis on ‘why s/he is collecting garbage’. Yes, it is challenging and sometime perplexing to make a comprehensive, thoughtful analysis on the causal relationship between poverty and child labour, yet it is important to distinguish whether a child is forced to take the work, or if it is his/her hobby; whether it is a comprising situation, or a coping mechanism, or if it is fun for him/her. There are several cases where this working situation turned into a hell for them. Finally, I feel the authors could have also presented the role of the state in their case studies, especially in case of Morocco, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
I expect that this book has already reached a wide range of readers and has been appreciated by them. The synchronisations of the chapters tied the readers with the book and generate curiosity. However, a few questions still remain unanswered in the book. Overall, it is an interesting book to read, and does a fair job of providing another pragmatic view on children and work.

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What Are We Learning about Intergenerational Transfer of Childhood Poverty? A Case Study of Young Lives Project

IRENE NYAMU

INTRODUCTION

Children are the most disproportionately affected by poverty. In spite of many years of investments to combat poverty, efforts have not been as successful as was initially expected, and poverty levels remain relatively high particularly in Africa (Moyo 2009). Mounting evidence shows a slight improvement between 1999 and 2005 when the number of people living on $1.25 a day decreased from 1.8 billion to 1.4 billion before a sharp decrease caused by the recent global financial crisis (UNRISD 2010). Changes have been quite uneven and in fact there are huge regional variations, with China and India accounting for the largest decline in real numbers compared to Sub-Saharan Africa poverty. This has resulted in widening of the inequality gap (Ibid). The declining living conditions and high inequality is seen as a consequence of harsh policy prescriptions imposed upon developing countries by their richer benefactors whose motivation has been to entrench economic globalization and liberalization of the market. As a result of the Washington Consensus for example, many governments tremendously reduced investments into public provisioning of education, health, agricultural subsidies and extension services as well as other social benefits to their citizens (UNRISD 2010). Most of these services were privatized, and with introduction of user fees, most poor families are consequently unable to access social services with ease (UNRISD 2010).
Given the skewed and age-dependent allocation of household resources, children from poor households suffer most as result of changes brought about by unfriendly policies. Two decades later, the effects are increasingly manifesting themselves through child poverty and intergenerational poverty, leading us to question whether one generation can be held responsible for the poverty or wealth of the next and in what ways. According to (Bird and Higgins 2011:9) intergenerational transfer of poverty (IGT) refers to “the private and public transfer of deficits in assets and resources from one generation to another”. Parents can pass on their state of being poor to either their children or to their old parents if the country does not have social security programs that take care of the elderly for example. Being poor means that parents are unable to make investments in terms of adequate nutrition and health care, education for their children as well as and savings and investments that they could then pass on to their children as inheritance. If parents themselves have low schooling outcomes, they are less likely to educate their children, have low earning capacity and are more vulnerable to internal (for instance death of a spouse) as well as external (famine) shocks with the resultant effect of having children have to contribute both paid and unpaid labor for household survival (Bird and Higgins 2011, Sabates-Wheeber et al. 2009).

A lot of children in developing countries are therefore starting out their lives already poor, with the unlikely chance that they will bridge the gap between them and their richer counterparts even with interventions aimed at reversing the decline (Sabates-Wheeber et al. 2009). This places them at great disadvantage too early in life, and challenges any efforts to combat world poverty—for example halving world poverty by 50 percent by 2015. The implications are that regardless of how poverty is defined (see Fischer 2013 for poverty measurement debates), policies aimed at eradicating poverty will not succeed unless intergenerational poverty is understood and confronted from a structural and multi-dimensional perspective. The IGT mechanisms have not been fully understood, even though there have been calls to take a life-course perspective if we are to fully understand childhood poverty well and develop sustainable interventions (Bird and Higgins 2011, Sabates-Wheeber et al. 2009). This long view needs a certain type of data which is severely lacking being consistently collected in many developing countries. It takes laborious efforts. It is quite expensive to produce, requires specialized capacity to collect and
analyze huge volumes of differentiated data over long periods of time with similar subjects to observe changes (Birds ad Higgins 2010).

The Young Lives project is attempting to fill this gap. My paper critically examines contributions of Young Lives research project to a better understanding of childhood poverty and the IGT transfer mechanisms in order to offer a glimpse into how some of the efforts to address childhood poverty are succeeding. Conditional and unconditional cash transfers have been for example hailed as the ‘magic bullet’ that will help millions of children in developing countries escape poverty. Conditional Cash transfers (CCTs) are said to focus on breaking path-dependent intergenerational transmission of childhood poverty and disadvantages (Sebates-Wheeler et al. 2009). Other interventions include investments in education as a public good and efforts to end gender discrimination especially among girls in developing countries.

**THE YOUNG LIVES (YL) PROJECT AND ITS CONTRIBUTIONS**

Young Lives (YL) is a 15-year multi-country longitudinal study jointly funded by Department for International Development (DFID) and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The YL project is spearheaded by University of Oxford Department of International Development working in collaboration with state and independent research institutions in India (Andra Pradesh), Peru, Ethiopia and Vietnam where the research is carried out. It follows a cohort of 12,000 children in the four countries (3000 from each country) in order to understand how poverty and inequality affect the lives of children, with the aim of shaping policy design and practice geared towards interrupting future poverty pathways. YL was designed to follow the same timeline as the millennium development goals (MDGs) as well as education for all goals in an effort to understand how changes occur over a life course. The 12,000 children belong to two cohort groups. The first 8000 were born between 2001-2002 when the MDGs were declared and the other cohort of 4000 were born five years earlier between 1994-1995 (Young Lives 2014).

YL is one of the few research projects that have made concerted efforts to understand childhood poverty in developing countries through a longitudinal perspective. Based on some of the documents available, I chose to focus on five selected areas that are important contributions in
Intergenerational Transfer of Childhood Poverty

There are many aspects of the project but in my opinion these five are significant:

a) The diverse mix of variables measured and use of unique methodologies.

b) Taking a life course perspective to poverty and inequality in order to understand intergenerational transfer of poverty as a whole, and the transfer mechanisms.

d) Relevance of Social Protection programs in interrupting childhood poverty and its transfer.

e) The role of gender and intersectionality in childhood poverty.

DATA AND UNIQUE METHODOLOGIES

Since inception in May of 2001, YL has published enormous amounts of information from the project. Not only is the data produced over a long period so that changes occurring in the lives of children can be seen, but it also covers a wide range of variables and attributes such as nutritional status, cognitive development, education and learning outcomes, early childhood development, parents and children’s expectations and schooling experiences as well as how children exercise agency to cope with economic crises. Some publications relying on YL data include (Woodhead et al. 2013; Behrman et al. 2013; Krutikova 2009; and Dornan and Boyden 2011). Over the 15-year period, YL has mixed both qualitative and quantitative research techniques in the five rounds of household surveys and in-depth interviews undertaken. Case studies capturing life experiences of children, parents, teachers and representatives of the community are also compiled. The usefulness of this approach is in the breadth and depth that combine to bring out rich descriptions of life stories of children’s resilience, dreams and expectations.

The use of both quantitative and qualitative methods enriches and complements data from this project. According to Bird and Higgins (2011), such a combination is useful for IGT studies in three ways. Firstly it creates linkage between families across generations in order to measure impart of family background on children. Secondly, a wide selection of variables is included such that they can measure well-being and other associated factors like parental education. Thirdly, sample size
ought to be large enough to allow for quantitative techniques to be applied and generalizations to be made to a bigger population. In addition, information on public services available to the group under study should also be collected. On all these, YL seems to have exceeded these expectations as I demonstrate below.

Taking a Life Course Perspective to Poverty and Inequality

Longitudinal research methodologies are robust enough to allow capturing of data at critical points in children’s lives in order to identify changes and explain cause-effect relationships. The project has five rounds of data collection. By the time the study is completed, the younger cohort will be between 14-15 years while the older cohort will be young adults of 21-22 years (YL 2014). At various points, it is possible to compare children’s indicators at 5 years and at 10 years or as an adolescent and a young adult; which is a powerful means of showing impact on progressive changes. Indeed, YL acknowledges that the “life course” perspective to child poverty takes account of multi-dimensionality of children’s lives. It denotes the importance of the kind of nurturing in early years and accumulation of disadvantages as being constitutive of quality of later life through health, nutrition outcomes and parental care (Ibid). At least two critical points where previous investments in quality nutrition and cognitive stimulation have greatest impact is transition from infancy to late childhood and from adolescence to early adulthood (Woodhead et al. 2013; Rampal 2013; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2009; Birds and Higgins 2011). The most rapid growth is experienced just before two years and during adolescence. Using data on the changing nutritional status of 2000 children from Andhra Pradesh that was collected at two years, six and eight years, Rampal (2013) concluded that once the critical window of opportunity that exists before two years is passed, it is difficult for a child to catch up even with very good nutritional interventions. In addition, poor nutrition among adolescent girls prior to their becoming mothers affects in-utero nutrition, and future pregnancies are likely to result in underweight babies. Woodhead et al. (2013) and Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2009) reported similar results, where persistent under-nutrition results in stunting, permanently compromising the child’s future outcomes and any possibility of reversing the negative effects of prolonged exposure. Stunting is associated with lower educational performance.
Fortunately, a complete reversal of the effects of stunting is possible within the first five years of life if the stunting is moderate but would remain unaffected in severely malnourished children (Crookston et al. 2010 cited by Woodhead et.al 2013). This is an important finding that should drive future changes in childhood programs and policies. Whereas previously it was apparent that early childhood phase below five years offered the best chance for recovery, it is now clear that other life phases like adolescence are equally important. Therefore equal policy attention is needed, and taking the whole life course perspective as modeled by YL not only makes a lot of economic sense but is also crucial.

**Understanding Intergenerational Transfer of Poverty and the Transfer Mechanisms**

There is an assumption that in equally the same way that rich parents pass their assets and resources to their children as inheritance, so do poor parents pass their liabilities and disadvantages both in life and death. The question however would be to what extent does inheritance affect IGT of childhood poverty? The mechanism of actual transfer process is not well known. According to Behrman et al. (2013), this greyness, has caused some critiques to cast aspersions on there being any close correlation especially because it is difficult to measure the extent of change and how significant that change would be in the lives of children. Bird and Higgins (2011) provided some evidence by reviewing various studies that show that a mother with a higher human capital is likely to invest more in her children. Such investments are also said to reduce gender inequalities and increase possibilities for better employment outcomes for her children. However, the YL project was able to use its panel data to answer this question. Behrman et al. (2014) used some elaborate economic model simulations to predict how increased schooling outcomes among parents together with higher household expenditure consumptions impact on their children in relation to the same variables (human capital and per capita consumption). YL data collected between 2009-10 with a total sample of 6,915 was used. However, parents’ years of schooling in each country were varied in order to test possible outcomes. Their findings were that

Substantial changes in the parents’ generation carry over somewhat to the distributions of human capital of their children, but lead to relatively small
changes to per capita adult consumption for the children’s generation when they become adults. Fairly large changes in parental schooling attainment and per capita consumption would be needed to have much impact on per capita consumption poverty heads counts for the children when they become adults… (Behrman et al. 2014:20).

These findings are quite significant for policy in the sense that a lot of interventions target increasing household income or expenditure, and hope for substantial changes in the lives of children. What the findings suggest is that interventions in education and household income have to be phenomenal and cut across one generation to the next for lasting changes. Public provisioning of health care and education at high quality could be possible solutions so that a well-educated and healthy parental generation raises the next generation of healthy and likely to be well educated generation.

Still as part of YL, Pasquier-Doumer and Brando (2013) on the other hand looked at schooling and aspiration failures of children in Peru. They showed that some social-cultural and economic factors encountered in early in life are likely to keep widening the gap between the rich and poor over the life course. They challenged prevailing attitudes that tend to portray the poor as lacking in ambition by demonstrating that all children start life with similarly high ambitions as their privileged counterparts, but life’s prevailing circumstances whittle or change their development experiences. For example long distances to schools in conflict situations in some regions within the same country may curtail school attendance or even make it impossible. The influence of gender, caste, religious practices, and ethnicity on children’s aspirations can also be profound. For instance, in India and Bangladesh where parents may feel deprived of benefits once a girl is married often limits education opportunities for girls. Secondly, higher dowry is needed for educated girls, which raises family liabilities (Bird and Higgins 2013) and may be motivation to invest less in girls.

RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS IN INTERRUPTING CHILDHOOD POVERTY AND ITS TRANSFER

Using YL data, Porter and Dornan (2010) showed that social protection programs assist in mitigating social inequalities and improving the success of other intervention programs that target human capital invest-
ments. Woodhead et al. (2013) provides further support by showing that social protection schemes can alter how children use their time in practice thus reducing child labour incidences. These schemes have been used to successfully improve access to education in Peru (Jones and Marquez 2014) and keeping adolescent girls in school in Malawi, minimizing the child labour and reducing loss of parental care in Mexico and Columbia (Roelen 2014). The data agrees well with others that have demonstrated positive impact of social protection on lives of children. For example in South Africa where child support grants have been shown to have between 160-230 percent return on investment meaning benefits far outweigh the investments (Birth and Higgins 2011).

Policies could have unintended effects on children’s lives. These may include commodification for perverse incentives, infantalization of adult recipients or carers who have to conform to certain behavior or risk withdrawal. There have been extreme cases of child maltreatment in order to qualify for benefits. Roelen (2014) cited Brazil and the Dadaab Refugee camps in Kenya where children were deliberately starved so they could become underweight, while in Nicaragua they were overfed a few days prior to the project’s scheduled growth monitoring sessions to avoid being withdrawn from the programs. In Romania, teachers under report pupil absenteeism making school dropout invisible since the child benefit program inextricably linked school attendance to teachers’ salaries. Social assistance programs like public works can also reduce schooling opportunities for children. Older siblings have been found to miss school periodically in order to meet domestic labor gaps created by parents enrolling for public works programs, India being a good example (Jones et al. 2008). Targeting a few children also means some families who view themselves as poor are left out, which creates community tensions and may adversely affect social dynamics of a community (Jones and Villar 2014).

There are also some problematic areas in child protection that may adversely impact on IGT of poverty that cash transfers have not adequately addressed. Some growing evidence shows efforts to link CCTs to family violence and neglect as useful means for confronting intergenerational poverty and social exclusion (Barrientos et al. 2013; Thompson 2014; Roelen 2014; Jones and Villar 2014 and Strueli 2014). So far, all are based on Latin America. Further, McLeigh (2014) argued that CCTs can motivate parents to conform to desired standards of child rearing rather
than aim to punish them for harmful behavior or practices towards their children. Most CCTs are predominantly applied in already difficult contexts such as where violence has become embedded in society due to many years of conflict such as Peru and Ecuador, or in extreme poverty situations as what confronts children affected by HIV/AIDS in Africa. The Peruvian Juntos program acknowledged that domestic violence was a social problem used to assert control over women and children and developed a response system to help families cope with it. However, this was only for a short time and community facilitators who used to make home visits and provide parenting education to parents have since been withdrawn though beneficiaries feel it was extremely useful for parents and should be retained (Jones and Villar 2014).

GENDER AND INTERSECTIONALITY IN UNDERSTANDING CHILDHOOD POVERTY

Childhood can be a complex phase with multiple factors intersecting to bring about adverse effects on a child’s life. According to Woodhead et al. (2013: 10), the most marked inequalities according to the YL data “relate to household wealth, urban-rural location, belonging to an ethnic or language minority or low caste group and level of rental education”. In Peru, multiple disadvantages among children from minority group were persistently observed in low health and education outcomes with a combined measure of 59.4 percent for rural dwellers even though they made up just 23.5 percent of the total sample. Poor households are also more likely to suffer greatest in the event of shocks and crises and to suffer longer in multiple ways simultaneously (Ibid). This was certainly the case in Ethiopia where families suffer multiple famine shocks making recovery very difficult without any external support.

To deal with vulnerability, families adopt various coping strategies, many of which are quite gendered and with adverse effects on girls because of their limited household bargaining power. The asymmetrical power relations at the household level determine important decisions such as which households members are starved when there is food scarcity, the marrying off young daughters and withdrawing children from school for their labour during financial crises (see Elson 2012). Whereas families with some accumulated material assets will mobilize them for short term responses before they can think of liquidating long term ones,
those with limited or no assets have to martial up their only capital in form of labor. Since most household members are expected to make contributions, children to end up providing paid and unpaid labour, and often by forfeiting schooling. For children who are orphaned, the circumstances prove to be much direr especially if the lost parent is the mother. Their chances of being enrolled in school diminish considerable (Bird and Higgins 2011).

When the above factors are conflated with gender differences, the challenges seem to grow in phenomenal ways surprisingly though, YL data shows huge gender variations between countries, and that boys are not necessarily positively discriminated or advantaged over girls (Woodhead et al. 2013). In Peru, they found out that boys were more under pressure to support their families than girls, while in India boys were likely to be enrolled in private school while large proportions of girls attended public schools known to be of poor quality. If asset transfer is considered as a factor, boys are more likely to benefit from inheritance than girls, which could subsequently set girls on a downward trajectory in spite of their family background. Having command over assets and resources puts people in a better position to invest and diversify their income as well as avoiding a slide back into poverty (Bird and Higgins 2011).

CONCLUSION

Based on evidence presented on the five areas examined, it is apparent that the Young Lives project has made a significant contribution to shedding light on the mechanisms of intergenerational transfer of poverty, child poverty in general and inequalities. Because of the wide range of data collected over a 15-year period, it is possible to tell a very rich story about what is happening to poverty in the lives of children in the four countries at different times. It has demonstrated the multi-dimensional nature of childhood poverty, and how it intersects with numerous factors such as gender, parental education and social-cultural factors and vulnerability to external as well as internal shocks to confound the lives of millions of children globally. Importantly, the role of human capital investment in shaping future opportunities for children has been underscored, as well as the role of health and nutrition throughout the life course. Interventions that aim to interrupt intergenerational transfer
of poverty have to follow a life course by taking a holistic rather than sectorial approach with substantial investments in order to make a difference that will last across generations. Similarly, equal attention needs to be paid to all phases of what constitutes childhood as a generational phase.

REFERENCES


How to Frame Work After Capitalism? Marxist Proletarianism, the Radical Populist Critique and its Emerging Alternative

LOUIS THIEMANN

INTRODUCTION

In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. (Marx 1996 [1894]: ch.48)

This essay examines the philosophy of work as a central axis of Marxist theory. I propose that by looking at ‘orthodox’ Marxism through this theme, some of its most important internal tensions can be diluted. The debate over these tensions is as old as Marxism itself, and with the gradual decline of orthodoxy since the 1960s, and more rapidly since the 1990s, different forms of dissent have become the new norm. Although rich in content, these debates have not yet crystallized into something new, a state that represents a stark burden for Marxist theory and practice. The aim of this essay is to develop a personal way out of the dilemma through a constructive dialogue between emancipatory currents in Marxism and elements of the radical populist tradition. Although the focus is on agricultural work, the essay is held in general terms, hoping to connect the radical populist critique that developed in specific rural settings with the wider world of work. In doing so with limited space, it will necessarily step over many detailed critiques of Marxist orthodoxy, and focus on connecting the fundamental lessons learned.
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF PROLETARIANISM

If a proletarian is defined as lacking control over the means to, and decisions over, his production, his only mode to gain liberty (i.e. labor beyond “necessity and mundane considerations”) is through the pure luck that he is given such labor by a capitalist. In this sense, Marxism rests on a profoundly anti-proletarian understanding of how work should be. Marxist political philosophy, however, practices the glorification of the proletariat for its potential to organize and struggle, projecting its ‘historical role’ as the ‘undertaker of capitalism’. The resulting tension between the ideal of self-directed labor as the future goal of communism and the ‘political necessity’ for many generations to largely forfeit their wish to such self-directed labor in the name of the ‘development of the productive forces’ runs deep.

The malaise is exacerbated by the likewise Marxian theory of alienation, which warns of the immense potential of proletarian life realities to print themselves into the conscience of those they hold prisoners. Marx readily glorified such work that was not ‘alienated’, i.e. self-directed and voluntary, opposing this to the bourgeois hypothesis that all work is ultimately worse than leisure (Spencer 2009). His basic political proposition, however, was that non-alienated work needed a completely new context (‘communism’) to emerge on a larger scale, and that before this new context is created a categorically different set of theoretical rules apply. As Grigat explains, this tension spills over into the question of political agency: “Bad societal conditions cannot be changed through the consistent conscientization of interests (i.e. class conscience) because they themselves constitute these interests. Wage workers as wage workers want higher wages, not communism” (2014: 21).

But this is not so much a late critique of Marx as a reiteration of the Grundrisse, where Marx writes of the proletarian’s complicity in capitalist production that “this ‘productive’ worker cares as much about the crappy shit he has to make as does the capitalist himself who employs him, and who also couldn’t give a damn for the junk” (Marx 1973:193). Nonetheless, Marxist visions of the development of the means of production have typically gone hand in hand with a quest to further proletarianize, and thus alienate, work. Emancipation through the ‘free association of producers’ envisioned by Marx is impossible in this context. In this sense, “the vision of a unified working class has always been imbued
with a pinch of collectivist delusion and a fair portion of conformism” (Grigat 2014:20).

From Lafargue’s (1907) Right to be Lazy to later currents such as situationalism, autonomous Marxism, communitarianism and the Italian operaismo, a swift history would show that there are theoretical possibilities contained within Marxism which allow for a humbling of the proletarian as the agent, as well as ideal and objective of revolutionary politics. In fact, large fractions of the Marxist left never subscribed to the cult of the proletariat. It is these fractions that are ripe for a complimentary project to the building of the working class, and of the means of production through its labor. Their positions collude in that our “aspiration should, instead, be to liberate the zest for action slumbering in every human, his creativity and needs for aesthetic expression, his desire to shape his own life and his wish for the highest-potential, differentiated pleasure from economic pressures and political paternalism, and creating the societal conditions that would permit a kind of productive leisure in the first place (Grigat, 2014: 21)”. To realize this option within Marxist theory, the portfolio of modes of production needs a new member. In its simplest form, such a re-focus would have to produce or otherwise rest on two theoretical units: a concept and definition of the envisioned life reality, i.e. a class definition of those who are, in the Marxist sense, neither members of a feudal regime, nor bourgeois or proletarian, as well as a concept of how this group produces, i.e. the mode of production it is involved in.

A NEW IDEAL TYPE?

To answer this ambitious question, five central aspects of labor philosophy that form a chain of theoretical building blocks are explored. After delineating the ‘orthodox’ Marxist judgment as well as the relevant radical populist critiques, I try to internalize the critiques and express the resulting blend in Marxist terms. Whether or not the issue of work can be re-conceptualized within Marxism remains up to the reader’s judgment.

External Motives of Work: Accumulation and Labor Productivity

Orthodox Marxism recognized the vicious cycle of labor productivity increases and corresponding deepening of accumulation in capitalism. To ‘counter’ this cycle, however, the idea of a similar cycle, under the
name of ‘socialist accumulation’, was theorized. At the end of a great ‘transformation’ (‘development’) stands a high-tech economy in which machines produce and “labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases” (see above).

If capitalism (and defense spending, arguably) have developed the means of production sufficiently, any other system of can pick them up for use towards its own motives. If we hold that the general development of the technological means of production has advanced sufficiently, work that has been directed towards societal accumulation (‘economic development’) can be shifted to the subsistence motive. But orthodox Marxism never discussed where the cut-off point should be between insufficient and sufficient means of production, between scarcity and abundance, and no such point has been successfully established in subsequent conversations.

Marxists tend to see the point where the majority would (if they could choose and were conscious of the choice) forfeit further wealth for idleness and leisure to ‘naturally’ shift more or less in correspondence with productivity, hence always being a stones’ throw away. This fails us especially in situations where the accumulative will of a few members of a village (or even outsiders) overshadows the relative contention of the majority, and where the question is whether to re-arrange resource access to benefit these individual’s will, or to safeguard against them. In these zero-sum games, whose position do we support? And, to complicate the situation further, if the first position is for an efficiency-based transformation and the second for an embedded transformation that will be less ‘efficient’ in economic terms, which is endorsed in Marxist theory?

The only organized way out of the dilemma (besides simple negation of the issue) seems to be reforming the concept of labor productivity. In fact, there is no need to stick with the common definition of ‘volume of output per hour worked’. As part of the general re-orientation of Marxist theory in light of ecological, anti-economistic and post-modernity concerns, many Marxists are indeed choosing to follow an inherently qualitative definition of value—whether it is subjective use value or innate value. Prominent quests to deploy Marxism in ‘ecological value analysis’ underscore this trend (Foster, 2000; Burkett, 1999). If this is possible when theorizing consumption, the production of value naturally should be measured in the same light, and represented in a complex, at least partly qualitative concept of labor productivity.
Direction

A shift in the basic definition of labor productivity has far-reaching consequences for how to direct work. In exhibition of Marxist orthodoxy, Lenin described the ideal of economic planning as follows:

Accounting and control—that is mainly what is needed for the ‘smooth working’, for the proper functioning, of the first phase of communist society. All citizens are transformed into hired employees of the state, which consists of the armed workers. All citizens have become employees and workers of a single country-wide ‘syndicate’. All that is required is that they should work equally, do their proper share of work, and get equal pay. The accounting and control necessary for this have been simplified by capitalism to the utmost and reduced to the extraordinarily simple operations—which any literate person can perform—of supervising and recording, knowledge of the four rules of arithmetic, and issuing appropriate receipts. [...] The whole of society will have become a single office and a single factory, with equality of labour and pay. (Lenin 1975:383)

Orthodoxy idealized the ‘economies of scale’ (towards ever more industrial scales), thus inherently decreasing the very possibilities for equality beyond purely economic terms. A thousand workers and managers at an industrial farm may push to earn exactly the same, but they cannot, in any practical way, aspire to meaningful equality of direction. Likewise, a hundred million workers may earn exactly the same as employees of a ‘socialist state’ and its enterprises, but the aspiration for equality of direction, and finally of any kind of self-direction, is doomed in such a setting.

Only industrialization makes hierarchical direction possible, because the increased deployment of capital-intensive technologies and the increased separation between ownership and labor go hand in hand. It can thus be argued that industrialization is best described as a loss of capacity to self-direction and not, in a hollow sense, as increased use of technology (van der Ploeg 2013:63). In that sense, the deployment of a technology can, but must not, result in the industrialization of a production process, and industrialization of labor may take place without the deployment of capital-intensive technology. It is the change in the basic struggle over who can direct work, and why, that matters most.

Chayanov’s theory of non-capitalist farms proposes that the management of the family farm is directed “by a script defined within and by the peasant family” (van der Ploeg 2013:25). Staying with the metaphor,
Marxists tend to be suspicious of the script-writing abilities of peasants, highlighting their supposed propensity to superstition, tradition, low ‘education’ and other bad influences needing ‘scientific direction’. Furthermore, the ideal of ‘scientific direction’ denigrates its ‘other’, which may be called ‘intuitive direction’. This ideal finds its political expression in the vision of economic plans replacing anarchy.

On the other hand, Marxism contains the theory of alienation as a strong internal critique to a centralization of direction. Alienation is defined as the deprivation of the right to self-direct one’s labor, therefore deprivation of the right to self-direct one’s socioeconomic relations, which finally leads to an attrition of individuals’ capability to even conceive of self-direction. This resonates in the theory of the metabolic rift, which details the steps of the separation of producers and the means of production, leading inevitably to the separation of the knowledge necessary to direct production independently. The more the rift advances, the more inconceivable self-direction becomes. As a question of knowledge and epistemology, this tension has been tackled comprehensively by radical agrarian populists. Argumentation in favor of peasant units of production has often pointed to the greater ability of peasant farmers to conceive of their production in inclusive, complex terms and cultivate ecological, place-based knowledge, both of which are central determinants of sustainable and equitable production processes—i.e. of the qualitative productivity of labor.

This difference is rooted in different philosophies of power. For classical Marxists, power had been about the interpretation, i.e. it could be used for the aim of one or another class, for the good of society or against it, for egoistic or altruistic goals, depending on the uprightness of those that held power. Radical populists are weary of any accumulation of power, and thus inherently against specialization in decision-making.

Beyond this there is the question of individual self-development. Classical Marxism highlighted the formulation of class-aligned social and political goals and the development of political (class) conscience to which proletarian work led, hence theorizing a ‘special’ political strength of the working class. On the other hand, proletarian work is characterized by a systematic suffocation of the everyday tools needed to negotiate social and economic relations, while self-directed work fosters the mastery of these tools. Proletarian work may induce collective aspirations for ‘after-work’ political action, meanwhile self-directed work de-
velops and practices political action as part of its daily occupation, in the social relations that constantly mediate the smallholder’s niche, within the family and other cooperative endeavors he undertakes to safeguard that niche, and in the other arenas of everyday struggle to retain niches and build the patrimony. It therein involves vastly more strategic thinking, planning of resources and markets, knowledge development (instead of skills development in proletarian work) and so on. Scott (1985) rightly pointed out that, often enough, this everyday resistance accumulates and triggers significant political changes. Even if Marxists continue to see organized and structured resistance as the main tool for change until the revolution, they have to concede that after the revolution, a truly emancipatory society would solve problems using everyday tools, not bureaucratic organizations. With the ongoing shift away from revolution-centered politics in the Marxist left, we can thus observe a corresponding interest in learning tools for everyday negotiation—small and medium elements of a future moral economy which grows in strength in two complementing paths: a) structured and organized struggles against forces that limit its spaces, and b) everyday processes of emancipation that fill the existing (as well as the newly conquered) spaces with alternative social and economic ‘life’. It is embedded self-direction, not centralized ‘scientific’ direction that can develop the tools for emancipated social relations on a broader scale.

Internal Motives of Work: Self-Realization and Work Ethics

In the Grundrisse, Marx (1973:iv), in criticizing Adam Smith’s perception of work as a burden (which for him represented the ‘bourgeois’ philosophy of work) wrote:

But Smith has no inkling whatever that the overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating activity—and that, further, the external aims become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits—hence as self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labor.

If this describes the emancipatory goal of Marxism, it represents a deeply anti-proletarian attitude: workers who do not reap the ultimate (personal) benefits of labor—self-realization—are deprived from them by the fact that they do not work for ‘individually posited aims’, but for aims either formulated by their ‘natural urgencies’ or by other individu-
als. This describes the Marxist agenda as a) the political quest to stop externally-forced labor, and b) the technological quest to limit ‘miserable’ tasks. But if the theory of alienation describes the denial of self-actualization to proletarians, it is most surprising that the classical Marxist answer was not simply that of broadening the existing spaces for self-actualizing work, and carrying capitalism’s technological advances over into these spaces. Instead, the existence of such emancipated work in any ‘pre-communist’ society was denied, along with the possibilities to build the means of production through it.

Weber (1983:42) traced the modern work ethic back to the emerging mid-19th century, where in part it was a defensive reaction of the middle class against workers and increasingly also peasants who could afford the leisure and luxuries reserved for the ‘distinguished’ classes. Disgusted at having to share coffeehouses, fashion trends and leisure spaces with workers and peasants, and fearing impediments to the market-centered economic growth its class interests were based on, the middle class did whatever it could to replace the waning necessity of the lower classes to work hard with a morality of hard work. Weber asks correctly: “What good would higher productivity be [for the middle classes] if its principle result was to lift peasants from their traditional misery to a subsistence level?”

In the Leninist state, the glorification of overwork for the collective was exemplified in Stakhanovism and the term udarnik (both describing the diligent over-worker), and through the decoration of individuals and factories as ‘Heroes of Socialist Labor’. In one or another way, the ideal worker that dominated work culture in the real-socialist countries was characterized by strong ‘self-obligations’, and engaging in a common-good equivalent of capitalist competition termed ‘socialist emulation’. Writing in 1982, Harry Madoff summarized this experience of real-socialism as follows: “It is now evident that the persistence, after the revolution, of the division of labor between intellectuals and workers, between administrators and the masses, and between city and country leads to the perpetuation of conflicts of interest between sectors of society along with the spirit of competition and individualism”. But instead of doubting the ideal of a ‘society without private property’, Madoff proceeds to lead us further into the dead end: “No doubt Mao Tse-tung was deeply impressed by this experience, since he repeatedly emphasized the
need to pay attention to the elimination of the major differences among the people if socialism is to progress” (Madoff, 2006).

The alternative would have been to make a categorical distinction between such private property that represents people’s patrimony (the term van der Ploeg (2013) uses for the peasant farm’s capital, i.e. the means of production of self-directed labor) and private property that goes beyond it. Following this track, the goal of communism would be not to ‘abolish’ all private property, but to a) abolish private property beyond the patrimony, and b) to develop systems that balance out the size and weight of patrimonies. This path would scale up the radical populist logic of equilibration between forces, from the individual peasant farm to the spheres on which the relations between these units, and between the groups they inevitably form, are governed.

**Labor’s Colleagues: Leisure and Idleness**

The question of whether Marxism wishes for an over-work ethic touches on a central question about post-modern ethics: How does the balance between drudgery and utility shift as the relative need to work for simple reproduction is reduced? In other words, what is the Marxist ethical position on the ‘normal’ amount of work after capitalism? To reach a strong position on this question, subsistence, as the basic motive of the peasant mode of production, and accumulation need to be brought into a convincing balance. Marx also settled on such a balance between self-fulfilling (necessarily self-directed) work and what he called ‘disposable time’—composed of non-necessary labor and idleness. He writes that if a worker “were in possession of his own means of production, [...] he need not work beyond the time necessary for the reproduction of his means of subsistence” (Marx 1990:336). Nonetheless, as mentioned above, he did not specify the social system that could institute cut-off points, i.e. the mechanisms by which societies define what is ‘enough’ and what is ‘redundant’. Radical agrarian populists hold that with higher productivity, the balances between drudgery and utility and between labor and consumption will tilt towards equilibria that involve less labor and drudgery, respectively. Thereby, they show how peasant units actively negotiate work time, as well as the use of other resources (van der Ploeg 2013:33).
This leads to the theory of labor’s ‘colleagues’, leisure and idleness. While self-directed work needs idleness in order to ponder and contemplate its direction, proletarian work relates primarily to regenerative leisure (‘relaxing’; disconnecting) in a ‘work-life balance’. Whether Marxism promotes the one or the other has far reaching consequences on cultures. While the leisure of proletarians only rarely involves self-development, idleness as a support for self-directed labor inherently does.

Valuation and Remuneration of Work

Orthodox Marxism argues for the industrialization of production and the centralization of direction. Its assumptions on the scale of direction are intimately intertwined with its treatment of value formation. Here, another important tension is found. In too-large scale, abstractly-debated spaces, value formation is inevitably dominated by exchange value (commodity fetishism), challenged only by highly simplified notions of use value. Complex use-valuation mechanisms cannot function on large scales, since they rely on complex, qualitative measurement. Any academic knows that the more accurately he wants to portray the true values of individuals, the smaller his potential sample size becomes. Intrinsic value formation processes cannot form and labor to a significant extent on ‘too-large’ scales.

Where Marxism recommends seeing all human activity as labor, valued for the utility of its products, the inverse argument—trying to see all work as potential art, and emphasizing the innate valuation of work—has arguably gained ground. The ongoing (re-)valorization of peasant production founded in radical populism often urges the use of innate categories of value when seeking to defend against the economistic valorization of peasant farm labor. Van der Ploeg terms the occupation of farming as an art, and shows why peasants will be more likely to interpret it that way than capitalist farms (2013:69).

SYNTHESIS

Internal tensions within Marxism about core assumptions on the meaning, motive and objective of work after capitalism have grown exponentially. A dialogue with radical populism can assist in re-thinking these assumptions, with the aim of developing an emancipatory paradigm of work, revising the focus on the proletariat, and hence overcoming the
contradictions between different ‘epochs of struggle’ in which emancipation is either curbed or furthered depending on the ‘judgment of the historical moment’. If proletarians are seen as complicit in capitalist production, they cannot at the same time be termed the inevitable ‘undertakers’ of that system. If proletarian work is understood as alienating work, it cannot at the same time be praised as conscientizing, thus justifying the view of the proletariat as the revolutionary vanguard. If self-realization and individual development is the goal of post-capitalist labor, proletarianization runs directly opposed to these core emancipatory goals. Finally, if labor after capitalism is to be subject to use valuation, not exchange value mechanisms, the distance of production chains is limited.

Diagram 1
Flow of logical building blocks in an orthodox Marxist perspective on post-capitalist work (left), and as one possible outcome of current theoretical reforms in dialogue with radical populism (right)
Self-directed work such as that advocated for by radical agrarian populists can fill these theoretical gaps. Replacing the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ with the progressive devolution of capitalism into a world of independent, self-directed producers (though with different specificities in accordance with the respective economic activities and means of production employed) must be the central change of direction. Self-directed work is defined as the opposite of the proletarian existence: such workers a) own the means of their production, and b) direct their labor according to their intrinsic values. As van der Ploeg (2009) shows, these work realities already exist, although in a marginalized position, besides the capitalist mode of production, and are “de facto distanciated from the markets”, even though products are sold.

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CONGRATULATIONS

Ladies and Gentlemen
Graduation is a hard nut
To scratch and crack
Yet, people graduate
With distinction

Such people
Ought to be splashed
With Felicitations
And commendations
All who graduated
Must be congratulated
For having granulated
Their brains into grains
Like a dream in a stream
They drained their brains
To obtain the
Gains of their dreams
CONGRATS!

Mawutodzo Kodzo Abissath
(1988)
Symbols on book cover

Nea Onim – The One who does not know
Symbolic meaning: Knowledge
- knowledge, lifelong learning and quest for continued knowledge
- He who does not know can become knowledgeable from learning.
- He who thinks he knows and ceases to continue to learn will stagnate.

Literal meaning: Spider web
Symbolic meaning: Wisdom & creativity

Literal meaning: Extension of the heart.
Symbolic meaning: Understanding agreement or charter: unity

Literal meaning: Help me to help you
Symbolic meaning: Interdependence: Cooperation: Helping one another

Literal meaning: Siamese twin crocodiles joined at the stomach
Symbolic meaning: Democracy and oneness irrespective of cultural differences
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