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Intersections of Land Grabbing and Climate Change Mitigation Strategies: Land and Resource Conflicts

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Abstract

Climate change mitigation projects and large-scale land deals are highlighted in recent research as potential instigators in conflicts over land and resources. However, this literature often wrongly views climate change policies and land grabbing as separate processes occurring in discrete geographies where displacement or contested claims occur. Working at the intersections of large-scale land acquisitions and climate change mitigation strategies viewed through a landscape perspective, may provide a lens through which to study complex interactions within and across social, ecological, and institutional arenas. This perspective, combined with the co-production of knowledge with residents of the land, enables scholars to move the discussion beyond framing conflict as discreet, bounded claims to land and resources. The effects of conflict situate within geographic landscapes and across living communities. There are important spill-over effects and chain reactions occurring in the interplay of climate change policies and land grabs that can produce social and ecological conflicts. By encompassing the indistinct boundaries and spill-over effects of land grabs and climate change strategies with a landscape perspective, we can more effectively attend to the multiple layers of conflict that ignite where these two development processes overlap. How, for example, do company-sponsored village displacements for the production of flex crops spill violence over from the known horrors of economic intensification into the supposed goods of climate change mitigation? When and where do calls for ecological conservation and preservation slip from village-centered claims to dwindling forest resources with which to feed their families into internationally sponsored enclosures that deny villagers access but promise them cash payments in the future? And further, what are the implications of the violent outcomes of humanitarian and development initiatives? The intersecting conflict zones highlighted here are instigated by historical processes, institutional agendas, and environmental particularities that require an intimate analytical focus achievable through engagement with grassroots organizers and activists. This paper will review the current literature on land disputes, struggles over natural resource management, and current strategies for the mitigation of, and adaptation to, the coming effects of climate change, and suggest that conflicts grow out of multiple intersecting processes that often involve resources, but not their scarcity or abundance. Attending to the landscapes in which resources are classified and land uses codified and co-producing knowledge with the inhabitants of those landscapes can offer insights into ways of preventing, resolving or transforming conflicts into more cooperative scenarios.

Reader Advisory

This paper is intentionally incomplete. Be advised that the authors welcome and encourage comment and critique on this piece, which seems to be at once forging new territory and moving with the collective unconscious of critical activist scholarship.
Introduction
Conflict ignites in lived places and occurs at multiple, often simultaneous, spatial scales. It emerges within particular historical, political, social, and ecological environments and each constituting feature relates to the others as conflicts emerge or dissipate. There is a large body of literature that attends to natural resources and their abundance or scarcity as the natural driver of conflicts. In this model, violent competition over resources happens and the research objective is to determine where, when, and how conflict will emerge. Some view resources and their relative scarcity or abundance in the face of universal need as the ground from which conflict grows (Omeje 2008; Homer-Dixon 2000, 2010; Fetzek and Mazo 2014); other scholars contest this long-held assumption, but still keep “scarcity” or “abundance” as the object of study (Humphreys 2005; Koubi et al. 2013; Ross 2015). In critical conversation with resource scarcity or abundance arguments, many examine the role of resources in conflicts (Mccarthy and Wolford 2011; Le Billon 2001; Peluso and Watts 2001; Peluso 2008). They attend to both the nature of the resource and the local texture of political, historical, and social circumstances surrounding the conflicts. Studies investigating the current rush in global land acquisitions, or land grabs, complicate the significance of resource scarcity or abundance further and posit land grabs for economic intensification and the changing politics of land access as important drivers of conflict (Peluso and Lund 2011; Oliveira 2013; White et al. 2012; Cotula 2012). These bring together global economic flows and political policies in ways that de-naturalize the resource-conflict nexus to show how economic objectives, rather than resources per se, contribute to policies of inclusion and exclusion (Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011).

Climate change and climate change mitigation policies add another layer to this resource-conflict matrix. The literature on climate change and conflict largely repeats, uncritically, the scenarios posited in the resource scarcity and resource curse literature mentioned above. In this framework, scarcity or abundance of resources becomes the driving problem and the historical, political, and racialized frameworks in which resource scarcity or abundance appears are not important considerations, only the fact of scarcity/abundance and the fact of conflict (Devlin and Hendrix 2014; Mayoral 2012). An additional body of work confounds the easy connections between climate change and conflict finding that the fact of scarcity does not directly lead to the fact of conflict (Knight 2013; Gledisch 2012). Further, climate change mitigation policies give rise to two other bodies of literature, one proclaiming the economic and environmental benefits of climate change mitigation policies (Khun and Sasaki 2014; Bradley 2009; Zhou and Thomson 2009; Timilsina and Shrestha 2010), and another largely critical of the professed benefits and pointing rather to the current and potential conflicts these policies engender (Brown and Corbera 2003; Borras, McMichael, and Scoones 2010; Milne and Adams 2012; Hunsberger and Ponte 2014).

The literature cited above outlines two strands of development, land-based economic development and climate change mitigation policies, as both the solution to and the cause of conflicts, depending on the discipline. The environmental security literature is concerned with potential militarized responses to resource conflict and promotes economic development to lessen the incidence of conflict over resource extraction (Omeje 2008; Homer-Dixon 2010). As a complement, the literature on climate change and conflict focuses on potential militarized responses to the effects of climate change (which includes militarized humanitarian aid), and also encourages climate change mitigation (Devlin and Hendrix 2014). Studies attempting to replicate and confirm the natural connection between resource needs and conflict are inconclusive and the available case studies present conflicting and contradictory outcomes (Salehyan 2014), while the case studies of critical social science research suggest that conflict is often the result of both economic development and climate change mitigation projects (Cotula 2012; Milne and Adams 2012), and that war and conflict over resources are crucial elements of the story that drives development (Vahabi 2012).
Drawing out the unintended and unexpected elements of land grabs and climate change mitigation projects contemporary literature is sufficiently nuanced and complex (Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011; White et al. 2012; Milne and Adams 2012; Hunsberger and Ponte 2014). This literature, however, often treats climate change policies and land grabbing as separate processes occurring in discrete geographies where displacement or contested claims occur. As a result, these two bodies of deeply contextualized literature, on land grabs and on climate change mitigation strategies, do not very often speak to one another (Hunsberger et al. 2015). Likewise, the literature that puts the resource at the heart of conflict, in the context of scarcity, abundance, or climate change, do not very often engage with the literature critiquing and contextualizing these claims (Peluso and Watts 2001).

This paper will intervene into these gaps. The discussions that follow, of the relationship between resources, climate change and conflicts over resources, illuminate the messy spaces where the growing economy, as a tool of progress and development, meets the strategies deployed to combat its social and environmental consequences, particularly REDD+ initiatives and biofuel production. World Bank economic strategies for developing countries encourage the development of agriculture production for market export (World Bank 2013), a project that land grabs as large-scale agro-development initiatives satisfy. At the same time, international attention to biofuels drives incentives for increased flex-crop production and more land grabs (Borras, McMichael, and Scoones 2010). The direct relationship between the carbon sink capacities of forests and the carbon reducing effects of biofuels puts them both under the umbrella of the United Nations Development Program (Sukhdev 2011). Further, forest projects are often conducted in cooperation with international conservation organizations engaged in the economic capture of nature as a commodity (Kelly 2011; Holmes 2014) and in cooperation with states engaged in driving economic growth (Yeang 2012) and ensuring state and elite access to territorial resources (Milne, in press). We suggest that the violence of climate change mitigation strategies needs to be understood not in opposition to land grabs for economic development, but rather as the latest stage in a longer process by which the land, water, and labor of the Global South are incorporated into national and international economies.

Climate change mitigation strategies emerge in reaction to, and in consort with, economic development, and are folded into the same administrative agencies and dispossessory mechanisms, which makes visible their intertwining logics. The layered complexity of land use at the landscape level comes out when knowledge is co-produced with local actors and their lived experiences of particular moments of conflict across a broad, but interconnected, physical area. Resource conflict becomes then, not simply a thing that can erupt or escalate in a given place, but a phenomenon that moves across physical and administrative boundaries creating seemingly disparate types of conflict that are nonetheless interrelated. Thus far, relatively little research has studied the cumulative and interactive effects of multiple projects within the same landscape or region (Hunsberger et al. 2015).

We will further that effort and arrange our paper in two broad sections. The first will treat the significant arguments, case studies, findings, and recommendations of a representative sample of papers on the topics of resource conflict, land grabs, and climate change mitigation in three discrete sections. Meierding (2013) suggests that the literature positing resource scarcity or abundance as the root of conflicts share theoretical paradigms that have always been inconclusive when confronted with actual case studies and that these paradigms have been adopted uncritically by the climate change and conflict literature. Analyzing these multiple bodies of literature as single entities and side by side makes visible the ways that different conflicts are anticipated by the different strands of literature and how each theoretical stance gives rise to different types of solutions respective of how the problem is framed. In the second section we will bring the disparate literatures into conversation with each other.1

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1 This second section remains under construction and it is the hope of the authors that productive conversation at this conference will help us think through both the intersections and their implications.
We want to draw out similarities in the case studies, trace the grassroots and the institutional actors, and attend to the governance instruments that bring both sets of actions into being. Through this conversation the authors will introduce the ways that new research strategies attending to landscapes of conflict, in which multiple land and resource uses overlap with competing claims, and co-producing knowledge with the inhabitants of contested landscapes can contribute to preventing, resolving or transforming conflicts even in places where difficult political transitions are underway (Hunsberger et al. 2015). We will conclude by considering how such a method can offer insights into conflict mitigation and pathways to cooperation that can take us beyond military and liberal economic solutions to resource conflicts.

Conflict and Resources

What the literature on resource conflict brings out is the way that long-held assumptions about the value of particular uses of land, as productive or non-productive, inform both the discussions about and the solutions to resource conflict (Harms and Baird 2014). In addition, they bring out unquestioned Hobbesian constructions of the natural competition over resources that will, without state protections and redistributions, devolve into a war of all against all (Springer 2011; Blomley 2003). The literature that focuses on resources as the primary driver of conflict subsequently conceptualizes conflict as the natural result of greediness and individuality, along with the state’s unquestioned role in extracting those resources for more efficient, profitable, and equitable distribution (Omeje 2008; Homer-Dixon 2000, 2010; Mayoral 2012). As such, social, political, racial, economic/environmental or historical phenomena are shelved as secondary while resource scarcity or abundance foregrounds the ‘problem’. Policy attention is paid in these works to where and when violent conflicts over resource scarcity or abundance might be expected and to the natural economic development agendas necessary to avoid military confrontations. (Humphreys 2005; Schollaert and Van De Gaer 2009; Fetzek and Mazo 2014).

The natural connections between resource scarcity and abundance and attendant conflict feature prominently in statements made by global governing bodies (Sunga 2014). For example, in the UN World Charter for Nature, 1982, the authors state that, “Competition for scarce resources creates conflicts, whereas the conservation of nature and natural resources contributes to justice and the maintenance of peace and cannot be achieved until mankind learns to live in peace and to forsake war and armaments” (UN 1982:4). And more recently, a ‘Peacebrief’ issued by the US Institute of Peace (Mayoral 2012) about the relationship between climate change and conflict suggests:

Climate change can be a conflict multiplying mechanism as it fosters unforeseen conflicts and reinforces existing ones... Climate effects that constrain resources are unequally distributed to those countries already in the most desperate situations. Coupled with rising population growth, these [climate change] events are likely to heighten poverty in the future if no action is taken. Adaptive development must be sustainable to bridge existing shortfalls, must plan for anticipated effects, and provide for the longer-term picture. More developed and higher carbon-emitting states should engage in mitigation efforts to reduce these effects... Failure to mitigate and adapt to climate effects can raise the likelihood of violent conflict (2012:1).

This basic assumption that resource availability will lead to violence is repeated in literature related to environmental resources, which accepts the basic premise and proceeds to document evidence from locations in the undeveloped world where this scenario has played out. Focusing on the
resource depletion that will result from climate change. Bamidele (2013) suggests that the existing Equatorial Tension Belt will extend north and south around its circumference, making the entire region hotter and drier. These twin conditions will likely lead to greater conflict, which will intensify as demographic and socioeconomic factors add further pressures on resources. Homer-Dixon (2000) identifies high incident locations like the West Bank, the Peruvian highlands, India, and China. He states that “environmental scarcity helps generate chronic and diffuse sub-national violence that bedevils conventional military institutions” (2000:28). As a result of this, “rich countries” should focus their attention on “regional environmental scarcities in the developing world” (2000:29), because “the rich will be unable to fully isolate themselves from the crises of the poor” and in this situation the prospect of a “global community” that can address the “grave political and ecological problems that humanity faces” (2000:34) has little hope.

Fetzek and Mazo (2014), however, do not accept scarcity as the complete foundational driver of conflict, but proceed to identify global locations where resource scarcity contributed to existing conflicts, in this case Syria and the Horn of Africa. The authors map out documented armed conflicts and suggest efforts that require “breaking down the barriers … between humanitarian and development actors” and further the additional expertise from the “security community” (2014:159). They conclude by acknowledging climate change as a “conflict multiplier” and suggest “conflict minimizer” strategies like mitigation, adaptation, economic growth and sustainable development (2014:163). Continuing the natural conflicts over resources discourse into resource extraction industries, Omeje (2008) identifies the armed conflicts and the states in which they occur. His analysis identifies state administered “distributive and developmental functions” to be the key feature that makes conflict, “less virulent and manageable” (2008:7). In further support of the economic development brings peace model, Gartzke (2012) suggests that stagnating economic development in middle-income states caused by efforts to combat climate change could actually realize fears of climate-induced warfare. In each of these studies, the incidents of conflicts over resources is accompanied by the locations of possible conflicts and assertions that solutions are to be found in some sort of state or global community led economic-development/ redistribution initiative.

Responding to this literature, Ide et al (2014) find that in Uganda and Kenya, quantitative data suggests a strong correlation of violent conflict with climate events, but qualitative data was inconclusive. Klomp et al (2013) find “little robust evidence” that links weather shocks to violent conflict, but it is also suggested that the effects of climate change conflicts could lead to an increase in authoritarian tendencies (Fristche et al 2012, see also Geisler 1982). Humphreys (2005) finds no evidence to suggest that conflicts over resources present particular difficulties and concludes that on the contrary, conflicts that involve resources come to more rapid and stable conclusions. Koubi, et al. (2013) find the connections between conflict and natural resources to be too unstable for conclusive declarations, but note that it is not armed inter-state or civil conflicts that are the most dynamic objects of concern. Rather, it is the increase and unpredictability of the ‘bedeviling’ violence that ignites at the sub-national level to which international bodies should attend.

Contesting the idea that resources are the source of conflicts, studies suggest that sources of funding are the more salient source of the incidence of violent conflicts (Guáqueta and Internos 2003). Natural resources often play a role in providing that funding, but not in providing the impetus for conflict. In Cambodia for example, competing faction leaders cooperated with the same timber contractors to fund their respective armies and emerged from the conflict years with access to capital and a comradery that continues into the contemporary land grab scenarios (Le Billon 2000 see also, Work 2015 in this conference). Allen (2013) tracks violent conflict in Melanesia and finds resource

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2 This section lacks a necessary discussion on the relationship between conflict and resource abundance that will appear in later drafts.
capitalism, rather than the resources themselves, at the heart of it. Still other reports found direct indicators for increased violence via climate change embedded within military interventions and suggest that if changes are not made to decrease military responses to the crises ahead there may be large scale conflict (Hastings 2013) or that the attention to military conflicts could induce a “self-fulfilling prophecy” of armed conflict (Gleditsch 2012, 3). In a study on water resources, Devlin and Hendrix (2014) find “cooperation over shared freshwater resources … is more common than conflict” (28). Further, Gorman (2012) finds that people whose access to common pool resources has been appropriated understand resource conflicts in terms of distributive justice and “moral economies” in order to make claims to resources.3

In trying to make sense of the conflicting available data, Meierding (2013) notes that the inconclusive literature attempting to align climate change with conflict is flawed due to its theoretical model, imported from the environmental conflict and civil wars literatures, with little modification. This resonates with other studies that attend to the fundamental flaws in the theoretical stance of the studies (Peluso and Watts 2001), which leave unquestioned the land-use and property values that uphold the current system of economic development (Diepart and Dupuis 2014), and conflict-based assumptions about human nature. Vahabi (2012) argues that conflict as the bedrock of human interactions over resources is essential to studies emphasizing economic models from as far back as Adam Smith. It is the separation of the economic from the political inherent in the state’s role to protect citizen’s economic activities from violent encroachment from others that facilitates the perpetuation of this model. The attention to military conflicts in much of the above literature supports this claim. Declaring that violent conflict goes down with economic development coupled by equitable distribution obscures the multiple ‘bedeviling’ (Homer-Dixon 2010) conflicts that rumble underneath even the most developed societies.

The idea that armed conflict is a salient model with which to declare a state of peace or a state of war with respect to resources within a given landscape has been long debunked (O’Lear and Tuten 2013) and along with it the idea that ‘development’ reduces conflict (Bebbington 2012). Further, the salient model with which we must declare a landscape to be in a state of peace is not the presence or absence of armed conflict, rather we must attend to the violence that remains in appropriated landscapes (Peluso and Vandergeest 2011). The potential for future warfare, Dalby (2013) suggests, comes from the development efforts to both enhance food supplies, a matter caught in the term “land grabbing”, and to “sink” carbon emissions in forestry plantation “offsets” that will aggravate rural dislocations and political instabilities (565).

**Conflict in the Land Grab literature**

Development projects as remedies to conflict and to global crises of food and climate reach their most violent mode of expression amid the current wave of large-scale agricultural development projects sweeping through the ‘developing’ world. Investigations into these “land grabs” attend to the multiple and often violent pathways through which transnational finance and agribusiness companies, via complex national and local avenues of power and land access, find their way into the lives of the world’s most marginalized people (Peluso and Lund 2011; Borras and Franco 2012). While such accumulative events are not new, the current cycle comes with aggressive speed and unprecedented scope driven by fears of multiple global crises: financial, environmental, energy, food… and the substantial profits gained by addressing those crises (McMichael 2014; White et al. 2012; Geisler and

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3 This section will be expanded to include a more robust discussion of how literature on ‘the resource curse’ also reflects the natural expectation violence over resources that occurs when groups struggle over abundant resources.
Makki 2014). The land, water, and labor of the Global South have become sources of alternative energy production (primarily biofuels), food crops, mineral deposits, and reservoirs of environmental services. Such diversity of resource use gives rise to multiple types of conflicts over the appropriations and exclusions necessary to bring the resources of ‘developing’ countries into the service of ‘global’ agendas. Studies of recent land grabs invite comparisons of the contemporary situation with the known horrors of the industrial/colonial era, primitive accumulation, capitalist intensification, and wage dependency, that sparked revolutions in Europe at the turn of the century (Borras et al. 2011; Peluso and Lund 2011; Diepart and Dupuis 2014; Springer 2011).

While we see protests and conflict where land is being grabbed and people are divested of their holdings, the armed conflicts we see in this contact zone are often armed state forces confronting citizens while protecting company interests. These are not yet revolutions nor are they wars, but are rather militarized events in which legally entitled entities, entitled through state contracts, mobilize against the non-legally recognized communities protesting their loss. In Brazil, racialized aggression against indigenous groups protesting against company encroachment is met with attacks and often-violent conflicts with third party security forces hired by the company (Sullivan 2014). Cambodians face the Royal Cambodian Army, or privately funded branches of that institution, in their confrontations with companies (Neef, Touch, and Chieengthong 2013; Pred 2013). Consistently, the literature offers stories where development interests and company claims to land and resources are violently privileged over local residents, and international ideas of appropriate land use trump all other options (Springer 2013; Neves and Igoe 2012; Grajales 2013).

In addition to armed violence, changes in property regimes delimit the terms of inclusion and exclusion. Terms of land title and zoning are negotiated across varied landscapes and political structures to privilege agro-business and elite land holdings (Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011; Borras and Franco 2012). In Colombia, Grajales (2013) documents how a legacy of violent bureaucracy leaves open a space where local state officials in conjunction with paramilitary forces are able to dispossess local residents of their land, transform that land into legal property, and transform the holdings into profitable agribusiness ventures. In Cambodia, social land concessions enacted as pro-poor counterpoint mechanisms for economic land concessions, formalized displacement through the depoliticized exclusion of those who could not enact the bureaucratic documentation necessary to apply for the benefit (Neef, Touch, and Chieengthong 2013). Oliveira (2013) traces land tenure changes in two separate areas in Brazil that expose contradictory practices in land tenure. In one region land titling initiatives are enacted to secure local tenure against company encroachment, while large-scale agro-business projects are secured in another region via the same state land tenure mechanisms. Vandergeest in Thailand (1996) documents a series of government actions designed to claim forest territory and control its occupation and use in ways that facilitate elite resource capture and define productive (profitable) use.

But the state is not monolithic: micro-processes and multiple transactions and mechanisms that determine access and expropriation also shape undercurrents (Wolford et al. 2013; Ribot and Peluso 2009). Differences in the way states conceive land grabs influence types of political engagement and regulation that can restrict, facilitate, or advantageously curtail investments (Borras Jr., Franco and Wang 2013). Businessmen in Russia, for example, engaged in community organizing to set a particular vision of the future for stakeholders, then through forged legal documents wrested valuable land from a farm cooperative (Mamonova and Visser 2014). Dwyer (2013), in Laos, finds that the political technologies involved to bring the interests of foreign agribusiness into development projects is administered by the mid-level government officials who broker these deals, and further that these transnational land deals can actually boost the effective sovereignty of particular mid-level state actors (see also Wolford et al. 2013; Harvey 2005). Sud (2014) also emphasizes the power of middle men who act as brokers, musclemen, and aggregators in land deals in India. While these players reproduce
larger structures of state bureaucracy and power, they become rule-makers in their own right and can control state process in particular ways. Work and Beban (2015, in press) describe small-scale elite capture and deforestation facilitated by the particular land-use requirements that accompanied land titling initiatives in Cambodia. These land grabs were fully orchestrated by local authorities who ushered in particular investors and attached capital to the labor and land of particular individuals.

This connection between external capital and local level land access runs along national, international, and transnational lines of capital and financing into village level concerns. Multilateral organizations from the United Nations to international development banks are “generating both the supply and the demand” for this land rush (White et al. 2012, 630; Cotula 2012). This process links agri-business initiatives directly to farmers fields through contract farming (Baird 2011; Vellema, Borras, and Lara 2011) and through funding for national cadastral projects. The codification and titling of land in Bolivia, that delimited indigenous lands, economic zones, and other land uses, was all facilitated through international funding (Lerch 2014). Grandia (2014) sites two sets of World Bank activities, one to de-legitimize indigenous land tenure systems and the other worked with national agendas to establish land titles and private ownership that would slow the expansion of ‘slash-and-burn’ practices into the protected areas in Guatemala and increase commercial agricultural lands. In Cambodia, the World Bank’s Land Allocation for Social and Economic Development (LASED) Project was instrumental in the promotion of pro-poor concessions, issued in conjunction with LASED recommended economic concessions, that opened yet another door through which local elite capture could further exclude residents from their access to resources (Neef, Touch, and Chiengthong 2013). The international community also creates demand and drives land grabs through laws enacted for social good, like the EU ethanol standards (Borrás and Franco 2011; Pred 2013) and China’s push to replace the trade in opium poppy in the Kachin State with legal cash crops via contract farming (Kramer and Woods 2012).

Cadastral projects are founded on notions of establishing ownership and the terms of exclusion, but also on demarcating land available for productive use and capital investment. The classification of land is deeply embedded in ideas of productive and appropriate use, and subsistence activities are not included as a valid category of land use. Under this mechanism that is at once discursive and material, the urban poor of Indonesia can be re-settled to empty forest lands during the Suharto era (Peluso 2007), the contemporary Burmese government can label the land of ethnic ‘insurgents’ as wasteland, devaluing both the people and their land-use choices and making that land available for state capture (Ferguson 2014), and the Brazilian state can expand state-making infrastructures into the vast savannas (Oliveira 2013). Empty lands that are only empty of certain kinds of activities haunt the case studies of land grabs across the spectrum (Peluso and Vandergeest 2001; Sullivan 2013; Blomley 2003; Harms and Baird 2014).

Attending to the lack, and bringing economic growth, jobs, and improved infrastructure to impoverished countries serves to obscure the exclusionary and violent state practices that this process requires. The very political acts required for benevolent economic growth, the conversion of ‘waste’ lands into monetarily profitable landscapes, cadastral and titling projects that re-zone and establish ownership over those underdeveloped areas, and the sometimes violent confrontations that occur at the zones of transformation, are cast not as conflict but as development. Communities obstruct progress, fail to comply with legal codes, and destroy the property of businesses and this evidence of political deviance obscures both the economic basis of community actions and the abuse that would be intolerable if directed at a non-deviant community.

The Conflicts of Climate Change Mitigation

The need to develop both landscapes and peoples continues to not only transform lands and
livelihoods, but also accelerates atmospheric carbon concentrations in ways that are destabilizing rainfall, storm systems, and other natural processes that support economic development (among other life processes) (Cutlip and Fath 2012; Du, Wei, and Cai 2012). Nonetheless, investigations into the implementation of these projects show them to be enacted with the objective of dispelling the negative effects of climate change so that development can continue (Khun and Sasaki 2014). Climate change mitigation strategies are directly involved in conflict-producing industrial growth and national security agendas (Dunlap and Fairhead 2014), as it is presented as a way for the developed world to ameliorate the coming suffering induced by climate change through humanitarian and military interventions (Hartmann 2014). In this new permutation of the development agenda, the developed world has devised tools by which the “un-developed” world can behave so as to continue unchanged, the lifestyles and objectives of the developed world (Adger et al. 2001). Kelly (2011) draws the lines connecting early laws in Europe that enclosed common resources for elite use to the conservation movements of the colonial era. The results of these conservation enclosures are now becoming visible as capital in themselves, revealing their nature as a form of primitive accumulation for the purpose of commodification. Like in the land grabbing literature, this trajectory is tied to the violent accumulation of land and resources that defined the feudal, colonial, industrial, and modernist eras in Europe.

The violence of climate change mitigation strategies need to be understood not in opposition to land grabs for economic development but rather, as the latest stage in a longer process by which a region’s natural resources are incorporated into national and international economies (see also Lohmann 2008; Holmes 2014; Neves and Igoe 2012) that open complex governance spaces involving layered interests that do not always coincide (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011). Along with this incorporation, climate change mitigation strategies are forcing certain ways of being economic in the world. People accustomed to reproducing themselves in close connection to the economic life of the forest are now asked to mimic the dominant view of human relationships to that same forest, as stewards of the ecological economy, as gatherers of commodities useful for sale, and as guides to this enclosure for traveling global elites (Kelly 2011; Blomberg 2015; Garrard 2012; Moyo 2005). This process is not limited to forest dwellers, and in rapidly developing China international pressure to lower emissions and behave in accordance with new ideas of green growth, inhibit Chinese national goals of economic growth and denies them the ‘rights to their own cultures, ecologies, and economies’, sustainable or not (Lo 2010).

Conservation initiatives are increasingly folding into Payment for Eco-Services (PES) initiatives, of which the UNREDD+ program, Reducing Emissions, Deforestation, and Degradation is the most ambitious. This program will attempt to place monetary value on the carbon that is stored in forests. The program presents potential conflicts on many levels beyond the accumulation, exclusion, and forced lifestyle changes outlined above. In a survey of the literature Corbera (2012) suggests that the commodification of resources undermines socio-ecological resilience and reproduces existing inequities. By promoting a system of value that creates access injustices any vestiges of morality disappear from the discourse of conservation. Recent studies find that further, issues with benefit disbursement (Mahanty et al. 2013) and access to subsistence resources (Pasgaard and Chea 2013) are emerging conflict zones in PES initiatives. These conflicts can intensify as governments use forest conservation initiatives to recentralize their control over forest access (Phelps, Webb, and Agrawal 2010).

Like in the stories of land grabbing above, climate change mitigation strategies embed multiple actors at multiple scales and bring international conservation and development agencies into the intimate lives of marginalized people. The benefits of this interaction favor the international organizations over ordinary people, under programs and policies that are largely illegible at the local level (Adger et al. 2001). The fulfilment of carbon sequestration quotas come from deals with international organizations, like USAID or PACT, that work with government agencies to enlist local
communities in the REDD+ program, and then bear none of the opportunity costs (Lohmann 2006). The costs of REDD+ implementation at the community level belie the pro-poor rhetoric of carbon sequestration, as project funding does not seem to protect villager and community assets, nor do they necessarily target the most vulnerable people and places. Atela, et al (2014) working in Kenya find that most REDD+ projects are located in low-vulnerability counties where low transaction costs and higher carbon revenues ensure profits for the international private and consulting companies that develop and manage the projects. In Mexico, Osborne (2011) describes how carbon forestry enables continued claims to the land, even though there is little income derived from their productive activity in the protected areas.

Regarding biofuels, Levidow (2013) tells of EU aspirations toward global leadership in developing ‘sustainable biofuels’ which can substitute for fossil fuels and thus reduce GHG emissions, while also enhancing energy security and rural development. McMichael (2010) quotes UN Human Rights Rapporteur Jean Ziegler, who claims that biofuels are a ‘crime against humanity’. The lands over which biofuel production is currently expanding are by no means uninhabited, and in many cases, plantations are expanding over the territories of now displaced communities (Lohmann 2008) as the “distraction of green fuel” glosses over the abuses and dispossessions enacted by development companies (McMichael 2010, 609). Nonetheless, renewable energy quotas for transport fuel continue to promote land capture for biofuel feedstock production. This is not a crime against humanity, say investors, it is an investment opportunity, as renewable fuel mandates “will drive global demand”, and technical institutes are on “a mission to enhance quality of life by collaboratively accelerating the commercialization of sustainable biobased technologies” (Biofuels Digest 2015). Hought et al. (2012) detail the supposed enhanced quality of life in the local effects of emerging cassava markets in northern Cambodia after increased development of industrial biofuel production in China and Thailand. The unforeseen market crash of 2008 and the closing of the Thai border due to political conflict caused major hardships in a region that had transformed most arable land to mono-cropping cassava.

In lieu of conclusion

We invite all who have read this far to consider the intersecting zones and landscapes of conflict with us in this conference. We suggest that by attending to large geo-political and environmental landscapes with an analytical lens that is focused by the conflicts experienced among living communities we can find socially just and environmentally sustainable pathways toward effecting change.

References


Khun, V., and N. Sasuki. 2014. Re-Assessment of Forest Carbon Balance in Southeast Asia: Policy
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The purpose of the 2015 Chiang Mai conference is to contribute to *deepening and broadening* of our understanding of global land deals, resource conflict and agrarian-environmental transformations – in the specific regional context of Southeast and East Asia, with special attention to climate change mitigation and adaptation policies as well as the role of China and other middle income countries (MICs) within the region.

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