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Peasant and Indigenous Transnational Social Movements
Engaging with Climate Justice

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Abstract

This paper offers a comparative analysis of the engagement of transnational peasant and indigenous movements with global climate politics, and particularly with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It focuses on two key networks within the global climate justice movement: the transnational agrarian movement La Via Campesina (LVC) and the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC). It shows that peasant and indigenous movements have been able to progressively create their own sense of *globality* in climate justice debates, by (a) using and transforming the human rights framework, (b) seizing and creating international political opportunities, both inside and outside the UNFCCC process, and (c) advancing their own global framing of the climate issue, and in particular their own solutions to climate change. It argues that land use discussions are playing a growing role in climate politics, leading peasant and indigenous movements to simultaneously increase and modify the terms of their engagement. Indeed, as their involvement in climate projects increases, these movements are likely to face the challenge of bringing their discourse in coherence with their presence and actions in their lands and territories.

**Keywords:** Climate justice, indigenous peoples, peasant movements, land use, global framing, international political opportunities.
Introduction

Peasant and indigenous transnational social movements have increased their engagement in global debates on climate change in the last decade. They have strived to achieve progressive approaches to justice in the new global environmental governance arrangements (Featherstone 2013; Powless 2012; Schroeder 2010), offering key contributions to the global call for “climate justice”. Climate justice is a broad term that refers to “principles of democratic accountability and participation, ecological sustainability and social justice and their combined ability to provide solutions to climate change” (Chatterton, Featherstone, and Routledge 2013, 606). Climate justice is used to designate both the various networks and mobilizations that contest the unequal impacts of climate change (the “global justice movement”), and the mobilising discourse that those activists deploy when engaging in climate politics. Climate justice is a highly dynamic and somehow contested term (Hulme 2009), as various constellations of activists from different organizations and movements have sought, since the late 1990s, to engage with and respond to the fragile status of climate politics.

In this article we offer a comparative and historical account of the engagement of transnational peasant and indigenous movements with the climate change field (Schüssler, Rüling, and Wittneben 2014), and particularly with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Conferences of Parties (COP). We focus on two key actors of the global climate justice movement: the transnational agrarian movement La Via Campesina (LVC) and the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC). Peasant and indigenous social movements are quite distinct from other actors of the climate justice movement, which are mostly environmental and development non-governmental organizations and urban-based social movements, on which a critical amount of the literature on climate justice has focused. Peasant and indigenous movements are recognized as speaking on behalf of those who will be (and already are) most affected by climate change, and by the potential impacts of the wide range of market-based and State-led solutions to mitigate it (Espinoza and Feather 2011). In addition, these movements count with two

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1 Following Bumpus and Liverman we use the term “environmental governance” (Bumpus and Liverman 2008) to signify the broad range of political, economic, and social structures that shape and constrain actors’ behaviours toward the environment (Levy and Newell 2005). The specific institutional arrangements we focus on in this paper refer to policies that engage the transnational level.

2 It rejects efforts to address climate change that are made in isolation from a broader critique of the global economic model, and seeks to re-politicize the climate issue (Swyngedouw 2010; Featherstone 2013).

3 When it emerged twenty years ago, the transnational agrarian movement La Via Campesina, a network of small-scale farmers and peasant organizations from Central America, North and South America, and Europe, was formed to articulate a common response to the wave of structural adjustment programs and trade liberalization in agriculture (Desmarais 2008a). Today, La Via Campesina has expanded to Asia and Africa, considerably increased its membership, and managed to gain the support of a large number of other social movements and civil society organizations in defence of its food sovereignty paradigm. It has moved beyond protest to become the active promoter of an alternative development paradigm, grounded in a radically distinct relation between producers and consumers of food, between cities and the countryside, between (wo)man and nature, and between North and South. It counts about 164 local and national organizations in 73 countries. Altogether, it represents about 200 million farmers. It is an autonomous, pluralist and multicultural movement, independent from any political, economic or other type of affiliation (www.viacampesina.org).

4 The International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) speaks for the indigenous organizations during UNFCCC meetings. Indigenous organizations have being particularly active since 2005 and arrived to strong common positions with the Anchorage Declaration in 2009. IIPFCC representatives are elected during meetings of the caucus, which are in charge of coordinating their presence in UNFCCC talks during the year. Regional networks are important in the shaping of their positions. During their global meetings three regions are particularly engaged: Africa, Asia and Latin America (including Central America and South America). The engagement of northern organizations was constant but less important after Copenhagen. Key networks represented within the IIPFCC include COICA (Amazon), Kuna Congress, AISAN (Indonesia) Tebbteba (covering several countries of Asia), regional organizations in Africa (from the Congo Basin, pastoralists from Kenya), etc.
features that make them particularly powerful: political legitimacy in transnational arenas (Bellier 2003; McMichael 2008; Desmarais 2002), and means of mobilising local communities in defence of their land rights in diverse subnational and national contexts (Delgado 2013; Margulis, McKeon, and Borras 2013).

Through this comparative analysis, we argue that both peasant and indigenous networks have been able to think globally (Wieviorka 2014) and progressively create their own sense of *globality* in climate justice debates. They have done so by (a) using and transforming international legal frameworks, and the human rights framework in particular, (b) seizing and creating international political opportunities, both inside and outside the UNFCCC process, and (c) advancing their own global framing of the climate issue, and in particular their own solutions to climate change. Bullard and Müller have argued that one of the starkest challenges facing the global climate justice movement is to create “its own globality” in the face of its opponents’ inability to do so. The counter-hegemonic climate justice project is weak, these two authors contend, because the “green economy” project pushed by global institutions and supported through green investment programmes is itself weak (Bullard and Müller 2012, 61). In this context, the contribution of peasant and indigenous movements to the global climate justice movement deserves our full attention. Both sets of movements have shown an ability to organize transnationally, and find common ground across potentially divisive issues North and South. Both have acknowledged various adversaries in their history as movements, and continue to expose new enemies, beyond the green economy strictly speaking. Both have built on their grounded struggles for land and territorial rights to intervene in the climate change arena: they defend a standpoint that is both particular and global, in the sense that is aspires to express what can be shared by all.

In the first part of the paper, we describe the respective trajectories of peasant and indigenous movements around the UNFCCC process from 2007 to 2015. The core of the paper discusses the similarities and divergences between indigenous and peasant social movements, focusing on three key and interrelated dimensions of social movement analysis: how these movements frame their demands at the global level and respond to counter-framing by opponents, how they seize and create political opportunities to try to influence international legal regimes, and how they seek to enhance their transnational identity and political participation. From there we move to recent developments in the COP process and describe how land use discussions are playing a growing role in climate politics, leading peasant and indigenous movements to modify the terms of their engagement. In the conclusion, we explore some of the challenges facing both movements in their relation to global climate politics in the years to come.

The analysis we provide in this paper is grounded in a combination of semi-structured interviews and participant observation conducted by the two authors between 2007 and 2014 in various sites relevant to the study of the peasant and indigenous dimensions of the climate justice movement. Deborah Delgado studied the involvement of indigenous organizations from 2010 onwards in the Conferences of Parties and in meetings of subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC as well as local struggles around environmental politics in indigenous territories in the Amazon Basin. Priscilla Claeys studied La Via Campesina as both an international actor and an arena of action (Borras 2004) through fieldwork in 12 countries where the movement is active, across Latin and North America, Europe, Asia and Africa, from 2007 onwards. She also studied the engagement of LVC with a number of UN arenas in particular the Committee on World Food Security and the Human Rights Council, where a number of issues relating to climate change have been discussed in recent years. In our discussion, we combine

5 If our focus is on the UNFCCC process as a central element of the international political opportunities facing the climate justice movement, we also discuss the interaction of both indigenous and peasant transnational movements with a number of other international institutions and processes, such as the World Bank and other UN bodies where relevant.
various insights provided by the sociology of social movements, including frame analysis (D. A. Snow et al. 2014), political opportunities (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998), and collective identity processes (Melucci 1996; Polletta and Jasper 2001), with a focus on recent developments in the field that are helpful to understand transnational collective action, global framing and international political opportunities (Siméant 2010; R. Benford 2011; Heijden 2006; Abélès 2008; Pleyers 2010a), as well as the articulation of strategic and identity-based motivations (Scholl 2013). We also draw, where needed, on concepts from global studies, development studies, rural sociology and human rights studies.

La Via Campesina and the IIPFCC’ Interactions with the UNFCCC Process (2007-2015)

In this section, we propose a historical account of the transnational engagement of indigenous and peasant movements in global climate politics. We focus on the 2007 to 2015 period, as the year 2007 showed considerable involvement by both sets of movements but also marked the beginning of a new cycle of negotiations – triggered around 2005 — that directly targeted land-related issues in “developing countries”. In 2015, this cycle should culminate with “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties” (as stated by the Durban Outcome of the UNFCCC in 2010), which should come into effect and be implemented from 2020 onwards.

It should be noted here that farmers’ involvement in climate change conferences is much more recent than that of indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples’ engagement can be traced back to 1998, when the first indigenous participants coming exclusively from the North attended the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (Powless 2012), and issued a strong declaration (Indigenous Peoples of North America 1998). A more global involvement followed, and in 2001, indigenous peoples were recognized as a constituency within the UNFCCC. The farmers’ constituency, in contrast, has been recognized on a provisional basis only, pending a final decision on their status before COP 21. The farmers’ constituency, as we discuss below, does not include La Via Campesina, which has refrained from getting involved in the UNFCCC process. LVC has nevertheless been very vocal on the issue of climate change, an involvement that finds its origins around the COP 13 (2007) in Bali. In this paper, we analyse social movement action both inside and outside the COP process.

The thirteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 13) in 2007 is particularly relevant for both peasant and indigenous movements because of the rather contentious decision that was made to include the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation as a mitigation mechanism in the framework of the “Bali Action Plan”. The various systems and incentives to reduce deforestation have since then been referred to as REDD+6, and have been discussed within two subsidiary bodies of the COP: the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI).

Indigenous peoples’ organizations came with strong delegations to Bali7. They felt that REDD+ compromised their lands and territories, and that the decision had been taken without proper consultation of their constituencies. Some important indigenous organizations made explicit their rejection of REDD+ (IFIPCC 2007). All indigenous groups strived for the creation of an Expert Group

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6 At the core of REDD+ is the idea that countries should have various systems, capacities and economic incentives in place in order to dramatically reduce carbon emissions due to deforestation and forest degradation, while encouraging the three carbon-sequestering “+” elements of conservation of forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (UN-REDD 2014).

7 Interview by Deborah Delgado with indigenous representatives of the Kuna Yala in Bonn during SBSTA meetings, 2012.
on Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples and the creation of a voluntary fund for the full and meaningful participation of indigenous peoples as adopted by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). They also demanded that all adaptation and mitigation plans affecting indigenous communities follow the principle of free prior and informed consent (FPIC) of indigenous communities recognized in international human rights law.

At the occasion of COP 13, member organizations of La Via Campesina elaborated their first joint position on climate change. While there already was awareness of the potentially negative impacts of climate change on farm livelihoods, it is the threat raised by the “solutions” that were promoted to respond to climate change that triggered the involvement of peasant activists into climate debates. LVC activists therefore focused on exposing the fallacy of what they perceived as false solutions, such as GMOs, carbon trading, REDD+ and agrofuels (Via Campesina 2007b). At the same time, they started positioning themselves as holding the solution to both mitigation and adaptation to climate change (Via Campesina 2007a). In Bali, LVC made alliances with a number of environmental and global justice groups, and joined the Climate Justice Now coalition that came into being following open conflict with the “relatively moderate” Climate Action Network, which had monopolized the environmental NGO space inside the negotiation process (Bullard and Müller 2012, 56).

The COP 14, in Poznan, took place in the midst of the 2008 Global Food Crisis. As we show below, this prompted La Via Campesina and its allies to further elaborate on the links between climate change, agroecology/peasant farming and food security. The movement was also heavily mobilized against land grabbing. For Indigenous Peoples organizations at that point, the focus was on ensuring the recognition of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) approved by the UN General Assembly in 2007. Indigenous movements launched a No Rights, No REDD campaign, following the refusal by many state parties to make explicit mention of UNDRIP (Tebtebba Foundation 2008). They expressed disappointment at the lack of political will by Parties to include reference to human rights language crafted under the UN, and at the lack of will to implement participation mechanisms that other environmental governance conventions, such as the CBD, had put in place. They saw the Copenhagen summit as an opportunity to reverse this. Hosted by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate Change issued a common position known as the Anchorage Declaration, demanding concrete outcomes from COP 15 (Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate Change 2009). The gathering of indigenous movements from the Global North and South stressed the importance of the UNDRIP and bridged some divides in the movement that REDD+ had brought to the fore.

The COP 15 in December 2009 in Copenhagen was described by observers as a complete failure, leading to what many called the end of the global climate justice movement (Bullard and Müller 2012) or at least its reorganization (Parks and della Porta 2014). However, inside official arenas COP 15 brought some common understanding of the importance of the recognition of human rights in the climate regime, and it helped build the momentum for the recognition of the UNDRIP for REDD+ safeguards in COP16. LVC activists were strongly mobilized in Copenhagen, in coordination with the “Climate Justice Action” (CJA) network which had established itself as a platform prior to the Copenhagen mobilisations (Chatterton, Featherstone, and Routledge 2013). LVC activists organized a candlelight action for victims of climate change, and coordinated public interventions against the Danish meat industry and against biofuels. As this French peasant woman activist who has actively followed climate change debates, insists: “For LVC, Copenhagen is not seen as a failure. It was better to have no agreement than a bad agreement. It is like for the WTO.”

LVC activists did not disengage after Copenhagen. LVC participation in the World People’s

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8 Interview by Priscilla Claeys with LVC staff, 15 July 2014.
9 Interview by Priscilla Claeys with LVC activist, 12 September 2014.
Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, a global summit gathering civil society and governments organized in April 2010 in Cochabamba by the Bolivian government, was very strong. LVC promptly endorsed the proposed Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth and the Cochabamba People’s Agreement. The People’s Agreement offered an “integral vision” of climate change; it incorporated the structural causes of the climate crisis, the rupture of the harmony with nature, and the issues of the climate debt and of climate migrants. The text rejected market mechanisms for the reduction of emissions, and proposed the creation of a mechanism that, unlike REDD+, would respect the sovereignty of states and guarantee the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities. While there was no mention of food and agriculture in the Copenhagen Accord that failed to be imposed in 2009, the People’s Agreement called for a profound shift toward the sustainable models of agricultural production used by indigenous and farming communities, in order to guarantee food sovereignty.

The presence of indigenous peoples during the Cochabamba Summit was also critical. They constituted a rather sceptical voice vis-à-vis Evo Morales’ government as they had different views on the management of indigenous territories, on extractive industries and on REDD+. While the Morales government had officially agreed to REDD+ in 2009, its administration became one of the most vocal opponents to it and to the “commodification of forest and nature” it implied (Delgado 2014a). Some subnational indigenous peoples organizations were already involved, as early movers, in cash transfers for conservation. Where they held considerable participation in decision-making and benefit sharing, they considered these mechanisms as opportunities to enhance their autonomy and the development of their territories. At the UNFCCC Intercessional Meeting held in Bangkok, in 2009, a consensus emerged which saw Bolivia, Venezuela, India, Mexico and Colombia come out in support of the inclusion of a reference to the UNDRIP in the UNFCCC decisions (Third World Network 2009). The global indigenous caucus consensus was to support that process and strive for the recognition of UNDRIP in the Convention.

Both movements arrived with a strong mind-set to the COP 16 in Cancun in 2010. LVC demanded respect of the Cochabamba People’s Agreement and again rejected privatization, REDD+, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) schemes and geoengineering as adequate responses to climate change. LVC activists organized caravans and camps, and established new coalitions with environmentalists from all over Mexico. The police met some of their actions with fierce resistance. Cancun also saw the strong presence of indigenous peoples organizations. Several indigenous movements coming from all continents expressed their rejection to REDD+ because of the risks of dispossession it entailed, particularly if it was included as an offset mechanism under the COP. Since the Mexican Presidency was strongly promoting REDD+, indigenous peoples organizations made use of this context to assert the recognition of UNDRIP by the UNFCCC. They were successful in this effort, as the UNDRIP was noted as a safeguard provision of the REDD+ mechanism.

At the COP 17 in Durban, in 2011, the World Bank introduced climate smart agriculture and sustainable intensification as solutions to climate change (Peterman and Langelle 2012). LVC issued

10 See http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/.
11 Interview by Deborah Delgado in La Paz, Bolivia, in October 2010.
12 CDM is one of the flexibility mechanisms defined in the Kyoto Protocol (2007) that provides for emissions reduction projects which generate Certified Emission Reduction units which may be traded in emissions trading schemes.
13 Climate-smart agriculture is a very contentious term used notably by the FAO to designate a set of agricultural practices that promote production systems that sustainably increase productivity and resilience (adaptation), reduce/remove green house gas emissions (mitigation), and enhance achievement of national food security and development goals. Sustainable agricultural intensification is equally contentious and is used to describe the selected technologies and practices that have the potential to improve or restore soil fertility, thereby establishing conditions for increased productivity while making better use of resources, also resulting in lower emissions per
a statement rejecting the introduction of agriculture in climate talks, and more specifically the offset mechanisms and the “green revolution” types of solutions that were discussed\textsuperscript{14}. The movement insisted that agriculture should not be treated “as a carbon sink” (Via Campesina 2011). The Green Climate Fund (GCF) – which had been established at COP 16 to support climate related projects – and the conditions of a new agreement were also high on the agenda. It was decided that the Secretariat of the GCF would be placed in the hands of the World Bank. Indigenous peoples organizations strived for dedicated mechanisms and a stronger voice in the financial decision-making process without success.

The COP18, which took place in Doha, saw a drop in the participation of observer organizations, since the cost of following the process and the possibilities to influence it were perceived as low. The report on Food Security and Climate Change produced by the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) and the recommendations of the CFS with regard to climate change (issued at its 39\textsuperscript{th} session) were presented in the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) as an introduction to the agriculture item. A key message from the CFS was that countries should develop agricultural strategies, in partnership with farmers, that take into account the need to respond to climate change, and integrate climate change concerns in food security policies (CFS 2012). The same year, LVC issued a call to action in the context of RIO+20, making a strong statement in rejection of the “green economy” and its “green structural adjustment programs”, describing the new green revolution as a “new enclosure” (La Via Campesina 2012).

There was strong scepticism about the role of the Polish presidency of COP 19, which was held in Warsaw in 2013. The climate justice movement strongly resented Poland’s efforts to get the private sector and coal industry on board. Almost all environmental organizations (including Greenpeace, WWF, Oxfam, 350.org, Friends of the Earth, the Confederation and Action Aid) walked out from the venue. For the Presidency, the minimum success to show to the world was an International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, and a package of decisions on REDD+\textsuperscript{15}. Although an agreement was reached on REDD+, the decision on how to address drivers of deforestation remained very general, and the Safeguards Information System (SIS), that should guide international reporting on how countries address and respect safeguard’s standards, was not specified.

The COP 20, which took place in Lima in December 2014, had a strong focus on the post 2020 agreement to be reached in 2015 in Paris. At the time of writing, right after Lima, the content of that agreement remains uncertain, but what is clear is that the climate regime that is shaping up is becoming global in reach. Indeed, discussions indicate that the fragmented set of measures and mechanisms to deal with climate change is to be harmonized across the globe. The Lima COP also provided a new incentive for Latin American grassroots organizations to engage. The contradiction between the weak respect of indigenous peoples’ rights and the protection of vulnerable ecosystems was strongly highlighted in several public actions; the most relayed being the Solidarity Act with the widows of Saweto community leaders killed 2 months before the conference by illegal loggers at the frontier of Peru and Brazil.

Key Dimensions of Peasant and Indigenous Engagement in Climate Debates

The existence of a social movement largely depends on its ability to develop a common interpretation of reality to nurture collective identifications. If a social movement requires mobilizing structures – organizational networks, communication channels, strategies and (largely non-conventional) action

\textsuperscript{14} Skype interview by Priscilla Claeys with LVC activist, 12 September 2014.

\textsuperscript{15} Interview by Deborah Delgado with national negotiator in Warsaw in December 2013.
repertoires—, and seeks to take advantage of political opportunities, framing processes play a key role in a movement’s success (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Framing or “the production of meaning” (R. D. Benford and Snow 2000, 612) essentially serves three purposes: diagnosing certain situations as problematic, offering solutions, and calling to action (R. Benford and Snow 1988). Organizational frames are produced and constantly reshaped by movement leaders and constituents, following complex processes that simultaneously have an impact on and are the result of a movement’s strategy, action repertoires, and collective identity processes (D. A. Snow et al. 2014). Frames also respond to the dynamics of counter-framing by opponents (Chong and Druckman 2013).

Transnational movements face specific challenges when it comes to framing: what they seek is to affect the global framing of social, environmental and political problems, and bring in alignment with the movement’s worldviews and goals. In order to reshape global governance, transnational movements need to identify discursive opportunities at the global level, such as global meetings and international norms (R. Benford 2011). This requires the development of a discourse that identifies both a common identity (the us) and the target of protest (the other) at a supranational level, in defence of an alternative vision (Touraine 2002; Pleyers 2008). In addition, because political decision-making has considerably shifted from the national to the international level, transnational movements face the challenge of having to act at these different (national, international but also sub-national) levels of politics. Research on the “international political opportunities” that are open to transnational movements is still incipient. The concept – which designates a highly complex composite of a number of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) establishing a number of international regimes and systems of global governance and norms (Heijden 2006) – is useful in our opinion because movements indeed engage with different dimensions of that composite at the same time, and on distinct terms.

In this section, we analyse three interrelated dimensions of peasant and indigenous engagement with climate debates: framing, the use of human rights and international legal frameworks, and the interrelation between transnational political participation and international political opportunities. We believe that these dimensions are all key to understand the joint efforts of peasant and indigenous organizations seeking to influence the multilevel scales of climate politics that will affect their lands and territories.

Collective Action Frames at the Global Level

Climate justice seeks to bridge the concerns of movements organized around global justice or alter-globalization (Pleyers 2010b) with those organized around climate change. Despite mutual recognition of the interconnections of “red” and “green” agendas since the late 2000s, the “climate justice” frame has failed to impose itself as a powerful and resonating master frame (Wahlström, Wennerhag, and Rootes 2013). This failure has been attributed to ideological and political divergences among the various networks within the movement, leading to a multiplicity of competing discourses, notably along the reformist vs. radical lines (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007). Divisions are also noted between a focus on changing the system and efforts geared towards changing oneself (Pleyers 2015). Both peasant and indigenous transnational movements have global political agendas that are distinct from, and largely exceed, climate change\textsuperscript{16}. Peasant social movements have demanded food sovereignty, land and resource rights, and a profound restructuring of our global food system (Rosset and Martínez-Torres 2010), while indigenous movements have claimed the right to self-determination.

\textsuperscript{16} When entering global climate debates, both sets of movements had to integrate the climate issue as part of their broader strategy (Bullard and Müller 2012), making room for it in their pre-existing frames. Such efforts can be characterized as “frame bridging”, that is the “linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (D. Snow et al. 1986, 467).
and autonomy as well as respect for their distinct relationship with the living and non-living in their territories (Charters and Stavenhagen 2009). To defend their sovereignty and rights against the state and/or the market, peasant movements have deployed global frames such as “Food Sovereignty” and “Peasants’ Rights” (Claeys 2014), while indigenous movements have used frames such as “Mother Earth” (Pacha Mama) and “living well” (Buen Vivir) (Postigo 2013). These frames have achieved considerable resonance within the global climate justice movement at large.

The politics of framing represented a considerable challenge for both sets of movements. Their first efforts had to focus on changing the perception that other climate politics actors had of them as social agents. Indeed, the way these constituencies were conceived in climate debates ranged from being major drivers of climate change because of their number and practices on the ground, to particularly vulnerable populations, as climate change is associated with declining yields in agriculture, extreme weather events and displacements. In response, both peasant and indigenous movements presented themselves as active actors holding “solutions” coming from the field, inducing shifts from “climate change solutions” to “peasant solutions”, and from “sustainable forestry” to “indigenous/community management of forests”.

La Via Campesina came out in 2007 with an elaborate position paper entitled “Small Scale Sustainable Farmers Are Cooling Down The Earth”, which was revised in 2009 (La Via Campesina 2009). The paper distinguishes what the movement denounces as “false solutions” – agrofuels, carbon trading and genetically modified organisms – from the “true solutions” – sustainable small-scale farming, agrarian reform and modes of food production, consumption and trade based on justice, solidarity and health. At this initial stage, framing by LVC was “intuitive”. It emerged in reaction to the solutions advanced by the corporate sector and governments that were perceived as market-based, but it was also seen as an opportunity to promote the food sovereignty vision17. In the words of this French peasant activist: “we are re-stating [food sovereignty] while adjusting it”18.

Part of the framing effort of LVC and allied international NGOs such as GRAIN and ETC Group was to highlight that food and agriculture are climate change issues, and that a new food system could be a major driver of a solution to climate change. GRAIN, in its “Food and Climate Change: the Forgotten Link”, denounced the contribution of the industrial food system to climate change, calculating that it is responsible for 44-57% of global GHG emissions (11-15% production, 15-18% land use change and deforestation, 15-20% processing, transport, packing and retail, 2-4% food waste). The organization called for a paradigm shift based on three pillars: shifting to local food production and consumption, reintegrating crop and animal production on the farm, and putting an end to land clearing and deforestation, by reversing the expansion of monoculture plantations. Operating such a shift, the NGO argued, would require building on the skills and experiences of farmers (GRAIN 2011).

Taking advantage of the renewed attention paid by the international community to food and agriculture following the food crisis of 2007-08 (McMichael 2009), peasant activists came out strongly in defence of agroecology and peasant farming as alternative models that can simultaneously “feed the world” and “cool the planet” (La Via Campesina 2009). GRAIN calculated that a sustained focus on peasant-based agroecological practices could capture 24-30% of the current global annual greenhouse gas emissions (ETC Group, GRAIN, and La Via Campesina 2013). LVC’s political endorsement of agroecology as food sovereignty in practice (Rosset and Martinez-Torres 2012) did not respond only to the need to develop a position on climate change. It also constituted a counter-framing effort to discard the international community’s emerging response to the global food crisis, which promoted the conversion of peasants into entrepreneurs (De Schutter 2008).

Indigenous peoples movements, on their end, made a strong push to change the framing of

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17 Interview by Priscilla Claeys with LVC staff, 15 July 2014.
18 Skype interview by Priscilla Claeys with LVC activist, 12 September 2014.
initiatives to control deforestation under the UNFCCC, in order to gain a fair participation of local communities and indigenous peoples’ organizations in these initiatives. Indeed, they feared that these new policies and projects would further undermine their access to land and resources. Indigenous peoples activists managed to problematize REDD+ in a critical but provocative manner. Their positions ranged from a stark opposition to carbon markets for land use activities (where LVC and indigenous organizations coincide) to considering these schemes as a way to regain control and autonomy in their territories and influence the regulation of other investments on their lands (such as oil, cattle ranching and palm plantations). Some indigenous peoples organizations tried to influence the constitution of the REDD+ scheme actively, others decided to boycott it or ask for an international moratorium. In all cases, a first step for indigenous peoples was to be recognized as actors in the territory, with legitimate organizations present in the forests concerned, which has been a long-lasting struggle in the politics of ecology and conservation (Chapin 2004; West 2006).

The next step for indigenous movements was to be recognized as efficient actors against deforestation. They largely succeeded in gaining recognition for the idea that indigenous peoples with respected rights are the best guarantee to keep forests alive, even if tensions between indigenous movements and states – that on one hand engage in climate change debates and on the other water down environmental provisions – remain vivid. Once achieved a reframing of their role, from beneficiaries to actors, indigenous movements demanded the broad application of the principle of free prior and inform consent to REDD+ strategies at national and subnational levels, and sought to demonstrate how to do this in a cost effective manner (as in Indonesia, Thailand or the Philippines). They also developed more ambitious proposals, such as “Indigenous Amazonian REDD+” where indigenous organizations are directly involved in REDD+ actions, through a scheme that includes safeguard provisions and empowers them to enhance REDD+ impacts.

Even though there was strong pressure from other actors of the climate justice movement for them to take an open stance against REDD+ (as well as other trading mechanisms), territorially-based indigenous organizations considered that they could not afford to loose the opportunity of gaining regional and national leverage by engaging in the reform debates that REDD+ had opened in different countries. At the risk of loosing their engagement with other social actors, they strategically used REDD+ ideas to further their own agenda, demanding that these schemes guarantee the respect of human rights, and include indigenous peoples in decision-making process and modalities of benefit sharing. The Indigenous REDD+ proposal is interesting in this regard because it succeeded in dissolving the significance of markets in carbon markets and in placing the emphasis on participation and rights. Yet, if the development of the climate field has enabled indigenous peoples organizations to somewhat enhance their control on the land and resources that historically belonged to their peoples, it has also brought risks tied to the boost of investment and capital flow in their territories.

Indigenous movements’ frames such as “Buen vivir” and “Mother Earth”, that played an important role in the rise of some progressive governments such as those of Evo Morales and Rafael Correa, are also trapped in contradictions. Conflicting relationships between indigenous organizations based in resource rich areas and these progressive administrations - that used to be their allies and are now giving their consent to resource exploitation - are becoming a constant source of conflict and deeply political issue. In December 2014, ECUARUNARI, the main organization of indigenous peoples of Ecuador was evicted from its headquarters. The Bolivian organization of indigenous peoples of the lowlands CIDOB had a similar fate in 2011. Counter-framing to these interventions can

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19 It can be argued that REDD+ schemes have been influenced by discourses on climate justice. One important example is the Forest Investment Programme (FIP), which counts with indigenous organizations in its decision-making bodies, both globally and in some countries such as Peru and Colombia. As a result, part of FIP investment and other funding coming from bilateral agreements will be dedicated to land titling and demarcation of indigenous territories.
be observed in the long run as new divergent views rise up in response inside the movements.

**The Use of International Legal Frameworks to Enhance Influence**

Both peasant and indigenous movements have made a strong use of human rights in the framing of their claims, placing their demands within the well-studied rights master frame (McAdam 1996). Framing demands in human rights terms is a way to facilitate the common formulation of claims across diverse networks, and a way to facilitate their insertion in global governance debates. Elsewhere, we have showed that both sets of movements have succeeded in making human rights subversive and relevant to their local and global struggles, by pushing the boundaries of existing human rights regimes (Claeys 2015). Their efforts to “localize” human rights (Feyter et al. 2011) have largely relied on the creation of “new human rights” (Bob 2010) for their constituencies (Claeys 2012; Claeys 2014; Daes 2000; Cambou and Smis 2013; Delgado 2014b). The creation of new human rights has played a key role in their strategy of pushing forward their visions of *globality*, and their perspective on how their lands and territories should be managed.

After two decades of struggles in different international and UN arenas, indigenous peoples succeeded in getting the UNDRIP adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007. This was a gain of global reach for the indigenous movement because the valuable 169 ILO Convention on Indigenous Peoples Rights adopted in 1989 has only been ratified by 20 states. Since 2007, the focus of indigenous peoples has been on getting this new framework recognized, and on seeing their new group rights implemented. Peasants have also but more recently put efforts into bringing their rights-based claims to various bodies of the UN. They are likely to see new rights recognized for rural working people in international law in the years to come (Claeys 2015). Indeed, a process is under way at the UN Human Rights Council to elaborate a Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas (Golay 2013; Edelman and James 2011; Claeys 2014), after La Via Campesina succeeded in demanding that a new instrument be negotiated. These advances testify to the growing inclusion of civil society in international standard setting and in particular to the emergence of social movements as “makers of law” (Rajagopal 2003). These processes also demonstrate the ability of transnational indigenous and peasant movements to carve out “legal opportunities” (Israël 2003) at the global level.

One of the main goals of indigenous movements in climate talks has been to mainstream the UNDRIP. As discussed above, as early as 1998 indigenous movements demanded that one of the key principles contained in the Declaration – free, prior and informed consent – be applied to all adaptation and mitigation plans affecting indigenous communities. However, this demand was not properly addressed by the UNFCCC, which has integrated human rights in its decisions less than other environmental Conventions (Johl and Duyck 2012). Resistance to link the human rights framework to climate affairs is the result of strong opposition by some key states. For instance, in 2008, the United States expressed that it was of the view that a “human rights approach” to addressing climate change was unlikely to be effective, and that climate change could be more appropriately addressed through traditional systems of international cooperation (United States government 2008). If the UN human rights system was late in analysing climate change from a human rights perspective, it has entered

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20 While peasant movements have chosen not to formally use the UNFCCC process to claim their rights, they have pushed their rights claims in a wide range of other UN arenas, in particular the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS), and the UN Human Rights Council, where climate-related issues have been discussed.

21 The US however recognized that “climate change … has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights”, as expressed by the Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 of March 2008.

22 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights presented a report in 2009 that detailed the impacts of climate change on human rights.
the debate in recent years. Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, for example, sent an open letter to the State Parties to the UNFCCC in Bonn (20-25 October 2014) demanding that “human rights be integrated in all aspects of climate actions” (OHCHR 2014). How States incorporate their existing human rights obligations into the climate change agreement for post 2015 is a deeply contentious issue.

La Via Campesina has also used global climate talks to advance its rights-based claims, insisting that the “rights to our farms, lands, seeds and natural resources need to remain in our hands”, thereby using a rights discourse in opposition to the logic of appropriation promoted by mechanisms such as REDD+ (ETC Group, GRAIN, and La Via Campesina 2013). Peasant networks, however, were not able to back their claims with a specific international instrument protecting their group rights, such as UNDRIP, because such an instrument does not (yet) exist. They mostly resorted to demanding uncodified and not universally recognized human rights, such as the right to land and the right to seeds. Their level of recognition as a constituency in the UN system is also much less advanced than that of indigenous groups. This reflects the fact that indigenous peoples have a longer experience in international legal regimes that comes, to a large extent, from their colonial past: they have long asserted their status as “peoples” and their governance and territorial rights. Peasants and other rural people are only beginning to demand their recognition as collective rights-holders, both at the UN and national levels. In these various settings, they have justified their demand for new human rights by emphasizing the important role that smallholder farmers play in feeding the planet while caring for the environment, thereby demanding to fulfil what they claim as their mission i.e. to feed humanity23.

International Political Opportunities and Transnational Political Participation

Peasant and indigenous movements have placed considerable emphasis on issues of political participation and representation24, which have long been key concerns (Fraser 2009). Claiming a collective identity that repositions peasants and indigenous peoples as revalorized and modern social actors embodying the key to an alternative development model has been a game changer strategy for both movements, as both groups were long considered remnants of the past, and their knowledge and value systems disregarded (Desmarais 2008b; Edelman 2013). In both cases, this process was tied to participating in global governance debates with one’s own voice, rejecting and reforming mechanisms built to facilitate the participation of NGOs talking on their behalf (McKeon 2009).

Contrary to the IIPFCC, which has deployed an inside/outside strategy of involvement in climate debates, LVC has focused its efforts on political mobilization with no involvement in formal climate negotiations at all. This does not mean that the peasant movement rejects the accreditation of some of its members, notably to organize disruptive activities inside (as was done in Cancun and Lima), nor that the movement does not follow the state of negotiations, through close contacts with insiders. Rather, the movement has adopted a strategy of trying to shift the terms of the debate from the outside, while local member organizations have managed to halt disruptive projects on the ground (Bullard and Müller 2012). As a result, the food and agricultural interests that are represented by the UNFCCC farmers’ constituency are quite at odds with those defended by LVC. The farmers’ constituency is very small in size (with a total of 10 members as per the UNFCCC website on 12 September 2014), partly a result of the fact that the food and agricultural community woke up late to climate change (Cabré

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23 French peasant woman from the Confédération paysanne talking on behalf of LVC at informal consultation on the Declaration on the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas at the Human Rights Council, 12 November 2014.

24 On issues related to sustainable development, during the Rio Conference of 1992, the activism of indigenous peoples was rewarded by increased recognition of their constituencies as groups who are entitled to speak with their own voice.
2011), and heavily biased towards organizations representing mid-to big farmers in rich countries, defending industrial and corporate agriculture. National and international federations of farmers, such as the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) and the World Farmers Organization (WFO), dominate the constituency, alongside the well-known research institutes IATP and IFPRI. In most statements made to the UNFCCC in recent years, the spokesperson speaking on behalf of the farmers’ constituency was the representative of WFO, and at COP 20 in Lima, the WFO acted as a focal point.

With increased attention given to agriculture in discussions on adaptation and mitigation, some of our interviewees have expressed deep concerns that the interests of small-scale family and peasant farmers who embody alternative solutions to climate change, such as LVC member organizations, are not represented in the negotiations. One activist suggested that engagement would be useful, if not to influence the “work programme” on agriculture that the WFO demands (Engelund Friis 2013), but at least to block agreements on what LVC perceives as wrong solutions. One of the first demands of the WFO, for example, is investment in climate-smart agriculture. The organization also demands that “sustainable bioenergy” (e.g. energy crops, bio-residues, bio-gas from manure) be recognized in the accounting rules of mitigation, and that voluntary schemes rewarding farmers for implementing practices that foster the sequestration of carbon into soils be established, for example through the payment for ecosystem services (PES) (World Farmers’ Organization 2012). For LVC, however, there is nothing to gain from being involved in formal negotiations, and the risk is too great to lend legitimacy to the “climate game.” One of the LVC activists we interviewed clearly compared the movement’s strategic approach on climate to that adopted in the late 1990s and 2000s towards trade liberalization, when the movement focused on undermining the legitimacy of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Desmarais 2003). Then as well, LVC worked in coalitions with others.

For indigenous peoples organizations, political engagement in the UNFCCC is one of the ways used to gain respect for their territorial rights and human rights inside and outside the UN regime. Discussions on how to manage and balance their participation in institutional arrangements, influence in international legal processes, national politics and more confrontational types of activism have long been debated at different levels within the movement. As discussed above, the human rights framework has been particularly useful at the institutional level to assert rights vis-à-vis the State, but engaging in the climate governance regime has brought new complexities, as this engagement may limit the capacity of indigenous movements to contest the political order at national level. Nevertheless, the fact that the movement is not homogeneous has given it the capacity to make use of different frames without breaking solidarity between different organizations that recognize themselves as indigenous throughout the world. Until today and after decades of movement activity, the consensus over the importance of autonomy and territory has not broken despite serious internal debate.

Peasant and indigenous movements’ involvement in global climate discussions shows that global governance debates can be used and are used as international political opportunities, both from inside and outside. In other words, international processes such as the UNFCCC may be seized as political opportunities even if there is no formal engagement. In the case of peasant movements in particular, the strategic objective is to shed light on the weak legitimacy of the emerging climate global order.

26 Skype interview by Priscilla Claesys with international climate justice activist, 11 September 2014.
27 Skype interview by Priscilla Claesys with LVC activist, 12 September 2014.
28 Skype interview by Priscilla Claesys with LVC activist, 12 September 2014.
29 However, it should also be noted here that some key demands that indigenous movements have made vis-à-vis the UNFCCC have not yet been addressed, such as the creation of an Expert Group on Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples and the creation of a voluntary fund for the full and meaningful participation of indigenous peoples that have precedents in Convention on Biological Diversity.
However, delegitimization is not as strong an objective as was the case with the WTO protests organized by alterglobalization activists. This may be linked to the fact that some actors of the climate justice movement, notably indigenous peoples, are engaging with the UNFCCC process in an effort to achieve concrete gains at the territorial level. It is also tied to the fact that the UN makes less of a target than the WTO, as many climate justice activists believe that the UN should be made accountable to the people.

The Road Ahead? Land use and climate change

Although still in a fragmented manner, and with different degrees of success in achieving support from Parties, options for including land use in a post Kyoto climate agreement have been tested and discussed under different negotiation tracks. Up to 2005, climate change measures did not focus on land use in Non-Annex I (mostly developing) countries. The agreement on a REDD+ mechanism revealed will from parties to engage in these issues, but the inclusion of agriculture in the negotiations remains extremely contested. Agricultural emissions are currently treated in a fragmented manner under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. For instance, for Annex I Parties, emissions resulting from land management are covered under voluntary accounting rules for Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), which cover activities such as forest management, cropland management, grazing land management and reforestation, whereas emissions resulting from the industrial processes that support agriculture (i.e. fertilizer production and use) and livestock (methane) fall into the mandatory emissions accounting of industrial emissions. Proposals to include forests (tree plantations) and land use activities in existing and new carbon markets (Clean Development Mechanism projects) were discussed in Lima, where civil society expressed concerns linked to the fact that carbon sequestration in land and forests can only be temporary and cannot compensate for continued fossil fuel emissions (Carbon Market Watch 2014).

Discussions on how to reduce emissions from agriculture have taken place within the UNFCCC’s two subsidiary bodies (SBI and SBSTA) but have made little progress. In September 2014, a Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture (GACSA) was launched at the UN Climate Summit organized in New York, giving visibility to a myriad of regional and national initiatives on climate smart agriculture, and to a growing number of national programmes/projects for agricultural adaptation and mitigation. The Alliance seeks to achieve sustainable and equitable increases in agricultural productivity and incomes, greater resilience of food systems, and a reduction and/or removal of greenhouse gas emissions associated with agriculture, wherever possible. In a press release issued in September 2014, LVC criticized the Alliance for bringing nothing new, and denounced what it saw as “a continuation of a project first begun with the Green Revolution in the early 1940’s and continued through the 70’s and 80’s by the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction projects and the corporate interests involved” (La Via Campesina 2014). At the time of writing, it remains unclear if agriculture will be made part of a “land use cluster” together with REDD+, wetlands, and grasslands management in the new agreement. But it is apparent that the agriculture-climate nexus is gaining visibility in global governance debates and that the issue of which agricultural development model needs to be supported is increasingly prominent. If peasant and indigenous movements started engaging in climate debates around 2007 following the inclusion of land use in the negotiations, they now need to position

30 The Convention divides countries into three main groups according to differing commitments: Annex I, Annex II, and Non-Annex I.
31 Such as the African Climate Smart Agriculture Alliance led by NEPAD (in partnership with international NGOs such as Care, Oxfam and World Vision, and technical partners such as the FAO and the research consortium CGIAR).
32 http://newsroom.unfccc.int/action-to-adapt/un-climate-summit-agriculture/
themselves in response to the rural development model that is being promoted in the name of climate change mitigation and adaptation.

A “landscape approach” is gaining weight in debates on land use. A landscape can be understood as a contiguous area, intermediate in size between an “eco-region” and a “site”, with a specific set of ecological, cultural and socio-economic characteristics distinct from its neighbours. Landscape approaches are promoted by actors such as the World Bank as the appropriate way to identify integrated solutions to competing demands on land uses and multiple pressures on social and environmental systems, and to trigger both private and public long-term investment in adaptation. Integral to landscape approaches are payment for ecosystem services schemes, that is, arrangements between local communities who manage watersheds, the forests and agriculture in certain areas, and other people, typically downstream, such as hydropower companies, tourism operators, and governments of cities and other jurisdictions. “Comprehensive land-use planning” is also coming back in fashion as a way to tackle the conversion of forests to agricultural land.

Transnational peasant and indigenous movements face the challenge of developing a coherent response to this new global framing of climate debates. Indeed the emerging global climate regime is likely to bring new changes into the modalities that dictate their access to land understood as the capacity of controlling its development (Ribot and Peluso 2003). In response, peasant and indigenous movements will need to further advance “solutions” that enhance their control on the land at the local level, and make more explicit the development model they demand, going beyond the defence of their group rights.

Conclusions

Both the peasant and indigenous peoples’ movements discussed in this paper have strived for a political engagement and global framing of climate discussions that seek to tackle the structural causes of climate change. They have seized the new international political opportunities opened by the UNFCCC process, to influence the decisions that may affect their access to land and territorial autonomy, and to advance alternatives such as agroecology and food sovereignty, to what they perceive as “false solutions”. To achieve this, they have called on and transformed the human rights framework, and tried to reinforce the interface between the climate and human rights regimes. New and existing human rights have been deployed by both sets of movements to push forward their visions of *globality*, and their perspective on how their lands and territories should be managed, and by whom. This strategy is particularly prominent in the case of indigenous groups who have attempted to influence the climate regime from the inside, and have insisted that whatever is negotiated within the UNFCCC should respect indigenous peoples rights and ensure their participation. Peasant movements, in turn, have used the human rights frame in opposition to the logic of appropriation/commodification promoted by mechanisms such as REDD+.

Both sets of movements have adopted a strategy of proposing solutions grounded in practices and knowledge coming from the field, and that seek to reinforce their long-term control over resources. Yet, while the proposals of peasant movements remain “abstract” (Bullard and Müller 2012), the solutions advanced by indigenous groups are more closely tied to concrete experiences and actual project implementation on the ground. If peasant and indigenous movements have taken stances that are clearly politicized, in the sense that they contest “uneven social and environmental relations” (Featherstone 2013), they are likely to increasingly face the challenge of bringing their discourse in coherence with their presence and actions in their lands and territories, as their involvement in climate

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33 Such schemes have been tested by the CGIAR Research Program on Forests, Trees and Agroforestry for over ten years.
projects increases. This may set them aside from other actors of the climate justice movement. So far, however, their engagement in global climate politics has reinforced the construction of “trans-local solidarities as alternatives to carbon intensive agribusiness” (Featherstone 2013) in part because both groups have prompted a conceptualization of the climate issue that is not as “de-compartmentalized” as that put out by their opponents.

Faced with a global climate regime that seeks to induce simplifications and reduce uncertainties in order to make the world “flat” (and facilitate the management of risk in public and private investments), indigenous and peasant movements have brought diversity and complexity to the fore. They have considerably transformed a multilateral process that was expected to be ruled by northern countries, and have influenced the global climate justice movement in a significant manner. Most relevant, they have brought perspectives on *globality* that are grounded in the experiences of specific socio-cultural groups, anchored in specific communities and territories. It is therefore not surprising if peasant and indigenous perspectives on climate debates are sometimes on the same line, sometimes not. Indeed, the *globality* that both movements put forward is tied to the way land is managed, and to the coalitions that might ensure action on land related issues.

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