AN EXERCISE IN WORLDMAKING
The International Institute of Social Studies
Best Student Essay 2014/2015

PERSPECTIVES IN DEVELOPMENT
An Exercise in Worldmaking
Best Student Essays of 2014/15

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An Exercise in Worldmaking

Best Student Essays of 2014/15

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Development Encounters: An exercise in worldmaking | 3
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Note about artwork by artist: The front cover is a foot shaped by the key words of all the selected essays (only the main body of essays). Bigger size means higher frequency. You can see the essays are centered on several interesting topics. Foot simply refers to “a step”. The back cover, with a red block in the middle, is inspired by a painting “Fire in the evening”, Klee Paul, 1929. In that picture the painter used cold color blocks to express “evening” (sky, cold air, grasses etc.) while he used the red block to represent “fire”.
Foreword

The Institute of Social Studies is one of the leading (critical) Development schools in the world. It boasts of a diversity of students from all over the world, specializing in varied subjects ranging from Economics of development to conflict resolution. The different majors (mentioned beside the names of all the students above) include Economics of Development (ECD), Social Justice Perspectives (SJP), Social Policy for Development (SPD), Agrarian, Food and Environmental Studies (AFES), Governance, Policy and Political Economy (GPPE), Transatlantic Atlantis Programme in International Security and Development Policy (ATL) and Erasmus Mundus Masters Program in Public Policy (Mundus Mapp) besides various short courses. This book of essays covers a range of topics from each the above specializations.

The essays provide a creative, reflective, and critical exploration of different issues relevant to our current times. The first essay explores the underpinnings of the anti-immigration movement, questioning if it is in fact a social movement? The aim is to understand the driving forces of the movement so as to counter it effectively. The second essay analyses the Dutch discourse of ‘integration’ by zooming in on case of the non-western young person. The third essay explores racism inherent in the Dutch tradition of Zwarte Piet. The theme moves next to the intersection of race and gender by looking at the indigenous women and the gendered Indian Act in Canada in the fourth essay. The fifth essay explores sexuality on the intersection of religiosity and beauty in the Hijabers community. With essay six, the theme moves onto to Conflict areas with the particular essay delving into socio-economic insecurities in post-conflict Philippines. Essay seven examines the loss of culture in conflict. Essay eight talks about the electricity conflict in Guatemala. The next section of the book presents a preview into participatory poverty reduction and its tokenistic approach in Zimbabwe through essay nine. Essay ten and eleven present a commodity chain analysis of banana and milk respectively. Essay twelve questions the role of the state in the corporate food regime. And the last essay provides a discourse analysis of of Xi Jinping’s First Public Speech as General Secretary of the CPC.
The selection committee consisting of 16 peer reviewers worked in pairs to select the best essay from amongst two and the shortlisted ones were further discussed by the whole group. The essays were selected according to matter: relevance (to current life/news), manner: clear line of argumentation and method: flowing structure. The selected essays were then edited by the selection committee who worked together with the authors to ensure that the essays read well without losing the author’s ‘voice’.

A hearty congratulations to all the authors, a big thank you to all the editors and a grand welcome to you, dear reader!

**The Editorial Committee**
The Hague, November 2015
# Table of Contents

1. The Anti-Immigration Movement: Is it a Social Movement?  
   *Author: Michelle Munteanu*  
   p.10

2. The Young and Non-Western in the Netherlands Integration Discourse  
   *By Mahardhika S. Sadjad*  
   p.22

3. The Paradox of Liberal Internationalism: Tradition, Racism, and the Case of Zwarte Piet  
   *By Carmel Rabin*  
   p.36

4. Indigenous Women and the gendered Indian Act in Canada  
   *Author: Constance Dupuis*  
   p.52

5. Narratives of Beauty and Religiosity: The Hijabers Community  
   *By Mahardhika S. Sadjad*  
   p.66

6. The Philippine’s Bangsamoro Development Plan: Socio-Economic Insecurities in Post Conflict Mindanao?  
   *Author: Anna Dinglasan*  
   p.82

7. The destruction of cultural heritage in conflict as a social justice problem  
   *Author: Kate Orlovsky*  
   p.92

8. Shedding some light on the electricity conflict in Guatemala  
   *Author: Paula Sánchez de la Blanca*  
   p.100

   *Author: Muchito Mudimba*  
   p.118

10. Commodity Chain Analysis: From Plantation to Breakfast Table – The Shifting Relations of Banana Production/Consumption  
    *Author: Wei-Li Woo*  
    p.132

11. Milking money  
    *Author: Giulia Simula*  
    p.154

12. Where is the State in the Corporate Food Regime?  
    *Author: Wei-Li Woo*  
    p.182

13. Making a First Impression: an Analysis of Xi Jinping’s First Public Speech as General Secretary of the CPC  
    *Author: Elisabeth IJmker*  
    p.194

14. Rescuing the state? Radical Agrarian Populism on New Institutional Economics  
    *Author: Giulia Simula*  
    p.210

Development Encounters: An exercise in worldmaking | 9
1. The Anti-Immigration Movement: Is it a Social Movement?

Author: Michelle Munteanu

Introduction
As immigrant populations grow in the U.S. and Western Europe, anti-immigration movements have steadily been gaining ground. Immigrants are commonly portrayed by the anti-immigration movement as a multifaceted threat on the economic, religious, cultural, security and political fronts of society, despite there being only feeble empirical evidence supporting this.

Movements like this, seen as “right-wing” and “conservative,” are often neglected in social movement discourse, since social movements are commonly thought to be groups that vie for progressive and positive social change, with their collective actions often influencing political processes. Yet these conservative movements can also play a critical role in influencing national policy. So, what exactly constitutes as a social movement? Can the anti-immigration movement, which voices nativist and reactionary sentiments, really be considered a social movement?

This essay will attempt to answer these questions through a conceptual discussion of what constitutes as a social movement. The first part will break down the various definitions of social movements, looking at the political process theory, the new social movements paradigm, and conservative movements. The second part will focus on the characteristics of the anti-immigration movement, providing the example of the Patric Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (Pegida) movement in Germany. Finally, the third part will bring these two parts together, and argue that anti-immigration movements are, in fact, social movements. By conceptualizing the anti-immigration movement as a social movement, academics and politicians alike can better understand the driving forces behind this movement, and work to find solutions for the betterment of society.
Social movements

a. Political Process Theory
Academics have long discussed and debated the concept of social movements. In its broadest definition, social movements are “voluntary collectivities that people support in order to effect changes in society ... contain[ing] carrier organizations that consciously attempt to coordinate and mobilize supporters” (McCarthy and Zald 1973: 2). However, while supporters can foster “their own opportunities and successes, historians and social movement scholars alike routinely highlight the important role the sociopolitical context plays in constraining and capacitating mass mobilization” (Ward 2014: 263). In other words, the social and political context can have a huge impact on the formation of a social movement. This is especially significant when considering the rise of the anti-immigration movement.

This incorporation of the sociopolitical context into the understanding of social movements is called the political process theory. This theory “makes a key distinction between internal social movement characteristics and the political opportunity structure – the broader set of social, political, and economic forces constraining and capacitating social movement mobilization” (ibid: 264). While internal social movement characteristics include things such as organizational structure, leadership, and composition, the political opportunity structure takes the external environment into account, addressing the issue of timing and emergence of social movements. As McAdam (1996) observes, the fate of social movements is “largely dependent upon the opportunities afforded insurgents by the shifting institutional structure and ideological disposition through power” (McAdam 1996: 23). Therefore, social movements only emerge when an “expansion in political opportunities” is favorable to the supporters (assuming an insurgent consciousness exists and mobilization resources are available) (ibid: 29). McAdam (1996) further notes that, upon acting on these political opportunities, movements “are likely to effect legislative or other forms of change that serve to restructure – in both intended and unintended ways – the legal and institutional or relational basis of the political system or both. Thus transformed, the structure of political opportunities acts back to once again confront the population of challenging groups with new constraints and possibilities for action” (ibid: 37). This cycle of
involvement explains the persistence of some social movements, as well as the eventual decline of others. An important conclusion of the political process theory is that “political attitudes and beliefs possess a strong motivational basis” for the mobilization and emergence of social movements (Jost et. al 2003: 369).

b. New Social Movements (NSMs)

One critique of the political process theory is that it excludes movements that are “lacking a specific social base and [are] largely indifferent to the goal of conquering the state” (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 35). Successes aside, many movements exist as a place for likeminded individuals to mobilize, experience feelings of solidarity, and express similar goals. The new social movements (NSMs) paradigm attempts to rectify this oversight of the political process theory by including the cultural and psychological aspects of social movements processes.

According to this model, the identity of the group is the most important factor in predetermining if the social movement will take collective action. Della Porta and Diani (2006) explain that collective action can occur if these group formations are: “(1) easily identifiable and differentiated in relation to other social groups; (2) endowed, thanks to social networks among their members, with a high level of internal cohesion and with a specific identity” (ibid: 37). Therefore, the undertaking of collective action will depend on the “simultaneous presence of specific categorical traits and on networks which link the subjects sharing such traits. From this perspective, the central question for the analysis of the relationship between structure and action will be whether social changes have made it easier to develop such social relationships and feelings of solidarity and of collegiate belonging, to identify specific interest, and to promote related mobilization” (ibid: 37). Unlike the political process theory, which focuses on the groups’ ability to interpret its political opportunities while already assuming an insurgent consciousness exists, the NSM paradigm focuses on the insurgents’ motivations to join and successfully mobilize as a collective group.
The NSM paradigm makes sure to note that these NSMs are “a product of the shift to a post-industrial economy, ... are unique and, as such, different from social movements of the industrial age” (Pichardo 1997: 412). Though social movements under the political process theory may include movements from the industrial era with largely materialist (i.e. economic, physical security) demands, NSMs are identified as having cultural claims and post-materialist demands, such as citizenship, personal freedom, and human rights.

c. Conservative Movements
The problem of the NSM paradigm is its tendency to leave out conservative movements in its conceptualization and discourse of social movement processes and identities. As Pichardo (1997) contends, the NSM theory “marginalized social movements that do not originate from the left. Contemporary right-wing movements are not the subject of their focus” (Pichardo 1997: 413). Yet, there is no a priori reason for the exclusion of conservative movements from the NSM paradigm, as “many of which over the last 20 years seem to be unique reactions (of a conservative character) to the alienating effects of postindustrial society” (ibid). Lienesch (1982) points out that “the theory of alienation and irrationality has provided the most popular model for the study of right-wing movements” (Lienesch 1982: 406). This seems to be unfair and presumptuous, preventing academics from understanding the real driving forces behind these mobilizations. Though they are anti-progressive, “conservative ideologies, like virtually all other belief systems, are adopted in part because they satisfy various psychological needs. To say that ideological belief systems have a strong motivational basis is not to say that they are unprincipled, unwarranted, or unresponsive to reason or evidence. Although the (partial) causes of ideological beliefs may be motivational, the reasons (and rationalizations) whereby individuals justify those beliefs to themselves and others are assessed according to informational criteria” (Jost et. al 2003: 369). By including past and contemporary conservative movements in the discussion of NSMs, “the process of government intrusion into the civic sphere would be more clearly highlighted, as conservative mobilizations are also reacting to the actions of governments to control the civic sphere” (Pichardo 1997: 426).
The Anti-immigration movement

a. Characterizations

Keeping this discussion of social movements in mind, it is important to characterize the anti-immigration movement in order to determine whether it constitutes as a social movement. As much of the literature on anti-immigration is centered on the U.S., this part will focus on characterizations of the movement in this particular region.

The anti-immigration movement first emerged in the United States, as the country experienced large inflows of immigrants with backgrounds different from the existing American culture. According to Diamond (1996), a decade’s worth of articles “argued that ethnicity, not a shared belief in core American values, was what gave the nation its identity… The focus on cultural homogeneity was central to early anti-immigrant activity” (Diamond 1996: 157). This fact remains true even in the contemporary anti-immigration movement, yet it is still important to consider the historical context. Ward (2014) identifies three key political, economic, and social changes that helped set the stage for contemporary anti-immigration mobilization: “(1) the move toward greater economic integration between the United States and Mexico, (2) a simultaneous escalation of public anger and fear over issues of unauthorized immigration, drugs and terrorism that were interwoven by entrepreneuring government actors and agencies, and (3) the shift toward more militarized border enforcement operated under the increasingly punitive logic of ‘prevention through deterrence’” (Ward 2014:273). Clearly, supporters of the anti-immigration movement were heavily influenced to join by their environment.

Despite frequent assertions of immigrants being threats to the economic security of native citizens, Huang (2008) contends that “though coded otherwise, there is little question that the current immigration debate is really about race” (Huang 2008: 398). This is supported by Fetzer (2001), who states that “politicians, educators, and journalists should not restrict themselves to economic myths about immigration. As [studies have] shown, culture plays at least as large a role in nativism” (Fetzer 2001: 18).
With nativism and racism attributed as reasons behind anti-immigration sentiment, what does the anti-immigration movement demand? Karapin (1999) simply puts that “anti-immigration mobilization consists of public statements and actions intended to gain political support for policies that will restrict immigration” (Karapin 1999: 426). Yet, it is important to note that the anti-immigration movement currently sweeping the United States is a rather heterogeneous phenomenon. There are a large variety of groups involved in the movement, including “a number of prominent nativist neo-vigilante groups, conservative think tanks and policy institutes, restrictionist publishing companies, and even government affiliated organizations” (Ward 2014: 271). However, “what coheres these groups is a shared set of ideas, beliefs, and values comprising a thoroughly restrictionist approach to immigration in the United States, as well as fairly unified policy stances on unauthorized immigration, guest worker programs and border security” (ibid).

As shown, painting a clear picture of the anti-immigration movement is difficult, and fully understanding the emergence of the contemporary anti-immigration movement “requires not only identifying key structural shifts facilitating mobilization but specifying how these emerging opportunities produce perceptions and worldviews amenable to anti-immigration mobilization” (ibid: 267). In other words, it is important to realize that the emergence of movements is closely related to how supporters respond to their contexts.

b. Example: The Pegida Movement in Germany

In order to contextualize the characteristics, a current example of an anti-immigration movement in Western Europe will be provided.

Recently, anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiments have been simmering throughout Europe, as “thousands of refugees continue to pour in at a time of economic weakness and amid growing fear created by the Islamic State and other militant Muslim groups” (Smale and Eddy 2015). Though Western Europe has often seen large groups of immigrants settle in the past, these anti-immigration sentiments seem to stem from xenophobia of Muslim immigrants, further supporting the claim that these movements always have to do with race. When
searching for news articles, results concerning Germany’s movement take the headlines, with many articles published as recently as January 2015.

Pegida, standing for Patric Europeans Against the Islamization of the West, has been causing quite a stir in Germany, with thousands taking part in their marches and the number of supporters rising with every march. Despite being compared to Nazis in the media, “many of Pegida’s supporters claim they are not a racist movement. Their 19-point manifesto says that war refugees and the politically persecuted are welcome, but there should be stricter implementation of immigration laws. What this means in practice is that expulsion should be used much more readily” (Arnett 2015). However, there are definite racist undertones to this claim, and without empirical evidence for the reasons why there should be stricter implementation of laws, this explanation falls flat.

A news article about their most recent march claims that marchers “were demonstrating to preserve a Germany they know and recognize. Marchers spurned the news media, and few would be interviewed, but those who did expressed concerns that the country was being overrun by foreigners” (Smale and Eddy 2015). The name of the group itself is telling of exactly what kind of foreigner these supporters are concerned about.

What effect is this movement having on actual politics concerning immigration? Haskins (2015) makes a link between the anti-immigration movement and the steady rise of fascist groups in Europe. He states, “Fascist groups have been particularly triumphant in European nations with large Islamic populations and in countries where foreign influences have been very powerful. This is because fascists have successfully persuaded large groups of working class natives that all foreign influences are detrimental to the wellbeing of the domestic culture and economy” (Haskins 2015). This connection between anti-immigration sentiments and fascism is particularly concerning. Regardless of whether or not Europeans have legitimate grievances with immigration issues in their countries, “turning to fascism will only end in disaster, and Europeans must make every effort to halt its recent expansion” (ibid).
However, the effect of anti-immigration movements is not always as extreme as a turn towards fascism. Yet, the movement still has a palpable influence on politicians, and “subnational politicians acted not purely on their own initiative, but rather under pressure, or potential pressure, from social movement organizations ...”

The underlying message often seemed to be the same: the immigrants already in the country were unwelcome, and additional immigration was unwanted” (Karapin 1999: 438). As politicians respond to societal issues with the intention to keep the majority happy, when the majority expresses anti-immigrant sentiments, politicians have little choice but to comply.

**Is the anti-immigration movement a social movement?**

Considering the characterizations of the anti-immigration movement, is it just to call it a social movement? According to the political process theory, a social movement emerges when an expansion of political opportunities to the group is beneficial to its members. Relating this to the anti-immigration movement, this movement is strongest when it can influence policy, and “subnational politicians often act under pressure from anti-immigration social movements at the local or state level … Their efforts usually include activities, such as petitions, demonstrations, and violence, that disrupt the normal routines of electoral and interest group politics” (Karapin 1999: 426). This movement has clear goals to effect immigration legislation, and their collective action depends on whether this expansion of political opportunities is beneficial to them or not. How exactly, then, does the movement assess these political opportunity structures as favorable? According to Karapin (1999), there are two key elements for political opportunity structures to be deemed favorable to anti-immigration movements: “the availability of potential allies among local or state politicians, who may take anti-immigrant or anti-immigration positions publicly, and passivity by police when anti-immigrant violence is initiated” (ibid: 427). On this account, the anti-immigration movement is surely a social movement that carefully assesses the favorability of political opportunity structures before taking collective action.
While the anti-immigration movement qualifies as a social movement under the political process theory, does it still qualify when social movements are conceptualized using the NSM paradigm? NSM stresses the internal identity structure of social movements, claiming that all NSMs possess strong feelings of solidarity and cohesion. Nevertheless, the NSM paradigm has the tendency to exclude conservative movements such as the anti-immigration movement from its discourse. Yet, what is the focus of anti-immigration movements if not identity? As seen in the Pegida movement, anti-immigrant activists focus on the preservation of national identity by advocating the restriction of immigrant groups, whose religious and cultural differences are seen as threatening to the already existing identity of the nation. Calhoun (1993) further expounds upon this by explaining nationalism:

Nationalism grew in part because of the rise of the modern state and the ideology of rights that became a crucial part of its legitimation apparatus and a continual opening for new claims. Nationality, despite nationalism's own ideology, was never simply a given identity, inherited unproblematically from the past, but always a construction and a claim within a field of identities. Not only did nationalist movements claim autonomy for specific peoples against others (for example, for Hungarians against the Austrian-dominated empire, or briefly for Texans against both Mexico and the United States) they also claimed a primacy for national identity over class, region, dialect, gender, and other subsidiary identities (395).

This explanation of the nationalistic ideology behind anti-immigration movements also fits the NSM typology, since nationalism emerged during the post-industrialist era. As nationalist anti-immigrant movements are calling for post-material demands such as the primacy of national identity over immigrant identities, this resonates with the NSM paradigm.

Therefore, under both the political process theory and the NSM paradigm, the anti-immigration movement is undeniably a social movement.
Conclusion
This essay explored various conceptualizations of social movements in order to answer the question of whether or not the anti-immigration movement is a social movement. Through a conceptual discussion of the political process theory, the new social movements paradigm, and conservative movements, the definition of a social movement is defined. Then, the anti-immigration movement is characterized by its key traits and an example of one country’s movement is given. By applying the definition of social movements to the characteristics of the anti-immigration movement, it becomes clear that the anti-immigration movement is indeed a social movement, albeit a conservative one.

This conceptualization of the anti-immigration movement as a social movement is important for various reasons. By applying social movement theories to the contemporary anti-immigration movement, a more thorough picture is painted of the ideologies behind the movement, and the social, political, and economic environments that prompt these sorts of movements into existence. This comprehension of the anti-immigration movement can therefore enable academics and politicians to find solutions for these issues without writing off these movements as irrational, or being pressured into making exclusionary immigration policies.

It is up to scholars to give the anti-immigration movement, and conservative movements in general, the conceptual dialogue it qualifies for. Without this, the collective actions of these movements may result in policies tuned to create a divided, exclusionary world.
References


2. The Young and Non-Western in the Netherlands Integration Discourse

By Mahardhika S. Sadjad

On 19 November 2014, CBS Statistics Netherlands published a press release titled “Statistics Netherlands: Integration Process is Uphill Struggle”. CBS Statistics Netherlands is an autonomous agency that collects and processes data with the aim of producing statistics used to inform policymakers and researchers. The press release was written to communicate the results of the Annual Integration Report 2014 (CBS Statistics Netherlands 2014) which offers a comprehensive evaluation on migrants and their children’s integration into Dutch society.

Through this essay, I would like to analyse how the press release problematizes integration and non-western young people in the Netherlands. While the focus of my analysis will be based on the content of the press release, the Annual Integration Report 2014, along with other sources, will be used to provide context and data. This is based on the assumption that the press release, rather than the report, is more likely used to inform mainstream media on findings related to integration and migrant groups, and therefore more accessible to the general public. I will start by explaining my methods of analysis, and then elaborate in turn on how integration and non-western young people are depicted through this press release.

Methods of Analysis

First, it is important to position the text within Dutch society. CBS Statistics Netherlands was commissioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment to compile the Annual Integration Report 2014, and produced a press release to

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1 The analysis in this essay are based on analysis tables and WPR frameworks that I have made available online, here.
communicate the results of the report to Dutch media. This note is not meant to question the credibility of these institutions. Rather, it highlights the voices represented in the press release. In the Netherlands, members of migrant groups are overwhelmingly underrepresented in political participation, media, and academic research (Sharpe 2014: 87-100 and van Dijk 1996: 92-94). Therefore, the press release can be understood as a product of the dominant group; it is an intragroup discourse about the others (van Dijk, Ting-Toomey et al. 1997: 145).

In order to analyse the press release, I use Scriven’s (1976: 39-45) seven steps to develop an analysis table of five columns, which consist of Scriven’s steps 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. The purpose of the table is to deconstruct the meanings (step 1), conclusions (step 2), and assumptions (step 4) expressed in the press release about integration of non-western young people. In developing my analysis table I considered critiques towards the assumptions (Step 5) and proposed counterarguments, other arguments, or more neutral ways of expressing the arguments (Step 6). I put special attention to titles and subheadings bolded in the press release, which can be interpreted as key messages communicated by CBS Statistics Netherlands to the press.

Following suggestions proposed by Gasper (2000: 8-11), I add a column for step 0: ‘identifying components’ and combine step 2 and 4 into one column. Step 3 (‘portrayal of structure’) is done by arranging the analysis into a table, while step 7 (‘overall evaluation’) is expressed in the analysis of this essay; these two steps are not explicit in the analysis table.

Scriven’s seven steps are effective a tool for analysing the content of the press release, however its focus on argument-counterargument analysis establishes a binary of structure versus agency in integration discourse. In order to go beyond this debate - beyond a problem-solution policy analysis – I use Goodwin’s (2013: 173) adaptation of Bacchi’s ‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ (WPR) approach to understand how the press release problematizes integration of young people with a non-western ethnic background. According to Bletsas (2012: 39-40), the benefits of using the WPR approach are (1) it allow us to analyse how different policy proposals represent problems differently and (2) it questions the relationship
between the problem and the policy; arguing that the relationship might not be natural but a product of certain ways of thinking about the problem and its enactment in governance.

**Integration as Policy and Integration as Statistics**

Integration, according to Coello (2010: 15), could be defined in contrast to policies that promote assimilation and multiculturalism; it recognises the right to manifest different identities and cultures within individuals’ private spheres while at the same time discourages it from the public sphere. In the Netherlands, ethnic minority policies were designed and enacted in response to mass migration after the Second World War. These policies shifted and changed through three phases (Vasta 01 August 2007: 716-719):

1. **Verzuiling** or pillarization, emphasized tolerance between different ethnic and religious groups, allowing each group to create their own institutions used to channel economic and cultural provisioning. While this phase emphasized tolerance, it has also been criticized for segregating groups through their own institutions.

2. Ethnic Minority Policies (1980s-1990s), focused on providing support for minority groups through legal-political, socio-economic, and cultural domains. These policies focused on issues such as anti-discrimination laws, access to housing, and mandatory integration and language courses.

3. Integration Policies (1994 – present), created on the principle of ‘mainstreaming’ services for immigrants which left behind the ethno-specific approach in social provisioning. During this phase, sanctions were also introduced towards migrants who failed to fulfil their responsibility of participating in mandatory courses and actively searching for employment.

4. The responsibility of integration shifted from ethnic and religious groups, to the state, and finally to individual migrants.
The title of the press release, ‘Statistics Netherlands: Integration Process is Uphill Struggle’, conveys the message that (1) integration has not been achieved and (2) integration is very hard to achieve. The title illustrates integration as an ‘uphill struggle’; it can only be accomplished through hard work, by overcoming challenges – it is a burden. The message offers an unwanted predicament: integration is a positive goal, but at what cost? It also begs the question: A struggle for whom? Who should be burdened with the ‘struggle’ for integration? Should it be a burden shared by the entire Dutch society or should it be a burden given to the newcomers as the cost of migrating into the society? Designed for the press, the title is intriguing and feeds into growing concerns towards immigration.

Another aspect worth noting from the title is the mention of its source, Statistics Netherlands. Understandingly, the mention of Statistic Netherlands is necessary to play tribute to the source. However, including Statistics Netherlands into the title, also frames the issue of integration as a problem that can be measured, quantified, and evaluated through statistics. It also takes advantage of hegemonic positivist views towards research. The unstated assumption is, if the report’s claims are made based on measurable data then it must be true. The title establishes a message of authority and objectivity on the subject of integration.

After the title, the word ‘integration’ only appears one last time within the first sentence of the first paragraph, through the mention of the ‘Annual Integration Report 2014’. After that, the word is conveniently replaced by socio-economic indicators. The subheading under the title states, in large bolded font, ‘Young people with non-western background still lagging behind in socio-economic terms compared to their native Dutch counterparts’. Integration is defined in socio-economic terms, where the bar is determined by the performance of ‘native Dutch’. This is illustrated more vividly through graphics in the report, such as the average percentage of correctly answered questions in the Cito Test as sited in the Annual Integration Report 2014 (CBS Statistics Netherlands 2014: 39):
Integration is expressed through socio-economic terms and described as an ‘uphill struggle’, where the goal (integration) will be achieved at the ‘top of the hill’. As illustrated by the graphics above, in terms of education, the ‘top of the hill’ is determined by the performance of ‘native Dutch’ students. Therefore, the burden to integrate becomes the responsibility of ‘young people with non-western background’ and depends on their ability to ‘catch up’ with the standards established by native Dutch.

The framing of integration as the individual responsibility of migrants and their family members is aligned to Netherland’s integration policies. Three main principles introduced in the integration bill of 2011 are (‘Integratie, Binding, Burgerschap’, 2011: 7):

1. Integration is the responsibility of migrants (those who come to settle in Netherlands permanently), and not the responsibility of the government.
2. ‘Niet afkomst, maar toekomst telt’\(^3\), which puts an end to ethno-specific policies and subsidies, and enforces the principle of mainstreaming.

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\(^2\) Native Dutch is referred to in the graphic as Autochtoon, which will be explained in the following section of this essay.

\(^3\) Translated by Google Translate: ‘Not descent, but future counts’.
3. Immigrants must depend on their own agencies, not on government support, to be economically independent.

Put into the context of Netherlands’ integration policy, the message conveyed in CBS Statistics Netherlands’ press release becomes clear: integration is an uphill struggle, and if not achieved, it is because people with ‘non-western background’ are not trying hard enough to meet the standards of ‘native Dutch’.

The Representation of Non-Western Young People and Young Native Dutch

A glaring element of the press release is the mention and contrasting of ‘non-western young people’ with ‘Native Dutch’. While this was left unexplained, it can be assumed that the two categories were translated into an English version of the press release from Dutch words Autochtoon (of Dutch birth and ancestry) and Allochtoon (of non-Dutch birth and ancestry – including mixed ancestry). The genealogy of these words can be traced to its use in geology to categorise rocks, mineral deposits, or other elements that are not indigenous to where they were found (Yanow, van der Haar 2010: 11). These words entered academic discourse in 1971 and has been used ever since for census and policy purposes related to migration (Ibid.). The word ‘non-western’ in the press release, however, is misleading since Allochtoon is sub-categorised into Western-Allochtoon and Non-Western Allochtoon:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autochtoon</th>
<th>Non-Western</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe (but not Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oceania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia (including former Dutch Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Yanow and van de Haar, 2010, 30

Despite the terms ‘west’and ‘non-western’, the categorisation can be understood based on ethnicity rather than geography.
The term ‘non-western’ in the press release can only be clarified if one goes through the Annual Integration Report 2014 (CBS Statistics Netherlands 2014: 7-13). It explains that the report evaluates the integration process of the four largest non-western groups (Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillean), the four non-Western refugee groups (Afghan, Iraqi, Iranian, and Somali), and a group of new European Union countries (Polish, Romanian, and Bulgarian). Despite this explanation in the report, the use of the term Allochtoon and non-western in the press release and media will be subjected to readers’ everyday racial discourse.

Yanow and van der Haar (2010: 35) write: ‘Allochtoon-autochtoon categorization thereby becomes a racial discourse carried on implicitly in a setting in which the use of the term “race” may be verboten, but where “everyone” knows, and understands, tacitly, the unspoken text.’ Naturalized migrants and second generation migrants who were born and raised in Netherlands are still categorised as Allochtoon and in practice the term is more often understood to specifically imply ‘non-western Allochtoon’ (Sharpe 2014: 83-84). Originally intended for migration policy, this categorization has become a basis for racial profiling of a particular migrants groups, namely the non-western Allochtoon.

How races are constructed can be seen by analysing the text within the press release. One means of doing this in the analysis table is by identifying sentences that imply criticism (unfavourable) and praise (favourable) towards people with non-western background (Allochtoon). Allochtoon parents and young people are mentioned in relation to unfavourable circumstances 14 times and favourable circumstances 6 times. Unfavourable circumstances include ‘lagging behind’, ‘dropping out of school’, ‘attend lower form of education’, ‘lack basic qualifications’, ‘lower test results’, ‘low-educated’, ‘unemployed’, ‘dependent on social security’, and ‘higher risk of committing crime’.

The subheading of paragraph two, ‘Non-western pupils attend lower forms of education than native Dutch pupils,’ is bolded. If one were to only read the subheadings (the intentionally bolded text), she will be misled as it suggests that all non-western pupils attend lower forms of education compared to all native Dutch pupils. It is explained in the next sentence, that this is not the case: ‘On average,
non-western pupils, in particular those with a Turkish or Moroccan background, attend a lower form of education than native Dutch pupils.’

The emphasis on ‘Turkish or Moroccan background’ is coloured by a trend of intertwining anti-immigration and anti-Islam propaganda. This assumingly objective statistics sounds familiar as it rings true to propaganda of right wing politicians, such as Geert Wilders (04.09.2014) who once stated in a speech, ‘It is not a clash of civilizations that is going on, but a clash between barbarism and civilization.’ The dichotomy between Turkish/ Moroccan and native Dutch, lower education and higher education, is parallel with the dichotomy of Islam and the West, barbarism and civilization.

Meanwhile, praise is given to non-western young people for performing relatively better compared to their predecessors. In one instance (see line 21), praise was given to pupils with an Iranian background for attending havo or vwo more often than native Dutch pupils. However, this praise was preceded by the mention of another group, pupils with Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, or Antillean backgrounds, who were performing worse than the rest.

The unstated assumption in the text is that integration can be measured through non-western young people’s attendance in higher education. Non-western young people from certain countries are doing much better in attending higher education, and therefore are more integrated into Dutch society than others. The group of non-western pupils who are lagging furthest behind in higher education are the four largest non-western groups, and therefore they are the least integrated.

In the fourth paragraph, attention moves away from young people to their families and the impact of home environment towards education. It states (lines 33-34): ‘If young people do not speak Dutch at home, they are in more unfavourable position when leaving primary education…’ Meanwhile, factors such as ‘low-educated parents, unemployed parents, living in a single-parent household and low household incomes…’ are mentioned (line 35) as ‘other factors’ that influences poor performance in schools. The prioritisation of language and an implied...
preference to monolingualism during primary school demonstrates the importance of language to the Dutch identity. According to a study in 2009, 48% of 1000 Dutch respondents felt that command of the Dutch language is an important characteristic to make ‘one a Dutch person’ (Coello 2010: 42). This mirrors policies for mandatory language courses and tests for migrants in the Integration law.

**Elite Racism and the Absence of Identity, Citizenship, and Inclusion**

The style of the press release depoliticises integration into a matter of statistics, ignoring the bias of defining integration based on the standards of the dominant group. Meanwhile, the press release omits any mention of racism, identity, citizenship, and socio-economic inclusion; placing the blame on individuals’ poor decisions and structural problems that has made it difficult for non-western young people to integrate themselves into Dutch society. The voices representing non-western young people are also unheard; while their behaviour is being problematized, their motivations behind it are not.

The press release is a product of what van Dijk refers to as an elite discourse that colours the relationship between the majority native Dutch and the minority ethnic groups. He (van Dijk 1993: 10-11) writes:

‘… much of the motivation and many prejudiced arguments that seem to inspire popular racism are “prepared” by elites… if the social mind is essentially formed by public discourse, and if public discourse is largely controlled by various elite groups, it warrants searching for at least some of the roots of racism among these elite groups themselves.’

The overall definition and indicators used to understand integration and the ‘Dutch society’ requires revisiting. The depiction of ethnic minority groups as separate variables of analysis from native Dutch, overlooks the interactions between these groups and how they influence both each other and the evolution of the ‘Dutch society’. Instead, the press release maintains the positioning of native Dutch as the dominant group.
Conclusion

Through this essay I have used Scriven’s analysis table and Goodwin’s interpretation of WPR framework to analyse the positioning of non-western young people in the Netherlands’ integration discourse. I have argued that the press release published by CBS Statistics Netherlands, titled ‘Statistics Netherlands: Integration Process is Uphill Struggle’, presents integration as the individual responsibility of migrants. This is consistent to existing trends in the Netherlands’ integration policy. The press release presents integration as a linear process where standards are defined based on the performance of the dominant native Dutch. Migrants are expected to aspire to these standards in order to be considered as integrated.

Moreover, the press release reproduces negative stereotypes against young people with non-western ethnic backgrounds. The association of young people of specific ethnicities, namely Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antilleans, with inferior performance legitimizes hierarchy between ethnic groups. This sends a message of cultural incompatibility and presents these ethnicities (and those whose races or religions are assumed to be connected to these ethnicities) as a larger threat towards integration and social cohesion.

Through this analysis, I suggest the need to revisit indicators used as a basis for integration discourse in the Netherlands. Rather than understanding integration as a linear process that can be quantified through statistics, more space should be given to for non-western young people to represent themselves and voice their own perspectives of what it means for them to be part of Dutch society.
References


Annex List


Annex 3: Goodwin’s (2013, 173) adaptation of Bacchi’s ‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ (WPR) approach

Annex list can be found online: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2dpUaPuY9XeTkhNUWk1MmRWZnM/view?usp=sharing
Development Encounters: **An exercise in worldmaking** | 35
3. The Paradox of Liberal Internationalism: Tradition, Racism, and the Case of Zwarte Piet

By Carmel Rabin

Introduction

Every year, from mid-November to the fifth of December, people in the Netherlands honor Saint Nicholas during the Sinterklaas holiday. As part of the festivities, an actor playing Saint Nicholas arrives by boat in a selected city in the Netherlands. Saint Nicholas is portrayed as an elderly man with long white hair and a white beard. He wears a red robe, bishop’s miter, and holds a shepherd’s staff. After docking the boat, Saint Nicholas travels throughout the country on a white horse and gives gifts to children that have been good. During this journey, Saint Nicholas is accompanied by a host of helpers by the name of Zwarte Piet, which is Dutch for Black Pete. This character is usually played by white actors who wear blackface makeup, golden earrings, bright red lips, curly wigs, and page attire. Additionally, some actors speak Dutch with a Surinamese accent and act foolishly (St. Nicholas Center. 2015).

This depiction of Saint Nicholas’ helpers has been critiqued for being blatantly racist as the Zwarte Piet makeup negatively portrays people of African decent, and the costumes worn by actors mimics the clothes worn by enslaved children during the colonial era (Helsloot 2012, Zeijden 2014). While some members of Dutch society may not consider Zwarte Piet as a manifestation of racism, it cannot be ignored that ethnic minorities, scholars, and non-governmental organizations find the practice offensive. Those who take offense to the tradition argue that Sinterklaas shows a slave-master relationship between Zwarte Piet and Saint Nicholas, that it reproduces an offensive caricature of African people, and that it embraces colonial imagery and power relations. According to Albert van
der Zeijden, “…in the view of Dutch minorities, the tradition reflects and even reinforces and encourages the impression of the inferior position of black people in the Netherlands” (Zeijden 2014). Therefore, this tradition of Zwarte Piet gave rise to a national and international debate about how the Netherlands deals with racism.

Domestically, racial tensions are increasing as more people claim that Zwarte Piet is racist, and that the holiday tradition should be changed (Helsloot 2012, Pijl and Goulordava 2014, Weiner 2014, Zeijden 2014). This national debate emerged in the 1960s with the White Pete Plan, which attempted to change Saint Nicholas’ helper to a Caucasian servant in order to avoid racial tensions. Later on, in the 1980s, migrants from former Dutch colonies expressed concerns over this cultural tradition, eventually banning its practice in Surinam in 1981. Ever since, many Dutch social groups and NGOs have linked the practice to slavery, colonialism, and racism (Pijl and Goulordava 2014). This has resulted in several attempts to alter the tradition and move away from the colonial origins of Zwarte Piet. This includes creating black Saint Nicholas, Petes in all colors of the rainbow, or doing away with the character all together.

While there have been several attempts to change the depiction of this character, the debate over Zwarte Piet reached a high point in 2013. This fiery debate escalated from the domestic to the international level, as the United Nations (UN) became involved in assessing the Dutch government’s observance of international norms on race (Pijl and Goulordava 2014). Concurrently, scholars and journalists from all over the world questioned how a tradition such as Zwarte Piet could still exist in a country that is globally perceived as liberal and tolerant (Nasman 2013). Many members of the international community could not comprehend how the Netherlands would allow for the perpetuation of such a cultural tradition that has been deemed as blatantly racist, offensive, and a perpetuation of colonial imagery.

It is precisely this puzzling contradiction that guides the focus of this research paper. This paper attempts to explain the paradoxical relationship that exists between the adoption and implementation of liberal internationalist norms on race in the Netherlands. In particular, this paper focuses on this paradox within the context of the cultural tradition of Zwarte Piet. Although this is a large topic...
that has been the subject of numerous studies, the scope of the current research is limited to the role and actions of the state. In doing so, this study aims to explore the Dutch government’s interaction with international liberal regimes, as well as the Dutch government’s handling of their own affairs as they relate to racism and cultural traditions.

In order to explore the inherent contradiction between the international and domestic practices of the Dutch government, this paper begins with an explanation of the international legal regime on discrimination. As the international community is guided by liberal internationalism, the liberal ideology is then related to the actions of the Netherlands. This allows for an exploration of the way in which liberal internationalism affects the cultural practices such as that of Zwarte Piet. Finally, the paradox of Dutch liberalism is emphasized through an exploration of the debate emerging around the Sinterklaas holiday.

Global Governance

While a domestic government controls much of a state’s affairs, many norms and rules (such as those of cultural practices and discrimination) fall under the jurisdiction of global governance. As the world experiences globalization, states are becoming increasingly interdependent economically, socially, and politically. When an economic or political crisis affects one country, it is inevitably felt in the global community. This interdependence has challenged the classical concept of Westphalian state sovereignty, as states are becoming susceptible to the actions of private and non-state actors. In order to ameliorate the effects of these problems, a new form of governance developed on the global level. This global governance is composed of a multitude of regimes and institutions that attempt to control international crises. However, these regimes and institutions are not merely empty vessels, rather they serve as the site for international struggles over wealth, power, and knowledge (Murphy 2000, Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006).

While global governance does not promote one particular ideology or political philosophy, it has become a platform through which prominent ideologies are contested and promoted. As explained by Robert Cox, global governance is essentially a space in which powerful states and actors promote their own self-
interest through ideologies of the elite (Murphy 2000). As such, those who create and promote these ideologies are often those who reap the greatest benefits. From this critical perspective, global governance is not a value-free term. Rather, it is a highly politicized struggle of who decides what for whom (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006). As such, the act of global governance is an attempt to claim political influence on a global scale in order to shape world politics.

Liberal Internationalism

The current hegemonic ideology that dominates global governance is liberal internationalism. According to Olav Stokke, liberal internationalism emerged in the 1970s as an amalgamation of seemingly opposing ideas on international intervention—humanitarian and realist internationalism (Stokke 1989). On one hand, liberal internationalism incorporates the assumptions and objectives of humanitarian internationalism. Stokke explains that these assumptions are that industrialized states must promote economic development in the “third world,” “that a more equitable world is in the best interest of industrialized states, and that international policy must be socially responsible. With these assumptions, humanitarian internationalism has the main goal of “promot[ing] economic and social growth and economic, social, and political human rights in the Third World and to alleviate human suffering” (Stokke 1989). On the other hand, realist internationalism is based on the assumption that, in an anarchic world, states must pursue their own self-interest, regardless of its effect on social, political, and economic equality. Borrowing assumptions from both schools of thought, liberal internationalism has incorporated inherently contradictory objectives that affect its implementation.

Nonetheless, supporters of liberal internationalism argue that the best way of addressing the emerging problems of globalization is through the strong promotion of and adherence to liberal values (Ikenberry 2009). These liberal values include the promotion of open markets, security partnerships, democratic norms, and human rights. Based on neoliberal economic theory and democratic peace theory, it is argued that the promotion of these values will naturally result in a more stable and peaceful international community. However, it can also be argued that the promotion of such values could serve as a façade for the self-interest of
states. Opponents of liberal internationalism argue that states use this as a means of maintaining and promoting their own power. In turn, this results in a moral inconsistency of liberal internationalism. While liberal values promote economic development along with democratic reforms and human rights, these values are often trumped by national interests (Murphy 2000).

One topic that is often affected by the contradictory nature of liberal internationalism is associated with the norms on racism and discrimination. While reducing instances of racism and discrimination helps to support the full implementation of liberal values, related policies may also interfere with individual state interests and goals.

**Liberal Internationalist Norms on Racism**

As globalization increases so do problems with racism and discrimination. As explained by Erna Appelt, in Europe, as well as in many other regions of the world, “xenophobia and racism are amongst the unsolved problems of the late twentieth century” (Appelt 2000). Instances of racism increase as globalization triggers mass migration, unemployment, and increased interaction between racial groups. Appelt explains that these events can amplify social, political, and economic problems that consequently may inflame feelings of racial insecurity. Therefore, the problem of racism and xenophobia has received a great deal of attention from the liberal international community.

Not only have global governance institutions attempted to end racism because of the challenges it poses to global stability, but also because reducing racism would support other liberal institutionalist goals. One of these goals is that of democracy promotion. As explained by Frank Cunningham, strengthening democracies includes promoting those marginalized and disempowered communities to fully participate in the democratic process (Cunningham 2000). Democratic inclusion necessitates both proactive government action, as well as the reversal of discriminatory social relations. If democratically active citizens do not want to change the relationship of superiority and inferiority among citizens in order to overcome racism, full democracy would not develop (Cunningham 2000, Imbert 2001).
Another goal of liberal internationalism is that of human rights promotion. With this goal in mind, the UN was founded based on the commitment to end all manifestations of racism, including colonialism and apartheid. Ending racism is seen as the precursor to the full observance and implementation of all human rights protections. This is because, as explained by Jyoti Shankar Singh, the denial of rights based on discriminatory practices undermines the basic notion of human rights as being equal and unalienable (Singh 2001). The discrimination in the application of human rights not only challenges these same human rights protections of privileged groups, but it also challenges the foundation of the liberal human rights regime.

Finally, racism also challenges economic development, which is a key pillar of liberal internationalism. Scholars such as Bernardo Kinksberg argue that equality is good for national and global economies since it has a positive effect on the rate of savings, investment in human capital, technological development, social capital, and economic governance (Roland 2001). A more equal society provides the foundation for prosperous economic development.

Liberal Internationalist Institution on Race

Given its importance to liberal internationalist, numerous institutions have been established to end racism and its deleterious effects. The predominant institution working against racism and discrimination is the UN. With the memory of the Second World War, the UN follows the principle of non-discrimination as one of the primary doctrines governing the international legal order (Dandan 2001, Symonides 2001). This mission was set forward as early as the first General Assembly (GA), on November 19, 1946, with Resolution 103/1. This resolution declared that social persecution and discrimination must be stopped in order to achieve higher interests of humanity. With racism growing in Europe, several European states led a series of resolutions in the GA, which urged the international community to fight racism. Soon thereafter, in 1948, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) undertook a number of studies on racism and its practices. This resulted in the preparation of the UNESCO Statement on Race (1950) and the UNESCO Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences (1951).
Several years later, in 1963, The GA adopted the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This was a pivotal declaration since it obliged states to take “immediate and positive measures to prosecute or outlaw organizations which promote or incite racial discrimination” (Article 9). Two years later, in 1965, the GA adopted the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. According to this covenant, state parties are obliged to not take part in discriminatory practices; to not sponsor, defend, or support racial discrimination; to take effective measures to end racial discrimination on national and local policy levels; and to nullify any laws, which perpetuate racial discrimination. Furthermore, this covenant made an important step by requiring states to eliminate both intentional and unintentional forms of discrimination (Wolfrum 2001).

Since the adoption of this covenant, the international community has discussed issues of racism, discrimination, and xenophobia in multiple settings, including three world conferences (Symonides 2001). Consequently, in 1993, the Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur to study direct and indirect institutional forms of racism throughout the world (Symonides 2001). Since the establishment of these declarations by the UN, the European Parliament, Council, and Commission have also issued several declarations, documents, and recommendations aimed at ending racism and xenophobia. Importantly, the Declaration and Plan of Action adopted by the Council of Europe laid out the foundational steps for ending racism and xenophobia in Europe (Imbert 2001). Additionally, the Council of Europe created the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance.

Through the history of the formation of international norms on racism and discrimination, two observations emerge. First, by the sheer amount of documents, covenants, and international conferences focused on ending racism, it is clear that this goal is considered paramount by the liberal international community. Second, international legal norms on discrimination have been shaped and supported by liberal internationalist ideology. With its values of democracy promotion, human rights protection, and economic development, liberal internationalism has greatly affected the current international legal regime.
The Netherlands joined the international regime against discrimination in 1966, with the signing of the International Convention to End All Forms of Discrimination (CERD). In 1971, the Netherlands created specific legal instruments and codes in order to incorporate the CERD into the Dutch Criminal Code (Havinga 2002). As a result, the Dutch government passed its first anti-discrimination act in 1975 – the Equal Pay Act. Soon thereafter, in 1983, the principle of equal treatment was introduced into the Dutch Constitution (Kang You and Mulder 2000). While the Equal Pay Act is related to gender-based discrimination, it paved the way for the Equal Treatment Act (1994), which prohibited discrimination in employment on the grounds of ‘gender, marital status, race, nationality, religion, belief, political opinion and hetero- or homosexual preference’ (italics added) (Havinga 2002). This act also created the Equal Treatment Commission, which addressed complaints on grounds of discrimination in employment. Since then, bills expanding the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability and age have also been under discussion in the Dutch Parliament. Additionally, according to Dutch law, with the aim of increasing the involvement of racial minorities in the Dutch workforce, employers must submit records of how many ethnic minorities they employ as a proportion of their workforce.

Based on its membership in the liberal internationalist anti-discrimination regime, the Netherlands has gained an international reputation for being liberal and tolerant. This reputation is furthered by the Netherlands’ stance on prostitution, marijuana, and the LGBTQ community. In fact, in a parliamentary debate in 2007, former Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende expressed that one of the primary features of Dutch identity is liberalism, tolerance, and respect (Pijl and Goulordava 2014). According to scholars such as Lilian Kang You and Louise Mulder, these features of Dutch identity have formed the basis for Dutch law and policy (Kang You and Mulder 2000).

However, as noted by Tetty Havinga, the kind of anti-discrimination legislation put in place by the Dutch government has often been described as “weak, lacking insufficient enforcement, rather ineffective and often largely symbolic” (Havinga 2002: 75). Furthermore, the Dutch government has primarily addressed
discrimination in employment, ignoring other forms of discrimination present in society (Dandan 2001). While support for equal treatment is displayed in the Netherlands, the impact of Dutch anti-discrimination legislation has been quite limited. As explained by Dienke Hondius, the impact of these liberal norms and antidiscrimination policies may have a limited impact in the Netherlands due to the sentiment of many citizens and policymakers that “we [Dutch] don’t do race” (Pijl and Goulordava 2014). Philomena Essed explains this phenomenon by noting that in order to reinforce a national image of tolerance, Dutch society is reluctant to discuss race relations or admit to racism (Essed 1991). Yvon van der Pijl and Karina Goulordava concur with this perspective noting that, “because the Dutch have strongly internalized the idea that they are not to discriminate, they are more reluctant to acknowledge that racism is a Dutch problem as well” (Pijl and Goulordava 2014: 282)

The paradoxical relationship between the Netherlands’ involvement in the international liberal regime and its lacking implementation of liberal values domestically, challenges the reputation of the Netherlands as a liberal country (Nasman 2013, Weiner 2014). Similar to this paradox of liberal values, racism in the Netherlands is not a new problem. Rather, racist imagery has long permeated Dutch art, music, advertisement, architecture, and holiday iconography (Weiner 2014). Since the Dutch Golden Age of colonialism, Dutch literature, art, and music have negatively portrayed individuals of African decent. Much of these depictions perpetuated the idea that individuals of African descent were unfit to be part of Dutch society. Although Dutch colonialism has ended, some of the depictions of ethnic and racial minorities have remained. As a result, minorities in the Netherlands frequently experience racism in education, employment, and interpersonal relations (Weiner 2014).

**Zwarte Piet**

According to various scholars and historians, the most prominent of these racial depictions is the character of Zwarte Piet in the Sinterklaas celebration (Helsloot 2012). This character also shows the tension between international liberal norms and national interests. While there has been a great social pressure to change the tradition, related proposals have provoked a heated debate within...
the Dutch government. Some Dutch politicians have vigorously and ignorantly argued in favor of keeping Zwarte Piet. Even more so, in October of 2013, a bid was submitted to protect Sinterklaas under UNESCO’s list of ‘intangible cultural heritage’. Accordingly, the former Minister of Immigration and Integration stated that the debate around Zwarte Piet was a threat to Dutch culture and traditions. This comment received support by conservative politicians such as Geert Wilders who tweeted that he would rather eliminate the UN system than eliminate Zwarte Piet (Helsloot 2012).

After receiving complaints by Dutch citizens and social groups, the UN Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a study into the nature of the holiday. In November 2013, the UN concluded its study and advised the Dutch government to facilitate the growing national debate on whether Zwarte Piet perpetuated a negative stereotype of people of African descent. However, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte responded to this in an interview, expressing that “Black Pete is black and I cannot change that...because the name is Black Pete” (Pijl and Goulordava 2014: 265) When confronted by the statement made by the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights classifying Zwarte Piet as a racist character, Rutte responded, “I simply do not agree” (Pijl and Goulordava 2014: 265). In this interview, Rutte also admitted that he dresses up as Zwarte Piet during Sinterklaas. In response to Mark Rutte’s comments, Glenn Helberg, chairman of a consultative body for the Council for Dutch Caribbean People in the Netherlands, said that Rutte “displays ignorance as to the origin of Black Pete in the kingdom” (Pijl and Goulordava 2014: 266). Helberg also deplored Rutte for his lack of responsibility for the perpetuation of racism, stating that “Rutte may be able to remove his makeup, but he cannot discard his colonial mindset” (Pijl and Goulordava 2014: 266).

The debate among government officials was joined by a debate between Dutch courts on the legality of Zwarte Piet. In July 2014, the Amsterdam District Court declared that the Mayor of Amsterdam should have been more careful in allowing the Sinterklaas festivities to feature the Zwarte Piet character. The court declared that the character “can be perceived as an encroachment in the private life of colored people, because of its negative stereotype of black people” (Zeijden 2014). Although this court ruling was of limited scope, it was seen as a big step
towards changing the holiday tradition (McBain 2014, Ohlheiser 2014). However, in November of 2014, the Netherlands’ highest administrative court—the Council of State—overturned this ruling. The Council of State decided that the banning of Zwarte Piet was outside the purview of the Mayor of Amsterdam, and ruled in favor of maintaining the character as part of the holiday festivities (Associated Press 2014, Deutsche Welle 2014).

While the debate in the Netherlands about Zwarte Piet continues, and while progress is being made to change both the social discourse and legislation about race and racism, the Netherlands continues to celebrate Sinterklaas by practicing the tradition of Zwarte Piet. Even though the Netherlands has developed the reputation as a liberal and tolerant country, as exhibited through the adoption of international norms and institutional agreements that align with the value of non-discrimination, the Dutch government still allows its own people to practice a tradition which perpetuates racist and colonial imagery. As discusses earlier in this paper, this imagery does not only offend minorities, but it also reflects upon greater forms of racial discrimination in Dutch society. Bearing in mind the relationship between racism and liberal internationalist values of democracy, human rights, and economic development, it can be argued that the perpetuation of racism in the Netherlands hinders the country from reaching its full liberal potential.

**Conclusion**

After exploring liberal internationalism, liberal norms on discrimination, and the interaction of the Netherlands with these norms, how can the paradox between adoption and implementation of liberal internationalist norms on racism explain the cultural practice of Zwarte Piet? The answer to this question lies in the nature of liberal internationalism. As discussed above, liberal internationalism was formed from a combination of both humanitarian and realist internationalism. Since ending discrimination and fighting racism is key in the liberal internationalist agenda, it must be adopted by liberal states, being the foundation for their legitimation. It follows that countries, such as the Netherlands, which would like to maintain their liberal reputation, must adopt international norms to fight racism. While the Netherlands has adopted these norms, and while its citizens
may well believe that racism should be eliminated throughout the world, the Netherlands' self-interest does not allow for the full implementation of these norms domestically.

As explained through a realist analysis of liberal internationalism, as long as the value of maintaining Zwarte Piet as a Dutch cultural tradition is more important to the Dutch government than upholding international norms, the Sinterklaas holiday will remain unchanged. The Dutch government must derive economic, political, and/or social benefits from changing this tradition in order for the national debate to have any effect. As long as the international community does not pose burdens on the Dutch government for maintaining Zwarte Piet, the Dutch government will continue to pursue its own self-interest. Through the lens of the state as the primary actor, the duality and purpose of liberal internationalism explains both how norms against racism are created and adopted at international level, and also how they are implemented at the national level.

An examination of this paradox of liberal internationalism points to three main findings. First, it can be argued that when liberal norms are not in the economic, political, or social favor of ‘liberal’ actors, they will not be implemented. Due to duality of liberal internationalism, ‘liberal’ actors tend not to apply liberal norms consistently, regardless of their international acceptance and justification. Second, the paradox between the adoption and implementation of liberal norms among liberal states puts into questions the legitimacy of the liberal project. It further questions the reputation of the Netherlands as a tolerant and liberal state. Finally, instead of solving the increasing problems of racism and discrimination, the politically motivated use of liberal cultural norms may further cement the negative social, economic, and political dynamics in the Netherlands and elsewhere in the world. Making issues of racism conditional on a state’s political and economic gain is prohibitive of forming an open, productive, and liberal world.
Bibliography


4. Indigenous Women and the gendered Indian Act in Canada

Author: Constance Dupuis

The history of Canada’s relationship with the territory’s original peoples is contested. What is certain is that, since 1876, this relationship has been primarily intermediated by the Indian Act\(^1\). Many aspects of this piece of federal legislation are deeply controversial. In particular, the act governs Indian registration, meaning the regulations that determine who is granted Indian status and who is not. To hold Indian status broadly entitles someone to benefit from the government’s obligations vis-a-vis Indigenous people. On this matter, some have questioned the narrowing of criteria for being ‘Indian,’ over the past century and a half, as one way the government seeks to discharge these obligations (Mann 2007). It is within these conversations that many have spoken out, despite recent amendments, about discrimination against women within the act.

The Indian Act, as an extension of the gendered state institution, regulates Indigenous men’s and Indigenous women’s access to ‘Indian status’ differently. In order to better understand the intersectional and intergenerational effects of these differences, this essay will first examine two different forms of gendered discrimination. From the more technical discussion of precisely how the Indian Act discriminates against Indigenous women, I will discuss the ways in which the Canadian state’s ongoing colonial relationship to Indigenous people is gendered. As this legislation also affects Indigenous women’s relationships to their families and communities, the ongoing legacies of colonialism, by way of patriarchal heteronormativity, will be discussed. First, however, by way of framing, two

\(^1\) Following the lead of many Indigenous authors on whose work I am drawing for this essay, the terms ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Native’ will be used, except when referring to government documents or citing authors. (Regan 2010, 240; Alfred and Corntassel 2005).
contextual elements will be underscored: the historical marginalization of Indigenous people, and women particularly, within Canada; and the meaning of ‘Indian status.’

Canada and Indigenous Peoples
To understand the situation of Indigenous peoples and particularly women in Canada, Jiwani borrows Galtung’s concept of structural violence, as they are among the most materially deprived, repressed and socially excluded segments of the Canadian population (2009, 67). Kuokkanen concisely describes what such structural violence looks like for Indigenous women:

*The rampant levels of violence against Indigenous women in Canada are created by social and economic marginalization, which in turn are consequences of colonialism such as dispossession of lands and livelihoods, abuse experienced in residential schools and assimilationist and racist policies seeking to erase identities and cultures (2008, 219-20).*

The legacies of colonialism and ongoing neo-colonialism have had profound impacts of Indigenous women.

Ann Stoler (1989)\(^2\) offers a comprehensive analysis of colonization as a racializing and sexualizing process. Intimately intertwined, ideas about the racial boundaries between European and native were permeated by beliefs about the sexuality of the ‘natives.’ Stoler speaks largely of centuries past, and speaks to the legacies of sexualized, racialized colonialism in former colonies today. Her analysis, however, continues to be relevant in an ongoing sense in North American Settler colonies. Andrea Smith (2014a, 1-2), a leading Indigenous feminist thinker, argues that the violence inflicted on Indigenous peoples of North America was and continues to be legitimized by ideas of Settler supremacy. Such beliefs dehumanize because, by equating Indigeneity with the natural world, the domination of Indigenous people

\(^2\) Having read the Cha and Thébaud (2009) piece about breadwinning and masculinities, I felt it was not of direct relevance here and so I chose to substitute it for this earlier course reading.
is made permissible in the same way Settlers dominate nature. Lugones states that “the colonial ‘civilizing mission’ was the euphemistic mask of brutal access to people’s bodies through unimaginable exploitation, violent sexual violation, control of reproduction, and systemic terror” (2010, 744). Indeed, Smith, in describing how settler society has and continues to relate to Indigenous sexuality in North America, states: “Native men and women’s sexualities are read as out of control and unable to conform to white heteropatriarchy” (2014b, 89). In this way, without intending to disaggregate the two, Smith is describing how Indigenous sexuality is racialized.

Indigenous racial identities are likewise sexualized. This process can be seen through the sexual violence inflicted on Indigenous women. Their hyper-sexualization legitimizes this violence, be it perpetrated by Indigenous or non-Indigenous men.

When I worked as a rape crisis counselor, every Native client I saw said to me a one point, “I wish I wasn’t Native.” My training in the mainstream antiviolence movement did not prepare me to address what I was seeing— that sexual violence in Native communities was inextricably linked to processes of genocide and colonization (Smith 2005, 116).

The sexualizing aspects of colonization are, as mentioned above, intricately related to other forms of domination and marginalization. “The sexual exploitation of indigenous women is integrally linked to their economic inequality and lack of political power both in dominant and in their own societies” (Kuokkanen 2008, 220). Kuokkanen, here, also touches of the marginalized positions Indigenous have come to hold in their own communities and families. Though, as touched upon above, women in Indigenous societies had held important positions of power in their families and communities, colonization and the imposition of heteronormative gender roles have changed Indigenous family structures.

I do not intend, through this discussion, to paint Indigenous women as victims without agency. Particularly when it comes to gender relations, where Indigenous conceptions of gender differ so starkly with European ones, resistance has been
paramount. Indeed, Enloe’s understanding of the intimately political nature of gender relations is particularly helpful when grappling with such contrasting genealogies of gender relations:

*The politics of marriage, of parenting, of daughterhood, of women’s friendships, of gendered divisions of paid and unpaid labor, of women’s organizing, of feminized sexuality and silence-each of these politics is gendered. That is, each is shaped by acceptance of or resistance to certain ideas about femininity and masculinity. Those ideas are political in so far as they not only take power to legitimize and sustain but also take power to transform and debunk* (2014, 262, emphasis in original)

When exploring Indigenous women’s resistance to dominant understandings of gender, it is clear that these struggles are political. It is within this context that I turn to a discussion and analysis of the Canadian state imposed and gendered regulations about Indigenous membership.

**Indian Status**

As mentioned above, broadly speaking, holding Indian status bestows privileges on Indigenous peoples in the form of government obligations when it comes to treaties the government had signed in exchange for access to Indigenous territories and resources. More specifically, being registered (having Indian status) generally means benefiting from certain tax exemptions, access to resources and access to available programs, including education and healthcare, as well as access to band membership in some cases (Mann 2010, 184). Michelle Mann (2010) also highlights the importance of non-material benefits of having status, which she sees as linked to personal, communal and cultural identity.

Historically, the Canadian government has sought to assimilate the Indigenous peoples of Canada into mainstream culture. It should be underscored that until

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3 A thorough discussion of the gendered dynamics of the economy when it comes to Indigenous women in Canada is outside of the scope of this paper. It is clear, however, that the *Indian Act*, as the legal body that regulates access to the economic benefits associated with having Indian status, is gendered.
the 1960s the legal term for assimilation was enfranchisement, which meant gaining the right to vote in exchange for giving up Indian status, as well as “treaty and statutory rights as native peoples, and [the] right to live in the reserve community” (McCardle 2006). Enfranchisement most often took place when an Indian status woman would marry a non-Indian status man, known as involuntary enfranchisement (Gehl 2013). Given that an Indian status man marrying a non-Indian status woman would not only be able to keep his status, but be able to pass on that status to his wife and children, this aspect of the Indian Act has long been criticized. The 1985 amendment to the act, Bill C-31, abolished enfranchisement and attempted to eliminate gender discrimination. While C-31 sought to amend the act’s most blatant forms of discrimination against women, the next section will explore how discrimination continues.

The Indian Act and amendments to eliminate gender discrimination

The Indian Act have been amended twice over the past thirty years, in large part due to the work of Indigenous women, in order to remove the Act’s most glaring forms of discrimination. Tracing the history of these changes, however, does offer insight into the Act’s underlying assumptions.

A number of legal cases, presented at both the provincial and federal levels, contested the legality of involuntary enfranchisement in the two decades preceding Bill C-31. While Canadian courts deemed that the Canadian Bill of Rights didn’t apply to the Indian Act, in order to maintain its legality, these cases served to underscore the inconsistencies of the state (Gehl 2013). Additionally, at the international level, Sandra Lovelace appealed to the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHCR) in 1981. Despite the Commission’s decline to rule on her case because her disenfranchisement took place before the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights took effect, the UNHCR “did rule that the Indian Act violated section 27 of the International Covenant, which protected culture, religion, and language” (Gehl 2013, 58). These legal struggles of Indigenous women both domestically and abroad greatly contributed to the passing of Bill C-31.

Constance Dupuis:
Indigenous Women and the gendered Indian Act in Canada
Bill C-31 reinstated Indian status to women who had been enfranchised for marrying a non-Indian status man (Mann 2007). The amendment also created two types of status, 6(1) referring to someone whose two parents are registered and 6(2) referring to someone who has only one registered parent. Having 6(2) status, as the weaker form of status means that you are not able to pass on status to your child if the other parent does not have status. While there is some technical complexity to the Bill, the creation of these two types of status is generally referred to as the second generation cut off rule, meaning a loss in the ability to pass on Indian status to one’s children after two consecutive generations of having children with non-Indian status people (ibid.). The table below demonstrates how the legislation discriminates against women who had been enfranchised prior to 1985 and their descendants. As Lynn Gehl (2013) states, this means that gender discrimination was not eliminated with C-31, but only delayed two generations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Woman reinstated after 1985, after enfranchisement for marrying a non-status man</th>
<th>Male counterpart who married a non-status woman (note that the wife gained status through marriage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman registered under 6(1)</td>
<td>Man registered under 6(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child (one 6(1) and one non-status parent) registered under 6(2)</td>
<td>Child (two 6(1) parents) registered under 6(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandchild (one 6(2) and one non-status parent) not entitled to register</td>
<td>Grandchild (one 6(1) and one non-status parent) registered under 6(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On these grounds, Sharon McIvor, a woman reinstated after 1985, challenged Bill C-31 in court and won an appeal in June 2009 (CBA 2010). This was addressed by the government in 2010 when it proposed Bill C-3, which allows children of reinstated women the right to change their registration from 6(2) to 6(1) once they have children in order to pass on 6(2) registration. This, however only applies once they have children.

While the government claims to have fully eliminated gender discrimination within the act itself, the Canadian Bar Association maintains that Bill C-3 eliminates...
gender discrimination only for certain descendants of formerly enfranchised women, depending on whether they were born before or after the passing of bill C-31 in 1985, meaning that siblings can be differently entitled (CBA 2010).

**Unrecognized and unstated paternity**

The second form of state gender discrimination is the regulation around unstated paternity. The government body in charge of implementing the *Indian Act* is Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC). As registrar, AANDC policy dictates what is sufficient proof of maternity and paternity. Prior to Bill C-31, AANDC’s general policy was to accept all qualifying applications for Indian status, and only if it was proven that the child had a non-Indian status parent would the child be removed from the registry (Mann 2007). This was the case also when paternity was not disclosed. In 1985, after Bill C-31 was passed, AANDC changed their policy so as to place the burden of proof on women. When a child is born to a married couple, it is assumed that the husband is the father. Where the father’s signature does not appear on the birth certificate of a child born out of wedlock, however, it is assumed that he does not hold Indian status (Mann 2007). In this circumstance it means the eligibility of the child is determined only on the mother’s status. This despite the fact that the *Indian Act* does not legally require AANDC to assume non-status paternity when it is unstated. Two problematic outcomes of this policy will be discussed here; namely the intergenerational issue and the revictimising effect.

First, an AANDC review of the impacts of the policy conducted in 2003 by Stewart Clatworthy concluded that a significant number of children eligible for registration are either being registered incorrectly or not at all, an outcome which has serious intergenerational consequences not only for women, but Indigenous communities as a whole. This is the case because the policy is greatly affected by the creation of two-tier status within Bill C-31. The consequences of the policy change are such that children whose Indian status father has not signed their birth certificate will be improperly registered as 6(2) if their mother has 6(1) status, or not registered at all if their mother has 6(2) status. Indeed, Clatworthy estimated 37,300 (20%) of children born to 6(1) mothers between 1985 and 1999 have unstated paternity,

4 Formerly Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (AANDC 2011).
and 13,000 children born to 6(2) mother in the same period (2003, 3-4). The Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC 2007) estimates that the vast majority of these children are entitled to either 6(1) instead of 6(2), or 6(1) instead of no registration at all. The effect is an ever shrinking number of descendants being registered.

Clatworthy (2003) found that roughly half the cases of unstated paternity were unintentional, being a result of poor communication of registration procedures to new mothers. Indeed, in part because the dizzyingly technical changes presented in Bill C-31, as well as the policy changes that accompanied it, children are being deprived access to status benefits and potentially their communities. While amending birth certificates is a possibility, the costs associated, such as paying a notary, are often a barrier.

The second negative outcome is the policy’s blindness to the multitude of reasons for which a woman would choose to withhold information regarding paternity. Clatworthy’s (2003, 18) study identified the most common motivations for mothers to choose not to state their child’s paternity as being related to an unstable relationship between parents, the father refusing to acknowledge the child, confidentiality within the community and concerns around custody of the child. Mann (2007, 130) also underscores how the policy can be revictimizing when the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest.

Single mothers concerned with protecting their children’s birthright face a difficult choice: either they submit to an invasion of their privacy and the ensuing social repercussions which may arise in the context of a patriarchal society or they forfeit their children’s right to status. […] Not only dehumanizing, but to put a woman into the position of having to ask her rapist for the confirmation of his deed is more than absurd (Huntley and Blaney 1999, 24, as cited in Mann 2007, 130-1).

The many legitimate reasons for which an unmarried woman would choose not to or be unable to disclose the name of her child’s father are not taken into account in the AANDC paternity policy.
Both the intergenerational effect and the process of revictimization are complicated by the fact that the policy affects single mothers more directly. As potentially more precarious situations in which to raise children, the policy affects most directly unmarried Indigenous women and their descendants who are most directly affected by this policy.

**Canada’s gendered colonial history**

While the *Indian Act* and the AANDC use benign language, assumptions permeate both the Act and the policies of the AANDC. These assumptions are rooted in the gendered, racialized, sexualized processes of colonial domination. These assumptions can most clearly be seen where dominant social norms clash with Indigenous perspectives. Broadly speaking, the two distinct but interconnected clashes that will be discussed here are Indigenous understandings of gender relations and Indigenous understandings of membership.

A great deal of work has been written on the matrilineal structure of many Indigenous peoples of North America (Mann 2007; Smith 2003). Connected to the above discussion of colonial imposition of rigid heteronormative understandings of gender, Joan Scott speaks of gender ideology as “fixed binary opposites” (1988, 43). Scott understands the existence of this binary conception of femininity and masculinity is dependent on the refusal of other possibilities. In a colonial context, the silencing, the erasing of other possibilities can starkly be seen. Andrea Smith states: “in order to colonize a people whose society was not hierarchical, colonizers must first naturalize hierarchy through instituting patriarchy. Patriarchal gender violence is the process by which colonizers inscribe hierarchy and domination on the bodies of the colonized” (2005, 23, as cited in Kuokkanen 2008, 221).

In earlier versions of the *Indian Act* patriarchal ideas of gender relations can clearly be seen, with a man being able to pass on status to his non-Indigenous wife and their children while a women was considered “white” (Gehl 2000) for marrying a non-Indigenous man. Such a policy speaks very clearly to an institutionalized form of gender binary. That descendants of enfranchised women

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As the choice of additional readings all spoke to gender in relation to economics, I chose to substitute it for this earlier course reading.
continue to be discriminated against speaks to the, perhaps more subtle, ways in which the government understands gender relations. Also telling in relation to government assumptions about Indigenous sexuality, is the requirement to prove Native paternity when registering a child if that child is born to an unmarried woman. Viewed perhaps as in need of controlling, the AANDC policy on proof of paternity subjects single women’s sexuality to scrutiny and stigmatization. The issue of unstated paternity is also intimately linked to concepts of Indigenous understandings of community membership, which are in direct conflict with the government’s racial calculus.

That the federal government has taken upon itself to determine who is Indian and who is not, by way of keeping track of how much Indian blood someone has, is very controversial and at the heart of debates around sovereignty. While many have worked tirelessly to ‘fight the system from within’ by way of legal challenges, those who outright reject this structure offer us insight into how dominant assumptions about race, sexuality, and gender within the Canadian state clash with the ways in which Indigenous people conceptualize them.

_The category of so-called “Non-Status” or “unregistered” Indians should disappear. It is thoroughly inappropriate for the federal government to possess the authority or to legislate in such a way as to divide a people into those it will regard legally as being members of the group and those it will not, on grounds that violate the cultural, linguistic, spiritual, political and racial identity of these people_ (Mann 2007, 139).

The government’s disrespect for matrilineal traditions, and particularly the crucial role that women play in passing on culture, is seen as fundamentally problematic (Mann 2007). Both the paternalistic nature of the government’s system of membership regulation, as well as the gendered ramifications of this regulation, are questioned. Historical accounts, both Indigenous oral accounts, as well as government and other settler accounts, of Indigenous community membership speak of fluid understandings of belonging, where adoptions of children from other nations for example was not uncommon (Gehl 2013). Drawing on work by Pamela Palmater, Gehl states: “it is the social cultural aspect that determines who
we are such as the deeply rooted connections to our nations that include family, larger community relations, and traditional territories, as well as the collective history, values, and beliefs that we share in common with one another” (2013, 62). Gehl also describes records of early Indian Act agents who had documented, with surprise, the lack of stigma directed at single women having children, noting instead how the such child is welcomed into the community. Such accounts contrast sharply with present day AANDC policies regarding proof of paternity. Focus group findings on this topic found that many Indigenous women find this regulation “offensive, degrading, discriminatory, and a potential violation of the rights of Aboriginal women to privacy” (Erickson 2001:27 as cited in Mann 2007, 128).

**Conclusions**

The above exploration of Canada’s Indian Act demonstrates that the state, as a gendered institution that embodies particular gendered ideologies, discriminates against Indigenous women. In this case, where the dominant gender norms have been imposed on Indigenous women and their communities through the brutal process of colonialism, the sexist and heteronormative assumptions can easily be contrasted with Indigenous understandings. That many of the legal battles mentioned above are ongoing is a testament to the conviction and perseverance of Indigenous women. That others are working to revitalize Indigenous governance structures, in which misogyny and domination of men over women has no place, is another avenue that some within Indigenous communities are choosing to pursue. Whether from within the state system or outside of it, many Indigenous women and their allies are resisting.
Bibliography


Constance Dupuis:
Indigenous Women and the gendered Indian Act in Canada


Development Encounters: An exercise in worldmaking
5. Narratives of Beauty and Religiosity: The Hijabers Community

By Mahardhika S. Sadjad

Introduction
The West has had a long and problematic history with the veil or the hijab that is part of the attire worn by many Muslim women. Literature on the subject suggests that this relationship was originally informed by colonialism and has developed into its current state, coloured by rhetoric of secularism and gender equality (Amirmoazami 2010, Hoodfar 1993, Scott 2007). Scott (2007: 2) writes, ‘… the veil was the ultimate symbol of Islam’s resistance to modernity’. In the West, the veil represents the otherness of the women wearing it, women who are perceived as both victims and threats.

Adding to this discussion, I would like to invite the feminist gaze away from the West and towards my own country Indonesia where the topic of the veil is more nuanced in its debates between Islamic theology, femininity, and modernity. I will focus on a particular network of Muslim women who has significantly influenced Indonesia’s pop culture, the Hijabers Community. I will argue that The Community provides a channel for Muslim women to explore and express their status as modern, young, independent, beautiful women within the boundaries of religious piousness. However, this positive narrative is ambivalent because it also reproduces heteronormative standards of beauty and encourages the commodification of religion.

Method of Analysis
Doing a critical analysis on a community whose cultural products are based on their religious beliefs is quite challenging. One simply cannot take up the position of objectivity and impartiality that is often promoted by mainstream western science through positivist and naturalist philosophies (Hammersley,
Atkinson 2007: 5), without risking the entire dismissal of the community’s worldview and belief systems. On the other hand, to completely indulge into the community’s theology and take up a relativist stand point would fail to see how the community’s cultural products connect with and influence larger structures in society.

In order to move beyond this dichotomy between universalism and relativism, I take up Haraway’s (1988: 581) doctrine of situated knowledge and try to come in with an agenda of understanding through feminist objectivity and positioned rationality. I will analyse the Hijabers Community using Scott’s (2007) gender lens. To do this I will look at Scott’s four elements of gender (Ibid: 42-44): (1) culturally available symbols that evoke representation, (2) normative concepts that limit metaphoric possibilities, (3) notions of politics and references to social institutions and organisations, and (4) subjective identity.

In applying Scott’s four elements of gender, I will start by looking at the veil as a cultural symbol within the Indonesian context. By situating my analysis in Indonesia, I highlight dominant normative concepts associated with the veil by different political and social institutions. I will then reflect internally on my own subjective identity and what the veil symbolises to me. By looking at these four elements of gender, I position the Hijabers Community as a social institution that contributes to and exists within larger structures of gender relations.

As an Indonesian Muslim woman who is both a critic and a consumer of the Hijabers Community, I am an embodiment of the ambivalences that Muslim women often feel when trying to find a place of comfort between her religious beliefs, her position in society, and her drive for self-expression. Therefore, while I attempt to understand the narratives of femininity and religiosity produced by Hijabers Community, I will also reflect internally on the positioning of my own gaze.

In order to construct my argument I will take a look at Hijabers Community’s social media profiles to see how they interact with other people through these online channels. I will analyse an article posted on the Hijabers Community’s blog, titled, ‘Enhancing Our Inner Beauty’ (Hijabers Community 12/31/2010). I chose this blogpost because it was the first post featured under ‘Islamic Studies’ and,
compared to their other blogposts, it is most relevant to the topic of beauty and femininity explored in my essay. I chose to look at their blog rather than their website because while the latter is more recently updated with information on The Community’s activities, it still lacks substantial content.

To ground my analysis I have deconstructed the article titled ‘Enhancing Our Inner Beauty’ using Scriven’s (1976: 39-45) seven steps to develop an analysis table (Gasper 2000: 8-11). The analysis table is useful to make explicit the Hijabers Community’s underlying assumptions and the meaning it inserts into narratives of beauty and gender relations. However, deconstructing this article proved quite difficult because it is more descriptive than argumentative in reporting the results of an Islamic study group that members attended.

Another challenge in deconstructing this article is that religious theology looks at scripture through a reflective approach, the holy texts function as a mirror ‘to reflect the true meaning as it already exists in the world’ (Hall 1997: 24). Followers perceive its interpretation of the text as mimetic, reflective of a fixed truth. To deconstruct the theological messages in the article would require scholarship that I do not have. Therefore, my focus will not be on the validity of religious text referenced in the article.

Instead, my focus is on how the Hijabers Community uses religious language to construct a very particular narrative of beauty. I will argue that through the narrative presented in their article, the Hijabers Community gives meaning to ‘beauty’ which informs and constructs their activities and online campaigns.

**The Veil in Indonesian Context**

While Indonesia is a Muslim majority country, the cultural symbolisms of the veil have been less than straightforward. In 1982, DaoedJoesoef, who was Minister of Education during that time, regulated the use of veils in public schools which caused several female students to be expelled (Madina 2008). This policy was one way that Soeharto’s New Regime responded to the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

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1 The deconstruction of the article is available online, here.
and religious organisations that inspired to overthrow the existing regime (Ibid). Since its independence in 1945, the Indonesian government has had to deal with different rebellions throughout the country, one of which was the Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesia Islamic State) or Darul Islam (Islam House) that wanted to establish an Indonesian state based on Islamic law. While the movement was abolished and its leaders executed by the 1960s, two decades later the fear of its regrowth was still very real. For Soeharto’s regime the veil was a symbol of support to such religious movements (Ibid.).

In 1986, a famous figure in Indonesia’s literary world, EmhaNadjib also known as Cak Nun, gave public readings to students at GadjahMada University for a poem titled LautanJilbab (Sea of Veils). His poem celebrated the veil as much more than just a piece of cloth, ‘Initidak main-main! Inilebihdarisekedarkebangitansepotongkain!’ The poem addresses moderate Indonesian Muslims, framing the veil as a style of dress that liberates them from unattainable designer goods advertised in Indonesia’s magazines by European-looking models (Scherer 2006: 203).

While LautanJilbab was critically acclaimed, Emha was criticised by Muhammadiyah, a dominant Islamic organisation, as being heretic. Despite these critiques, Emha paved way for religious philosophy to enter more openly into Indonesia’s cultural scenes. In 1991 he co-founded IkatanCendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals – ICMI), whose comfortable relationship with the Soeharto regime gave more space to religious attributes, including the veil (Madina 2008).

While regulations constraining religious attributions weakened during the 1990s, popular culture in Indonesia still had limited space for the veil. One controversial case was SandrinaMalakiano, a prominent news anchor on MetroTV (Ibid.). In 2005, after coming home from doing pilgrimage in Mecca (haji) Malakiano decided to use the veil full time. However MetroTV management was concerned that this might affect ratings since the veil was commonly presented only during

\[2\] Translated by writer: ‘This is not a joke, this is more than the rise of a mere cloth’.
Ramadhan and other holy days of the year. In May 2006, Malakiano chose to resign rather than take off her veil (Ibid.).

Afterwards, more women in the entertainment industry took up the option to wear a veil. Famous names in the industry include models NenoWarisman, Astri Ivo, Anne Rufaidah, and RatihSanggarwati, music composer TyaSubiakto, presenter Dewi Hughes, and Indonesian pop culture icon Zaskia Mecca, all of whom increased visibility of the veil as a popular trend (Ibid.). The entertainment industry developed creative spaces to suit Muslim women’s lifestyles and the fashion products to go along with it.

While mainstream interpretation in Islam commonly sees the veil as mandatory for Muslim women, the general practice in Indonesia frames it as a personal commitment that women make when and if they feel prepared. That said, the Indonesian military, police force, and some hospitals still deny employment to women who wear the veil. On the other extreme, local Shariah law implemented in the Aceh province makes the veil mandatory for all Muslim Acehnese women and enforces this law through morality police.

My Own Narrative on My Veil
Since a very young age, I have always been very critical towards advertisements promoting fashion and beauty products. Growing up, I always identified myself as being ‘the smart one’ and not ‘the pretty one’. This was perhaps influenced by the depiction of characters in my favourite childhood novels. Laura Ingalls in the Little House series and Jo in Little Women were the smart, bold, outspoken girls while their older sisters, Mary and Meg, were depicted in contrast as the good, beautiful, and gentle ones. Montgomery’s Anne Shirley was also the outspoken, stubborn, dreamy heroine of the book series while her best friend and kindred spirit, Diana, was the little town’s obedient beauty. Needless to say I identified with the main characters more, while my older sister or close friends represented beauty and femininity in my pre-teen life.

So when I heard about the Hijabers Community and became acquainted with some of its members, I naturally positioned myself the same way as I always had
before. The dichotomy between brain and beauty had become so entrenched in my head. When I was in the presence of what I considered ‘beauty’, I would automatically try to prove myself as the brain who couldn’t care less about physical appearance – ‘I’m not shallow!’ I would proudly think to myself.

When I made the decision to start wearing a veil at the age of 12 in 1998, the fashion industry for veils was not what it is now. There was only one common model. The extent of creativity I would put onto the white veils I used with my secondary school uniform was a trick my mother’s friend and seamstress taught me using old buttons and a pin. When I became part of an eight-girl clique during 7th grade I was the only one wearing a veil. My peers experimented with their hair and makeup while my younger self took comfort in the position of a spectator. I remember feeling a sense of superiority in my self-declared role as ‘not the pretty one’.

For my 27th birthday, a colleague of mine gave me a book titled ‘Hijab Style by Hijabers Community’ that was written, made, and published by the Hijabers Community (2012). The book consists of picture tutorials for 28 different hijab styles modelled by different members of The Community. On top of each page, the girl modelling the look tells a short story about her experience wearing a veil. I remember snorting a little at the gift (‘Ugh, so much effort!’), but ended up spending a whole night going through it and trying on different styles.

For me, this marked a time in my life when I finally acknowledged my right to feel beautiful. It was a part of my personal history when I let go of my second wave feminist critique of normative beauty practices and embraced what Lazar calls post-feminist identity that emphasizes freedom of choice (Lazar 2011: 39). I thought I was liberated in my refusal to care about beauty. Instead, I paradoxically trapped myself in another box that continued to categorize and judge women based on their appearance. After years of associating the veil with a way to downplay my physical appearance, the Hijabers Community’s book helped me reclaim the freedom to explore and express my own beauty; allowing me to feel more comfortable in my own skin.
Hijabers Community’s Narrative of Veiling and Beauty

The veil has represented different things during different moments in time. For the West, the veil represents women’s oppression by misogynous Muslim societies, while for women in Muslim societies it can also be an expression of modesty, piety, and functions as a ‘portable seclusion’ that allows women to participate in public activities while maintaining their ‘morality’ (Abu-Lughod 2002: 785). During the New Regime in Indonesia, the veil symbolised a form of political rebellion that needed to be suppressed. For EmhaNadjib it represented a freedom from advertised mainstream Western beauty. For me the veil provided protection from the external pressure of exploring and expressing my own body when I was growing up. It symbolised the wall that allowed me to be the brain I was comfortable of being in public and hide the beauty I felt I was not. The veil, like many religious attributes and languages could be represented to inspire both passivity that upholds status quo and collective consciousness necessary for reform (Williams 2002: 252-253).

The Hijabers Community was established in 27 November 2010 by 30 Muslim women with various professional backgrounds (Rahmanti 2013: 5). On youtube.com, the Hijabers Community introduces themselves as a community for young women that wear hijab (veil) to discuss tips and experiences related to it (Prasetyo 03/12/2011). In the video, one member, Jenahara, expresses that The Community exists in response to opinions that think the veil is ‘gitu-gitusaja’ (Ibid.). Hijabers Community’s narrative frames themselves as a force of creativity, modernity, and fashion within the boundaries of religious norms.

The Hijabers Community claims that its community is not driven by any political agenda; members emphasise an apolitical stance. However, their influence in the fashion industry is quite significant. One of the most prominent founding members of The Community is fashion designer and blogger, Dian Pelangi, whose blog, Twitter account, and Instagram account reach over 2.5 million followers. Through social media Dian Pelangi promotes her brand, shares tips about the veil, fashion, and travelling. On her blog she tells readers to ‘Be Different!’ (Pelangi 12/23/2014).

3 Translated by writer: (an expression) repetitive, boring.
In 2013, the Hijabers Community established branches in three cities, Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Aceh and have members in at least 46 Indonesian cities and five overseas branches in Kuala Lumpur, Sarawak, Kelanten, Malaysia, and Egypt (Beta 2014: 380). On top of sharing fashion tips, The Community also organises fundraising events, bazaars, and religious study groups for members.

While The Community has successfully reached a relatively wide audience, it represents predominantly young middle-upper class, modern, educated, urban Muslim Women. As Beta (2014: 382) elaborates in her comments regarding Dian Pelangi’s blog: ‘Her photos suggest both luxury and ‘modesty’ to her readers, mostly 18–24 year-olds’. The Community’s preference to use English on their blog and website suggests that it targets an international and Indonesian audience that is educated in English as a first or second language.

One activity that The Community has written about on its blog was an Islamic study group titled ‘Enhancing Our Inner Beauty’ (Hijabers Community 12/31/2010). The article dichotomises outer beauty, defined as physical appearance, and inner beauty, defined as virtue and character. Both inner and outer beauty is framed through hierarchies where inner beauty is seen as more important than outer beauty in order to ultimately achieve ‘real beauty’. The article writes:

‘With a great inner beauty, we will automatically understand and aware that outer beauty is also important. But at this stage, we have understood that the outer beauty is only the supporting tool for characterizing our inner beauty but that is not the main thing in our life. We have to always remember that Allah SWT, the One who creates us, does not see us from the look or the body of a person but from the quality of their heart.’

This paragraph repeats a message that we often hear from campaigns critical about body images promoted in most beauty advertisements. It echoes the idea that we should not be fixated by physical appearance since it ‘is not the main thing in our life’. However, rather than placing the right to choose in the hands of the individual or the right to judge in the hands of society, the article places the definition of beauty in the hands of Allah SWT (Arabic for God).
If we accept this interpretation of beauty as mimetic, then the normative concept can be both empowering and limiting. It provides space for women to challenge misogynous standards of beauty on the grounds that women shouldn’t look for society’s approval but for God’s approval based on what is ‘exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad SAW in his Hadith and Allah SWT in the Qur’an’ (Hijabers Community 12/31/2010). However, at the same time it limits the concept of beauty to the constraints of what one defines as acceptable within her interpretation of Islamic theology.

Take for example the interaction between a member of the Hijabers Community and a representation of male online viewers on the Hijabers Community youtube.com video (Prasetyo 03/12/2011):

_tuzzman72 [translated]: ‘i want to undress them if this is how they wear hijab… turns me on… if you want to be pretty just use a tank top + mini skirt… if you want to follow Shariah then wear hijab correctly… don’t be “clothed but naked”… inadequate!’_

_AimalaNadini [not translated]: ‘those who badmouthed the girls in this video (esp. you muslim men), before you say anything try to put yourselves in the shoes of girls. you have no idea how it feels to cover your whole body every time in every occasion, you have no idea how stuffy it is to have your head covered, maybe you even forget the fact that we are girls too (and we are still human) we want to wear cute colorful stuffs just like others. you have no idea at all cause you never try to wear one. thus you have no right to judge bad or good at all. you’re not even God to begin with. what these girls are trying to do is expressing themselves through styles and at the same time proudly declaring their Islam-ness. what’s so bad about that? you dare calling yourselves muslim but you don’t even appreciate your own sisters? these closed-minded and judgemental attitude are probably the reasons people look down on our religion. Islam promotes peace. you guys pissed me off.’_

_Tuzzman72 was not the only person that expressed a negative attitude to the Hijabers Community, therefore AimalaNadini’s comment was not necessarily...
a response to tuzzman72 in particular. That said, statements represented by tuzzman72 and AimalaNadini are characteristic to the gendered nature of online interactions. Research on the internet has found that ‘marking oneself as feminine’ online often increases women’s vulnerability to harassment and sexist practices (Mann, Stewart 2000: 165). That said, AimalaNadini’s response shows that there is agency in saying, ‘you’re not even God…’ The response allows space for women to challenge misogyny by referring to a higher power. This view is consistent to Hijabers Community’s narrative that frames beauty as one’s responsibility to God and not society.

Yet, AimalaNadini’s comment is also very telling of how the Hijabers Community reproduces existing binaries between genders. Her comment was addressing ‘you muslim men’, demanding them to put themselves in ‘the shoes of girls’ who ‘want to wear cute colorful stuffs’ while still ‘proudly declaring their Islam-ness’. The same gendered language is also visible in The Community’s article about inner beauty. The Community chose to use the word ‘beauty’ in a discussion about character and virtue in Islam (Adab and Akhlak), utilizing language that is commonly used in relation to a female audience.

The Hijabers Community’s narrative on beauty shows that while it creates room for women to reclaim their own style as Muslim women, it does so within the limit of their own religion. While this can be perceived as a constraint towards their expressions, it can also be seen as an alternative narrative from Western feminism where many Muslim women don’t feel they are represented (Hoodfar 1993: 13). As Beta (2014: 387) writes:

‘The Hijabers are critical of conventional perceptions of religious values and norms, and yet they decide that a part of them wants to celebrate their religiousness as well as their ability to play with the tools they have at their disposal to express their modesty and youthfulness… Such sets of meanings can be seen as a form of empowerment, which cannot be overlooked’

However, one must also be critical at the heteronormative standards that the Hijabers Community perpetuates. While Hijabers Community positions inner...
beauty as more important than outer beauty, their focus on Muslim women fashion and style promotes a lifestyle of consumption.

One cultural product associated with the fashionable accessories consistent to the styles promoted by Hijabers Community is the popular ‘99 Cahaya di AtasLangitEropa’, a religious drama film based on a novel of the same title by HanumSalsabielaRais and RanggaAlmahendra. Indonesian film critic, HikmatDharmawan (03/26/2014), writes in his movie review for 99 Cahaya Di AtasLangitEropa [translated]: ‘This means, the hijabers construction of “beautiful” is attached to consumerism, closely associated to a lifestyle that consumes beauty products and fashion. The radical meaning of “hijab” has been replaced by its industrial meaning.’ By celebrating fashion and trends of veiling, a sacral symbol in Islam, the Hijabers Community has been criticised for commodifying religion.

**Conclusion**

By looking at the veil as a cultural symbol with multiple normative associations, we are able to see how the individual subject and social institutions interact and give meaning to gender. We are able to see that power relations through gender construction is neither unified not centralized. Instead, within these processes and structures there is room for human agency to ‘… construct an identity, a life, a set of relationships, a society within certain limits and with language – a conceptual language that at once sets boundaries and contains the possibility for negotiation, resistance, reinterpretation, the play of metaphoric invention and imagination’ (Scott 2007: 42). The narratives of veiling and beauty reproduced by the Hijabers Community through their social media establish both these boundaries and spaces for resistance and reinterpretation.

Through this essay, I have explored the narratives produced by the Hijabers Community. These narratives are quite paradoxical because on one hand it has reclaimed Muslim women’s right to design and explore their own preferences of style and fashion within the boundaries of Islamic modesty and piety. On the other hand, it also reproduces conventional gender constructs and heteronormative standards of beauty.
The space that the Hijabers Community has created for themselves is quite narrow. They are balancing between conservative critics that limit their rights as women to explore and express beauty, leftist critics that perceive their celebration of fashion as a commodification of religion, and their internal struggles of creating a recipe of femininity that is consistent to their own religious beliefs. While I acknowledge the validity of some of these critics, it is also my opinion that the Hijabers Community adds to the plurality of Muslim women’s experiences and therefore contributes to nuancing discussions about women and Islam.
Reference List


Development Encounters: An exercise in worldmaking | 79


**Annex List:**

Annex 1: Analysis table on the article ‘Enhancing Our Inner Beauty’ (*Hijabers Community* 12/31/2010).

Annex list can be found online:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2dpUaPuY9XeLWNKenRLeVZZcnM/view?usp=sharing
Development Encounters: An exercise in worldmaking
6. The Philippine’s Bangsamoro Development Plan: Socio-Economic Insecurities in Post Conflict Mindanao?

Author: Anna Dinglasan

Introduction
In the recent years, a number of debates about humanitarianism have surfaced, exploring its links with development, securitization and peacebuilding. This essay explores how humanitarian aid can either address or exacerbate crises situations in conflict-affected areas, particularly looking at the case of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding in Mindanao, Philippines. It reflects on Mary Anderson’s (2004) thoughts about the impact of international assistance on the dynamics of conflicts, and the important issues she raised about the neutrality of humanitarian aid, and how it plays into, and reinforces relationships between and among various actors in a conflict.

The essay is divided into four parts. It first provides a socio-historical background of the conflict in Mindanao, followed by a short discussion on conflict analysis frameworks used by international humanitarian and development organizations. It flows into a discussion about the links between security and development through an examination of the Bangsamoro Development Plan – the process by which it was created and the framework that informs its substance. The essay ends with a critical reflection about humanitarian aid, and its implications for post-conflict Mindanao

Historical Flashback: The Mindanao conflict and peace process
The conflict in Mindanao has had a long history that can be traced back to 1898 when Spain sold the Philippines to the Americans near the end of the revolution.
While not occupied by Spain, Mindanao which belonged to the Sultanate of Sulu, had been illegally annexed as part of the Philippine territory turned over to the Americans through the Treaty of Paris. The beginning of Moro resistance in Southern Philippines was a reaction to America’s purposeful effort to populate Mindanao with Christian settlers, displacing thousands of Muslims by corporations and Christian settlers, “who, through government sponsorship and land acts obtained titles for land that Moros had occupied for generations” (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2007: 22).

Violence escalated in the aftermath of the massacre of a number of young Moro cadets who complaint against being unjustly and unfairly treated compared to non-Moro soldiers. The incident, known as the Jabidah massacre, sparked strong secessionist sentiments in Mindanao especially among young and college educated Muslims. Resistance was fought by the separatist Muslim group, the Moro National Liberation Front and its Bangsa Moro Army, composed of Muslim youth and professionals, who called for the right to self-determination and the creation of an independent Bangsamoro homeland (Women and Gender Institute 2012).

While a series of talks between the MNLF and the Philippine government later resulted in the 1996 Peace Agreement, disagreement and ideological differences within the MNLF sparked the creation of a breakaway group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Discontent with the substance and implementation of the 1996 Agreement resulted in continued violence until the term of President Gloria Arroyo who sought the help of the Malaysian government to convince MILF to begin a new round of talks (Ebrahim, M., et. al. 2013). By 2008, the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was drafted, containing general principles concerning Bangsamoro identity and rights, including the right to self-determination and governance, as well as the right to the protection and utilization of resources within their specified territories. However, the MOA-AD was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court resulting in renewed fighting that eventually led to a new round of talks (Women and Gender Institute 2012) culminating in the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012.

1 Unpublished research by the Women and Gender Institute (WAGI)
The FAB maps out the direction of the peace process, including the creation of a new political entity with a ministerial form of government to be called the Bangsamoro. Following the signing of the framework, a Transition Commission, composed of multi-sectoral representatives from both parties was created. The Commission was tasked to draft annexes on Wealth Sharing, Power Sharing, Normalization and Transition Arrangements which were signed by both parties. The framework and its annexes make up the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro which was signed by the MILF Chair, Murad Ibrahim and President Benigno Aquino III in the presence of Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib Razak last March 2014.

**Analyzing the Conflict: Towards relevant, inclusive and effective responses**

Eleanor O’Gorman (2011:44) notes the importance of conflict analysis in development planning in conflict affected areas if responses are to produce long lasting peace. Mapping out a conflict can give development planners a better understanding of the situation in affected communities. Analysis must be done such that it is “sequenced as a film that moves: conflict analysis should edit and capture the back story, the key events, the actors, and their complex interactions over time” (Ibid). A good understanding of triggers and actors can produce policies that may mitigate and prevent conflict, as well as promote “lasting transformation of the causes of conflict” towards the promotion of lasting peace (O’Gorman 2011:45).

Several approaches may be used in understanding conflicts. O’Gorman (2011) and Jacoby (2008) refer to Chris Mitchell’s model of conflict analysis triangle. This analysis involves assessing the conflict situation, where two or more social actors “perceive that they have incompatible goals” (Jacoby 2008:19). O’Gorman notes that assessment of the conflict situation is necessary to surface the issues that are at stake and the extent to which these can be resolved (O’Gorman 2011:46). Assessment of the situation must be done alongside an examination of behaviors aimed at “an opposing party with the intention of making that party abandon or modify its goals” and attitudes that create positive or negative “images of self and other,” and perpetuate conflict (Ibid.).
Various actors have developed different tools to map out the context where interventions are to take place, as well as to inform development actors about “appropriate entry points for action to promote peace and / or to reduce the likelihood and incidence of violence.” This means that addressing conflicts must go beyond traditional peacekeeping and conflict resolution, towards including a range of other issues including inequality, poverty, weak governance, local insecurity, that exacerbate fragile situations and could fuel conflict and violence (O’Gorman 2011:50).

An example of such tools is the two-step process espoused by the Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The CAF first requires a thorough analysis of conflict dynamics to provide diagnosis. This involves looking at the political, economic, social, and security factors that work within a given context, focusing on grievances and resilience, as well as analyzing how these are mobilized to drive or mitigate conflicts. The analysis of conflict dynamics is followed by pointing to trajectories or future scenarios. These include looking at trends or patterns that can influence developments (positive or negative) in the situation; and triggers or immediate actions that provoke or suppress conflict (USAID 2012). The second step is to develop recommendations based on this analysis. This entails prioritizing key issues, identifying entry points, and examining existing programs and how they are affected by the conflict dynamics.

USAID’s CAF does not deviate much from the other tools developed and used by other development programs that require looking at structures, actors and trigger factors. For instance, the World Bank CAF requires an examination of the socio-historical context of the conflict, the trends and conflict dynamics; actors and interest groups involved; and how the conflict relates to development issues, particularly how it perpetuates poverty situations (World Bank 2002). O’Gorman (2011:52-53), while acknowledging the different approaches various development actors take in conflict analysis, notes 6 points of convergence. All six are observed in the tool developed by USAID. These are (1) causes and drivers; (2) actors (3) conflict dynamics; (4) causes of conflict and triggers for outbreaks; (5) dividers and connectors; (6) future scenarios or trajectories. Most are also informed by
the “do no harm” principle, identifying dividers and connectors, which “prevent conflictdeepening, or even, more positively, build resources for peace” (O’Gorman 2011:53).

The Bangsamoro Development Plan and the Security-Development Nexus

The Bangsamoro Development Plan (BDP) is the product of an intensive analysis of the conflict dynamics in Mindanao and how such dynamics may shape prospects for peace or fuel further violence in the region. It is a blue print for the socio-economic development of post conflict Mindanao. It builds on the “gains of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front” (BDP 2014:1). It was developed by the Bangsamoro Development Authority, the development arm of the MILF, in consultation with various communities within the Bangsamoro region. The BDP is the result of the collaboration of government agencies, civil society organizations and various development partners (Ibid.). The BDP has seven thematic areas for which programs and recommendations are designed: (1) Economy and Livelihood; (2) Infrastructure; (3) Social Services; (4) Environment and Natural Resources; (5) Culture and Identity; (6) Governance and Justice; (7) Security and Normalization.

Indeed the collaborative process by which it was crafted and the involvement of various sectors within the Bangsamoro have produced a plan that is inclusive, locally and culturally contextualized and owned by the people of the Bangsamoro. It covers a range of programs and strategies that encompasses traditional notions of security, and takes into account indigenous mechanisms, knowledge and structures that could build confidence and foster cooperation in the region.

The BDP clearly reflects the apparent shift in notions of security in policy and programming particularly on conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Focus from military and state-centered security towards a broader definition to include “safety from such chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression…and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” (UNDP 1994:35) reflects a change from emphasis on territorial security to people’s security, that must be attained through sustainable human development (UNDP 1994:23.).
O’Gorman (2011) notes that these shifts have, in turn, resulted in changes in the understanding of certain concepts. For instance, she highlights how conflict prevention has been re-envisioned to move away from “operational prevention as measures applicable in the face of immediate crisis” towards “structural prevention as measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place or…do not recur” (Ibid, p. 72) This change entailed the necessity of supporting the creation of effective governance institutions and “addressing inequality through economic development, support for civil society initiatives and the promotion of education and awareness raising.” In other words, development is necessary if root causes of conflict are to be addressed.

Evidently, CAF guidelines used by development organizations reflect such shifts in understanding conflict, and conflict prevention and resolution. Indeed, they reflect a perspective that establishes an intricate connection between development and armed conflict. We see that the USAID framework indicates that while conflict is inherent to the process of development, armed conflict is “development in reverse…destroys lives, wastes capital, and directs scarce resources away from productive uses” (USAID2012:1). Negative outcomes are clearly not limited to direct targets of the attack for when there is war, there is also low economic performance, increasing incidence of poverty, in turn increasing risks of violent conflicts. Similarly, the World Bank emphasizes that conflicts create major challenges for the development of a state as they “constrain development efforts, divert scarce financial and physical resources and weaken a country’s social fabric and human capital” (World Bank 2002:1). Moreover, the World Bank recognizes that the human, social and economic costs of conflicts may last for generations, and hold back economic development (World Bank 2011).

These perspectives are apparent when one takes a closer look at the BDP’s main objective – “to address injustice and tackle the sources of discontent that drive conflict, as a pre-condition for achieving sustainable and inclusive growth and the subsequent years” (p. 2). There recommendations in the BDP are therefore designed to “respond to the needs and aspirations for the Bangsamoro communities, and address the sources of dissatisfaction” (Ibid.)
At the surface, the BDP seems promising. The BDP was crafted with the goal of emancipating the region from “the vicious cycle of underdevelopment wrought by decades of injustice, conflict and poverty” (BDP Executive Summary 2014:3), and yet the framework that it provides has seemingly glossed over the “structure and dynamics of war economies that are part of protracted conflict” (O’Gorman 2011:36). The BDP therefore has failed to situate Mindanao within a larger political-economy context, and its confidence on the help of its development partners have created “market distortions and incentives for corruption and gain… that may fuel and drive violent conflict” (Ibid.). Indeed conflict resolution and peace-building, in Mindanao and elsewhere, is a highly political process, with numerous factors influencing and shaping the course of events and various actors involved directly or indirectly, all having different agendas and resources for conflict and peace (O’Gorman 2011:49).

**Tools of the trade: Mapping out the conflict to fit priorities of the international security agenda?**

Mindanao has endured a long history of violence and it is now on the cusp of what potentially may be the peace that many of its peoples have aspired for. While I join in their hope, I am also a little skeptical about the prospects for peace. The BDP is carefully crafted, yet I wonder if it is truly the answer to socio-economic progress in the region. It is inspired by the (global/international?) vision of addressing poverty and inequality as a means to achieve peace but I am uncertain that the actual strategies and programs by which poverty and inequality are to be addressed are the right ones.

Although the BDP was developed in close collaboration between the Bangsamoro Development Authority and various government offices and civil society groups, international organizations have also participated in its formulation process through various and numerous consultations. Moreover, methodology used in its formulation is “based on insights from the joint UN-World Bank guidelines on post conflict needs assessments,” and with the World Bank providing technical and logistical support throughout the process (Bangsamoro Development Authority, n.d.). Needless to say, the BDP is a product of a process that is highly political and shaped by power structures that define the kind of relationships
within this particular context. The blueprint (and the resources provided for its implementation) set out for the reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of conflict affected areas clearly reflects Anderson’s (2004) argument about the neutrality of aid and how it can reinforce or exacerbate relationships between and among different actors in conflict situations.

This brings to light the power structures within such a process and how they shape outcomes. Anderson (1999:67-68), reflecting about the role of humanitarian and development organizations in promoting lasting peace, explained how aid can be a powerful factor in creating peace or supporting war. She said that while “aid can save lives, reduce human suffering and support the pursuit of greater economic and social security in conflict settings,” it can also increase tensions and weaken what little support there is for peace. Thus it is necessary to understand that “…when international assistance is given in the context of a violent conflict, it becomes part of that context and thus also part of the conflict” (Anderson 1999:145).

Certainly, all actors involved in the crafting of the BDP are well versed in conflict sensitivity and have, in their intentions, only the desire to support local communities to address underlying causes of conflict. Yet one must ask how aid and assistance, on the one hand aimed at addressing poverty and inequality (the main drivers of conflict), require as preconditions, on the other hand, adherence to neoliberal economic policies. How is the desire to support local communities possible without serious reflection about the larger global economic and political context in which conflicts are deeply embedded? When the BDP is finally to be implemented, to whom must accountability be directed? How long is the do no harm trajectory? Does doing no harm only mean within the immediate timeframe, or do we also consider the long term effects of interventions? Certainly, the impact of economic restructuring in post conflict situations will only be felt long after immediate hostilities have ended.
References:


7. The destruction of cultural heritage in conflict as a social justice problem

Author: Kate Orlovsky

Introduction
Conflicts destroy human lives and livelihoods, as well as the lived-in and built environment. In the aftermath, priority is justifiably given to survivors and rebuilding the structures needed for daily life. However, international and legal responses to conflict have paid increasing notice to destruction of cultural heritage. This essay will examine the destruction of cultural heritage in conflict as a social justice problem. The first section of the essay will situate cultural heritage in the human rights discourse. It will map the actors involved in the protection of cultural heritage, and will then focus on the roles of international courts in responding to destruction of cultural heritage.

Situating cultural heritage
UNESCO defines cultural heritage as ‘the legacy of physical artifacts and intangible attributes of a group or society that are inherited from past generations, maintained in the present and bestowed for the benefit of future generations’ (UNESCO 2014) Tangible cultural heritage ‘includes buildings and historic places, monuments, artifacts, etc., which are considered worthy of preservation for the future’ as well as ‘objects significant to the archaeology, architecture, science or technology of a specific culture’ (Ibid.)

The value and significance of cultural heritage however relates to its role in forming and reinforcing identity and power. Merry notes that,

*Cultures consist of repertoires of ideas and practices that are not homogenous but continually changing because of contradictions among them or because new ideas and institutions are adopted by members … Cultural discourses*
legitimate or challenge authority and justify relations of power (Merry in Steiner 2008:526).

Silverman goes further to identify how ‘Attention to contested cultural heritage is, fundamentally, awareness of the construction of identity and its strategic situationality and oppositional deployment – the knowledge that “self and society are not…given, as fully formed, fixed, and timeless, as either integrated selves or functionally consistent structures. Rather, self and society are always in production, in process” (Silverman 2011:1 citing Bruner 1983a:2-3). By situating cultural heritage as an intimate and formative component of self and society, we can better understand its connection to social justice, and therefore its destruction as an attempt to control and destroy not only the monument, but also the identities, rituals, practices, and social cohesion associated with that monument.

As such, cultural heritage can be included in the human rights discourse. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes limited reference to the ‘right to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits’ (Article 27), a broader definition positions human rights as both connected to ‘claims based on particular values or principles and … also legal rights that entail entitlements and freedoms’ (Batekas and Oette 2013:10). Silverman and Ruggles argue that ‘heritage ought to rank … as an essential component of human rights because the very concept of heritage demands that individual and group identities be respected and protected’ (2007:13). As discussed below, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has gone further to articulate the dynamics of group identity and persecution in respect of crimes against cultural heritage in the former Yugoslavia. In doing so, the Court supports a new, ‘holistic’ definition of cultural heritage, which ‘extends its attention to the spiritual significance of cultural properties, as an essential element of the identity of the human communities which reflect themselves on such heritage’ (Lenzerini 2013:56).

Mapping the actors protecting cultural heritage

A number of actors are responsible for designating, protecting, and preventing the destruction of cultural heritage. International bodies, specifically UNESCO,
have a role in designating sites or monuments under international protection. However, under most UNESCO instruments, the actual protective functions fall to the signatory governments. At the local level, the state itself, the state’s various ministries, or if applicable religious groups, may have primary roles for protection and maintenance. When heritage is under threat, the daily maintenance and protection of monuments may also fall to individuals in the local community. For example, in July 2014 it was reported that threats to a 12th Century minaret in Mosul, Iraq, by the Islamic State prompted the women of the neighborhood to sleep at the foot of the monument, stating that ‘if you want to blow it up, we are going with it’, and resulting in the militants leaving the minaret standing (Bowley 2014).

Although cultural heritage has been the subject of numerous international treaties including the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, this convention, and the subsequent 1972 World Heritage Convention, have had little practical impact (Silverman and Ruggles 2007:8). There has been an increasing role after the fact for international criminal institutions, such as the ICTY and International Criminal Court (ICC), both of which have explicit jurisdiction over destruction of cultural heritage in their statutes. Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute includes jurisdiction over ‘seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science’ as a violation of the laws or customs of war. Likewise, the ICC Statute includes the war crimes of ‘extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’ (Rome Statute Article 8(2)(a) (iv)) and ‘intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion … historical monuments … provided they are not military objectives’ (Rome Statute Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv)).

The symbolic value of cultural heritage
The increased attention to the significance of cultural heritage has manifested in both productive and destructive ways. In the context of conflict, cultural heritage appears to increasingly be a focal point for destruction. In March 2001, while under intense international pressure and scrutiny, the Taliban destroyed the monumental Buddhas in Bamiyan, Afghanistan, in ‘an act of cultural iconoclasm,
political assertion, and religious fervor’, specifically ‘designed to focus Afghan history on Islam and marginalize its Buddhist past’ (Silverman and Ruggles 2007:13) It was also ‘a contestation of the right of the international community – including UNESCO – to intervene in foreign soil and to assert humankind’s ownership of the world’s cultural heritage, defined universally, but, of course, from a Western perspective’ (Silverman 2011:15). In 2003, following the destruction of the Buddhas, UNESCO produced a declaration referencing that act as one that ‘affected the international community as a whole’, while also acknowledging at the local level, ‘cultural heritage is an important component of the cultural identity of communities, groups and individuals, and or social cohesion, so that its intentional destruction may have adverse consequences on human dignity and human rights’ (UNESCO 2003).

The broadcasting of an international stake in protecting cultural heritage however appears to occasion backlash. Significantly, commentators have identified the 28 June 2012 decision to place the World Heritage Sites of Timbuktu, as well as the Tomb of Askia in Northern Mali, on the List of World Heritage in Danger, as the ‘spark triggering the iconoclastic fury of the leaders of Ansar Dine, who on 29 June, started to deliberately destroy the cultural heritage of Timbuktu’, which they considered to be idolatrous. (Lenzerini 2013:60). Increased international attention increases the political value of any interaction with or appropriation of a site, even if the interaction is destructive. As such there is an explicit tension between the universal and the local, in terms of competing claims of ‘ownership’ and control, played out strategically through, and at the expense of, these monuments.

**Prevention and deterrence**

The ICTY has to date created the most significant body of jurisprudence addressing the strategic destruction of cultural heritage in conflict. The Balkan wars were significant in that ‘systematic plans of destruction of religious and cultural heritage of special spiritual significance were carried out’, which were not byproducts of military campaigns but instead were ‘painstakingly and selectively planned in order to hit the sense of identity and self-worth of the communities which had a special spiritual and cultural connection with the heritage concerned’ (Lenzerini 2013:44;46).
The Court addressed these acts in a number of cases, and in doing so articulated how, from a legal perspective, these acts qualified as international crimes. Specifically, it found that destruction of symbolic buildings may qualify as persecution, for example as acts ‘clearly aimed at mortifying the local people’s sense of belonging to the Muslim community’ (Lenzerini 2013:49). The Court confirmed this jurisprudence, essentially finding that acts of destruction of cultural heritage have an additional degree of gravity based on the ‘symbolic and spiritual significance’ of the property ‘because it amounts to a mutilation of the very cultural and spiritual identity of the group that finds expression in that property’ (Lenzerini 2013:52). The Court considered the shelling of the old town of Dubrovnik, on the UNESCO World Heritage List, in more than one case, articulating the attack as one both against the ‘history and heritage of the region, but also against the cultural heritage of humankind’, noting that Dubrovnik’s status as a protected site made the crime of greater seriousness (Ibid.). Lenzerini points out that this finding recognizes ‘the collective character of the crime’s victim; that is a people’ (Ibid.).

In 2013 the ICC opened a preliminary investigation into the Situation in Mali, which includes investigations into the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against protected objects, relating to a series of attacks that took place between 4 May and 1 July 2012, against mausoleums, mosques and historical monuments in the city of Timbuktu. (ICC 2013:24) Fundamental to the rationale of creating a permanent international criminal court is the idea of deterrence, namely that having a standing international body publicly and efficiently prosecuting individuals for serious crimes, a combination of increased awareness of the crimes and desire to avoid prosecution may deter some would-be perpetrators from committing these crimes.

The idea of seeking justice for destruction of cultural heritage raises important questions about the proxy role of international institutions claiming damage to the heritage of specific local groups, as well as the ability of the interests harmed by such destruction to be truly represented. Fraser writes that ‘an adequate theory of justice for our time must be three-dimensional’, encompassing redistribution, recognition, and representation (Fraser 2005:11). While it is important that
courts are including these acts among the crimes within their jurisdiction, and articulating the damage done, the international judicial response is framed as individual criminal responsibility for the acts, which is highly limited in its ability to address these three dimensions of justice, in particular the redistributive and representative. It remains important to acknowledge that to some extent this framing of responsibility for the acts may mask larger global dynamics that may create preconditions for these crimes.

References


Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).
8. Shedding some light on the electricity conflict in Guatemala

Author: Paula Sánchez de la Blanca

Introduction
Electricity thieves, for some, and legitimate resistors, for others, the reality is that hundreds of thousands of consumers have stopped paying their electricity bills to Energuate, distributor of the service since 2011. Supported by one of the largest national peasant organizations, the consumers denounce arbitrary overcharging in the service since the privatisation and they call for the (re)nationalisation of the service. The state mainly embodied in the Comisión Nacional de la EnergíaEléctrica(CNEE) has proved to be unable to find a solution to a conflict that has reached national attention as one of the major focus of social unrest nowadays. Yet, without reliable figures on the phenomena there is almost no official report about it, beyond numerous instrumentalizations by the polarised political discourses.

This essay aims to analyze the electricity conflict in Guatemala via the application of governance concepts and, specifically, dwelling on its contradictions. This case touches upon the three main actors that are part of the typical governance triangle: state, market and civil society. It can also be a clear case of the “hollowing out” of the government by, first, its deliberate decision of privatisation, and, second, the empowering of the two other actors in scene. Within the plural governance frameworks, shiftology – represented by Levi-Faur and Lynn among others – has been chosen since the privatisation of the energy services was, indeed, a shift in public responsibilities. Beyond looking at it as a mere shift in energy policy, I ask: how have the boundaries between state and non-state actors’ responsibilities and authority been modified?
To answer this question, I will apply three main conceptualizations of the shift present in the *shiftology* approach: the trajectories of the shift, the nature of the shift (as a structure, mechanism, process or strategy) and the shift in the agents’ interplay. As a result, more than evaluating the extent of an actual shift; this essay will emphasize the contradictions implied by this *shiftology* framework. Hence, this case study can be an illustrative exercise to problematize the theory of governance as a shift. Simultaneously, the application of contradictory governance concepts enhances an interesting analysis of the case.

**Privatization and conflict**

In 1996 in the context of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), liberalization of the electric energy was enacted in the General Act of Electricity. The main promises underlying this decision were to reduce cost and price of energy, improve the service and extend the infrastructures. As a result of this policy shift the Guatemalan state transferred the responsibilities of the service provision in almost all the stages of the chain to big international corporations.

Looking at distribution, mainly two big corporations hold the provision of the service. One of them, Energuate, in charge of the distribution of the electricity in nineteen departments, is facing a growing resistance from a movement of consumers that have decided to stop paying their bills and connect directly to the general electricity network as a way to fight for the (re)nationalization of the service. Represented in peasant organisations, such as Comité de Desarrollo Campesino (CODECA), this movement denounces the breach of all the liberalisation promises. Moreover, they accuse Energuate of systematic abuses such as arbitrary overcharging, and hindering any solution by institutional means, backed by an accomplice state. In contrast, Energuate and the government tackle the illegality of these practices and highlight the existence of informal electricity providers taking advantage of the conflict. Meanwhile, the practice spreads across the country from the west where more than 57% of users have already stopped paying (Pérez 2014). With more than 95 people imprisoned (CODECA 2014), the conflict faces an impasse and reaches the status of one of the main socio-political conflicts in the current Guatemala.
Analysis of the cases via the shiftology approach

Among the very heterogeneous approaches, the understanding of governance as a ‘signifier of change’ (Levi-Faur 2012) has a great holistic potential to make sense of other—frequently disconnected—approaches. With the policy shift as a starting point, the presence of this shift idea in the agents’ discourses (understandings of conflict and solutions) makes of this framework a suitable one for this case study.

Within shiftology, the main issue is how to conceptualise the shift. And that is precisely the focus of this analysis: the conceptualisation of change according to its trajectory; its nature (as a structure, mechanism, process or strategy) and its embodiment in the actors’ interplay. I will apply these three dimensions of the conceptualisation to the Guatemalan case. Simultaneously, this conceptual discussion will enhance a better understanding of the Guatemalan electricity conflict.

A. Trajectories of the shift

For Levi-Faur (2012: 8) the idea of shift as ‘a movement’ implies a particular from and towards within the division of public tasks. In that sense, the Guatemalan policy of electricity privatisation transformed the formal divisions of tasks concerning the electricity service, from public to private.

At a glance, it might seem that this policy shift had a horizontal direction in Levi-Faur’s terms (ibid: 8) from government to non-state spheres of authority, concretely towards international private corporations. It becomes clear that this international dimension – together with the fact that the privatisation decision took place in the context of SAP from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – can lead to a second interpretation of an upwards movement towards more transnational levels of authority. The scene should also be completed with the local communities’ claims for authority in the provision of the service. In this case, Levi-Faur would talk about downward movement towards local authorities contesting the situation.

Hence, I identify one (the transfer to private authorities is difficult to deny) to three simultaneous displacements of authority. All of them have in common the displacement from a previous concentration of authority in the state sphere.

Paula Sánchez de la Blanca:
Shedding some light on the electricity conflict in Guatemala
Following Lynn (2012: 58-59), empirical research should reveal that trajectories of change are path-dependant. This case study, indeed, has a very particular combination of context-specific simultaneous trajectories. Yet, the thesis of the “fading out” of government would still apply to this case. In the next section I will further argue this statement by going into the details of the case via the analysis of the different natures of the shift.

B. Nature of the shift
Levi-Faur (2012: 8-10) argues that governance has had four main meanings in the literature: as a structure, mechanism, process or strategy. Continuing with the shift from government idea, I will use all four meanings to understand how the electricity conflict can be understood as rooted in the shaking of boundaries between state and society. With the first two conceptualisations (as a structure and mechanism) I will illustrate the formal changes embodied in the privatisation of the service, while the latter two (as a process and strategy) will help me to deal with the socio-economic dynamics and power relations intertwined under the shifting institutions.

The privatisation
The very first hydroelectric plants were built in the 1880s via foreign investments. Since then, except some conjuntural attempts to nationalise the energy, the Guatemalan government continue enhancing foreign capital participation (CODESA 2014: 11-12). Only in 1940s the government started to engage in a public commitment that would finally fleshed out in 1959 in the Instituto Nacional de electrificación (INDE), whose mission was to develop a national electricity market and foster rural electrification.

Though, this public commitment was heavily reduced with the 1996 General Act of Electricity. Following the recommendations of IMF Structural Adjustment Program, the Decree number 93-96 (Congreso de la República de Guatemala 1996) established the legal bases for the privatisation of the market on the grounds that the supply didn’t satisfy the growing demand. Liberalisation of the sector was meant to raise the supply and improve the service, being the main promises: reduction of the cost and price of kW/h, improvement of the quality of the service and expansion of the coverage.
Coming back to Levi-Faur’s conceptualisation, this policy shift of 1996 can be understood as a shift in the *structure*, as in the architecture of institutions. In fact, INDE reduced its functions and release the monopoly of generation and distribution of energy. In 1999 it sold the distribution service to the Spanish firm Union Fenosa, who later sold it to the British firm Actis (owner of Energuate). In parallel it also released the generation of energy and nowadays it only holds ownership of the 30% generation plants (CODESA 2014:10).

Though, the replacement of public provision by private international firms wanted to be seized under state control. And a new institution was created: the National Commission for Electric Energy (CNEE). It was conceived as the enforcer of 1996 Act, being responsible of the supervision of the concession holders, the defence of consumer’s rights and the regulatory pricing of electricity.

Within the institutional change, the transformation of state institutions was accompanied by the heavy entrance of new private firms. This shift within the structure of institutions was accompanied by a change in the *mechanisms* of decision making. As illustrated in the mission of 1996 Act and the CNEE, there was a voluntary adoption of market mechanisms as to conduct to higher efficiency.

**Problematic socio-economic implications**

Almost ten years after the privatisation, the analysis of how figures have evolved can help to understand dynamics underlying the institutional change and in decision-making. It is important to notice that figures are part of the ongoing conflict. Since there is not official quantitative report, I have mainly used the report made by one of the major social organisation involved: CODECA (2014)\(^1\).

Compared to 1995, by 2011 Guatemala had indeed increased in 239% its capacity leaded by the hydroelectric plants. As a result Guatemala has the second biggest installed capacity for electric, just after Costa Rica. Though, it is dominated by private ownership – 88.5% compared to 14.5% in Costa Rica (CEPALin Codeca2014:15).

\(^1\) Also see Rojas’ (2013) report for CEPAL
Concerning distribution of this increasing energy, the tendency has been the consolidation of two major private firms benefiting from the increase of the energy of both supply and demand: Empresa Pública de Medellín (EPM) controlling EEGSA (three departments) and Energuate controlling DEORSA-DEOCSA (nineteen departments).

**TABLE 1.** Installed capacity in mW/h, 1995-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Hidro</th>
<th>Geo</th>
<th>Vapor</th>
<th>Diesel</th>
<th>Gas</th>
<th>Carbón</th>
<th>Cogeneración</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2,590.50</td>
<td>1,082.10</td>
<td>902.3</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>128.8</td>
<td>317.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CODESA (2014: 16)*

**TABLE 2.** Distribution regions

*Source: CODECA (2014: 19)*
TABLE 3. Consumption evolution in gW/h (1997-2011)

Source CODESA (2014: 22)

TABLE 4. Users by each distributor (2011)

Source CODESA (2014: 23)

EPM is the biggest distributor of energy in terms of gW volume, but Energuate is the first distributor in terms of number of consumers (see table 3 and 4), within a context where demand has increased to a point where Guatemala has nowadays
the first place in electricity users in Central America. Only in the period 2000-2008 the demand has augmented 62%, in contrast with 44% of the supply (Mejoremos Guatemala 2011:7).

These figures show how the increase of supply and demand has indeed occurred; and that it was accompanied by the consolidation of private actors in the energy chain. Nonetheless, there is no data about the capital investment of the private firms to improve or expand the service; the main role to expand coverage was still performed by the INDE. Following this report from CODECA (ibid:32), the annual rate of expansion of rural electrification fell from 2.6% before privatisation to 1.5% after it. That means a big distance from the raising trend on the demand, and still a deficit of 14.1% of homes without electricity.

The ultimate promise of the privatisation policy has not been fulfilled. Prices of electricity have not decreased but increased, even if costs have decreased. According to CODECA (ibid:25-29) price of electricity have increased in Guatemala from 7.35 to 23 dollarscents, being the highest price in the region and as a consequence of high profits of distributor companies (see table 5 and 6).

TABLE 5. Price of kW/h electricity at homes in dollar cents, 1997-2012, given the growth rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Países</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Tasa de crecimiento (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>-83.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>-25.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>17.08</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-79.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad y Tobago</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>69.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>16.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia*</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>23.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>8.77</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>7.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>117.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perú</td>
<td>13.84</td>
<td>12.85</td>
<td>-7.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>13.63</td>
<td>91.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>13.96</td>
<td>122.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>16.73</td>
<td>46.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>212.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source CODESA (2014: 27)
It is important to remember that the price is mainly fixed by the CNEE as an estimation of value added by distribution which is directly linked to ‘capital utility’. Moreover, the price is supposedly subsidised by the government via the ‘social tariff’ granted to the 12 millions of users that consume less than 300 kW/h.

INDE transfers (from its gains from the generation of electricity) more than 1,400 millions of Q to Energuate and EPM (ibid:35).

With these figures, the report shows the breaking of promises made by the liberalisation policy. In addition, the deterioration of the service is exacerbated by the arbitrary overcharging suffered by many consumers of Energuate. While there is not a clear reason of the overcharging in the bills, the figures show that 87% of rural users paid more than 13% of the minimum wage in their electricity bills (ibid: 38). Bearing in mind two more details: the actual low consume of energy of these users (between 150-200 kWh for the 2-4 bulbs in their houses) and the fix charging for public lightning (even if they have not that service in their communities).

As a result of this deteriorating situation some of these users could not continue paying. Moreover, since the early 2000s rural communities of San Marcos department have started a resistance movement, backed by peasant organisations. Under the heading ‘nationalisation of the right to energy’ they have stopped
paying Energuate and disconnected their electricity meters and connected themselves to the public net. The research driven by CODECA shows that 66% of the interviewed said that the reason why they join the resistance was an excessive bill. Nowadays more than 57% users of Energuate in the West of Guatemala have disconnected their meters (Montepeque 2014) and the resistance is spreading to the east of the country.

Beyond its relevant findings, the report of CODECA reveals other understandings of governance. They would agree on the process conceptualisation of governance as they focus on the dynamics and problematize the implications.

In addition, the authors of the report are also articulating a strategy conceptualisation when emphasising the agents’ efforts to govern and steer this process.

Firstly, they pointed out the exaggerated concentration of power in two big private distributors. According to this report these ‘private monopolies’ have enhanced their advantageous position in order to amass large profits. Without big investment burdens, they have been benefited by the growth of supply and demand of energy. Given the opacity of their accounts, CODECA (ibid: 34) estimates that net utilities of these monopolistic enterprises would not be less than 30-40% of their gross profits, equal to 80,000-150,000$ millions net profit per year. Both private distributors would have consolidated these profits by assuring the compliance by the liberalizing policies – such a beneficial pricing from the CNEE.

Second, the authors support the social resistance of consumers face to the exacerbation of injustices especially towards low income rural consumers. The resistance via the non-payment of electricity is interpreted as the fight for a fundamental right and it pushes for the nationalisation of the energy.

Having dwelled into the institutions and contradictory processes of change surrounding the policy shift of the privatisation of electricity, one can conclude on the complexity of the shift: multidirectional, multidimensional and with very problematic implications. Nonetheless, these evidences are still consistent with the
shiftology argument supporting, first, how the division of tasks and responsibilities has changed and, second, how the major tendency of this change is about of the move away from government. In the next section I will problematize this whole tendency looking at the agents’ interplay.

C. Shift in the agents’ interplay
The very first assumption of a shift is that there is more than one player in the game. And if the plurality of agents has existed before what has changed after the privatisation, and would evidence the shift, is a new interplay between them. The study of a shift in the interplay would help me to bring new points to the analysis. First, it will point out the actors’ methods to expand its limited area of power. After this, a contradictory conclusion would be raised concerning the role of the government. As a consequence, shiftology statements can be challenged.

From control to influence and appreciation
In this section I will follow the concepts of the Control-Influence-Appreciation framework\(^2\), according to which control, influence and appreciation are three different types of steering other agents’ behaviours and interests.

Along with the privatisation the state has lost the actual control that it used to have over energy services. Still it keeps formal control of prices via the CNEE—though, they are in fact based on market criteria. As regulator CNEE also holds a role of guarantor and conflict mediator, yet it is a second instance and it has proved itself very ineffective in the resolution of the current conflict.

In contrast, the private distributors, Enerquate and EPM, have increased their influence over prices and formal mechanisms regulation, being official providers of the service and mainly the first instance of any complaint (CODECA2014: 44-47). In addition, legislation supports them and even the creation of a special prosecutor on ‘fluid thefts’ has been announced by the government (García 2014b).

\(^2\) I take as a reference the AIC process defined in ODII website http://www.odi.org/aic-process.html
Lastly, the social resistance of consumers capitalised by CODECA would theoretically remain in the *appreciation* field, trying soft power techniques to appeal to their cause. However they have proved an efficient use of legal legitimacy when denouncing the violation of the concession agreement and promises, and the systematic blockage of the solution via institutionalised paths (e.g.: useless complaint efforts and exclusion of resisters in the round tables). Moreover, they are constantly resorting to energy as a fundamental right established in the Guatemalan constitution and international agreements (CODECA2014:51). In parallel thanks to the growing resistance, organized consumers have proved their capacity to mobilise and actually *influence* (and in some areas *control*) the energy service.

In any case, all these situations of shaking boundaries of agents’ areas of control would mean a higher concern on the appreciation field. An illustrative example of the size of this concern is the fight to shape perceptions of the situation. In fact, as I could experienced on the ground, it is easy to locate the popular understandings of the situation in two main camps opposed by their definition of the non-payer consumers as ‘resisters’ or as ‘thieves’.

The resisters’ camp understands the disconnection of the electricity meter as a legitimate struggle for a fundamental right. And they use legal legitimacy to denounce criminalisation of these disadvantage groups that have been forced to resist this abusive situation. Indeed, an increasing number of deaths during demonstrations and imprisonments have been suffered by the resisters’ communities since the beginning of the conflict (Itzamná2014a; 2014b; 2014c).

On the contrary, the thieves’ camp would focus on the economic nature of the case claiming massive losses, more than 7$million, due to energy theft (GarcíaKihn 2014a; 2014b; Montepeque 2014). Moreover, the theft of the energy would already be at the origin of some exceptional high bills received by some consumers, whose bill probably includes a fine due to illegal consumption of electricity. Once the non-payment practice spread the massive illegal connections caused the overload of the network and the frequent blackouts. In other words, the theft of the service would be at the origin of the growing prices and worsening quality,
and not the other way round. What is more, the fallacy of the abuse from the distributor companies would have been used by some peasant organisations, such as CODESA, to provide a parallel illegal service of electricity much cheaper. This accusation is meant to be supported by evidences of the existence of illegal meters and the obscurity in CODESA’s accounts (Pérez 2014).

Needless to say that there is not a simple match between actors’ discourses and ‘camps’. But one can identify major trends in their discourses. Energuate, supported so far by state actors, has more frequently performed the thieves’ discourse. While consumers, backed by peasant organisations such as CODECA, have defend the resistance’s discourse.

What is important of this changing interplay is that the growing role of appreciation techniques is always supported by the appeal to state regulation. From both camps of appreciation (‘thieves’ and ‘resistors’) there is a strategic use of the role of the state: as enforcer of laws against ‘fluid theft’ and as provider of a fundamental public service.

**A paradoxical hybridation of modes of steering**

Now I will combine some analytical frameworks to understand the strategies of the two major opposing discourses: Energuate’s and CODECA’s. Concretely I will intertwine Levi-Faur’s and Lynn’s classification of governance frameworks in relation to the state.

Looking at Energuate’s practices and relation with state, one could say that since privatisation there has been a *degovernancing* process going on. This concept implies a deregulation and ‘debureaucratisation’ that include not only the hollowing out of the state but of politics and hierarchical authority as a whole (Levi-Faur 2012:11). However, these new market forms of governance would have been decided by the state, which also remains as testimonial regulator (CNEE). So, there would be governance *with government* (Lynn 2012), where the latter has adapted to new interaction mechanisms with other stakeholders.
In contrast, CODECA's practices would embody an example of governance without government where, while coexisting with it, both are different and increasingly disconnected (ibid). Thus, interestingly, the way to reach this autonomy is by fighting for the nationalisation of energy.

Having said this, the situation is far from the state-centred model where the state remains as an active pivotal player, but it is more the case of Levi-Faur’s Big (regulatory) Governance framework. In fact, both actors are claiming for a better regulation of energy distribution. That would support the thesis of the shift towards higher demand and supply of regulation via hybrid modes of governance in the context of ‘regulatory capitalism’ (Ibid: 13).

This claim for regulation, of course, is done from strategic understandings of regulation by each actor and within the discursive field. There is none certainty about whether if in the future nationalisation occurs, informal connections will disappear; neither if a big decrease in regulatory prices of energy would be accepted by Energuate.

This analysis explores the link between the role of the state and the extent of an actual shift. Acknowledging that the state keeps a key role in steering strategies allows to problematize the arguments of a shift from the government. While at the same time, the historical weakness of Guatemalan stateshows continuity more than change regarding the strong role of transnational companies or opposing civil society. It is interesting to notice that civil organisations concentrating the resistance are indeed peasant associations already involved in other social struggles against what they consider state-market alliances.

**Conclusion**

This essay did not focus on measuring the (in)existence of an actual shift in Guatemala related to the privatisation of electric energy. Instead, I have tried to explain the complexities and contradictions of the shiftology framework to better understand the dynamics, strategies and implications of this case study.
The framework of “governance as a shift” allows different conceptualizations of the shift. I have argued that three of them (focused on the trajectory, the nature, and the agents’ interplay) can be applied to this case study, driving to different, but complementary, conclusions. The first two have agreed that in the Guatemalan case since the privatization there has been a movement from the government. Thus, it has been multidirectional, multidimensional and with very problematic implications, having as a result the actual conflict.

When, thirdly, we approached governance as a shift in the agents’ interplay another dimension arose. Concretely, an interested strategic understanding of state regulation arises with the analysis of the shift in the interplay of the agents, both in the institutional architecture and in the shaping of public perceptions. Both of the two – increasingly important – actors, from national civil society and international market, have used a combination of modes of steering that implies interesting strategic relations with the state. This conclusion problematizes the statement of a shift from the government since the state has proved to keep a strategic potential.

If there has been a major shift linked to the policy shift, as many of the actors involved have suggested, it is rooted in strategic appeals to government regulation. This could offer a great opportunity for government to take advantage of the situation and try to become to pivot agent of a state-centred scenario. However the actual impasse of the conflict might evidence, once more, the traditional weaknesses of the Guatemalan state and its disconnection with civil society.
References


Development Encounters: An exercise in worldmaking

Author: Muchito Mudimba

Abstract
The intimate connections between ‘poverty reduction’, ‘gender’, ‘participatory development’ continue to attract interest from development scholars and practitioners. Since the 1970s, increasing gendered participatory development in decision-making has been one of the dominant strategies in poverty reduction initiatives. The debate on gendered community participation has links with ‘feminisation of poverty’ discourses associated with Women in Development (WID) and Gender and Development (GAD). While the ‘feminisation of poverty’ thesis has had an impact in raising gender issues, its heavy and narrow focus on income means gender issues have not been addressed holistically to include capabilities, obligations and power. Using the case of Binga District in Zimbabwe, I posit that participatory poverty reduction strategies have failed to deliver the expected and theoretically predicted gendered benefits. Instead, not only has community participation remained gender insensitive but rather tokenistic in order to maintain the male-dominated status quo rather than using this approach to address long standing inequalities. I conclude that unless approaches to poverty reduction go beyond the ‘feminisation of poverty’ to control of the decentralised structures, community participation as a poverty reduction strategy will remain a farce.

Introduction
The intimate connections between ‘poverty reduction’, ‘gender’, ‘participatory development’ continue to attract interest from development scholars and practitioners. This interest can be traced from the 1970s’critique of structural, straight-jacket approaches to poverty reduction which called for a shift from top–down approaches to people-centred approaches towards development (Cornwall...
and Brock 2005). Decentralisation was, and still seen today as medium through which community participation can address poverty.

In this article I use Schön’s (1983) reflective practice, by drawing on my work experience, to argue that decentralised participatory development as a poverty reduction strategy has failed to deliver the expected benefits, mainly due to lack of the quantitative and qualitative participation of women. Evolving from Kurt Lewin’s action research and experiential phenomenology, reflective practice is associated with social constructionist epistemology, and offers a perspective more firmly rooted in the realities between gender and poverty (Thompson and Pascal 2012), which is also integral to poverty reduction. To frame the arguments, I begin by exploring the concepts of poverty reduction, community participation within the context of gender. I then illustrate the Zimbabwean government’s attempt to reduce poverty through decentralisation policy. Binga District, being one of the poorest and marginalised districts in Zimbabwe, provides an interesting example of the opportunities as well as challenges in reducing poverty through gendered participatory development. Although my conclusion is based on this case study from Zimbabwe, it however demonstrates the complexities of gendered participatory development which may be experienced more widely. This calls for increased empirical evidence to inform context-specific sustainable development approaches that will enhance resilience and emancipate marginalised communities, including women, from yokes of poverty.

Poverty reduction, participatory development and gender
Since 1970, there has been an intriguing confluence over notions of poverty reduction. Increasingly, poverty reduction has been discursively framed to denunciate the orthodox, singular, universal and unidirectional development narratives that are associated with top-down approaches (Cornwall and Brock 2005; Mohan and Stokke 2000). Instead, consistent with feminism, contemporary poverty reduction narratives tend to encapsulate postmodernist notions such as transformation, situatedness, rights, and multi-directionality, mainly associated with postmodernist writers such as Foucault and Derrida (Schuurman 2000). Implicated in these contemporary notions of poverty reduction are two words
that have gained purchase: ‘participation’ and ‘gender’. Their explicit or implicit presence in the Millennium Development Goals, the draft post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals and the recently adopted Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 attest the extent to which they have permeated the development theory, policy and practice.

The term ‘poverty’, contested as it may be, lies at the nucleus of development and has a long history (Cornwall and Brock 2005). The oorhodox development thinking associated withmodernization perspective of universality and that economic growth, throughmacroeconomic stability, privatisation and liberalisation will address poverty(Desai and Potter 2008). As the empirical evidence points to the contrary, discontent has ensued. Chambers (1983) and Sen (1999) argue that poverty is not unidirectional but rather a relative and context specific concept. Similarly, Carr’s (2008) critical grassroots approach denounces the universalizing, blue-print models in which communities are ‘invited’, instead ofinviting technocrats to participate in poverty reduction programs.

As a result of the disaffection with the universal approaches, participatory, bottom-up approaches have found currency. In this connection, at least two major schools of thought have emerged that relate to gendered development. Amongst theseis Women in Development (WID), based on the liberal feminist framework, which sees women’s poverty as the consequence of underdevelopment rather than of subordination (Jackson 1996; Miller and Razavi 1995). In many ways, WID emphasises the need to integrate women into the development process. WID is contrasted with Gender and Development (GAD) approach which argues that the basis of differences between men and women is socially constructed hence the need to challenge existing gender roles and relations (Jackson, 1996; Kabeer, and Subrahmanian,1996) . But WID and GAD tend to be associated with the ‘feminisation of poverty’ (Chant, 2007) which, according to Chant (2008:178) include:

• lack attention on the differences among women;
• emphasises on income more than other sources of poverty such as inadequate access to resources, denial of political rights, limited social options and being vulnerable to risks and crises; and
over-emphasis on female-headed households and the associated suggestion that when women are without men, their situation becomes worse. In contrast, women are actively choosing household headship as a means by which they are able to enhance the well-being of their households and exert more control over their own lives.

While Chant (2007) proposes the abandonment, and replacement of ‘feminisation of poverty’ with ‘feminisation of responsibility and/or obligation’ or ‘feminisation of survival’, she later reminds us that: “… we must not miss what is conceivably the main point, namely that even as women enjoy increased capabilities and opportunities, their potential gains are all too often cancelled out by men’s seemingly infinite reservoir of props for asserting power, and (re)masculinising advantage.” (Chant, 2008: 190.)

Participatory development offers opportunities to go beyond feminisation of poverty to address such issues as capability, resilience, power, and control of structures that increase gender inequalities. Participatory approaches, contested as they can be, can be traced to Arnstein’s (1969) typology of participation. Arnstein’s ladder of participation has eight rungs, which could be viewed as a continuum, ranging from manipulation to citizen control. Consistent with Arnstein’s ideas were the 1970s scholars such as Paul Freire whose work focused on emancipative and transformative popular education (Estrella and Gaventa 1998). However, it was not until the 1980s that Robert Chambers’ Rapid Rural Appraisal ignited the participatory revolution (Mohan and Stokke 2008). The shift from control by authorities to control by the citizens, including women, reminds us that participation is about power and control (Cornwall 2008).

Although community participation is a contested concept and not necessarily ‘the magic bullet’ (Rifkin 1996) to poverty reduction, it is generally viewed as a process where local people, including women and children, play a role in dealing with issues that affect them (Burns et al 2004). Participation is not limited to development projects but includes many activities that take place in normal day-to-day city life outside the project context (Moser 1987). These range from the micro-scale, including activities like community-based maintenance of local drains,
to the macro-scale, like public support for government-sponsored environmental protection programs.

However, in most cases, the local knowledge is more often than not regarded as weaker with outside expertise rendered as dominant. Such power dynamics are inherent in almost all societies although Scott (1985) argues that the poor people tend to employ whenever they feel they have been looked down upon in matters that concern them. Even Chambers, one of the pioneers of ‘participatory approach’ to development acknowledges that in some instances bottom-up approach to development can be used as a formality especially by development practitioners hence it ceases to be active participation (Chambers 1983). Moreover, even if citizens are granted decision-making power and control, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) remind us that citizens are not a homogenous group. Vulnerable groups, like women and children, may not participate in decision-making processes as the social standing of the different people in the society determine the power they have in decision-making. From this vantage point participation can be elusive and fail to address fundamental poverty reduction issues.

**Participatory development and poverty reduction in Zimbabwe**

Participatory development in Zimbabwe can be traced from her independence from Britain in 1980. It was one of the strategies that aimed at redressing inherited colonial imbalances, improve participation of rural people and transfer powers from central government to rural councils (Makumbe 1998). The District Councils Act of 1980 consolidated the previously fragmented chiefs and headmen African Councils from over 220 to 55 districts that were dominated by elected councilors(Kurebwa 2015). However, it was not until the Prime Minister’s Directive on Decentralization of 1984, which significantly changed participatory development through local government system reform. Four main tiers can be identified: the national, provincial, district and local levels (Helmsing 1991). Operationalized through the Rural District Councils Act (RDC Act) of 1988, the Provincial Councils and Administration Act of 1985 and the Traditional Leaders Act of 1999, the decentralized participatory development is particularly interesting. While the Prime Minister’s Directive on Decentralization
clearly illustrates that participatory development is a necessary condition for poverty reduction, Makumbe (1998) argues that the development structures created by the directive have been hijacked by politicians such that ‘token’ rather than active participation has taken place. In particular, although the lower level structures, that is, the Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and the Ward Development Committees (WADCOs), in theory develop plans of their needs through a participatory process, in practice these structures tend to serve the political interests of the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF).

**Participatory poverty reduction in Binga District, Zimbabwe.**

Binga district has a population of 120,000 and divided into 21 wards. Binga growth point, the headquarters of the district, is over 400km from Bulawayo, the major urban center and further away from Zimbabwe’s capital city, Harare. Although agriculture is a predominant source of livelihoods, the district is ill suited for agriculture due to poor soils, low and erratic rainfall, and high temperatures. Binga district is dominated by the minority Tonga ethnic group (Colson 1971.)

Most commentators, for example, McGregor (2009) and Manyena (2012), tend to associate the marginalization of Binga district to the eviction of the Tonga in 1950s to give way to the construction of the hydro-electric project, the Kariba Dam. Before the resettlement, the Tonga were seldom victims of hunger due to diverse livelihood portfolios, comprising fishing, riverine agriculture and hunting. Not only did the Tonga lose entitlement to these livelihoods due to the inundation of their homes in 1957-8 by the Kariba Dam, they also lost access to water as they were placed in arid areas (WCD 2000). Consequently, the Tonga requires humanitarian aid every year to supplement their harvests (McGregor 2009).

Consistent with the RDC Act and the Traditional Leaders Act, in February 2011, Binga Rural District Council requested all villages and wards to submit development plans that would address their needs. Through the work of Zubo, a community-based organization focusing on women’s empowerment, I was among those who facilitated participatory planning process from the village level to district level and
observed the process at provincial level. Zubo’s interest was to ensure a gendered development planning process. This would help Zubo identify capacity gaps for women and local communities more broadly.

In May 2011, Manseme village, like all the five villages of Kariangwe ward, was asked to submit their development plans to the ward, which would later be consolidated into a ward development plan. Consequently, the VIDCO1, with support of Zubo, organized a public planning meeting, involving about 300 members of Manseme village. The purpose of the meeting was to identify key projects that would address the needs of Manseme village. In attendance were the ward councilor and government officials such as Head of Manseme Primary School, village health worker and agriculture extension officer. There were two interesting aspects worth highlighting. Firstly, all the VIDCO members belonged to ZANU PF and therefore such meetings provided opportunities to consolidate the party’s political base. Secondly, although more than half of those who attended the public meeting were women, only 25% of VIDCO members were women. The discussions were male-dominated, an element which could be attributed to patriarchy and power relations in society. Although over a dozen projects were identified, only five projects were prioritized: irrigation scheme to improve food security; clinic to improve access to health care; four boreholes to improve access to water; road to link Manseme village to markets; and a secondary school that would absorb children from Manseme Primary School. Absent from the discussions was the issue of resources as it was assumed the government and donors would provide. However, when asked about their contribution to the projects, community members would avail their labor through public works program where they would get paid in cash or kind to enable them meet their basic needs. Homesteads were divided into five groups, and all the group leaders were men, as women feared their husbands would not allow them to lead; women could only lead if there were no men in the group of their homesteads.

1 The VIDCO comprises Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Secretary, Vice Secretary, Treasurer, and Committee Member
In July 2011, the Kariangwe WADCO convened, with at least two members of each VIDCO’s in attendance, together with Heads of schools, agriculture extension workers and health extension officers. Also, in attendance were members of School Development Committees, CAMPFIRE committees. As the VIDCOs are male-dominated, there were only five women out of 30 people who attended. Although the Councilor is the leader of the WADCO, in practice Chief Siansali, an ex-officio member of the WADCO, wields more power than the councilor and without his consent none of the projects discussed can be implemented. As planned, the WADCO received the projects from each of the villages and consolidated them into a ward plan, with Manseme irrigation scheme being one of the top-five priorities for Kariangwe Ward. Interestingly, during the discussions, some members raised concerns that the projects that were being consolidated were not new. They saw the planning exercise as a waste of time. The proposed Manseme irrigation scheme, for example, was on the agenda since Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980.

In September 2011, the Rural District Development Committee (RDDC) was convened to consider the proposals from sector ministries and WADCOs, including those from Kariangwe WADCO. The RDDC meeting, that was predominantly male, was chaired by the District Administrator, a central government representative. In attendance were the chairpersons of all other committees of council, heads of department of ministries, and non-governmental organisations such as Plan International and Zubo. Also present, were members from the security, which cannot only be intimidating but also signals the desire to control development processes (Chakaipa 2010). Although most of the projects from WADCOs were approved by the RDDC and included in the district development plan, the sector ministry projects received top priority. The argument is that the plans submitted by WADCOs tend to be ‘shopping lists’ with little technical details compared with sectoral plans that take a blue-print approach (Kurebwa 2015).

Nonetheless, the Binga district development plan, together with development plans from other six districts of Matabeleland North Province, was submitted to

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2 CAMPFIRE stands for Communal Areas Management for Indegenous Resources.
the Provincial Development Committee (PDC) for consolidation into a provincial plan. Like the RDDC, the PDC tend to favour sectoral projects authored by line ministries (Kurebwa, 2015). The projects submitted by Binga RDC that came from local communities were not incorporated into the provincial plan, including the Manseme irrigation scheme. Instead, projects that were approved for Binga district were:

(1) the Bulawayo Kraal irrigation scheme, authored by the Ministry of Agriculture whose goal was to improve food security. However, Muponde (2015) argues that the irrigation project was highly political, with the underlying objective being to serve the interest of ZANU PF to improve its waning support base in Binga District. When the Vice President Joyce Mujuru, who spearheaded the project, was ousted from power due to ZANU PF's factional fighting, the irrigation equipment was looted (Muponde 2015). But more strikingly, although a woman led this project, men dominated its operations.

(2) Sijarira Resort road, that was authored by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management and Ministry of Transport. While the project would enable tourists access to photographic safaris, the underlying objective was in response to the International Monetary Fund's recommendation for Zimbabwe to woo private foreign investment, in order to improve its economy (Bayai and Nyangara 2013). Clearly missing is not only the role of local people, considering these projects are associated with conservation of natural resources.

(3) The long-standing Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project (MZWP) (Swain 2012), that was first mooted in 1912, and first authored by MZWP Trust, a Non-Governmental Organization in the 1990s (Gwebu 2002), before being taken over by the government in 2009 (New Zimbabwe 2009). The MZWP intends to draw water from Kariba Dam to Bulawayo, Zimbabwe's second capital. But piping water to Bulawayo more than 400km from the Kariba Dam when the Tonga who are within 20km from the dam have perennial water problems is ironic. This is particularly true for women who walk...
several kilometres to obtain water yet they have not been consulted about
the project. Besides, the Tonga, paid a heavy price for the construction of the
dam; they were resettled to adjoining uplands of Binga district during the
1950s and lost their entitlement to water resources (Mashingaidze 2013).

Conclusion
In this article, I started by outlining the conceptual issues and optimisms that
underpin gendered decentralized participatory poverty reduction. However,
using the case study from Binga, I have demonstrated that community initiated
poverty reduction programmes, do not only play second fiddle to those initiated
by politicians and technocrats but barely incorporate gender issues. Top-down
approaches are still dominant, and in sync with the mainstream male-dominated
economic growth models of poverty reduction, despite criticisms since 1970s.
Thus, I strongly believe that community participation in Binga district remains
at the ‘tokenistic’ where communities are asked to articulate their poverty
reduction needs and yet those needs are highly unlikely to be incorporated into
government programs. Although decentralization and notions of local government
are Western construction, and intimately tied to capitalism (Schuurman 2000),
gendered community participation, though complex, still has role. Following
from this, advocate for civil society organizations, to focus on the “politics of the
local” (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 247) to empower and ‘conscientise’ (Freire 1996)
communities through transformative social justice, advocacy and action research.
In this way, local communities, including women, are likely not only to take control
of the decentralized structures and the associated decision-making processes
but also unlock political and neoliberal guise of participatory poverty reduction.
Although it is difficult to generalise from one case study, the arguments presented
in this article may apply to wider contexts.
References


10. Commodity Chain Analysis: From Plantation to Breakfast Table – The Shifting Relations of Banana Production/Consumption

Author: Wei-Li Woo

Introduction
From your morning breakfast cereal to the guilty pleasure of a banana split, or perhaps the children’s cartoon ‘Bananas in Pajamas’, the banana is ubiquitous in Western diets as well as in the popular imagination. Whether you shop in a supermarket, a corner fruit stand along your daily commute, or a greenmarket, it is likely that you will find the cheerful bunches of the bright yellow fruit waiting to be inspected, picked and bought. More likely than not, they will also be labeled: would you like them Fairtrade, organic or perhaps adorned with the Chiquita label – ‘that familiar bright blue sticker on the outside is your assurance of superior quality and flavor inside – exactly what you want for you and your family!’ (at least according to the company) (‘Chiquita Bananas’ 2015). The banana, the world’s most traded fruit by volume (Wiley 2008: xvii), may not provide the caloric basis of diets in the global North as they do in parts of the global South, but they have become an indispensible part of American and European diets. In 2012, 18% of worldwide banana production was for export, but these 19.3 million tonnes of bananas (FAOSTAT 2015) travelled a network of commodity chains that span the globe. These movements, and their historical shifts, allow us to trace the tensions and contradictions inherent in the tangled social relations of banana production and consumption.

How did a perishable tropical fruit that had to be transported thousands of miles to fruit markets in North American and European cities become so widely consumed? How did it become available in every supermarket, day in and day
out, regardless of season? How did it change lives and shape societies and economies as it made this unpredictable journey through space and time? This rather suggestively shaped, asexual fruit has been responsible for the rise and fall of governments, of commercial empires and, not least, left its mark on the lives of millions of plantation workers and farmers, whose sweat and blood have fuelled the export banana trade since the early 19th century. By tracing the banana’s journey from the tropics to the breakfast tables of working class families in the US in the first half of the 20th century, through the shift from cultivation of the Gros Michel to the Panama disease-free Cavendish in the 1950s-1960s, and lastly the recent growing popularity of organic and Fairtrade bananas, I show how production and consumption relations have been mutually constitutive, and how capitalist relations have sometimes concealed the negative social and environmental consequences of banana production and at other times been a way for corporations to co-opt consumer attempts to ameliorate those consequences. Particularly in the case of organic and Fairtrade bananas, they have become a lucrative market and another mechanism for capital accumulation by the large banana-producing companies. Finally, I argue that the tensions inherent in production/consumption relations should lead ‘conscientious’ consumers to question the ubiquity and homogeneity of the banana itself.

Analytical Framework

In this paper, I undertake a partial commodity chain analysis of the dessert banana commodity chain. In the contemporary US and Europe these are almost exclusively the soft, sweet bananas of the Cavendish variety. ‘Commodity chain’ was a term first used in a 1977 article by Hopkins and Wallerstein, which they later referred to as a ‘network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity’ (1986, as quoted in Bair 2005: 155). The approach drew on the world-systems perspective to show how commodity chains ‘structure and reproduce a stratified and hierarchical world-system’ (Bair 2005: 156). The commodity chain construct as formulated by Hopkins and Wallerstein provided a way to map and analyze the international division of labor without being analytically constrained by the statist orientation of much of the social sciences of the time (Bair 2005: 156). Gereffi’s work on global commodity chains and the subsequent proliferation of global value chains literature is more focused on ‘upgrading’ by firms and
countries along value chains so that more value can be ‘captured’ by firms, sectors and national economies. Taking an approach that attempts to reveal and critique social relations hidden in commodity chains, other researchers, including feminist scholars, have used commodity chain analysis in a more critical way, to ‘build contingency, specificity and multiplicity into their accounts’ (Collins 2005: 6).

Ian Cook’s article ‘Follow the Thing: Papaya’ is one such account that illuminates the partial and situated knowledges of actors along the papaya commodity chain, by juxtaposing their experiences. His intent is to “get behind the veil, the fetishism of the market”, to make powerful, important, disturbing connections between Western consumers and the distant strangers whose contributions to their lives were invisible, unnoticed and largely unappreciated… and thereby provoke moral and ethical questions for participants in this exploitation who might think they’re decent people.’ (Cook 2004: 642). Cook brings his readers into the lives of the papaya farmer, the papaya packer and the papaya consumer, among others, and immerses them in the contradictions, difficulties and pressures of their lives, with historical context as well. While a multi-sited ethnographic account is beyond the scope of this paper, I am inspired by Cook’s commodity chain analysis to historicize the nodes of the commodity chain and to show how actors at disparate nodes shape each other even whentough they do not have direct contact. The unique biology and pathology of the banana plant itself, can have surprising and unintended consequences for the social, political and economic relations of humans and their societies along the commodity chain.

In this commodity chain analysis, I also draw on Sidney Mintz’s work in Sweetness and Power (1985), which provides a gripping account of how sugar consumption in Europe rose rapidly from 1650 to 1900 and how sugar went from a luxury good to a fuel for the working class. The sugar trade was also at the center of the growth of powerful capitalist interests, both in the colonies and industrializing Britain. Sugar production sustained the capitalist classes in Britain who invested and operated these colonial enterprises, but it also nourished and consoled the emerging proletarian classes in the mines and factories (1985: 61). Mintz avoids totalizing explanations for the growth of sugar production and consumption and brings in contingency and agency, arguing that ‘slave and proletarian together
powered the imperial economic system that kept the one supplied with manacles and the other with sugar and rum; but neither had more than minimal influence over it. The growing freedom of the consumer to choose was one kind of freedom, but not another’ (1985: 184). Changing consumer tastes were not simply a matter of the evolving ‘inside meanings’ that ordinary working class Britons gave to the shifting eating and work habits in their daily lives, which were associated with sugar consumption, but also had to do with ‘outside meanings’ – ‘the wider social significance of those changes effectuated by institutions and groups whose reach and power transcend both individuals and local communities: those who staff and manage the larger economic and political institutions and make them operate’ (Mintz 1995: 6). In this paper, I examine how the banana trade was dialectically shaped by both individual consumption habits and the wider forces of capital accumulation at work in banana production, and the different meanings of banana production/consumption made by individuals and social institutions.

Food regime analysis, in attempting the ‘ambitious task of theorizing the ways that practices of food provision and consumption are co-determined’ provides a lens through which to situate the shifting relations between banana production and consumption in the broad arc of capital accumulation from the late 19th century to the present (Goodman and DuPuis, as quoted in Collins 2005: 7). The concept of food regimes was formulated by Friedmann and McMichael in their seminal 1989 article and they have each individually elaborated on the concept further. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on Friedmann’s formulation and elaboration as she focuses more on the crises that lead to transitions between food regimes, and because her concept of the emerging corporate-environmental food regime, is very much related to standard-setting in the agri-food industry, which has historically played a critical role in the banana industry and has important implications for recent developments in banana production/consumption relations.

According to Friedmann, a food regime is a set of implicit rules that govern the global system of food provisioning (2005). Food regimes are historical and ‘sustained but nonetheless temporary constellations of interests and relationships’ (Friedmann 2005: 228). Since food regimes are shaped by often unequal and contested relations between states, businesses, people and ecologies, they are
stable for only relatively short periods, which are followed by periods of transition and instability, where various actors jostle with each other over the way forward (Friedmann 2005: 228). Each food regime is characterized by a specific set of complexes – webs of production, consumption and distribution that link various actors in the food system together – and flows of specific agrifood commodities.

The first food regime, which Friedmann later termed the ‘colonial-diasporic’ food regime, dominant from 1870 to 1914, was centered on European imports of wheat and meat from settler states of the US, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Argentina (2005). In return, manufactured goods, labor and capital, particularly for transcontinental railways and shipping lines, flowed from Europe to the settler states. This took place in the context of British hegemony in the world economy, the culmination of colonialism in Asia and Africa – the final scramble for colonial control occurred as rising nations such as the US and Germany, sought to challenge British power – and the establishment of the nation-state system. In their original formulation of the first food regime, Friedmann and McMichael argue that ‘a truly international division of labour emerged as settler states replicated European agricultural production – and industry – on a more cost-efficient basis appropriate to the large-scale provisioning of the growing European working classes’ (1989: 96). Tropical imports such as cotton, rubber, tin and copper played an important role as raw materials for industry and other commodities such as tea, coffee sugar and bananas became articles of mass consumption by industrial workers (Woodruff, as cited in Friedmann and McMichael 1989: 98). The end of the first food regime was marked by World War I, the Great Depression and the ecological catastrophe of the ‘Dust Bowl’ in North America in the 1930s (Friedmann 2005: 237).

The second food regime, the ‘mercantile-industrial’ food regime, emerged in 1947 and lasted until 1973, in the context of US hegemony in the world economy and the consolidation of the international state system with the independence of former colonies in Asia and Africa (Friedmann 2005, Friedmann and McMichael 1989). Subsidized grain exports from the US were first sent to Europe as part of the postwar Marshall Plan, then to the Third World under Public Law 480. Another important development was the growing power and transnational nature
of agribusiness capital, linked to the fact that the US ‘modeled and supported major state involvement and industrialization of agriculture’ (2005: 242). These transnational agribusinesses created agrifood complexes such as intensive meat production through the grain-fuelled livestock complex and ‘durable foods’ complex that sought to substitute tropical exports like sugar and vegetable oils with industrial derivatives of temperate grains; these complexes were characterized by ‘increasing separation and mediation by capital of each stage between raw material inputs and final consumption’ (Friedmann and McMichael 1989: 113).

The second food regime ended in the food crisis of 1974 and the ‘competitive dumping and potential trade wars’ between the European Economic Community and the US. An additional factor was the tension between the mercantilist and industrial elements of the second food regime, as ‘transnational corporations outgrew the national regulatory frameworks in which they were born, and found them to be obstacles to further integration of a potentially global agro-food sector’ (Friedmann 1993: 39).

Friedmann argues that the ‘lineaments of a new food regime based on quality audited supply chains seems to be emerging in the space opened by impasse in international negotiations over food standards. Led by food retailers, agrofood corporations are selectively appropriating demands of environmental, food safety, animal welfare, fair trade, and other social movements…’ (2005: 227). The emergent ‘corporate environmental’ food regime is led by agrifood businesses, and seems to be organizing food supply chains along two differentiated pathways that provision transnational classes of rich and poor consumers according to different food safety and health standards (2005: 251-252). Governments and inter-governmental organizations are embracing minimal standards, while agrifood companies offer ‘quality’ products to consumers that adhere to standards above the floor set by government and international organizations.

As I trace changing banana production/consumption relations, I will draw linkages between each period and the contours of the dominant food regime of the time, in order to connect banana flows to the broader picture of global capital accumulation in the agrifood system.
Methods
In this paper, I make use of data from FAOSTAT, FAO, government and NGO reports as well as academic articles and books. Due to the importance of historical data for my analysis, I had to make use of historical academic literature. It was not possible to obtain historical figures from FAOSTAT as data is not available prior to 1961. As FAOSTAT does not collect separate data for organic or Fairtrade banana production or exports, I relied on NGO reports from organizations such as Fairtrade Foundation and the International Institute for Sustainable Development for information on bananas sold under the alternative trade or organic labels.

The Banana – An Overview
The banana plant is in fact not a tree, but a perennial herb. The banana’s true stem is not the trunk from which the leaves grow, but an underground rhizome. Unlike wild banana species, the Cavendish does not have seeds because it is a triploid, meaning that it has three sets of chromosomes, which render it sterile. Cavendish and other domesticated banana plants can therefore produce fruit without fertilization. Genetically identical daughter plants simply grow out from the rhizome, as offshoots. These shoots, known as ‘suckers’, produce new banana plants. A banana plant can produce up to three or four harvests in its lifetime and dozens of daughter plants. Banana plantations are maintained by constantly digging up the suckers and replanting them elsewhere. This may seem convenient for covering large areas with a monoculture of Cavendish bananas, but also facilitates the spread of disease (Koeppel 2008: 12-13).

The banana plant has a long history of domestication and is an important staple food, especially in Africa and ranks fourth in global production volume, after maize, rice and wheat (CGIAR, n.d.). Consumption can be as high as one kilogram per person per day in East Africa (CGIAR, n.d.), compared to about 11 kg per capita per year in the US (Evans and Gordon 2011: 19). Currently, the world’s top five producers of bananas are, in descending order, India, China, Philippines, Brazil and Ecuador (FAOSTAT 2015). Most of world production is for domestic consumption, only about 18% is exported (FAOSTAT 2015). Latin America and the Caribbean have historically dominated world banana exports, which in 2012 had a value of US$8.8 billion (FAOSTAT 2015, latest figures available are from 2012),
and continue to do so, averaging 80% of banana exports from 2011-2013 (FAO 2015a). The top 5 exporting countries are Ecuador (27%), Philippines (14%), Costa Rica (10%), Guatemala (10%) and Colombia (9%) (FAOSTAT 2015, latest figures available are from 2012). North America and the EU-27 are the top importers of bananas averaging 31% and 28% of total imports from 2011-2013 respectively (FAO 2015b). In this paper I will focus on the top export producing region – Latin America and the Caribbean, and the top importing country – the US, which have been tightly connected through the growth of the banana export industry since the early 20th century.

**Structure of the International Banana Marketing Chain:**

![Diagram of the international banana marketing chain](chart)

*Source: UNCTAD 2003: 9*

**From Luxury to Commodity – The Banana in the Early 20th Century**

In the 1870s, bananas were a luxury item, consumed as a status symbol rather than for their taste; they were sold at a dime a piece (about two dollars today), peeled, sliced and wrapped in tin foil to avoid its suggestive shape offending Victorian sensibilities (Jenkins, as cited in Koeppel 2008: 52). The banana’s rise to become a ‘staple article’ in US diets happened quickly (Humphrey 1894, as quoted in Soluri 2003: 51). In 1871, the wholesale value of banana imports into the US was less than $250,000. By 1901 the figure had risen to $6.5 million and within the next decade banana imports had almost doubled, to $12.4 million (Adams, as cited in Soluri 2003: 49).
From the 1870s to mid-1890s, the banana industry was characterized by independent farmers in Central America and the Caribbean selling fruit to schooner captains in a competitive marketplace (Soluri 2003: 49, Wiley 2008: 5). These initial shipments established the market for the fruit in North America, but it was in 1899, when three men united their business ventures and entrepreneurial prowess in railroads, shipping, and fruit trading to create the United Fruit Company, that the industry was revolutionized. United Fruit, with its capital-intensive and iconic Great White Fleet of steamships, would establish a ‘stranglehold’ over banana production in Central and South America ‘systematically acquiring or destroying competitors in all its areas of operation (Kepner, as cited in Moberg and Striffler 2003: 10). It was the pre-cursor to Chiquita Brands International, which is still the largest banana trading company in the world today.

The backgrounds of United Fruit’s founders point to the historical importance of transportation links to the banana industry. The subsequent growth of banana plantations in Central and South America was closely tied to the development of railways, to facilitate transport of the perishable fruit to North America in large quantities. Due to the geography of banana production and consumption, it is practically impossible for independent farmers operating on their own to exercise sufficient control to ensure delivery of fruit to the market at the right time (Wiley
2008: 5). This contributed to the need for some form of association, corporate structures, and even to the consolidation of so-called Banana Empires through vertical integration and mobilization of massive amounts of land, labor and capital to leverage on advantages of scale. United Fruit was portrayed by a 1924 New York Times article as a ‘pinnacle of human achievement’, the story described how United Fruit was opening up the jungle through new ports, railroads and banana plantations and demonstrating a new kind of ‘empire-building’ that would correct the mistakes of the past and return the region to its ancient and glorious past (Koeppel 2008: 69). This linkage to railroad networks as a form of capital accumulation, the web of capital flowing from Europe and the US, and tropical commodities moving from Latin America and the Caribbean to the US and Europe fits into the framework of the first food regime.

The growing specialization of the region in this export commodity, coupled with the control over land and labour that companies like United Fruit, and its smaller rival Standard Fruit, wielded, could also be seen as a form of neo-colonialism. Despite popular portrayal of the banana multinationals as altruistic agents of ‘development’, US military forces were putting down banana workers’ strikes in Guatemala, Panama and Colombia as early as 1918 (Koeppel 2008: 64). In a 1913 editorial, the Houston Post explained that the reason why foreign-grown bananas had become cheaper than apples while increasing in quality was because they were produced on a huge scale and sold directly to consumers. According to the newspaper, banana companies understood that there was more money to be made by selling huge volumes at low prices rather than pricing the fruit out of reach of the average consumer (Koeppel 2008: 68). In order to understand the growing ubiquity of the banana, however, we have to look at social forces driving consumption, since transport innovations and growing production alone cannot account for the banana’s burgeoning popularity in the US.

At the end of the 19th century, doctors, public health officials, nutritionists, as well as authors of cookbooks and home economics manuals were promoting fruit consumption for their health benefits and because preparation generally required less-demanding labor that was more amenable to a ‘refined woman’ than the handling of greasy animal products (Soluri 2003: 55). An 1890 housekeepers’
manual praised the banana’s affordability, ease of preparation and year-round availability. But the banana was not just popular among the upper classes. In 1917, a New York City Department of Health official stated that the banana was ‘used in almost all racial and social groups in this city’ (United Fruit Company, cited in Soluri 2003: 57). In 1936, the American Medical Association endorsed the banana because of its germ-resistant peel, a boon to public health officials who were concerned about the spread of infectious diseases in poor and densely populated working-class areas; this endorsement was promptly taken up by United Fruit in their advertising campaigns (Soluri 2003: 57). The banana’s popularity was also growing in a period where less time was available for meal-preparation, and more women and men were becoming urban workers. The banana was affordable, nutritious, ‘self-packaged’ and also had a relatively high carbohydrate content compared to other commonly available fruits like apples and oranges, which made it an ideal working class food (Soluri 2003: 58).

The banana had also entered the popular imagination through songs such as ‘Yes, We Have No Bananas!’ The banana split was invented between 1904 and 1907, with towns in three different US states claiming to be the birthplace of this confection (Koeppel 2008: 65). Soluri explains: ‘The banana’s life as a commodity was not limited to the breakfast table; over the course of the twentieth century, the banana served as a ubiquitous symbol in US popular culture. The banana’s cultural meanings were (and are) multiple, but the fruit has most often been linked to humor, zaniness, and sexuality. Since at least as far back as the 1870s, comedy sketches have deployed bananas in a variety of ways to amuse audiences. Songwriters and poets have played with the word’s phonemic qualities; comedians and musicians have exploited the fruit’s physical qualities to conjure everything from a penis to antidemocratic political regimes’ (2003: 76-77). Its rise was also indicative of changing values and norms in society. While on vacation in 1904, the American novelist Edith Wharton despaired over the spread of the nation’s banana-eating habits, which stemmed from the fact that the banana, rather than being associated with the aristocratic traditions of other tropical imports such as tea, coffee and chocolate, was a sign of ‘crass’, popular American culture, ‘shaped by both mass consumerism and democratic ideals’ (Soluri 2003: 60-61) Derogatory terms such as ‘banana republic’ also hinted at the veiled and racialized disdain
with which Americans viewed their Southern neighbors, whose labor made the production of their beloved fruit possible.

As the above account and Mintz's work on the sugar trade demonstrate, we cannot draw simple explanations of causality in production/consumption relations of agrifood commodities, especially those around which vast quantities of land, labor and capital coalesce and which are imbued with different meanings by individuals and societies. The consumer who makes an ostensibly ‘free’ consumption choice is also shaped by her milieu and the political and economic system that enables banana multinationals to amass an empire of plantations and transport networks.

From Gros Michel to the Cavendish: A Fungus Drives a Crucial Innovation

Until the 1950s, vast quantities of land and labor were required in the transportation and processing of bananas and also to open new land frontiers. The commercial Gros Michel variety was susceptible to the soil-borne fungus Panama disease, which infects banana plant roots and vascular systems, and devastated banana plantations in the region. This meant that banana companies were constantly on the run from the disease and had to constantly shift cultivation to disease-free areas, only to have plantation workers carry the spores with them to new plots. For example, by 1930, United Fruit owned nearly 20 times the 139,000 acres of land then under cultivation, supposedly to ensure that disease-free land would be available for cultivation (Moberg and Striffler 2003: 12). Critics, however, accused the company of monopolistic practices, that it was preventing other companies or independent farmers from acquiring land for cultivation (Moberg and Striffler 2003: 12). In 1954, the democratically elected Arbenz government in Guatemala was overthrown by the US government through a covert CIA operation and replaced by a US-backed military regime, to thwart its planned redistribution of United Fruit’s uncultivated land to landless peasants. The banana multinationals’ consolidation of capital and land, and their need to maintain labor discipline at cheap prices over vast tracts of land, made them a clear target for resistance on the part of workers, peasants and national governments in producing countries.
Standard Fruit, United Fruit’s smaller rival, was running out of capital to hold large tracts of virgin land or for ‘flood fallowing’, the process of killing the fungus by flooding land for several months (Soluri 2003: 70). The company was therefore an early mover in the switch from the Gros Michel to the Panama-disease resistant Cavendish, which was completed in 1958 (Koeppel 2008: 146). The switch to the more productive Cavendish variety meant that the same plantations could be cultivated almost indefinitely and led to the multinationals’ decision to withdraw from direct production and to contract with local producers (Moberg and Striffler 2003: 14). Even though they could produce the fruit more cheaply with a vertically integrated operation, there were political reasons for contact farming, which included gaining partners in the form of domestic capitalist classes, divesting their land holdings and no longer being such prominent employers, which would presumably make them less prominent targets for local resistance (Bucheli 2003: 93). The transition to contract farming as a way of decreasing risk, prefigured the shift from domestic food production to non-traditional exports and re-emphasizing the traditional exports of the colonial-diasporic food regime, such as bananas, as a vehicle of capital accumulation. In the crisis period after the second food regime, this process would take place in the context of structural adjustment policies as part of loan packages from the international financial institutions.

The transition to the Cavendish banana, however, was not a simple or smooth process. Wholesalers complained that the new fruit bruised much more easily, and consumers were more accustomed to the old variety (Soluri 2003: 72). This led to Standard Fruit developing innovations in boxing and handling. Hailed as the ‘greatest innovation in the history of the banana industry’, shipping bananas in boxes rather than on the stem revolutionized the banana industry on a few fronts (Soluri 2003: 72). Bananas could now be branded as consumer products; Standard Fruit launched its newly boxed Cavendish bananas under the brand name ‘Cabana’ and the new production processes of destemming, washing and boxing enabled the company to export virtually unblemished fruit (Koeppel 2008: 150, Soluri 2003: 73). The banana companies began to focus much more on marketing as they divested their land holdings and to begin the transformation of bananas from commodity to retail product, which coincided perfectly with the
The growing popularity of supermarkets in the US. Blemish-free, branded bananas were a perfect fit with the self-service supermarket model that was spreading in the US (Soluri 2003: 74). The transition to the Cavendish banana made the packing process more labor-intensive, as the fruit was more delicate and therefore mechanization was limited (Myers 2004: 48). The Cavendish, while resistant to Panama disease, was still vulnerable to a variety of other plant diseases and combined with the growing emphasis on aesthetics as indicator of quality, the companies began to apply fungicide treatments and baths to combat fruit-spot diseases, to cover the bunches in polyethylene bags and to apply a range of chemical herbicides and pesticides, which led to environmental contamination, public health problems and increased the risk of cancers and birth defects in workers (Raynolds 2003: 34, Soluri 2003: 74). The case of thousands of male workers who became sterile as a result of prolonged exposure to nematocide DBCP on Standard Fruit plantation in Central America is indicative of the risks to plantation workers of chemical exposure (Thrupp, as cited in Raynolds 2003: 34).

Perhaps the biggest irony is that the standards to ensure ‘quality’ production created the need for intensive pesticide use, which in recent times is cause for concern both for environmental movements, workers’ movements and increasingly consumers who are concerned with food safety and pesticide contamination. As Jansen argues, ‘standards appear as an apparently neutral tool to organize and define relationships and to pacify tensions in a range of processes: the restructuring of producer-consumer relationships [and] the shaping of contract farming (with its shift from permanent unionized labour to the employment of temporary, unorganized labour)...If the arena shifts away from the state to an increased role of standard-setting by non-state actors, then it is likely that standards will no longer so easily appear as neutral tools, but instead standard-setting will in itself become politicized in the near future (2006: 111). As the next and final period I discuss shows, standard-setting does not appear to be becoming politicized as it has been firmly co-opted by supermarkets, the new powerhouses in the banana industry.
The Rise of ‘Standard Compliant’ Bananas

The banana on supermarket shelves today may be the Cavendish instead of the Gros Michel, but the three largest banana traders – Chiquita, Dole (which acquired Standard Fruit) and Del Monte (which acquired United Fruit’s Guatemalan holdings)– continue to play a major role in the international banana trade. In 2013, they controlled about 36% of global banana export volumes, though this is significantly less than their share of 65.3% in the 1980s (FAO 2014: 1). They are also aggressively addressing the increasing demand from Northern consumers for ‘standard compliant’ bananas (Potts et al. 2014) such as Fairtrade, organic and Rainforest Alliance-certified.

In 2012, about 3.3 million tonnes, or 3%, of bananas were produced under an international voluntary sustainability standard; standard-compliant banana production had grown over 12% per year between 2009 and 2012 (Potts et al. 2014: 114). In 2011, about 3% of global exports were certified organic. Three countries, the Dominican Republic (29%), Ecuador (25%) and Peru (15%), account for the majority of global organic banana production (Potts et al. 2014: 109). Certified organic bananas have been available for more than 20 years, but have seen especially strong growth since the early 2000s. The annual growth rate between 1999 and 2002 in organic banana imports was an average of about 45%, which has tapered in recent years (FAO 2003, Potts et al 2014: 109). Growth in the global organic market is led by consumer demand and can be attributed to growing concerns among Northern consumers about health, and to a lesser extent environmental issues, that has also been driven by food safety scares such as ‘mad cow’ disease, E. coli contamination and concerns over the use of hormones and GMOs in food production. Although organic certification does not make explicit health claims, consumers tend to associate organic labels with food safety and quality (Raynolds 2004: 732).

‘Alternative trade’ bananas are certified by a variety of organizations such as Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) as produced under socially and environmentally sustainable conditions and traded in that way that ostensibly fosters more equitable trading relationships (Murray and Raynolds 2000). The Fairtrade movement arose in response to consumers’ ethical concerns about
the social conditions under which goods are produced, in addition to the environmental and health concerns underlying the organic market (Raynolds 2003: 44). Fairtrade certified bananas account for about 2% of global exports, with almost all Fairtrade banana sales occurring in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Peru.

In contrast to the small export market share of organic and Fairtrade bananas, Rainforest Alliance certified bananas make up 14% of global exports, due to the organization’s direct partnership with Chiquita, which has all of its plantations in Latin America Rainforest Alliance-certified. The Rainforest Alliance initiative was originally conceived of as a ‘conservation certification’ program; social justice concerns are secondary, which is evident from their vaguely worded principle that producers must ensure ‘fair treatment and good conditions’ for workers and maintain ‘good community relations’. Their strategy involves close cooperation with dominant companies in order to have the greatest impact on conservation in the shortest amount of time (Rainforest Alliance, as cited in Murray and Raynolds 2000: 70).

The challenge that the Rainforest Alliance certification poses to the Fairtrade movement is obvious. Consumers who might already suffer from ‘label fatigue’ might not realize that the Rainforest Alliance standards do not stringently address social issues around workers’ rights. Also, since Rainforest Alliance works so closely with Chiquita, there is no risk that they will be unable to meet demand. Fairtrade bananas sometimes face supply issues in transport supply chains due to lack of vertical integration, which helps multinationals like Chiquita to ensure that produce arrives unblemished and in the right quantities (Murray and Raynolds 2000: 71). Dole subscribes to a variety of standards, including Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade and Organic. They have signed various agreements with Fairtrade initiatives and report that 100% of their Peruvian operations are certified organic. These are examples of what Friedmann describes as corporations selectively responding to consumer demand – ‘a privatized expression of demands by health and environmental movements’ (2005: 254). As Raynolds shows in her study of the boom in agro-export production in the Dominican Republic, of which bananas are a major component, consolidation in the Dominican organic banana
industry has occurred because small-scale farmers are unable to deliver the perfect and uniform fruit demanded by European supermarkets (Raynolds 2008: 178). Volume contracts and increasing international competition are also leading to concentration among exporters. In sum, supermarkets are reinforcing mainstream pressures such as quality defined by industrial and market conventions, as opposed to the social and ecological features that were part of the original ethos of the organic and fairtrade movements.

The intensity of mergers, acquisitions and internal growth of supermarkets in the global North, and increasingly in emerging markets as well, has led to increasing competition among retailers. The banana trade is a crucial part of retail business: in the US, banana sales may constitute up to 10% of total produce department sales and account for up to 1% of store sales and 1.7% of store gross margins (AmericaFruit, as cited in UNCTAD 2003: 32). Supermarkets have increasingly squeezed the multinational banana companies in an effort to compete with each other on price, which has resulted in even lower wages for workers and deteriorating working conditions (Myers 2004: 141). Major supermarket chains in the US and EU are also increasingly purchasing from smaller wholesalers or directly from growers which has become easier due to the establishment of direct container services from South America to Europe and Russia, which has shifted market power away from the banana multinationals (FAO 2014: 3).

In the increasing production/consumption of ‘standard compliant’ bananas, we can see once again that these processes are mutually constitutive. Consumers’ growing concerns about health and the environment as well as social issues around exploitation and unequal terms of trade in the banana industry have fueled the demand for organic, Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance-certified bananas. But increasing production of certified bananas is also the result of the banana multinationals’ branding strategies and attempts to hold on to market share, as well as part of strategies by producing countries such as the Dominican Republic, to increase export earnings in niche agro-export markets, often in order to service national debt (Raynolds 2008: 167). As for the potential of standard compliant bananas to reform the sector, it is clear that it will be an uphill battle and leads to further unveiling of the banana as commodity. Even as consumers buy and
producers export more organic, Fairtrade or Rainforest Alliance certified bananas, the lives of plantation workers and small-scale farmers continue to be ignored in the inexorable rush of capital’s drive to accumulate.

Koeppel makes a compelling argument that organic bananas are not the likely solution to the environmental and health hazards posed by the agrochemical-intensive nature of the banana plantation industry. He argues that the banana is vulnerable to all manner of fungi and disease because of its genetic homogeneity. What makes it easy to cultivate also endangers its survival. Organic bananas are most commonly grown in quarantined farms at higher altitudes, which diminishes yields, or traditionally in intercropping arrangements, which has the same limits in terms of scale (Koeppel 2008: 233, Raynolds 2003: 37). Perhaps the biggest problem is that the Northern consumer has become so used to a commoditized banana that standards take priority over everything else. Perhaps if consumers were more forgiving of blemishes, and uneven-sized bunches, there would be more room to envision a more environmentally and socially sustainable form of banana production.

Conclusion
As the above discussion of the three periods of banana production/consumption shows, it is often not clear which takes precedence or is the driving factor for changing social relations in each period. In the first stage of banana production, at the end of the 19th century, when bananas first became a common fruit in the US, the fruit was touted for its health benefits and convenience. It also entered the popular imagination at least partially because of its suggestive shape and its association with democratic ideals and mass consumption. The dramatic growth in banana consumption in this period was enabled by the consolidation of so-called Banana Empires, characterized by vertical integration and consolidation of extensive railroad and shipping networks, made necessary by the long distances that the fruit had to travel between producers and consumers. In the second stage of banana production, from the 1950s to the 1970s, the spread of Panama disease drove the shift from the Gros Michel to the more easily bruised Cavendish variety. This led to innovations in how bananas were transported, and an increase in fungicide and pesticide use, that coincided with growing consumer demand for
uniform and unblemished fruit and the rise of supermarkets in the US. In more recent years, growing consumer awareness and demand for ‘standard-compliant’ bananas have driven the growth in production of organic, Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance-certified bananas. In the context of the emerging corporate-environmental food regime, it is important for concerned citizens to be aware of the political and contested nature of standard-setting, and how easily standards originally created to protect workers and the environment can be co-opted by agribusiness capital. The role of the state, which has not been the center of my analysis, is crucial here as it can safeguard small-holders and consumers’ interests, or allow corporations free rein. Although my focus in this broad historical journey has been the overarching development of production/consumption relations in a capital-intensive industry where corporate power has long dominated, banana plantation workers and small-holders are the often invisible anchor of the narrative. The story of the shifting balance of production/consumption relations that stretch from the plantation to the breakfast table would not be complete without them. More research could be done to bring their side of the story to the table and to add their agency to the story of corporate power and consumer desire that has coalesced around America’s favorite fruit.

References


11. Milking money

Author: Giulia Simula

“If they increase the price of milk it does not matter because some time after the price of the animal feed will increase anyway.”
(Milk producer in the documentary by Pani and Carboni, 2013)

“Faced with the growing threat of dispossession, declining terms of trade and increasingly unstable markets for their output, small farmers are arguably the biggest losers of the financial transformation of food provisioning.”
(Isakson 2014)

This paper is about milk, small-farmers, feed, dependency, distance, speculation, fake milk, and the financial turn of big actors in the milk commodity chain. The driving question in this paper is: How does financialization have an impact in influencing the price, the value of a commodity, in this case of milk?

The question of value has been and still is one of the main driving questions of political economists. Answering this question is extremely difficult. In fact there is no exact answer to this compelling issue. Value is constantly debated. Therefore the answer to this is not going to be provided in this paper. However, this paper will deal with the financialization of agriculture has created further distance between those who produce commodities and those who determine its exchange value. The chronic crisis of the dairy sector in Europe makes milk an interesting lens to look at the financialization of agriculture and, more specific, the mechanisms through which value is extracted from the periphery -small scale milk producers- and concentrated to the centre -processing and distributing companies both on upstream an downstream markets-.

The focus will be the impact of financial mechanisms upon small-scale milk producers. The main argument that I will try to highlight is that small farmers are squeezed between two markets, which increasingly rely on financial tools
in order to make profit. It will be argued that financial capital -which includes both ‘traditional’ financial actors, interested into food and agriculture, as well as food corporations going financial- is using mechanisms once implemented to protect farmers in order to accumulate profit. Moreover, the rationale driving agribusinesses processing companies is increasingly confined to profit maximization and increasing market shares. These mechanisms have the effect of i) further concentrating power in the hands of big businesses ii) shifting the control further away from producers diminishing their bargaining power in negotiating prices and iii) supporting an idea of value which is increasingly related to financial motives.

This paper is divided in three main blocks: 1) Analytical framework 2) Overview of the commodity chain 3) Analysis of mechanisms of financialization. Firstly, I will explain my analytical framework and place milk in a commodity complex. This will justify my choice of talking about the intersection between the milk and feed chains. I will argue that the internationalization of livestock and milk production has increased dependence of small farmers upon inputs companies on one side and upon milk processing companies on the other side. Then, the financialization of the main companies involved in this chain is having consequences that deserve being explored as it is further exacerbating dependency through new and different mechanisms. After having explained the main concepts that inspired my paper, I will give a brief overview of milk in Europe and in Italy and I will also look at some data on feed, particularly soy which has been increasingly used in Europe as animal feed (this connects us to the standardization of global practices). I will then go on to talk about the financial turn of grain companies, the speculation on commodities by financial investors and the political economy of speculation. In the last section, I will look at the case of Parmalat as an illustrative case of how financialization is facilitating value extraction from small producers and consumers leading to a further concentration of power in the hands of big companies. Processing and distribution companies have distorted the notion of ‘value’ increasingly favouring exchange value over use value. In this way, ‘adding value’ is not necessarily the main preoccupation for these companies but rather making money in processes (that do not necessarily add something to the initial product) becomes central. Banks and politicians alike support this behaviour because they are themselves stakeholder in the process.
1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This paper is mainly inspired by three masterpieces. The first two papers are Sanderson’s (1986) paper: “The emergence of the “world steer”: Internationalization and foreign domination in Latin American cattle production” and Friedmann’s (1992) paper: “Distance and durability: Shaky foundations of the world food economy”. The third one is a paper written by Isakson (2014) on the financial transformation of agro-food supply chains. These papers offer me the analytical tools to argue that small-scale farmers have firstly been introduced in global commodity chains and became dependent from external inputs provided by distribution companies (Sanderson, 1986; van der Ploeg, 2008). At a second level, the financialization of agriculture has further decreased small farmers’ bargaining power and their capacity to control prices and further increased the distance between producers and consumers, and producers with other actors in the commodity chain (Isakson, 2014; Clapp, 2014)

Commodity complexes: milk as part of a more complex chain / feed and milk intersecting chains.
Sanderson and Friedmann look at commodity chains from the perspective of complexes. In other words, they both look at the interrelation between different types of commodities and at how cattle, wheat and soy cannot be treated as independent commodities but as key elements of commodity complexes, in particular the foodgrain-feedgrain-livestock complex. This line of reasoning, made me think that when looking at the global structure of the milk chain as well as the local level, I cannot avoid contextualising this chain into a broader picture. The milk chain intersects deeply with -among others- the grain chain and the feed chain. Therefore if I want to look at small-scale milk producers and at their decreasing power vis-à-vis big actors, I cannot look only at the milk processing companies or retailers but also at grain processing companies and distributors of feed. I will therefore look at the intersection between the milk and the grain chain.

To justify my choice of looking at the growing power of grain and feed companies, in a milk commodity chain analysis, I found the “world steer” concept used by Sanderson useful in order to understand the global and political character of livestock production and consequentially dairy products. To explain the
international character of beef production, Sanderson (1986) suggests the emergence of a “world steer”. This expression refers to the international standardization of production. Even though cattle (or other animals for that matter) are raised in one specific place, the way in which production is organized and structured is global in nature. For example animal diets are increasingly similar regardless of the place of origin, as well as the way animals are fed, the medical treatments and added vitamins given to animals and the slaughtering process that is becoming increasingly centralised. This global restructuring, of course is political in nature (Friedmann, 1992).

Friedmann stresses the emergence of a world meat sector with feed inputs sourced globally and meat related commodities sold in the global market (1992: 378). The production of meat and feed was reorganised globally undermining local, more ‘traditional’ types of production through for example imports of feed. In this regard the literature has concentrated greatly to the ‘global South’. B, but even in Europe, maize and soy imports contributed to changing animal diets (as well as human diet and lately bio-energy consumption) and to rendering small farmers more dependent from external inputs. At the same this facilitated the concentration of power in the hands of grain and feed corporations on one side and of processing corporations (of milk, meat, dairies) on the other side.

**The financial transformation**

The internationalization of cattle production helps me to understand 1) the importance of feed companies in the livestock complex –of which milk is part- 2) the international character of the food grain-feed-livestock complex and 3) the growing dependence of small farmers upon external inputs. The next step that I am interested in is the qualitative change that happened in the accumulation of capital once the big processing companies on both sides of the chain (grain and dairy) started relying more and more on financial mechanisms in order to accumulate capital.

For this reason, I will draw extensively from Isakson’s paper in order to understand the process of financialization in the grain and feed industries in Italy as well as the financial motives driving milk processing companies. As defined in his
financialization refers to the increasing importance of financial motives, financial actors, financial markets and financial institutions in the operation of economies and their governing institutions” (Isakson, 2014:750).

I will look at first the financial mechanisms used by grain and feed companies and their growing power and on the other side the milk processing companies and their financial turn. The first mechanism is the creation of financial products and speculation in the context of grain and feed firms increasingly engaging in financial activities. I will argue that if contracts such as futures and other derivatives were born as a way to provide security for small farmers, after the privatization of risk management mechanisms, as Isakson calls it, they became a big source of price volatility and instability for small farmers. Krippner (as cited in Isakson: 750) understands financialization as “the tendency for profit making in the economy to occur increasingly through financial channels rather than through productive activities”. I will use the example of the Italian dairy company Parmalat to look at how this becomes increasingly true.

METHODS

I started this commodity chain analysis with the intention of looking at sheep milk and sheep dairy products. However, I found out that finding data about the main buyers, sellers and about their involvement in financial activities is extremely difficult when looking at a commodity that is not widely researched by others. For this reason I switched my attention to milk in general, a commodity that is slightly more studied at the global and European level. Even so, finding the main actors in the chain - and for the purpose of this paper, their financial involvement - was a very difficult task.

This was a loud and clear lesson for me in regards to commodity fetishism that Marx (1867) has referred to. The commodity form, the cell of the capitalist system, fetishize or masks the human social relations behind commodities making it

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1 I have found that hardly any study that critically analyses the crisis in the dairy sector in Europe or in ‘developed countries’ and the financialization of the sector.
extremely difficult to understand how commodities and their values are created. Who participate in the decision on how values are given and measured? Who has more voice in the process? Understanding the actors behind commodities is a starting point for a process of defetishization to unveil the hidden costs behind commodities.

Through desk research I have been able to understand some of the main actors in the feed/grain production and distribution node and some of the main actors in the milk processing node, thanks to reports drawn by organizations such as Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, Grain and so on. The FAO statistic website was useful to get data about production levels and import/export but it provides less data regarding to where commodities are exported to. The limited time and the impossibility to do some “following the commodity” research on the field will result in a paper that at times presents information and data that are not fully connected among each other - or at least that are more connected at the conceptual level than at the practical/evidence-based level-. The most important thing that I learnt through this paper is certainly that ‘following the thing’, as Cook (2004) puts it, is not easy.

2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN THE MILK AND FEED CHAIN GLOBALLY AND AT THE ITALIAN LEVEL.

“Nothing is more important to food and farming in the EU than dairy. It makes up about a fifth of the EU’s total agricultural production, and about a fifth of the global milk supply is consumed in the EU. But European dairy farming is in profound crisis.” (GRAIN, 2011:8).

This quote, from a report elaborated by Grain, shows the importance of the dairy sector in Europe. Countries such as France and Italy are iconic for their cheese production around the world and proudly use this status as a marketing strategy to export their products as high quality and embedded in culture and tradition. Germany is the biggest producer of milk in the EU producing twice as much as Italy and contributing to the 4% of the global output. The EU as a whole is an
important global actor in the production of dairies. As shown in table 1 the EU-25 represents about 20% of the world’s total milk production (when we include all types of milk). India and the USA are the other leading countries. When put together they provide the other 30% of the global output.

When looking at the top 10 commodities produced in Western Europe, milk is the first one. The high level of milk and livestock production in Europe is highly connected to the political reasons behind the boom of meat production and consumption after WWII that Friedmann (1992) talks about.

Table 1: Milk production in 2009 for world, EU and selected countries. Totals in tonnes and shares by animal type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions/Countries</th>
<th>Milk Total</th>
<th>Share of world total</th>
<th>Share of national total by animal type</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All milk</td>
<td>Cows’ milk</td>
<td>Cow</td>
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<td></td>
<td>per cent</td>
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<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>702,137</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>83.1</td>
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<td>EU-27</td>
<td>152,260</td>
<td>21.7</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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Source: EU Report, 2011
Italy
Within Europe, Italy is one of the important actors in the production of milk and dairy products being 4th in production after Germany, France and the UK. Milk production - as well as feed distribution- is more concentrated in the North of Italy (Mottura and Mingione, 1991).

The majority of milk that is produced is used to produce cheese. Italy produces around 1million tons of cheese and exports around 200/300 thousands tons abroad (FAOSTATS, figure 5).
Figure 2: Cows distribution in Italy

Source: Bedino and Morisiasco (not specified)

Figure 3: Milk production and processing in Italy

Source: Bedino and Morisiasco
Table 2: Production of cheese in the EU by member state, 2000-2010, 1000t

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<td>371</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EU Report, 2011

Figure 4: Where does the milk come from and who process it?

Source: Bedino and Morisiasco
Feed

Forage production in Italy is quite high. However, much of the raw material that is used for other types of feed is imported from elsewhere (van Gelder et al. 2008). Soy has gradually become a big component of animal feed everywhere, including Europe. Much of the soy imports in the EU comes from Argentina and Brazil and is used as animal feed and biofuel (ibid.). The dependence from imports makes buyers of feed - i.e. milk producers - vulnerable to price fluctuations (Figure 9).

Figure 5: Forage production in Italy

Source: FAOSTAT

Table 3: Soy meal used in types of animal compound feed in the EU-27 (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of animal compound feed</th>
<th>Production volume 1,000 tonnes</th>
<th>Estimated soy meal content %</th>
<th>Volume of soy meal in compound feed 1,000 tonnes</th>
<th>% of EU soy meal</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle - meat</td>
<td>12,148</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<td>Cattle - dairy</td>
<td>27,852</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>2,893</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<td>Pigs</td>
<td>51,440</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>14,815</td>
<td>41%</td>
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<td>Poultry - broilers</td>
<td>30,929</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>11,389</td>
<td>32%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poultry - layers</td>
<td>15,532</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>3,477</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other animals (incl. pet food)</td>
<td>9,522</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>1,577</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>147,423</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>35,834</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

Source: van Gelder et al 2008
In between two markets

Even when cheese export levels go up, the dairy sector is hit by constant cyclical crisis. The main ‘losers’ of this crisis are small producers that during the past decades have protested in front of national governments and the EU for fair milk prices (Marshall, 2014). The reoccurring story is that small producers are not able to cover their costs of production. Therefore a litre of milk is paid less than the money small-farmers invest to produce it (investments in feed, veterinaries, machineries and so on) (van der Ploeg, 2008).
In the middle of the year, roughly around summer time, small producers and milk buyers (processing companies) negotiate the price of milk (Mannia, 2014). The majority of milk producers organize in cooperatives in order to have a greater bargaining power vis-à-vis processing companies (Grain, 2011). But both milk and feed companies have the oligopolistic power over price making (van der Ploeg, 2008). Milk stays in between two big markets where power and control are highly concentrated in the hands of big corporations: the market of food-grain, feed-grain on one side, and that of milk and dairy processing companies on the other side. The main actors in both of these markets are increasingly relying on financial instruments in order to make profit (GRAIN, 2011). The political and social consequences of this shift are greater than thought. Small farmers’ indebtedness has become a reason of social differentiation and restructuring in the rural domain (Gerber 2014).

“The processors don’t seem to understand it. Why do they cut prices? Because they can […] look at the cars they drive - who’s making a living out of milk? I can tell you, as a dairy farmer, I’m not.” (Marshall, 2014)

With these words, David Handley, the Chairman of the Farmers for Action (FFA) organization, condemn the squeezing of small farmers by processors. Even though the FFA represents dairy farmers in the UK, this situation is familiar to many...
farmers around Europe. The constant situation is that the price paid for milk does not even cover the average cost of production, even in situations where cheese production goes up (ibid.). Then the question that I am interested to explore is: who are the actors that influence changes in price and, if the cost of producing milk goes up, why aren’t farmers paid more? Who extracts the value from small farmers?

3. THE FINANCIAL TURN OF THE ACTORS IN THE CHAIN.

Speculation of grains: increasing farmers’ vulnerability and increasing distance.
One of the main difficulties for small milk producers is covering their costs of production. The fluctuating price of animal feed is very important in this regard. Even before negotiating the prices of milk and selling milk to processing companies, small farmers have to deal with all the costs involved in raising their animals (Mannia, 2014). As mentioned above, meat production has increasingly been homogenized in the past decades (and this is an on-going process). This has resulted in the changing type of feed used to raise animals and in the specialization of certain companies in feed and more in general input production. In Italy for example, ‘scientific research’ has shown that by feeding soya to animals, the percentage of protein and fats composition in the milk gives a better quality of milk that will result in better dairy products. Echoing Tomlinson (2013) on the political nature of statistic, science as well is not neutral and objective and it reflects political interests and the global restructuring of global capital. Without entering into a discussion on the political nature of scientific research, what is of interest for the purpose of this analysis is that the power of feed corporations has increased. Their ability to provide diversified feed to small farmers together with the elimination of state subsidies has left small farmers dependent from feed companies (Mottura and Mingione, 1991).

Feed companies going financial
Most of the official explanations of the rising food prices -including those of basic commodities such as grains- have looked at changes in supply and demand as the main factors influencing price spikes (Clapp, 2009). During the food crisis of 2007-2008, analysts and politicians alike have argued that the high demand was
not met by the increase in production and this resulted in a shortage of food and consequently to an increase in price. Clapp recognises that the stocks of grain were at an historical low level during the period of the crisis. However, if the price rise were purely a result of production and shortage, the world would have faced the same deep crisis in 2004 when again the stocks of grains reached very low levels (ibid: 1185). But this was not the case; so, there is evidence to show that other factors -among which the speculation on agricultural commodities- played an important role in determining the sharp fluctuation of prices.

As Isakson (2014) notes, this is one of the mechanisms used by agricultural companies such as the biggest global grain traders, the ABCDs that benefit from selling financial products to commodity traders. After the privatization of grain storages under the neoliberal restructuring the situation with food supplies has become more uncertain. Therefore, those who know more about the supply state are clearly the major grain traders who have contact with the producers and whomanage the distribution. For this reason the financial products that they offer are very appealing to commodity speculators (ibid.).

The main feed companies in Italy are: Veronesi, Martini, Amadori, Mignini/Petrini and Cargill (Cevaloni, 2012). These five companies together control more than the 40% of the feed market in Italy². As Isakson argues, there is significant evidence that the food trade and processing companies have increasingly become more financialized in recent years. “Characteristic of the financialization process, this has entailed food traders and processors diversifying into - and earning an increasing revenue of their revenues from - financial activities” (Isakson 2014). Evidence shows that Cargill has basically become a financial enterprise (Murphy et al., 2012). And it is also true for other important feed companies in the Italian context like Veronesi (L’arena, 2014).

² But the major grain traders, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus, collectively known as the ABCD traders, share a significant presence in a range of basic commodities, controlling, for example, as much as 90 per cent of the global grain trade. (Murphy et al., 2012)
Banks investing in agriculture
This phenomenon goes both ways: not only have agricultural companies increasingly invested in financial means to grow, but also banks, typically financial actors have increasingly been interested in agricultural commodities. A typical example of banks involvement can be seen by the creation of new investment products. They have managed to simplify and standardise financial products in order to sell them as an investment like any other, presented to investment funds as a great way to diversify portfolios (FoEE, 2012). Goldman Sachs for example has brought together a number of commodities into a single tool: the Goldman Sachs commodity index fund (Kaufman, 2011). This tool is almost detached from the actual market regarding commodities and it therefore requires little knowledge about it. For this reason, big investments funds, sovereign funds and pension funds have increasingly been interested to invest in these products thereby fuelling a speculative bubble and exposing farmers to even more volatility (FoEE, 2012).

Agricultural companies investing in financial products are not the only evidence of financialization of agriculture. The growing role of banks is also telling. Isakson says that the inputs companies are also increasingly involved in the provision of credit. In the dairy industry in Europe, it is difficult to find research on the topic or credit schemes that are provided by feed companies to small-scale producers. However, there is evidence showing that, with the neoliberal restructuring and austerity policies, the credit schemes and European subsidies that were previously handled by regional governments have been dismantled or passed onto banks to deal with rural credit schemes (Mannia, 2014).

Before the neoliberal wave of the 1980s and 90s, nation-states provided protection to agricultural producers through a number of mechanisms such as price support, quotas, purchasing boards, subsidies etc. These instruments helped agricultural producers to manage risk at the national level. The agricultural sector is in fact a very risky one, predisposed to weather changes, fluctuation of prices, changes in demand and supply and so on. With neoliberal and austerity policies, the state was declared an inefficient actor in controlling agricultural risk and risk was assigned a monetary value. Isakson (2014) refers to this mechanism as the privatization of agricultural risk. The responsibility to manage risk was thereby given to private
actors rather than the state. As one of the ways to manage risk, futures were initially designed in order to offer protection for producers and buyers against price fluctuation. Futures are a type of derivative that consists in a contract signed between producers and buyers to lock prices. The two parties agree that at a specific time in the future, the producer will supply a given amount of product at a pre-established price. This allows both to negotiate a certain price and to be less exposed to possible fluctuations in the future.

"Not only did a grain “future” help to keep the price of a loaf of bread at the bakery – or later, the supermarket – stable, but the market allowed farmers to hedge against lean times, and to invest in their farms and businesses. The result: Over the course of the 20th century, the real price of wheat decreased (despite a hiccup or two, particularly during the 1970s inflationary spiral), spurring the development of American agribusiness." (Kaufman, 2014)

However, “having been privatized, agricultural risk is now being financialized” (Isakson, 2014: 756). The process of financialization has undermined the initial positive effects of risk management privatization.

Political economy of commodity speculation: winners and losers.

"Speculation is a zero-sum game. Just like in a casino, there are as many losers as there are winners in the game. But the casino, or bank, always wins (through fees and commission).” (FoEE, 2012)

When contracts are initially stipulated between producers and buyers, it could be argued that both parties have an interest in the agricultural commodity itself. But once these contracts go into the stock market and are sold as a commodity in itself, the connection with the real commodity is lost. Speculators are interested in the price movements rather than in the commodity itself. If futures and derivatives used to help both the producers and the buyers, now speculation has increasingly been associated with price volatility (Ghosh et al. in Isakson, 2014:759). It could be argued that speculation contributes to liquidity by boosting demand for agricultural commodity. If there is more demand for a certain product, prices tend to go up and this can insure a better remuneration for farmers. However,
speculation also distorts market prices by sending wrong signals. In the period of the financial crisis for example, wheat prices increased by 136% and soya by 107% because large amounts of money were poured into commodities. These investments are like a hot potato. Everyone wants to buy but nobody wants to keep the contract. The idea is to sell it before the price goes down. But once investors retreat, price fall and the financial market collapse just as it happened in 2008 (Clapp 2014)

“Countering Irwin and Sanders (2010), Spratt (2013) and Ghosh et al. (2012) maintain that activity in futures markets can, in fact, impact actual commodity prices by shaping expectations. Given that private actors control most food stocks in the neoliberal era and that information regarding those stocks is proprietary, participants in actual grain markets have limited information about market fundamentals and, thus, look to the futures markets for guidance (Spratt 2013). In other words, buyers and sellers in spot markets look to the futures markets when determining prices, thus jumping on the investor-led bandwagon. Indeed, price changes in futures markets are increasingly leading price changes in spot markets for key commodities like wheat, corn and soybeans (Hernandez and Torero 2010), suggesting that financial actors in agricultural derivatives markets are directly influencing global food prices.” (Isakson, 2014:759)

Those who have profited from speculation and from increasingly instable prices are the speculators themselves. The question that Isakson rightly pose is whether their speculation is directly creating the volatility from which they benefit. There are enough evidences to show that big agricultural companies and financial institutions have benefitted from these financial activities and, when in trouble, they have also benefitted from nation-states who rescues them from the accumulated huge debts. Cargill, one of the biggest corporation worldwide and an important actor in the Italian feed market, acknowledges that its strong performance, especially when food prices are most volatile, is also due to financial activities (Murphy et al. 2012:22).
The effects of price fluctuation on small producers on the other hand can be devastating in two major ways. Firstly, the financialization of agricultural commodities depoliticizes price fluctuations. With the increasing influence of speculation in determining market prices, the control of small farmers on the prices and their ability to influence them diminishes considerably. The number of actors that influence the price increases, as does the distance between farmers and the end consumers. Financial mechanisms are extremely complicated to understand and the dynamics and functioning of the stock markets are not even clear to economists themselves that are unable to predict crisis and market cycles. Moreover, the language used by analysts of financial markets is so technical that it automatically excludes those people who do not have an expertise in the matter. For this reason, it is much easier to justify price fluctuations as a technical issue rather than a political one. This is yet another way to fetishize commodities. Secondly, the decentralised nature of financial markets makes it very difficult to pin-point the direct effects of specific investments. For this reason, it is difficult to causally link a particular investment to hunger or price change in a specific time and place. “The new forms of distancing, in other words, have expanded the opportunity for powerful agents within commodity chains to shade costs” (Clapp 2014). These costs are paid by small farmers that with decreasing prices of milk and increases inputs prices are increasingly squeezed between two markets.
Financialization of processing companies: it’s rotten milk but…hey it pays the banks!

Table 4: top 20 global dairy corporations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dairy sales in US$ billions, 2009</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Nestlé</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Danone</td>
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<td>Arla Foods</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Mortonalea Milk Industry</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Grain, 2011

As Isakson argues, processing companies have increasingly been driven by financial motives and values. The first value Isakson refers to is the ‘shareholder value’. This value has been predominant over other values such as producing healthy food or high quality products and has led companies to concentrate more on maximizing returns and consequentially to reduce costs in any possible ways and increasing revenues (Isakson, 2014).
The big milk giant Parmalat\(^3\) offers a clear example of how shareholder values have prevailed over other values. The first evidence is illustrated by Parmalat's growing strategy that aims at maximizing return but essentially built on debts and mortgaging. The second illustration of the predominance of shareholder value is given by the 'latte fresco blu' launched by the company in order to reduce costs at the minimum through outsourcing (and importing milk from eastern Europe) despite the health hazards that this created (van der Ploeg, 2008). The 'Parmalat finanziaria' i.e. its growth strategy has basically created a food giant with feet of clay\(^4\). All the big dairy companies have pushed to grow and expand globally in the past decades (GRAIN, 2011). Parmalat has done the same acquiring presence in more than 30 countries (van der Ploeg, 2008) and buying companies in Europe, Latin America and the USA. However, the company used mortgaging as a mechanism for expansion.

Figure 8: “The mechanics of expansion through mortgaging”

![Diagram](source: van der Ploeg, 2008: 89)

This means, as van der Ploeg (2008) effectively illustrates, that companies were bought by incurring huge debts and therefore together with the company market shares, debts were increasing too. As it is clear in the picture, Enterprise 1 is mortgaged in order to buy Enterprise 2 and the chain goes on until the bubble bursts. This is possible because loans taken in order to buy other enterprises

\(^3\) Parmalat started to collapse in 2004 and then was partly bought in 2011 by the French company Lactalis making the French company the second biggest one globally (Chalikidou, 2011).

\(^4\) Expression taken by van der Ploeg, 2008:91.
are transformed themselves into commodities and then sold as shares in the stock market. This is a way to move the risk away from banks and towards the stockholders and is justified by the expectation of future growth of the company itself, in this case Parmalat. Somehow, this can also be interpreted as waste (or risk) that becomes value for someone else as soon as it is resold as a commodity. As debts grow parallel to the company, no extra value is produced whatsoever as van der Ploeg argues. The only thing that the company does is concentrating control. Everything sticks together by the trust that creditors and shareholders have in the future growth of the company. In order to create and keep this trust alive Parmalat previsions of the future growth of the company were overly optimistic and actually constituted fraud (Chalkidou, 2011).

“In 2004, Parmalat’s debts are fixed at €14.3bn, eight times what the firm had admitted. After initial denials, Luca Sala, Bank of America’s former chief of corporate finances in Italy, admits to participating in a kickback scheme. Furious US creditors file a $10bn class action suit against Parmalat’s former auditors and bankers while Parmalat’s administrators under replacement chief executive Enrico Bondi separately sue Bank of America, Citigroup, Deloitte & Touche and Grant Thornton for $10bn each. The US SEC calls the affair a ‘brazen corporate financial fraud’” (Chalkidou, 2011)

The quotesuggests the extensive relationships between Parmalat and several financial big names involved in providing credit and briberies. Interestingly enough, Enrico Bondi who was appointed as CEO of Parmalat in order to rescue the company from the financial disaster also became part of the Monti administration\(^5\) in 2012 in order to take care of the spending review and the growing sovereign debt.

**Political economy of financialization: Milking money from small farmers.**

It is evident how Parmalat was not confined to being a milk processing company anymore; its links with finance, banks, politicians and its involvement in bribery, investments, and mortgages made it a company primarily driven by financial

\(^5\) The Monti cabinet was appointed as a so-called ‘technocratic government’ explicitly selected in order to introduce austerity measures.
motives - as it is increasingly the case for processing companies (as noted by Isakson, 2014). The principles that motivated the company were very far from those of creating quality or healthy products. In fact, during the last years before the Parmacrac the company introduced a new product called “Latte Fresco Blu” fresh blue milk. This was essentially raw milk imported from Poland, put through a process of microfiltration in a plant located in Berlin and consumed in Italy around a month later sold as “fresh milk” (van der Ploeg, 2008). Since the adjective blue was put together with the word fresh, it was legally possible to include the name fresh in the name. Van der Ploeg refers to this food as food without identity and as ‘lookalike’ food.

It is clear from the Parmalat growth strategy and from the way problems are fixed that the modus operandi of this processing company is only profit. The healthiness, quality or origin of the products is of no concern. Nor are of any concern the costs paid by small farmers in order to produce milk. Value is extracted from both the consumers and the producers and concentrated in the centre thereby enriching the company that rather than creating value per se, it “simply takes over (expropriates) and accumulates value produced at the lower level and at the periphery of the system” (van der Ploeg, 2008:100).

CONCLUSION

I started this commodity chain analysis with a quote by an Italian dairy farmer and with the intention of better understanding the crisis faced by small-scale milk producers in Italy. The lived experiences of small farmers that talked about problems related to the price of milk but also to the price of feed (in the documentary Pani and Carboni, 2013) guided me to look at the intersection between these two chains. Being dependent from the big actors in both chains, small-scale producers have been among the main losers of the financial turn taken in recent decades. The main actors in the feed and milk chain have capitalised on others’ losses even if sometime the bubble have burst earlier than expected like in the case of Parmalat.

6 i.e. the collapse of the company
“Distancing has [...] obscured the impact of financial investments on the global food system in ways that complicate the efforts of campaigners to engage the general public and that open the door for competing narratives to undermine campaigners’ goals” (Clapp, 2014:810).

Has Clapp argues, distance is not only geographical. Distance also refers to the creation of obscure financial tools that facilitate new ways of accumulation and are embedded in complex markets and new values. In order to reduce this virtual and physical distance, the first step to de-fetishize is making an effort to understand how this mechanisms work and making an even greater effort of politicizing the financialization of agriculture. This may seem like a not so “active” way of constructing an alternative but given the complexity of financial mechanisms of accumulation, understanding their political character and implications is certainly the first step to uncover what is often portrayed as the ‘natural’ functioning of markets and as ‘technical things’. Many social movements have already taken this effort as already mentioned by Clapp (2014). My paper was a first attempt of understanding some of the actors and mechanisms of financialization in the context of milk in Italy, and maybe after having written this paper I will be able to better articulate how behind the financial market there are indeed economic interests rather than only technical fluctuations.

Moreover, the creation of alternatives and diversification towards other markets is vital to reduce dependence from big traders and vulnerability from price fluctuations. “The more the farm is distantiated from the large upstream markets (and imperial control rooted in them), the larger the room for manoeuvre to construct the new alternatives on the downstream side” (van der Ploeg, 2010:20). The GRAIN report (2011:30) concludes by stressing why the dairy sector should constitute an important part of food sovereignty. “Dairy is a cornerstone in the construction of food sovereignty. It touches so many people: estimates are that around 14% of the world’s population depend directly on dairy production for their livelihoods [...] milk must remain in the hands of the people.”
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12. Where is the State in the Corporate Food Regime?

Author: Wei-Li Woo

Against the backdrop of persistent global hunger, especially in rural areas of the Global South, and recent food price crises, Holt Gimenez and Shattuck attempt to point out areas of transformative potential in the landscape of food movements that have sprung up in response to the problems associated with industrial, corporate food provisioning. In their article, ‘Food crises, food regimes and food movements: rumblings of reform or tides of transformation’, Holt Gimenez and Shattuck distinguish between the ‘Neoliberal’, ‘Reformist’, ‘Progressive’ and ‘Radical’ trends within the corporate food regime and global food movements (Holt Gimenez and Shattuck 2011). Using a Polanyian analysis of the ‘double-movement’ of society between market liberalism and state intervention, which mitigates the dislocating forces of marketization, they show how food movements, governments and corporations seek to influence and control the food system. ‘When applied to capitalist food regimes, the Polanyian thesis suggests that under social pressure even strongly liberal food regimes can undergo substantive, regulatory policy change’ (ibid.: 113). Holt Gimenez and Shattuck conclude that ‘regime change will require sustained pressure from a strong global food movement, built on durable alliances between Progressive and Radical trends’ (ibid.: 109).

Holt Gimenez and Shattuck see possibilities for change in the food system if the Progressive and Radical trends can join forces to apply ‘concerted social pressure’, as well as ‘advance clear political proposals’ (ibid.: 136), but acknowledge that it is unclear that the Progressive elements will go down this track rather than being co-opted by ‘the growing Reformist-Progressive discourse asserting that ‘we need all solutions’ to confront the tremendous challenge of global hunger (read: sustainable agriculture and industrial agriculture; free trade and certified fair trade)’ (ibid.: 133). They also recognize that ‘the focus on mobilizing local communities to solve local problems constitutes both a strength and a weakness of Progressive
food justice movements. Energizing grassroots constituencies and creating innovative models also results in a “patchwork” of successes and failures (Bellows and Hamm 2002) that does little to challenge the structure of the corporate food regime’ (ibid.: 125).

In this essay, I argue that scholars should not consider the food regime as a thing in itself, as implied in Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck’s above statements. As McMichael reminds us, the food regime is a ‘historical concept’, ‘not a structural formation in itself so much as an attribute or an optic on one or more historical conjunctures…and can be considered to be simply an analytical device to pose specific questions about the structuring processes in the global political-economy, and/or global food relations, at any particular moment’ (McMichael 2009: 148). I argue that their analysis can be sharpened by paying more attention to how elements of the Progressive trend are making political demands, and if those demands are being met. The strength in the Progressive movement of focusing on local and grassroots activities can also be a weakness, especially if demands for political change are not well-articulated or not articulated at all and responsibility for safeguarding citizens’ interests is devolved to civil society. I will further apply a Polanyian analysis to show that it is important for the state to occupy a more central role in debates that aim to unpack if and how food movements can roll back neoliberal policies and resist the corporatization of the food system and commodification of food. Resistance to the corporate food regime must mobilize the state project as well to be successful; social movements cannot do it alone.

**Food regime analysis as an analytical frame**

Much has been written on the food regime since McMichael and Friedmann initially formulated it as a concept that links ‘international relations of food production and consumption to forms of accumulation broadly distinguishing periods of capitalist transformation since 1870’ (Friedmann and McMichael 1989: 95). McMichael and Friedmann traced the food regime from its first appearance in the 1870s-1930s, as a political and economic order premised on Europe, particularly Britain, receiving imports from its tropical colonies as well as cheap wheat and beef from settler colonies. This trade flow, in the context of a consolidating free trade system, fed the emerging European working classes...
and enabled Britain to become the ‘workshop of the world’ (McMichael 2009: 141). The second food regime, which structured global agri-food relations from the 1950s-70s, was characterized by the US, the emerging global power, sending surplus food to a developing informal empire of postcolonial states as part of its Cold War containment strategy. This flow of ‘food aid’ subsidized industrialization in states friendly to the US. These dumping practices also resulted in the widespread dispossession of peasants from the countryside, who migrated to burgeoning cities to form part of growing marginal surplus populations there. The postcolonial developmental states also adopted Green Revolution technologies and the model of national agro-industrialization, while agribusiness was allowed to develop transnational linkages between national farm sectors (McMichael 2009:141).

There is broad agreement between scholars on the ‘colonial-diasporic’ food regime of the 1870s-1930s and the ‘mercantile-industrial’ food regime of the 1950s-70s, but less agreement on whether a third food regime has emerged (Friedmann 2005, McMichael 2009). McMichael describes a corporate food regime underpinning the current neoliberal economic order, while Friedmann sees the emergence of a ‘corporate-environmental regime’, characterized by the corporate co-optation of social movement demands around environmental and health concerns. For Friedmann, the corporate-environmental food regime is still unconsolidated because of the absence of a ‘specific set of (often implicit) relationships, norms, institutions, and rules around which the expectations of all relevant actors converge’ (Friedmann 2009:335).

Regardless of whether one considers the corporate food regime to be in fully place, it is clear that corporations and multilateral organizations such as the WTO, are major drivers of current dynamics in the global food system and that the state is a much less prominent actor in the corporate/corporate-environmental food regime than in previous formulations. The first and second food regimes have nation-states (particularly Britain and the US) at the center of analysis. According to Friedmann, agriculture might have been a relatively marginal policy focus, but it was nonetheless globally the most state-centered sector (Friedmann 1993). Broadly speaking, food regime analysis uses the agri-food trade as a lens
to illuminate the historical conditions under which the nation-state emerged (McMichael 2013: 1), hence the concept offers scholars a way to think about global processes of capital formation, not just as a way to theorize about the food system or the social relations of agriculture and food. The first food regime was characterized by Britain’s role as the first country to intentionally sacrifice domestic food security as it opened up markets to grain imports from settler colonies. This was done to subsidize wage foods for the growing working classes in order to ensure social stability for industry, the source of Britain’s geopolitical and economic power (Friedmann 2005: 234-235). The second food regime was marked by the importance of US farm subsidies, brought about by strong domestic farm lobbies, which were one of the three pillars of the Democratic Party’s New Deal coalition, in power during the early postwar reconstruction period when the second food regime was being consolidated (Friedmann 2005:239).

The corporate food regime, particularly as conceptualized by McMichael, is dominated by corporations and multilateral organizations such as the WTO and IMF, which continue to open markets for food, land and seeds to agribusinesses while encouraging input-intensive, technology-dependent monocrop agriculture and sidelining peasant-based agroecological alternatives that would also be better for climate change mitigation and adaptation. McMichael characterizes the corporate food regime as dominated by markets through a process of financialization that resulted in the regulation of money being vested in the IMF rather than the state (McMichael 2005: 294), but it could alternatively be read as sustained by a combination of states that ‘seek to promote its expansion through the activities of development cooperation agencies, international financial and developmental institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; and big philanthropic institutions such as the Gates Foundation that promote “technical” solutions to human development problems even though technological paradigms are embedded within and thus reflect prevailing social structures of power and privilege’ (Akram-Lodhi 2012:133)

Even in the current environment and regardless of the debate over state agency in international fora, nation-states continue to play a crucial role in regulating agriculture and food at national and regional levels. Conditions of production,
such as land use and labor markets, and of consumption, such as food safety, cannot be regulated by private capital alone; although large supermarket chains are constantly trying to create new premium product categories (with higher profit margins) that adhere to ‘higher’ standards (Friedmann 2005: 257, 253-255, Trauger 2014: 1134). From these examples, it becomes clear that the state is still very much in the picture in the global food system. As Polanyi intuited, the market is always embedded in society and cannot be disconnected from it entirely, despite what the advocates of free trade would have us believe. Once the state is brought back into the corporate food regime and located in the analysis of food movements, scholars can more cogently analyze the prospects that the various food movements hold for real change in the foodsystem.

**The food regime is not a thing in itself – re-introducing the state**

Since the concept of food regimes is an analytical tool rather than a social institution in itself, it is important to situate the state when analyzing the interactions between proponents of the corporate, industrial food system, and food movements. Although Polanyi was writing in the early 1940s, The Great Transformation is particularly relevant in the context of today’s pervasive neoliberal logic: ‘the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark Utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness’ (Polanyi 2001: 3). The ‘self-adjusting market’ is not simply a liberal ideal, it cannot exist because the state has to be involved in regulating what Polanyi calls ‘fictitious commodities’ of land, labor and money; Polanyi refers to these as fictitious because they were not originally ‘produced’ to be sold in the marketplace (Polanyi 2001).

Fred Block, a prominent Polanyi scholar, explains that Polanyi had in fact discovered the concept of the ‘always embedded economy’, but that many scholars who use his analysis as a starting point have mistakenly understood that he believed the self-regulating market to be an achievable phenomenon (Block 2003). Block writes:

*The concept of the always embedded economy […] begins with the premise that any favorable economic dynamic has to be understood as flowing from the*
interaction among self-interested agents, the actions of the state, and forms of social regulation. [...] The always embedded concept makes it very hard to gloss over or hide the state’s fundamental role in shaping actually existing economies. [...] Moreover, the always embedded analysis suggests that the multiple forms of dependence of business groups in market societies on state action provides a critical resource or lever for those seeking political change. Even those business interests who profess to believe in the most extreme form of laissez-faire doctrine need the cooperation of the state and this often disguised dependence can be employed to renegotiate the legal underpinnings of market society (Block 2003:229-301).

Block also shows that corporations’ dependence on state action can create opportunities for protective counter movements to challenge state priorities. He gives the example of the civil society movement against pharmaceutical companies that questioned the state’s privileging of firms’ intellectual property rights over the lives of human beings who would die without access to essential, but proprietary medicines (Block 2008:6). When applied to food movements, Block’s contributions can help bring the state back into the center of analysis and also allow us to further understand how the Progressive and Radical strands of the food movement might have to organize themselves in order to stop and reverse the effects of marketization of the agri-foodsystem.

According to Watson, the state project reflects internal characteristics, the balance of political forces and is marked by the state’s need to balance its accumulation and legitimation imperatives (Watson 2005: 184-185). If we see the state as a balance of political forces, then all four trends traced by Holt Gimenez and Shattuck are concurrently at work, and rather than trace their effects on the food regime, we can examine how they are acting on the state project. Although the world has arguably moved from a state-centred, ‘development project’ to a ‘globalization project’ (McMichael 2004) where corporations and other transnational actors have increasingly more influence in development processes, we cannot abandon the state altogether. The corporate food regime might somewhat over-privilege the role of corporations and transnational actors since its focus is on transnational capital accumulation, but states continue to play
an important role in the global political economy. Ultimately social movements will have to make demands of national governments to counter the effects of liberalization or to truly represent their interests in intergovernmental platforms such as the WTO. The countervailing force against marketization and corporate excess continues to be that of the state acting to protect its citizens.

Taking into account the fact that radical reform of the food system requires an unpredictable process of contestation over the state project for radical reform of the food system cautions analysts against an overly deterministic about Polanyi’s ‘double movement’. It cannot be taken for granted that greater marketization, even to crisis levels, will result in a spontaneous backlash by society towards reclaiming social protections. One might argue that since the 2007-2008 food price crisis, little has fundamentally changed in the global food system and that the trend towards greater industrialization of agri-food systems and reliance on petrochemical inputs and private, industrial biotechnology continues.

Is the transformative potential of the Progressive and Radical food movement overstated?

Re-situating the state in Holt Gimenez and Shattuck’s analysis of the different trends within food movements serves to point out some instances where the transformative potential of the Progressive and Radical trends of food movements may be overstated. Holt Gimenez and Shattuck describe Food Policy Councils in the US as good examples of local movements, within the Progressive trend, coalescing to resist the corporate food regime, while leaning towards the Radical trend that espouses food sovereignty as its goal (Holt Gimenez and Shattuck 2011: 126). However, a recent nation-wide study of successes and challenges facing Food Policy Councils found that despite their name, they had very limited, if any, engagement with policy, and kept few systematic records of what policy changes they may have influenced through advocacy (Harper et al. 2009). In addition, what the report (and presumably the Food Policy Councils) referred to as policy success stories included introducing EBT payment methods into farmers’ markets (Harper et al. 2009: 35), which in fact serves to reinforce marketization and financialization rather than push for alternatives in the vein of food sovereignty.
Alkon and Mares (2012) find that efforts in the US such as those by the Community Food Security Coalition to reform the farm bill (responsible for expensive agribusiness subsidies) are in the minority when it comes to food justice movements that Holt Gimenez and Shattuck would classify as Progressive. Alkon and Mares’ (2012) ethnographic studies in West Oakland and Seattle showed that food justice organizations tend to focus on grassroots solutions to problems of access to healthy food and therefore prefer to work through creating alternative markets rather than working for political or policy reform. The links to global capitalism are also not well understood, so forces linking the displacement of the immigrant Latino/a community from rural livelihoods in the global south are not identified as part of the same systemic problem (Alkon and Mares 2012: 357-358). Guthman also observes that many US food movements tend to reproduce neoliberal logics through their responses by taking on what were formerly state responsibilities and shifting them to individuals or market mechanisms, instead of challenging market logic and advocating for a reorientation of food and agricultural policies away from market liberalization (cited in Alkon and Mares, 2012:350).

Trauger draws our attention to the contradictions inherent in the demands drawn up by the transnational peasant movement La Via Campesina, one of the major global advocates of food sovereignty, in the Declaration of Nyeleni. La Via Campesina is one of the most outspoken advocates within the Radical trend of food movements. The Declaration appeals to the state for policy changes to protect small-holders and communities, while simultaneously demanding autonomy from the state. This contradiction is apparently reconciled by appeals to ‘do democracy better’ by expanding individual rights. However, this may not address the issue of food sovereignty if the way that state power and capital work together is not adequately addressed (Trauger 2014: 1140). If the state project has been captured by the interests of capital then such appeals will be mostly futile. It is beyond the scope of this essay to conduct a comprehensive review of the organizations, initiatives and documents described by Holt Gimenez and Shattuck as Progressive or Radical, in order to assess their transformative potential. I would like to suggest, however, based on the above examples, that in order to understand the true transformative potential of a Progressive and Radical alliance, a more
comprehensive analysis is needed that takes the state and actions to reform it into account. This would help scholars to evaluate whether such an alliance warrants Holt Gimenez and Shattuck’s optimism.

**Conclusion**

Holt Gimenez and Shattuck's analysis of the various political and social trends in the corporate food regimes and food movements provides a compelling and useful analytical framework to understand contestation among different actors in the food system and their potential to enact substantive change. In this essay, I re-emphasize the role of the state in the food system to highlight the necessity for various streams in the food movements to make political demands for change. Working for a more democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable food system must include advocating for political change and demanding for the state to roll back marketization policies. The concentration of resources and power in the hands of global agribusiness has had profound consequences for both producers and consumers, and while powerful corporations and multilateral institutions have been taken to task for some of the negative effects, analytical lenses should also be focused on the state to theorize how the balance of political power can be tipped to make state institutions a protective force for safeguarding society from the destructive effects of the ‘self-regulating’ market.
References


13. Making a First Impression: an Analysis of Xi Jinping’s First Public Speech as General Secretary of the CPC

Author: Elisabeth IJmker

Introduction

Every ten years, the National Congress of the Communist Party of China chooses a new leader, who will function as the President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, hereafter ‘China’) for the next ten years. On November 15th 2012, Xi Jinping was presented as China’s next leader, following in the footsteps of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. As China becomes increasingly more important on the global level, politically as well as economically, many eyes were turned to the presentation of this new leader. This paper takes a look at Xi Jinping’s speech at the closing of the first plenary session of the 18th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, as this was the first time Xi made a public statement to national and international press. It was thereby also the first time the international community heard Xi speak in his function of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC. As his first address, this speech offered the opportunity for Xi to make a first impression. We can assume that the words of this speech were thought over and written down carefully, realising the wide coverage it would receive, making it a relevant and important object of study.

By looking at this text (a full transcript can be found in the Annex), I specifically look at how Xi Jinping positions himself and the CPC. As this speech was given at the beginning of his tenure, we can expect he has a need to present himself in a way that creates a certain amount of legitimacy and status for himself as the new leader of China. As Wong (2012b) writes at the time, Xi “has to spend his first years building a power base,” a necessary condition for possible future policy reforms. At the time of the speech, the CPC had been facing some serious political
issues in the months before, making issues of legitimacy and reputation even more important. The central question of this paper is thus how Xi Jinping attempts to create legitimacy for himself as well as the Communist Party in his speech. When looking at the wider social context in which this speech was written and given, we see that the legitimacy of the Party was facing some serious issues. The following section gives more background about Xi Jinping personally, after which I go more into the social context in which the text was written. The methodology section discusses the methods used, which include content analysis and narrative analysis. This is followed by the main analysis, which uses these methods to look at the manner in which the text was written, paying attention to important choices of style and vocabulary. Some of the themes I look at more closely include corruption and the use of appeals to nationalism and history. Putting the outcomes of this analysis in the social context helps provide more explanation of the choices made in the text. The final section looks at how the text functions as a social phenomenon, the effects it achieves and how it achieves those effects. One of the main conclusions of this analysis is that Xi Jinping is able to establish legitimacy for himself and the Party by not avoiding contested issues at the time such as corruption and by appealing to nationalism.

**Xi Jinping’s background and social location**

Xi Jinping was born in Beijing on 15 June 1953, as the son of Xi Zhongxun, a founding member of the Communist Party. When he was fifteen year old, Xi was sent to work at a remote village for seven years as part of the “sent-down youth” movement. Xi later on continued to study chemical engineering at Tsinghua University, China’s number one university located in Beijing where most former high-ranking officials in the CPC have studied. Xi has extensive international experience, spending time at a U.S. farm in his early 30s. He climbed his way to the top spending almost four decades in the Communist Party. He served in top positions in both the Fujian and Zhejiang provinces and as Shanghai Party chief in 2007, after which he became vice-president of China under Hu Jintao in 2008. He is married to well-known Chinese folk singer and actress Peng Liyuan, with whom he has a daughter who studies at Harvard University in the United States under a pseudonym. The manner in which the speech was delivered reflects Xi Jinping’s upbringing as the son of a high-ranking official in Beijing. As Johnson
196

(2012) writes, “Mr. Xi spoke in clear Mandarin Chinese, making him one of the first modern Chinese leaders whose speech does not bear the heavy accents of an upbringing in one of China’s provinces.”

The announcement of Xi Jinping as the new leader of the CPC did not come as a huge surprise. In the months leading up to the first session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC, it was already clear to most people that Xi would be taking the position of General Secretary of the CPC and Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, making him the paramount leader of the Party. It was widely speculated that Xi together with Li Keqiang would take over the positions of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao as top Politburo Standing Committee members. After his function as a high Party chief in Shanghai, Xi joined the Politburo Standing Committee and Central Secretariat in October 2007, marking him as one of the potential successors of Hu Jintao. When made Vice President of the PRC in 2008, little doubt remained about the future prospects of Xi Jinping.

**Intended audience of the speech**
The speech was given on live television, in the presence of foreign and domestic reporters. It was known to the wider audience beforehand that this would be the moment where the new leader of China would be presented to the public. The speech was highly anticipated, as it would be the first time for Xi to give an address in his new function as General Secretary of the CPC. As Xi gave his speech in Mandarin Chinese, we can hypothesise that the main audience he had in mind was the Chinese people. At the same time, he (and probably the people that helped him write the speech) must have known that the global community was watching as well. The speech received great media coverage around the world, and full transcripts with the text translated to English were widely available. Though it was a public media appearance, Xi Jinping left without taking any questions from the scores of waiting journalists (Johnson 2012).

**Social context in which the text was written**
Xi Jinping gave this speech on 15 November 2012, at the closing of the first plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee. At this session, Xi Jinping was announced as the new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the...
CPC and this speech signalled his first public speech in this position. In line with regulations of the CPC, Xi only officially became President of the People’s Republic of China and Chairman of the Central Military Commission a few months later, in March 2013. The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China began on November 8, 2012 and was held in Beijing. The Congress’s main intention was to laud the work of Hu Jintao and set broad priorities for Xi’s presidential term. The Congress elected the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and signalled in the installation of the new Politburo Standing Committee.

Looking more broadly at what was going on in Chinese society and politics at the time, there are a few interesting developments to note. In the year leading up to the Party’s congress, there were a number of corruption scandals among the Communist Party’s high-profile leaders that came to light. Among these scandals was the story of Bo Xilai, Party chief of Chongqing, who received a lot of attention as he was a well known high Party official, also belonging to the so-called “prince-lings,” descendants of prominent and influential senior communist officials in the PRC (Liu 2012; Watson 2012). He was also considered a likely candidate for promotion to the Politburo Standing Committee, but all this came to an end when it turned out Bo had been involved in the Wang Lijun incident, a major political scandal surrounding the murder of a British businessman (LaFraniere, Burns & Ansfield 2012). Just a few months before the 18th Party Congress, in September 2012, Bo Xilai was expelled from the CPC and subjected to a criminal trial (Watson 2012). This scandal was extensively covered by national as well as international media and put corruption back on the agenda as an important issue in China. As Fewsmith (2013) puts it, the “politics preceding the 18th Party congress were long, nasty, and brutish” (1). Another issue playing in China at the time was the expanding gap between the rich and the poor, creating social disturbances throughout the country (Liu 2012). In short, the developments leading up to the 18th Party Congress were signs of unrest in Chinese politics, weakening the position of the Party and providing challenges for the start of Xi Jinping’s years of leadership.
Methodology

To examine Xi Jinping’s speech and to answer the question as posed in the beginning, I use two main methods. The first method central to this analysis is that of content analysis. Using word count across the whole text helps highlight what terms are used most frequently and thus where the emphasis lies in Xi Jinping’s speech. Following the several methods for systematic micro-analysis that Alexander (2009) uses in his analysis of discourse surrounding environmental issues, I also pay close attention to terms of praise and ridicule, usages of personal pronouns, collocation, and concordances.

From a critical discourse perspective, how often a word is used in a text may have something to do with points the writer wishes to express (Alexander 2009: 28). Critical discourse analysis in general helps in understanding the way discourse (re)produces certain representations and related power relations (Van Dijk 2009). One way in which power and dominance are involved in what Van Dijk (2009) calls “mind control,” is how “recipients tend to accept beliefs, knowledge, and opinions through discourse from what they see as authoritative, trustworthy, or credible sources” (357). When thinking about a political address such as that of Xi Jinping, it becomes even more interesting to look at these constructions of speech. As a leader with a certain position his words are important at the national and international level, but at the same time he needs to establish a certain power base for his future years as president of the PRC. Using content analysis and critical discourse analysis especially helps in answering the above stated research question, as it disseminates the words that Xi Jinping uses to create this base of power and legitimacy for both himself and the Party. By looking more in detail at the lexicon used while also paying attention to the words he did not use, we can understand more about Xi’s important choices of style and vocabulary. In the content analysis of Xi Jinping’s speech, I proceed by focusing on the speech as a whole (the speech’s total word count is about 1,000 words). Main tools used include simple word counts and online software such as Wordle and CasualConc, which help in identifying collocation and concordance.

As a second choice of method, I take a close look at the use of narrative in Xi Jinping’s speech. A narrative presents a sequence of events with identified
characters and types of interactions, providing a tool to understand the present in terms of the past and the future. Especially at the end of the first half of the text, Xi presents a story about the nation of China that includes many references to history, the present, and the future, indicating developments over time. Borrowing ideas from Labov (1972), Johnstone (2001) explains how a fully developed narrative includes a certain plot with a set of characters. In analysing the narrative in Xi Jinping's speech, I attempt to identify these elements, seeing where and how they are used. Shenhav's (2004) exploration of the “nation” as a “narrative concept” is especially useful here, as in his speech Xi presents a certain story about the history of the PRC as a nation. Shenhav points to how the ‘nation’ is not an agent that passes through time, like a normal agent in a story. Instead, it is an imagined agent that is defined by the story through which it has passed. Xi Jinping's construction of the history of China's history is thus worth paying closer attention to. The use of narratives can also be an important element of collective action frames, though they differ in the extent and contexts in which they are able to persuade people (Polletta 1998, Polletta, Chen & Gardner 2011).

Analysis
A first look at the full speech by Xi Jinping gives an appropriate first impression of the main word choices. Figure 1 shows a so-called “world cloud” generated by Wordle. The cloud gives greater prominence to words that appear more frequently in the source text.

Figure 1

Development Encounters: An exercise in worldmaking | 199
The words that immediately stand out are “people,” “party,” “nation” and “responsibility.” Looking at a list of most frequently used words with their respective word count, we see these terms at the top of the list. Table 1 lists the most frequently used words in Xi Jinping’s speech.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Word Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comrade</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

Some general observations following from looking at this initial analysis of the choice of vocabulary clearly show the frequently used words. At the same time, we can also think about words Xi Jinping did not say. Johnson (2012) points out that what was absent from the speech were terms such as law, constitution, democracy and freedom. Though responsibilities were clearly advocated by Xi Jinping, rights were absent from his discourse. In his initial analysis, Liu (2012) notes that while Xi called the Party to serve the people and change its work style, “there was little about institutionalising accountability and transparency.”

The frequent emphasis on the people, the party and the nation appeals to a certain form of nationalism. This nationalistic discourse has been identified by other analyses as well (see for example Fewsmith 2013). By stressing the responsibility to the nation, the people and the Party, Xi repeatedly showed his commitment to nationalism and continuing reform policy. Another way Xi attempts to unify the Chinese people under one nationalistic discourse is by emphasising inclusiveness. China is home to 55 officially recognised ethnic minority groups, which in the past have occasionally caused social disturbances, such as the uprisings by the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang province. In his speech, Xi refers to “all ethnic groups” three times, as the following citations illustrate:

“… the expectations of people of all ethnic groups around the country …”
“... unite and lead people of the entire nation and of all ethnic groups ...”
“Chinese people have opened up a good and beautiful home where all ethnic groups live in harmony ...” (emphasis added).

Fewsmith (2013) also gives the example of Xi appealing to national pride in the following quotation: “the Chinese people have opened up a good and beautiful home where all ethnic groups live in harmony and fostered an excellent culture that never fades” (3). The construction of the identity of the Chinese nation is something I return to the in the analysis of narrative structures.

When looking at collocations, we see that the term “nation” is most often used in combination with “Chinese,” “great” and “our” (all six times). Table 2 gives a more detailed overview of the collocations of when and where the term “nation” occurs in Xi Jinping’s speech.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Our nation is a great nation</th>
<th>has experienced constant hardship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... united and lead people of the entire nation</td>
<td>has made an indelible contribution to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the modern era, our nation</td>
<td>in order to let the Chinese nation stand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The great revival of the Chinese nation</td>
<td>is a great nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the Chinese nation</td>
<td>reached the most dangerous period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... realising the great revival of the Chinese nation</td>
<td>rose to resist and fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our nation</td>
<td>stand more firmly and powerfully</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... responsibility to our nation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chinese nation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the great revival of the Chinese nation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... let the Chinese nation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A similar pattern applies to the term “people,” which is most often collocated with “our” (7 times) and “Party” (5 times). The following two citations from the text summarise these two central themes in the speech:

“Our nation is a great nation”
“Our people are a great people”.
The nation and the people are thus presented as something positive (“great”). Another dominant theme in Xi Jinping’s speech is that of the collective. Xi’s emphasis is on the important of a unified collective identity, as represented by the nation, the people, and the Party, which we also see in his frequent use of the personal pronoun “our.” The following quotations furthermore illustrate this point:

“...We deeply understand that the capability of any individual is limited…”
“...Individuals have limited time in work…”
“...as long as we unite as one, there is no difficulty that we cannot overcome”
“We must always be of one heart and mind…” (emphasis added).

Moving on to the use of narrative, the main body of the text where Xi Jinping uses references to history, present, and future, creates a certain story of the Chinese nation, starting from the first time Xi mentions “nation” and the paragraphs that follow. Xi starts his narrative with the ancient history of Chinese civilisation, the initial stage of civilisation slowly undergoing development processes. The next identifiable stage in his story is that of “the modern era,” which is characterised by “hardship and difficulties.” Xi explicitly calls this period the “most dangerous period” and stresses the attempt of many people to fight back against these obstacles yet never succeeding, according to Xi. A turning point in the plot comes at “the founding of the CPC,” which did succeed in uniting people and “transforming the impoverished and backward Old China into the New China.” The created narrative is thus one that sharply contrasts the situation before and after the founding of the CPC. The CPC is the central actor in the story, as the founding of the CPC signals a significant turning point in the story of the Chinese nation, as constructed by Xi Jinping. It is not clear whom Xi refers to when he talks about “countless people” who “rose to resist and fight” against the struggles in “the modern era.” These people could be his predecessors, though it is clear that whoever these people were, they did not succeed since they were not united as one Party (i.e. the CPC). Towards the end of his speech, Xi also explicitly refers to “the people” and “the masses” as actors who have a significant role to play in the future development of China. This is in line with his references to nationalism and unity, making clear everyone has a role to play and a responsibility in the years to come.
When referring to the future, Xi continues to stress the importance of unity, standing strong as a collective nation. Xi repeatedly emphasises the responsibility of the Party to the people. At the same time, as he talks about “our” responsibility, he seems to be talking about a responsibility of the Chinese people at large and not just that of the Party. In the middle of his speech Xi explicitly mentions a number of expectations of the Chinese people for the future. All these in some way stress the wish for “more” and “better” (e.g. education, jobs, income, social security, environment, etc.), signalling improvement and growth. A significant theme in this narrative is that of national humiliation and how the struggle to overcome the humiliation has been led by the CPC. This is also illustrated by his choice of metaphors such as “road” and “journey,” which implies this process of development is a continuous process that has a certain history to it and will continue in the future.

Xi roots his vision for the future in the miseries of the past (Fewsmith 2013: 3) and does this by not denying some of the challenges of the past as well as those of the present. When talking about “the new situation,” Xi mentions there are “many severe challenges” that need to be resolved. One of the main issues he addresses is that of corruption. In the way Xi constructs his narrative, corruption is seen as one of the main challenges that needs to be addressed by the new CPC Central Committee. The implied zero-tolerance policy towards corruption and bribery also confirms the importance of a unified Party, nation, and people that together can overcome any difficulty.

In short, the analysis of Xi Jinping's speech shows how Xi frequently refers to the nation, the people and the Party, creating a nationalist discourse that stresses the power of the collective and the importance of unity. In his narrative on the Chinese nation, Xi highlights the founding of the CPC as a turning point in history, while acknowledging that challenges still exist, of which corruption is one of the central issues.
Discussion

How can we place the findings from the analysis in the social context as previously described? The most important element to keep in mind from the social context is that this speech was Xi Jinping’s first public address to the media as General Secretary of the CPC. Standing at the beginning of his tenure, we can thus expect Xi to be conscious of the first impression he is making to the public. Additionally, the year of corruption scandals preceding the first plenary meeting of the 18th CPC Central Committee made the moment of the speech even more important.

Knowing that the legitimacy of the CPC at the time was questioned by corruption scandals as well as other social disturbances, it makes sense that Xi Jinping put a large emphasis on unity and nationalism in his speech. In order for him to implement his introduced reform policies, he first needed to gain support from the people as well as the Party. Also internationally, the image of the CPC had been damaged by the corruption scandals, so Xi needed to create an image of the Party and the nation as one that is strong and has a legitimate power base to work from. As Yamaguchi (2012) writes, the way in which Xi stressed the nation, the people and the Party, illustrates his commitment to nationalism and the continuing reform policy as the agenda for his first years as President of China. What Xi calls “the great revival of the Chinese nation” became a recurrent theme in his subsequent speeches, continuing a nationalist discourse.

Xi’s choice to explicitly highlight corruption as one of the challenges faced by the Party’s leadership is also understandable when looking at the greater social context. With corruption growing out of control, Xi tried to “rekindle ideals and stoke populism and nationalism” (Fewsmith 2013: 6). It seems it was almost impossible for Xi not to make a reference to the recent unrest, as that would have been perceived as denial, putting China’s leadership in an even more negative light. The corruption scandals had damaged the image of the Party and many eyes were fixated on the survival of the Party, including the Party itself (Fewsmith 2013: 4; Mahoney 2014: 31; Ranade 2013). Corruption remained a theme for Xi Jinping also after this speech, not only in his subsequent public addressed but also in his policies. Remarks in December 2012 again stressed corruption as a major
issue to be taken seriously (Ranade 2013) and over the past years we have seen Xi implement a far-reaching campaign against corruption.

What effects did Xi Jinping achieve by his choice of style and vocabulary in his speech? First, his appeal to nationalism created a sense of unity among the Chinese people. By repeatedly referring to the nation, the people and the Party, Xi managed to create an image of a unified collective identity that together In his use of narrative, this identity has overcome struggles in the past, and though it is still facing challenges today, it will be able to overcome those, as long as everyone is united and stands together. Implicitly, there is no room left for anyone to disagree with the Chinese leadership, as those would form obstacles in the “road” to success and development.

By explicitly mentioning corruption as an important challenge for the Party, Xi showed he does not shy away from difficult topics. Watson (2012) reported that China’s social media users in particular praised Xi for coming across as “more human” in his opening speech as he mentioned popular topics such as the problem of corruption. In other words, the themes addressed in Xi’s speech positively affected the reputation of Xi as the new leader as well as that of the Party. Mentioning corruption in this first speech as General Secretary, widely covered by national and international media, also signalled that corruption would become a major theme for Xi’s years of leadership, something we can now after a few years also confirm.

**Conclusion**

Going back to the question posed at the beginning of this paper, how does Xi Jinping attempt to create legitimacy for himself as well as the CPC? After applying methods of content analysis and narrative analysis, I conclude that Xi does this in two explicit ways. First is the use of a nationalist discourse, by repeatedly referring to the nation, the people and the Party, and presenting a narrative of the history of China in which the founding CPC signals a significant turning point in time. By not avoiding contested issues such as corruption, Xi is able to present himself as a leader who is aware of what is going on in the larger social context and who is not afraid of addressing challenges.
As always, one cannot cover everything there is to be said when analysing a piece of text. In general, when analysing developments in Chinese politics, one has to be cautious of drawing strong conclusions, as there is much going on behind the scenes that is unknown to the wider public. The lack of transparency about the inner workings of China’s leadership especially can form an obstacle to researchers. It should thus be acknowledged that sometimes what one can merely do is make assumptions. Suggestions for future research would be to take a number of Xi Jinping’s speeches over time and see how themes that he addressed in this first public addressed continued to be of importance or maybe received attention. One could also look more in detail at this speech and analyse how Xi uses devices of rhetoric, paying attention to logos, pathos and ethos, to persuade his audience. This additional method would have proven useful in this paper as well, but one has to make choices when faced with limited space and time.

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14. Rescuing the state? Radical Agrarian Populism on New Institutional Economics

Author: Giulia Simula

Introduction
This essay aims to be a reflective exercise to better understand theoretical concepts and how they relate to reality or rather how they can be helpful to make sense of it. The state has been an important driver of the ‘development project’ and the ‘globalization project’ as defined by McMichael (2004). The globalization project is centered in the liberalizing of the global economy and has therefore the value chain project at its heart. Proponents of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework have understood the importance of the state in creating and maintaining the institutions needed for the globalization project to be realized.

The state in this case has been a main actor in the inclusion of small farmers in global value chains. On the other hand, the framework used by radical struggles for alternatives to the current food system (broadly brought together in the food sovereignty framework), offers little analytical tools to examine the role that the state could or could not play. Some exceptions to this are explained in Edelman et al. (2014) where he points out at some of the authors that have tried to engage more deeply in state society interactions. The state has been brought into the discussion mainly when state policies have tried to institutionalize food sovereignty (like Schiavoni, 2013 looking at the case of Venezuela).

Even though the theory offers limited analytical tools to look at the state, social movements asking for radical agrarian transformation, as defined in Giménez & Shattuck (2011: 128–130), have an ambivalent view vis-à-vis the state (Edelman, 2005). “As a political demand, food sovereignty invokes the sovereign power of the state for the implementation of re-distributive land reform, social protections...
and safety nets. It also challenges and transcends the state as “the state has been captured by capital, and the rights of small farmers, and [their] ability to influence state policy (despite their numerical superiority vis-à-vis large farmers) has been abrogated” (Patel and McMichael 2004 as cited in Giménez and Shattuck 2011:129). My main aim is to understand the role of the state in the creation and construction of alternatives.

My question is then: can we rescue the state?

I will argue that the state has been embedded into values which reflect the NIE ideology. As I will explain in the second paragraph, after a brief introduction of the Sardinian context, one of the values intrinsic in the NIE perspective is efficiency defined as profit and production—maximization. But does that mean that the state becomes a useless institution with which we should not engage? As I will argue in the last paragraph, the state has been either discarded as a modernizing vehicle or put aside while constructing parallel markets and parallel economies. However, the concept of embeddedness can help us rescue the state as a potential vehicle for the construction of alternatives.

The crisis in Sardinia is a crisis just like any other: say hi to globalization!

Sardinia is a relatively marginal region in southern Italy. One of the main sectors in the agricultural domain is the dairy/pastoral one that constitutes the skeleton of agricultural production in the island. This sector is in crisis, or, if seen with other theoretical perspectives, is increasingly exposed to globalizing forces and constantly modernizing. Historically, the great majority of milk produced has been processed into Pecorino Romano, an export product that is almost exclusively sold in American markets (Mannia, 2014).

The crisis in the dairy sector is related to the internationalization of the “foodgrain—feedgrain—livestock complex” that Sanderson (1986) and Friedmann (1992) have analyzed extensively. Sanderson argues that after WWII the livestock sector has gone through a process of internationalization and standardization; a
process of global restructuring where norms, quality requirements, cuts of meat, type of cheeses, types of feed and so on have been standardized globally creating feed–stockcomplex. In essence, what this has meant at the state level is that agriculture has been restructured so that each country or country block globally would specialize in what was more ‘comparatively advantageous’ for them. The USA, that in the second food regime had a big surplus of grain production (Friedmann, 1992), highly specialized in grains and feed, dumped its surplus on ‘third world countries’ as aid, and in Europe through the Marshall plan.

The livestock complex parallels industrial restructuring in the world economy. During the food regime of the 1950s and 1960s, animal and crop production were reorganised, first in the USA and then in Europe. While intensive, specialised livestock production was national, new feed crops were from the outset industrial raw materials for the transnational feed manufacturing industry. After the crisis began in the early 1970s, the complex exploded into intense international competition.

(Wibbrig:376)

Wheat production was still ‘allowed’ in Europe, and it was also protected with import duties given that soy and maize production was largely left to the USA business and imported to Europe. Production of ‘traditional feed’ and open grazing was dis–incentivized by national and European policies (Mannia, 2014). Environmental motives where often used to restructure agricultural production. For example, farmers in the south west of the region that used to produce animal feed (for example forage) were paid by the government to leave the land to recover for 5 years. At the same time, scientific research was proving the superiority of high–protein feed (such as feed that included soy) in giving an end product, milk, higher in fat content and eventually more palatable cheese for international consumers(ibid).

The result for small-scale dairy farmers or shepherds, as they call themselves, was a higher degree of dependency on upstream markets (in this case feed and raw materials), and a higher dependency also on downstream markets. The main
markets where they were selling their principal products were not in Sardinia or Italy but the distance between producers and consumers - and therefore the numbers of intermediaries- was increasing together with the oligopsony power of buyers (be it American cheese buyers or processing companies in Sardinia). This resulted into a double squeeze that is rightly exemplified by the fact that shepherds could no longer cover their costs and were increasingly marginalized by international competition.

Increasing costs of production were further exacerbated by the liberalization of agricultural commodity financial markets (Isakson 2014) that influences price fluctuation and therefore further extraction of revenue away from farmers and further concentration of profit in the hands of financial institutions and agribusiness corporations.

This situation is clearly not limited to Sardinia but is at the heart of the global agrarian question (McMichael, 2008). Even if to different extents and with different specificities, the struggle against globalization, relentless privatization of land and natural resources, free trade agreements, dumping, and the power of corporations has been global. At the center of global resistance to the globalization of agriculture has been the Food Sovereignty movement which proposes an alternative to the neoliberal project (Edelman et al. 2014). Even though Food Sovereignty (FS) as a concept has its own genealogies (Edelman 2014), the essence of the struggle advanced by FS proponents can be compared to some of the requests made by social movements that are not officially part of La Via Campesina such as the MovimentoPastoriSardi(MPS) - Sardinian shepherds’ movement.

The state has been and is at the center of the modernizing process. But when we talk about alternatives, the role of the state is often looked at only when food sovereignty is adopted at the state level policies (Schiavoni, 2013). But even when no state-led food sovereignty program is implemented, social movements --local and transnational alike-- seem to demand autonomy and sovereignty to the state. The state seems to be both an enemy and the institution that can actually implement redistributive policies as well as promote programs to incentivize
peasants’ autonomy. When shepherds in Sardinia issue their demands (MPS, n.a.) the state is the interlocutor. Hence, what is the NIE and RAP interpretation of the state? What concepts can be helpful for thinking about and deconstructing the state’s role? Before discussing this, I will look at the two theories’ different view of the state.

**NIE and the resurrection of the state as market enabler**

NIE is part of the family of neoclassical economics. If the latter was more concentrated on the market and rejected the role of the state completely -- following the ‘failure’ of state-led projects after decolonization, NIE accepts that the *laissez faire* does not necessarily bring about developmental outcomes, therefore, with the Post Washington consensus, the state’s role was stressed again by NIE (Gore, 2000).

**What role for the state?**

The state has the role to provide a good environment and the right institutions for the market to function properly. This includes institutions such as private property (de Soto 1994) and the institutions that allow rational individuals to maximize their profit. The assumption, both for neoclassical and neo institutional economic frameworks is that individuals are profit--maximizers. But if according to neoclassical economists the market should be left ‘free’, according to the NIE perspective, the state should play a role when market imperfections prevent economic efficiency from being realized. Lipton (1993) argues that market led land redistribution is more efficient if the state deals with market’s imperfections for example by providing credit to farmers who cannot afford to purchase land, but want to). The state is also responsible for creating social policies for those who will be excluded from the market interaction because considered ‘inefficient’, hence unable to keep up with international competition. This explains the strong focus on poverty reduction since the Post Washington consensus.

**The state and valuechain**

Efficiency is one of the key concepts in the NIE literature, and the market is the institution that best allocates resources in an efficient manner. The state therefore
has the role to create the best conditions for the market to work properly. This NIE state prescription is found repeatedly in Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the global South as well as in austerity policies in Europe.

As mentioned above, the inclusion of peasants in the value chain is considered to be efficient. The World Development Report of 2008 -one of the key texts representing the NIE view on agriculture, is explicit about the role of peasant and their inclusion into value chain as a means of ‘poverty reduction’. The three main policy suggestions in the reports are: 1) More export-oriented agriculture, more market access, more competitiveness and integration of small peasants with agribusiness 2) Farming of high-added value products i.e. more niche products with higher prices and 3) more investment in biotechnologies (de Janvry, 2008; Akram-Lodhi, 2009).

These points are highly criticized as being apolitical, or rather as not looking at the political contestation behind natural resources and the different ways of farming. But for NIE proponents, value chains are the most efficient outcome. This is because their underlying premise is that the end goal is modernization and development as understood in the Rostowian tradition (1960). If this is the starting point, then the inclusion of profit-maximizer entrepreneurial farmers in the food chain is efficient and the exclusion of smaller farmers and their eventual inclusion in the labor force is just as efficient in order to provide working power and facilitate industrialization (ibid). In other words, it is a win-win situation if we assume, like the World Bank does, that development follows linear stages of growth like (Oya, 2009).

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) instituted by the European Union after the creation of the European Community, is grounded in the same ideological premises. Financial resources are concentrated much more on the first pillar that rewards production levels. Subsidies are allocated according to the size of land holding thereby favoring large agribusinesses rather than small farmers (farm subsidies, n.a.). According to the NIE this will allow the most efficient outcome to be reached.
Therefore, the state’s role is that of facilitating the inclusion of small farmers in the value chain by giving incentives to invest and modernize and on the other hand instituting social policies for those who are left out. The underlying assumption is that profit maximization is the end goal for rational individuals and rational peasants and therefore the best way to maximize profit is by strengthening institutions for the market to work and for the peasants to gain better access to markets and technology. The Green Revolution and market-led land reforms were informed by this logic.

**Unveiling the assumptions**

The ‘rational individual’ is another central concept and fundamental assumption of the neoclassical theoretical framework (and the NIE position that is part of this broader family). The state helps the rational individual to maximize outcome by enabling a better access to the market. In this case, being rational is equivalent to being a commercially oriented entrepreneur (Akram-Lodhi, 2009). Popkin (1979) argues that peasants are indeed driven by the desire to invest contrary to what a moral economy perspective would argue with the risk-averse and safety-first concepts that Scott (1976) talks about. He provides examples of peasants’ investments in their farms (p. 21-23) and comes to the conclusion that peasants are not market averse.

Yet the engagement in the market and the role of peasants as investors has also been recognized by moral economy proponents. Ploeg (2013) in his Chayanovian manifesto widely refers to peasants as rational beings and economic actors. For example forming cooperatives is a very rational act since by doing so peasants gain more bargaining power vis-à-vis buyers. However, what is intrinsically different between the two theories is that according to neoclassical and NIE positions, peasants are profit-driven, this makes peasants who are not driven by profit motives irrational and inefficient.

However, if we deconstruct this assumption, it can be argued that some peasants simply calculate their cost and benefit analysis according to a different type of rationality and different values. But they can both be considered as ‘rational’
decisions. Hence, Popkin’s (1979) argument about the investment logic may as well be sound. But the idea that this logic is only driven by profit maximization is rather disputable and a very deterministic view of peasants’ calculations. Cost and benefit calculations may be influenced by other values and other goals such as environmental sustainability, biodiversity health and quality over quantity. Profit-maximization is only one of many possible variables influencing peasants’ decisions.

In the NIE framework profit-maximization is equated with efficiency. The role that the state plays is therefore consistent to the assumption underlying the NIE theoretical framework. The state and the way the market is regulated are embedded in the underlying assumption that modernity is the end goal and that this is reached through productionist and profit-maximizing behaviors. But once we deconstruct this assumption and agree that efficiency, rationality and investment logic do not equal profit-maximization logic, efficiency becomes a disputable open concept.

Appropriating the word efficiency, NIE proponents often portray their view of efficiency as the only way of being efficient, as if this was not a questionable concept. In this way, NIE proponents render technical, normalize and institutionalize what is essentially a very political matter (Li, 2007). Underlying this rather important point is essential if we want to problematize the role of the state. Indeed, the state -as I will argue further in the coming paragraph- is embedded in dominant NIE paradigms.

But can we not embed institutions like the state in different paradigms?

**State as friend or foe? Rescuing the state through the concept of embeddedness.**

**Contested meanings of modernity**

If what has been called ‘modernity’ -which is in fact one notion of modernity: the capitalist notion- is the central mobilizing factor for NIE proponents, the construction of alternatives, among which food sovereignty is one of the most
articulated globally, is the mobilizing principle for Radical Agrarian Populists (RAP). If efficiency defined as profit maximization and growth is at the center of the NIE assumptions, it is defined in very different terms by different proponents of the wide-ranging RAP framework.

The contested views around development are nicely portrayed in one of Ploeg’s figures (2008:180).

![Figure 6.10: rural development as a contested and fragmented process. In Ploeg (2008:180).](image)

If the value chain project rightly mirrors the NIE ideology, the food sovereignty frame has emerged as an overarching framework for the struggle against globalizing forces. However, the left is divided as Giménez& Shattuck (2011) argue. This is especially true in regards to the role of the state. While some argue that it is necessary to engage with institutions, others reject this notion and consider the state as an instrument for the elites. In general however, the discussion about the position of the state in the construction of food sovereignty or rather the question of *who will administer food sovereignty* is widely underexplored (Edelman et al. 2014). Too often the free market and its alleged intrinsic values have been
problematized by RAP, but the state’s intrinsic values have been too seldom explored. The position is rather that of rejecting the state as an elite instrument. But is the State a thing in itself with a will or do we decide what the state should be? Should we reject the state a priori or rather reject the values in which the state has been embedded and work towards building other values and a truly democratic state? Should we think about the possibility of rescuing the state?

These questions are serious questions to take into consideration that are triggered by the reality of social movements. The MPS for example is very diffident vis-à-vis the political elite. Corruption scandals in Italy have abounded in the last decades (Leney, 1993) and with the deeper and deeper integration into the European Union, national and supra-national policies have increasingly resulted in opening up the borders to international and competitive trade. So, on the one hand the MPS condemns the state and stresses the fact that the movement is not a political party and is not involved in politics (MPS, n.a.). Yet, on the other hand, the requests of protection, regulation, redistribution and so on are directed to the state as it is visible from the document where they lay out their points. So, on the one hand the state is like an enemy and intruder, but on the other hand, its power and potential as a regulator are also recognized.

“As in earlier moral economy discourses, the state is viewed ambivalently, here as a benevolent provider of direct and indirect price supports, but also as an antagonist and promoter of a destructive model of production and commerce.”

(Edelman 2005:339)

**Where is the state?**

Scott (1998) has widely talked about the state and its modernizing role. Where economies functioned in an apparently chaotic, complex but very functional way, colonial powers arrived and ‘organized’ ‘simplified’ and rendered agricultural systems more legible and more controllable. The end goal was of course to modernize, to increase production through the implementation of monoculture plantation during colonialism and the further process of specialization aided by
technology during the Green revolutions. The imperial, modernizing knowledge was deemed superior to the local knowledge which became to be labelled as backward, non scientific and inefficient.

The same discourse of superiority is inherent in the ‘development project’ of the post-WWII period and the current ‘globalization project’ as defined by McMichael (2004). The discourse around globalization and the ‘there is no alternative’ discourse have long been the hegemonic ones in the Gramscian sense. Through the creation of ‘consent’, people have internalized discourses related to competition, globalization, and the free market as ‘normal’. The role of the liberal state and its accumulation imperative is also seen as intrinsic to the state and is seldom deconstructed. The food sovereignty project proposes an alternative modernity to that of the capitalist one (or a counter-movement to modernity). The path towards this alternative modernity according to Ploeg (2010) looks more like the construction of parallel alternative markets and local institutions. But his engagement with the state is rather absent. He particularly stresses the role of autonomy in the construction of food sovereignty. He argues for the importance of distantiation as opposed to self-integration into the market and into value chains. This, contrary with what is often thought, is important in the ‘North’ just as well as in the ‘South’. Distantiation is a useful concept that can be very helpful to think about how to create alternatives to food empires where corporations have a monopolistic power. Practically distantiation means delinking from upstream markets i.e. inputs markets. The idea of distantiation is combined with the creation of alternatives in the production modes and the creation of nested markets to diminish the length of commodity chains and therefore to empower both producers and consumers.

In the Sardinian example, it is interesting to note that the MPS is asking for incentives by the state to motivate the production of forage as animal feed (MPS document). This is an attempt to distantiation. Yet the fact that they are explicitly asking the state makes my initial enquiry about the state’s role even more relevant.

The construction of relative autonomy plays an important role in the construction of food sovereignty but to what extent can transformation happen if nested
markets and alternative economies remain only parallel to the capitalist agro food system? Can the state promote schemes that aid distantiation processes and the increase of relative autonomy? Would that go against its accumulation imperative?

Rescuing the state?
The concept of embeddedness as theorized by Polanyi can be useful to better understand the role of the state. Embeddedness was firstly used to refer to the market. Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness is often misunderstood (Block, 2001). According to Block’s reading of Polanyi, disembedding of economies from the society was a utopian goal that classical economists wanted to pursue. Disembedding however is not possible if we hold true that market just as well as states are created by people and do not exist in a vacuum. Markets and states are institutions that living people decide to regulate and shape in a certain way. Markets and states are always embedded and inter-related with society. Therefore the ‘unregulated’ markets that Giménez & Shattuck (2011) talk about are indeed not unregulated but rather regulated in a certain way that gives more space for accumulation to happen. These are the results of specific political decisions. The question then shifts from one of embedding/disembedding markets and states to one of how one decides to embed institutions. At the same time it does not make sense to reject markets and states a priori but it is more useful to ask the question of who gets to decide the values in which institutions are embedded and how to change those.

If we use this analytical framework to look at the state, the question then becomes: why do we see the institutionalization of the accumulation imperative in state apparatuses as ‘normal’ and as a given? We should not. Just as much as the creation and normalization of ‘free market’ is the result of the institutionalization of ideological beliefs the same is valid for the state and what we refer to as the intrinsic accumulation processes (Watson, 2005). The state should not be discarded a priori because it does not have a will a priori.

Sylvia Kay (2012) in this regard offers a great attempt to ‘rescue the state’ in her two policy papers published by the Transnational Institute: “Positive investment
alternatives to large-scale land acquisitions or leases” and “Reclaiming Agricultural Investments”

She starts the first report like this:

“Investment in agriculture is about choices: choices about the organisation of rural economies, about the construction of rural subjects and cultures, and about the wider role that agriculture is to play in various articulations between states, markets, humans and nature. Yet these choices have been masked by the generalization of a form of capital intensive, large-scale, export-oriented, mono-cropping agriculture that presents itself as the most efficient, most productive and therefore most rational way to feed the world. As a result, both state-led and market-led forms of agricultural investment have been channeled towards the promotion of this model of agriculture.” (2012:5)

This way of looking at the state leaves evident space for possibilities of embedding the state in different values. After all, as Eckersley (2005) has argued, sovereignty is a constructed concept, which means that it is what we make of it.

**Conclusion**

Critiquing the NIE approach from a RAP perspective is a task that many have attempted. The two theoretical frameworks are diametrically in opposition therefore what results as efficient for one, is considered as a deep crisis for the other. While the NIE approach favors an idea of modernity rooted in the industrialization process and based on science and technological progress - as intended in the mainstream understanding of modernity- the other is rooted in attempts to create an alternative and flourishing countryside where production is ecologically sound and peasants regain control. Food producers are in fact at the heart of the construction of food sovereignty, but in the NIE approach they are sometimes considered as inefficient economic actors merely in need of social assistance.

What I have tried to ask in this essay is: can one learn anything from the NIE perspective even when one’s bias is pro-peasant? NIE understood the importance
of the state and as some have argued already, RAP approaches should analyze the role of the state further to understand its potential role in the construction of an alternative food system. Social movements’ ambivalent view of the state makes this requests rooted in a real need to think about the state. Historically, the state has been serving more the elite’s interest but can we deconstruct the state’s role and imagine states embedded in different paradigms?

I have argued that we can. Sylvia Kay’s reports on the importance of agricultural investments were key to my argument in this sense. Despite the limits of this essay, the main message has been that while this should not prevent us from thinking about alternative institutions, conversations about the role of the state are important and should be central in the construction of any alternative.

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**Development Encounters: An exercise in worldmaking** | 223


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Annex. Full transcript of Xi Jinping’s Speech (15 Nov 2012)

Good day, ladies, gentlemen, and friends.

Sorry to have kept you waiting. I am very happy to meet with you, friends of the press. Yesterday, the 18th CPC National Congress victoriously concluded. During these days, friends of the press have made lots of coverage on the congress and conveyed China’s voice in abundance to every country around the world. Everyone has been very dedicated, professional and hardworking. For this, on behalf of the Secretariat of the 18th Party Congress, I would like to express sincere gratitude to you.

Just now, we have conducted the first plenary meeting of the 18th CPC Central Committee and elected the new central leadership organisation during the meeting. The plenary meeting election has produced seven Standing Committee members of the Political Bureau and elected me as the CPC General Secretary. Here, let me introduce to you my colleagues, the other six Standing Committee members. They are: Comrade Li Keqiang, Comrade Zhang Dejiang, Comrade Yu Zhengsheng, Comrade Liu Yunshan, Comrade Wang Qishan, and Comrade Zhang Gaoli.

Comrade Li Keqiang served as a Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau of the 17th CPC Central Committee while other comrades served as members of the Political Bureau of the 17th CPC Central Committee. You have known them well. Here, on behalf of the members of the new central leadership organisation, I sincerely thank all comrades of the Party for their trust in us. We will live up to the great trust placed on and the mission assigned to us.

The great trust of all members of the Party and the expectations of people of all ethnic groups around the country are not only a tremendous encouragement to our doing the work well, but also a heavy burden on our shoulders.

This great responsibility is the responsibility to our nation. Our nation is a great nation.
During the civilisation and development process of more than 5,000 years, the Chinese nation has made an indelible contribution to the civilisation and advancement of mankind.

In the modern era, our nation experienced constant hardship and difficulties. The Chinese nation reached the most dangerous period. Since then, countless people with lofty ideals to realise the great revival of the Chinese nation rose to resist and fight, but failed one time after another.

Since the founding of the CPC, we have united and led the people to advance and struggle tenaciously, transforming the impoverished and backward Old China into the New China that has become prosperous and strong gradually. The great revival of the Chinese nation has demonstrated unprecedented bright prospects.

Our responsibility is to unite and lead people of the entire nation and of all ethnic groups around the country while accepting the baton of history and continuing to work for realising the great revival of the Chinese nation in order to let the Chinese nation stand more firmly and powerfully among all nations around the world and make a greater contribution to mankind.

This great responsibility is the responsibility to the people. Our people are a great people. During the long process of history, by relying on our own diligence, courage and wisdom, Chinese people have opened up a good and beautiful home where all ethnic groups live in harmony and fostered an excellent culture that never fades. Our people love life and expect better education, more stable jobs, better income, more reliable social security, medical care of a higher standard, more comfortable living conditions, and a more beautiful environment. They hope that their children can grow up better, work better and live better. People’s yearning for a good and beautiful life is the goal for us to strive for.

Every bit of happiness in the world has to be created by diligent work and labour. Our responsibility is to rally and lead the whole Party and all of China’s ethnic groups and continue to emancipate our way of thinking, insist on reform and
opening up, further unleash and develop social productive forces, work hard to resolve the difficulties faced by the masses in both production and life, and steadfastly take the road of common prosperity.

This is a major responsibility towards the Party. Our Party is a political Party that serves the people wholeheartedly. The Party has led the people in scoring accomplishments that capture the attention of the world. We have every reason to be proud. However, we are proud but not complacent, and we will never rest on our laurels.

In the new situation, our Party faces many severe challenges, and there are many pressing problems within the Party that need to be resolved, especially problems such as corruption and bribe-taking by some Party members and cadres, being out of touch with the people, placing undue emphasis on formality and bureaucracy must be addressed with great effort.

The whole Party must be vigilant.

The metal itself must be hard to be turned into iron. Our responsibility is to work with all comrades in the Party to be resolute in ensuring that the Party supervises its own conduct; enforces strict discipline; effectively deals with the prominent issues within the Party; earnestly improves the Party’s work style and maintains close ties with the people. So that our Party will always be the firm leadership core for advancing the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

It is the people who create history. The masses are the real heroes. Our strength comes from the people and masses. We deeply understand that the capability of any individual is limited, but as long as we unite as one, there is no difficulty that we cannot overcome. Individuals have limited time in work, but there is no limit in serving the people wholeheartedly.

Our responsibility is weightier than Mount Tai, and our journey ahead is long and arduous. We must always be of one heart and mind with the people; share weal
and woe with the people; make concerted and hard effort with the people; attend to our duties day and night with diligence; and strive to deliver a satisfactory answer sheet to history and the people.

Friends from the press, China needs to learn more about the world, and the world also needs to learn more about China. I hope you will continue to make more efforts and contributions to deepening the mutual understanding between China and the countries of the world.

Thank you everybody.
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