iSS International Institute of Social Studies

Graduate School of Development Studies

AN EXERCISE IN WORLDMAKING
2010

Best Student Essays of 2009/2010

evaluated and published by students
from the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 batches
with the support of the PhD students and ISS staff

ISS SCHOLAS Representatives

Armand Ngaleu Ngounou
Migena Dako
Mical Auma E. Okumu
Carlos Alberto Garcia Reyes
Ana Victoria Portocarrero Lacayo
Jimmy Baluku
Nani Bendeliani
Willem Albert Flinterman

The participatory and student-driven academic exchange and reference tool created by the International Institute of Social Studies MA students of 2009 for the Institute and its future

Student Evaluators

Lise Paaskesen
Fabio Andres Diaz Pabon
Robert Nyakuwa
Alonso Ramirez Cover
Gustavo Voeroes Denes
Martin Alejandro Bermudez
    Urdaneta
Jitendra Roy
Ridwan Aman Doloksaribu
Emmy Primadona
Halinishi Ndunge Yusuf
Abdulaziz Ahmed Saeed Abduh
Zuzana Novakova
Malinda Carol Wink
Charmaine Rudo Sanelisiwe
    Manyani
Naazlin Dadani
Paata Gurgenidze
Sana Rahim Kapadia
Sean Patrick Looney
Lauren Elizabeth Mumford
Juve Nelson Mugarura
Wilson Box
Daniel Aristizabal Corredor
Charity Mukami Kaaria
Aster Georgo Haile
Ajitha Raghava Majeshwar
Narelle June White
Md. Badiuzzaman
Chanel Vanessa Nahar
Ajay Sule

Debaleena Saha Ghatak
Desiree Munoz
Abdul-Basit Issah
Dominic Garcia
Chantal Kotte
Sean Patrick Asiimwe
Ishwar Babu Bairwa
Tenzin Sherab
Ramesh Deshar
Vineet Kumar
Nadya Karimasari
Cathelijne Gemma Grutters
Tamara Michelle Yasmin
    Soukotta
Jusuf Rhoni Simamora
Nancy Nagui Refki Khalil
Pity Kalikuwa Ndhlovu
Armand Ngaleu Ngounou
Francios Ngoboka
Hannah Lindiwe de Wet
Maesy Angelina
Matilda Flemming
Afroza Bulbul
Ilona Marjolein Hartlief
Mahsa Shekarloo
Jacqueline Rugalabam
Beatrice Stella Atingu
Nicole Ann Hosein
Alessandra De Guio
Charles Cleophas Makau Kitale

Contents

Acknowledgements

This book could not have been produced without the collaboration of all the ISS staff members and students involved in the process. We would particularly like to thank:

• the program administrators, Annet van Geen, Irene Lopez, Sharmini Bisessar, Tanya Kingdon, Vlada Tchirikova, Marja Zubli, Karin Hirdes, Cisca Vorselman, Josée Haanappel, and Katherine Voorvelt. Thank you for your time, commitment, and willingness to answer all our questions. Without your time and energy this book would not have been possible.

• Leo De Haan, Wim Knoester, Wil Hout and Marie Louise Gambon for your support in this student initiative.

• the dedicated team of evaluators formed by the talented MA students, who applied their knowledge, time and energy in judging the essays with valuable qualitative comments, providing us a selection of the best among the best essays of Terms 2 and 3.

• the editing team, also formed by MA students who contributed their time on the English language editing of this book.

• Joy Misa, for the fifth year in a row, who has graciously taken on the meticulous task of assuring that the layout and format was done in the highest of professional standards. Thank you for working so hard within such a short span of time. Deadlines are always tight but you always help us shine in this project.

• David John Wilding Venn, a 2009-10 MA student for taking the time and creative talent to design such an aesthetically pleasing cover for this publication.

• Last, but certainly not least, we would like to thank the members of the 2009-2010 SCHOLAS Executive Committee who have been resourceful in ensuring this book gets published.

A Word from the Rector

For the fifth consecutive year, SCHOLAS – the ISS student association – is publishing a collection of best student essays of the graduating batch. The essays not only reflect the diversity of themes and perspectives on development theory and practice represented at ISS, but also testify to the high quality student work attained at ISS.

Since its foundation, ISS – now the International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam – forms an international community of students and staff. The enormous diversity of both students and staff, in terms of geographical and cultural background and in terms of experience from different corners of society – such as state institutions, civic society organizations and the private sector – offers a vast wealth of experience forming an enriching complement to our educational programmes.

I look upon ISS as a research-led and teaching based academic institute. Being a research-led school means that research feeds into education. ISS trains the decision makers of tomorrow that are found throughout the world. Our students face the complex challenges of poverty and development. To meet these challenges, they must become both independent thinkers and creative development professionals. They must integrate the best of critical thinking and practical applications. Embedding students in research is the best guarantee to develop this critical attitude. This also means, that students are actively involved in research and many of the papers in this volume bear witness to that. After all, rather than making a choice for a particular set of arguments, critical social science means putting to the test arguments from various corners of the debate: the test of fact finding and analysis.

I congratulate the Scholas Editorial Committee – true to the tradition set by their predecessor – with taking up the big challenge of bringing together the best essays of their batch and successfully completing their endeavor by

publishing this exciting collection. I am convinced the reader will have much reading pleasure.

Professor Leo de Haan
Rector

Foreword

This collection of essays represents the fifth edition of *An Exercise in World-making*. The contents of this book also reflect a sampling of the insights and perspectives of the 2009-10 MA students from the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam. These essays are illustrative of how a diverse student body, representing over fifty countries and a host of professional and educational backgrounds, can contest, construct and redefine the notion of development; thus maintaining the contemporary social, political and economic relevance of development theory and practice.

In addition, this year, one of the student volunteers came up with the theme of pluralism. Harvard University works with issues of pluralism and provided a nice definition, which I have included below to further understand how the theme fits well with the aim of the book.

"Pluralism is based on dialogue. The language of pluralism is that of dialogue and encounter, give and take, criticism and self-criticism. Dialogue means both speaking and listening and that process reveals both common understandings and real differences. Dialogue does not mean everyone at the 'table' will agree with one another. Pluralism involves the commitment to being at the table – with one's commitments"

Pluralism is learned not only from our classes, but also from our experiences with each other, that people need to listen to one another and work together to achieve things. As we work towards re-defining development or finding alternatives, dialogue and exchange of ideas is an important part of the process. It is hoped that this essay book could serve as an example of pluralism as the student essays presented in this volume open up the process of dialogue, understanding, and the questioning of knowledge we may take for granted.

Indeed, *An Exercise in Worldmaking* provides acuity of perspective on the most relevant themes of development by professionals who are immersed in

the theoretical, historical, practical work and literature of development. It is in this way that the enclosed essays serve to further the effort of collective and participatory *worldmaking.*

On behalf of the 2009-10 student body, we are pleased to share 14 essays selected by a committee of peers on the basis of excellent writing, innovative thinking and critical analysis.

The Process

The Methodology of this essay book is modelled on the approaches chosen in previous years. As in the last four years, the 2009-10 'best essay book' was developed in an open, democratic and collaborative fashion. However, due to time constraints, smaller groups made several decisions during the last stages of the compilation process.

The 14 'best' essays included in the book were divided into categories related to the MA programme specializations and selected from a total of 98 essays provided by ISS professors and lecturers during terms two and three. The initial 98 essays were those essays that received the highest marks. The essays were acquired through course administrators in an anonymous fashion, bearing only the course code and student number and further kept anonymous by eliminating the student number during the evaluation process and giving each essay a randomly assigned number. Because of the inherently subjective nature of selecting essays, the editorial committee set up teams (between 4-5 people) and encouraged everyone in each team to read all essays in efforts to reduce bias, encourage discussion and foster collaboration.

A total of 58 students volunteered to review, rank and recommend essays for the book. Fourteen teams of four-five student evaluators each reviewed an average of five essays and two teams divided amongst themselves, fifteen-seventeen essays. Student evaluators came from a range of backgrounds, disciplines and continents, representing the diversity of the essays and the institution itself. While the workload for each evaluator was greater this year, it is believed that the overall evaluation experience was more open, collaborative, and with less bias as a result of the discussion and reflection inherent within the team evaluation process.

Evaluation teams were determined by common interest, specialization and previous experience. Thus, the essays assigned to each team generally followed a similar theme of specialization or topic to ensure that evaluators would be in the best position to appropriately assess the essays. Each team

was facilitated by an 'old batch' to guide the 'new batch' with the process, providing opportunity for mentorship and candid dialogue. To guarantee that no evaluator assessed their own essay, the course administrators provided a list of the student authors of the 98 essays. This list was separate from the essays themselves and only reviewed by two of the student volunteers who coordinated the assignment of essays to all the teams.

As in previous years, creating a dialogue and learning process between the current 'old batch' and 'new batch' of MA students lies at the very heart of this essay book. This continuous and intergenerational dialogue is what propels the process of discovery, innovation and analysis by fostering collaboration and increasing diversity and representation. Thus the reflections of the 2009-10 MA students included in this essay book represent the influence of previous MA student groups as well as future students. Indeed, this essay book is an important addition to the International Institute of Social Studies' *exercise in worldmaking.*

1   The ABC Approach Unpacked: Assumptions versus Lived Reality of Youth and Safe Sex in Sub-Saharan Africa

MAESY ANGELINA

Introduction

Since the launch of its President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programme in 2004, the U.S. has been the world's largest donor for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment efforts in the world (Kaiser Family Foundation and UNAIDS 2009). The programme focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa, the region most affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic by accounting for more than half of the world's infection in 2008 (UNAIDS and WHO 2009) and pays a special attention to the prevention of HIV transmission among young people, given that more than half of the people living with HIV being young women and men between 15-24 years old (Bankole et al. n.d.).

Considering that the most common mode of transmission of HIV among young people in Sub-Saharan Africa is through heterosexual sex, the programme champions the popular promotion of safe sex through ABC, which generally means: Abstinence from sex, Be faithful to one partner, and the use of Condoms. However, PEPFAR's definition has been slightly modified from ABC for all into an emphasis in 'A' bolstered by 'B' with very little if not absent discussion of 'C' for young people, which is supported by the mandate for 33% of the prevention budget to be spent on abstinence only programmes (Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator 2005). This has resulted in many sharp critiques from the advocates of youth's sexual and reproductive rights that have been resounded in the past year to the Obama Administration in the hopes for the PEPFAR policy's modification (see, for example: Human Rights Watch 2005 and Youth Incentives / Rutgers Nisso Groep 2008).

As one of such advocates, I share the same critiques and am especially intrigued by two other fundamental issues with PEPFAR's overall ABC approach. Firstly, ABC promotes safe sexual behaviours that are intended to apply to all target groups, it was never conceived to address youth specifically. How does PEPFAR adopt ABC to address youth? Secondly, it is being treated as a foolproof, context free formula and hence fails to recognize that youth are embedded in social contexts and this influences their sexual behaviours. What, then, are its assumptions and how do they correspond with the diverse experiences of youth in Sub-Saharan Africa?

This essay aims to critique PEPFAR's ABC approach and its implementation by exploring the contradictions between its assumptions of youth and the lived experiences of young people in various Sub-Saharan African countries. Specifically, this essay argues that PEPFAR's ABC approach is fundamentally flawed because of its youth blindness, or failure to acknowledge the different perceptions and experiences of youth that are socially constructed. Although, I acknowledge that the notion of 'sex' is also socially constructed and this has an impact of PEPFAR's ABC, I choose not to delve into this aspect and focus on the youth lens given the limitations of this essay.

I will begin the argumentation process with a brief discussion on youth as social construction, the main angle this essay concentrates on. I will then further clarify the ABC approach in PEPFAR before unpacking it by identifying the assumptions on youth in relation to sex and contrasting it with the socially constructed lived experiences of youth in various countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead of focusing on a single country case study, I opt for multi-country examples to further reiterate the diversity of contexts that should be taken into account. I will then summarize the findings and discuss their implications for PEPFAR and conclude with a reflections gained from the analysis process on policy making for youth.

Youth as Social Construction

The concept of youth is no longer taken for granted as an age group mediating childhood and adulthood; many policy makers have acknowledged that age-based definition is insufficient given the variety of ways of different entities in defining youth.[1] A variety of new ways to define youth have

---

[1] Youth has been defined differently by different entities; for example, for the UN youth are those between 15-24 years of age while Ghana's National Youth Policy (1999: 5) acknowledged the difficulty in pinning down a definition but

emerged, nevertheless, the most popular notion is youth as a transitional phase from childhood to adulthood. Social constructionists argue that the markers on the onset and ending of this transition are not universal nor are being youth experienced in the same way. Instead, they are influenced by the social, political, cultural and economic contexts of a society and also determined by the location of an individual in terms of gender, class, caste, ethnicity, and others. This means that youth is defined and perceived differently across and within societies; it also stipulates that discrepancies between the dominant definition and perception and the real experiences of youth are possible (Wyn and White 1997).

The brief discussion above reiterates that thinking about youth in policy making also means going beyond age and considering the interaction between youth and social structures; yet, the ABC approach disregards this by default due to its orientation to the biomedical tradition in viewing health. According to Ansell (2005: 92) the biomedical tradition focuses on 'diseases rather than the people affected by them' and interventions informed by this tradition 'focuses on individual causality by identifying connections between environmental and behavioural factors and the incidence of a disease'. The ABC approach endorses this tradition by focusing only on the risky actions that may cause HIV transmission and neglecting other factors that might influence the person to perform such behaviour. Consequently, the ABC approach, as does the biomedical tradition to health, ignores the broader social, cultural, and political contexts that shape how sex is experienced by young people.

It does not, however, suggest that the ABC approach is free of assumptions. On the contrary, the ABC approach comes with a set of fixed assumptions shaped by a particular set of contexts that leave no room to adapt to the differences found in the actual experience of young people in a variety of other contexts.

The discussion above demonstrates that there is a possibility of tension between the ABC approach's assumptions of youth and the diverse, socially constructed lived experiences of youth. Hence, this section cements this essay's objective to unpack the underlying assumptions of the ABC approach on youth.

---

opted to recognize those between 15 to 35 years old as well as 'anyone who is acknowledged by deed as identifying with and committed to youth development' (http://www.youth-policy.com/Policies/Ghana%20Adolescent%20Reproductive%20Health%20Policy.pdf).

The ABC Approach Unpacked: Assumptions versus Lived Reality of Youth in Sub Saharan Africa

The ABC approach refers simultaneously to individual behaviours as well as the approach and content in interventions that lead to those behaviours, which gained popularity after its perceived success[2] of this strategy in decreasing the HIV prevalence in Uganda in the mid-1990s (Cohen 2004). However, the notion was hardly new; the three behaviours have been known to reduce the risk of HIV sexual transmission since the late 1980s (Avert n.d.). The new element was sequential presentation in the acronym's creation,[3] which suggests a hierarchy of safe sexual behaviours, the most ideal being abstinence and only when it is not possible to practice then individuals should turn to being faithful and the use of condoms is the last resort (Youth Incentives/Rutgers Nisso Groep 2008).

This hierarchy is not only adopted by PEPFAR, it was enhanced by the certain emphasis attached in its specific strategy for youth. Abstinence becomes the primary intervention for youth, defined as delaying sexual initiation until marriage. Being faithful should also be advocated to youth, but there should be more weight given to marriage rather than monogamous relationships outside of wedlock. The consistent and correct use of condoms should only be promoted to young people practicing high-risk behaviours, which include substance abusers and sexually active couples with one partner having an HIV positive status, but the failure rate of condoms and the value of abstinence as a safer choice should still be emphasized (Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator 2005).

At a glance, there are many assumptions made in PEPFAR's formulation of ABC; however, as previously mentioned, this essay will focus on its assumptions on youth and how it compares to the diverse lived experiences of young people in Sub-Saharan African countries. The comparative analysis will be grouped in two parts, one focuses on PEPFAR's conception of youth and the other on its perceptions of youth in relation to their sexual behaviours.

---

[2] The term 'perceived success' is used to acknowledge various researches that contests this perception, which will not be discussed in more depth given the limitations of this essay. For samples of such criticism, see Cohen (2004) and Human Rights Watch (2005: 68-71).

[3] This is showcased, for instance, by Human Rights Watch's (2005: 70-71) finding in 2004 that the ABC approach was not known by many HIV/AIDS educators in Uganda who have been active since the early 1990s.

Youth as the Unmarried – The Assumed Definition of Youth

As previously discussed, the definition of youth should go beyond age and consider as well the markers defined by the society for the start and end of youth. PEPFAR's ABC categorized younger youth as those between 10-14 years old, who should exclusively receive abstinence only education, and older youth as above 14 without giving the end of the age bracket, who should be educated on being faithful in marriage in addition to abstinence (Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator 2005: 5). It can be deduced that in PEPFAR's of youth starts with a biological trigger, puberty, but ends with a social marker, entering marriage. Thus, it insinuates that youth are mostly unmarried or single individuals and that this transition to adulthood ends with marriage, upon which they can safely have sex.

These particular markers on the beginning and ending of youth have both Western and African[4] roots, but they are more related to the social category of adolescence rather than youth. The Western conception of adolescence stemmed from the 19th century American and West European societies when puberty started earlier due to the improved health conditions. Concerns were raised over the earlier age of young people's sexual awakening when middle class young people could not marry at a young age given the obligation of school and to start a career, thus the concept of adolescence was created to distinguish these young people from the innocent children and the married adults (Stearns 2006: 60-62). The same idea is also found across many Sub-Saharan countries. Neema et al. (2004: 6) reiterates that puberty and marriage are seen as the starting and ending markers of adolescence in Eastern Uganda and further illustrates the meaning of adolescence in the area as a period of growth into adulthood, when young people are still in need of care, guidance, and protection from their parents and elders in the community. This is reiterated by other ethnographic researches in Beitbridge, Zimbabwe (Mate 2010) and Dakar, Senegal (Eerdwijk, 2007), which discovered that being unmarried is one of the defining characteristics of youth according to both adults and young people in the area.

---

[4] I am well aware of the diverse constructions, discourses, and experiences of youth in both 'the West' and 'Africa' and have no intention to negate this by presenting general representations, but given the limitations of this essay it is not possible to entirely avoid it. In order to quote this, I will quote sources that have discussed taken into account the diversity of the 'West' or 'Africa' in their work, I will also balance the representation with examples from various countries.

Based on these constructions, the picture painted by ABC's assumed definition of youth is young people who are unmarried, in school or starting a career, and living under the care of parents or other adult relatives. This picture is unsettling because of its mismatch with diverse realities of young people in the region. While there are certainly young people who fit into the assumed picture of youth, they are also mostly upper-middle class and male. The majority of young people in Africa are direly affected by the economic and political instabilities resulting in poverty, mass unemployment, limited access to schools, armed conflict and insurgencies (Abbink 2005: 1). In this context, the borders of what represents youth and adulthood are also blurred, as reflected in the emerging discourse of African youth being in between 'waithood' and 'child-adult' (Honwana forthcoming). 'Waithood' refers to the delayed transition to adulthood due to the inabilities of young people to shoulder economic and social responsibilities associated with adults, such as having a steady job and providing for their families; on the opposite, 'child-adult' are young people who attain adult roles at an early age due to various reasons, as seen in the case of emerging child headed households due to AIDS related deaths in the family. While 'waithood' mostly applies to young men, young women have increasingly become 'child-adults' because they often enter marriage and start becoming wives and mothers at an early age due to poverty, even as soon as 12 years old (ibid).

Consequently, the assumed definition of youth in the PEPFAR's ABC approach excludes the majority of youth in Sub-Saharan Africa from its interventions because it ignores the variety of contexts that are shaping the markers and experiences of youth. The excluded ones are, among others, teen mothers, men who are in his thirties but are unable to marry or jobless, youth heads of households – the majority of them being poor young women.

The Ideal, The Acceptable, and The Bad – Perceptions on Youth's Sexual Behaviours

Another consequence of ABC's hierarchical presentation is that it indirectly gives meaning to youth based on an association with their sexual behaviours. The best of youth, the 'ideal' one, are able to practice abstinence, while the ones who practice being faithful is still 'acceptable' because they are having sex within marriage or at least a monogamous relationship. However, those who resort to condoms are considered as the 'bad' youth for failing to follow through the two preferred behaviours, although they are more labeled in a more politically correct manner as youth with 'high risk

behaviours' within the policy (Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator 2005: 6).

The three perceptions of youth in relation to their sexual behaviours seem to be informed by the dominant undertones of studies on youth sexuality in Sub-Saharan Africa that have been driven by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Most of these studies are based on surveillance data on youth's sexual behaviours, highlighting those that put them at risk of infections, which have led to a further marginalization of youth by viewing them as having full responsibility over their risky behaviours (Mate 2010: 2).

The labels suggested by the aforementioned perceptions of youth also echoes the broader existing discourse on youth in Africa as 'makers or breakers', 'vanguards or vandals' (De Boeck and Honwana 2005; Abbink 2005). This discourse poses a binary idea of youth's responses to the economic, political, and social instabilities that affect the sub-continent elaborated in the previous section; those who were drawn to criminal activities are considered 'breakers' while those who are able to avoid the trap are 'makers' who can positively contribute to the society. One problem with this discourse is predominant male undertone, the other is that the binary discourse is pigeonholing the youth into an either/or category, without acknowledging that young people navigate through the two poles in myriad of ways; the same sentiment of boxing and labeling youth are apparent in PEPFAR's discourse on youth in relation to their sexual behaviours.

These labels are problematic for three reasons. First, they simultaneously negates youth's agency in making decisions for themselves and neglects the extent to which their choices have become limited due to the social structures around them. Second, even as implicit suggestions, these labels are problematic in a policy for applying a stigma to the subject of interventions that do not conform to the moral ideals of the policy makers. Third, these labels do not correspond to the diverse ways young people interpret and practice the behaviours promoted by PEPFAR's ABC based on their social conditions.

In the case of abstinence, for instance, Eerdwijk (2007: 179-180) discovered that high school students in the poor peri-urban area of Dakar have multiple interpretations and practices of abstinence. Although, one of them corresponds with the ABC's assumption of sex by defining abstinence as not having penetrative sexual intercourse, other interpretations do not. Many boys seem to define abstinence not as remaining virgins, but as controlling one's sexual impulses and avoiding sex as much as possible. This means that they are practicing sex, but not on a regular basis. A substantial

portion of girls consider abstinence as remaining virgins, but virginity is tied to penetrative vaginal sex and that other forms of sex, such as oral or anal sex, can be and are practiced since they are not 'real sex'.

These young people do not fit into any of the labels insinuated by PEPFAR's ABC. In terms of straddling along the labels, the example demonstrates how youth negotiates their sexual experience against the discourse imposed upon them by societal norms, as well as how it differs by gender. Conversely, as far as safe sex goes, the practices of these youths cannot be considered safe. The irregular frequency of sex - whether vaginal, anal, or oral – are most likely not accompanied by condom use, since the message sent by ABC does not address any of these possibilities. This underscores another key problem with PEPFAR's ABC approach: it does not discuss what sex means nor does it take into consideration the diverse meanings given youth themselves to their sexual behaviours, which belongs to none of the meanings perceived by the programme.

The assumptions behind the labels also ignore the possibility of youth being coerced into sex. In the civil conflict areas of Northern Uganda, many young women have experienced rape and quite frequently being forced to marry due to pregnancy (Moore et al. 2007). A research in Beitbridge, Zimbabwe, found that the incidence of girls being coerced into sex, physically and economically, has increased since the financial crisis in Zimbabwe escalates. The physical coercion often took place in the home, where the size of household has increased given the increased poverty caused by the high inflation; in the economic sense, school girls are often forced into transactional sex to fend for themselves, sometimes for the simple reason for being able to eat while in school (Mate 2010).

The examples of Dakar, Beitbridge, and Northern Uganda reiterates that youth is not a universal experience; rather, it is shaped by the social, economic, cultural, and political contexts where the young people live in.

Policy Implications: Reimagining Safe Sex and Aid

The analysis above identifies several problem areas that policy makers should consider in re-assessing PEPFAR's HIV prevention strategy for youth. Firstly, PEPFAR's current definition and perception on what constitutes youth is narrow and excludes the majority of young people in Sub-Saharan Africa. These overlooked people include teen headed households, young wives and mothers, as well as jobless and unmarried men over thirty years old. This exclusion has gender and class dimensions, but it is rooted in a youth blindness, an assumption that youth is universally defined and ex-

perienced regardless of their social location. Secondly, PEPFAR's perceptions of youth in relation to their sexual behaviour has pigeonholed young people into the categories of the 'ideal', 'acceptable', and 'bad'. It stigmatizes both the unfavoured sexual behaviours and their actors; hence there is little incentive for young people to practice behaviours that will keep them safe but are considered to be inappropriate. It negates young people's agency, ignores their victimhood, and the way young men and women straddles through the victimhood – agency continuum. Both of these problem areas are related to the social construction of youth, which means that policy makers should be aware of the different ways youth is defined and experienced. This is not determined only by the social, political, cultural, and economic contexts of a society, but also the class, gender, ethnicity, and race of the youth involved.

In addition to providing highlights of youth-centred problem areas, this essay would also like to call on policy makers to re-evaluate whether safe sex to prevent HIV among youth should be promoted only as ABC. While individually the behaviours of abstaining from sex, being faithful, and using condoms are indeed able to prevent HIV, presenting them as a formula in a hierarchical format prevents ignores the complexities of how sex is defined, given meaning to, and experienced by young people. On the contrary, it even stigmatizes young people who fail to practice safe sexual behaviours.

Thus, the essay calls for a reinvention of PEPFAR's strategy of promoting safe sex for youth. At the moment, PEPFAR's funding is based on a top-down approach based on strict yet ambiguous guidelines on the ABC approach. Alternatively, PEPFAR should consider funding interventions that do away with formulaic ideas of what safe sex and youth means. Studies on how abstinence, being faithful, and condom are understood and given meaning to should be supported as a starting point. Researches that attempt to uncover how young people experience their youth and sex based on their particular social, political, cultural and economic contexts as well as those which recognize the intersections of those factors with gender, class, ethnicity, and caste should be encouraged. PEPFAR should encourage its partners to re-conceptualize safe sex from a youth perspective based on empirical researches from their particular locales and design their programme accordingly. By re-imagining both safe sex and the mechanisms of aid, interventions that cater to the different realities of youth may be able to materialize and contribute to HIV prevention among young women and young men in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Conclusion

This essay explored the underlying assumptions on youth and their sexual behaviours made by PEPFAR through its ABC approach and contrasting it with the lived experiences of youth in Sub Saharan Africa. Using the lens of youth as social construction, the essay demonstrates that the PEPFAR's ABC approach has a set of problematic assumptions on youth, which are shaped by particular events and discourses in both the U.S. and Sub-Saharan Africa. These assumptions are inconsistent with the diverse lived realities of youth and their sexual experiences, as shown by a comparison with examples from Senegal, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, these assumptions exclude the majority of young people in the region and ignore their agency, victimhood, and how young men and women navigate through this continuum. This finding cements the essay's main argument that PEPFAR's ABC approach is essentially unsound due to its youth blindness, which stems from the ignorance of youth as social constructions that is defined and experienced differently across contexts.

Consequently, the essay proposes a re-evaluation of PEPFAR's use of ABC as the main strategy to prevent HIV transmission among youth and encourages a formulation of safe sex based on empirical researches on how youth is experienced and how young people practice and give meaning to sex in specific centexts. In order to do this, PEPFAR must first acknowledge its youth blindness and commit to accommodating the diverse ways youth are socially constructed by questioning the ABC formula and give room for new youth centered approaches to safe sex. These are crucial steps for PEPFAR not just to prevent HIV transmission among youth in Sub-Saharan Africa, but to also allow them to have a safe, happy, and healthy sexual experiences.

References

Abbink, J. (2005) 'Being Young in Africa: The Politics of Despair and Renewal' in J. Abbink and I. van Kessel (eds.) *Vanguards or Vandals: Youth, Politics, and Conflict in Africa,* pp. 1-34. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Ansell, N. (2005) 'Health: Ensuring Survival and Well-being?' in N. Ansell (ed) *Children, Youth, and Development,* pp. 91-125. Oxon: Routledge.

Avert (n.d.) 'The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)'. Accessed 2 July 2010 < http://www.avert.org/pepfar.htm>.

Banknole, A., S. Singh, V. Wooj and D. Wulf (n.d.) *Risk and Protection: Youth and HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa.* New York & Washington: The Alan

Guttmacher Institute. Accessed 2 July 2010< http://www.guttmacher. org/pubs/riskandprotection.pdf>

Cohen, S.A. (2004) 'Beyond Slogans: Lessons from Uganda's Experience with ABC and HIV/AIDS' *Reproductive Health Matters* 12(23): 132-135.

De Boeck, F. and A. Honwana (2005) 'Introduction: Children and Youth in Africa' in A. Honwana, and F. De Boeck (eds.) *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa,* pp. 1-18. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press

Eerdewijk, A. v. (2007) *The ABC of Unsafe Sex: Gendered Sexualities of Young People in Dakar (Senegal).* Nijmegen: Ipskamp B.V.

Honwana, A. (forthcoming) 'From Marginalization to Active Citizenship: An Introduction', in Honwana, A. (ed.) *African Youth: From Marginalization to Citizenship.*

Human Rights Watch (2005) 'The Less They Know, The Better: Abstinence-Only HIV/AIDS Programs in Uganda'. Accessed 2 July 2010 <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0305/index.htm>

Kaiser Family Foundation and UNAIDS (2009) *Financing the Response to AIDS in Low and Middle Income Countries: International Assistance from the G8, European Commission, and Other Donor Governments in 2008.* Accessed 2 July 2010 <http://data.unaids.org/pub/Presentation/2009/20090704_UNAIDS_K FF_G8_CHARTPACK_2009_en.pdf>

Mate, R. (2010) 'Discourses of Youth Sexuality in the Context of HIV and AIDS in Beitbridge, Zimbabwe: Preliminary Findings', Doctoral post-fieldwork seminar paper. The Hague: International Institute of Social Studies.

Neema, S., M. Nakanyinye and R. Kibombo (2004) *Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health in Uganda: A Synthesis of Research Evidence.* New York & Washington: The Alan Guttmacher Institute

Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (2005) 'ABC Guidance #1 For United States Government In-Country Staff and Implementing Partners Applying the ABC Approach to Preventing Sexually Transmitted HIV Infections within the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief'. Accessed 2 July 2010 <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 57241.pdf>

Stearns, P.N. (2006). *Childhood in World History.* New York: Routledge.

UNAIDS and WHO (2009) *2009 AIDS Epidemic Update.* Geneva: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS and World Health Organization. Accessed 2 July 2010 <http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2009/JC1700 _Epi_Update_2009_en.pdf>

Youth Incentives / Rutgers Nisso Groep (2006) *Young and Sexual: An Exploration of Young People's Sexuality and Their Sexual Development* (2nd ed.). Accessed 10 June 2010 <http://www.rutgersnissogroep.org/ourinternationalwork/product-services/products/products-1/yiyoungsexualbinnen-eng-2.pdf>

Wyn, J. and R. White (1997) *Rethinking Youth*. London: Sage Publications

2

What Does Sex Have To Do With It? The intersections of sex and gender analysis on emerging discourses of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and violent conflict

LAUREN MUMFORD

"But most of the relatively small body of literature linking conflict with HIV/AIDS identifies sexual violence as only one among a broad range of factors that could increase the likelihood of HIV infection in conflict…" (De Largey and Klot, 2006:23).

Introduction

Beginning with UN Security Council resolution 1308 in 2000, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) was brought to the forefront of the discourse of Security. Much of the literature produced was on the spread and increased risk of HIV leading to AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome)[1] due to war and violent conflict. In recent years, and after methodical epidemiological studies carried out particularly by UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Paul Spiegel, these claims have been refuted due to a lack supporting scientific data. Spiegel has attempted to clarify the factors

---

[1] To quote Colin McInnes directly: 'this article uses terminology which differentiates between the human immune-deficiency virus (HIV), a virus which is transmitted by human to human contact, and AIDS, which is not a virus but a syndrome of infections and diseases which develops as the immune system is weakened by HIV'. Like McInnes, I am primarily concerned with the spread of the virus, HIV, "but it is the syndromic condition referred to as AIDS that results in death… [Note] people living with HIV are not necessarily AIDS patients" due to advancements in anti-retroviral therapy (2009:99 footnotes).

which both increase and decrease the risk of HIV transmission during conflict, yet mentions *among a number of other factors*, changes in sexual behavior leading to risky sex, transactional sex or sexual violence. This essay attempts to open up the debate by focusing on the gender dynamics of sex –the way in which HIV is most prevalently transmitted and yet least mentioned in Spiegel's work, and the gender dynamics of conflict. An examination of gender power relations before and during conflict will be examined to help give a greater understanding to the ways in which sex is used as a weapon during conflict and why HIV could pose a greater threat to vulnerable groups.

Much of the focus will be on women who remain less visible in both the discourse on the epidemiology of HIV in conflict and HIV as a security concern. I will examine the difficulties in reporting and analyzing the spread of HIV in conflict, particularly pertaining to the difficulties in eliciting 'private' data regarding sex. Epidemiological studies purport that fact-based analysis can help assess the need for response to HIV in conflict, yet often these facts are convoluted by instability, displacement of population, and pose a danger to the very people they aim to study. Going beyond epidemiological analysis, I will incorporate both gender and sexuality to analyze how women get erased from much of the discourse of HIV and conflict.

Lastly, this essay will also begin looking at the use of HIV as a weapon of war, as it remains highly unexamined. I believe that relegating sexual transmission to a factor among many in the discourse on HIV and conflict helps to preclude a link to the ways in which HIV could pose a great risk to those who are most vulnerable during conflict. While this is not specifically and always women, women do tend to be targets of sexual violence due to the way in which men and women's identities inform their experiences within conflict differently. Incorporating a focus on the way in which HIV can be transmitted should be primary to a discussion on the increased risk of transmission, especially when it is purposefully being spread. I believe this denotes examining the intersection of sex, gender and conflict; particularly this would be helpful in understanding the increases in risk to women who experience, en mass, sexual violence, rape, and non-consensual sex during conflict.

Sexual Violence: gendered identities, conflict and weapons of war

To preface an analysis of how HIV could pose a greater risk to women in conflict, it is pertinent that first this paper outlines the gender relations of

power that allow for gender-based violence, and particularly sexual violence, to occur. Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice (2009) defines gender-based violence as violence based on 'gender-defined roles of victims', and is most prevalently manifested sexually but includes physical and psychological attacks as well. Sexual violence refers to an act that is sexualized and violent, such as rape, forced prostitution, slavery and mutilation (WIGJ, 2009, webpage).[2] For the purpose of this essay, these definitions will be used.

To begin, I examine Judith Butler's (2005) focus on the particularity of gender-based violence stemming from identities. By examining the genealogy of identities, one can begin to understand the construction of the binary of man/woman, and masculine/feminine, as both a subject and object. The way in which women are framed opposite men is constructed through actions, language, writing, and representation, but also how men/women represent, act and write about themselves (Butler 2005:12 in Shepherd 2008:5). Identities therefore are not fixed, but are negotiated and repeated; in this way using the term gender-based violence does not preclude men from being victims ipso facto as power-holders, aggressors and perpetrators, nor does it preclude women from being aggressors or agentic insofar as they are identified as victims (Shepherd 2008:40-41). Identities do become normalized within institutions through their representation and repetition, and it is here that they inform action within conflict situations for both women and men.

Cynthia Cockburn's (2001) analysis of the gender dynamics of armed conflict discusses how the differentiations between men and women within different structures (that order society - race, ethnicity, class, religion, etc) present us with diverse understandings of men and women, but in a gendered way (2001:15). Albeit differences due to context, place or region, the construction of 'what is a man and a woman' remains normalized within structures of race or ethnicity (for example). These constructions of what is a black man or woman are – if we use intersectional analysis – both subject to the hierarchies of race and gender in comparison with what is a white man or woman. The ordering principle of gender differentiation is inherently tied to distributions of power and resources – whereby a black man would have more than a black woman, but certainly a white woman might

---

[2] This distinction attempts to delineate difference between gender-based violence and sexual violence, and to acknowledge that limiting gender-based violence to sexual acts reduces understanding the reality of experiences (Zarkov, 2006: 217).

choose to exercise her racial superiority over a black man. Thus, the norma-
tive function of gender is linked with who gets what, how and why – and
predominantly privileges men over women in all structures of society
(Cockburn 2001:15).

The ordering of power and resources within society in 'peaceful' times
also has a direct relation to the reactions and motivations of individuals dur-
ing conflict. Cockburn (2001) uses John Galtung's concept of structural vio-
lence to explain the analogy of a woman who is subject to different forms of
violence long before her husband begins to beat her (2001:17). This analogy
highlights how identities, formed and normalized prior to conflict, inform
the way in which violence is carried out. For example, media discourse prior
to the Rwandan conflict often reinforced and essentialized gender roles and
identities; specifically for Tutsi women, the discourse of 'pure femininity' as
the site of men's honor was a dangerous depiction as it materialized into
rape aimed to directly 'wound' the Tutsi men's masculinity (Cockburn
2001:19, 22; Jones 2002). During conflict Cockburn cites that the most ex-
plicit example of difference between men and women is the way in which
they suffer brutality on their bodies shaped by understandings of their
physical body differences, which are informed by their gender identities.[3]
For women, their torture and brutality is often sexualized (Cockburn
2001:22). Gender identity can contribute to the notion of accessibility of
women for rape during war, based upon peacetime understandings of
women within different institutions in society (as discussed above).

Sexual violence has historically, in feminist scholarship, focused on rape,
and rape of women (Zarkov 2006:219). Dubravka Zarkov (2006) expands
the range of discussion on rape and gender identities to include masculinity
and representations of sexual violence beyond gendered sexualities. Zarkov
is helpful in de-essentializing men from hegemonic masculinities inherent in
analyses of armed conflict and the institution of the military (and the milita-
rized structure/mindset of armed groups). Hegemonic masculinity can op-
press men within conflict and the military through conformity and pressure
to commit acts (such as sexual violence towards women) to prove oneself as
a man. Furthermore, torture of men in a sexualized way attempts to reduce
victims to a feminine status (removal of genitalia, sodomy) and rarely is sex-

---

[3] "Men and women often die different deaths and are tortured and abused in
different ways, both because of physical differences between sexes and because
of the different meanings culturally ascribed to the male and female bodies
(Cockburn, 2001:22).

ual violence against men visible in post-conflict analysis of sexual violence. Examining masculinity as both constructed and hyper-visible in the military and in conflict helps scholars, particularly feminist scholars, to avoid linking sexual violence to the heteronormative gender-sex binary of female victims - male oppressors.

Analyzing gender identities and sexuality is vital to understanding why sexual violence occurs, to whom and how. This can help broaden our analysis of sexual violence to refrain from essentializing heteronormative sex-gender binaries, deconstruct the hierarchical structures of society that remain gendered, to better understand the reality of violent conflict (Zarkov, 2006:222). Understanding gender power structures within the dynamics of conflict helps to make visible some of the causes and prevalence of sexual violence as a tool of war. Given that gender identities are implicit and normative within societies, it is little wonder that they are barely considered in discourses of conflict and HIV.

HIV: analyzing the connection to violent conflict

The motivation for this paper stems from reports of HIV-positive perpetrators infecting persons through sexual violence, which has been suggested in cases in Central African Republic, Rwanda, and Democratic Republic of Congo (Donovan 2002; Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice 2009; Mills et al. 2006, AidsFreeWorld 2010). While the influence of gender identities has helped shed light on reasons for the prevalence of sexual violence, purposely infecting persons with HIV through sexual violence is yet another level of suffering – one that continues to inflict pain and loss of life long after the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) strategies deployed, peace agreements signed and transition begun. What will continue to be examined is the securitization of HIV, the difficulties in counting and measuring the spread of HIV in conflict, and what this means for understanding HIV as a weapon of war.

It is my belief that analyzing and reporting the spread of HIV in conflict has neglected the main targets of sexual violence in conflict – vulnerable groups, such as (but not restricted to) women.[4] Securitization and reporting

---

[4] When I refer to women, it is not to homogenize the experiences of women, nor promote that *all* women experience sexual violence. I focus on women because they are targets of sexual violence because of constructed gender identities (discussed earlier).

of HIV within conflict reluctantly misses the main way in which HIV is spread –through sexual contact. Securitization and reporting go hand-in-hand in making women who experience the effects of both sexual violence and HIV transmission more invisible. These discourses will be briefly examined to see if gender is considered or not, if this makes women less visible as victims of sexual violence and HIV, and what the implications are of this (in)visibility.

Securitization of HIV

The signing of UN Security Council Resolution 1308 in July of 2000 signaled a shift from looking at HIV as merely a health issues to a much deeper examination of the risks HIV could pose to national, regional and global (in)security (McInnes 2009:100). It became at this instant, a political and economic as well as a social issue (Altman 2003:420). The focus in beginning of the decade was on the way in which HIV could pose a risk to already instable states by creating further economic, social and political instability (Altman 2003). Claims such as those found in the United States Institute for Peace Special Report on AIDS and Violent Conflict in Africa (2001), link AIDS to the 'weakening of the state' and a possible catalyst to violent conflict in Africa (USIP 2001).[5]

By examining the different threats to public security, analysts remain on a macro level while the disease remains potent in what is regarded as a private realm - sexuality. HIV has exposed sexuality in non-conflict situations leading to prevention strategies like sexual education and promoting condom use, and retroactive responses like increased programming for health services and Anti-retroviral therapy. However, the relationship between sexual violence in conflict and the transmission of HIV remains only speculative (Singer 2002 in McInnes 2009:106). Suggested reasons include i) the difficulty in collecting data to support such claims (discussed later), and ii) sex not being included as a security issue.

Interestingly, sexual contact and the word *sex* are seldom used in some literature about security and HIV, except if it is implicated as *one of many* factors linking the increased spread of HIV to conflict. The acknowledgement

---

[5] David Gordon of the National Intelligence Council in the US was quoted in the USIP Special Report, concluding that 'the AIDS pandemic threatens to overwhelm already fragile structures and will exacerbate all of the conditions that have made Africa extraordinarily vulnerable to violent conflict in the past' (USIP special Report 2001).

of sexual practices within conflict in relation to the spread of HIV is particularly lacking in the discourse of HIV and security. Altman (2003) poignantly notes that this may be the cause of governments, traditionally been charged with security, having to 'intervene in areas often regarded as both natural and private' (2003:423). The lack of connection between sexuality and security is problematic when one considers the prevalence of sexual violence in conflict and times of instability.

It is peculiar how, since 2001, the consolidation of global support to end the fight against HIV has been framed in a securitized manner, yet focuses little on the human security risks that are posed to individuals in conflict, particularly to woman through sexual contact. Like John Caldwell who states 'the central plank in the victory over AIDS is the recognition by African governments of social and sexual reality' (in Altman 2003:423), the intersection of gender, sexuality and security can reframe global responses to HIV by: i) making the prevalent method of transmission –sex, more visible; ii) understanding the limits to an individual's human security based on gendered structures of power, and iii) creating measures to improve security as well as increase responses/support for vulnerable persons. Sex, being very private and highly structured by gender relations of power, should be understood as increasingly risky when transmission of HIV is a possibility and sex is not a choice. Furthermore, transmission of HIV is a security concern for individuals and for states, should we consider that those vulnerable to transmission through sex are left out of the discourse on security and HIV. This invisibility is inherently tied to the avoidance of acknowledging state and global asymmetrical power structures, and poses a risk to the 'state security' if HIV is understood as a catalyst for weakening states. Until vulnerable groups become more visible in the security discourse, states will continue to be exposed to the threat of HIV due to asymmetrical power structures that reinforce the existence vulnerable groups[6] (Altman 2003: 423). Securitization has pushed HIV into the public sphere, yet this spotlight has remained timid in tackling the more private issues of sex and gender, the interface which helps prop up the public status quo.

---

[6] "Effective HIV prevention requires governments to acknowledge a whole set of behaviors which they would rather ignore, and a willingness to support, and indeed empower, groups practicing such behaviors… thus effective measures against HIV may involve changes to existing structures of power, which threaten those who have most to lose. At some level politicians understand that to speak of empowering women… threatens the status quo from which they benefit" (Altman, 2003:423).

Connecting the dots: reporting the links between HIV and conflict

Recent literature on security and HIV remains focused on the whether AIDS is *in fact* a catalyst to conflict and poverty, attempting to create a growing body of factors which could influence the spread of HIV. This positivist approach attempts to clarify (through data collection) the hype surrounding the links between HIV transmission and conflict. Spiegel et al. (2006) and Anema et al. (2009) focus on the primacy of scientific data to clarify the *actual* prevalence rate of HIV being transmitted in conflict in their studies (Spiegel et. al 2006:155). Spiegel and Le (2006) cite that data collection during and after conflict is not only difficult but also biased, due to improper collection methods, in-disclosure of methodology and political and anecdotal rather than fact-based claims or recommendations made by NGOs. Instead they purport the need for 'fact-based' claims to better formulate 'interventions, program monitoring and allocation of resources' to the effects of HIV from conflict (2004:204; 2006:154-55). While epidemiological studies signal increased attention for the links between HIV and conflict, beyond the macro-understandings of security, they still continue to marginalize the experiences of women and other vulnerable groups and relegate sexuality and sexual violence.

Changes in sexual behavior have been recognized as *one of many* factors linking conflict to the increased spread of HIV (McInnes 2009:106), yet epidemiological studies have found that despite wide spread rape, transmission rates remain quite low (Aranka et al. 2008; Spiegel et al. 2005 in McInnes, 2009). Spiegel et al. (2006), McInnes (2009) and Aranka et al. (2009) have focused on the contextual factors of conflict that could increase the likelihood of transmission. Spiegel looks at the HIV prevalence in the population at risk and the surrounding area, and length of time or existence of the conflict (Spiegel, 2004:323). McInnes focuses on 'susceptibility' and 'vulnerability' to understand how conflict might lead to increased risk of HIV transmission (2009:112). Susceptibility refers to conditions that exist before conflict that can increase HIV transmission –HIV prevalence before conflict, population density, human mobility, duration of conflict and poverty. Vulnerability refers to the changes due to conflict that can make a state more vulnerable to HIV transmission –population migration and mixing of IDPS/refugees, changed sexual practices, increased drug abuse, unstable health and education infrastructure (McInnes 2009:112). As conflicts are not homogenous, McInnes (2009) (and Spiegel) help clarify that HIV may not be transmitted to the extreme that was first believed (in early 2000) nor in every conflict. However, due to the fact that all studies so far have cited that HIV prevalence is not easily quantifiable due to the way in which it can be

spread – through sex, which increases the stigma surrounding the issue – the prevalence and instances of transmission are still not confirmed from either NGO or epidemiological studies.

Linking HIV prevalence and transmission during conflict through epidemiological methods can be quite limited. McInnes (2009) finds the most predominant limitation being data available to study. Collection of population data is often dangerous during conflict due to instability, while health facilities and surveillance studies of the disease before, during and after conflicts are insufficient due to displacement and death (McInnes 2009:101; Mills et al. 2006:713). The Social Science Research Council on behalf of United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and World Health Organization (WHO) met in 2005 to examine the existing methods for reporting and monitoring sexual violence. They found that guaranteeing the trust, physical safety and protection of survivors posed the greatest challenge to data collection (SSRC Report 2005). Specifically, trust is broken by a blurring of protector and perpetrator for women (SSRC Report 2005). This breach of trust perpetuates a cycle of vulnerability that, post-conflict stops women from disclosing information about rape and sexual violence for fear of further retaliation or violence, or continued psychological trauma caused by retelling. Furthermore, 'documentation also puts researchers and service providers at risk' as it exposes victims and perpetrators in transitioning societies (SSRC Report 2005). Mills et al. (2006) argue further that because of the limitation of reporting these studies may 'fail to recognize important increases in conflict of HIV infection among vulnerable subgroup of the population such as women and children', and downplay the experiences of women, who are disproportionately affected by HIV and predominant targets of sexual violence (2006: 714). Avoidance of the gender structures prior to and within conflict as a primary focus can limit the ability of epidemiological data to reflect the reality of sexual violence, conflict and the spread of HIV particularly among vulnerable groups.

Pam DeLargy and Jennifer Klot (2006) focus on sexuality in their analysis of the difference between 'drivers' and 'risk factors' in HIV transmission. Drivers are the different factors of conflict which produce vulnerability – population displacement, poverty, lack of information regarding sexual health, changing family and social structures, psychological trauma, illicit drug use and changing health infrastructure. However, the principle 'risk factor' focuses on the method of transmission, which for women is predominantly sexual contact that is violent, forced or exploitive (DeLargy and Klot, 2006). From this gender-sensitive perspective, DeLargy and Klot state that the 'relatively small body of literature linking conflict with HIV identi-

fies sexual violence as only one among a broad range of factors that could increase the likelihood of HIV infection in conflict' (2006:23). They importantly bring the power structures of sexuality and gender into the discussion of how HIV is transmitted within conflict. This can have a much larger impact on designing the response and programming for post-conflict reconstruction, especially considering the long-term effects sexual violence and HIV transmission can pose: trauma, reproductive health problems, increased discrimination and violence due to stigma that is based on 'tarnished' gender identities or being HIV-positive (DeLargy and Klot, 2006:10, 24).

In an effort to clarify sensationalized claims of HIV being a security threat, epidemiological studies have tried to fill the gap. However, epidemiological studies remain limited by data available to collect during conflict (McInnes 2009; Mills et al. 2006), partially because sexual violence and HIV victims are plagued by a cycle of violence that precludes them from disclosing their status (SSRC Report 2005). I argued that both the securitization and reporting of HIV obscure the importance of the interface between gender and sexuality, and limit the visibility of those who are most affected by HIV transmission –vulnerable groups. In the next section I will examine why these groups are most likely to be exposed to HIV.

HIV as a weapon of war

The emergence of HIV being defined as a weapon of war is fairly recent. It made history in the 20th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (2006), where the transitional government of DRC alleged that 'purposeful infection' of more than 2000 persons in Southern Kava of STIs, 'including HIV, through rape' were committed by forces from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda (Mills et al. 2006:752). While it was a landmark report, the inability of linking the intended use of HIV to conflict in this case was not well supported, as no further evidence was presented by the defendant states than the allegations made from the DRC. The difficulties in reporting instances of sexual violence, rape and HIV prevalence within conflict also impact how this new 'ultimate punishment' can be tracked and specifically distinguished by its intended use. This is evidenced further by the allegations of intentional infection made during the Rwandan Genocide, and yet not a single charge was laid during the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda albeit the 'effects' of sexual violence, including HIV infection, were mentioned in case material.

Nor have provisions been made to respond to claims made by the NGO AVEGA, who assist HIV-infected widows within Rwanda.

While difficult to ascertain whether HIV is being intentionally spread in more conflict zones, it is well documented that rape is being used as a weapon of war and women and girls are continually targeted by sexualized violence (Mills et al. 2006: 715). HIV transmission and sexual violence could then pose increased risks to women within conflict because i) gender identities frame how they act and are acted upon before, during and after conflict through asymmetrical power structures; ii) sexual violence is increasingly becoming a prevalent and systematic method of torture inflicted within conflict, iii) susceptibility to transmission is much higher in cases where violent sexual contact occurs.

Women are biologically more susceptible to HIV than men according to UNIFEM (Arriaga 2002:18). Especially in sexual encounters which are non-consensual, violent, or include younger victims, genital trauma and penetration (causing micro lesions and tearing) serve as an effective entry point for the virus (HIV) to have access to susceptible cells (Arriaga 2002:18; De-Largy and Klot, 2006). Altman (2003), McGinn et al (2001), and Smith (2002) have documented the increased prevalence of HIV amongst military personnel and armed combatants – sometimes two to five times greater than civilian populations (in Spiegel 2004:330), and discuss how humanitarian workers are often exposed to power structures that benefit them when it comes to sexual violence or transactional sex. Their presence within conflict situations already increases the likelihood of HIV transmission, especially considering the hegemonic masculinity that normalizes their protocol.

Motivations for inflicting others with HIV are described by Ellman (2005) as a 'fatalist psychology' (in McInnes 2009:108). Analyzing motivations for intentional infliction of HIV so far have been minor, but must include analysis of structures of power and identity. Rates of rape may be increasing due to the inclination of HIV positive persons to spread the disease as much as they can. Ostergard et al (2008) found that there is a positive correlation between HIV prevalence and rape rates within South Africa, and that fatalism or hopelessness is the link between the two. Ellman et al (2005) expand this 'fatalist' mentality to times of conflict, when HIV-positive combatants facing inaccessibility to health care and stigma may choose to exercise their power over victims of sexual violence and intentionally spread the disease (in McInnes 2009:108). Otherwise, increased demoralization may decrease a combatant's sensitivity to AIDS prevention or increase neglect (Bratt 2004 in McInnes 2009:108). Therefore, disempowered by the stigma

and hopelessness of the disease, combatants may choose to exercise their power over sexual victims, which are predominantly women (as discussed earlier). Thus, services for HIV prevention and care need to include military and peacekeeping forces whom are both present in conflict situations and likely to have high HIV prevalence rates.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to broaden the analysis of links between the increased risk of HIV transmission and conflict by primarily including sex, sexuality and gender to the discussion. This paper began in response to Spiegel et al.'s claim that despite previous assumptions, 'HIV prevalence in conflict affected areas is lower than expected' (in Mills et al. 2006:752) and that higher vulnerability does not necessarily mean transmission. In looking further, it became more obvious that the way in which sexuality was considered in literature about HIV transmission, securitization and conflict was quite minimal. Given that sexual contact is a primary means of transmitting the virus, the analysis seemed to obscure the seriousness of the risk posed to vulnerable groups within conflict.

Particularly, this paper has focused on the way in which gender identities are negotiated within all structures of society (Butler 2005 in Shepherd 2008), where hierarchies of power intersect across gender, sexuality, age, race, religion, etc., and cement themselves within different institutions, such as the military, the family, the state (Cockburn 2001). Furthermore, these identities normalize differences in the way men and women act and are acted on, in times of peace and conflict. Particularly, predominant understandings of femininity and the feminine body sexualize the torture that women experience in conflict, while men remain oppressed by hegemonic, aggressive masculinities and are tortured with non-heteronormative sex as an ultimate punishment (Cockburn 2001; Zarkov 2006). Therefore, experiences in conflict cannot be disassociated from sexuality and gender. So when the analysis of the links between HIV transmission and conflict negate sexual conduct to one among many risk factors, it raises a warning sign. This paper attempted to look at the way discourses of HIV, security and conflict has been framed. To conclude, I find that relegating sexuality and gender analysis in these discourses poses serious problems for informing appropriate responses (whether material, legal or discursive), particularly in reducing the visibility of sexual and gender-based violence, and those who are adversely affected by them. Should HIV continue to be used as a weapon of war, then this poses an even greater threat, as invisibility will

only make the cycle of violence for these vulnerable persons continue long after the conflict is seemingly over.

References

Arriaga, A. (2002) 'HIV and Violence Against Women' *Human Rights*, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 18-20.

Altman, D. (2003) 'AIDS and Security' *International Relations*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 417-427.

Aranka, A., M. Joffres, E. Mills, and P. Spiegel (2008), 'Widespread Rape Does Not Directly Appear to Increase the Overall HIV Prevalence in Conflict Affected Countries: so now what?' *Emerging Themes in Epidemiology*, Vol. 5:11, pp. 1-7.

Carballo, M. (2006) 'An Urgent Issue of Public Health and Human Rights', *Forced Migration Review*, Vol. 17, pp.10-11.

Cockburn, C. (2001) 'The Gender Dynamics of Armed Conflict and Political Violence' in O.N. Moser & C.F. Clark (eds) *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence,* Delhi: Kali for Woman, pp. 13-29.

DeLargy, P., and J. Klot (2006) 'Sexual Violence and HIV/AIDS Transission', *Forced Migration Review*, Vol. 17, pp.23-24.

Donovan, P. (2002) 'Rape and HIV/AIDS in Rwanda', *The Lancet*, Vol. 360, December, pp. 17-18.

Jones, A. (2002) 'Gender and Genocide in Rwanda', *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 4, No.1, pp. 65-91.

Mills, E., and J.B. Nachega (2006) 'HIV Infection as a Weapon of War', *The Lancet*, Vol. 6, December, pp. 752-753.

McInnes, C. (2006) 'HIV/AIDS and Security', *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 2, pp. 315-326.

McInnes, C. (2009) 'Conflict, HIV and AIDS: a new dynamic in warfare?', *Global Change, Peace & Security*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 99-114.

Shepherd, L.J (2008) *Gender, Violence & Security,* London and New York: Zen Books.

Spiegel, P. and P.V. Le (2006) 'HIV Behavioural Surveillance Surveys in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations: A call for improvement' in *Global Public Heath*, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 147-156.

Spiegel, P. (2004) 'HIV/AIDS Among Conflict-affected and Displaced Populations: Dispelling Myths and Taking Action' in *Disasters*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 322-339.

Social Science Research Council, Final Report (2005) 'Sexual Violence and Exploitation'. Accessed online 4 April 2010. <www.ssrc.org/programs/HIV/publications/SVE_Report.pdf>

United States Institute of Peace, Special Report (2001) 'Aids and Violent Conflict in Africa'. Accessed online 3 April 2010. <www.usip.org/resources/aids-violent-conflict-africa>

Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice (2009), 'Clarification of the Term "Gender"', In *Background Papers* Accessed online 5 April 2010. <www.iccwomen.org/resources/gender>

Women's Initiative for Gender Justice, *Gender Report Card on the International Criminal Court*, Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice: The Hague, 2009.

Zarkov, D., (2006) 'Towards a New Theorizing of Women, Gender and War', in Evans, M., K. Davis, and Lober, J., (Eds.) *Handbook of Gender and Women's Studies*, London: Sage, pp. 214-233.

3 Towards a Feminist Post-Structuralist Analysis of 'Antigone', by Sophocles

ANA VICTORIA PORTOCARRERO LACAYO

I. Introduction

Most literature related to feminist thinking or the feminist movement history, refers to the first, second and third waves[1] of feminism, starting in the late 18th century with, among others, the work of Mary Wollstonecraft. However, men and women that have transgressed patriarchal ideology in their own way have existed for as long as patriarchy itself.

Ancient Greece was the stage of some of these characters, some of them real, some fictitious. Figures such as the poet Sappho from Lesbos, and the 'Amazon' Warriors,[2] dating back as far as approximately 600 BC, have been related to the struggle against the oppression of women, or are examples of emancipated women throughout history. The work of Sophocles, and especially his tragedy 'Antigone', written in approximately 442 B.C., presents the story of a woman, Antigone, who transgresses the rules imposed by Creon, the king of Thebes, and commits suicide after being condemned to death.

Antigone is the eldest daughter of Oedipus and Jocasta, whose incestuous relationship was unknown to them. Once they came to realize this truth their story unravelled dramatically. The play relates the struggles between Antigone and Creon, who is not only the king of Thebes, but also her uncle and the father of her fiancé. Antigone decides to bury her brother Polineices, violating the explicit rules of Creon, who instructed that he not be buried, as he was considered a traitor of Thebes. Following a face-to-face

---

[1] Each of these waves corresponds to important changes in the feminist thinking and movement.

[2] Female warriors. See: F.G. Bergmann, *Les Amazones dans l'histoire et dans la fable* (1853)

confrontation between Creon and Antigone, he decides to put her to death, thus triggering a series of events ending in a long list of tragedies.

When I read 'Antigone' some months ago, I was shocked to find this representation of such a powerful and atypical woman in such an ancient play. A further reading of the text offers very interesting elements of gender power-relations that are worthy of closer attention.

This paper explores, from a feminist post-structuralist perspective, the way in which gender power relations and specifically, how men and women are represented in the text, in order to identify to what extent, then and still today, these representations contributed to, contested or influenced gender power-imbalances in society.

Gender is going to be understood throughout the essay as a socially constructed category, not attached to sex in a fixed manner, and hence, able to be modified in order to challenge power relations based on sex and gender 'differences'. I will adopt, as I stated, a Post-structuralist approach to discourses, seeing language as producer of meanings, which shape our understanding and experience of social reality, but which is also mediated by power relations.

Interest in the piece and in the scene selected

I am interested in analysing Antigone, as I am amazed by the characters of this play, in particular Antigone. Her position, in relation to the King's power, her determination despite adversity, her courage to accept death instead of compromising her values, and her tenderness in defending her brother, talking about her father, and referring to her love (Haemon), make her a truly fascinating character.

I am particularly astonished by the fact that this character and play were written so many centuries ago. This demonstrates that the conceptions of women's role in society have been contested since that time, which is precisely the importance of the text. It reveals, what I would call, 'roots' of women's resistance found in literature. This is not a minor accomplishment, but rather, is of enormous importance given that written history is an exercise of power, a power mostly exercised by men and about men.

In this sense, as Johnstone argues in relation to narratives, it is relevant to pay attention to the political effects of narrative, considering storytelling also as exercises of power, "as a resource for dominating others, for expressing solidarity, for resistance and conflict. […] Like all talk and all ac-

tion, narrative is socially and epistemologically constructive: through telling, we make ourselves and our experiential world" (Johnstone 2001: 644-645).

Despite the text being fictional, it remains very important as it reflects the society of its time. Considering that all texts are mediated by power relations, and reflect the author's views and subjectivity, all 'real' stories can be considered fictional, and all fictional stories can be considered 'real', in the sense that they reflect part of the 'real' world. As Johnstone states, "[t]he essence of humanness, long characterised as the tendency to make sense of the world through rationality, has come increasingly to be described as the tendency to tell stories, to make sense of the world through narratives" (Johnstone 2001: 635).

In scene two, of seven, many characters interact, including the Guard, the Chorus, Creon (the King), Antigone, and her sister Ismene, it is for this reason that scene two was selected for my analysis. In this scene, the two female characters are opposed to each other, which enables a comparison of the two models of femininity that Sophocles presents. Additionally, in this scene the dialogue between Creon and Antigone encapsulates the main aspects of their personalities, further, it is in this scene that both make their decisions based in their own perspectives.

Methodology

To answer the question above, I will discursively analyse the second scene of the play Antigone, using a various methods in order to obtain from the text the information required.

Considering my main objective; to understand how men and women are represented in the play, as well as the way in which these representations have contested or reinforced gender power relations, I will engage a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) method, which I will relate with a post-structuralist perspective of discourse and operationalize with narrative analysis methods.

CDA and post-structuralism have many elements in common in relation to discourses. According to Hansen (2006), the main epistemological and ontological objects of post-structuralist discourse analysis are identities and the way in which they are formed and negotiated in language, through processes of linking and differentiation. In the specific case of the play, the analysis of the ways in which the male and female characters are represented, and specifically, the way in which they form their identities through processes of linking and differentiation with one another, will allow me to

identify the role of power in the maintenance or contestation of gender power imbalances in the play.

While the post-structuralist perspective recognises the central role of power in the mediation of language, meanings and representations of social reality, CDA or "CDS [(Critical Discourse Studies)] scholars are typically interested in the way discourse (re)produces social *domination,* that is, the *power abuse* of one group over others, and how dominated groups may discursively *resist* such abuse." (Van Dijk 2009: 63). This position is very close to the ideas of discourses, identities and power of Hepburn, who states that "discourses shape and constitute our identities, and legitimate certain kinds of relationships between those identities, thus locking people into particular kind of social arrangements" (Hepburn in Wooffitt 2005: 151).

In practical terms, according to van Dijk (2009) CDS value the *cognition* (mental representations, ideologies), and *society* (societal context) in the critical analysis of *discourse* (a form of social interaction).

Linking this method with Hansen's methodology to conduct post-structuralist discourse analysis,[3] I will investigate the chosen text by analysing the construction of female and male identities through processes of linking and differentiation based in an ethical criteria (see Hansen 2006). This exercise will be complemented with two types of narrative analysis, the first is a basic check-list presented by Gasper,[4] in which the text will be put in context, relevant information about the author, the social context in which the text was produced, and other important aspects related to the plot will be established. The second narrative analysis type employed is narrative semiotics; texts always have a *surface structure,* the elements of the text that are immediately recognizable and accessible; and a *deep structure,* which are the systems of values embedded in the text. Lastly, mediating both structures is *narrative structure,* which produces and articulates meaningful discourses (Titscher et al., 2000). Narrative analysis' purpose is to "identify the narrative structures of a text that form the bridge between the surface and the deep structure." (Fiol in Titscher et al. 2007: 127).

---

[3] In a very partial way due to the limitations of this essay.

[4] Des Gasper's Lecture Notes; ISS, The Hague: Ma course 3304- Discourse Analysis: Analysis of Narratives 2010

To analyse the narrative structure, the six *actants* distinguished by Greimas (1983: 202ff; 1987: 106ff) are identified in the scene[5] (see the *actants* in table 1).

Table 1
Actants and their Role in the Narrative

Destinator	This refers to the particular force which puts the rules and values into action and represents the ideology of the text.
Receiver	This carries the values of the (a). It therefore refers to the object on which the (a) places value.
Subject	The subject occupies the principal role in the narration.
Object	The object of the narration is what the subject aspires to. It represents the goal to which the interest of the subject is directed.
Adjuvant	This supporting force helps the subject in its endeavours concerning the object.
Traitor	This impeding force represents everything that tries to deter the subject from its goal.

Source: Titscher et al. (2000: 128).

The relationship between the six *actants* is as follow:

> The *subject* directs him or herself to the *object* and in this is supported by the *adjuvant* and impeded by the traitor. All of this takes place within the value structure of the *destinator*, which is imparted by the *receiver*. The ideology of the *destinator* is often presented by the *narrator*. (Titscher et al 2000: 128).

The value structure and ideology that the analysis of *actants* propose, can be linked to the framework of CDS: discourse-cognition-society.

Starting by the third corner of the triangle, society, this is going to be covered with the presentation of the context in which the play was written, which is included in the previously mentioned basic check list. The cognitive corner is related to the "subjective representations of the events and situations observed, participated in or referred to by discourse" (Van Dijk 2009: 63). It also includes the characters' attitudes, understood as the "so-

---

[5] The *isotepe of space* and the *isotepe of time* are not going to be included in the analysis.

cially shared, ideologically based opinions (normative beliefs) about specific social issues." (ibid). I will link this element with the ideas about identity presented by Hansen, focussing on gender identities, and based on the values and ideologies that emerge from the analysis of the *actants*. Finally, the first corner, related to discourse, is going to be interpreted as a way of social interaction, and mental representations (Van Dijk 2009), both present in a cultural product: a play. Additionally, relating discourse with the ideas of gender identities that are the main focus of this work, discourses are to be understood in the way it was stated above by Hepburn in Wooffitt (2005), as shapers and constitutive of identities, legitimising particular kind of social arrangements. However, at the same time, discourses are going to be seen as a source of contestation of those social arrangements as well.[6]

This is indeed what CDA or CDS is about. It is "a critical *perspective, position* or *attitude* within the discipline of multidisciplinary Discourse Studies, [in which] scholars are sociopolitically committed to social equality and justice." (Van Dijk 2009: 62-63).

A visual representation of the combination of the three methods is the following:

_____

[6] To do this exercise, I will use an adapted version of the Scriven-Gasper analysis table.

Limitations and Complexities

Relevant to mention are the complexities faced with the analysis of this text, which will also illustrate the limitations of the analysis.

Firstly, it is important to explain that considering the nature of the text: a play, it contains not one discourse but several voices with their own discourses. In this sense, the methods used had to be adapted, and none of the three methods were applied in exhaustively, but rather parts of each of them were used.

The original text was written in ancient Greek, more than 24 centuries ago by Sophocles. The text has been translated and adapted many times since then. The Italian saying: 'traduttore traditore' (translator, traitor), refers to the fact that in the exercise of translation, there are always changes resulting from the interpretation of the translators. In this sense, and adding the possibility that the version of Antigone I am using might be an adaptation of the original, it is perfectly plausible that parts of the text are not transmitting the meaning that the author intended. Despite this limitation I consider it worthwhile to analyse the text, with the assumption that it still maintains its original essential message.

Another limitation that the age of the text poses is the lack of information available to have a better idea of the context in which the play was created. In this sense, it is important to acknowledge that the context and information about the author that is provided is not complete enough. More historical research would help to overcome this constraint, but the time was not permitting.

Due to the length of the play, I selected only one scene out of seven sections. The justification for selecting this scene was provided above. The last complexity that I find in the text is its language, corresponding with its literary nature and its age, is very poetic and proved at times difficult to grasp.

II. Text in Context

Societal Context[7]

Greece, some centuries ago[8]

Between 500 and 336 B.C. (Classical Period), Greece was the stage of several political struggles, against the Persian and Macedonian empires, and between Sparta and Athens internally. Pericles was leading the Athenian state from 461 to 429 B.C., period in which Athens was experienced a flourishing (Golden Age) in terms of politics and culture; the democratic system of government was fully developed, the Parthenon on the Acropolis was built, the philosophical school of Socrates and Plato was founded, and Sophocles, and Aeschylus and Euripides wrote their famous masterpieces during that period.

Antigone was written in approximately 442 B.C., during the Thirty Year's Peace period, that was broken in 431 B.C., when the Peloponnesian Wars started, not ending before 404 B.C., putting end to the Athenian Golden Age. (Perseus Digital Library, n.d.).

The Gods

Ancient Greek literature, including Sophocles's Antigone, is full of references to the Gods. The gods were part of their beliefs, and their lives were very much led by these beliefs. At the same time, they relied in seers, diviners, oracles, dreams and prophets to understand what the gods wanted, or what was making them to anger.

Some of the god's expectations, in relation to human behaviour, were specified in a moral order for human beings. It was very important, for example, to offer hospitality to strangers, bury family members properly,[9] avoid being arrogant, and to avoid murderous violence.

Among the different ways to honour the gods was the performance of human sacrifices and through art. For example, the tragedy, as a literary peace, often showed unfortunate fates of human beings, due to the conflict-

---

[7] This section comprises some of the basic Check List questions proposed by Gasper.

[8] Most of this section was written with information collected from the Perseus Digital library: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/

[9] In the play, Antigone breaks Creon's rules and bury her brother, which was prohibited by Creon.

ing interaction between them or with the gods. The tragedies of Sophocles, that were in honour of the god Dionysus, were presented and won many of the main festivals of Athens. Other very famous tragedians of ancient Athens were Aeschylus (525-456 B.C.) and Euripides (485-406 B.C.). The three tragedians were, in many ways, participating in the public sector and/or the army of Athens. (Perseus Digital Library n.d.).

Sophocles

Sophocles was one of the three most famous ancient Greek tragedians,[10] who lived approximately between 497/496 and 407/406 BC. He was part of a wealthy family and was a very recognised person not only in theatre circles, but in the public sector and armed forces of Athens, having a close relation with Pericles (Sommerstein 2002).

In terms of his literary work, his main contribution besides his plays, was the introduction of a third actor in his dramas, which reduced the importance of the chorus, and at the same time introduced more conflict between the characters. At the same time, he developed his characters more than the other playwrights of his time (Freeman 1999).

Women in ancient Greece

Women in ancient Greece had a lower status than men. According to historians, they were simply in charge of the reproduction of children, especially of sons. They were their father's property first, and became their husband's property when married in their teens. Additionally, women were not supposed to socialise with their friends or husbands, activity that was reserved to men and women slaves only (Pomeroy 1975).

Socrates, Greek philosopher, contemporary of Sophocles, did not address the differences between men and women in their philosophical exercises. Nevertheless, analysing the study of his pupil Plato, who lived between 428-384 BC, the position in relation to women was ambivalent. In some of Plato's work (Republic), he advocated for improvements for women in terms of education, for example. However, on the other hand, he explained women's inferior status in relation to men, as a result of their degeneration in relation to human nature.

"It is only males who are created directly by the gods and are given souls. Those who live rightly return to the stars, but those who are 'cowards or [lead

---

[10] The other two tragedians were Aeschylus and Euripides.

unrighteous lives] may with reason be supposed to have changed into the nature of women in the second generation'. This downward progress may continue through successive reincarnations unless reversed. In this situation, obviously it is only men who are complete human beings and can hope for ultimate fulfilment; the best a woman can hope for is to become a man" (Plato, Timaeus 90e, in Disckason 1976:24-33).

Aristotle, Plato's successor, was less ambivalent than his master, and believed that women were inferior because of their defective nature, due to the fact that they couldn't provide semen. At his time, the belief in terms of reproduction was that the soul of a human being was in the semen of men, and that women provided only the matter. He compared women with animals, and considered that they should be dominated, and behave passively in front of men.

> "It is the best for all tame animals to be ruled by human beings. For this is how they are kept alive. In the same way, the relationship between the male and the female is by nature such that the male is higher, the female lower, that the male rules and the female is ruled." (Women can be Priests, n.d.).

These were some of the most influential ideas about women in the 5th and 4th century BC. These ideas were reflected in laws, for example, in 441 B.C Pericles's citizenship law, men and women didn't have the same rights. While men had the new advantages of more freedom to participate in politics and juries, more influence in general decisions relating to their lives, and had access to lands and properties; women continued to be excluded from politics, were dependent on a male guardian for legal issues, and were not entitled to participate in large financial transactions. (Perseus Digital library, n.d)

In this sense, it is very interesting the contrast in which Sophocles presents Antigone in the play, portraying her as a relatively independent woman, brave, secure and capable of challenging a King's authority.

Author and Narrator

In Gasper's checklist for narrative analysis, the role of the author in the narration of the events is relevant. In this sense, the author-narrator relationship is an element that is worth close attention. However, in the case of plays, especially when the stories are fictional, the voice of the author is the narrative voice as well, presented through the chorus, through some characters, or through an introduction to the events that will take place in the stage.

This author-narrator relationship is very interesting in theatre plays, because in this case the story is not being narrated but is being enacted. What the reader/audience see, are the interactions between the characters while constructing the story, and sometimes a chorus interpreting the story (showing the ideas of the author in relation to what is happening), or announces what is about to happen, in case of tragedies, the omen. Sophocles, however, made an important contribution to the genre, by introducing a third actor, as explained, this renders the story be more interactive, and diminishes the role of the chorus.

Audience

The audience to whom the story is written is also relevant, because it can explain its purpose, language, agenda, and in general the values that are mediating its development.

In the case of Antigone, the play was created to be acted in an annual festival in honour of Dionysus, called The Dionysia. This festival was held in rural areas around December, and in urban areas around April. The festival lasted some days, in which people from all economic class participated. In this sense, the audience for this play was very large, however, considering the author's wealthy origin and his participation in the political and military life of his time, it is possible that the play was written for the higher classes.

III. Narrative analysis of the text

This section comprises the second corner of the model: the discourses or interactions that the play presents. These discourses are generated by the relationship of the other two corners: *society* and *cognition*. However, to be able to recognise this third element of *cognition*, or the deep structure in semiotic *narrative analysis*, the *actants*, or *narrative structure* are to be analysed first.[11]

I will start with the first step of Narrative Semiotics: a 'general sense-making' of the play, which I will present by providing a summary.

The second step will be to present a precise examination of the narrative structure, through the identification of the *actants* and their interactions.

---

[11] Two different methods (CDA/S and Semiotic Narrative Analysis) are being put together in the model. Despite each of the elements that the models present are not exactly the same in relation to the other model, I find many similarities that helped me to relate each other.

The third step, the identification of the deep structure (values), and its evolution, will be addressed in the fourth section of the essay, joining an analysis if the characters and their identity formation.

Summarized structure of the play

The play comprises a background, a prologue, five scenes and an exodus. I am going to limit my analysis to the second scene of the play, but I will start by summarising the whole play in order to position the piece in the wider text.

The Background

In the background the story of the incestuous relationship between Oedipus and Jocasta (Antigone's progenitors) is briefly explained, as well as the tragedies that accompanied that story: the suicide of Jocasta; the battle between Polineices and Eteocles (brothers of Antigone) for the reign of Thebes, which ends in each of them killing the other; and the ascendancy of Creon (uncle of Antigone) to the throne.

Prologue

The prologue consists of a dialogue between Antigone and Ismene, in which the first explains to the latter, that Creon has decided to bury one of their brothers (Eteocles) and to dishonour Polineices, by not burying him with the rituals. During the dialogue Antigone urges her sister to accompany her in the task of burying Polineices by themselves, and Ismene tries to convince Antigone of the contrary, arguing that they would be breaking Creon's ban, and condemning themselves to a tragic death, as the rest of their family.

Scene 1

Creon explains, in this scene, the reasons he had to make the decision of burying only one of the two brothers and dishonour the other one. The Chorus express that with this decision Creon seems to control all laws, the rules of the living and the dead. After this first dialogue, a guard tells Creon that the corpse of Polineices has been buried by someone, and Creon threatens the guard and says that if the culprit is not found, he will be made responsible for the event. The culprit is assumed to be a man in the dialogue.

Scene 2

This is the scene that I will discursively analyse. In this scene, Antigone is put before Creon, after being found by the guards trying to bury Polineices again, after the guards excavated his body following Creon's orders.

In this scene, Antigone accepts her crime, and express not being sorry, nor ashamed of what she has done. She expresses that the only authority she recognises are the gods, and not Creon. Both characters debate about Antigone's reasons to do what she is doing, and Antigone shows her determination to maintain her position until the last consequences.

Ismene tries to accompany Antigone in her fate, declaring that she participated in the burial, but Antigone does not accept her intentions of sharing the responsibilities of the crime, and rejects Ismene for not being loyal since the beginning.

Ismene tries to convince Creon to change his verdict in relation to Antigone, but he keeps his decision of send her to death.

This scene ends with a reflection of the Chorus of Creon's decision, and foreshadowing problems related to his decision.

Scene 3

In the third scene Haemon, Creon's son and Antigone's fiancé, maintains an intense debate with Creon and tries to convince him of changing his mind in relation to Antigone. The Chorus intervene many times in the discussion to convince Creon to listen to his son, as well as to convince Haemon to listen to his father. Creon dismisses Haemon, and remains strong in his decision, saying that nobody will teach him how to rule Thebes.

In this scene, three important ideas are exchanged between the characters: the notions of democracy versus dictatorial government, age differences between father and son, and the notions of taking sides between Creon and Antigone, in terms of gender.

The Chorus, once more, try to convince Creon to change his mind, and advise him to pay attention to Haemon's desperation.

Scene 4

In this scene, Antigone and the Chorus discuss her fate. She starts showing less security, and express sadness and fear. The Chorus, meanwhile, stresses the responsibility of Antigone in the outcome that is taking her story.

Scene 5

Teiresias, a new character, faces Creon in this scene and tells him a very negative prophecy. He announces that he is going to lose his son, and that it is due to his own arrogance.

Creon asks for advise to the Chorus and they advice him to liberate Antigone and bury Polineices, in order to avoid more tragedies sent by the gods. Creon accepts the Chorus' advice and goes directly to liberate Antigone.

Exodus

In the exodus, the outcome of the story is revealed. Creon's decision of liberating Antigone was made too late. A tragedy occurs, in which not only Antigone, but also Haemon commit suicide. The messenger that is announcing this news emphasises the responsibility of those that are alive for the death of Antigone and Haemon.

After telling the story to Eurydice, Creon's wife also commits suicide, and the messenger gives the news to Creon, now desperate, recognises his responsibility in the tragedy.

The Chorus closes by stating that wisdom is the most important part of true success, suggesting that is wisdom what Creon lacked in facing the whole situation.

The Actants and their Interactions

According to Greimas, the Narrative Structure of a text is characterized by six roles that interact. These six roles are called *actants* (see table 1 in the methodology section).

Antigone is the *subject*, who occupies the principle role in the narration. She is a female teenager, whose strength of character and love for her family impulses her towards the *Object,* which is what she aspires to during the whole play: to bury her brother. In this case, the corpse of Polineices is the object of Antigone. She struggles during the whole play to bury him, first when trying to convince Ismene, then by burying him two times, and in the second scene by explaining to Creon her reasons, and accepting to die instead of changing her mind.

Polineices body, and specifically the act of burying him, offers Antigone an space for agency and dignity. Everybody in her family, except for her and Ismene, has faced a tragic destiny. The people in Thebes, including the Chorus, disrespect her father and mother, who had an incestuous relationship.

Antigone not only loves them, but admires them and respects them. In the act of burying her brother, she is not only doing what she thinks her brother deserves, but she is also making a statement: that her family is honourable and that she prefers to die than to see her family honour destroyed by the power of Creon.

Creon, on the other hand, is the traitor, who impedes Antigone to continue with her project. There are other traitors during the play, for example the guards that find her and denounce her, as well as Ismene, who tries to convince Antigone not to continue with her enterprise in the first scene, and tries to convince Creon to be merciful with Antigone in the second scene.

On the other hand the adjuvants of Antigone are less. She acts alone in most of the play, and is only supported in parts of it by the Chorus, Haemon and Theiresias, who try to make Creon understand that his arrogance will cost many lives. None of the three *adjuvants*, except the Chorus at the end of the fifth scene, refers directly to the object, but in indirect ways they appeal to Creon's reason to avoid what seems unfair to them.

The whole story and its tragic conclusion, happen in a setting where Creon has all the time and power to reverse the destiny of the characters. With only one decision of Creon, all could have enfolded different. In this sense, the authoritarianism and arrogance of Creon, and the struggles of the characters to make him change his mind, represent the *destinator*. The force that puts the rules and values into action, or the ideology of the text, as Greimas describes it, is represented in the *destinator*. In this story, the struggle between the arrogance and authoritarianism of Creon, versus the values of justice and magnanimity that should be the characteristics of a king, take place. It is relevant to say here, that the sin of arrogance was one of the most punished by the gods, as explained previously. These two force the *destinator*, and take place in Creon or around Creon, making him the *receiver*.

IV. Deep Structures:[12] Values of the Play

To help to identify the values of the play the language and the interaction between the characters in the second scene of the play will be analysed using the following table. This is a variation of the Scriven-Gasper analysis table, whereby instead of conducting a detailed argument and meaning analysis, I simply explore some key elements of the dialogues, and identify important words and metaphors that will allow me to understand the deep structure of the story, and more specifically, the way in which the characters' identities are constructed by processes of linking and differentiation.

---

[12] To conduct the entire exercise of narrative and deep structure analysis, many other phases and exercises have to be conducted, for example the construction of the *carré de veridiction*. I am not going to conduct the full exercise with this text, considering that I am using a mix of methods in order to answer an specific question.

Meaning and Argument(s) analysis[13]

Text	Comments (assumptions, suggestions, rewording). Identification of key words and metaphors
CHORUS LEADER What is this? I fear some omen from the gods. I can't deny what I see here so clearly—that young girl there—it's Antigone. Oh you poor girl, daughter of Oedipus, child of such a father, so unfortunate, what's going on? Surely they've not brought you here because you've disobeyed the royal laws, because they've caught you acting foolishly?	The Chorus see Antigone as a foolish girl, not as a woman making conscious decisions. It is emphasized in this part of the text that she is a young girl. Age, besides gender, is another axis of power that she is challenging with her acts. By mentioning Oedipus, the Chorus is implying that Antigone is acting foolishly because she is the 'unfortunate' daughter of Oedipus. In this sense, they are making Oedipus responsible for Antigone acts, diminishing her agency.
GUARD This here's the one who carried out the act. We caught her as she was burying the corpse. Where's Creon? *[The palace doors open. Enter Creon with attendants]* CHORUS LEADER He's coming from the house— and just in time.	
CREON Why have I come "just in time"? What's happening? What is it?	
GUARD My lord, human beings should never take an oath there's something they'll not do—for later thoughts contradict what they first meant. I'd have sworn I'd not soon venture here again. Back then, the threats you made brought me a lot of grief. But there's no joy as great as what we pray for against all hope. And so I have come back, breaking that oath I swore. I bring this girl, captured while she was honouring the grave. This time we did not draw lots. No. This time I was the lucky man, not someone else. And now, my lord, take her for questioning. Convict her. Do as you wish. As for me, by rights I'm free and clear of all this trouble.	The guard feels entitled to talk to Creon, because he found Antigone burying the corpse. He is also relieved because with this finding his life will be spared. He also uses the occasion to express to Creon his previous feelings when he couldn't explain Polineice's burial, as well as his role in the discovering of Antigone. In his explanation, he is trying to obtain the king's empathy, as well as giving himself more importance in front of him.

---

[13] This is not a complete exercise of meaning and argument analysis, but rather a partial exercise based in the Scriven-Gasper table, that allows me to see the text microscopically, to be able to identify the *actants*.

Text	Comments (assumptions, suggestions, rewording). Identification of key words and metaphors
CREON This girl here—how did you catch her? And where? GUARD She was burying that man. Now you know all there is to know. CREON Do you understand just what you're saying? Are your words the truth?	Creon cannot believe what is being said, that Antigone was burying her brother against his mandates. He asks for clarifications and puts the guard's testimony in doubt. For Creon it is easier to believe that the Guard is a liar, or is confused, than to believe that someone close to him, with his blood, has done something that is against his own laws.
GUARD We saw this girl giving that dead man's corpse full burial rites—an act you'd made illegal. Is what I say simple and clear enough?	The use of 'the girl' by the guards, instead of 'the woman', emphasises that she wasn't seen by the guards as a grown up female.
CREON How did you see her, catch her in the act?	Creon still does not believe what the Guard is saying. He knows that it would be easier if the culprit was a man, and better if it was a man not close to him, someone from a lower class maybe. In this perplexity, Creon is demonstrating his own struggle to make sense of the situation. He can't believe that someone from his own class and blood, and specially a young woman, is engaged in a crime that puts her life at risk.
GUARD It happened this way. When we got there, after hearing those awful threats from you, we swept off all the dust covering the corpse, so the damp body was completely bare. Then we sat down on rising ground up wind, to escape the body's putrid rotting stench. We traded insults just to stay awake, in case someone was careless on the job. That's how we spent the time right up 'til noon, when the sun's bright circle in the sky had moved half way and it was burning hot.	The Guard is not only explaining how they found Antigone. He is also using this occasion to let Creon know how his life is, how bad it is to take care of the corpse with the 'putrid rotting stench', and how worried he is to do his work in a proper way. He is trying to gain Creon's recognition.
Then suddenly a swirling wind-storm came, whipping clouds of dust up from the ground, filling the plain—some heaven-sent trouble. In that level place the dirt storm damaged all the forest growth, and the air around was filled with dust for miles. We shut our mouths and just endured this scourge sent from the gods. A long time passed. The storm came to an end. That's when we saw the girl. She was shrieking— a distressing painful cry, just like	This part of the Guard's narrative of the event has a different objective. He is not appealing to Creon's recognition or empathy, but he is positioning the problem on another level, the level of the gods. Antigone is compared with an animal, specifically a bird. She is closer to nature, savage to some extent, according to his view. He is 'de-humanizing' her, seeing her as a strange creature.

Text	Comments (assumptions, suggestions, rewording). Identification of key words and metaphors
a bird who's seen an empty nest, its fledglings gone.	
That's how she was when she saw the naked corpse. She screamed out a lament, and then she swore, calling evil curses down upon the ones who'd done this. Then right away her hands threw on the thirsty dust. She lifted up a finely made bronze jug and then three times poured out her tributes to the dead.	She is not only close to nature and savage, but she is evil. A bad creature that was using her own hands to bury 'the corpse'. The image that comes to mind is one of someone possessed by some evil force. This also coincides with the mention of the gods in the previous paragraphs.
When we saw that, we rushed up right away and grabbed her. She was not afraid at all. We charged her with her previous offence as well as this one. She just kept standing there, denying nothing. That made me happy— though it was painful, too. For it's a joy escaping troubles which affect oneself, but painful to bring evil on one's friends. But all that is of less concern to me than my own safety.	'She was not afraid at all', 'denying nothing'. Here, Antigone's strength, bravery and determination are presented.
CREON You there—you with your face bent down towards the ground, what do you say? Do you deny you did this or admit it?	
ANTIGONE I admit I did it. I won't deny that.	Her strength is showed again, and her determination.
CREON *[to the Guard]* You're dismissed—go where you want. You're free— no serious charges made against you.	
[Exit the Guard. Creon turns to interrogate Antigone] Tell me briefly—not in some lengthy speech— were you aware there was a proclamation forbidding what you did?	Creon still does not believe that Antigone did what she did on purpose. He is trying to find an answer from her; he is surprised and discomforted by the story.
ANTIGONE I'd heard of it. How could I not? It was public knowledge.	
CREON And yet you dared to break those very laws?	
ANTIGONE Yes. Zeus did not announce those laws to me. And Justice living with the gods below sent no such laws for men. I did not think anything which you proclaimed strong enough	Antigone not only accepts the charges, but she disqualifies Creon's authority, and express that the only authority she respects is that of the gods.

Text	Comments (assumptions, suggestions, rewording). Identification of key words and metaphors
to let a mortal override the gods and their unwritten and unchanging laws. They're not just for today or yesterday, but exist forever, and no one knows where they first appeared. So I did not mean to let a fear of any human will lead to my punishment among the gods.	
I know all too well I'm going to die—how could I not?—it makes no difference what you decree. And if I have to die before my time, well, I count that a gain. When someone has to live the way I do, surrounded by so many evil things, how can she fail to find a benefit in death? And so for me meeting this fate won't bring any pain. But if I'd allowed my own mother's dead son to just lie there, an unburied corpse, then I'd feel distress.	She recognises her actions, accepts the consequences and explains her reasons for doing it.
What is going on here does not hurt me at all. If you think what I'm doing now is stupid, perhaps I'm being charged with foolishness by someone who's a fool.	With this phrase she is not only disqualifying Creon's authority but also Creon as a person, by calling him 'a fool'. She feels superior to Creon, and she is not afraid to show it.
CHORUS LEADER It's clear enough the spirit in this girl is passionate— her father was the same. She has no sense of compromise in times of trouble.	Here the Chorus changes their perceptions about Antigone. She is not a foolish girl, but a passionate woman. They also compare her with her father, due to her temper and strength. The unstated conclusion here is that this kind of strength can't be original in a woman, but a heritage of a male: her father.
CREON *[to the Chorus Leader]* But you should know that the most obdurate wills are those most prone to break. The strongest iron tempered in the fire to make it really hard— that's the kind you see most often shatter. I'm well aware the most tempestuous horses are tamed by one small bit. Pride has no place in anyone who is his neighbour's slave.	Creon thinks that Antigone is going to give up. He believes that this strength she is showing is only temporal, and that he is going to recover his power over her.
This girl here was already very insolent in contravening laws we had proclaimed. Here she again displays her proud contempt— having done the act, she now boasts of it. She laughs at what she's done. Well, in this case, if she gets her way and goes unpunished, then she's the man here, not me. No. She may be my sister's child, closer to me by blood than anyone belonging to my house who worships Zeus Herkeios in my home, but	'if she gets her way and goes unpunished, then she's the man here, not me'. The fact that she is a woman is one of the most important issues for Creon. To be a woman means for him to be obedient, not proud, and not rebellious. On the contrary, to be a man is to be powerful and to make decisions.

Text	Comments (assumptions, suggestions, rewording). Identification of key words and metaphors
she'll not escape my harshest punishment— her sister, too, whom I accuse as well.	
She had an equal part in all their plans to do this burial. Go summon her here. I saw her just now inside the palace, her mind out of control, some kind of fit. *[Exit attendants into the palace to fetch Ismene]*	
When people hatch their mischief in the dark their minds often convict them in advance betraying their treachery. How I despise a person caught committing evil acts who then desires to glorify the crime.	Creon explains that the crime is not the only reason for his condemnation, but the fact that she accepts it and does not ask for clemency. He wants her to ask for his for-giveness.
ANTIGONE Take me and kill me—what more do you want?	She won't apologize, she is sure of what she is doing.
CREON Me? Nothing. With that I have everything.	
ANTIGONE Then why delay? There's nothing in your words that I enjoy—may that always be the case! And what I say displeases you as much. But where could I gain greater glory than setting my own brother in his grave? All those here would confirm this pleases them if their lips weren't sealed by fear—being king, which offers all sorts of various benefits, means you can talk and act just as you wish.	Antigone expresses her feelings about Creon in a very open way. She expresses not being afraid of him, and goes further by stating that she is not the only one that disagrees with Creon.
CREON In all of Thebes, you're the only one who looks at things that way.	Creon needs the approval of people to be more secure in his role.
ANTIGONE They share my views, but they keep their mouths shut just for you.	Antigone is not only disapproving of him, but also creating more insecurities within him.
CREON These views of yours—so different from the rest— don't they bring you any sense of shame?	'This views of you' 'shame'. This is also im-portant, he sees Antigone as a strange crea-ture, as something different from the rest, perhaps more importantly, different from other women. To be different should be a source of shame according to Creon.
ANTIGONE No—there's nothing shameful in honouring my mother's children.	This section of the dialogue presents each of the arguments. Antigone appeals to her blood ties with Polineices to explain her

Text	Comments (assumptions, suggestions, rewording). Identification of key words and metaphors
CREON You had a brother killed fighting for the other side. ANTIGONE Yes- from the same mother and father, too. CREON Why then give tributes which insult his name? ANTIGONE But his dead corpse won't back up what you say. CREON Yes, he will, if you give equal honours to a wicked man. ANTIGONE But the one who died was not some slave—it was his own brother. CREON Who was destroying this country—the other one went to his death defending it ANTIGONE That may be, but Hades still desires equal rites for both. CREON A good man does not wish what we give him to be the same an evil man receives. ANTIGONE Who knows? In the world below perhaps such actions are no crime. CREON An enemy can never be a friend, not even in death.	decision. She is not looking for Creon's understanding or mercy she is making a point. And her point is that Creon's logic is irrelevant to her, because to her what matters is the love and the blood she shared with her brother.
ANTIGONE But my nature is to love. I cannot hate.	'my nature is to love'. Here she appeals to nature. This is a very interesting phrase because the Guard described her as an animal, and Creon does not see her behaviour as rational (closer to nature than to the rationality of the males). She is using this 'naturalization' in her favour. The depiction of women as care takers by nature, and as essential different than men, is contained in this phrase.
CREON Then go down to the dead. If you must love, love them. No woman's going to govern me—no, no—not while I'm still alive.	What is more important to Creon is to maintain his status, especially in relation to woman. He does not accept that a young woman can be stronger than him, accepting her own death in order to maintain her ideals.

Text	Comments (assumptions, suggestions, rewording). Identification of key words and metaphors
[Enter two attendants from the house bringing Ismene to Creon] CHORUS LEADER Ismene's coming. There—right by the door. She's crying. How she must love her sister! From her forehead a cloud casts its shadow down across her darkly flushing face— and drops its rain onto her lovely cheeks.	Ismene, Antigone's sister, enters the room crying. She is beautiful, loving, and tender. She is more similar to a typical woman, not a 'manly' girl like Antigone.
CREON You there—you snake lurking in my house, sucking out my life's blood so secretly. I'd no idea I was nurturing two pests, who aimed to rise against my throne. Come here. Tell me this—do you admit you played your part in this burial, or will you swear an oath you had no knowledge of it?	Creon call Antigone and Ismene 'pests' and 'snakes'. These are two metaphors through which he is comparing them with astute, silent and bad creatures. A snake acts calmly, the pest attacks in a silent way, but both things are extremely dangerous and are traitors, not doing their acts in an open way.
ISMENE I did it— I admit it, and she'll back me up. So I bear the guilt as well. ANTIGONE No, no— justice will not allow you to say that. You didn't want to. I didn't work with you. ISMENE But now you're in trouble, I'm not ashamed of suffering, too, as your companion.	Ismene attempts to share the responsibility of the crime with Antigone, but her attempt is strongly rejected by Antigone.
ANTIGONE Hades and the dead can say who did it—I don't love a friend whose love is only words.	Antigone does not respect Ismene, because she is not as courageous and brave as her. She doesn't want Ismene to share the responsibility, nor the moral glory of her acts.
ISMENE You're my sister. Don't dishonour me. Let me respect the dead and die with you.	
ANTIGONE Don't try to share my death or make a claim to actions which you did not do. I'll die— and that will be enough.	For Antigone, to die for her ideals is part of the consequences of being responsible for her actions. She does not see Ismene as a responsible woman. She is implying that they are not 'equals'.
ISMENE But if you're gone, what is there in life for me to love?	Ismene shows fragility. She wants to die with Antigone, not for her commitment with her and her values, but because she doesn't want to stay alone.
ANTIGONE Ask Creon. He's the one you care about.	

Text	Comments (assumptions, suggestions, rewording). Identification of key words and metaphors
ISMENE Why hurt me like this? It doesn't help you.	
ANTIGONE If I am mocking you, it pains me, too.	
ISMENE Even now is there some way I can help?	Ismene shows again that she is not sure of what she is doing. She doesn't have a serious commitment to any cause nor does she have an opinion. She is only afraid of what is happening and wants to help. She is even putting in Antigone's hands the decision of the way she is going to participate. She can't decide by herself.
ANTIGONE Save yourself. I won't envy your escape.	Antigone does not appreciate people that escape. She does not prefer her sister's life.
ISMENE I feel so wretched leaving you to die.	
ANTIGONE But you chose life—it was my choice to die.	'Choices': Antigone emphasises that each of them is responsible for their own decisions.
ISMENE But not before I'd said those words just now.	
ANTIGONE Some people may approve of how you think - others will believe my judgement's good.	There is not one truth; the two sisters are just different.
ISMENE But the mistake's the same for both of us.	
ANTIGONE Be brave. You're alive. But my spirit died some time ago so I might help the dead	Why is her spirit dead? Is it because she lost her brothers? Is it because she knew that the way she has lived her life, with her strong views, was going to end up putting her in opposition to power?
CREON I'd say one of these girls has just revealed how mad she is—the other's been that way since she was born.	Creon differentiates the two women here. One is perturbed, the other is mad by nature, since birth.
ISMENE My lord, whatever good sense people have by birth no longer stays with them once their lives go wrong—it abandons them.	With the word 'my lord' Ismene recognises Creon's authority. She is asking for mercy indirectly, she is suggesting that the harsh conditions in which they have lived are causing Antigone's behaviour.
CREON In your case, that's true, once you made your	Creon continues differentiating the sisters. One is wicked (Antigone), the other made a

Text	Comments (assumptions, suggestions, rewording). Identification of key words and metaphors
choice to act in evil ways with wicked people.	bad decision (Ismene).
ISMENE How could I live alone, without her here?	Ismene is appealing to Creon's mercy, showing desperation. She doesn't want to be alone.
CREON Don't speak of her being here. Her life is over.	
ISMENE You're going to kill your own son's bride?	Ismene continues trying to convince Creon appealing to his feelings. In this case, making him think of his son.
CREON Why not? There are other fields for him to plough.	Creon displays his stubbornness and hardness. Additionally, he compares Antigone with a field, a thing, his son is a man, he can find another 'thing' to 'use' in the future.
ISMENE No one will make him a more loving wife than she will.	
CREON I have no desire my son should have an evil wife.	Creon thinks that he can decide on behalf of his son, that he knows better.
ANTIGONE Dearest Haemon, how your father wrongs you.	Antigone implies that Creon doesn't know his own son.
CREON I've had enough of this— you and your marriage.	
ISMENE You really want that? You're going to take her from him?	Ismene doesn't give up. She recognises that she won't make Antigone change her attitude, so she is trying with Creon.
CREON No, not me. Hades is the one who'll stop the marriage.	
CHORUS LEADER So she must die—that seems decided on. CREON Yes—for you and me the matter's closed.	The Chorus is concluding, after analysing what has just happened, that everything has been decided.
CHORUS Those who live without tasting evil have happy lives—for when the gods shake a house to its foundations, then inevitable disasters	The Chorus closes this scene, explaining that what is happening is the product of the those who have tasted evil. Disasters are coming, and there is nothing to do to impede it.

Text	Comments (assumptions, suggestions, rewording). Identification of key words and metaphors
strike, falling upon whole families, just as a surging ocean swell running before cruel Thracian winds across the dark trench of the sea churns up the deep black sand and crashes headlong on the cliffs, which scream in pain against the wind.	
I see this house's age-old sorrows, the house of Labdakos' children, sorrows falling on the sorrows of the dead, one generation bringing no relief to generations after it—some god strikes at them—on and on without an end. For now the light, which has been shining over the last roots of Oedipus' house, is being cut down with a bloody knife belonging to the gods below—for foolish talk and frenzy in the soul.	The Chorus is implying here that Antigone and/or Creon's foolishness and frenzy souls are the cause of the disasters that are about to happen.
Oh Zeus, what human trespasses can check your power? Even Sleep, who casts his nets on everything, cannot master that—nor can the months, the tireless months the god's control. A sovereign who cannot grow old, you hold Olympus as your own, in all its glittering magnificence. From now on into all future time, as in the past, your law holds firm. It never enters lives of human beings in its full force without disaster. Hope ranging far and wide brings comfort to many men—but then hope can deceive, delusions born of volatile desire. It comes upon the man who's ignorant until his foot is seared in burning fire. Someone's wisdom has revealed to us this famous saying—sometimes the gods lure a man's mind forward to disaster, and he thinks evil's something good. But then he lives only the briefest time free of catastrophe.	The Chorus confirm that a tragedy is coming, because god sees everything, and what has happened is not good for god. A man mind (Creon), is confused, he didn't take the proper decision, and now his life will never be free of catastrophe.

Values, Identities and Power

Through the previous analysis of this scene, the values of the story are identified. In the first place, the values of authoritarianism, arrogance, obstinacy and pride, are not only expressed in the character of Creon, but also in the character of Antigone, in parts of the narrative.

The message of the author here is that a good king, a king who pleases the gods, should be magnanimous, flexible and just, not arrogant, obstinate and authoritarian. This is linked with the political situation of Greece in the time of the play, in which the political class (to which Sophocles was close, and at times a participant of), was very committed to the values of democracy.

In the case of Antigone, the main character, the fact that she is not only a hero, but also bears contradictions, being both arrogant and intransigent at times, offers a complexity in her role by which Sophocles is breaking from the typical female image (which is presented by Ismene). Antigone is active, brave, tough, stubborn, determined. Her voice can be seen as the voice of a man, and not of a young girl. In this way Sophocles is questioning the existence of only one model of femininity.

This complexity is also present in the character of Creon. He is not only the powerful authoritarian king; he is also a vulnerable man that needs the approval of Antigone and of the people of Thebes, to feel secure. At the same time, he is so afraid of Antigone that he has to put her to death, because she is the only one able to question his authority. *'[...] if she gets her way and goes unpunished, then she's the man here, not me. […] No woman's going to govern me— no, no—not while I'm still alive'.* Creon needs Antigone to reinforce his authority. He needs to send a message to the rest of Thebes, that he is a man and to be a man is powerful. Antigone not only represents a threat to his authority as a king, (civil disobedience), but she is a threat to his authority as a man, and also as a grown up person. She is a woman, and also a young person, who questions the power of the male adult. This is what terrifies Creon, that an apparently vulnerable girl shows more strength than him. Sophocles is questioning the model of masculinity with this presentation of Creon; by showing that Creon's demonstrations of bravery are at the same time his demonstrations of a profound weakness of character.

The Chorus is also an interesting character, because it changes its perception of the story during the scene. From seeing Antigone as a 'foolish girl', they become aware of her strength and acknowledge her determination and bravery. *'t's clear enough the spirit in this girl is passionate— her father was the same. She has no sense of compromise in times of trouble'.* In this comparison with her fa-

ther, they are suggesting that Antigone is not fully feminine, but has a 'masculine' behaviour, looking more like his father than like his mother and sister. This is a process of 'linking' with the father that helps in understanding Antigone's identity.

The character of Ismene, offers the possibility to reinforce the identity of Antigone, by a process of differentiation. Ismene is the female model, the beautiful, crying, passive, simple girl that doesn't want to be alone and doesn't know what to do in order to change the direction of the events. Antigone is her opposite. She has values that she will defend to death: love, dignity, independence, loyalty, and commitment. This difference between the two female characters is expressed in Antigone's rejection of Ismene's attempts of solidarity, when she says to Ismene: '*I don't love a friend whose love is only words*'.

Antigone with that phrase, is not only rejecting Ismene for showing fragility and lack of commitment, but at the same time she is making clear that despite that they are sisters, they are radically different from each other. This is a process of differentiation from the 'femininity' of Ismene to reinforce Antigon's character. This process is also evident in the phrase: '*But you chose life—it was my choice to die*'. Here two elements are very important. First, the need of Antigone to put distance from her sister's behaviour (differentiation). And second, the emphasis of choices and responsibilities.

One very important consequence of the introduction of the 'third actor' in the plays of Sophocles, is that the characters can be more complex, because they interact more, and that they can exercise their agency in a more clear way, with less need for the chorus to explain what the character wanted, or thought. This is particularly relevant in this story because the ones making choices are two women. Both of them are exercising their agency in the story, and in this exercise they are taking different paths. What is different in Antigone, is that she accepts the responsibilities that coming with her decisions. She sees her freedom as attached to responsibilities, that is what Ismene is more scared about. This is a key element of Sophocles's message, that women can bear responsibilities and consequences of them.

V. Conclusions

Antigone's powerful story offers interesting material to analyse women's agency and the construction of femininity and masculinity. Antigone, the heroine of the story, is a passionate, strong, rebellious and complex woman. She challenges the authority of the king as well as the roles that the society of her time assigned to her as a woman. However, she also reinforces the

naturalization of some characteristics that have been seen as intrinsically feminine, such as their nature for love: "But my nature is to love. I cannot hate", and her commitment to take care of others (Polineices burial), instead of thinking about herself and saving her life. This can be interpreted as bravery and coherence with her own values, but also as an ultimate sacrifice for others (a man).

In this sense, even though she seems more agentive than her sister Ismene, her agency is costing her own life.

Ismene, on the other side, is portrayed as a more typical woman. She is beautiful and fresh, she doesn't disobey the king, and she also loves her sister and wants to save her from dying. At the same time, through her choices during the play, she could be interpreted as a coward, a passive and scared woman, or as a more rational and less instinctive woman. From her position, she has more space to negotiate with power and preserve her life, because she does not represents a threat to Creon.

Sophocles is not offering easy answers. He is questioning (perhaps without realizing it), some of the most fundamentals sociological dilemmas (structure and agency). However, what he does offer very clearly is that Antigone and Ismene wouldn't be who they are without each other. They build their own identities in relation to one another.

Sophocles, with this two female characters, along with the rest of the characters, is showing that the binaries that are often used to distinguish men and women, such as body/mind, reason/nature, emotion/rationality, active/passive, can be also found within men and within women, and in this sense he is questioning not only the roles assigned to women in the society of his time, but also the assumptions in relation to their inferior nature.

Unfortunately, the play remains relevant. The struggles of men and women to contest patriarchy are as old as patriarchy itself, and while the systems and forms of oppression against women and other groups have changed, the oppression has not yet disappeared.

References

Dickason, A. (1976) 'Anatomy and Destiny: The Role of Biology in Plato's Views of Women', in C.C. Gould and M.W. Wartofsky (eds.) *Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation.* New York: G.P. Putnam's Son.

Freeman, C. (1999) *The Greek Achievement: The Foundation of the Western World.* New York: Viking Press.

Hansen, L. (2006) *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. London: Routledge.

Johnstone, B. (2001) 'Discourse Analysis and Narrative' in D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen and H. Hamilton (eds) *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, pp. 635-649. Oxford: Blackwell.

Pomeroy, S. (1975). *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity*. New York: Schocken.

Perseus Digital library (n.d) 'An Overview of Classical Greek History from Mycenae to Alexander'. Accessed 6 July 2010 <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0009:chapter%3D10:section%3D2:subsection%3D4>

Sommerstein, A. (2002) *Greek Drama and Dramatists*. London: Routledge.

Titscher, S., M. Meyer, R. Wodak and E. Vetter (2000) *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*. London*:* Sage Publications.

Van Dijk, T. (2009) 'Critical Discourse Studies: A Sociocognitive Approach' in R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis,* pp. 62-86. London: Sage.

Wooffitt, R. (2005) *Conversation Analysis and Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage Publications.

Women can be Priests (n.d.) Greek Philosophy on the Inferiority of Women. Accessed 5 July 2010 <http://www.womenpriests.org/traditio/infe_gre.asp>

4

Fair Voting Right Distribution and Alternative Supplementing Resources: A Proposal to Enhance IMF's Authority and Legitimacy

GOSHIME YIBRAHU WOLDEAREGAY

Argument: One of the major criticisms frequently raised against the IMF is the issue of weighted voting system through which the major industrial powers exercise greater power over major decisions favoring their interest in the institution and the relative under-representation and powerlessness of the majority of its member states which are developing countries. While the limitations associated with unbalanced voting systems are several, the need for reform is an imperative alternative to sustain the institutions role and importance in managing global financial problems. A viable reform alternative to this problem, among other things, depends on restructuring the institutions voting system with a fair distribution of voting rights among all member countries. Yet, the viability of this restructuring, in turn largely depend on or requires finding alternative sources for the institutions existing supplementing resources, as the existing resource supplementing mechanism is one of the major reasons used justify the current weighted voting system in the institution. A reform along these lines will not only increase the negotiation power of the majority of its developing countries members, but also give a greater authority for the institution and enhance its legitimacy.

Introduction

The IMF Current Voting System: An Overview

The central feature of the IMF's current governance structure is its economically determined weighted voting system, where each member country's vote is determined by a quota based on its position in the global econ-

omy (Woodward, 2007: 1). This quota system determines each country's financial contribution to, and access to borrowing from the Fund. In other words, the governance structure in the IMF is based upon a system that relates financial contribution of member states to voting powers in the Fund (Blomberg, 2006:1). This is a fundamental design feature meant to reflect the differences among countries in their contribution of resources (Leech, 2002: 6). However, several questions were raised in relation to this justification, including, whether the resulting power inequality over actual decisions is precisely what was intended for the relation between power and contribution (ibid). Studies undertaken on many organizations with weighted voting system show that actual power inequality has been found to be far greater than the nominal voting power inequality among members of the same organization, hence mere observation of the later may give a false picture of the power distribution. In an organization that makes decisions by a weighted voting system there is no simple and direct relationship between formal/nominal and actual voting weight (ibid).

The results of these studies show that, members who have large weighting vote posses a disproportionately greater voting power and the other members actually have less power proportionately. This means that countries with large voting power have some sort of 'invisible power' due to the relative advantage they have owing to the very structure of the organization. To investigate the reasons behind this hidden bias is an important aspect of understanding the limitations of the institution's current weighted voting system and governance structure. In some cases, individual voting members even may lack any voting power at all despite possessing a clearly considerable number of votes in the nominal distribution of votes (Leech, 2002: 6). Hence, richer economies contribute large resources and have a substantial influence over important decisions. Particularly, many scholars argued that the current voting system gives a disproportionate influence to the United States at the expense of all other member states (Leech and Leech, 2003). To investigate each county's real voting power Leech and Leech for example used a voting power analysis grounded on the mathematical theory of games, and found that a county's real voting power just does not lie in the nominal number of votes it has in the Fund, but in its ability to use the number of votes it has decisions taken by voting. According to the results of their analysis, for example, the US with 17.1% of the total nominal votes in IMF has at least 24% real voting power, and all other countries have slightly less power than their nominal voting weight (ibid). This distribution of voting power thus provides a framework within which negotiations in the institution take place among countries prior to decision-making.

In addition, though basic votes significantly increase the votes of a few small economies i.e. compared with a purely quota-based voting system, "the failure to increase their relative size after 1944, even as Fund quotas have increased by a factor of 37 and membership only by a factor of four, has greatly reduced their significance" (Woodward, 2007: 2). Basic votes currently account for only 2.1% of the votes in the IMF, compared with 11.3% original (IMF, 2003). The relative decline in the basic vote "has substantially shifted the balance of power in favor of large-quota developed countries (Woodward, 2007). As a result of all these, the voice of small/developing countries in IMF discussions has been significantly weakened and their participation in decision-making made negligible".

Governance Structure and Formal Decision-Making in the IMF

The IMF has two major decision-making bodies: the board of governors and the executive board. While the board of governors is vested with all powers, and it delegates all its powers to the executive board authority except those it specified to reserve for itself, the executive board is concerned with the general operations of the Fund (Leech, 2002: 11). The powers that are reserved for the board of governors are expressed by the article of agreement and relate to matters of fundamental-political nature that may have significant economic consequences (ibid: 12). Some of these powers include admitting a new member country, requiring a member country to withdraw, approve quota revision, and decide over the number of executive directors who are elected. Being primarily responsible for exercising power delegated to it, the executive board has also the important role of making recommendations to the board of governors where the later is to take decisions (Woodward: 2002). The board of governors consists of one governor appointed/nominated by every member state (often the minister of finance or governor of the central bank of that country) and meets twice in a year. Most decisions in the board of governors are often taken in the form of resolutions through a simple majority vote cast system. However, decisions over certain matters require an 85% special majority. A description on IMF governance structure summarizes the decision-making in the board as follows:

> The board makes decisions by consensus. Optimally this comprises a unanimous decision by all EDs [Executive Directors]. However, often there are important differences of view among the membership, for example between debtor and creditor interest. The IMF's rules and regulations prescribe that "the chair shall ordinarily ascertain the sense of the meeting, in lieu of a for-

mal vote", effectively seeking to obtain the broadest spectrum of support in terms of numbers of EDs and voting share, provided that if put to a vote there would be the needed majority (depending on the decision being made, a majority of 51%, 66 or 85% is required). The chair urges the board to consider matters at least until a broad majority has emerged on the issue under discussion. Where no consensus can be reached a simple majority of the voting power can quickly be achieved by a collective agreement among the G-7 chairs and a few other directors. (http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-351636)

Major Limitations of the Current/Weighted Voting System and Governance Structure in the IMF

There are both general and more specific criticisms that are raised against the present voting system of the IMF. One of the general consequences of this weighted voting system is that, while the developed countries accounting only 20% of the funds members and 15 % of total world population enjoy a substantial majority of votes (above 60%), developing countries are under-represented in relation to their share taken both in number of membership and population (Woodward, 2007: 2). For example, Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has only 4.6% of the total seats in the Fund, which is much less than US, Japan, Germany, France or United Kingdom. In contrast, Luxembourg with a half million population has twice as many votes as Ethiopia which has over 70 million people (ibid). Seen from a political economic perspective this big disparity in voting power reflects the distribution conflict between developed and developing countries (Blomberg, 2006: 1). In addition the weighted voting system provides only the United States, or the rest of the G7 countries excluding the United States, to have adequate votes to block decisions over the 18 policy areas that require a majority vote of 85%.

> Special majorities have been used to block decisions supported by an absolute majority of votes on increases in the size of the IMF (that is, quota increases) and on SDR allocations, sales of the IMF's vast gold holdings and policies on access to IMF resources. The special-majority requirement has ha the effect of inhibiting the discussion of even theimportant and difficult issues. (Buira, 2003c: 18)

On the contrary, the whole of Sub-Saharan African countries and all of the other low income developing countries together with India represent almost one-third of the Fund's membership and 40 % of the world 's population, but have only 8.3% of the total vote. This is almost half of what is

required for blocking a given vote on the strict qualified majority requirement.

Specific Asymmetries Relating to IMF's Weighted Voting System and Governance Structure

Asymmetries in the Constituencies

The power disparity between developing and developed countries in the executive board due to the weighted voting system is surrounded by a number of features relating to the board's operation. One of these is the constituencies (Woodward, 2007). Representation in the executive board reflects the weighted votes of members. While countries with the five largest quotas have the right to appoint their own executive directors in the Fund, the other directors are elected by the board of governors every two years through a constituency system. Currently, there are three other countries—China, Russia and Saudi Arabia—each able to form a constituency in their own right in the Fund and therefore able to elect its own executive director (ibid).

As highlighted above, a power analysis by Leech and Leech (2003) indicated that the weighted voting system gives more power for countries which have larger quota than their nominal vote shares. Most developing countries are found with the constituencies, and since the developed countries are also included in these constituencies the relative power of the developing countries to vote over important decisions in the constituencies will be undermined by the weighted voting system. This further exaggerates the under-representation of developing countries due to the inability of the executive directors to divide their votes, especially because the director's stand will normally reflect his/her county or else the majority of the votes in the constituency (Buira, 2003b). In addition, due to their very large votes, developed countries also tend to dominate the executive director's position.

Asymmetries in Accountability

Even though executive directors are elected by and effectively cast the votes of particular member states in the executive board, there are practically no means for holding them accountable within the Fund itself, or among the constituencies' members, once a director is elected (Woods and Lombardi, 2006). Furthermore, even as the appointed director remains under the control of the appointing government "a member that elected or helped to elect an Executive Director has no right to terminate his service" (Gold, 1974).

This means that, the Executive Directors are not representatives of these countries; rather they are officials of the Fund's Bank (Woodward: 2002) "The fact that [an Executive Director] has been elected by certain member states does not establish an official obligation for him to defer to their views or to cast his vote in accordance with their instructions" (Gianviti, 1999: 48).

However, to take positions in board meetings, appointed directors usually receive and follow instructions from the governments that appoint them and also meet the sanction of removal. Similarly, while some elected directors also receive instructions from their constituencies, in reality they have greater prudence as to whether they follow the instructions or how they interpret them. For them consultation with constituency members is usually informal, which makes the representation of the constituencies' views and interests more indirect and less secured (Woods and Lombardi, 2006). "Since all appointed Directors are from developed countries, the different relationship of appointed and elected Directors to the governments which appoint and elect them further shifts the balance of representation away from developing countries (and other developed countries), as their interests are less directly and reliably represented" (Woodward, 2007: 5).

Coordination

Another important issue in the political dynamics of executive board (like other decision making bodies within the Fund), which further increases the power disparity between the developed and developing countries is the coordination among groups of directors (Woodward, 2007: 6). This is primarily, because coordination among developing countries is more limited, less cohesive and less effective compared to that of the developed countries (Woods and Lombardi, 2006). In fact, the executive directors of developing countries periodically meet as the 'group of 11' or G11 to talk about their respective positions, and their governors also discuss in other informal meeting. But the diverse nature of these country's interests in several areas, surrounded by problems of workload and intra-constituency coordination, make the group's coordination effort very limited (Woods and Lombardi, 2006). Therefore, given all these limitations among developing countries in terms of coordination, it is almost impossible for them to achieve a decision favoring their position in the board. "'In total, the G11 Directors account for only 30.4% of the votes in the IMF, and in order to secure even a simple majority in the board would need, not only to be unanimous in their posi-

tion, but also to secure the support of at least five of the other six non-G7 Directors" (Woodward, 2007: 6).

System Maintenance

In addition to is its disempowering effect on developing country's membership within the Fund the IMF weighted voting system results in another major problem at the systemic level. Since those countries with greater power in the Fund tend to use their power to maintain aspects of the existing system that benefit them, developing countries who are benefiting little/no from the existing system and who have little power in the Fund have a hard chance to change the status quo (Woodward, 2007: 7). Moreover, Woodward argues that this problem becomes even more difficult when "the beneficiaries have a substantial absolute majority of the total votes, and the most powerful single player has a *de facto* veto over any decision which would substantially change the distribution of power" (ibid). Woodward referred to this particular problem resulting from weighted voting as 'Systemic Inertia' to suggest that the voting system allows the developed countries to defend the existing system from any action that tries to change it.

Therefore, in the context of the current IMF weighted voting system the obstacles for realizing institutional change are very significant. Even some scholars have gone to the extent of arguing that any possible change is subject to the will of the current dominant stakeholders in the Fund. "Meaningful change can only be made with the consent of the industrial countries, which hold a majority of the voting power in the IMF Executive Board and of course in the IMF Board of Governors. And these members currently see little benefit in changing the status quo" (Rustomjee, 2005).

Restructuring Fair Voting Distribution and Alternative Sources for supplementing IMF Resources

As highlighted in the introductory discussion, one of the major reasons for the existence of the weighted voting system in the IMF is the different level of financial contribution member states make to the Fund. Many scholars and groups have criticized such voting system and insisted on the need for reforming the IMF governance structure as well as its voting rights systems. While there are several reform proposals relating to the overall governance structure and procedures in decisions making, due to the nature of the problem I want to address in this paper I will only emphasize on the fair or equal representation reform proposal along side with the major criteria and condition required to realize it. There is a greater consensus among various inde-

pendent observers that the current distribution of voting rights in the IMF lacks legitimacy. This is not only because it does not meet the minimum criteria for equity due to erosion of 'basic votes' but also because it no longer reflects the increasing economic importance of most its member countries (Akyüz, 2005: 19). The current distribution of voting rights, together with the special majority need for certain key decisions, gives a veto power for America in issues such as adjustment of quotas, balance of payments assistance, the sale of IMF gold reserves, and allocation of SDRs (ibid). In the immediate years that followed the second world war there was enough justification for the greater degree of power possessed by the U.S., because at the time it was the only important creditor to the rest of the world and also the only effective creditor to the Fund. "However, now not only the United States is the single largest debtor in the world, but it is only one of the 45 creditor countries at the IMF" (ibid).

I argue that to address the problems associated with and resulting from the weighted voting system two important reforms are important. First, the special majority requirement needs to be changed so as to take away the veto power enjoyed by the Fund's major stakeholders over important decisions. Second, and more importantly, the Fund should focus on redistribution of voting rights so as to give a fair representation for developing countries. According to Akyüz (2005), this later reform can be achieved by increasing the share of the basic votes for developing countries in the total voting rights, or by redistributing quotas based on PPP. Obviously such restructuring meant to change power inequalities will disadvantage some groups. For example, Akyüz stated that the European Union, which jointly possesses almost twice as many votes as America, would be the main loser. In fact, the Union's current representation is highly unfair as its share of vote is far above the level justified by the share of the region in the world economy (Akyüz, 2005: 20). A particular proposal which calls for redistributing basic votes to the original share of near 11% of the total votes and distributing quota-based votes on the basis of Purchasing Power Parity, the share of the developed countries would fall from above 62% to 51%, whereas the share developing countries would increase from around 30% to 42% (ibid).

Given that a reform is undertaken along the above specified lines, there is no doubt that the Fund will move an important step ahead in its governance structure. Such a reform will remedy several anomalies in the Fund, such as Canada having equal number of votes as China, or smaller countries in Europe such as Belgium and the Netherlands having more votes than

India, Brazil, or Mexico (Akyüz, 2005: 20). This in turn will make the institution more democratic and participatory.

Scholars also note that despite their importance in changing the overall structure of the institution such reforms will not have a significant impact on the political power of the major stakeholders in the Fund or the reforms will not ease the imbalance between the Fund's creditors and debtors (Akyüz, 2005; Woodward, 2007). And the major obstacle for such changes in power relations is the mode in which the institution currently receives its funding, which is subject to the political negotiation of few dominant member countries.

Akyüz (2005) argues that the problem of governance in the IMF and the lack of equal treatment of member countries "cannot be resolved as long as Fund resources depend on the discretion of a smaller number of its stakeholders". Countries with reserve currencies are the major creditors to the Fund and their quota contributions serve as the only working international assets, since national currencies paid by developing countries are not acceptable. In addition, the sources of borrowing for the Fund are not international financial markets, but rather a very small number of developed countries. But this does not mean that the developing countries don't provide credits to the Fund. In this regard, Akyüz also notes that the distinction between creditor and debtor countries is not the same as that of developing and developed countries. Both the developed and developing countries contribute to the funds financial resources. However, as distinct from the developed countries, the net financial position of most developing countries in the Fund is highly unstable. This is the principal reason that allowed the major/dominant stakeholders in the Fund to use it as an instrument to advance their separate and distinct interests. Hence, it can be argued that a genuine attempt to reform the institution should start from finding alternatives to the sources of it resources.

> A reform that would translate the Fund into a truly multilateral institution responsible for international monetary and financial stability with equal rights and obligations of all its members, de facto as well as de jure, would call for, inter alia, an international agreement on sources of finance that do not depend on the discretion of a handful of countries as well as a clear separation of multilateral financial arrangements from bilateral creditor-debtor relations. (Akyüz, 2005: 20)

Scholars have also tried to identify specific possible sources of multilateral finance. For example, Atkinson (2003) and Wahl (2005) indicated that based on international agreements sources of multilateral finance could be

different sorts of international taxes such as environmental taxes, currency transaction taxes (known as the Tobin Tax), arms trade taxes and other similar types of taxes which can be applied by all parties involved in the agreement concerning the transactions and activities to be taxed. The common characteristic of all of these taxes is that they are all 'sin taxes' which can maximize the Fund's revenues by discouraging some international 'public bads' including financial speculation, armed conflict and violence or environmental problems (Akyüz, 2005: 21). Actually, revenues obtained in these forms will not be adequate enough to meet the Fund's total resource requirement, especially for liquidity provision; however, these revenues can serve to meet the needs for development grant to developing countries or to the provision of global public goods, thereby also enhancing the Fund's legitimacy.

As proposed by many scholars, a more proper and neutral source of support for international liquidity provision could be the SDR (Special Drawing Rights) (Akyüz, 2005). In fact, under the current arrangements the IMF may allocate the SDRs to its member countries based on their quota shares, but not to itself (Woodward, 2007; Akyüz, 2005). However, in such arrangements members receive SDRs through free exchanges and by the Fund assigning members with strong external positions to purchase SDRs from members with weak external position. In this case, when a members share rise above or fall below its allocation it earns or pays interest respectively. The important step to make the SDRs a proper source of international liquidity provision is, therefore, changing the present arrangement so as to enable the SDR to substitute quotas and the other major sources of funding for the institution, namely the GAB and NAP. As a means to sustain this source as a reliable source of funding for the institution, the IMF also should be given the mandate to issue the SDR to itself (to a certain agreed level) and this should increase across time with the increase in world trade (ibid). In addition, countries access for SDR should be based on curtained determined limits, which should grow with the increase in world trade. Generally, based on mutual agreements and consensus among member countries, the SDR has a greater potential to serve as a universally acceptable means of payments under both private and public institutions (Akyüz, 2005). While more study is needed to work out on the several issues associated with replacing the SDR as the main source of funding for the IMF, the first and most important step that would lead to the achievement of the intended objectives lies on reaching agreement to substitute the traditional sources of funding by the SDR. This is a major requirement for the effectiveness of restructuring the institution along fair voting rights distribu-

tion thereby avoiding the democratic problems associated with the traditional funding sources which primarily resulted from the politically charged negotiations dominated by the developed countries (ibid). Recalling the earlier discussion, if the two reforms regarding the governance structure and voting rights are supplemented by a reform to substitute the major source of funding with the SDR there will be a greater prospect for the Fund to act in the interest of all member countries, rather than serving as an instrument for few developed countries. This is crucial for enhancing both the authority and legitimacy of the Fund avoiding the 'democratic deficiency' and lack of fairness that has been essentially characterizing the institution for several decades.

References

Atkinson, B. ed. (2003) *New Sources of Development Finance*. UNU-WIDER Studies in Development Economics. New York, Oxford University Press.

Akyüz, Y. (2005) Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board. G-24 Discussion Paper Series. No. 38, November 2005. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. United Nations.

Blomberg, B. (2006) The Political Economy of IMF Voting Power. Claremont McKenna College, University of California, San Diego

Bretton Woods Project, (2005) Decision making at the IMF. Available at: http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-351636

Buira, A. (2003a) The Governance of the International Monetary Fund. In: Kaul I, Conceição P, le Goulven K and Mendoza RU, eds. *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization*. UNDP, New York, Oxford University Press

Buira A (2003b) "Introduction". In Ariel Buira (ed.) *Challenges to the IMF and World Bank: Developing Country Perspectives*. London: Anthem Press.

Buira, A. (2003c) An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, In: Buira A, ed. *Challenges to the World Bank and IMF: Developing Country Perspectives*. London, Anthem Press.

Gianviti, F. (1999) Decision-Making in the International Monetary Fund. In: IMF, ed. *Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law*. Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund.

Gold, J. (1974) Membership and Non-membership in the International Monetary Fund: A Study in International Law and Organization. Washington, DC. International Monetary Fund.

IMF (2003) Quota Issues: Selected Issues. Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, 17 July

IMF (2003) IMF Concludes Discussion on the Review of Contingent Credit Lines. *Public Information Notice* 03/ 146. Washington, D.C.

Leech, D. (2002) Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund (Online). London: LSE Research Online. Available at: http://eprints.ise.ac.uk/archive00000648

Leech, D. and Leech R. (2003) Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Institutions. Warwick Economic Research Papers No. 718. Department of Economics, Warwick University.

Rustomjee, C. (2005). Improving Southern voice on the IMF Board: Quo vadis shareholders? In: Carin B and Wood A, eds. *Accountability of the International Monetary Fund.* Ottawa, International Development Research Council.

Wahl, Peter (2005) *International Taxation: Regulating Globalization, Financing Development.* World Economy, Ecology and Development (WEED), Berlin

Woods, N. and Lombardi D. (2006) Uneven Patterns of Governance: How Developing Countries are Represented in the IMF? *Review of International Political Economy*, 13(3), August.

Woodward, D. (2007) IMF Voting Reform: Need, Opportunity and Options *Paper for the G24 Technical Meeting, 12 March 2007*, nef (The New Economics Foundation) 1 February 2007

United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Philippines "Production Partnership": The Role of Policies in Corporate Land Acquisitions

5

TANIA SALERNO

As a nation existing within the realities of a desert, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are characterized by poor soil conditions and scarce water resources. These conditions often put the nation under the threat of a food crisis and dependent on food imports. In fact, the UAE imports 85 per cent of its food at an estimated annual cost of Dh10.64bn (Constantine, 2009). At the same time, however, the nation is powerful with vast financial resources. With the ability to fall back on their oil earnings and status, the UAE has joined a new trend which aims at alleviating national food insecurities. Entitled a corporate land acquisition, the situation is when wealthier governments and private firms from food-insecure regions purchase or lease large tracks of land in poorer investment-insecure regions with the aim of producing food for export.

As a response to the most recent food crisis in the region, the government of the UAE entered into a partnership with the Philippine government. Both governments emphasize this as an equally beneficial production partnership, one which will establish food security for the United Arab Emirates and important investment for the Philippines. To support this new partnership a memorandum of understanding was signed between the two governments taking effect July 2008 (Augustine, 2008). This memorandum of understanding was strengthened through certain policy moves which work in favour to secure food production for the United Arab Emirates. These policy arrangements between the two governments include, the waiving of food export restrictions, the use the land reform policy (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)) as a mechanism to acquire land and agrarian reform communities (ARCs) as their main area of interest due

to its accessibility to foreign investment, and placing their 'land investments' in the Philippines halal industry policy.

Each policy has a different level of importance and a separate role to play, yet all of these policies play a part in the implementation of UAE corporate land acquisitions. As there are three primary policies which can be viewed as corresponding to land acquisition intensions, there are consequently three ways policies can be seen to foster land acquisitions. First, the removal of food export restrictions. This policy can be seen as a way to encourage foreign interest in the Philippines. Second, the use of land reform policies. This policy can be seen as tool to acquire land in a policy grounded way. And Third, the use of the Philippine halal industry policy. This policy can be seen as a way to avoid suspicion. By using these three policies the Philippine government and the United Arab Emirates government are able to paint the land acquisitions as a positive investment for both nations. A partnership which can be thus presented as one that establishes food security for the UAE and investment in the Philippines. Therefore, through both the management of policies and the rhetoric surrounding the investments, the policies are influential as they depict the agreements between the governments as dually beneficial. An analysis of the policies and how they are manipulated to aid in the corporate land acquisition process portrays the power dynamics of land grabs in the Philippines, the contrast of interests, and the rhetoric that surrounds the topic of corporate land acquisitions which influences the way land grabs are viewed overall. Therefore, by first analysing the roots of the UAE and Philippine partnership then evaluating three policies - the waiving of export tax, the use of CARP and ARCS, and the Halal Industry policy- it is possible to see how certain policies are being manipulated by the Philippine government to encourage investment, to apply the corporate land acquisition in a policy grounded way and to do so without suspicion.

'Production Partnership': The Roots, Dynamics and Reasoning for Further Investment

Before going in depth into each policy it is first important to understand the dynamics of the blossoming relationship between the two nations. The "relationship" itself is being used as a manoeuvre in the corporate land acquisition therefore it is important to analyse the dynamics to understand the use of policies to support their affiliation. At the same time, this analysis presents the rhetoric surrounding the investments. Essentially, the nations are attempting to prove the depth of their commitment to the investment

through two main aspects, first because of the Philippines' migrant population and second their similar values. Once the proof of the relationship is solidified the nations can progress through the process while publically presenting each policy move as a step towards investment in the Philippines.

A figure often mentioned when discussing the deeply rooted relations between the Philippines and the UAE is the number of migrant Filipino workers in the UAE as well as the amount of present exports to meet the migrant population. 60 % of expatriate workers in the UAE are from the Philippines and in the past five years an average of $1.6 billion were sent home in remittances (Constantine, 2009). The government of the Philippines is using this number as a stepping stone to strengthen their relations with the UAE. Their reasoning is that, because there is already a strong presence of Filipinos there is presently vast amount of exports going to meet this population. At the same time, the number of Filipinos in the UAE is considered to depict the current and past affiliations of the two nations.

Another example of the discourse used by both governments is the motivation to strengthen trade ties due to "shared values." For the case in point, most of the land of interest to the UAE is in Mindanao, a region known for its large Muslim population and also known for its emergent halal industry. This aspect of the relationship can be understood as important to land investments for two main reasons. First, the government of the Philippines is using their "shared values" as a reason for their partnership- thus solidifying a mutually beneficial relationship built on deep moral principles. Second, the halal industry in the Mindanao was done as an investment in the early 2000s as an opportunity for increased trade between the Philippines and the UAE. Therefore, on top of the amount of exports sent to meet Filipino workers there is also the exports of the halal industry meeting the rest of the UAE population.

The claim of shared interests built upon their associations of the past plays an important role in the present investments. This is depicted through the current intensification of their trade relationship and the talk for increased "joint investment incentives" (Khan, 2009). The joint investment incentives are directly linked to the memorandum of understanding and the Philippines promise to help ensure food security for the UAE. Margarito B Teves, the current secretary of the Department of Finance of the Philippines, highlighted three main aspects of the memorandum of understanding which coincide with the present UAE investment dynamics (Constantine, 2009). They are, the role of the halal industry, the role of migrant workers and the opening of real estate to foreigners. These three aspects depict what

is considered important in their partnership and also where land acquisitions fall into the discussion. Of primary interest is how the discussion of the increase in halal production to meet the UAE standards and the support of remittance flows for migrant Filipino workers tie into the inevitable ability for foreigners to buy and lease land in the Philippines. In the case of the Philippines, foreign parties are now able to invest in real estate through the ownership of private lands to up to 60 per cent of foreign equity in a domestic corporation (Sec. 4 of RA 9182 or the Foreign Investment Act of 1991) (Khan, 2009).

The history of trade relations between the two nations is key to the analysis in several ways. First, it paints the picture as to why these nations entered into a memorandum of understanding in the first place. As stated previously, the relationship is built on rhetoric of similar values and the role of the Filipino migrant population, therefore the memorandum of understanding was a natural progression. Second, it depicts how this history is used to paint the partnership as truly beneficial for both nations. Essentially, since there is a shared past of cooperation between the two nations both will mutually benefit and aid one another. Third, it presents why certain policies are being used to aid the UAE corporate land acquisition in particular. Since there is a distinct history of specific trade agreements than certain policies will coincide with this history and the agreements (for example the waiving of export taxes on products related to their trade and the growth of the halal industry). Therefore, as stated previously, while each policy- the export tax, the land reform, and the halal industry- plays a significant role in the applying the land investment, each also coincides with the strengthening of the trade relations and the ability to apply corporate land acquisitions. To depict this, first each policy must be introduced along with what it is said to do for UAE - Philippines trade relations, followed by an analysis of the policy, finalized with the way this policy can aid in a corporate land acquisition.

The Waiving of Export Tax

As an investment incentive, the Philippine government waived export taxes on certain products destined for certain nations (Grain, 2008: 5). It was decided that removing export taxes within the Philippines for products exported to certain nations would allow for a strengthening of trade partnerships and investment. The UAE was considered an important partner and therefore taxes on products exported to this region were waived. As stated by the government, "being a gateway to the Middle East and a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at that, UAE offers vast market op-

portunities for Philippine exporters" (Cruz, 2002). In the Middle East region, UAE is ranked number one as an export market for the Philippines and is considered "an attractive market for ethnic foods and other Philippine food exports due to the presence of a number of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) in the country and the growing acceptance by the nationals" (Cruz, 2002). At the same time, the Agriculture secretary Arthur Yap has also mentioned the possibility of setting up a special economic zone in Mindanao for Arab investors (Cayon, 2009). As they aim to strengthen the halal industry, a special economic zone is in the works for Arab investors also. The waiving of export taxes on products destined for the UAE and setting up special economic zones for trade are clear examples of the first steps taken through policy to persuade the interest of investors.

The waiving of export tax contributes to the relationship of the two nations and instigates the corporate land acquisition through the encouragement of foreign interest in the region while also proving to the possible investors their commitment to the investment. The Philippine government sees the relationship with the UAE as a possibility of encouraging agriculture, and the Agriculture and Fisheries modernization Act.[1] Consequently, since the UAE can add valuable investment the Philippine government wants to prove their commitment and does through the waiving export taxes and establishing SEZs. At the same time, it presents to the public the image of an ordinary production partnership. Therefore, this policy can be seen as one of the primary steps taken in order to set up a corporate land investment. It encourages foreign investment, strengthens their relationship, contributes to the realization of the AFMA, and all the while depicts the image of a natural trade partnership.

The Use of CARP and the Targeting of ARC

Another way to encourage a land investment is through the use of land reform policies. Established in 1988, the land reform policy of the Philippines

---

[1] In 1997 the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) was passed to encourage the progression of the agriculture and fisheries sector. Point four of the act – Market Assistance with Private investors and Industry Associations- stresses the role of investors in stimulating growth and infrastructure and encourages their participation in planning and executing projects. The investment from the UAE is related to this point and is therefore also encouraged under AFMA. More information available on government website: http://nafc.da.gov.ph/afma.php

is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), and the communities where land is to be redistributed are called Agrarian Reform Communities (ARCs). The goal of the reform in the Philippines is to break up large farms and redistribute the land into small plots to be cultivated by landless small family farmers, who are considered more efficient in their use of land (Borras, 2005: 333). Essentially, the land reforms are aimed to, "shape and maintain their livelihoods, to prevent exclusion from social opportunities, to gain access to the dominant political processes, and to preserve their cultural heritage as a crucial dimension of their survival" (Borras, 2007: 1). Needless to say, land reforms are considered key to a peasant's livelihood.

Even though CARP has positive aims and some positive gains, it has also been ridden with some issues based on the social, political and economic dynamics which influence government policy and action. In fact, it is the flaws of the program that are being used in the corporate land acquisition. Most critiques of the program are based on how it has been manipulated by the powerful and used to acquire or maintain land for the elites. The primary way it has been used to acquire land is through manipulation of the policy, the use of the loop holes of the program, and the corruption within the organization and government itself. Therefore, The UAE is attaching itself on to this process of using the flaws of the program to attain land. One of the most significant flaws which directs land away from landless peasants and towards foreign investors is though the priority given for infrastructure and marketing support in ARCs. CARP is aimed at harnessing collective production potentials for farmers and the way the government aims at attaining this potential is through the help of investors. Essentially, the program encourages corporations and foreign investment "to help the ARCs find marketing or agriculture production tie-up to help improve the economic status of the beneficiaries " (Cayon, 2009), and this is where the UAE investors step in.

The issue thus is that although ARCs are intentioned as communities of small family sized lands or still undivided plantation lands, ARCs are given priority to infrastructure and marketing. Since investment is aimed at finding marketing or agriculture production tie-up to help improve the economic status of the beneficiaries, foreign investment has become a priority. The companies who have entered into agreements with the Philippines claim they are centered on satisfying the expansion needs of these companies. Therefore, initially these lands are being targeted because they are claiming they want to add investment, however at the same time they "have indicated high interest in acquiring tracts of land for planting and raising poultry" (Cayon, 2009). It is consequently very important to look at all as-

pects of these policy moves and attempt to look behind the motives of such investment. It also important to recognize that CARP is actually aimed at redistributing land to landless peasants not foreign interests. Thus, the use of land reform policies show the heart of the complexity of these deals. While supposedly bringing support to the farmers of the ARCs, the reforms are also allowing foreign investors to integrate into the system and acquire large tracks of land while painting their interest in the region as investment incentives. Therefore, the manipulation of this policy and its use in the UAE land acquisition is the land made available through the emphasis on investment based on their claim to bring modernisation agriculture.

Halal Industry Policy

The use of the halal industry in the production partnership is also very significant in the UAE corporate land acquisition. The halal industry in the Philippines is a specialized segment which produces food authorized under Sharian or Islamic jurisprudence. The halal industry includes the handling and processing of all food production from meat to wheat. The opportunities of the halal industry were recognized by the Philippine government and on October 26 2001 President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed into law Executive Order No. 46 as an attempt to jump start the development of the halal industry in the country (Lidasan, 2008: 1). The Philippines foresaw the opportunities of the halal industry and therefore in the 2001 began to strengthen their halal production through a certification process along the same lines of the Gulf States. The development of the halal industry was based on local markets for Muslim communities in areas such as Mindanao as well as regional markets for specific Muslim nations in South Asia. Now with growing trade with nations in the Middle East, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) expects the local halal industry to grow further starting in 2010. In fact, NEDA has claimed that the Philippine halal industry is thought to grow to P500 billion in 2010 (Lidasan, 2008: 3). Thus, qhile most nations feared complications with the economic crisis, the Philippines aimed at expanding trade for export of food and agricultural products to the Gulf Nations and the halal industry with the baseline of encouraging expansion. As The United Arab Emirates is the top export market of the Philippines in the Middle East region, the halal industry has been structured around its policies and in June 2006 the Philippines received its accreditation through the UAE (Gonzales, 2009). The Philippines is said to have a comparative advantage over other nations in the region both due to the fact that is has been declared and recognized by the

World Animal Health Organization as free from the foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and bird flu-free, and because of the basic trade understanding between the Philippines and the UAE (Gonzales, 2009). Accordingly, the government is increasing investment in this sector of industry, including plans to establish a P2.2-billion halal Economic Zone in Davao (Gonzales, 2009). Other investment proposals to boost the halal industry, include an P840 million halal model poultry farm complete with research laboratories and other modern facilities. It is also important to recognize that the investment will not come from the Philippines alone but from the nations who wish to increase trade for halal products with the Philippines. This is depicted in the fact that the Philippines is directing their halal production to meet the standards of the UAE and have done so through the creation of a national agency for halal production to become a reliable supplier of food products for the UAE. As the Philippines reshapes their halal production for the market of the UAE they accordingly find a sector in which the UAE investment and land deals can be placed.

The halal industry in relation to the UAE and Philippine production partnership can be seen as investment in a sector which unites the morals of two nations while bringing economic expansion for the Philippines and food security based on moral standards for the UAE. The halal industry was the perfect sector for the Philippine government as it encouraged a trade partnership between the two nations. At the same time, it is the perfect sector to place the land investments while avoiding the suspicion that the corporate land acquisition often brings. What is of primary significance of the use of halal industry policy in the corporate land acquisitions is how most of the "investment" which the UAE is bringing to Mindanao is being placed in halal industry policy. Therefore, by putting the "land investment" under the halal policy it portrays the corporate land grab as a trade investment for the UAE. In turn, the government is able to waiver any suspicion towards the foreign interest in land and is able to paint the partnership inevitably as a beneficial investment for the development of the Philippines through the expansion of trade with nations of similar values. Thus, the role of the halal industry in the manipulation of policy for UAE corporate land acquisition is through the establishment of food production along the lines of the UAE, the recognition of a sector which the UAE can invest in for its own food sources, and in so doing it connects all other policies being used to conceal the land acquisition as a production investment.

Concluding Remarks

The promotion of the United Arab Emirates and the Philippine production partnership can be seen as primarily established through the manipulation of policies which stem from a particular history of trade between the two nations. To present this, first the discussion of the dynamics of the trade relationship between the Philippines and the United Arab Emirates were introduced followed by an analysis of the various policies related to the land investment. The analysis of the roots of the partnership presented the rhetoric behind the agreements, the use of the memorandum of understanding to solidify the relationship, and how certain policies aligned with the trade relationship ensures the continuation of the process of investment. It is clear that the history of trade relations between the two nations is seen as a basis for growth as well as the extent of the possibilities that the UAE investments can bring to the Philippines.

At the same time, since there is a basis for this investment certain policies are considered key to begin the growth of the production partnership; which are the waiving of export tax, the use of CARP and ARCS, and the halal industry policy. Through evaluation, it is evident that certain policies are beneficial to encourage the corporate land acquisition by first establishing investment, then applying the land acquisition in a policy grounded way through CARP, and finally doing so while still avoiding suspicion. By briefly discussing each policy, along with its role in the trade relationship and its use in the corporate land acquisition, it is also possible to see the relevance of policy manoeuvring in the present debate to show the means by which the government can present controversial concepts in a more accepting manner.

The positive manipulation of policies is presented in the way the view of corporate land acquisitions has been transformed over time from the onset of the idea to present time. Initially, there was an uproar amongst the population and even transnational organizations such as FAO and the UN, against the concept of foreign land grabbing. Presently, however, there is much discussion on how partnerships such and the UAE-Philippine production partnership can be a "win-win" situation as long as certain regulation are followed. The UAE itself has claimed that the partnership will be strengthened through their similar morals and joint ventures. At the same time, the UAE claims that the Islamic tradition of charity will drive their investments by establishing infrastructure, schools, and hospitals. The possibility for this to be realized is not the topic of discussion however, what is the topic of discussion is how rhetoric such as this, based on their previous

trade relations is strengthened through policy which depicts how subjective the whole debate is. At the same time, the analysis of the policies and the process of manipulation of these policies portrays the power dynamics of land grabs in the Philippines, the contrast of interests, and the rhetoric that surrounds the topic of land grabs which influences the way corporate land acquisitions are viewed overall. With the help of such rhetoric and the manipulation of certain policies, the concern over foreign land grabbing has transformed itself into that which is now called a possibility for a positive production partnership and "joint investments." Thus, the transformation of terminology and use of policy leads to a convergence of factors which ultimately legitimizes land acquisitions and inevitably could end the debate of "land grab or production partnership?".

References

Augustine, B. (2008). Philippines keen on UAE investments. Gulf News. Retrieved from http://gulfnews.com/business/investment/philippines-keen-on-uae-investments-1.136264

Borras, S. (2010) 'Contemporary Discourses and Contestations around Pro-Poor Land Policies and Land Governance', *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10 (1), 1-32.

Borras, S. (2007) '"Free Market", Export-led Development Strategy and its Impact on Rural Livelihoods, Poverty and Inequality: The Philippine Experience Seen from Southeast Asian Perspective', *Review of International Political Economy* 14 (1), 143-175.

Borras, S and J. Franco (2005) 'Struggles for Land and Livelihood: Redistributive Reform in Agribusiness Plantations in the Philippines', *Critical Asian Studies* 37 (3), 331- 361.

Cabacungan, G. (2008, December 18) 'Requiem for Land Reform', *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. Retrieved from www.inq7.net/

Cayon, M. (2009, December 14) 'Philippines: Mideast Farm Firms Eye Investment Tie-up Here', *Business Mirror*. Retrieved from http://farmlandgrab.org/9798

Constantine, Z. (November 16. 2009). GCC urged to reduce its reliance on food imports. The National: UAE. Abu Dhabi. Retrieved from http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091117/NATIONAL/711169856/1010

Cruz, E.(2002) Philippine Bureau of Export Trade. United Arab Emirates Page. http://tradelinephil.dti.gov.ph/betp/uae1

Daniel, S. and M. Anuradha (2009) 'The Great Land Grab: Rush for World's Farmland Threatens Food Security for The Poor'. Oakland Institute.

Franco, J. and S. Borras (2007) 'Struggles Over Land Resources in the Philippines', *Peace Review* (19)1, 67-75.

Grain. (2008). 'Seized: The 2008 Land Grab for Food and Financial Security*, Grain Briefing.*

Gonzales, I. (January 5, 2009). Live Halal: Philippines halal industry to grow on stronger Mid-East demand. The Phil Star. Retrieved from http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?ArticleId=428665&publicationSubCategoryId=66

Ho, P. and M. Spoor (2005) 'Whose land? The Political Economy of Land Titling in Transitional Economies*, Land Use Policy* 23. 580-587

Khan, G. (September 9, 2009). Agricultural Investment firm Opened. *Arab News.* Retrieved from http://farmlandgrab.org/7393.

Lidasan, T. Generating Popular Support for the Halal Industry. *National Halal Convention on 25 June 2008* at the Philippine Trade Trading Center (PTTC). Pasay City. Retrieved from http://tradelinephil.dti.gov.ph/dti/halal/Sustaining_the_Support_of_Filipino_Muslims_for_the_Halal_Export_Trade_Devt_Program.pdf

Overhold, W. (1976) 'Land Reform in the Philippines', *Asian Survey* 16(5), 427-451.

Stephenson, E. (2009, July 30) 'Is Philippines Selling Land or Selling Out?', *The National.* Retrieved from http://farmlandgrab.org/6583

6 Gender, Nationality, and Subjectivity in a European 'Welfare Regime': The Case of Domestic Care Migrant Workers in Germany

Nora Szabo

Abstract

As a consequence of globalisation, 'international migratory flows have led to a category of people who fall between borders and systems of protection'. This paper does not aim to cover all aspects of immigration and integration of immigrants coming from South to North. That would be a virtually impossible task involving thousands of pages. Rather, this paper presents a specific gendered migration pattern in Germany – considered as a European 'welfare regime' – which concentrates on the situation of domestic migrant workers in the country.

While dealing with questions of vulnerabilities and opportunities, this paper examines the livelihoods of migrants in relation to care and welfare, as the one of the main "sources of growth in female employment within the context of globalisation of global chains of care and social reproduction" (Kofman, 2005:121) Finally, it concludes by proposing a gender-sensitive and transformative social protection approach to address the situation of domestic migrant workers.

Keywords: global care chain, welfare regime, immigration, Germany, gender dimensions, new domestic servants, vulnerability, social reproduction, care economy, social protection, entitlement, intersectionality

Introduction

Today the distance between high-income and low-income countries has accrued to an unprecedented state, and has created a prevailing problem for the global economy. Dramatic poverty in developing countries is pregnant

with consequences at both the national and international level. Furthermore, growing inequalities on the global scale have resulted in massive population movements from the South to the North, as well as from South to South. Migrant communities are moving from low-income to high-income countries for the purpose of searching for job opportunities and improving their lives. But do they get what they want? What happens to low-income immigrants when they settle in a high-income country in Europe? What does it mean today to be a migrant domestic worker in Germany? These are the central questions of my essay.

Research over the last decade and more – conducted in the name of 'gender analysis of globalization' – has emphasised the consequences that changes in the global economy have had on the intensification of women's labour force participation. "But, if gender analysis is still to be understood as a focus on the relationship between men and women, the absence of any counterpart discussion about the impact of globalisation on men is problematic" (Pearson, 2000:219).

Pearson's study raises concerns about "what are the implications for men?" (Pearson, 2000:219). It is widely acknowledged in literature about the care economy that there is a resurgence of paid domestic and care labour across the global North.[1] Many of the studies have documented an "increasing reliance on migrant, as opposed to home-state, domestic workers, and it has been suggested (Lutz, 2007: 4) that domestic and care work has contributed more than any other sector of the labour market to one of the key features of the 'age of migration' (Castles and Miller, 2009) – its feminisation" (Kilkey et. al 2010:379). Indeed, while there is abundant attention to women, I have found only one thoughtful and interesting discussion on men in Europe related to the subject of migrant domestic and care work (Kilkey, 2010).[2]

---

[1] For instance, see Cox (2006) on England; Hochschild (2000) and Lazaridis (2007) on Southern Europe; Akalin (2007) on Turkey; Platzer (2006) on Sweden; Hondagneu-Sotelo (2001) on the USA; and Kofman et. al. (2000)

[2] Her article does not discuss the impact of female migration on men, as Pearson suggests, but rather Majella Kilkey (2010) indicates the commoditisation of male aspects of domestic work through the evidence of Polish men (Kilkey 2010: 381). She claims "the labour market compared with the majority of the EU15, helps explain both the increase in supply of migrant, especially Polish handymen, and the increase in demand, since the availability of cheaper migrant labour reduces the relative costs of outsourcing." (Kilkey 2010:382)

In the current essay, I will refer exclusively to two sets of European case studies collected by Kopenhof (2005) and Kilkey, about domestic care workers in Europe in the context of globalisation and transnational migration movements. As my particular main source, I will use the article of Helma Lutz (2002) who directly deals with the question of "new domestic servants" in Germany and the Netherlands. But as I have argued above, there is limited debate in literature or policy circles about the impact of globalisation on men, particularly as domestic migrant workers in Europe. Therefore there might be an imbalance in this paper towards the female migrant domestic care phenomenon.

The essay will construct such an analysis in three steps. Firstly, it will highlight the gender characteristics of the domestic migration pattern in Germany during the last few decades. Secondly, it will address the current situation interconnected with their vulnerabilities, entitlements and obligations. Thirdly, it will call for gender-based and transformative social protection measures in order to manage integration, diversity and multiculturalism of domestic migrant workers.

Theoretical and analytical applications of the study

Many studies from diverse disciplinary perspectives have been produced recently around the issue of 'care'.[3] In feminist scholarship, both feminist economics and gender and social policy strands have largely contributed to the conceptual and empirical development of the term.[4] Within feminist social policy literature there is a growing concern about care regimes and

---

[3] While encountering the main ideas on 'gender' and 'care', Razavi writes: "care (whether paid or unpaid) is crucial to human well-being and to the pattern of economic development. Some analysts emphasize the significance of care for economic dynamism and growth. Others see care in much larger terms, as part of the fabric of society and integral to social development. Citizenship rights, the latter argue, have omitted the need to receive and to give care" (Razavi, 2007: iii).

[4] While some of their implications are different, "(t)he two strands of thinking converge at many different points—both conceptual and policy. One is their critique of the undervaluation of care (both paid and unpaid), the other is their skepticism toward markets (both in terms of providing good quality care to care recipients and decent work to care providers), and a third is the need for voice if those providing care, on a paid or unpaid basis, are to access social rights and enhance their economic security" (Razavi, 2007:32).

how welfare state regimes organise the care of dependents. The frame of the 'global care chain' attempts to deal with the impact of globalisation on domestic care services and includes different types of care work provided by migrants (Kurian, 2006). It "draws attention to the ways in which disadvantaged female migrant workers from the developing world fill in the 'care deficit' in the more economically advanced countries" (Razavi, 2007:12). The current essay gives specific attention to domestic workers and the care sector as situated in the heart of social reproduction.[5] Taking intersectionality[6] as a methodological approach, the essay will pinpoint some ways in which gender, class, ethnicity, social status, sexuality, and their political affiliations create certain categories of exclusion for domestic care workers. Furthermore, the concept of 'new domestic servants' (Lutz, 2002) will be used to address the recent migrant domestic care work phenomenon in Germany.

Germany as a migratory regime

Kofman (2005) considers Germany[7] as a historically 'immigrant country' because apart from Austria, Germany was the only country in Europe[8]

---

[5] Social reproduction has a broad interpretation. It does not only refer to the biological procreation and childbearing, but it is rather more. According to Bakker, "social reproduction is the ongoing reproduction of the commodity labour power and the social processes and human relations associated with creating and maintaining the social order" (Bakker, 1994). Its analytical notion is valid – besides the biological understanding – in terms of reproduction of the labour-force (daily reproduction of unpaid goods and services; domestic labour), reproduction of the community, and as paid reproductive work (sex work, entertainers and domestic workers). This study puts emphasis on the last form of its representation.

[6] Building on feminist theories of intersectionality, this paper looks at the relationship between gendered migratory and welfare regimes in the geopolitical context of a European state. By outlining significant rationalities and conditions for cross-border migration in Germany, it explores how "diaspora" identities of domestic migrant workers are shaped by gender, race, ethnicity, and nationality.

[7] The composition of migrants is the following in Germany: "large majority, two-thirds come from Turkey and North Africa. Their number largely exceeds those originating from non-EU Eastern Europe: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Bosnia etc." (Council of Europe Demographic Development Research 2006 in Youssef Courbage, 2007:6)

"which implemented deliberate policies for attracting guest workers from Southern Europe and Turkey (already) in the 1960s" (Kofman 2005:32). Germany has a long history of immigration from neighbouring countries[9] as well as from the developing world. Therefore, it is worth giving a short retrospection on its emergence during the last few decades.

In the case of ethnic Germans, Germany provides privileged links to "single migrants unencumbered by family responsibilities" (Kofman, 2005:108), as they "had immediate access to German citizenship" (Kofman, 2005:109) since 1980. In this sense, the future entitlement of a German ethnic migrant is assumed to be achieved through citizenship in a higher-income country from a probably lower one. But the reality for other migrants is rather complex. Some of the areas where we can find crucial differences when addressing citizens and migrants are: "the right to enter, conditions of residence and unlawful presence in the territory, security from deportation, the rights and conditions of family life, employment, including access to the public sector, self-employment and the liberal professions; access to citizenship and the ability to make the transition from one legal, residence and employment status to another" (Kofman, 2005:112).

Taking into account that Germany is one of the founding members of the European Union, it becomes obvious that EU enlargements have had impacts on the country's migrant population, at least in the case of intra-European immigration. Since 1989, as the European Union has significantly expanded its borders, the spaces of immigration have been modified too. However, "intra-European migration remains profoundly gendered given its assumption of a male breadwinner model and derivative social rights" (Acker in Kofman, 2005:109). When the EU was enlarged to include eight Eastern European countries and two Mediterranean islands in 2004, some of the previous EU member countries – like Ireland, Sweden and the UK – decided to open up their labour markets, but Germany chose to maintain restrictions for the full transnational period of 7 years (Kofman, 2005:110-111). But as Morokvasic highlights, many migrants to Germany developed

---

[8] Regarding the European scale, researchers have pointed out that in 1960 the percentage of female and male migrants is the following 48.5% female and 51.5% male. (Hania Zlotnik 2003, in Kofman's paper 2005:109).

[9] According to the findings of Anderson and Phizacklea (1997) the majority of domestic workers in Germany were Poles or other East-Europeans in 1997. (Report on 'Migrant Domestic Workers: A European Perspective' submitted to the European Commission's Equal Opportunities article)

strategies and "settled in mobility" (Morokvasic 2003) even without the right for permanency or work.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the migration patterns (country of origin, types of migration, duration) had changed as a counter-effect of "the continuing and new political conflicts in neighbouring regions in Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa" (Kofman, 2005:110). As more and more asylum seekers came to the country, the German state was obliged to respond by generating a range of statuses[10] among migrants on the basis of their economic utility, social esteem and supposed ability to assimilate (Kofman, 2005). This selection has further leaded to differential rights and entitlements,[11] for instance "whilst IT workers and domestics were both in short supply, the former enjoyed the rights attached to the skilled unlike those working in low status employment in the household" (Kofman, 2005:111). Skilled migrants are welcomed however. For instance, "the new German Immigration Law, in force since 2005 only grants immediate permanent residence to skilled migrants" (Kofman, 2005: 132). And since "men and women circulate differently in the global economy" (Kofman, 2005:120), this has consequences in gender terms.[12] "Men occupy an elite space of flows (Castells 1996) in a masculinised high-tech world of global finance, production and technology, at the commanding heights of the knowledge economy, while women provide the services largely associated with a wife's traditional role – care of children and the elderly, homemaking and sex" (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003 in Kofman, 2005:120). What is highly important for our analysis is that the role of migrant women – who are points of support, care and social reproduction – have been undervalued, except for the most skilled ones in the education and health sectors (Lutz, 2002; Kofman, 2005).

---

[10] "Stratification by nationality, religion, race and language skills, leads to different conditions and pay" (Kofman, 2005:125). For instance, in the domestic sector "Filipinas are generally viewed as the most valuable domestic workers, being Christian, English-speaking and well educated. On the other hand, Albanians in Greece or Moroccans in Spain are considered less valuable and have less negotiating power with their employers, often doing less rewarding work and receiving lower wages" (Kofman, 2005:125).

[11] Entitlement was differentiated through social stratification; particular differences exists between skilled and less skilled, documented and irregular migrants.

[12] The main shortages they are seeking to fill are in IT and engineering, both very masculine sectors (Kofman, 2005:132).

While many formal rights are taken for granted by citizens of the EU, it is not the case for migrants. "There relationship to entitlements (which are defined as access to resources and cover material, social and symbolic dimensions), is more problematic and constrained by a lack of rights. It is therefore not just a matter of the inability to exercise rights but also involves formal exclusion, which is sanctioned by immigration, residence and employment regulations" (Kofman, 2005:111-112). In the following part, I will discuss the specific situation within the domestic sector.

Migrants in the domestic care sector of Germany

In the context of globalisation and transnational migration movements "house- and care work is a cheap product that can be 'bought in': the impoverished and completely de-regularized labour markets of the world offer a large reservoir for these services" (Lutz, 2002:100-101). And as Geldstein demonstrates "the sexual division of labour in the domestic sphere is so

deeply rooted that many female breadwinners, particularly those in the lower social strata have to take on the double burden of domestic and productive tasks" (Geldstein, 1997:552 in Pearson, 2000). It is not astonishing in gender terms, that nowadays maids are still over 90% women (Lutz 2002). In a study, two years later, Lutz (2002) contends that, while the number of domestic care workers is very similar to data made a century ago there are several changes at the threshold of the 21st century. For instance, while the reason for demanding migrant care services "was part of the prestige of bourgeois families" in the past, more recently it can explained by the phenomenon that German "professional working women today need help in coping with the double burden of family care and career" (Lutz, 2002:91). Noting limited reliable data, she also shares one finding that todays' maids are "working-class German women, through Turkish migrant women, ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, to Poles, Czechs and Russians, as well as women from Asia and Latin America" (Lutz, 2002:91). Apart from the current world-wide trend of 'feminization of migration', she therefore highlights the "shift of exploitation and dependence from a national to an international[13] context". Following the same line of argument, she writes that "the maids issue has evolved from one of class to one of ethnicity and na-

---

[13] "In all aspects we can see that globalisation leads to a decline in the significance of borders, both as a physical line being crossed much more frequently by individual migrants, but also as a social and cultural dividing line"(Kovacs and Melegh 2007:27).

tionality" (Lutz, 2002:91). What we can see today is a wide range of 'heterogeneity': the heterogeneity of their working tasks,[14] the heterogeneity of their employment situation[15] and last, but not least, the ethnic heterogeneity of the women doing this work (Lutz, 2002).

Now, I will address questions around their vulnerabilities, obligations and entitlements. In common understanding, migrants and their families tend to face higher vulnerability to poverty and risks, especially when working in low-skilled jobs. Therefore, "social protection for this group is an urgent policy issue, and shows the interface of the lack of decent work opportunities and social protection in home countries that drive migration" (Schaefer, 2010).[16] Giving an example of the existing formal dependency – sanctioned through immigration legislation – there were few cases in Germany when third world migrant women were "not permitted to enter the labour market in the first few years" (Kofman, 2005:112). But on the other hand, "it has become possible since February 2002 for citizens of accession countries to work legally for up to three years in households that are taking care of a relative i.e. elderly care and are receiving benefits from the statutory long-term care insurance system" (Kofman, 2005:124). Lutz (2002) explicitly refers to the report provided by Anderson and Phizacklea (1997), in which they order some common problems for domestics, such as "unpaid hours; low income, often less than the minimum wage; denial of wages in cases of dismissal following trial or probation periods; refusal by employers to arrange legal resident status (for tax reasons, etc.); control and sexual harassment; pressure to do additional work (for friends and colleagues); excessive workloads, especially where in addition to caring for children and elderly people they are responsible for all other household chores; and finally the very intimate relationship between the domestic helpers and their employers (Anderson and Phizacklea, 1997)" (Lutz, 2002:92-93). Among domestic migrant women, plenty of them come to Germany 'via the internet'

---

[14] Regarding their working tasks, the platform is various: cleaning, washing and cooking, caring for children, the elderly and the infirm, to assisting at family celebrations and corporate events etc.

[15] Recruiting domestic care work can refer to activities „from a 2-h a week cleaning job to the 24-h on-call service of the live-in maids" (Lutz, 2002:92)

[16] Source: Schaefer, 2010 'Seminar on Promoting Inclusive Growth through Social Protection' At the Annual Meeting of ADB's Board of Governors 4 May 2010Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Speeches/2010/ms2010043.asp. Accessed on 23-06-2010

and commercial agencies. Or in the case of Southeast Asian and Latin American migrants, the travel is often organized through the Catholic Church in the name of giving "charitable care for those concerned in the host country" (Lutz, 2002:92) – that is, their counterparts in terms of legal and social consequences. This is another proof of the claim that 'woman' is not a universal experience or category, and neither is 'domestic female migrant' in Germany. Hence, to understand the particular situation of any of them, we must identify all their diverse identities.

While addressing the continuities and discontinuities in the situation of the 'past' and 'new' domestic migrant servants in Germany (and in the Netherlands), Lutz (2002) presents some similarities: "the feminization of the domestic servant's work is still relevant", "the people convened are women" and "most of them think of this work as a period of transition" (2002:95). But there are significant changes as well. Today maids are older (often married and mothers) than in the past. They work "in order to cope with a familiar financial crisis, the provision of a family, the education of their children", while in the past the most common motivation was "to bridge the time between school and marriage". And they are "better educated than their predecessors". However new forms of differences have emerged even within the category of 'new domestic servants'. They still take risks in favour of expected positive results. Certain evidences have shown that the higher educational status led to better employment status, but it is not a granted correlation. Collective actions are difficult to establish as the work is often considered as temporary (Lutz, 2002:101). Perhaps, the most serious problem is that the implications of care and the need for social protection "are not recognised explicitly by policy actors" (Kilkey et al., 2010:381) in Germany. However, it is worth mentioning that the situation for Eastern European women is different from that of women coming from Latin America or South-East Asia.

Since the 1990s, Eastern European women (who have joined the stock of domestic workers in Germany) have rights of residence for up to 3 months – while their counterparts are likely to be undocumented (Kofman, 2005:125). Another interesting feature is that "the care of the elderly is more likely to result in work permits and regularisation than for child care" (Kofman, 2005:125). But what is true for all of them, is that the old-age pension is not regulated for domestic migrant women. "One consequence is that while the demand for (migrant) domestic and care work among German households, particularly for elder care, has increased rapidly in recent decades, the institutional framework, albeit with one or two exceptions, does not allow for migrants to work legally in this sector" (Kilkey et al.,

2010:381). But despite the problems around denied citizenship and membership, migrant women come and stay, however it is uncertain that they can really raise their status. Someone can ask the question: As long as there is a 'care deficit' in Germany, what can we expect from the future? Many scholars have assumed that the demand for domestic care workers will continue to rise in Germany, mainly for three reasons. Firstly, the country faces an ageing population; secondly, the state care provisions are not adequate to provide care for children, the elderly and the infirm; and thirdly because of a change in middle-class lifestyles[17] (Lutz, 2002). The German government is complicit (Kilkey et al. 2010:381). It uses the increased migrant demographic work as a tool to "solve the (country's) care deficit, while avoiding social conflicts" (Kilkey et al. 2010:381).

Conclusion

The argument above has served to show that in the case of Germany, globalisation has intensified pressure on the domestic and public sectors, while financial markets have simultaneously started to chasten the public sector. Production and social reproduction have both become finance meditated processes. And we have also noticed that "domestic work is one of the most insecure forms of employment and is mainly performed by women". Workers are mostly outside the system of the host country, especially when they come from outside Europe. Moreover, skill, nationality, legal status, and the channel of entry are determining factors for rights, entitlements and obligations for migrant women (Kofman 2005). Overall we can say that the impoverishment of migrant women entitlements, and the absence of adequate social protection, each limit a number of capabilities outlined by Martha Nussbaum (2003) – for example: bodily integrity, affiliation, control over one's environment and practical reason are restrained. The State has certain policies, but they based on a segregation in favour of skilled migrants. So, what should we consider in terms of achieving better social protection?

As the expansion of private, home-based care agencies has become an "open secret" (Kilkey, 2010:381), the German government should deal with it in the future. One implication is that "social policy must be designed not only residually, to cater for social needs, but as a key component of policies that ensure the wherewithal for their own sustainability" (Mkandawire,

---

[17] "Childcare is demanding, cleaning with environmentally friendly products is time-consuming, standards of cleanliness have risen, people have more pets and so on (Gregson and Lowe, 1994)" in Lutz (2002:93).

2001:23). But moving away from the conventional approach (based on sole government responsibility in protection), I would call for joint-efforts. In my opinion, using the potential of civil society could better pursue social transformation from a gender rights perspective. Greater protection can be further achieved through 'transformative' measures that aim to address underlying power imbalances -which are responsible for creating and sustaining longer term vulnerabilities. These measures include anti-discrimination legislation, secure rights, different form entitlements, and strengthening the ability of citizens to claim rights etc. I share the view that "ensuring socio-economic security requires both employment security as well as citizenship-based entitlements" (Chhachhi, 2009:13), but is it relevant for migrants? "It would be incumbent on any attempt to offer universal socio-economic security to develop mechanisms that enable the probability of rights, which ensure both employment and citizenship-based entitlements as migrants move across borders" (Chhachhi, 2009:33). When migrant domestic workers enter the country accompanying their employer, Germany can offer them the possibility to leave that employer if they are abused or exploited and offer basic protection under German employment law. Along the same line of thought, migrants could be entitled to the national minimum wage, statutory holiday pay and a notice period. As a worker, the migrant person's visa can be renewed annually, and renewal could be dependent on the migrant domestic worker being in full-time employment as a domestic worker in a private household. There can be also a right to apply for settlement and for family reunification.[18] Furthermore, the state and civil society can jointly offer social protections and entitlements to migrants through training, employment, language classes and through access to medical treatments and pension funds. Even though (in a non-realistic case) the host country could offer full citizenship and equal access to resources for migrants as for German citizens, I would say that the 'sending country' is at least as much responsible for the situation of migrants as the former one. The greatest task starts in the origin country, who should build up sustainable public sector systems designed to reduce chronic poverty, and social vulnerability and risk facing these people.

---

[18] The recommended ways on further social protection measures was based on the previously existing migrant law in the UK. I have considered it as a good legislative attitude towards migrant workers, but we should also mention that the regulation announced by the step encouraging exploitation (Kofman, 2005:12: 124)

References

Acker, J. (2006) *Class Questions. Feminist Answers.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Bakker, I. (2007) 'Social Reproduction and the Constitution of a Gendered Political Economy'. In: *New Political Economy*, 12 (4), 541-556.

Calas, M.B et al. (2010) 'Editorial: Observing Globalized Capitalism: Gender and Ethnicity as an Entry Point', *Gender, Work and Organization.* 17 (3): 243-247.

Chhachhi, A. (2009) 'Democratic Citizenship or Market based entitlements? A Gender Perspective on Social Protection in South Asia', ISS Working Paper No. 486, ISS, The Hague.

Kofman, E., A. Phizacklea, P. Raghuram and R. Sales (2000) *Gender and International Migration in Europe.* London: Routledge.

Kofman, E. (2005) 'Gendered Migrations, Livelihoods and Entitlements in European Welfare Regimes'. http://www.anrisd.org/website/document/ (httppublications)/3D6D3CEDC4703D17C1256FF00046C428?OpenDoc ument Accessed 06-02- 2010

Kurian, R. (2006) 'The Globalisation of Domestic Care Services' in Thanh-Dam Truong, Saskia Wieringa and Amrita Chhachhi (eds) *Engendering Human Security: Feminist Perspectives*, Women Unlimited New Delhi, pp. 147-168.

Kilkey, M., Lutz, H. and Palenga-M. Work at the Intersection of Welfare, Gender and Migration Regimes: Some European Experiences' in *Social Policy & Society* 9 (3): 379–384. Cambridge University Press 2010

Lutz, H. (2002) 'At your service Madam! The globalization of domestic service' in *Feminist Review* (70): 89-104

Mammey, Population in Germany." In Werner, Haug, Paul Compton, Youssef Courbage, The *Demographic Characteristics of Immigrant Populations.* Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

Mkandawire, T. (2001) 'Social Policy in a Development Context. Programme on Social Policy and Development'. Paper No. 7. UNRISD, Geneva.

Nyberg-Sorenson, Ninna, Nicholas Van Hear and Poul Engberg-Pedersen. 2002. "The migration-development nexus: Evidence and policy options, state-of-the-art overview." *International Migration*, Vol. 40, No. 5, pp. 3-43.

Pearson, R. (2000) 'All change? Men, women and reproductive work in the global economy', *The European Journal of Development Research*, 12: 2, 219—237

Razavi, S. (2007) "The Political and Social Economy of Care in a Development Context: Conceptual Issues, Research Questions and Policy Options, Gender and Development Programme Paper Number 3, UNRISD, Geneva

Schaefer, 2010 'Seminar on Promoting Inclusive Growth through Social Protection' At the 43rd Annual Meeting of ADB's Board of Governors 4 May 2010Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Available at http://www.adb.org/ Documents/Speeches/2010/ms2010043.asp Accessed on 23-06-2010

Schiller, N. G., Basch, Theorizing Transnational Migration', *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), 48-63.

Youssef Courbage: Migrants in western Europe: demographic behaviour and socio-economic conditions (2007) in Melegh, A. et al. *Demografia* 50 (5.): 5-26. Budapest

7 Defining Human Security: Political Implications

CRISTINA BALCASO

The definition of human security is hotly debated. While some argue for a wider, all-encompassing definition, others seek to narrow and increase the precision of the term. The following analysis will look at the debate over the definition; however, it will extend the analysis beyond the descriptions of human security. Instead of simply asking, "how is human security defined?" it will ask, "why is human security defined in the way that is it?" This analysis argues that those who defend narrowing the definition for the sake of feasibility to policy-making reduce 'defining' to a technocratic act, isolating it from its political implications. As an example, Canadian human security policy is examined and the possible implications of its narrowed human security agenda are explored.

According to Sabina Alkire, the security environment of the 1990s is one that was altered due to a mismatch of security threats and the response mechanisms of countries and the international community (Alkire 2003, p. 11) This altered security environment can be explained in three ways: (a) *empirical* changes in the nature of security threats; (b) *analytical* advances in understanding security threats and; (c) *institutional* changes within national and international security structures (p. 10). For empirical changes, Alkire cites several examples of threats that have either increased or changed in form, including: the shifting nature of conflict from inter- to intra-state (with higher rates of civilian casualties), increased environmental insecurity, financial crises and deepening poverty levels, higher inequality, etc. (ibid). Due to these empirical changes, advances were made in theoretical, qualitative and quantitative analyses that attempted to uncover causal relationships and interdependence relationships between types of insecurity, such as the relationship between poverty and conflict (ibid). In regards to institutional changes, Alkire cites increased collaboration among national governments to address common goals, as well as more global coordination of humani-

tarian, civilian and military agencies, as seen within the military intervention in the former Yugoslavia (ibid).

Within this altered security environment, several attempts were made to both widen and deepen the concept of security in response to the dominant neo-realist state-centric approach. This approach involved a conception of security as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force" (Walt 1991, quoted in Buzan and Hansen 2009, p. 162). It is based on the Hobbesian model of the state and the social contract, whereby states are obliged to provide security for those living within their borders in exchange for the legitimate means of the use of force (state sovereignty) (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, p. 18). As no authority can be imposed above the state, and it is assumed that no supranational organization may be able to regulate all relations between states in an anarchical international system, the state is responsible for its own security, in particular the threats posed by other states (ibid). However, this approach does not take into account the instances where the state is unable to fulfil its end of the social contract with its citizens, by way of either failing to ensure their security from threats or even being the source of threat itself. Furthermore, a state-centric approach centered primarily on the use of military resources to ensure security proved inadequate in the post-Cold War era as fears of intra-state conflicts, disease, environmental degradation, and poverty became more urgent than the traditional inter-state conflicts of the past.

In widening the concept of security, advocates sought to include and give equal emphasis to domestic and trans-border threats They also sought to recognize other sectors outside of the military that can or should be responsible for safeguarding security (Buzan and Hansen 2009, p. 188). Deepening of the security definition focuses on the question "Security for whom?" and involves considering other referent objects beyond the state (ibid). Emma Rothchild explains that the newest approaches arising in this era extended traditional national security in four directions: (1) *downwards*, "from the security of nations to the security of groups and individuals"; (2) *upwards*, "from the security of nations to the security of the international system, or of a supranational physical environment"; (3) *horizontally*, "from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or 'human' security" and; (4) "political responsibility for ensuring security is itself extended: it is diffused *in all directions* from nation states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to nongovernmental organizations, to public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market" (Rothchild 1995, quoted in Alkire 2003, p.15).

Human security was one such attempt to widen and deepen the existing notion of security in the 1990s. The United Nations Development Programme was the first to use the term "human security" in its 1993 Human Development Report (later expanded in 1994), explicitly in response to the state-centric approach to security of the Cold War:

> The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people […] Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. (UNDP 1994, p. 22).

Human security, as set out in this report, has four main characteristics: (a) it is a *universal* concern, relevant to people everywhere; (b) components of human security are *interdependent* and its effects can cross borders; (c) it is easier to ensure human security through *early prevention* rather than intervention and; (d) it is *people-centred* (emphasis in text, ibid). In general, to have human security is to have both "freedom from fear and freedom from want" and threats to human security can be grouped in the following categories: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security (p. 24).

Economic security speaks to an assured basic income, generated from remunerative work but also from a government-funded safety net as a last resort. For the UNDP, this type of economic security can thus extend to both the developing and developed world, and can be measured in rates of unemployment, underemployment and percentages below country-specific poverty lines (ibid). Food security is defined as the physical and economic access to basic food at all times. "Access" in this sense is not just adequate amounts of food available, but a person's "entitlement" to food through private farming, purchasing it in a store or receiving it as part of a pubic food distribution program (p. 27). In this sense, access to food is intertwined with access to assets and an assured income (economic security). Health security encompasses exposure to health risks such as polluted water or industrial waste, lack of nutrition as well as inadequate access to health care. As seen, health security is also intertwined with economic and food security. One measure for health security is maternal mortality, which is 18 times higher in developing countries than developed (p. 28). Environmental security is related to both threats to local ecosystems and to the global sys-

tem. These include threats to supplies of water, usable land and clean air. Environmental threats can be sudden and violent (ex. Bhopal, Chernobyl) as well as chronic and long lasting, such as deforestation leading to droughts, landslides and floods. Personal security involves security from physical violence. Threats can take many forms, such as threats from the state, other states, other groups of people, individuals or gangs against other individuals or gangs (p. 30). Threats can also be directed specifically against women and children (based on their vulnerability and dependence, i.e. child abuse) and also directed against the self (suicide, drug use) (ibid). Community security involves the recognition of the community as a vital social unit - whether it is a family, an organization, or a racial or ethnic group. Communities are described as providing "a cultural identity and a reassuring set of values" as well as practical support such as shared household responsibilities and resources (p. 31). The UNDP cites threats to community security as including discrimination based on race or ethnicity, which can result in "limited access to opportunities", as well as the degradation of traditional customs and ways of life, as experienced by some indigenous peoples (ibid). However, the report also recognizes that communities can perpetuate "oppressive practices" (for example, employing bonded labour, genital mutilation) (ibid). Furthermore, communities can be a source of division within society as a whole, particularly in cases of ethnic conflict, when competing groups fight on the basis of race or ethnicity (p. 32). Political security involves protection against state repression and the preservation of basic human rights, including freedom of expression and information (ibid).

Thus, human security as conceived covers a multitude of threats, both agency-based and structural sources of insecurity, direct and indirect. The concept can be seen to have three main assumptions about threats: (a) equal weight given to non-traditional 'threats' such as under-development and human rights violations, as is given to traditional 'threats' (for example, violence due to war); (b) threats are inter-connected and; (c) since threats are linked and all threats are to be given equal weight, they should not be prioritized (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, p. 16). Inter-connectedness can be understood as threats breeding other threats (such as health insecurity leading to poverty) as well as threats geographically creating threats in other areas (for example, ethnic conflict leading to mass refugee claims in another country) (ibid). As such, threats to human security are seen as *global*, due to the inter-connectedness of threats and the inter-dependence of the world system (p. 17).

This initial conception of human security was widely criticism, primarily for being too broad a concept. In reviewing the various definitions of hu-

man security, Roland Paris draws upon the formulation in the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report*. Paris argues that this definition is so broad that it seemingly includes all aspects of life to be secured, though the drafters of the report applaud its "all-encompassing" and "integrative" qualities as strengths (Paris 2001, p.90). Paris argues that these vague and expansive definitions pose problems for policymakers and scholars. For policymakers, by necessity they must formulate specific solutions to specific issues, which is difficult when the definitions of human security are so broad and also when within the definitions themselves, there is no prioritization of concepts or goals (p. 92). Indeed, many of the characterizations frame the constellation of physical, material, psychological, environmental, social needs as equally important. For scholars, Paris argues that the vagueness of the concept leads to it being "capable of supporting virtually any hypothesis – along with its opposite – depending on the prejudices and interests of the particular researcher" (p.93). Further, since these physical, material, and psychological dimensions are thought to be both constituent parts of human security as well as possible factors "causing" an increase or decrease in human security, Paris argues that the concept also lacks the necessary "analytical separation" that a study of such causal relationships requires (ibid). Paris also examines attempts at narrowing the concept in more precise terms, to allow it to be a better guide for research and policymaking. However, he finds this to be problematic. One example that Paris cites is Gary King and Christopher J.L. Murray's work, "Rethinking Human Security" (2001-02).

In creating their own conception of human security, King and Murray draw from a definition of security that has two elements: (1) an orientation to future risks and, (2) a focus on the risk of falling below some critical threshold of deprivation (King and Murray 2001-02, p. 592). Therefore, security is not the average level of future wellbeing but the risk of being severely deprived, or in other words, "my security today is not only a function of my wellbeing today, but also the prospects of avoiding states of great deprivation in the future" (p. 592). In defining 'wellbeing', King and Murray acknowledge that this can include domains such as health, freedom, or knowledge, however advocate for a conceptualization of human security that includes only "those domains of wellbeing that have been important enough for human beings to fight over or put their lives or property at great risk" (p. 593). King and Murray continue by arguing "because security is based on the risk of severe deprivation, it depends heavily on the concept of poverty" (Ibid). Their conception of poverty is what they call 'generalized poverty', which is broader than just a particular level of income but extends to "the deprivation of any basic capabilities" (p. 594). Thus according to

their definition, "a person is in a state of generalized poverty whenever he or she dips below the pre-defined threshold in any of the component areas of well-being" (Ibid).

King and Murray build upon their concept of 'generalized poverty' and define Years of Individual Human Security (YIHS) as the "expected number of years of life spent outside the state of generalized poverty" (p. 595). Individual Human Security (IHS) is the proportion of an individual's lifespan that he or she can expect to live outside of generalized poverty, and population human security can be seen as aggregate YIHS, using the life expectancy at birth (to control for variations in age structure) (p. 596). For example, a 40-year-old woman with a life expectancy of 35 additional years and a 50% chance of being above the generalized poverty threshold in each future year leads to individual human security of 17.5 years. King and Murray exclude future generations in their calculations (focusing only on defining population human security as a function of currently living individuals), as well as "anything that affects the security of institutions, governments, or other organizations, unless it also affects individuals" (p. 597).

In measuring human security, King and Murray suggest that the domains should be income, health, education, political freedom, and democracy, informed by current popular approaches to wellbeing (money-metric utility and the human development index) (ibid). King and Murray then describe an indicator and a threshold value for each domain. For income, King and Murray use the World Bank measure of absolute (economic) poverty of less than $365 per capita per year in 1985 international dollars. For health, the World Health Organization measure of health states is utilized, with values on a scale of 0 (death) to 1 (full health). They advocate for a threshold of 0.25, which is slightly more than quadriplegia with a value of 0.2. By comparison, severe depression has a value of 0.6 (p. 600). For democracy, King and Murray utilize the Freedom House measurements and suggest a threshold of the right of an individual to vote in at least one free and fair election (ibid). For education, they suggest both the binary measure of literacy, and an average of five or six years of schooling as the threshold (ibid).

King and Murray's approach definitely shares some general ideas with the UNDP definition of human security, focusing on the individual, expanding the definition to non-traditional security threats, and portraying threats as multi-dimensional and inter-connected. However, there are also clear differences, particularly in the way that their approach identifyies insecurity and the domains in which to do so. Paris argues that such attempts at prioritization do not offer justification for why certain factors are consid-

ered to be more important than others (Paris 2001, p. 94). To begin, King and Murray' justification for only choosing "those domains of wellbeing that have been important enough for human beings to fight over or put their lives or property at great risk" is at best tenuous (King and Murray 2001-2, p. 593). This is in part because it is difficult to identify what "domains of wellbeing" are being fought for at what time, and also because it discounts all intangible reasons why human beings may fight (for example, honour or identity). Notably, among the domains there is no measurement for safety, or a lack of violence or intimidation. Indeed, previous conceptions of human security have tended to include this element, while King and Murray seemingly focus only on the "freedom from want" or development approach, as opposed to a security studies approach (Buzan and Hansen 2009, p. 204-5). Moreover, the use of threshold values can be challenged for their arbitrariness, and it can be questioned whether or not such concepts of wellbeing can be measured at all. For example, is it possible to say that a system is democratic or not based on the number of 'free and fair elections', given that the definition of 'democracy' is itself contested, as well as the concepts 'free' and 'fair'? Further, in using quantitative measurements, King and Murray's epistemological empiricism "takes the individual as the referent object to such an extent that the political dynamics at the state and international levels are virtually absent" (Buzan and Hansen 2009, p. 205). In fact, King and Murray are explicit that their analysis excludes "anything that affects the security of institutions, governments, or other organizations, unless it also affects individuals" (King and Murray 2001-2, p. 597).

Buzan and Hansen parallel the human security debate to that of the wide versus narrow debate for the concept of security: "As wideners point to the political consequences of privileging state security at the expense of marginalized people […], those advocating narrow approaches stress the need for security concepts to make distinct academic arguments and be a guide towards making policy priorities" (Buzan and Hansen 2009, p. 205). This debate of widening versus narrowing, as demonstrated, is not only about theoretical coherence and which approach best explains the concept of human security, but also about what approach lends itself best to policy-making. Sabina Alkire, in her 2003 work "A Conceptual Framework for Human Security - CRISE Working Paper 2" speaks to the issue of applicability. She admits that "if human security is to be a feasible agenda it must be narrower" (Alkire 2003, p. 13-4). Specifically, she cites Canada, Norway and Japan as examples of how "the operationalization of human security by committed institutions in a way that is relevant to their contexts has naturally given rise to somewhat narrower interpretations of human security" (p.

20). As such, when human security is incorporated and operationalised into foreign policy frameworks, there is a tendency to narrow the conception of human security for reasons of *necessity*.

As an example, the Canadian human security approach has focused only physical safety and violence through initiatives such as support for the International Criminal Court, a prohibition on child soldiers, and a treaty to ban the manufacturing, use and sale of land mines. Thus, Canada's interpretation of human security focuses on "the protection of civilians, conflict prevention, public safety, governance and accountability, and peace support operations" – that is, more on the "freedom from fear" aspect of human security than "freedom from want" (p. 21). Alkire quotes a Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) report, where the policy focus on violence as opposed to poverty reduction is defended because: "we believe this is where the concept of human security has the greatest value added – where it complements existing international agendas already focused on promoting national security, human rights and human development" (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2003, quoted in Alkire 2003, p. 21).

As quoted above, Alkire assumes that narrowing policy is out of feasibility, or simply, the ability to operationalize the concept, thus making narrowing 'natural' or inevitable. Indeed, the fact that human security policies are narrowed by countries such as Canada is taken as a given - states necessarily have to alter (in this case, narrow) a concept in theory in order to carry it out in practice. However, this functionalist approach, in effect, isolates such policy decisions from its political nature. Thus, instead of analyzing the functionalist, technocratic question "How was a policy narrowed and what was the process?", a deeper question would be "Why was a policy narrowed in the way that it was? Who benefits?" One way to answer this question is explored by Caroline Thomas in her work "Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links" (2001).

Unlike both the UNDP and King and Murray approaches, Thomas does not seek to simply *describe* human insecurity, but to understand and explain why the current state of human insecurity is the way that it is. In her analysis, Thomas links the lack of material entitlement, health, education and conflict to the "fundamental economic and social structures [that] allow a privileged global and national elite to control a disproportionate share of available resources" (p. 163). Primarily, Thomas sees this global inequality perpetuated by neoliberalism:

Neoliberal ideology attributes universal legitimacy to a conception of freedom based on private power. It places a premium on individual choice in the market place. It attacks the public realm and associated ideas of collectivity and society. Neoliberal ideology presents a set of essentially local, Western norms as universal […] Neoliberalism supports global economic integration and presents it as the best, the most natural and the universal path towards economic growth, and therefore towards development, for all humanity (p. 167).

However, Thomas cites a clear discrepancy between the theoretical prescriptions of neoliberalism and its practical outcomes. In the 1980s and 90s, practical application of neoliberalism was seen in global development policy (for example, through structural adjustment programs). Despite improvements in social indicators such as adult literacy, access to safe water and infant mortality rates increased throughout the 1990s, and there has been a deepening of inequalities between and within states (UNDP 1997, quoted in Thomas p. 165-6).

What implications does Thomas' analysis have on our understanding of Canadian human security policy? Canadian policy focuses more on issues of conflict and violence, rather than development and poverty-related goals, due to its above stated belief that this is where it has its 'greatest value added'. However, using Thomas' approach, one can question the extent to which Canada wished to omit development-related goals as to not disturb the global "economic and social structure" Thomas described, and from which it benefits as a developed country. Indeed, it is documented that Canadian human security policy initially included goals such as "economic development through rules-based trade" when it was introduced in 1996. However, these goals were discarded by 1999 and instead Canada focused more on a conflict prevention and violence approach (Black 2006, p. 55-6).

Moreover, Canada's stated human security approach, while adopting in spirit many of the general tenets of the UNDP definition, is seemingly at odds with other aspects of its external policy. In Elizabeth Blackwood's analysis, "Human Security and Corporate Governance: A Critical Assessment of Canada's Human Security Agenda", she looks at how "Canada's almost exclusive emphasis on protection from physical violence serves to preclude consideration of the political economy of the violence" (Blackwood 2006, p. 87). Blackwood argues that in doing so, the protection of civilians from violence is treated as if it is isolated from issues of "poverty, economic marginalization, distribution of wealth and resources, and equality" (ibid). Blackwood cites Canada's lack of regulation for its corporate nationals' overseas activities as an example, namely Talisman Energy Inc. and

its operations in Sudan. In the 1990s, the Canadian government commissioned a fact-finding mission to examine the human security situation in Sudan, stating that it "may consider applying economic and trade restrictions" if the mission found evidence "that oil extraction is exacerbating the conflict in Sudan, or resulting in violations of human rights of humanitarian law" (Harker 2002, quoted in Blackwood, p. 89). The report (named "The Harker Report" after the author, and mission leader) concluded that oil was exacerbating the war, and that "there had been, and probably still is, major displacement of the civilian populations related to oil extraction" (ibid). However, the Canadian government did not apply economic and trade restrictions as it had previously indicated, but rather opted for a policy of 'constructive engagement', based on the notion that one state can 'export' values to another through economic relations (p. 90). Blackwood argues that such engagement had no positive effect at all, and quoted Talisman Energy Inc.'s own admission that it "could not afford to alienate host governments", so while it had "grave concerns over the military use of oil concession infrastructure, the infrastructure was in fact owned by the government and only leased by oil companies" (Talisman 2001, quoted in Blackwood p. 90-1).

What do the actions of this private company imply for the policy orientations of the Canadian government? It has been debated whether or not Canada has the regulatory capacity to sanction a private company's activities overseas. While the Canadian government has employed principles of extraterritoriality to some laws (for example, engaging in sexual activities with minors while abroad is covered under the Canadian Criminal Code), there is a lack of legal instruments specifically to regulate corporate activities in regards human rights (p. 93-4). Indeed, Canada recognizes the need for corporate responsibility in these areas, although only promotes *voluntary* tools such as OECD's 'Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises' for regulation (emphasis added, p. 96). Thus while Canada highlights human rights protection in its human rights agenda, its omission in any regulatory framework regarding overseas operations of corporations may be indicative of its priorities in foreign policy-making.

As demonstrated, the debate over definitions is not simply about how best to explain a concept, but rather the act of defining is itself an expression and manifestation of political struggle. In regards to human security, those who advocate for a narrower definition for the sake of functional, policy implementation needs are in effect isolating this act from its political nature. As explored through the example of Canadian foreign policy, narrowing the definition of human security can serve to preserve a global eco-

nomic structure from which Canada benefits. Thus, while defining human security, in any form, "provided a rallying point for a diversity of political actors seeking to boost support for development issues and humanitarian foreign policies" (Buzan and Hansen 2009, p. 205), its omissions are just as indicative of the priorities and interests of those seeking to define it.

Works Cited

Alkire, S., 2003. A Conceptual Framework for Human Security. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Oxford University. Working Paper 2.

Black, D.R., 2006. Mapping the Interplay of Human Security Practice and Debates: The Canadian Experience. In MacLean, S., Black, D.R. and Shaw, T.M., *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Ch. 5.

Blackwood, E., 2006. Human Security and Corporate Governance: A Critical Assessment of Canada's Human Security Agenda. In MacLean, S., Black, D.R. and Shaw, T.M., *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Ch. 8.

Buzan, B., & Hansen, L., 2009. *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

King, G., & Murray, C.J.L., 2001-02. Rethinking Human Security. *Political Science Quarterly*, 116(4), pp. 585-610.

Paris, R., 2001. Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? *International Security* 26(2), pp. 87-102.

Tadjbakhsh, S., & Chenoy, A.M., 2007. *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*. London: Routledge.

Thomas, C., 2001. Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links. *Third World Quarterly* 22(2), pp. 159-175.

United Nations Development Programme, 1994. *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<div style="display:flex;align-items:center;">

8

The Emancipatory Potentials of 'The Right to Development'

CYPRIANUS JEHAN PAJU DALE

</div>

The Declaration on the Rights to Development (RTD), adopted by United Nations General Assembly in 1986, has been seen as "a major milestone that brought development and human rights discourses together" (Rajagopal 2003: 220). At discursive level it stimulates scholarly discussions on inter-linkages between human rights and development. At strategic level, it become foundations and socio-legal framework for integrating development and human right practices such as human development program by UNDP and right-based-approach development projects by government institutions and non-governmental organizations.

In the context of current historical crisis of development – due to its negative impact to human and nature, its ideological crisis after the Cold-War Era, and its hegemonic ambivalence – the merger of development and human rights consolidated the revitalization of development idea. Through the so-called "Developmentalization of Human Rights" (Rajagopal 2003: 222), development discourse regained its power as a credible tool for social change, contributing to the well-being of the people. To what extent the RTD contributes to new paradigm and transformative discourse of development, which- from Post-Development Critiques – is a form of hegemonic domination over and even causing violent damages to the "underdeveloped" people and countries? How can the RTD framework ensure the respecting, protecting, and fulfilment of the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of the 'under-developed' , 'the poor' and "the third world" people through the practice of development? In other words, how can the RTD framework deal with the cynical view on the mainstream human rights and development discourses as hegemonic and pro-status-quo? What are the emancipatory potentials and the limitations of the RTD framework?

In answering those questions, this essay shall be organized in four main parts. The *first* section discusses the critique of post-development school on

the mainstream development discourse, in order to make explicit the ambivalence and contradictions of development in thinking and practices nowadays. In the *second* part, I shall explore emancipatory potentials of the RTD concept and framework, with specific reference to the declaration on the RTD. I shall put forward the argument that the declaration on the RTD does have emancipatory potentials especially in its formulation on what is a genuine development, and in the notion to right holders and duty bearers of the right. However, in the *third* section, the limitations and obstacles will be drawn, with specific reference to the existing hegemonic role of states at national and international human rights and development system, which caused the RTD loss its emancipatory power. Here, I shall argue that, on the hands of states at national level and international level, the RTD is used for legitimating the 'doing development as usual', without fundamentally taking into account the basic principles of the Declaration. On the other side, I shall show in the *fourth* section, the emancipatory potentials of the RTD are effectively used by the social movements in advocating alternative kinds of development beyond the domination of state and market.

Post-Development Critiques to Development

Development has been seen as tools for positive change or progress to improve living standard of human beings. The governments of the so-called "third world" or developing countries exercise development to "catch up" with the developed countries, gaining the levels of advancement they have achieved. At the same time, the developed countries help the developing countries through international cooperation and development aid. Besides economic activities, development in this sense includes also modernization in politic, social and cultural lives of the third world. In the formulation of World Bank chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz, "development represents a transformation of society, a movement from traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and education, traditional methods of production to more "modern" ways" (Stiglitz 1999, cited in Rajagopal 2003: 205,206).

The idea of development as positive change has been challenged by social movements and progressive intellectuals who are generically known as Post-Development Thinkers. They argue that "it is not the lack of development that caused poverty, inflicted violence, and engaged in the destruction of nature and livelihoods; rather, it is the very process of bringing development that have caused them in the first place" (Rajagopal 2004: 3). Additionally, "…at best, development has failed," says Thomas" …or at

worst it always a 'hoax', designed to cover up violent damage being done to the so-called 'developing' world and its people" (Thomas 2000: 3 quoted in Ziai 2007: 3)

Development of that kind is "a threat to people's autonomy", "a new form of colonialism", a tool for expansion of economic and geopolitical power imposed to the people who are constructed as backward or under-developed (Rahnema 1997: 9). In Rahnema's words, "Development, as it imposed itself on its 'target populations' was basically the wrong answer to their needs and aspirations. It was an ideology that was born and refined in the North, mainly to meet the needs of the dominant powers in search of a more 'appropriate' tool for their economic and geopolitical expansion...the ideology helped a dying and obsolete colonialism to transform itself into an aggressive –even sometimes an attractive- instrument able to recapture new ground" (Rahnema 1997: 384, 397).

The critic of development as hegemonic exercise of power is also obvi-ous in Escobar's writings. "The development discourse...has created an ex-tremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over the Third World" (Escobar 1995: 5). Development is "a dis-course of Western origin that operated as a powerful mechanism for the cultural, social, and economic production of the Third World" (Escobar 2007: 19).

As part of the critique to that hegemonic development, the Post-development thinkers also scrutinize the creation of institutional apparatus such as World Bank, IMF, United Nations system at global level as well as national planning and development agencies and local level projects as part of creation and exercise of power over the third world (Escobar 2007: 19).

How should we evaluate the Post-Development view on Development discourse, especially in relation to the RTD? Following Ziai (2007), I would argue that although the claim of total failure of development in the Global South can be contested and the promotion of local communities as alterna-tives to the global system are debateable, there are two convincing main contribution of Post Development School to our reflection on develop-ment. *Firstly*, the traditional and mainstream concept of 'development are Eurocentric and hegemonic'. The notion of developed (for Europe and North America) and the rest of the world as 'underdeveloped" are construc-tion of power and can be seen as continuation of colonialism. The way de-velopment enterprise is organized nowadays, including in international aid and development assistance is not free from the nuance of superiority of the developed countries over the rest of the world. *Secondly*, the mainstream

concept and practice of development has "authoritarian and technocratic implications". It has intrinsic potentials to do violence to the people and the nature. To quote Ziai,

> Post-Development authors have convincingly demonstrated that some measures undertaken in the name of 'development' had disastrous consequences for those supposed to benefit. The violence they had to suffer was directly related to their disempowerment concerning the question whether they wanted this 'development' and to the question who is in the discursive position to define the common good and to dictate what (and who) can be sacrificed to achieve it. Knowledge about 'development' is in this sense knowledge about the deficiencies of the others' way of life, about the necessity of its transformation, about the appropriate method, and about the legitimacy of all that. In the face of heterogeneous conception of a good society, to define one conception as universal clearly implies a position of power (Ziai 2007: 9).

In short, a critical evaluation on development discourse would reveal not only its contribution to positive progress, but also its ambivalence and contradictions in creating violence over people and nature, and in maintaining the hegemonic relation between the so called developed or first world and underdeveloped or third world. Hence, the future of our civilization will rely on the fundamental change or development or, in the post-development terminology, on "alternatives to development."

Right to Development as Human Rights: Is it Emancipatory?

The Declaration of the RTD defines development as "comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefit resulting there from" (preamble). It is clear that the declaration perceive development far beyond the mainstream focus on the economic growth or modernization project at the expense of social and environmental costs. Contrarily, it covers all aspects of human endeavours: economic, social, cultural and political. Through its objectives of "improvement of well-being of entire populations and individuals" (preamble) and "realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms" (article 1 paragraph 1), the RTD puts human persons at the centre and main subject of development.

That particular kind of development is adopted as fundamental entitlement, in which individuals and peoples are right holders and states, indi-

vidually and collectively, as duty bearer. The Declaration states that "The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized" (article 1 paragraph 1). This notion contains some pivotal points in the development and human right practices: (1) right to development is a right that cannot be bargained away, (2) it promotes a particular kind of development, which ensures the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, and (3) every human persons and all peoples own the right not only to enjoy the results but also to "participate in" and "contribute to" the process of development (Sengupta 2005: 64).

As articulated by Rajagopal (2003), this definition of development and its legalization (normative framework) as human rights is potentially challenging the existing human right discourse and even the international establishment in general, which is based on the hegemonic relation between the West and the Third World as legitimized through development discourse. The new understanding of development in the RTD has a powerful implication to the national and international practice of development which very much relies on exploitation of resources for profit accumulation to gain growth and on replacing traditional practice with modern invention in the name of affectivity and efficiency. This kind of development is not a eurocentric mainstream discourse as criticised by Post-Development Critiques. Contrarily, the individuals and people can formulate the development they want to pursue using their agency "to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy" the process and results of development.

Moreover, the declaration articulates the indivisibility and interdependency of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; and insists that the violations of human rights "resulting from the failure to observe civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights" are obstacles of development, and should be addressed by development initiatives (article 6).

The emancipatory potential of the right to development is even more obvious in the notion of the right holders and duty bearers. Individuals and peoples are rights holders of right to development. That means that individuals and peoples have the rights claim for development which promotes all human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to refuse other types of development that in not in accordance with human rights principles. Interestingly, the declaration explicitly recognizes and promotes the collective rights of the peoples for self-determination, including "the exercise of their

inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources" (article 1 paragraph 2). The notion of people as right holders is crucial in the realm of development due to at least two interrelated reasons. First, development is not merely individual rights, but a collective right. Secondly, as a collective right, the right to development can be used by peoples to resist for their rights against state at national level and group of states or international system at global level. Consequently, the right to development promotes the collective agency of peoples or civil society in relation to states and market system. By implication, individuals and peoples have an authoritative position, not only in controlling the accountability of states and business actors, but also in making decisions with a veto position.

States, individually and collectively, are the duty bearers of right to development. "States", according to the article 3, paragraph 1, "have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development". They have the "duty to cooperate with each other" (article 3 paragraph 3), "to promote a new international economic order" (article 3 paragraph 3), "to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to development" (article 4 paragraph 1), and "to promote more rapid development of developing countries" (article 4 paragraph 2).

The notion of States as duty bearers of right to development has at least two interrelated implications to the practice of development: firstly, the states have the obligation to intensify the development; and, secondly, they have to change the way they do development from the hegemonic one to the genuine development in accordance to human rights standards. The declaration explicitly requires the creation of "new international economic order" and "national and international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development". Moreover, "States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the realization of the right to development and shall ensure, inter alia, equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income....Appropriate economic and social reforms should be carried out with a view to eradicating all social injustices" (article 8)

It is plausible to conclude that the declaration on RTD has the potential for changing not only our understanding to development, but on how development is practiced as part of the human rights in the national and international arena. At the national level, the states (or government institutions)

have the obligations to implement a particular kind of development in a manner that "some or most rights are realized while no others are violated" (Sengupta 2005: 67). At the international level, the states do not merely oblige to help the other countries though development aid as part of the human right obligation, but also to change the way they do development, and hence, change the international hegemonic economic, social, cultural and political system.

In that sense, the RTD have transformed the development discourse from a mainly economic and political activity to a human right system in which development can become object of claims by the right holders with a clear social arrangement of duties and responsibilities of states and international community and duty bearer. The question now is, after almost twenty five years of its declaration, how do the RTD contribute to change of the development discourse?

Developmentalization of Human Rights: limiting the emancipatory potentials of the RTD

Stephen P. Marks – who is recently appointed as chairperson of United Nations High-Level Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development – articulates that one of the main obstacles of the right to development is the lack of implementation, "resulting from the absence of policies at the national and international levels that go beyond lip service to the concept and that set priorities and allocate resources based on the right to development" (2003: 13). At the national level, despite of recognition right to development as a human right, the governments tends to do development as usual, without following the normative principles of the right to development. Similarly, the programs of international cooperation, both bilateral and multilateral, including those initiated by United Nations agencies and financial institutions, "although …. contains elements and principles that overlap with RTD, the effort that goes into conceiving, funding and monitoring them is done outside of the RTD framework" (ibid:14).

Under the umbrella of RTD, there are many initiatives to merge development and human rights for what is called by Rajagopal as "developmentalization of human rights" (2003: 222). Those initiatives includes (1) integration of human rights into sustainable human development such as Human Development Program of UNDP and Millennium Development Goals of various stakeholders, (2) capacity building of human rights institutions such as national human rights commission and Ombudspersons, (3) and support for human rights programming (ibid: 222-229). Nevertheles,

there *is no fundamental and paradigmatic change in the way development is done*, as criticised by Post-Development ideas and as normatively addressed in the Declaration of Right to Development.

Among other reasons, in my opinion, the deficit of the implementation of right to development lays in the inability to transform the discourse (concept, thinking, and practices) of development from the mainstream hegemonic to non-hegemonic one, which is called "alternatives to development" by post-development school or "particular kind of development" in the formulation of RTD. This inability to transform is partly, if not mainly, caused by remaining centrality of states in the international law. As articulated by Rajagopal (ibid), the crisis of development has been caused by the inability of states in doing development without social and environmental cost. Returning to state under the new banner of human rights, without changing the way states are operating, will likely not solve the problem.

The equally problematic is the international cooperation. Although the language of human rights is being used, its very essence is still the 'exercise of power over the third world' by the so called first world countries through human rights and development discourses.

Given the fact that international law and the whole United Nations system is a terrain of struggle over power and domination (Evans 2005; Rajagopal 2003; de Sousa Santos 2002), it is understandable that the RTD as a declaration cannot change the practice of international development and human right practice overnight. Although it is revolutionary in reformulating the development and in making it as an entitlement, rights to development have limitations when it is implemented in the existing hegemonic system. The very fact that right to development is "no more than" a declaration (which means that it is not legally binding, although have normative imperative) – despite of the current efforts of the its proponent to make a convention with a legally binding statues (Salama 2008; Schrijver 2008) – is one of the indicators of unwillingness of the stakeholders to fundamentally change the development discourse as called upon by the post-development critiques.

The "developmentalisation of human rights" through various development projects on one hand, and the unwillingness to fundamentaly change the way of doing development on the other, have contributed to to the hegemonic maniputalion of human rights to re-legitimize the development ideology of states and market. The critiques of post-development thinkers is still relevant, to states individually at national level and collectively in international cooperation.

However, it does not mean that we should dismiss the Right to Development. Although it is manipulated by the its duty bearers, it is faitfully explored and utilized by the right holders, especially by individuals and peoples of the victim of mainstream development. The way the RTD is being used by social movements will be breiefly elaborated in the next section.

Right to Development and Emancipatory Movements

One of the prominent lessons we can learn from social movment is that a meaningful social transformation can be built by fundamentally questioning the development discourse of states at national and in international arena as well as fostering the actual practices of social transformation by the people of social movements who stuggle for alternative (to) development.

According to Escobar, these alternatives are located in grassroots movement, urban and rural local communities and the informal sector. The post development thinking point out the emergence of 'new social structure' based on new conception of economy (solidarity and reciprocity instead of *homo oeconomicus* and the world market), of politics (direct democracy instead of centralized authorities), and of knowledge (traditional knowledge systems instead of modern science, or the hybridization) (Escobar 1995; Ziai 2007). Escobar calls for the multiplication of centres and agents of knowledge production especially to let the 'objects' of projects and interventions become "subject of their own right" (21). It can be done by (1) "focusing on the adaptations, subversions and resistance that local peoples effect in relation to development intervention" and (2) "by highlighting the alternative strategies produces by social movements as they encounter development projects" (21). Supporting Escobar's points, de Sousa Santos calls for "another knowledge", "another democracy", and "another production" outside the mainstream hegemonic ones (2002; 2007).

In my opinion, the RTD framework has emancipatory potentials to be used by social movements in their struggles. The definition of genuine development in the declaration is consistent with the "alternative to (mainstream) development" or alternative development as proposed by social movement. The recognition of peoples (and not only individuals) as right holders is a unique notion in human rights instrument that can be used for promoting the agency of peoples in relation to states and business actors. Moreover, the very fact that states, individually and collectively, are duty bearers, can be used to claim their accountability in respecting, protecting,

and fulfilling all human rights and fundamental freedom in the practice of development.

The strategic use of RTD will involves (1) the interpretative work to make explicit the emancipatory potentials of the right to development; (2) the advocacy work to promote and ensure the respect, promotion, and fulfillment of all human rights; (3) the policy making, through the claim of right to participation; and (4) the resistance in the case of violation of rights by the hegemonic development, and finally (5) the creative works in creating alternative change beyond the state and market in improving the well-being of all individuals and peoples as practices by social movements.

Although limited, the RTD provide normative human rights frameworks for those agendas. There is certainly a need for its improvement, either by encouraging its implementaion mechanism, upgrading its status from "declaration" to a legally binding instrument, or by complementing it with other instruments. For a long term vision, as international law is an on-going process, RTD can be seen as a milestone before other milestones for securing the social justice in human rights system.

Conclusion

The Declaration on RTD has provided a normative framework for combining human rights and development discource for the sake of improving 'the well being' of all individuals and peoples and realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. As a normative framework, the declaration has provided an alternative formulation of development which is fundamentally different from the mainstream hegemonic development. It also promotes the strategic position of individuals and peoples as right holders who can claim a right for 'alternative (to) development' to states both at national level and international level. Theoritically, the Declaration provides basic foundations for an emancipatory development and human rights discourse.

However, as I have shown, there is discrepancy between the normative principles and the actual practices and policies of states and international cooperation. Despite of clear guidelines in the international system of human rights, the states do development as usual. The 'developmentalisation of human rights', combined with unwillingness to fundamentaly change the way of doing development, has contributed to the hegemonic maniputalion of human rights to re-legitimize the development ideology and explorative practices of states and business actors. Operating within the hegemonic system of national development and international cooperation, the RTD as

normative guideline is unable to fundamentally change real practice of development.

In contrast, the social movements do make good use of the emancipatory potentials of RTD in supporting the struggles for "alternative (to) development." With all its limitations, I have argued, the RTD can be a suffcent framework to nurture the alternatives outside the state and market, alternatives that is on-going in the practices of people of social movements all over the world.

References

Andreassen, B.A. and S.P. Marks (eds) (2006) *Development as a Human Rights: Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions.* Boston, MA: Harvard School of Public Health.

De Sousa Santos, B. (2007) *Another Knowledge is Possible.* London: Verso

De Sousa Santos, B. (2002) 'Towards a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights', in Hernandes-Truyol, Berta (ed.) *Moral Imperialism: A Critical Anthology*, pp. 39-60. New York: New York University Press.

Escobar, A. (1995) *Encountering Development.* Princeton. NJ: Princeton University

Escobar, A. (2007) '"Post Development" as Concept and Social Practice' in A. Ziai (ed), *Exloring Post-development: Theory and Practice, Problems and Perspectives*, pp. 18-31. London: Routledge,

Evans, T. (2005) '"nternational Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge', *Human Rights Quarterly* 27: 1046-1068.

Marks, S. and A. Clapham, (2004) 'Development' in *International Human Rights Lexicon*, pp. 91-105. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marks, S. P. (2005) 'The Human Rights Framework for Development: Seven Approaches', in in A. Sengupta, A. Negi and M. Basu (eds), *Reflections on the Right to Development,* pp. 23-60. New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd.

Marks, S.P. (2003) *Oblstacles of Right to Development.* Accessed 7 April 2010 <http://www.harvardfxbcenter.org/resources/working-papers/FXBC_WP17--Marks.pdf>

Pieterse, J. N. (2010) *Development Theory: Deconstructions/Reconstructions* (2nd ed.). London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Pogge, T. (2008) *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press

Rahnema, M. (1997) *The Post-Development Reader.* London: Zed Books

Rajagopal, B. (2003) *International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Salama, I. (2008) 'The Right to Development: Renewal and Potential' in Marks, S.P. (ed.), *Implementing the Right to Development: The Role of International Law*, pp. 117-126. Geneva: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Schrijver, N. (2008) 'Many Roads Lead to Rome. How to Arrive at a Legally Binding Instrument on the Right to Development?' in S. P. Marks (ed.) *Implementing the Right to Development: The Role of International Law*, pp.127-129. Geneva: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Sengupta, A. (2005) 'On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development' in A. Sengupta, A. Negi and M. Basu (eds.), *Reflections on the Right to Development,* pp. 61-109. New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd.

United Nations General Assembly (1986) 'Declaration on the Right to Development', UNGA Res. 41/128, 4 December 1986.

Ziai, A. (2007) 'Development Discourse and Its Critics: an Introduction to Post-development', in Ziai, A. (ed.), *Exloring Post-development: Theory and Practice, Problems and Perspectives*, pp. 3-17. London: Routledge.

9 Neoliberalizing Civil Society: Who Is Enabling Who?

NATALIA ANDREA SUESCUN POZAS

Introduction

This essay will address the way in which different International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (like the Interamerican Bank for Development – IBD, – the World Bank – WB – and the International Monetary Fund – IMF) understand and develop strategies around the notion of civil society, and will respond the question of why, if the neoliberal agenda is based on individualism, does it promotes the strengthening of civil society. The first part of the essay will be centred on the different notions and concepts of civil society and the way this essay will be engaged with one of them. The second part will deal with the history around how civil society organizations started to become important in the agenda of the international financial institutions. The third part will look at how different financial institutions conceive civil society and how it is undertaken into their programs in order to achieve their strategic goals. Then we will respond why, if the neoliberal agenda is based on individualism, does it promotes the strengthening of civil society through its main international organizations. Finally, we will move to the conclusions.

I. Civil society notions, definitions and dilemmas

The term of civil society is not new. It can be traced back to the late 18th century and the writings of important political theorist such as Thomas Paine, Georg Hegel, John Locke and Alexis de Tocqueville (Hyden, 1997). Among these four theorists, Paine, Locke and de Tocqueville influenced, to some extent, the conception that the financial institutions have around the concept of civil society. They specifically raised the issue of the role that civil society represents in relation to the market and to democracy. According to Paine's theory, 'it is the market rather than the state that provides the

best opportunity for the growth of civil society, because the limits of individual capacity to satisfy natural desires can only be transcended by commercial exchanges' (Hyden, 1997: 6). For Locke, 'the state arises from society and is needed to restrain conflict between individuals. At the same time, however, Locke emphasizes the need to 'limit state sovereignty in order to preserve individual freedoms derived from natural law'. Tocqueville also addresses the term civil society as a 'self-governing association' (Hyden, 1997: 6-7) that educates the citizenry, scrutinizes state actions, facilitates distribution of power and provides mechanisms for direct citizen participation in public affairs.

One of the key authors that summarize the conception that these institutions have around the concept of civil society is Larry Diamond. He points out an extensive set of functions that civil society has to undertake in order to achieve development and democratic goals. According to him, civil society is 'the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules' (Diamond, 1994: 6). The functions that the civil society assumes are: limit the state power; stimulate political participation; development of democratic attributes as tolerance, moderation and compromise; articulate, represent and aggregate interest; generate a wide range of interests that may cross-cut, and so mitigate, the principal polarities of political conflict; and recruiting and training new political leaders. Also, civil society disseminates information, thus aiding citizens in the collective pursuit and defence of their interests and values; spreading new information and ideas is essential to the achievement of economic reform in a democracy; a rich association that encourages the capacities of groups to improve their own welfare, independently of the state.

The definitions and functions of civil society stated in section III are going to shape the way in which the IFIs are going to understand and develop strategies among civil society organizations – CSOs – as we will see in the next parts. Nevertheless, further explanation will be given in the fourth and fifth part of this essay.

II. A brief history: civil society captured the attention of the international financial institutions

The shift from the Washington Consensus to the Post Washington Consensus implied a change in the agenda of some of the international financial institutions. After the failure of the previous model, these institutions realized that some aspects of governance should be incorporated into the

agenda. The new policy package promoted by the IFIS showed an aware-ness that 'no economic project was likely to succeed unless minimum condi-tions of political legitimacy, social order and institutional efficiency were met' (Hewitt de Alcantara, UNESCO 1998).

Two things gave the floor to civil society to come onto the scene. The first one is that the IFIs were having problems of legitimacy among the lenders, especially the International Monetary Fund (Thirkell-White, 2004) and the World Bank (Goldman, 2007). These problems of legitimacy were the result of the deeper financial troubles faced by the governments and the rising levels of poverty and unemployment that the population of their countries were facing (Potter, 2007). The second one is that, in order to en-gage governments to the new policy package that was designed to achieve the so wanted economic growth, these Institutions needed to attract a wider segment of the population that supported the initiatives proposed.

The IFIs stated that governments were corrupt and therefore a problem for the economic policy making and growth. In that sense, civil society en-ters the scene in order to discipline the state and 'give useful input on eco-nomic policy issues, facilitate the growth of private enterprise, and help en-sure the state does not suffocate the economy' (Carothers, 1999). Civil society became a key component not only to create and strengthen democ-racies, but also to support and enable the market to function without the interference of the State actions.

III. Civil society meets some International Financial Institutions

Each financial institution chosen has different definitions and understand-ings of what civil society is and how to engage it in the process of develop-ment and democracy strategies. Nevertheless, there are certain particular similarities regarding the underlying assumptions of why they must engage with civil society. I will explore their understandings, trying to highlight first some of the major common assumptions:[1]

- The effectiveness of correct economic strategies and policies has been limited by the inadequate operation of public institutions or an ad-verse political climate.

---

[1] Based on the 'Frame of Reference for Bank Action in Programs for Moderni-zation of the State and Strengthening of Civil Society of the Interamerican De-velopment Bank.

- There can be no effective democracy or sustainable and equitable development without a strong civil society.
- A robust civil society is founded on the existence of economic opportunities and democratic freedoms for all its citizens.
- Furthermore, the greatest constraints on the strengthening of civil society in the countries of the region are the socioeconomic exclusion of vast sectors of the population and fragile democratic institutions, affecting citizens' ability to exercise their economic, social and political rights to the fullest.

Let's see now each IFIs particular understanding of the matter:

International Monetary Fund

According to the IMF, the term civil society (organization) refers to the 'wide range of citizens' associations that exists in virtually all member countries to provide benefits, services, or political influence to specific groups within society'. This civil society organization includes: business forums, faith-based associations, labor unions, local community groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), philanthropic foundations, and think tanks. In that sense, civil society organizations comprehend a broad notion of individual association that is highly diverse. These organizations are then related to either political or economic issues and are committed to activities that can: aggregate citizens voice; provide information, advice and lobbying on particular issues; provide support or funding to other organizations; and finally, implement development projects or provide services (Dawson and Bhatt, 2001).

World Bank

For the World Bank, the term civil society refers to the 'wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, among others. CSOs comprehend a wide range of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations. According to the World Bank, civil society undertakes two important functions in the strengthening of democracy and the creation of a proper environment for development to be achieved: the first is campaigning issues related with public policies and disseminating information related with governmental

decisions in different areas, and the second one is delivering social services and implementing different programs in which the state has a weak presence.

Interamerican Bank for Development

For the Interamerican Development Bank, civil society is defined as the activities of citizens, either individually or in associations, in the economic, social and political spheres. For the Bank, civil society organizations can work in the following areas: participate and monitor performance in the conduct of public affairs, participate in the delivery of complementary services, promote and assist production units established to advance social integration and solidarity and not just to make a profit and, finally, the acquisition of resources and participation by the private sector in the contribution of financial and technical resources for purposes of socioeconomic and cultural promotion.

IV. Neoliberalizing civil society organizations

The main reason for the markets un-trust in the State is that the latter is constituted by individuals that will always pursue their own benefit (not a collective one). Nevertheless, the State has the duty of providing the minimal conditions under which the market can function in a proper way. 'Furthermore, if markets do not exist then they must be created by state action if necessary. But beyond this task the state should not venture. State intervention in the market must be kept to a bare minimum because the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-signals (prices) and because powerful interest inevitably distorts and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit' (Harvey, 2007: 22-23).

For a market economy to consolidate it requires the modernization of the State in a comprehensive way. It must encompass, therefore, the entire institutional and regulatory framework in which economic, social and political activities take place. Civil society, therefore, comes onto the scene to restrain the power of the state and to enable the market to function without much interference (IDB Frame of Reference).

Up until now we can understand why the IFIs see it as necessary to bring civil society into their strategies. But, as we have seen, interested individuals also constitute civil society; civil society also promotes political ends and represents the interest of some particular groups in society. Why then, if the neoliberal agenda is based on individualism, and there is mistrust on collec-

tive organizations, it promotes the strengthening of civil society? To answer this question, I will bring my own perspective on this dilemma; influenced by the ideas of Rational Choice Institutionalism (an in particular the Collective Action) and those of David Harvey.

Under the collective action approach, self rent-seeker individuals look forward to organizing themselves into a group in order to coordinate a mutual advantage. The cost for individuals to be excluded from this group is higher than the one of being part of it and, therefore, at the end of the day, individuals accept to be part of a civil society organization in order to be able to maximize their utility at the same time that they are reducing the costs of acting alone.

But, it seems that there is something more than collective action approaches to explain why they engage with civil society organizations. If we take a deeper look to the definitions of civil society that these organizations have used, we can see that these CSOs are no longer in the realm of society but rather in the realm of markets. The three IFIs stated that the CSOs were delivering services, providing information and also funding projects to support their constituencies and other group interest.

Suddenly, and under the logic of CSOs, there is a whole arrangement of actions that tend to support and internalize the market logics and not necessarily democracy strengthening. CSOs are actors that, as industries and businesses, are competing among other organizations with the same characteristics, to provide services, attract investment and undertake projects to benefit their members. According to the World Bank web page, CSOs are significant players in carrying international development assistance, in delivering social services and complementing the government presence. In doing so, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported that CSOs were channelling some US$18 billion into development aid annually to developing countries by 2006.

In order to compete, these organizations need information, and in order to attract funds they need to commercialize their achievements. They also need to be accountable, accessible, transparent and clear with the way they manage the funds but also in the way they are fulfilling the interest of their members, if not, they may run the risk of been dismissed or punished by the market. What does this have to do with individuals? Under neoliberalism, human well being 'can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade' (Harvey, 2007: 22). Under this state, individuals' well being, in civil society

terms, depends on the extent in which they support collective action to private well-being.

On the contrary, the state, because of its inner structure, cannot act under the logic of the market mechanism. It can try to include some managerial action in its functioning but hardly will act under the market logic. States therefore cannot compete (at the national level) with other states to provide the public goods and services. The state will always have privileged information and the monopoly of violence, and this will allow it, under the neoliberal agenda, to have a comparative advantage among other institutions or organizations.

It seems that only under the logic of the market, and not thanks to the state actions, individuals can achieve their well-being and also organize to pursue their utility maximization. Individuals, therefore, are organized among markets and not markets organized among individuals. We can say that under the perspective of the International Financial Institutions, civil society, states and individuals are embedded in the market logics and not the other way around. States and markets are not embedded in society, rather, state and individuals (organizations) are embedded in the market logics. The point is not that civil society organizations are enabling market to function properly; rather, the point is that markets are the only mechanism under which individuals can organize themselves in truly representative organizations that are looking to provide what they want.

V. Conclusions

The picture that has been brought into this essay reflects only one side of the true reality. This reality is more related with the way in which the neoliberal agenda has permeated certain levels of society, until the point of reaching civil society organizations, to pursue their project. In that sense, the version of civil society that was exposed here is the one reflected by some of the articles and documents of the International Financial Institutions named in this essay. Therefore, they reproduce, legitimize and justify (and to a certain point, react to) the own actions taken by these institutions in order to implement governance and economic policies.

The civil society organizations, characterized here, are important tools under which the neoliberal agenda has encountered the possibility to spread its main tenets and also to achieve its project to restore class dominance and reinforce capital accumulation for certain sectors of society. At the end of the day, the powerfulness of civil society doesn't' come from the direct actions it undertakes; it comes rather from the veiled objectives it helps (aware

or not) to accomplish. Under CSOs, the financial institutions have managed to go where they could not go in the past – into slums, dense tropical forest, indigenous communities', etc (Goldman, 2007: 18).

In sum, the strengthening of civil society kills many birds with the same shot (a Spanish proverb). In fact, at the same time, it constrains the action of the state, either by assuming or complementing the actions that are part of its nature (state nature), it promotes either the establishment or spread of the market, or creates the conditions under which these ones can flourish and finally, it becomes part of the market itself.

One of the "qualities" of neoliberalism is that it is capable (because of the action of the people managing his agenda) to reinvent itself, to mutate, to hybridize or change the skin in order to influence outcomes for the spread of its creed. The approach to civil society is not an exception. Neoliberal institutions, more particularly the International Financial Institutions, have been able to change, up to a certain point, something that at the beginning was challenging the entire individualistic edifice upon which the neoliberal agenda was constructed, to something that became part of the project and a perfect tool for the accomplishment of its purpose.

These explored ideas offer a kind of paradox. Indeed, I have explored one dimension on how civil society strengthening has been co-opted and utilized by the neoliberal agenda. Another part of the reality is still out there (the one on the civil society organizations 'resisting' globalization), willing to be explored. If, in the reality presented, 'civil society is co-opted by hegemonic capitalism and political elites, and promotes hegemonic interest by distributing neoliberal values and providing a façade of opposition' (Katz, 2006: 333) the other is rather different. Civil society can also be seen as the 'infrastructure from which counter-hegemonic resistance… will evolve and challenge neoliberal hegemony' (Katz, 2006: 333). There are also powerful civil society organizations resisting the neoliberalization of life. This will be a case for further exploration.

Bibliography

Articles

Carothers, Thomas. Civil Society Think Again. *Foreign Policy*. Winter 1999/2000

Chambers, Simone and Kopstein, Jeffrey. Bad Civil Society. *Political Theory* December 2001. University of Colorado at Boulder

Dawson, Thomas C and Bhatt Gita. The IMF and Civil Society Organizations: Striking a Balance. IMF Policy Discussion Paper 01/02. 2001

Diamond, Larry. Rethinking Civil Society. Towards Democratic Consolidation. *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 5, No 3 July 1994

Frame of Reference for Bank Action in Programs for Modernization of the State and Strengthening of Civil Society. Strategic Planning and Operational Policy Departament. Interamerican Bank for Development.

Fukuyama, Francis. Social Capital, civil society and development. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 22, No 1, pp 7-20, 2001

Goldman, Michael. Under New Management: Historical Contezt and Current Challenges at the World Bank. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*. Spring/Summer 2007. Vol XIII, Issue 2

Grugel, Jean. Romancing Civil Society: European NGO's in Latin America.

Harvey, David. Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction. *The Annals of the Amercian Academy of Political and Social Science* 2007; 610;21

Hewitt de Alcantara, Cynthia. Uses and abuses of the concept of governance. *ISSJ* 155/1998 Ó UNESCO 1998

Katz, Hagai. Gramsci, Hegemony, and Global Civil Society Networks. *Voluntas* (2006) 17:333-348

Kelly, Robert Edwin. Disertation. A Lot More Than the NGO's seem to Think: the impart of Non-Governamental Organizations in the Bretton Woods Institutions. The Ohio State University, 2005

North, Douglas. (1981) *A neoclassical Theory of the State, in Structure and Change in Economic History.* Norton, New York, pp 20-32

Ostrom, Elinor. A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 1-22

Pearce, Jenny. Building Civil Society from the outside: The problematic democratisation of Central America. *Global Society*, Vol 12 No. 2, 1998

Potter, Brian. Constricting Constestation, Coalitions, and Purpose: The Causes of Neoliberal Restructuring and its Failures. *Latin American Perspectives* 200u7; 34; 3

Shepsle, Kenneth A. *Rational Choice Institutionalism. Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions* eds. S. Binder, R. Rhodes, and B. Rockman. Harvard University January 2005

Sholte, Ian Aart. The IMF Meets Civil Society. Finance and Development; Seo 1998; 35,3; ABI/INFORM Global Pg 42

Thirkell-White, Ben. The International Monetary Fund and civil society. *New Political Economy*, Vol 9, No. 2, June 2004

Internet Sources

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,content
MDK:20101499~pagePK:220503~piPK:264336~theSitePK:228717,00.ht
ml

http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1441506

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CSO/Resources/Issues_and_Options_Spa
nish.pdf

http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/cs/index.aspx

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,content
MDK:20101499~pagePK:220503~piPK:264336~theSitePK:228717,00.ht
ml

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,content
MDK:20092185~menuPK:220422~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSit
ePK:228717,00.html

http://fathom.lse.ac.uk/features/122552/

10 The Role of Aid and Market in Local Economic Development: The Case of Bamboo Basketry under OTOP programme in Thailand

JUN YAMAZAKI

Introduction

Rural development has remained the greatest challenge in developing countries for a long time. Even so, the integration of international markets has created a new field to play on for rural villages, and exporting of local products has become one of the realistic strategies for growth, development, and employment creation in a village. In response to the changing circumstances, the One Tambon One Product (OTOP) policy was introduced by the government of Thailand in 2001, under the leadership of the former Prime Minister, Dr. Shinawatra Thaksin. The priorities of his government were to recover from the shock of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and to reduce the widening gap between urban and rural areas. The OTOP policy was one of the key elements to achieve these goals by encouraging the development of rural areas through utilizing local resources with the participation of the community population (JICA 2003: 1-1).

The basic concept of the OTOP is based on the One Village One Product (OVOP) movement in Japan, which was a regional development strategy initiated in Oita Prefecture, Japan in the 1980s and the 1990s. The concept of OVOP has three main principles: (i) local yet global, (ii) self-reliance / creativity (iii) human resources development (Oita OVOP International Exchange Promotion Committee, n.d.). Under this policy, 'each village is encouraged to produce at least one product or service [based on local resources] which can be showcased across the country and the world' (Kurokawa et al. 2008: 23-24). The success of this movement had a great influence on the policy makers in other countries and this approach was adapted by many developing countries. In Thailand, a unit of implementation is the

Tambon (village), the lowest administrative body in rural areas throughout the nation and it is regarded to be a remarkable success by creating more than 3500 registered exporting products such as handicrafts and processed food.

This paper aims to illustrate the features of the OTOP project in comparison with other local economic development (LED) theories and also to analyse the influences of the aid programmes provided mainly by JETRO, The Japan External Trade Organization, a governmental agency of Japan that provided a series of technical assistance in 2002. An example of Bamboo basketry is examined here as a typical 'success' story in which a market-oriented aid scheme played important roles in the process of market participation of one local product under the OTOP policy. Lastly, this paper intends to provide several implications for a market-oriented aid programme by illustrating the different functions of an aid programme and market in a promotion of a local product.

Features of the OTOP policy and LED theories

Even though the OTOP programme has the same principles of the Japanese endogenous regional development model, there are different features in its scale and focus. In addition, the OTOP programme has both national and local dimensions. This section analyses the characteristics of the OTOP as national policy and its instruments to support local development by using the typology of LED.

Firstly, the national government is the driving force in the OTOP programme in Thailand. Even though a local initiative was emphasized in the principles as mentioned above, a hierarchal administration system was established from the central level, where the OTOP committee was set up under the Prime Minister's office, and subsequently to provincial, district, and Tambon (village) levels (JICA 2003: 2-1). A new OTOP section was not established in the Tambon, but existing public-hearing committees and a Tambon administration office were assigned to play a role for implementation of the activities such as community mobilisation and product advertisement (Fujioka 2006: 156). This is in contrast with the Japanese model, in which the OVOP movement 'emerged as a popular reaction to local development policy led by an independent people's movement and therefore less dependent on government from the start' (Kurokawa et al. 2008: 25). Despite the fact the OTOP was initiated by the national government in Thailand, villages had autonomy to a certain extent to select local products and local resources related with the programme. It is pointed out that the Tam-

bon Autonomy Act in 1997 is one of the important factors that made the state-driven local development possible by legalising a Tambon as an administrative body which could receive subsidies directly from the central government (Takei 2007: 168).

Secondly, the OTOP explicitly targets international markets and it has clear standards and instruments to prioritise the products. This can be seen in the process of product selection; for example, a candidate product is selected by a Tambon public hearing committee in consultation with village leaders and it is registered in a higher administrative body, which ranks the product by quality standards called OTOP Product Champion (OPC) and five-star certification and the product's potential for export and production capacity is assessed (Fujioka 2006: 156-158). The products with OPC and a star are entitled to receive intensive assistance such as training and export promotion (ibid).

To clarify the characteristics of the OTOP approach further, it is effective to compare them with other LED theories. Helmsing (2003: 67) provides a typology of LED strategies in developing countries in which there are three categories of LED: (1) community economic development, (2) locality development, and (3) enterprise development. In the first category of community economic development, which aims to 'facilitate household economic diversification as an essential strategy of rural and urban livelihood' (ibid), from the view of community economic development, the OTOP deals with the issue of improvement of livelihood and community empowerment in principle, but the programme generally focuses on producer groups or SMEs and it doesn't provide measures to spread benefit throughout the whole community. On the other hand, locality development, which is 'designed to create local public goods and positive externalities' (ibid), has more connection with OTOP in locality marketing: the OTOP approach intends to enhance the attraction of a locality as a result of product promotion, and moreover, a process of selecting and promoting 'one product' of a locality includes a marketing strategy of that locality as well as the product itself.

The third category, enterprise development, is a strategy that aims to specialise the local economic base. Most of the activities of the OTOP programme belong to this category. In the OTOP programme, a variety of business development services (BDS) is provided to OTOP committee members and registered producers. The field of services ranges from production technique, organisation management, finance and accounting, product design, to packaging (Routray 2007: 31-32). Funding support is rarely

provided from the programme, but other financial organisations such as SME banks and agricultural banks sometimes have schemes for OTOP producers with a star-certificate (ibid). Intensive advertising and marketing activities such as exhibitions, fairs, publications, and the opening of retail centres are led by strong initiative of government at local, national and international levels to promote the products; some activities are implemented with help from JETRO (ibid). Kurokawa et al. (2008: 30-31) point out the theoretical parallels between OVOP/OTOP and value chain theory, using the example of OTOP as this intervention of government into the retail chains, even though 'the OVOP [OTOP] approach lacks a clear understanding of sequencing and service flow' and 'the OVOP approach would therefore benefit from value chain analysis'.

As discussed in this section, the OTOP programme can be understood from different dimensions. From an organisational dimension, although it is based on the principle of endogenous development of the Japanese model, it is mainly led by the national government and there is not much space for local initiatives. From the theoretical point of view, most of the activities of the OTOP programme can be categorised as the ones from enterprise development strategy from the three major LED strategies.

Promoting One Product: A Case of Bamboo Basketry

This section aims to illustrate the case of local development in one village under the OTOP with some analysis on the role of local initiative and foreign aid in the process of market-participation of one product, bamboo basketry. Onkarn Borihaan Tambon (village) is located in Ang Thong Province in central Thailand with a population of approximately 2,600 within 600 households. The economic base is agriculture (rice), agrotourism, and bamboo basketry production; 60% of the working population and 70% of the female population is engaged in the basketry industry (Takei 2007: 170-176). Basketry has been produced in every household in the village since early times for daily use while these also being sold in a local market which was an important cash income source for farmers before plastic products began to flow into the local market, which reduced the sales of basketry (Ibid.).

The first turning point was in 1990 when a new village leader decided to promote basketry production by specialising in delicate and value-added basketry for commercial purposes. A 100-million-baht grant from the Japanese government was distributed to every village to ease the shock of the financial crisis in 1997. This grant was expected to be used for public basic services such as health centres, but instead, the village spent this fund to

produce competitive basketry (ibid). They conducted a training programme among producers and organised producer groups headed by skilled instructors for more effective production; consequently, basketry became famous for its quality in Thailand, and domestic and foreign buyers started to visit to procure their products (ibid). There are six producer groups consisted mainly of middle-aged women, and there is a division of labour within each group: the leaders are usually in charge of marketing and process control; they are supposed to receive a purchase order from buyers and procure necessary material for production, then other members work under the leaders as subcontractors and receive a wage or fee from the leaders (ibid).

Under the OTOP programme starting from 2001, the basketry of the village was listed in the OTOP list and the village received various assistance from foreign donors. Firstly, JETRO dispatched experts and Japanese buyers to the village and assisted to standardise the production line (e.g. size and quality) as well as to improve the design; for instance, a wooden mould was introduced to the line which made it possible to produce an equal size of basketry (ibid). JETRO also conducted a seminar in Bangkok on Japanese Market Trends and Marketing for OTOP and invited some producers (Thai- OTOP-City.com, n.d.). Another important example of assistance by JETRO was product promotion in Bangkok and Japan; various events such as 'One Village One Product in Thailand Sample Exhibition in Tokyo' and 'Bangkok International Gift & Houseware 2003' were held to promote the OTOP products (Ibid.). Usually one skilled leader of a producer group in the village was invited to these events (Takei 2007: 175). In addition to the JETRO's technical assistance, community centres were constructed with a loan from JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation) in rural areas throughout the country in 2002 and these centres started to be utilised to exhibit and sell their products to buyers and tourists.

The following is some of the outcomes which could be observed in the village during the OTOP programme period. Firstly, the programme contributed to the process upgrading in a value chain: the production line was improved during the OTOP period. A large-lot production turned out to be possible with this improvement. Secondly, the quality of product was improved and the brand was established (product upgrading): one producer's group obtained a five-star certificate of the OTOP programme and its products could be sold to Japan, Europe and the U.S. at a price which was more than three times higher than before (ibid). The five-star certificate system is motivating producers to upgrade the quality of products. Thirdly, intersectional upgrading also occurred: one of the major clients is a Japanese traditional textile (kimono) producer which procures the Thai basketry as

intermediate goods to produce Japanese traditional bags; this business is handled by the community centre and provides a stable and high volume of orders (Takei 2007: 173). The village, therefore, entered a global value chain as a supplier of intermediate goods. The fourth outcome is synergy with agrotourism, which was also launched in the village during the OTOP project and now many tourists come to the village by buses and buy their products as souvenirs at a community centre (Takei 2007: 172). The last point is income generation: the average income of the female producer is 3,600 Bahts per month which is adequate for a home-worker when compared with the wage of a hard-working factory worker in the provinces or in Bangkok.

To sum up this section, the export promotion of bamboo basketry in the village was initially led by the local leaders and they utilised foreign aid strategically to specialise the economic base. Most of the foreign assistance under the OTOP was regarded to be market-oriented involving foreign buyers, and the technical advice from experts and buyers played a significant role for market participation. As a result, the village acquired access to the international market successfully by creating high value-added products by organised production structures.

Opportunities and Limitations of Aid and Market

As described in the previous section, the combination of different foreign aid schemes and involvement of the private sector made significant results in the village. Even so, this case gives some important implications on positive and negative aspects on the role of aid and market power.

Firstly, the flexibility of aid can contribute to reinforce local competences: the fund provided by the Japanese government was utilised in order to realise the local strategy to specialise in the product and enhanced the competitiveness of the locality. The decision was led by locals and as a result it contributed to improve the capability to adapt further assistance under the OTOP programme. Thus, aid is effective when it is flexible. Secondly, aid can bridge community development and business demand. The technical assistance of JETRO filled the gap between the local marketing capacity and international market by providing advice and conducting promotion events. This was possible because the assistance was market-oriented and involved the private sector such as foreign buyers.

However, it can be pointed out that there are some limitations of aid even in the successful market-oriented assistance. First, aid is not good at feedback to producers. The fact that aid itself is not a main player of busi-

ness tends to limit the level of feedback to producers because there is less incentive to improve the situation in the logic of business. This is one of the reasons that JETRO needed to involve Japanese buyers.

The second drawback of aid comes from the bottom: when a project is introduced in a community in order to maximise the benefit of locals, the most likely strategy is a bottom-up approach, in which a marketing process starts from a menu in a community, not from a market opportunity. One of the reasons that many projects cannot be sustained is that 'demand does not exist in order to satisfy the need to produce' (Millard 1996: 6). In the case of this village, the promotion of bamboo basketry went successfully because there was a need in the market, but it doesn't always happen.

The last point about aid is that it generally tends to look for a quick result because an aid project is supposed to be evaluated. In the case of bamboo basketry, the pressure to make results from JETRO could not be found but the Thai government, eager to make a result of export growth, and the OTOP programme tended to assist relatively strong producers who might have had succeeded without aid (Fujiwara 2006: 160). This output-oriented tendency is similar to the limitation of the market in poverty reduction as described below.

The market is a strong driving force of economic growth. The OTOP project made remarkable results by using this force. One of the important advantages of the market is its economic scale benefit. Once the product breaks into the market, the transactions can create significant profit and a trickle-down effect in the local territory, which leads to income generation and employment creation. The logic of the market explains that poverty can be reduced through growth. In the case of the village, there generally has been a positive effect on income generation and employment creation among the households of most of the producers. Another advantage is that the market can sustain a business. JETRO's cooperation was only for one year and once the business relationship was established, the buyer and foreign manufacturers maintained transactions continuously.

Nonetheless, there are some critical limitations of the market. Firstly, a market initially increases an income gap. Takai (2007: 178) states that among the basketry producers, the financial capacity of self-procurement of material is a critical factor of income generation and there is a remarkable gap in net income between the producers who are able to procure material and the ones who depend on supplies from leaders. It can be reasonable to think that the gap is partly caused by the style of the project that relies on the market and doesn't have enough instruments to support weak producers.

Another limitation of the market is a contradiction with local development. Utilisation of local resources is one of the important concepts and the core of competitiveness in the OVOP/OTOP approach. Since the design of basketry became sophisticated, special bamboo needed to be procured from a neighbouring province instead of local wild bamboo, which consequently caused the rise in the cost price. It happens when the volume of production exceeds the capacity of local resources or when producers encounter the need to adjust to the demands of the market. These might be unavoidable situations when industry grows, but compromising with a philosophy is not about a matter of economy but also about a value of locality.

The last point is that the market doesn't promise a long-term business relationship because of the product cycle. Even though the sales of basketry have grown so far, it needs to be pointed out that the village has encountered a new challenge: an emergence of competitors and a fall of unit price. Bamboo basketry has been produced in the next village and in other provinces for the past few years, which has caused a gradual decline of unit price (Takei 2007: 179). This is a typical situation in the maturity stage of a product cycle. In theory, a new measure such as innovation is necessary in the village, but it is not easy in reality in a rural area due to the lack of resources and capacity.

In concluding this section, there are various opportunities and limitations in aid and market. Aid has some limitation mainly in the weak business logic and the problems of market are in the lack of social consideration and unpredictability. Nevertheless, both are essential actors of local economic development in developing countries and the realistic option for development is to understand the features of these actors and to look for an ideal mix by maximising advantages and minimising the disadvantages.

Conclusion

This paper intended to illustrate and analyse the role of aid and market in local economic development using the case of a handicraft product under the OTOP programme of Thailand. These discussions lead to three conclusions: firstly, the OTOP programme is mainly categorised as an enterprise development strategy whereas it has much wider dimensions of local economic development in principle. Secondly, technical assistance of foreign donors played a significant role in the process to export products into the international market. Thirdly, despite the success of the product, aid and market have advantages and disadvantages, and it is critical to understand these characteristics for successful implementation of local economic devel-

opment. These two actors can be spoken of as two sides of the same coin: the opportunity of one side often means a limitation of the other and vice versa. Therefore, finding complementarities among different actors and approaches is always the way toward successful implementation of local development.

It also should be mentioned that the argument of local development must start from the local level and finish at the local level. This paper treated a case which was mainly led by the national government, and in which the interventions of government, donors and the external private sector were critical factors. Even so, there was a local initiative before the OTOP programme and the residents made use of the opportunities during the programme. It is a pre-condition of success of local development and what creates it is still an open question.

References

Fujioka, R. (2006) 'Tai no OTOP project [OTOP project in Thailand]' in K. Matsui and S. Yamagami (eds) *Issonippinundou to kaihatsu tojoukoku [OVOP movement and Developing Countries]* pp.153-173. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies – Japan External Trade Organization.

Helmsing, B (2003) 'Local Economic Development: New Generations of Actors, Policies and Instruments for Africa', *Public Administration and Development* 23(1): 67-76

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (2003) 'The Study of Monitoring and Evaluation Model on the One Tambon One Product Development Policy', Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency

Kurokawa, K., F. Tembo, and D.W. te Velde (2008) 'Donor Support to Private Sector Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding the Japanese OVOP Programme' JICA-ODI Working Paper 290. Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency and London: Overseas Development Institute

Millard, E. (1996) 'Appropriate Strategies to Support Small Community Enterprises in Export Markets', *Small Enterprise Development* **7** (1): 4-16.

Oita OVOP International Exchange Promotion Committee (n.d.) 'One Village One Product Movement (OVOP)'. Accessed 23 March 2010 <http://www.ovop.jp/en/ison_p/haikei.html >.

Routray, K.J. (2007) 'One Village-One Product: Sustainable Rural Development in Thailand' *Cab Calling* January – March 2007, pp. 30-34. Accessed 3 April 2010   <http://cab.org.in/CAB%20Calling%20Content/Productivity%

20of%20Rural%20Credit%20-%20A%20Review%20of%20lssues/One%20Village%20One%20Product.pdf>

Takei, I. (2007) 'A Study on One Tambon and One Product Policy and Rural Household Economy in Thailand', *Journal of Takasaki City University of Economics* 49(3-4): 167-180

Thai-OTOP-City.com (n.d.) 'Backgroud About OTOP' Accessed 1 April 2010 <http://www.thai-otop-city.com/background.asp>

11 Maternal mortality: Can Kenya successfully reduce maternal mortality rate by 75% by 2015?

IRENE AWUOR OWUOR

Objective and Outline

In this paper, I hope to shed some light on the causes and negative impacts of maternal mortality in the Kenyan context. In addition, I hope to provide general suggestions on how 'avoidable' deaths of pregnant women or those delivering children in public hospitals/health centers and in rural communities can be reduced (this includes adolescent girls attempting abortion). I propose that pregnancy and child birth be promoted as a natural process through maternal health care interventions aimed at preventive care or building capacities of primary stakeholders in child birth (women, their families and traditional birth attendants) to ensure safety in handling pregnancy and child birth. However, I argue that competent/knowledgeable/well-informed primary stakeholders who can promptly detect and refer obstetric complications to 'modern' medical facilities are crucial for greater impact in reducing maternal mortality. Therefore, a collaborative effort among all key stakeholders in maternal health care is likely to help reduce pressure on limited public health facilities while promoting cultural practices and communal responsibility for the lives of expectant women and the unborn children. Like HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns, I believe that creating public awareness on what to view as the danger/risk signs during pregnancy and labor could help save many women's lives if referred to a medical health facility in time and attended to with equal urgency at the facility.

In conclusion, I hope to 'convince' my readers that the Millennium Development Goal (MDG)-5(a) can be achieved with political goodwill, commitment and dedication from all stakeholders, although in my view, reducing maternal mortality by 75% by 2015 seems a bit too ambitious.

My targeted audience/readers of this paper are people I will refer to as key stakeholders in safe motherhood, such as: Ministry of Health officials, Medical professionals in public health facilities (doctors, nurses, clinical officers, pharmacists), adolescent and adult women, Community Health Nurses (CHN), Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs), NGOs, men, family and friends who interact often with pregnant women.

Introduction

Maternal mortality is an important measure of women's health and indicative of the performance of health care systems in any country (AbouZahr and Wardlaw, 2001). As a believer in the school of thought that 'Women deliver for development' (Kirrin et al, 2007), my position is that a substantial reduction of the maternal mortality rate of a given country is not an option but an obligation of any government that wants to achieve socio-economic and political growth.

A maternal death is defined as "the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and the site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy or its management but not from accidental or incidental causes" (Panos Institute,2001). Panos Institute (2001) indicates that more than 525,000 women die every year from complications of pregnancy and childbirth, exacerbated by existing poor health and inadequate care. The most recent figures available show that among adult women globally, maternal deaths are second only to deaths caused by AIDS, especially in Africa, with preventable problems in pregnancy and childbirth being the single greatest cause of premature death and disability among women of reproductive age in the developing world (*ibid*).

United Nations' (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for concerted efforts to end what he described as the "scandal" of women dying in childbirth. "Some simple blood tests, consultation with a doctor and qualified help at the birth itself can make a huge difference," Mr. Ban said in an address to an international conference in Washington aimed at finding solutions to problems affecting women and girls worldwide (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/). Reducing "the rate of maternal mortality by 75% by 2015" is one of the development targets that has been endorsed at numerous international meetings, including it being number 5(a) of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) supported by world leaders who came together at United Nations Headquarters in New York to adopt the United Nations Millennium Declaration in the year 2000(*ibid*). From 1987 -2006,

there has been international and national advocacy for safe motherhood with an estimation of 10 million women dying of maternal causes during this period (Campbell, 2006).

> For this to happen in a world where we state that "we know what works" and that "88–98% of maternal deaths are preventable" is obscene. (ibid.)

Primary Health Care programs, common in many developing countries (including Kenya) tend to train Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) to improve their services but successes are limited (Hong, 1987). Lack of attention to the specific role of the TBAs in the cultural context of the intervention area is a contributing factor to this failure (Larson et al., 1987; Anderson and Staugard, 1988). Since each culture has its unique mechanisms of coping with pregnancy and childbirth complications, a study of traditional medical system and health service utilization patterns (both traditional and modern) may provide important clues for intervention strategies (Bannerman et al., 1983; Good, 1987). It is with this understanding that I will argue for strengthening capacities and collaboration among traditional and modern health care providers in efforts to reduce maternal mortality among Kenyan women and adolescent girls.

Situational context

Maternal mortality has been a major global concern since the world focused on safe motherhood in 1987 at the International Safe Motherhood consultation at Nairobi, Kenya (Wani et al, 2009) Despite global attempts to promote safe motherhood, 'The continued scarcity of progress in maternal health over the past decades in several parts of the world is disturbing. The little progress is especially of concern for South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, which have consistently presented the worst maternal health in the world' (Kirrin et al,2007).

Despite the bleak situation, the introduction of MDG-5(a) in 2000 has prioritized the reduction of maternal mortality in health programs in many developing countries, providing hope in this area. Scarcity of reliable data on maternal mortality still presents a greater challenge to finding a baseline from which to evaluate impacts of these projects with most countries often relying on statistics from central referral systems to assess both the magnitude and the cause of maternal mortality in the whole country (Boerma and Mati, 1989). Unfortunately, the accuracy of these data is questionable since most cases of maternal mortality occur in rural areas and go unreported.

The Kenyan government finances Maternal and Child Health (MCH) care programs through the Ministry of Health with a significant portion of the funding (70-80%) provided by the World Bank and various donor organizations. Program sustainability is unreliable and is a concern due to its donor-dependent nature. In Kenya, according to UNICEF (2002), the national level of maternal mortality is estimated to be 590 per 100,000 live births; whereas according to government figures released on Oct 24, 2001, at least 700 women die every year from pregnancy-related complications, (Siringi, 2001). Abdullah Wako, the 2001 Medical Services Assistant Minister of Kenya, stated in parliament that more than 3500 women have died in the past 5 years from problems in childbirth and pregnancy in public hospitals alone. The admission excludes unreported cases in rural homes where access to health services is still poor. Although the government could not explain the nature of the deaths, the 2001 chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Health, Dr.Newton Kulundu, claimed that more than half the deaths resulted from complications during or after abortion, which is illegal in Kenya but can be obtained in backstreet clinics (ibid). However a study released in August 2001 by the Ministry of Health stated that even without deaths from abortion, maternal death rate is still high, and more than half of government health institutions are ill equipped to handle pregnancy-related complications (Lancet 2001; **358**: 481). The Kenya Service Provision Assessment Survey report indicates that most hospitals cannot cope with obstetric complications, either due to shortage of medical supplies, overwhelmed skilled staff or shortage of blood in most public hospital blood banks resulting in high incidences of hemorrhage, the most common cause of maternal deaths (Siringi, 2001).

A recent household survey in Kenya reports a reasonably high proportion of women delivering in health facilities. This sounds encouraging although it is not time to celebrate just yet. Delay in decision making to seek care, delay in reaching an appropriate obstetric facility and delay in receiving appropriate care once at the facility are factors that still contribute to maternal mortality in this part of the world (Ziraba et al, 2009).

What then are the other causes of maternal deaths in Kenya?

These will be discussed by first addressing the deaths that occur at public health facilities followed by those 'avoidable' deaths of women at the household and community level.

Maternal deaths at public health facilities, whose fault is it?

Severe bleeding during delivery is the biggest direct cause of maternal mortality in most developing countries (Panos Institute, 2001). Kenya is no exception, especially because of the inadequate blood supply in public health facilities to handle obstetric emergencies that require blood transfusion as well as unsafe abortions that result in hemorrhaging which increases both maternal morbidity and mortality. These unsafe abortions also lead to infection of the reproductive tract and in some cases secondary infertility (Kirrin et al, 2007). Because abortion is illegal in Kenya, some adolescents bleed to death at home after a botched abortion attempt for fear of being criminated or 'man-handled' at the hospital or fear of public embarrassment. Issues such as Low pay for the medics in public health facilities translates to their reluctance and low morale in dedicating themselves to offering quality service to patients. This also explains the 'brain-drain' where Kenyan-trained medical professionals migrate to developed countries for better remuneration for their services, reducing the number of service providers in Kenyan health facilities, especially in rural areas where trained medical personnel are scarce. The health providers cite unavailability of, or poorly maintained equipment in health facilities as a de-motivating factor to carry out life-saving emergency obstetric procedures effectively and in time. Trained health professional employed by the government are known to dedicate most of their time to private practice on the 'side' for their own subsistence, with accusations of those in authority corruptly transferring 'public' drugs to their private clinics for sale. This practice, together with reluctance and absenteeism among medical service providers to do their work effectively can be attributed to inefficient monitoring systems in many government health facilities. Inefficiency in public hospitals has resulted in maternal deaths due to unnecessary delays in attending to pregnant women when they seek medical care at these facilities.

As a result of the factors discussed above, the population lack faith on services offered at government health facilities, hindering most people from accessing services there. This prompts the poor who cannot afford private clinics to seek services from family, traditional healers or traditional birth attendants (TBAs) who have been helpful. Yet, these cases go unreported and has resulted in uncountable maternal deaths in cases of obstetric emergencies.

With this background, I will argue that strengthening capacities of TBAs and the families in communities where home-births are common is another way of actively involving the public in saving the lives of women who de-

liver for the development of their families, their country and the world at large.

Maternal deaths at household and community level: Are these deaths avoidable?

This section discusses the causes of deaths of women that occur at the household or community level. Kirrin et al, 2007 in their survey report observed that women's low status in most Kenyan societies mean that their healthcare needs are low priority, increasing the risks of deaths. Many uneducated women in the rural areas require their husbands' consent to be able to seek medical care at a hospital. If permission is denied, the possible consequences are obvious in cases of emergency. On the other hand, some women are simply ignorant about where to seek proper treatment and their entitlements in different facilities. Due to poor socio-economic condition of some women, healthy nutrition becomes a challenge which in extreme cases could lead to anemia. Anemia could easily turn fatal during delivery when a woman bleeds severely. Physical violence on pregnant women, mostly inflicted by spouses at domestic level have also accounted for a number of maternal deaths in Kenya. With the issue of physical violence, the question remains, since 'wife-beating' is viewed as a cultural way of disciplining an errant wife, does the Kenya government, in its efforts to reduce maternal mortality have a say in stopping this practice?

As a declared national disaster in Kenya, HIV/AIDS also indirectly increases susceptibility to moderate and severe maternal morbidity as well as chances of maternal death due to opportunistic infections like tuberculosis and pneumonia (A.K Ziraba et al, 2009). Many infected women die quietly at home for fear of being stigmatized at public health facilities and for lack of money to pay medical bills. Having discussed what factors cause maternal mortality in Kenya, I will attempt to outline the consequences of maternal deaths below:

What are the consequences of maternal mortality (Preventable deaths of women) in Kenya?

- At national level, maternal mortality results in the loss of workers, leaders, counselors, decision makers, peacemakers and key actors in social change and development

- Loss of provider of income at family level which lowers domestic savings and investments thereby increasing economic insecurity (Ziraba et al, 2009)
- Loss of a care giver, provider of love, emotional, physical and psychological support within families and communities hence disturbed family and community relationships
- Increased number of orphans. This could have negative impacts on the overall survival and development of the child who has no choice but to be raised by either relatives or in a child-care institution
- Loss of a life that has the biological potential to bring forth children who can be a source of labor in the work force
- Children are likely to leave school so as to help earn income for the family when their mother dies. This could lead to poor life chances for the children or worse still, a cycle of poverty
- Increased 'burden' to grandparents who are compelled by circumstances to raise orphans when they should ideally be retired and receiving care from their offspring and the state

What can be done to reduce maternal mortality in Kenya?

Despite the complexity of understanding what works in terms of reducing maternal mortality due to a huge diversity of country contexts, the commitment of all stakeholders and the leadership of decision/policy-makers is crucial in reducing maternal mortality. Neither a single intervention nor a single agency can reduce the maternal mortality rate in a population. Instead, a concerted effort and co-operation among various actors is crucial (Campbell, 2006). My argument in this paper largely concurs with Bangladeshi's maternal health policy vision which states that "All Bangladeshi women with their heads held high, smiling in the fulfillment of their right to safe motherhood," as well as the policy's mission which is "To nurture a socio-cultural movement that reduces maternal mortality and morbidity as a woman's right, and also enhances her self-esteem and status." Contextually, the above vision and mission could apply in Kenya as well, albeit with inevitable differences in the social, cultural and religious practices in these two countries. Since Bangladesh and Kenya are both developing countries, there are certain similarities in challenges faced in the health sector, I will begin by highlighting some of the recommendations of a report titled '*Maternal Health Scenario in Bangladesh: The Policy Context*' compiled by Dr.Shirin and Dr.Rahman and dated 4th April 2005, on how Bangladesh could improve on

its Maternal health policy which I feel could apply in the Kenyan context as well if 'borrowed' and correctly implemented. I will further give my personal recommendations on how maternal mortality can be reduced in the Kenyan context.

Recommendations of the policy on Maternal Health Scenario in Bangladesh:

1. Enhancement of access and utilization of public health facilities

There is crucial need for the government to first put in place a concrete idea of financial investment followed by a guideline for quality assurance, management, communication, and social mobilization of key stakeholders in maternal health. The guide should include human resources development and management plan for realizing the services. For instance; simplifying and quickening the administrative process when admitting pregnant women into the hospital during emergency, improving quality of care in public health facilities through provision of adequate drugs, medical equipment and regular refresher courses for the medical personnel, ensuring that blood banks in hospitals are well stocked to handle emergency obstetric procedures (through awareness creation on the need to develop a culture of voluntary blood donation), as well as putting in place an effective referral system within communities and health centers to ensure proper detection and timely transfer of the complicated cases to the hospitals. Coming up with strategies to address physical, cultural and financial barriers can help speed up timely access to proper obstetric-care among pregnant women hence reduction of maternal mortality.

2. Health voucher programs

The vouchers provided by Bangladesh government to pregnant women allow them to purchase antenatal, normal delivery and postnatal services from a designated provider of their choice for the first and second pregnancy *(Shirin & Rahman, 2005)*. To improve maternal health care, Kenya could borrow this idea to compliment the current use of clinic cards by mothers to access 'user-free' medical care in the country's public hospitals for children under five years.

3. Public information campaigns/Community involvement

In rural areas, specialized health care should be decentralized and infrastructure improved to promote easy access and utilization of health services.

Community education awareness on how to detect danger signs/obstetric complications in pregnancies, first aid training on how to handle emergencies before proceeding to the health facility and proper nutrition for expectant women should be a priority too. Knowledge on healthy feeding can prevent cases of anaemia which continue to claim many women's lives in Kenya. Promoting behavior change among family, service providers and community in favor of supporting women to realize their right to safe motherhood during pregnancy and after delivery can never be over-emphasized enough.

In cultural contexts where men make decisions for the women, especially in rural areas, the trainings should target both men and women for it to be effective. This kind of information can help save a number of lives of mothers and their unborn children.

4. Sustainability

Sustainability still remains a challenge in a country that highly depends on donors to fund health projects. Encouraging national Sector-wide approaches and mobilization of resources within communities through local social networks could make a sustainable impact if well coordinated and resources properly managed to improve maternal health thereby reducing maternal mortality (*AbouZahr and Wardlaw, 2001*).

My personal recommendations on how maternal mortality can be addressed in Kenya

To summarize this paper, I will give further recommendations on how maternal mortality can be addressed within the Kenyan context, in addition to the already highlighted recommendations of Bangladesh Maternal health policy relevant to the Kenyan context

1. Promoting partnerships and respecting culture

In a country that is largely rural, where the population strongly believes in cultural practices, interventions that accommodate these cultures are likely to be people-friendly. Kenya is a developing country with 'Western' influence brought in by colonizers in the 19th century. This makes it inevitable to combine both traditional and modern practices in addressing maternal health issues for any meaningful impact to be made. By encouraging partnerships between the community, local authorities, medics and the national leaders/politicians to design and effectively monitor the implementation of

people-friendly maternal health policies, setting up active systems for capturing the opinions, reports and suggestions of the public concerning service provision in public health facilities and efficiently acting on them for improvement alongside increasing user-friendly facilities (for example training the personnel to handle patients with respect and care, clean sanitation facilities at the health centers among others) it is likely that utilization of public health facilities will be enhanced. These public health facilities are currently shunned by many due to bad experiences of service users.

2. Law enforcement

In order to fully regain the confidence of the public, the government can show further commitment by strengthening the enforcement of laws which incriminate health service providers whose negligence causes maltreatment, maiming, morbidity and maternal or infant mortality.

At the community level, allowing only Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) licensed by Ministry of Health to offer trainings and refresher courses to Community based TBAs and community health workers on basic midwifery while strengthening referral systems will surely contribute towards reducing maternal and child mortality.

3. Contraceptives

Though still illegal in Kenya, wider access to safe abortion in South Africa where safe abortions in hospitals is legal has been reported to be saving lives of many women, especially adolescent girls (AbouZahr and Wardlaw, 2001). Ideas of 'best practices' can be borrowed from South Africa but in the meantime, allowing public access to correct information about contraceptives can reduce mortality rate by preventing 'unwanted' pregnancies which usually lead most adolescents to procure 'unsafe' illegal abortions that often turn fatal (Weintraub,Heidi,1997)

4. Remuneration and incentives:

Of equal importance is ensuring that medical personnel in public hospitals are paid well and providing occasional incentives to Community Health Workers (most of whom are volunteers) so as to encourage dedication to their work for the good of pregnant women, the new-born children, their families, the nation and the world at large since as rightly put by (Kirrin et al, 2007), 'Women Deliver for Development'.

5. *Sustainability:*

For the sake of sustainability, I recommend promoting safe motherhood either through preventive care or community resource mobilization through local social networks instead of heavily relying on donor-funded services at the government health facilities and NGOs working in rural areas.

Conclusion

Since Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have identified maternal health as a key development outcome, I concur with Kirrin et al (2007) assertion that improving maternal health as a development goal is essential.

> Not simply because a maternal death is one of the most terrible ways to die… but above all because almost every maternal death is an event that could have been avoided, and should never have been allowed to happen. (Dr Mahmoud Fathalla, President of the International College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists)

Reducing maternal death should be a priority for most governments and it is possible to achieve the goal of reducing maternal mortality in Kenya by 75 per cent, but achieving this goal by the year 2015 is a bit ambitious and debatable. Internationally, the focus of the Safe Motherhood Initiative has been to ensure low risk of maternal death and severe complications related to pregnancy and childbirth. It is however important to remember that pregnancies and births are natural processes. This means that promoting preventive care and limiting overuse of medical technologies while encouraging partnership between women, their families and healthcare professionals when handling pregnant women is likely to reduce maternal deaths substantially, especially in Kenyan rural communities. Sustained political commitment has been a key factor in Sri Lanka and other countries which have been successful in reducing maternal death rates despite limited resources, as well as a commitment to reducing inequalities in thhe hutilization of services (AbouZahr and Wardlaw, 2001). I believe the statement above on Sri Lanka and other countries by AbauZahr and Wardlaw (2001) can yield equal positive results if replicated in Kenya.

References

AbouZahr, C. and T. Wardlaw, 2001 "Maternal mortality at the end of a decade: Signs of progress?" *World Health Organization Bulletin*, 79, 6, 561

Boerma , J.T. and J.K.G Mati (1989) "Identifying Maternal Mortality through Networking: Results from Coastal Kenya" Studies in Family Planning, 1989, 20, 5, 245

Heidi, W. (1997) "Status of women, maternal child health and family planning in Kenya" *International journal of public administration.*

Kirrin, G. P. Rohini & M. Anju (2007*), "*Women Deliver for Development", *The Lancet* Vol. 370, Oct 13, 2007 pp1347-1357.

Maternal Health Scenario in Bangladesh: The Policy Context <http://www.humanrightsimpact.org/fileadmin/hria_resources/Report_of_HeRWAI_Naripokkho.pdf>

Oona, C. (2006) "Maternal Survival 2: Strategies for reducing maternal mortality: getting on with what works", *The Lancet* (British edition) 2006, 368, 9543, 1284

Panos Institute (2001), Birth rights: New Approaches to Safe Motherhood. Panos report No.43,London.Pp.1-2, pp 17-21, pp 22-26 and pp 39-41.

Siringi, S. (2001) "Kenyan government admits to high maternal death rates" *The Lancet* (British edition), 358, 9292, 1523

Wani, Reena J, Priti Chikhal et al (2009) "Maternal mortality: Preventable Tragedy?" *Bombay Hospital Journal*, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2009. Accessed on http://www.bhj.org/journal/2009_5104_oct/download/pg427-431.pdf

Ziraba, A.K et al, 2009 "Maternal Mortality; Study data from A.K. Ziraba et al provide new insights into maternal mortality" OBGYN & reproduction week, 2009, 104

12 Too BIG to Fail?

NICOLAS PALAU VAN HISSENHOVEN

Generally speaking, an unconditional Basic Income Grant (BIG) is a monthly cash grant paid by the state to every citizen regardless of his age, income, working condition, ethnicity, social class, etc. It is uniform (strictly equal for every citizen), not dependent on means tests (no proof of poverty, unemployment or school attendance required), and not linked to any *a posteriori* condition (the income can be used anyway by the beneficiary).

In this document, I will explore some of the core features of the BIG approach, framing it in terms of its right-sensitiveness and cost-effectiveness. First, I will explore the BIG's power as a moral and achievable idea. Second, I will challenge the initial optimism with some concerns that defy it. At the end, I will conclude asserting its general plausibility, but proposing further investigation in some creative and contextually specific variations of the BIG that can cope with its major flaws and fit into particular countries or regions at particular times.

BIG: A powerful step, an influential debate

The BIG has been valued both on grounds of its moral justification and its pragmatic feasibility. In this section I will briefly look at some of the main arguments that have been stressed making the case for the BIG.

Following different names and templates, public policy discussions have been always concerned with the idea of some 'minimums', 'floors', or 'bases' that make individuals lives worthy to live, and their society worthy to live in. Those minimums are conceived as 'rights' when they are designed as universal and unconditional; that is when every single citizen is entitled to them for the simple and unique reason of being citizen (for example: right to free speech, right to education). The BIG idea can be framed upon these struggles – some additional 'floor', conceived as a 'right", has to be granted for everyone in order to assure him the possibility of reaching a good life. Thus,

as in the cases of free speech and right to education, the BIG proponents believe that a minimum amount of material welfare has to be provided from the State to each single individual, without conditions and without exceptions.

Giving individuals a specified amount of, say, food and shelter can assure some degree of material welfare. However, the majority of social policy measurements and interventions focus specifically on personal money and income security. For example, interventions have been designed to promote a minimum amount of income in cases of crisis (say, unemployment), or in special cases for special groups (as in the cases of some disabilities, or some affirmative actions), or through public wages (as in workfare schemes).

Thus, the case for an income-related policy is strong enough. In our world, many deprivations arise by simple lack of money. Of course, not every deprivation has to do with money, and money is not the only (nor even the main) way to alleviate some of the worse aspects of contemporary insecurity. However, money is important (albeit *un-romantic*) for every single person in the globe as it constitutes a strong enabling means to command functionings, and as it enhances the practical applicability of other rights. Without some sort of basic economic security you wouldn't be able to make rational, dignified and/or autonomous decisions (see Standing 2004; Ackermann and Alstott 1999). Without some money also, your access to other rights or benefits could be seriously undermined (Van Parijs 1995). Poverty, besides its multi-dimensionality, is undoubtedly a crucial aspect of income deprivation and income insecurity.

The BIG proponents construct over these ideas and argue for a step further. As some money is essential to live a secure and worthy life, so too a 'right to (some) money' must be guaranteed by any responsible state committed to social justice and fairness. As one of its major proponents puts it, "adequate socio-economic security is the bedrock of real freedom" (Standing 2004). Another major author talks about the "BIG as real freedom for all" (Van Parijs 1995). In sum, the case for a BIG can be seen as deriving from the perceived necessity of complementing the traditional dimensions of freedom with a new enforceable right that enhances an individual's ability to pursue their preferred way of living. The traditional bill of rights, even in its most complete and effective ways of provision, has proved insufficient to promote the chances of living a good life for any individual.

And this right to (some) money must be given with no previous or subsequent conditions attached to it; that is, without posing new duties or burdens in individuals' lives. This is the only way to reach everyone (it's a right!)

without slipping into the problems of excessively big states. Indeed, on one hand, the BIG proponents stress that as most existing social security programs are related to stable waged employment or to finely targeted programs on poverty, these programs exclude increasing numbers of long-term unemployed workers, informal workers, 'churning' poors, women, etc. (see Barchiesi 2007). On the other hand, the BIG is deemed to avoid the dangers of big states (Standing 2004; Ackermann and Alsott 1999). First, it avoids the (hardly defensible) burden affronted by the poor according to which the state is enabled to a permanent investigation of their individual lives (this burden is not at all affronted by richer people). Second, it is non-paternalistic (for example, unlike a food subsidy) as the money can be spent in the same way as more affluent individuals usually spend their money (ie: in the way they want). Third, it is not prone to social engineering; the state (or the economists) are not to tell people how should they live their lives – rewarding and punishing those who accommodate or not to the preferred behavior. In sum, BIG proponents soundly affirm that theirs is a policy intervention that, simultaneously complies with the moral requirements of a just society by enhancing the freedom of its citizens; correctly emphasizes the role of the state in the distribution of resources in society; and limits any danger of excessive state control that usually burdens the poor the most.

Hence the idea of a BIG is a major contribution to the discussion of social policy, poverty alleviation programmes, human rights debates and political models. It is a step forward towards the universalization of social policies. Its right-sensitiveness is asserted as the most contemporary way of further constructing the (always incomplete) list of minimum securities a society must grant to its individuals. It is a further solid brick in constructing a 'floor' to protect and enhance freedom in moving towards basic security for all.

Moreover, the BIG is praised by proponents for a series of practical corollaries – the most important being its cost-effectiveness. Indeed, the accumulated experience in poverty alleviation interventions progressively stresses the cost-effectiveness of universalizing social policy (Mkandawire 2005). In a still contested realm, Universalists highlight the problems of any form of targeting and the ability of universal measures to engage with broader outcomes. Briefly put, a universal and unconditional basic income grant can be put in place with relatively small administrative costs (no investigation and monitoring of an individual's life), with no problems of leakage or undercoverage (it's a right for everyone, not a gift to some), and with diminished problems of corruption (corruption appears when functionaries are enabled to take detailed decisions on the allocation of resources). More-

over, universality avoids some of the worse problems of perverse incentives (the beneficiaries of a conditioned grant have no real incentive to overcome its situation), and the problem of stigmatization linked to targeted programs (to receive a conditional aid you have to 'prove' your poverty, a situation with feeble moral plausibility, regardless the actual condition of the receiver). Furthermore, universal policies avoid the two-tier systems that exist in many regions of the world, in which benefits that are meant only for the poor appear to be invariably poor benefits. And also, universal policies are deemed to have greater political feasibility (everyone is concerned with its rights, instead of just a small group of disempowered beneficiaries concerned with its aid) and better synergies with states committed with progressive taxation models and political will against poverty, exclusion and inequality. Finally, the BIG is supposed to achieve greater outcomes in terms of social bonding, redistribution and social capital.

In sum, the missing 'right to money' is not only morally and politically necessary, but it brings also a sound model of efficient, honest and responsible state intervention.

Some pilot examples are being shown as proof of the soundness and sensitiveness of BIGs. The village of Otjivero in Namibia has been the subject of a BIG scheme for two years (2007-2009). The expectations of the project have remained small when compared to the actual success of outcomes. In one and a half years (the last progress report was released in September 2009), the village has improved almost every single indicator of social policy: income poverty (using the national food poverty line) has fallen from 76% of the population to 37% of it; the rate of those engaged in income-generating activities has increased from 44% to 55%; child malnutrition has dropped from 42% of underweight children to 10%; more than double of the number of parents paid the school fees and children school attendance has consistently raised; overall crime rates have fallen by 42%; social organization and empowerment has improved, etc. Most important of all, the income security and the quality of life of every single villager have improved **(BIGNAM 2009)**.

Apparently thus, there are some sensible arguments behind the idea of creating a 'right to (some) money' in the form of a universal, unconditional basic income grant for all. Should we straightforwardly go for a BIG then? What's missing in this entire story? In the next section of this document I will look at some of the broadest problems and criticisms to the BIG.

The Core Concerns

If everything apparently goes so smooth with the BIG, why aren't governments competing to be the first and braver to push them? Some rich countries have made some partial and progressive attempts to implement some form of BIGs but none has still established a universal BIG on a national basis. Some developing countries (especially South Africa, Namibia and Brazil) have had strenuous debates on the BIG – their leaders have affirmed commitment to the idea, but nevertheless no BIGs exist on a national basis. There are projects, pledges, declarations of intentions, even laws (as in Brazil) showing support to the BIG, but no one has really started with it. Its political feasibility appears to be always hard. Why?

The BIG idea has attracted a whole range of criticisms. Lots of them depend on some level of suspiciousness around its positive arguments and some others criticize its details.[1] More importantly, other criticisms aim at the very core of the idea. "Albert Hirschman has reminded us that every great progressive idea is opposed initially on three grounds: trough the claim of futility (it cannot be done), the claim of jeopardy (if done, it would endanger other goals) and the claim of perversity (if done, the unintended consequences would undermine the benefits)" (Standing 2004). I propose this categorization as a useful way to locate and analyze the potential problems of the BIG. Hence, in the rest of this document, I will treat these three claims in regard to the BIG. However, I will be very brief in the first two, as much literature has been devoted to them. I will pay greater attention on the third claim – where it's most complicated (and mostly unexplored) difficulties lie.

---

[1] Some difficult debates on the details of the BIG won't be treated in this document but they should be briefly mentioned: should the BIG be monthly, daily, yearly? Should it be confined to citizens, or also migrants and any person in the territory of any state? Should it be confined to non-pensioned people? To children? I won't treat those questions here as they depend first on a general acceptance or refusal of the core idea of the BIG.

Concerns over the BIG's 'futility' and 'jeopardy'

Above all, the BIG is expensive. Some governments and groups of opinion simply say that the BIG is financially unaffordable.[2] Some others fear that the same amount of public money could have a better use in a range of other public policies or that the massive reallocation of money that the BIG implies will be made at the expense of other social policies (i.e. BIG's opportunity cost is deemed to be too high).[3] These concerns are understandable, but not unavoidable.

Part of the problem could be simply a matter of time. A BIG project needs time to reach a critical threshold of political consensus, administrative capacity and financial adjustments. More interestingly, many studies have shown for particular countries that the BIG is financially affordable.[4] By the same token, actual comparisons of the benefits and costs of the BIG against other policies have been undertaken (see for example Garfinkel 2002; Naidoo 2004; Bryan 2005; Big Financing Reference Group 2004). Even more, it has been argued by the proponents of the BIG that, in the long run, the BIG has the ability to be self-financing through an increased general wealth and thus increased tax earnings (Ackermann and Alstott 1999; BIGNAM 2009). More important still, as Saith recalls, the arguments on fiscal constraints rely heavily on simple political will (Saith 2008).

In sum, the arguments against the financial affordability or opportunity of the BIG are obviously important and have deserved a significant amount of thinking and diligence; nevertheless, its potential solutions are more a matter of particular contexts and of creativity and imagination.

Concerns over the BIG's long term 'perversity'

The most important problems of the BIG, however, relate to its potential *perversity*. This realm has not yet been fully explored. The literature has focused on one specific type of potential negative effect of the BIG but other

---

[2] Some examples of this situation in South Africa are given by Van der Berg (2002) and Meth (2004a; 2008), in Namibia by BIGNAM (2009), and in Brazil by Suplicy (2006).

[3] See, for example, Thurlow (2002), BIG Financing Reference Group (2004)

[4] Cases have been reviewed, for example, for countries of Europe (EUNetwork 2009), South Africa (EPRI 2004), BIG Financing Reference Group (2004), Brazil (Suplicy 2006), and Namibia (Samson 2006).

important long-term (negative) effects still remain somewhat in the shadow. These potential effects are briefly discussed.

First of all, the literature has focused on the possible criticisms that the BIG can create dependency from the state grant and can deviate the incentives to work (Meth 2004b; Standing 2009; Naidoo 2004; Barchiesi 2007; Big Financing Reference Group 2004). Behind this criticism, apparently lies a lingering suspicion of the 'undeserving poor' (Matisonn and Seekings 2002). Several strong attempts have been made to dismiss the dependency claim against the BIG. First, some argue the 'poverty is the most debilitating root of 'poor's people dependency' so, any measure that reduces poverty, such as a BIG, can lessen their dependency (Big Financing Reference Group 2004). For example, some studies show that the poor are currently dependent on other poor households, who act as their primary social security net (Haarmann and Haarmann 2005). Second, some studies show evidence that different policies are likely to create more dependency than the BIG (as in the cases of food aid or work programmes) (Standing 2009; Naidoo 2004). Third, some argue that a BIG can overcome the 'unemployment trap' and other causes of idleness by giving the people the minimum money to assure displacement, to look for jobs, and insurance against the opportunity costs of not going to informal or independent work for a day (or half a day) (Van Parijs 1995; BIGNAM 2009). Fourth, some argue that any form of subsistence is 'dependent', so dependency is always a blurred matter – changing the mix of, or introducing different welfare measures will change the degree and nature of dependency relationships (Meth 2004b). Fifth, related to the above, empirical evidence from the pilot project in Namibia shows that the working population rose, instead of fell, when the BIG was implemented on the village (BIGNAM).

The claim is however contentious.[5] There are strong arguments that can be used to dismiss it. Anyway, creativity over the actual implementation of a BIG scheme is the main tool to overcome any fear of dependency or idleness.

A major problem for the BIG is the 'supply side' problem. As Saith puts it, "[a] fundamental pre-condition for any meaningful universalization strategy is the adequacy of supply-side coverage" (Saith 2008). In fact, an injection of money into people's lives can be a waste if there is not an effective and affordable supply-side capacity on, say, health, education, and infrastructure. For example, the BIGNAM report on the village of Otijivero

---

[5] For a critique, see Harvey 2003.

shows positive outcomes about school enrollment, but only because there was a school in the village. What if the BIG happens to be implemented in a town without those facilities? Its long-listed positive outcomes would be seriously undermined!

This problem can also be seen from another perspective. A boost in aggregated demand has to be balanced by a similar boost in aggregated supply if inflation is to be avoided. The BIG can surely act as a boost in demand, but its outcomes won't generate inflational pressures only if the factor capacity of the country is up to the task of enhancing its supply capacity in the short-term. If inflation were generated, the positive outcomes of the BIG would be overcome by the rising cost of life and by decelerated economic growth. As American scholar Thurlow puts it, "the impact of the grant on economic growth is found to hinge on its ability to enhance factor productivity" (Thurlow 2002).

These arguments are, in my point of view, strong enough to confine the BIG idea as a national policy to some particular countries with particular structures of production. Specific contexts are to be scrupulously studied in order to predict both the robustness of development supply-side (i.e. roads, hospitals, schools) and the flexibility of the general supply-side in a pointed country. If the BIG at a national level can produce the perverse outcomes of resource-waste or general inflation, its political feasibility can be seriously undermined. Pre-emptive studies or creative ideas are to be devised to avoid this macro-economic outcome.[6]

In the long run, the BIG can be attacked also on the grounds that high taxes undermine growth. The BIG, to be affordable, plausibly requires a reorientation and escalation of the tax system. And, as it is said, taxes on the rich undermine its ability to invest, and investment is crucial for economic growth. To improve the BIG's chances, it would be necessary to prove two major things: first, that a displacement on investment from rich to poor is likely to occur (the lost ability of rich households to invest is balanced with the gained ability of poor households to invest); and second, that this displaced resources from rich to poor are to be used at least as efficiently by its new recipients. Part of a positive answer can be "that the poor tend to be

---

[6] One crucial idea would be to find a way to assure that the BIG would finance investment rather than consumption. This is easier to say than to follow, but the literature on the impact of aid can show promising possibilities, as the external economic boost' of aid is inherently problematic for similar reasons (Boone: 1996), referenced by Easterly (2006), pp. 45.

more credit-constrained and so will have more unexploited opportunities for using some extra money" (Ravallion 2009). Nonetheless, adding to the reasons mentioned above, some features to assure that the BIG goes more to investment rather than consumption are extremely necessary.

Finally, another potential long-term perversity problem of the BIG can be found in its focus on endowments and not on entitlements. In fact, the whole idea is centered on what the people actually have (or not), and so little is said on what the people can really do with its increased amount of money. Differences arise in the way in which people of different classes, regions, gender, etc. can actually use their money, as some of them will be privileged to spend it in more fruitful ways in terms of wealth generation (due to better access, contacts, information, education, etc.). In general, the underlying belief of the BIG idea on some sort of 'invisible hand' that will reach the positive (and the best!) outcomes of a cash transfer is put into question by differences in entitlements. This concern, for example, has been put into evidence by van Driel, who warns us that 'the [South African] State, through the nature of social grants, inadvertently reinforces the subordinate and unequal position of black women, structurally responsible for the caring for the young and the aged" (van Driel 2009). At the end, this is not a problem particular to the BIG, but a general problem relevant for the implementation of any social grant. The BIG can have perverse impacts in the form of 'wealth capture' of its benefits by better-off groups. Again, contextual studies and creativity are important to predict and tackle some of those potential negative outcomes.

Conclusion

The BIG has shown tremendous merits. Some are still contemptuous, but hardly any would argue that the BIG is not a major 'shaking' idea in the realm of public social policy and poverty alleviation. Its 'size', and the size of its imagined benefits and problems at a national scale translate into potential discussions in almost any social discipline.

Moreover, the idea is still immature: most of its benefits have been just theoretically argued or showed only in small-sized pilot projects. But no large-scale projects are currently running to actually see what happens. There is, thus, still a lot of room to explore its strengths and its potential negative outcomes.

For the moment, the following things have to be assessed:

1. The idea of a BIG promises such a quantity of good outcomes that makes it the most optimistic ground of intervention in today's social policy discussions.

2. The BIG, however, is no panacea: a veritable social policy must be composed by a number of complementary interventions (Saith 2008).

3. The BIG has to be studied on particular contexts. Potential micro- and macro-economic outcomes depend heavily on the particular circumstances in which the BIG is to be applied.

4. There are thus no general or universal recipes. I believe that a lot of creativity is still needed to explore new problems and find new ways and particular alternatives to overcome them.

The BIG, in sum, proposes a strong move towards universalization of dignity in rights. But, to assert that it is the so-called most right-sensitive and cost effective approach to poverty reduction is still audacious. A lot depend on particular contexts. And a lot more still depends on further venues of investigation and research.

References

Ackermann, B. and Alsott, A. (1999), *The Stakeholder Society*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press.

Barchiesi, F. (2007) 'South African Debates on the Basic Income Grant: Wage Labour and the Post-apartheid Social Policy'*, Journal of Southern African Studies*, 33:3, 561-575.

BIGNAM Colaition (Haarmann, C., D. Haarmann, H. Jauch, H. Shindondola-Mote, N. Nattrass, M. Samson & G. Standing (2009) Making the Difference: The BIG in Namibia"-Basic Income Grant Pilot Project Assessment, april 2009.

BIGNAM Colaition (Haarmann, C., D. Haarmann, H. Jauch, H. Shindondola-Mote, N. Nattrass, M. Samson & G. Standing (2008) "Towards a Basic Income Grant for All"-Basic Income Grant Pilot Project Assessment, September 2008.

Big Financing Reference Group (2004) "Breaking the Poverty Trap": Financing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa, Closed Conference, Johannesburg.

Bryan, J.B. (2005) "Targeted Programs v the Basic Income Guarantee: An Examination of the Efficiency Costs of Different Forms of Redistribution", *Journal of Socio-Economics*, Vol. 34, pp. 39-47. Elsevier, Ltd.

Easterly, W. (2006), *The White Man's Burden*, London, Penguin Books.

Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI) (2002), Social Security Reform and the Basic Income Grant for South Africa, Geneva, ILO.

EU Network of National Independent Experts on Social Inclusion (2009), Minimum Income Schemes Across EU Member States, Synthesis Report EU Network

Garfinkel I., Huang C. and Naidich W. (2002), The Effects of a Basic Income Guarantee on Poverty and Income Distribution, USBIG Discussion Paper No. 014, Columbia University, February 22, 2002

Harvey P. (2003), The Right to Work and Basic Income Guarantees: A Comparative Assessment, USBIG Discussion Paper No. 57, FebruaryUSBIG Conference, New York City

Ferguson, J. (2007), Formalities of Poverty: Thinking about Social assistance in Neoliberal South Africa, *African Studies Review*, Vol 50, nr 2, pp 71-86.

Haarmann, C. and Haarmann, D. (2005), The developmental impact of a Basic Income Grant, The Basic Income Grant in Namibia Resource Book.

Matisonn, H. & J. Seekings (2002) *Welfare in Wonderland? The Politics of Basic Income Grant in South Africa, 1996-2002*, University of Cape Town, South Africa.

Mkandawire, T. (2005), Targeting and Universalism in Poverty Reduction,Social Policy and Development,Programme Paper Number 23 , United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

Meth, C. (2004a) *Debating the Basic Income Grant*. University of Cape Town.

Meth, C. (2004b) "Ideology and Social Policy: 'Handouts' and the Spectre of 'dependency'", *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa*, Vol. 56, pp. 1-30.

Meth, C. (2008), Basic Income Grant, There is no Alternative! (BIG: Tina!), School of development studies, Working paper no 54, Cape Town.

Naidoo (2004), The Basic Income Grant: Poverty, Politics and Policy-making, Harold Wolpe Lecture Series, University of Natal.

Olin Wright, E. (ed) (2006), *Redesigning Distribution: Basic Income and Stakeholder grants as alternative cornerstones for a more egalitarian capitalism*, London, Verso

Ravallion, M. (2009), 'Bailing out the world's poorest, *Challenge*, Vol 52, n 2, pp 55-80.

Saith, A. (2008), Towards Universalizing Socio-economic Security: Strategic elements of a Policy Framework, *Indian Journal of Development Studies*, Vol 2, No. 1

Saith (2005) Social protection, decent work and development, Discussion paper DP/152/2004, International Institute for Labour Studies, ILO, Geneva.

Samson, M. (2006) Universalism Promotes Development: Evidence from Southern Africa's Social Transfers

Standing, G. (ed), (2004), *Promoting Income Security as a right*, London, Anthem Press

Standing, G. (2008), How cash transfers promote the case for a Basic Income, *Basic Income Studies Journal*, Vol 3, Issue 1. BIEN network.

Suplicy, E. (ed), (1992), Programa de garantia de renda minima, Brasilia, Senado Federal.

Suplicy, E. (2006), 'Citizen's Basic Income: The Answer is Blowing in the wind', *Basic Income Studies Journal*, BIEN network.

Thurlow, J. (2002), Can South Africa afford to become Africa's first welfare stete? USBIG discussion paper no 43, BIEN network.

Van der Berg, S. (2002), The Basic Income Grant: Comments on the Report of the Commitee of inquiry into a comprehensive Social Security System, South africa Foundation

Van Driel, M. (2009) "The Social Grants and Black Women in South Africa: A Case Study of Bophelong Township in Gauteng", *Journal of International Women's Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 4, May 2009, pp. 127-143.

Van Ginneken, W. (2009) "Social Security and the Global Socio-Economic Floor: Towards a Human Rights-Based Approach", *Global Social Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 228-245

Van Parijs, P. (1995) *Real Freedom for all. What (if anything) can justify capitalism?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

13 Evaluation of the Mobilizing IDPs and Locals on Social, Economic and Political Rights by the Community Development Organization of Puttalam District

JUAN PAULO FAJARDO

Background Information and Context

The protracted civil war in Sri Lanka left a trail of devastation. For more than two decades, conflict between the government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been on-and-off with stages of lulls and conflict. The toll however in human miseries has raged on. UNICEF (2010) notes that the war has internally displaced hundreds of thousands of people causing them to leave their livelihoods, lands and belongings. Families have been plunged into unsafe environments and abject destitute situations – living in refugee areas and having limited access to pre-conditions for human well-being. One of the minority groups trapped in the crossfire of the war were Muslims – in particular those residing in the Eastern region that was predominantly occupied by Tamils and had significant LTTE presence. De Silva (1998) notes how Muslims tended to be uprooted easily because of the conflict. This was primarily due to being geographically dispersed and not constituting a majority in all but one of the Eastern Province districts. With their lives threatened, Muslim refugees fled to areas of lesser tension at the expense of their livelihood, properties and lifestyles.

The eventual cessation of hostilities with the defeat of the LTTE in 2009 allowed the country to start moving again. This however has done little to heal the damaged lives of people affected by the conflict. Internally displaced peoples (IDPs) are trapped in between poor living and socioeconomic conditions as refugees on one side, and the difficulty of regaining lands and investments in Tamil, LTTE and/or government occupied areas on the other side. As of 2006, there have been about 65,000 Muslim refugees living in the Puttalam area (Mohideen 2006). Like other minority

groups in the wake of the civil war, they live in poor economic, political and social conditions.

In this context, the Community Development Organization (CDO) was established to advance the rights and conditions of the many IDPs in Puttalam, most of whom are Muslims. CDO focuses on building capacities of IDP communities to enable them to articulate their needs and assert their social, political and economic rights with a special focus on women. As a grassroots organization, CDO has a relatively small organic staff of five paid staff members and a coordinator, but with a large grassroots membership of over 300 all from IDP communities. With the aid of a financial support from Hivos, CDO carried out a two-year project to support 15 villages that resulted in advances in the conditions of women. This initiative was successful in helping raise girls' enrollment rates and reducing rates of domestic violence. It also resulted in a higher percentage of women transacting with authorities and increased the number of land titles and availability of certification documents for marginalized IDPs. While the initiative marked great success for IDPs, it has also sparked animosity between them and the local communities. The latter have reportedly accused the CDO of not helping them obtain land and legal documents. The local communities themselves also lament at not having enough knowledge for securing legal documents and understanding their importance. As such, a larger initiative was set in place – not only to cater to IDPs in other villages, but also to continue to strengthen the capacities of IDPs connected to past endeavors and other members of the host communities.

In July 2007, CDO began implementing a three-year project entitled 'Mobilizing IDPs and Locals on Social, Economic and Political Rights' with financial aid from Hivos. The project employs a strategy rooted in helping solve the difficulties associated with obtaining basic documents as a means to ensure human rights and socio-economic advancement of the marginalized. The project is designed to help improve socioeconomic and political conditions of disadvantaged people in several villages in the Puttalam district – specifically the IDPs, local Muslims, Sinhalese and Tamil people. Through implementing activities to form and strengthen existing small groups, building capacities, and launching public awareness campaigns through arts and media, the project envisages a raised awareness of beneficiaries in obtaining land rights, basic documents and voter registration information. Furthermore, the project includes mobile services and dialogues to improve communication and understanding between the IDPs, the occupants and governments. These efforts aim to help resolve the land issues in Puttalam and in areas IDPs previously resided in. Moreover, the project in-

volves lobbying and interaction with concerned government authorities to help gain their cooperation in streamlining the acquisition process of voting registration listing, land documents as well as other basic identification and certification documents. In raising awareness, improving access and creating room for understanding and communication, the project envisages prospective beneficiaries gaining greater opportunities in accessing land deeds, obtaining basic identification or certification documents as well as voter registration. Ultimately, through gaining access to these documents, beneficiaries would experience greater socio-economic and political well-being as they would have greater employment and livelihood opportunities, avoid harassment and physical abuse by authorities, and would regain the right to suffrage.

The project primarily involves CDO as the main implementer of the initiative, and the disadvantaged people in the Puttalam district who have encountered socio-economic, cultural and security difficulties due to absence of key documents like basic identification documents (birth certificates, NIC, marriage and death certificates), land titles and voter registration. The project involves government functionalities involved in decision-making and issuance of these documents. The initiative also involves land brokers, grassroots NGOs as well as media (particularly in the public awareness component of the project).

Progress reports have shown some progress in some aspects of the project, for instance in successfully organizing hundreds of small groups and beneficiaries receiving land documents and different basic identification and certification documents. The project however has encountered significant hurdles, mainly from a lack of political and government support, as well as the general situation of peace and order that has adversely affected mobility and performance of transactions and dialogues.

Function of the Evaluation

With the conclusion of the project, it is essential to look back and examine what the project has attained insofar as its envisioned outcomes are concerned. It is also relevant to identify and understand the occurrence of any unintended or unexpected outcomes of the conducted activities as these may impinge on the longer-term impacts of the efforts made. Furthermore, it would be of interest to look into the spearhead organization in this endeavor (CDO), including its structure and its capabilities to serve as key factors in the turnout of the project.

The evaluation is designed as a summative endeavor as it focuses on the attainment of the desired outcomes through the interventions done by the project. While explicitly seen as an accountability exercise, the evaluation also seeks to be a forward-looking initiative for both Hivos and CDO. The evaluation will provide learning opportunities for Hivos in supporting future initiatives of such nature, and for CDO to better align their activities and governance structures to their envisaged organizational objectives.

Scope of the Evaluation

The evaluation would cover the CDO and its project 'Mobilizing IDPs and Locals on Social, Economic and Political Rights', which was implemented from 1 July 2007 and would end on 30 June 2010. The project covers 21 villages in the Puttalam district where IDPs, local Muslim, Singhalese and Tamils reside. The project also includes a component wherein 15 villages from the previous project are further strengthened to enable them to function more independently. Considering the nature of the project, evaluation would look at CDO as an organization, as well as the involvement of other stakeholders, particularly the government authorities, land brokers and partner grassroots NGOs.

Objectives of the Evaluation and Key Questions

The evaluation will be two-pronged as it aims to analyze the accomplishments of the program implemented, as well as the organization spearheading it. The evaluation would be conducted on the grounds of effectiveness and relevance, but would also have efficiency as one of the evaluation criteria.

The primary objective of this evaluation is to assess the attainment of the envisaged results of the project. The evaluation would also look at the emergence of any unexpected outcomes of the project and the factors that contributed to their emergence, as well as cost efficiency and gender responsiveness. The secondary objective of this evaluation is to assess the organizational aspects of CDO (particularly its governance structure and decision-making, strategic directions, staff skills development, coherence of activities to its core organisational mission or purpose, existing planning and monitoring schemes). It also looks at the effectiveness of CDO in terms of developing personnel capabilities. Accordingly, the evaluation is geared towards addressing two core questions: How effective was the project in at-

taining its desired results? And does the mechanisms and structure of CDO contribute to its organisational objectives?

Questions for program analysis:

a. What have been the intended and unintended outcomes achieved by the project?

b. Have outcomes been achieved in a cost-effective and cost-efficient manner?

c. Has the project contributed to women's empowerment and gender equality?

d. Has the project triggered or contributed change in policy or practice?

e. What lessons can be learned about the effectiveness of the intervention strategies employed in the project in order to achieve outcomes?

Questions for organisational analysis:

a. How does CDO operate to achieve its strategic objectives?

b. How does CDO's organisational structure contribute to the implementation of its initiatives?

c. How coherent are the interventions being carried out by CDO in line with their core organisational purpose?

d. How effective has the organisation been in developing staff competencies?

The evaluation is expected to utilise different qualitative and quantitative indicators. These indicators and the plausible means of obtaining such information are included appended in Annex I.

Evaluation Methodology[1]

A combination of participatory and other qualitative approaches along with fundamental quantitative analysis would be utilized for the evaluation. The following activities are to be performed:

▪ Review of secondary sources of information (project plans, reports, publications, policies, etc.)

▪ Semi-structured key informant interviews

---

[1] Gender is to be methodologically embedded into the evaluation process. Whenever possible, sex disaggregated data should be utilised.

- Direct observation
- Group discussions
- Field visits

Following mutual agreement between evaluating party and Hivos, other means of obtaining data may also be undertaken. Project plans, reports and other documentation from CDO, small groups and governments are to be used for conducting desk reviews. This is particularly to help understand the input and output elements of the project, and in contributing to the analysis of the organization – one of the main objectives of this evaluation. Desk reviews of these documents are also expected to contribute to understanding project outcomes.

Semi-structured interviews with key informants are also expected to obtain qualitative information from relevant respondents – notably in conducting context analysis and in assessing group or individual capabilities. This also ensures that the evaluation process allows openness to other inputs of respondents, while ensuring replies would remain relevant to the evaluation exercise.

Group discussions are to be performed as much as possible in a participatory manner and segregated by community group (IDPs, local Muslim, Tamil and Sinhalese) and by sex. The United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2007) saw this as one of the recommended methods of obtaining information from IDPs and hosting communities as it helps not only in gathering numerous views simultaneously, but also in observing the interchanges among different participants. This would allow respondents to relay information with fewer inhibitions and also facilitate obtaining sex and community-disaggregated data. Conducting homogenous group discussions would also bear a certain degree of empowerment for some members of the community to share her or his viewpoints on the matter and enlighten other participants taking part in the discussions through the interactivity of the dialogues, which are appropriate for the group being facilitated. Questions should be limited to a few that can be easily asked and answered within the available time. Direct observations and field visits in the localities would also be essential in obtaining other non-quantifiable information such as actor, abilities, behaviors and level of awareness.

The evaluation is to be performed in coordination between the evaluator, CDO and Hivos throughout the process. Details on the activities to be undertaken for the evaluation are found below:

Preparatory activities:

- Initial desk reviews of secondary information
- Pre-travel communication with CDO for supplemental information and coordinating with prospective informants to interview
- Presentation of inception report by the evaluating party which includes a detailed evaluation plan

Evaluation proper:

- Supplemental desk reviews
- Travel to Sri Lanka and conduct of preparatory meetings with CDO
- Meetings with CDO and collection of relevant documentations in the locality
- Conduct of interview, discussions and direct observations with key stakeholders and agencies involved with the project, with consequent collection of relevant documentations
- Supplemental desk reviews
- Field visits to selected villages

Post -evaluation:

- Presentation of initial findings to CDO and consequently to Hivos
- Submission of field work brief
- Submission of final report

Evaluation Outputs[2]

The evaluation is expected to generate the following outputs:

- An inception report (which also serves as the proposed structured evaluation plan) is expected from the evaluation team after preliminary

---

[2] All documentary deliverables should be compliant to Hivos policies for evaluations and DAC standards for quality of evaluation. Submissions of reports should be both through electronic versions (sent to Program Officer in-charge of the initiative) as well as a printed copy of the documentary submissions. Successful submission and duly approved documentary requirements of the commissioning agent serves as the milestones for remuneration of the evaluation team. Literature, presentations and communications in line with the evaluation should be in the English language.

desk review. This report should contain a more detailed discussion of the description of the methodology to be utilized, detailed work plan and other pertinent components of the evaluation that need to be discussed before actual implementation.

- As a result of the completion of the desk review, field visits, interviews and group meetings, a brief on the result of the field activities is expected. This brief outlines preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations of the team.
- Afterwards, a final evaluation report is to be submitted to Hivos by the evaluation team within a month of submission of the brief. The final report should include a three to five-page executive summary highlighting the major findings of the evaluation. The final evaluation is expected to be a more detailed discussion of the entire evaluation endeavor as well as a discussion of the analysis performed and the results. The final evaluation report is expected to provide recommendations related to the key evaluation questions and any other relevant issues not mentioned within the evaluation focus. The final report should include instruments utilized, finalized terms of reference and other pertinent information.

Governance and Management of the Evaluation

The evaluation is commissioned by Hivos, a Dutch non-governmental organization that supports local organizations in developing countries, including the initiative proposed for review. Approval of any documents to be submitted by the evaluation team is subject to approval and acceptance of Hivos, in line with its organizational policies and procedures.

Composition of the Evaluation Team

To allow greater independence in conducting activities, the evaluation would be externally led and would be comprised of an experienced evaluator duly recognized by Hivos. The team as a whole should have these cumulative capacities and credentials:

- Extensive evaluation experience (particularly the head of evaluation)
- Fluency in Sinhala and or Tamil
- Understanding of the human rights and historical context in the Puttalam district and of Sri Lanka in general
- Experience in conducting qualitative evaluation or research

- Experience in conducting focus group discussions and key informant interviews
- Experience or familiarity in conducting at financial and organizational analysis of projects
- In line with ensuring gender balance, the evaluation team is expected to have equal male and female members.

Annex I: List of Indicators to be Utilized
(see next page)

Subject in Focus (Program Analysis)	Particulars	Indicators/Variables	Plausible Sources/Means of Collection of Information

Intended and unintended outcomes of the initiative	Raised awareness of beneficiaries obtaining land rights, basic documents and voter registration	- Magnitude and proportion of land rights recipients in Puttalam and Mannar assisted by the project (by sex)
		- Magnitude and proportion of recipients of basic documents who became aware because of the project, by sex
		  * Birth certificates
		  * NIC
		  * Marriage
		  * Death
		- Magnitude and proportion of recent voting registrants who became aware because of the project (by sex)
		- Level of familiarity on how to obtain land rights, basic documents and voter's registration
		- Familiarity in procedures and importance of obtaining basic documents, land rights and voter's registration
		- Awareness of beneficiaries in detecting land title fraud
			Project documents
			Government documents
			Group discussions
			Direct observations

	Streamlined procedures in obtaining basic documents, land titles and voter's registration	- Presence of signed agreements on improving access to documents - Legislation or policy documents on streamlining - Average time in acquiring land documents, basic documents and voters registration	Project documents Government documents Key Informant Interviews Group discussions Direct observations
	Better understanding of all stakeholders (government, IDPs, occupants of ancestral lands) on the land issue	- Land titles successfully distributed - Prevalence of contestation from stakeholders on land distribution	Project documents Key Informant Interviews Direct observations
	Unintended outcomes	- Outcomes not indicated in the project design	Project documents Key Informant Interviews Direct observations
	Factors contributing to the outcomes	- Reported / observed factors contributing to the outcomes	Project documents Key Informant Interviews Direct observations

Subject in Focus (Program Analysis)	Particulars	Indicators/Variables120	Plausible Sources/Means of Collection of Information
Emerging socio-economic impacts of the project	Decreased human rights violations	- Incidence of harassment by authorities for inability to present NIC, by sex - Incidence of physical abuse reported, by sex	Key informant interviews Group discussions Direct observations
	Gainful income opportunities	- Involvement in income generating activities as a result of obtaining NIC Cards, by sex - Involvement in income generating activities as a result of obtaining NIC Cards, by sex - Increase in income of beneficiaries as a result of obtaining basic documents, by sex	Key informant interviews Group discussions Direct observations
	Increase in employment of beneficiaries	- Number and proportion of beneficiaries hired/ had stable status as a result of obtaining basic information documents, by sex	Key informant interviews Group discussions Direct observations
	Ability to Vote	- Election participation among beneficiaries, by sex	Key informant interviews Group discussions Direct observations
	Peaceful co-existence of communities	- Incidence of cross-cultural conflict - Incidence of cross-cultural activities/ gatherings	Key informant interviews Group discussions Direct observations
	Better family relationships	- Incidence of domestic violence reported - Incidence of separation of families due to unfavourable relationships	Key informant interviews Group discussions Government records
	Improved psycho-social conditions	- Incidence of depression	Key Informant interview
	Unintended impacts	- Incidence of unintended impact	Group discussions

Subject in Focus (Program Analysis)	Particulars	Indicators/Variables	Plausible Sources/Means of Collection of Information
Cost Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency		- Overall beneficiary to expense ratio - Average expense for every small group maintained - Average expense per trained participant - Average expense per every land deed obtained in Puttalam - Average expense per every land deed obtained in ancestral areas - Expense for publicity materials and campaigns vis-à-vis number of beneficiaries who obtained basic documents, land rights and voter's registration - Expense for dialogues as compared to number of participant - Expenses for meeting with government officials of pertinent agencies as compared to the policies released - Recycling practices used for the project - Purchase of cheaper materials of similar quality - Optimisation of travels	Financial documents Project documents Direct observation Key informant interview
Gender empowerment and equality		- Recipients of land titles, by sex - Recipients of basic documents, by sex - Voter's registration by sex - Trained of CDO staff, by sex - Trained CDO members, by sex - Trained land brokers on land transactions, by sex - Small group leaders, by sex - Composition of group meetings - Roles of functions of women within CDO and the project	Project documents Key informant interview
Project contribution to policy change or practice	Contribution to policy	- Presence of signed agreements on improving access to identification and certification documents - Legislation or policy documents on streamlining acquisition of land rights, basic documents and voters rights - Agency resolutions, memorandum circulars or executive orders on acquiring land rights, basic documents and voters rights	Project documents Key informant interview MOUs between government MOAs between government
	Contribution to practice	- Change in the document acquisition processes - Change of manner of distribution of basic documents, land rights and voter's registration	Key informant interview Field visit (confirmatory

References

De Silva, K. M. (1998) *Reaping the Whirlwind Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka*. New York: Penguin Books.

UNICEF (n.d.) 'The Situation in Sri Lanka' . Accessed 2 March 2010 <http://www.unicef.org/srilanka/overview.html>.

Mohideen M.I.M. (2006) North-East Muslim Question and Peace Process in Sri Lanka.

UNHCR (2008). Protection of Conflict Induced IDPs: Assessment for Action. Geneva: United Nations Inter Agency Standing Committee Protection Cluster Working Group and Early Recovery Cluster Working Group.

14

The reach of international campaigns for informal workers. Beyond Global Value Chains?

WILLEM ALBERT FLINTERMAN

Introduction

In this essay I would like to discuss the above-noted topic. To this end I will describe how precarious and informal work has increased due to globalized business interactions in so-called Global Value Chains. I will also refer to international campaigns intended for the development of policies and programmes protecting informal workers, both of which are inserted in value chains. I will further describe the work of trade unions and their alliances for informal workers, particularly in India and South Africa. I will show how some informal workers organizations have been formed in the Global South and have been supporting the interests of informal workers who do not produce for international markets.

Supports for informal workers, those that in various degrees perform work that is unregistered, unrecognized and unprotected, can be numerous. There are different actors, national and international, public and private, that can use their influence to positively affect the livelihoods of informal workers. Barrientos and Barrientos use the following Social Responsibility Matrix for horticulture workers that can also be applied to other occupational areas of informal work.

Domain	Domestic	International
State	National government Ministries Labour Inspectorate	ILO, WB, EU, ECLAC, WHO, ISSA
Market	Exporters Employers/Producers Labour contractors Trade unions Private insurance and welfare providers (pensions, health, etc.)	Supermarkets Importers MNEs Ethical Trading Initiative
Community	Domestic NGOs Political parties Community organisations Church organisations	International NGOs Consumer organizations
Household	Extended household	Migrant relatives

Source: Barrientos and Barrientos, 2002, p. 8.

Chen et al. (2002: 22) list a number of policies that can be developed by governments in order to support workers in the informal economy:

- "Macro-economic policies: monetary, fiscal, price, trade and industry
- Sectoral economic policies: small enterprise development, agriculture
- Labour policies, laws and standards
- Infrastructure and services: housing and sanitation
- Social services: health, education and childcare
- Social protection: social insurance, social assistance
- Regulatory controls: licensing, registration, zoning, land/space allocation
- Institutional reforms: institutional location of those dealing with the informal economy, representation of informal workers in consultative processes."

In this essay I choose not to further elaborate on the aforementioned examples of public policy. Instead, I would like to concentrate on efforts of civil society organisations, for example, trade unions, NGOs and multi-stakeholder initiatives, that seek to improve the economic and social position of informal workers. I would like to critically discuss their contributions

towards realising decent work for informal workers in the context of a value chain (through the Sialkot soccer ball case) and subsequently their efforts in support of those that work outside of the value chain. As part of my discussion of informal workers in global value chains, the role of transnational companies will come to fore.

Challenges for Informal Workers in Global Value Chains

In the 1980s globalization, stimulated by rapid improvements in communication technology and lower transport costs, increased the demand for products from the Global South. To deal with this rising demand many companies in the North opted for "productive decentralization" as Tokman calls it. He refers to "modern enterprises adapting to globalization by introducing flexible production systems and decentralizing production and labor processes, which reduce costs, externalize demand fluctuations and weaken the bargaining power of unions". He says that "the typical employment relationship between an employer and his workers within an enterprise was partly displaced by another employment relationship, not always visible or clearly defined" (Tokman 2007: 3).

As a result of productive decentralization, many Northern enterprises started to organise their manufacturing processes by operating through global value chains. After the financial crisis of the 80s that affected many countries in the South, a wave of trade liberalization and deregulation swept through the world imposed by international financial institutions under the banner of the Washington Consensus.

The ensuing reduction of trade barriers and government support together with trends in globalization required local firms in the Global South to be more competitive. Answering this challenge, firms in developing countries sought cost reductions through flexibilization of their workforce. This affected many workers in manufacturing plants whose work was either outsourced to the informal sector or whose employment status was stripped of the labour rights enjoyed by a small core of permanent employees (Tokman 2007: 4, 5).

With flexibilization of labour the informal sector expanded into the informal economy. The ILO has defined informal economy as: "all economic activities by workers and economic units that are – in law or practice – not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements" (Tokman 2007: 4). Whereas the informal sector is a structuralist concept for work settings that are excluded from registration, regulation and protection (e.g. home-based work, street vending, rural day labour, informal enterprises), the in-

formal economy also includes informal work arrangements in the formal sector, usually referred to as precarious work. The informality of precarious work is not an absolute, but may also reflect an erosion of labour rights, with some of them remaining. The concept of precarious work makes clear the fact that the status of different workers is situated on a continuum between formality and informality.

In their 2006 article Knorringa and Pegler draw upon Kaplinsky's theory of immiserizing growth to assert that insertion of local firms in Global Value Chains may not easily lead to economic or social upgrading. They state that "fundamental asymmetries in employment and industrial relations imply that labour rights improvements, especially those based on trust, may not be consistent with flexibility requirements in global production networks" (Knorringa and Pegler 2006: 472). They point at an "increased insecurity and precariousness of workers in firms at the lower end of the chain [which] needs to be seen within the context of such firms being squeezed by their global spiders-in-the-web in a cut throat competitive environment" (Knorringa and Pegler 2006: 474).

Hence, further to their observation that "general improvements in labour conditions will not emerge from the existing type of economic globalization", they suggest that "labour rights improvements must be based on a broader and more inclusive human development agenda", such as the decent work framework (Knorringa and Pegler 2006:475).

Knorringa and Pegler express a concern that insertion in a Global Value Chain would lead to higher costs for local producers in complying with social codes. This could give a negative incentive for local producers to segregate their workers into a group of formal workers that enjoy better workplace standards and a category of informal workers to whom work is outsourced and who are excluded from those improved conditions. They refer to "strongly segmented and differentiated employment conditions" (Knorringa and Pegler 2006: 473).

This greater degree of segregation in the economic position of local workers is also described by Barrientos in her article about the effects of globalization on sub-contractors in the cluster. It is clear that, as she names it, the sub-contracted informal workers are the "Achilles Heel" for the improvement of labour standards in local firms (Barrrientos 2008: 983).

In their discussion paper on informal workers in horticulture in Chile and South-Africa, Barrientos and Barrientos point to the predicament and lack of power of producers who find themselves at the bottom of the chain: "the only group remaining at the base of the value chain, onto whom they

can off load some of the risk, is the labour force, and particularly the more flexible seasonal workers where the highest levels of female employment are found" (Barrientos and Barrientos 2002: 11). In horticulture, like in so many other industries, producers reduce their risk and obligations by sourcing their workforce from labour contractors that often extend few labour rights to the workers (Barrientos and Barrientos 2002: 19). Employment insecurity is further increased by the seasonal nature of the work:. "compared to others in the sector, informal horticulture workers are much less likely to be protected by employment rights, they are also less likely to be able to benefit from a stable employment relationship, and related employer provided protection" (Barrientos and Barrientos 2002: 20).

International Campaigns for Rights of Informal Workers in Value Chains

Various campaigns by NGOs, trade unions and multi-stakeholder organisations have been organised to draw attention to the precarious situation of informal workers in value chains and improve their position. Most of the civil society groups trying to improve conditions in value chains are groups from the North who are trying the influence transnational companies either at head office level or by pressuring local producers that are inserted in the value chains governed by these TNCs. The following three examples pertain to the activities of a Global Union, the IUF, a civil society network called Clean Clothes Campaign and a multi-stakeholder initiative called the Fair Wear Foundation.

Global Unions

Global unions have been instrumental in supporting workers and their representatives in the Global South when they lack the power to stand up against the power of an employer that is part of a multinational organization. In that case, the global union can mobilize its network to apply pressure on the other operations of the multinational around the world, including its brands. One of these global unions is the IUF. On the website www.global-unions.org the IUF is described:

> The International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations (IUF) is an international federation of trade unions representing workers employed in agriculture and plantations; the preparation and manufacture of food and beverages; hotels, restaurants and catering services; and all stages of tobacco processing. The IUF is com-

posed of 348 trade unions in 127 countries with a combined membership of over 12 million workers. From its founding in 1920, international labour solidarity has been the IUF´s guiding principle. The IUF builds solidarity at every stage of the food chain, international organising within transnational companies and supporting global action to defend human, democratic, and trade union rights.[1]

In 2009 the IUF coordinated a campaign against the marginalization of labour at a tea factory in Khanewal. The Lipton/Brooke Bond factory was being operated by a permanent workforce of only 22 employees and 500 casual workers who were supplied by labour contractors with no chance of being hired on a permanent contract. While the Pakistani union affiliated with the IUF coordinated local campaigns, the IUF filed a complaint with the OECD contact point in the UK, seat of the factory's mother corporation, Unilever. They complained that Unilever had breached OECD guidelines by refusing to offer adequate rights to the 500 employees who, after all, worked under the Unilever's supervision and control.[2]

At the same time the IUF launched a global campaign against the labour practices of Unilever and its subsidiary, which they gave the catchy name "Casual T". National unions in South Africa, Russia, the Philippines, Australia and also The Netherlands joined in with supporting actions.[3] The campaign proved to be successful during the same year as an agreement was reached in mediation at the OECD offices and Unilever undertook to create an extra 200 permanent positions at the Khanewal plant.[4]

Clean Clothes Campaign

The Clean Clothes Campaign is an alliance of trade unions and NGOs in 13 European countries with a wide array of interests such as women's rights, consumer advocacy and poverty reduction. The Clean Clothes Campaign has more than 200 organisations with which it collaborates in the Global South to improve the terms and conditions of workers in the garment industry. Most of the workers in the garment industry have a precarious status or are informal in the way that they are not recognized, registered or pro-

---

[1] http://www.global-unions.org/spip.php?rubrique13

[2] http://www.iuf.org/cgi- bin/dbman/db.cgi?db=default&uid=default&ID= 6000&view_records=1&ww=1&en=1).

[3] http://asianfoodworker.net/?p=719

[4] http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file53915.pdf

tected. Many of the informal workers work out of their homes. Some do their work in so-called stitching centres.

The Clean Clothes Campaign coordinates international action such as the Asia Floor Wage Campaign, which forms an organised effort to raise the wages on a regional basis to the level of a living wage. The motive informing the campaign is the reasoning that the cycle of poverty of many informal workers cannot be broken unless employers are willing to pay a wage that does not require a worker to struggle for his economic survival every day (Merk 2009:7). Indeed, increased social protection and human rights improvements can by themselves not remedy a lack of income. In order to determine what a living wage is, the campaign has calculated the cost of an average food basket in the Asian countries where it is targeting the garment industry to raise wages. The Asia Floor Wage Alliance strives for a regional wage floor to establish "a floor on the race to the bottom" and to prevent "wage competition between Asian garment exporting countries". In the 2009 report by Jeroen Merk of the Clean Clothes Campaign explain this further: "By uniting together and adopting a common Asia-wide bargaining strategy, garment workers and their representatives and supporters in Asia and the North can campaign for improved pay and conditions with the fear of causing job losses. Instead of workers competing with each other, pressing wages down even more, we have formulated a unified, regional demand, with a global echo for a wage which is decent and fair" (Merk 2009: 8). Obviously, a regional wage floor would enhance the livelihoods of many garment workers. The campaign seeks to include a Floor Wage formula in the contracts between major brands and retailers and local producers on the other hand. Commitment is also sought from local producers to translate higher revenue for their product into higher wages for their workers (Merk 2009: 10).

The Clean Clothes Campaign works together with multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Fair Wear Foundation (The Netherlands), the Ethical Trading Initiative (United Kingdom) and the Fair Labour Association (United States). These multi-stakeholder initiatives often collaborate with international organisations, Western buyers, local firms and business associations in the Global South, but are mostly coordinated by civil society organisations in the North. I would like to use the Fair Wear Foundation as an example.

Fair Wear Foundation

The Fair Wear Foundation is a multi-stakeholder initiative governed by trade unions (including the Clean Clothes Campaign) and business associations that is aimed at improving the lives of workers in the garment industry and in manufacturing of other sewn products.[5] It applies a monitoring system in supply chains by conducting inspections at factory level and at the company level of the Western buyer. The Fair Wear Foundation also implements a complaint process for workers in the countries where it operates. The Foundation seeks to ensure compliance with a number of labour standards, all in line with the ILO's Decent Work Agenda.[6]

One of the Fair Wear Foundation's standards is that "Working relationships shall be legally binding and all obligations under labour and social security laws and regulations shall be respected." Accordingly, suppliers to participating Western buyers are audited to verify compliance with this and other standards. However, compliance is not a given. In its country report of 2006 on Bangladesh it was noted that employers in Bangladesh are not obligated to give their workers a written contract. On informal work in the clothing industry, it was stated in the report:

> The first and foremost indicator of the vulnerability of the Ready Made Garment worker is their lack of recognition as industrial workers. It is very rare that workers have formal working contracts with their employer. At best they are provided with an identity card as proof of employment, more commonly they have just an attendance card as a credential of employment. They are never issued with a legally tenable contract of employment. There condition resembles more of inmates of a labour camp (FWF, Background Study Bangladesh 2006: 2).

Case: Soccer Ball Stitchers from Pakistan

The case of soccer ball stitchers in Sialkot, Pakistan illustrates how problematic it has been to eliminate unsound labour practices in the informal economy, even should it be expected that Western buyers in value chains readily impose their standards.

In its 2010 report the International Labour Rights Forum states that "non-permanent workers are the standard for the hand-stitched soccer ball industry"… "Workers are often paid below the legal minimum wage and

---

[5] http://www.fairwear.org/about

[6] http://fairwear.org/page/verification

their incomes can barely cover basic needs. While they are vulnerable to occupational health hazards, their part-time status makes them ineligible for many social protections including health care. The rights to organize and to bargain collectively are usually legally barred to workers with informal employment status." Gender-based discrimination is also prevalent in this industry. Commonly, women that perform home-based work are paid less than men and run the risk of losing their employment when they become pregnant (ILRF 2010: 2).

In his 2008 article Khalid Nadvi describes the failed attempt by various local and international stakeholders to weed out child labour in the sporting goods cluster of Sialkot, Pakistan (Nadvi 2008: 339). The sporting good cluster in Sialkot specializes in the manufacturing of soccer balls that are mostly sold to big brands merchandisers such as Nike and Adidas. It comprises more than one hundred companies that also sub-contract to informal home-based workers. Many of these workers are women that are hired to do the hand-stitching of the balls. However, children have been among the home-based workers. Low wages paid to adult workers form one of the main causes for child labour. If the parents need to complete a large number of balls in order to survive financially, often children are expected to assist. It is easy for children to participate in such work due to the fact that it takes place in an informal setting such as a home and since it does not require a lot of training(ILRF, 2010, p. 7).

Because of the vulnerability of branded companies to consumer perceptions, Nike has collaborated with multi-stakeholder initiatives since the end of the '90s to eliminate child labour in the industry. In 1997 the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Government of Pakistan, ILO, UNICEF, the World Federation of Sports Goods Industries and FIFA signed the so-called Atlanta agreement to that effect. The Atlanta agreement had two strategies. The first strategy was a program led by the ILO-IPEC to prevent and to monitor child labour in the workplace. The second strategy was a program for social protection led by UNICEF, Save the Children, the government of Pakistan and Pakistani NGOs. This strategy was aimed at tackling the underlying issues of child labour. It included promotion of education, training, income generation and social security for child workers. Additionally, there were various active contributions from the private sector, including the establishment by the local chamber of commerce of a Corporate Social Responsibility team and an organisation for Child and Social Development.

Nadvi states that many informal workers in the rural areas moved their work to stitching centres where it was easier to monitor compliance with labour standards (Nadvi 2008: 334). Although stitching centres as a model for a better workplace in which women only would work to satisfy cultural norms, were seen as a good alternative to home-based work, in many cases they did not bring about the expected solution. Stitching centres are sometimes not operated by the company for which soccer balls are produced, but are independently owned (IRF 2010: 9). In some of these stitching centres the ILRF found that 100% of the workers are employed as casual labour without labour rights of any significance (ILRF 2010: 11). It seems that independently owned stitching centres are first and foremost a business opportunity for the owners and are not aimed at improving the rights of home-based workers.

However, buyers of big-branded firms called in assistance from NGOs in order to increase their monitoring capability. In 2000, 68 of 90 export firms in the cluster that represented three-quarters of the cluster's entire production were voluntarily checked by ILO (Nadvi 2008: 334). Nadvi states that the ILO's monitoring system was so comprehensive that it was even duplicated for use in the Jalandhar cluster in India.

In 2003, for reasons of program sustainability, monitoring of the ILO was transferred to a new national body comprising multiple stakeholders, called the Independent Monitoring Association for Child Labour (IMAC). IMAC was not funded by UN-organizations but received most of its support from local producers, who increased their role in governance of the monitoring scheme. However, one of the leading multinationals in Corporate Social Responsibility practices, Nike, had developed its own monitoring system, in order to oversee compliance with standards extending beyond child labour. Nike's standards also included social security, time keeping, occupational health and safety and environmental protection.

In 2006, despite the elaborate monitoring systems of the ILO, Nike and other stakeholders, child labour resurfaced in the cluster, causing Nike to terminate its relationship with its supplier Saga Sport and withdraw from Pakistan altogether. In 2007 Nike returned to Sialkot in order to work with the Silver Star company. Nike imposed an entirely revised labour relations regime whereby Silver Star was required to comply with not only Nike's standards, but also all provisions of the Atlanta Agreement. Silver Star was expected to employ only registered full-time workers in its production, have no production take place outside the plant, pay at least minimum wage, offer social benefits and permit collective bargaining (ILRF 2010: 28).

Nadvi suggests that the reason child labour to reared its head again in the cluster was related to the reduced involvement of external actors and the increased influence of local producers in IMAC. He says that external actors missed the mark in distancing themselves from the monitoring activities and the local producers by not giving sufficient priority to the elimination of child labour (Nadvi 2008: 337). Nadvi also presumes that the social and economic outcomes of reducing the role of children on the shop floor were insufficient for both local producers and workers to fully embrace the agenda promoted by the multi-stakeholder initiatives. He articulates this point as follows: "If outcomes can be shown to be positive -in terms of improved incomes, employment, better working conditions and reduced vulnerabilities then it may become easier to accept the values and virtues implicit in specific labour standards. If outcomes are at best ambiguous and worse negative, then it is more than likely that the standard is seen as a necessary but external 'evil' that has to be responded to, but that does not necessarily change local social perceptions on the values implicit of the standard." (Nadvi 2008: 339).

Obviously, a prohibition of child labour will not have much chance of success if it does not go hand in hand with an improvement of the labour standards for adult workers. Providing higher wages and enhanced social protection for parents of child workers will reduce the need for them to involve their children in the stitching work. Ultimately, it is the large extent of informality and precarious work and therefore the lack of decent jobs that caused child labour in Sialkot (ILRF 2010: 12). It is likely that Nike understood this relationship when it decided to formalize stitching work at the Silver Star plant, disallowing any work to take place outside the facility.

However, when looking critically at this decision to formalize the work of soccer ball stitchers, it can also be concluded that Nike has shortened its value chain to reduce its risks. Although numbers are not available, Brill notes that shortening the value chain has also excluded female stitchers that were not able to work at Silver Star plant due to cultural norms or parental responsibilities. Even working at local stitching centres has proven problematic for some homeworkers for the same reasons. A consequence of this was that where work was concentrated in these production facilities, incomes of the homeworkers who did not transfer were greatly affected (Brill 2002: 117).

Informal workers outside Global Value Chains

A large portion of informal workers are not inserted in Global Value Chains, meaning that they do not produce goods or services that are marketed and sold by other firms on foreign markets. These are for example the home-based workers, street vendors, agricultural own-account workers and informal entrepreneurs that sell to consumers domestically. Whereas civil society groups, international organisations such as ILO and even national governments in the Global North can influence the practices of buyers operating on behalf of "Northern" companies, they face substantially more challenges in trying to improve conditions for informal workers who are not inserted in value chains.

Carr et al. define home-based workers as comprising own-account workers (outside a global value chain) and industrial out-workers or homeworkers (inserted in a chain) (Carr et al. 2000: 127). To support home-based workers they state that a research-action-policy agenda is needed including the following elements: "….

- Research and statistical studies: to document the number, contribution, and working conditions of home-based women workers and to assess the impact of globalization on them;

- Action programs: to help home-based women workers gain access to – and bargain effectively within – labour and product markets (both local and global);

- Grassroots organizations: to increase the visibility and voice of home-based women workers and other women workers in the informal sector, and

- Policy dialogues: to promote an enabling work and policy environment for home-based women workers." (Carr et al. 2000: 137)

Within this policy framework civil society groups would need to focus on supporting local trade unions to mobilize and organize informal workers and help them to increase their bargaining power either with market parties or employers. Civil society groups from the Global North can also participate in international networks with trade unions from the South, which concentrate on lobbying governments and international organisations. Thirdly, NGOs could assist informal workers with income generating programs including business development services and referrals to appropriate micro-financing schemes. This is in line with policy solutions suggested by Carr et al. (Carr et al. 2000: 137).

Organising Informal Workers

There are several reasons why traditional trade unions have a poor record of organising informal workers. Traditional trade unions are geared towards serving the needs of factory workers and tend to disregard home-based workers, although many do work that factories have outsourced to them. Also, trade unions view home-based workers for instance as entrepreneurs and not as wage-earners. Further, trade unions are concerned about having members with conflicting interests who compete for the same work (Schiphorst 2008: 2). There is also a perception that the informal sector is too dispersed to effectively organise (Hill 2008: 116). Finally, since most of the home-based workers are women, unions assume that they cannot leave their domestic duties to participate in union work (Hill 2008: 117). Since mainstream trade unions have been so reluctant in providing representation to informal workers, the latter have in some instances, sometimes with success and other times without, established their own workers' organisations. Many of these initiatives were taken by women who felt not only underrepresented due to their work status, but also as a result of gender discrimination. In the following paragraphs I will describe two of these organisations: SEWA from India and SEWU from South Africa as well as two umbrella organisations for informal worker unions, HomeNet and StreetNet.

Self Employed Women's Association

The Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) from India is probably the best known example of an association by and for informal workers. In 2004 SEWA had 688,743 members, making it the biggest union in India. Most of these members are based in the state of Gujarat (Hill 2008: 120).

SEWA was founded in 1971 as part of the Textile Labour Association and became an independent trade union in 1981 (Hill 2008: 118, 119). The immense informal labour force in India, many of whom are female own-account workers, generated a need for collective representation. SEWA had to battle against the traditional interpretation of what it means to be a woman, a worker and a trade union. Patriarchal notions in Indian society have maintained the idea that women should stay at home, take on parental and domestic duties and perhaps accept a job, when that is necessary to support the family budget, but only for a supplementary income and not as the main breadwinner. Similar attitudes prevail in the industrialized sector where women suffer from discriminatory practices in the workplace. Career advancement is seen as a male prerogative. Although in many industries the majority of lower-skilled low-paid workers are female, industrial trade un-

ions have been male dominated. The perception that home-based workers do not have a stable relationship with a particular employer has raised questions about SEWA's legal status as a trade union. Elizabeth Hill summarized this as follows: "The demand that self-employed women be recognized as 'workers' with an equal need for industrial representation as that enjoyed by their male factory-based counterparts challenged socially constructed notions of 'woman' and the dominant legal and cultural understanding of what it meant to be 'a trade union' and 'a worker' (Hill 2008: 118).

SEWA covers a wide range of occupations in which female informal workers can be found. Its membership can be divided into four categories: "(1) Home based workers, including weavers, potters, bidi rollers, agarbatti rollers, dry food makers, tailors, handicraft artisans and embroiderers; (2) hawkers and vendors, including purchasers of vegetables, fruit, fish, other food items, household items and clothes from wholesalers; (3) manual labourers and service providers, including agricultural labourers, construction site workers, handcart pullers, head-loaders, dhobi wallahs and cooks; and (4) rural producers, including gum collectors, salt workers and cattle/dairy farmers." (Hill 2008: 120).

In order to cater to the needs of informal workers SEWA moved from traditional union concerns to a broader service package comprising of legal aid, child care, trade co-ops, credit and banking services and even social insurance. SEWA established the Gujarat State Mahila Co-operative Federation, a federation of approximately 90 co-operatives, such as the Shri Mahila SEWA Sahakari Bank that offers products in the area of savings, loans and insurance. Vocational and leadership training activities are provided through the SEWA Academy. The Mahila Housing Trust provides affordable accommodation for union members (Hill 2008: 121). SEWA also operates the Sangini Child Care Co-operative, consisting of 128 childcare facilities (Hill 2008: 125).

SEWA further endeavours to connect its members with business opportunities through its Trade Facilitation Centre, where information is dispensed on trade and marketing. Carr, Chen and Tate name producer associations as essential for informal women to bargain for better prices, capture more rents by circumventing middle men and gain access to technology, to modern communication tools and to marketing information (Carr et al. 2000: 138). SEWA has been successful in setting up those producer associations for its members.

Hill describes how SEWA distinguishes itself from a traditional union. Firstly, they organise around the (negative) common life experience of

women workers. Secondly, SEWA seeks development of the whole person, recognising that the private sphere of women has a bearing on their professional sphere and vice versa. Thirdly, they place a strong emphasis on organizing and mobilizing in addition to servicing. Fourthly, they resocialize women's work whereby women are able to have non-exploitative workplaces and a collective voice (Hill 2008: 122-128). SEWA has developed itself through the years as benchmark for organizing informal workers.

Self Employed Women's Union

SEWU, the Self Employed Women's Union, was an informal workers' union exclusively for women in South Africa. Its membership mostly comprised street vendors and home-based workers. It existed between 1994 and 2004, when the workers organization ceased to exist due to several reasons including poor financial management, the termination of financial assistance by foreign donors and lacking support from South Africa's biggest trade union, COSATU. Schiphorst, in his 2008 article, even exclaims that "it seems that if COSATU had made a move, it might have been able to safe SEWU!" (Schiphorst 2008: 13). Despite its short life SEWU has made a difference for its members. Webber credits SEWU with "negotiating improved conditions and facilities for street traders". He adds as other achievements of the organization: "In this way SEWU has been able to circumvent the constraints of exclusion from the employment relationship and the protections of labour legislation. Through negotiation, it has established a new form of inclusion in terms of local government regulation and resources" (Webber 2006: 32).

International alliances for informal workers

HomeNet and StreetNet are international alliances for home-based workers and street vendors respectively. Both organizations were founded in the mid-1990s, HomeNet in 1994 and StreetNet in 1995. Both alliances seek to mobilize and unite civil society organizations in an effort to lobby governments and international organizations. They also are involved in capacity building of their member organizations, many of which are national workers' unions.[7]

There are several national and regional HomeNet organizations in 25 countries. Examples are HomeNet South Asia, HomeNet Pakistan, Home-

---

[7] http://www.streetnet.org.za/?page_id=6

Net Bangladesh, HomeNet Sri Lanka, HomeNet India (connected to SEWA) and HomeNet Turkey. Many HomeNet organizations share organizing principles with SEWA. HomeNet Turkey for instance, seeks visibility for home-based workers, offers membership training, organizes local workshops and does mapping exercises to reach women. At the same time HomeNet Turkey tries to change national policy by collaborating with other trade unions (Coskun 2008: 214, 215).

HomeNet has strong linkages to SEWA and together with UNIFEM they have successfully lobbied for the design and final ratification in 1996 of ILO's Convention 177 on Home Workers. HomeNet is now striving for recognition and labour protection of home-based own-account workers so that ultimately all home-based workers will be covered by international labour law and national legislation.[8] HomeNet, SEWA and UNIFEM, together with researchers and grassroots organizations, are also actively involved in Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing also abbreviated as WIEGO, which is an international alliance engaged in developing relevant statistics, research, policies and programs (Carr et al. 2000: 141).

The HomeNet initiative has also lead to a great number of national HomeNet organizations in Asia. In 2000, HomeNet South Asia was created with the support of SEWA and UNIFEM at a meeting in Kathmandu between government representatives of India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh and civil society groups.[9] This regional organization lead to HomeNet groups in the said countries with further proliferation in South East Asia, where there are now organizations in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines (www.homenetseasia.org/intro.html). HomeNet South Asia claims that it influenced the ILO to include the issues around own-account home based workers in the 2002 Resolution concerning Decent Work and the Informal Economy.[10]

Conclusion

Collaboration between civil society, government institutions and private actors is essential for fitting solutions to the insecurity of informal workers. Many civil society organizations play an important role in ratcheting up

---

[8] http://www.homenetsouthasia.org/actionareas

[9] http://www.homenetsouthasia.org/actionareas.php

[10] http://www.homenetsouthasia.org/actionareas.php

conditions in global value chains. However, strengthening the position of informal workers in value chains has proven to be challenging, judging from the Sialkot case. On the other hand, best practices, such as the approaches by SEWA and HomeNet, can be found in the representation of home-based workers that operate outside of chains. It is clear from the HomeNet example that scope matters for the degree of pressure that can be exercised on international institutions such as the ILO. International coordination and alliances with other civil society actors have given HomeNet a collective voice that has enabled the group to gain influence. Also, national workers organizations in the informal economy, even the perished SEWU, have shown to be successful in empowering workers, connecting them to the market and positively affecting their working conditions. The approach to supporting informal workers needs to be engendered, as cultural views on women determine their vulnerable position in the informal economy.

References

Barrientos, S. (2008) 'Contract Labour: The 'Achilles Heel' of Corporate Codes in Commercial Value Chains, *Development and Change* 39(6): 977-990.

Barrientos, A. and S.W. Barrientos (2002) 'Extending Social Protection to Informal Workers in the Horticulture Global Value Chain', Social Protection Unit, Human Development Network, The World Bank.

Brill, L. (2002) 'Can Codes of Conduct help Home-Based Workers', in R. Jenkins, R. Peason and G. Seyfang (eds.) *Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights: Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy*, pp. 113-23. London: Earthscan.

Carr, M., M. Chen and J. Tate (2000) 'Globalization and Home-Based Workers' *Feminist Economics* 6(3): 123-142.

Chen, M., R. Jhabvla and F. Lund (2001) 'Supporting Workers in the Informal Economy', Paper Prepared for ILO Taskforce on the Informal Economy, Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing.

Coskun, G. (2010) 'Building Women Homebased Workers' Organizations in Turkey' in P. Bowles and J. Harriss (eds.) *Global Labour Journal, Special Issue on Globalization(s) and Labour in China and India* 1(1): 212-216.

Fair Wear Foundation, About. Accessed 12 July 2009 <http://fairwear.org/about>.

Fair Wear Foundation, Verification. Accessed 12 July 2009 <http://fairwear.org/page/verification>.

Fair Wear Foundation (2006) 'Background Study Bangladesh'. Accessed 12 July 2009 <http://fairwear.org/bangladesh#pageitem >.

Global Unions, International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations. Accessed 29 July 2009 <www.global-unions.org/spip.php?rubrique13>.

Hill, E. (2008) 'India: The Self Employed Women's Association and Autonomous Organizing' in K. Boradbent and M. Ford (eds.) *Women and Labour Organizing in Asia: Diversity, Autonomy and Activism*, pp. 115-133. London: Routledge.

HomeNet South Asia, Action Areas. Accsesed 12 July 2010 <www.homenetsouthasia.org/actionareas.php>.

HomeNet South East Asia, Introduction. Accseed 12 July 2010 <www.homenetseasia.org/intro.html>.

International Labor Organization (ILO) (2007) 'The Informal Economy: Enabling Transition to Formalization'. Background Document for the Tripartite Interregional Symposium on the Informal Economy: Enabling Transition to Formalization, Geneva.

International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF) (2010) 'Missed the Goal for Workers: The Reality of Soccer Ball Stitchers in Pakistan, India, China and Thailand'. Accessed 12 July 2010 <www.cleanclothes.org/resources/recommended/missed-the-goal-for-workers>

IUF, Unilever Drives Casual Tea Workers Deeper into Poverty for Claiming Rights. Accssed 12 July 2009 <www.iuf.org/cgi- bin/dbman/db.cgi?db=default&uid=default&ID=6000&view_records=1&ww=1&en=1>.

IUF, Asian Food Worker, Solidarity campaign for Lipton tea workers in Pakistan grows: actions in Australia, Philippines, Russia and South Africa. Accessed 12 July 2009 <http://asianfoodworker.net/?p=719>.

Knorringa, P. and L. Pegler (2006) 'Globalisation, Firm Upgrading and the Impact on Labour' *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 97(5): 470-479.

Merk, J. (2009) 'Stitching a Decent Wage across Borders: the Asia Floor Wage Proposal, Clean Clothes Campaign on Behalf of the Asia Floor Wage Campaign'. Accessed 12 July 2010 < www.cleanclothes.org/resources/recommended/stitching-a-decent-wage-across-borders-the-asia-floor-wage-proposal>.

Nadvi, K.. (2008) 'Global Standards, Global Governance and the Organization of Global Value Chains' *Journal of Economic Geography* 8: 323-343.

Schiphorst, F. (2008) 'Defending Vulnerable Workers in South Africa; Which Role for COSATU, NGO and State?'. Paper prepared for the 5th regional

African Conference of the International Industrial Relations Association, Cape Town, 26-28 March, 2008.

StreetNet, About Us. Accessed 12 July 2010 <www.streetnet.org.za/?page_id=6>

Tokman, V. (2007) 'Informality; Exclusion and Precariousness'. Paper prepared for the Tripartite Interregional Symposium on the Informal Economy: Enabling Transition to Formalization, International Labor Office, Geneva, 27-29 November 2007.

UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Final Statement re Complaint of the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations against Unilever plc on Pakistan's Khanewal Factory, London, 21 October 2009. Accessed 12 July 2010 <www.bis.gov.uk/files/file53915.pdf>.

Webster, E. (2006) 'Trade Unions and the Challenge of the Informalisation of Work'in S. Buhlungu (ed.) *Trade Unions and Democracy: COSATU Workers' Political Attitudes in South Africa*, pp. 21-43. Cape Town: HSRC.