International Institute of Social Studies

PERSPECTIVES IN DEVELOPMENT
AN EXERCISE IN WORLDMAKING
BEST STUDENT ESSAYS OF 2015/16

Erasmus University Rotterdam
Make it happen.
Perspectives in Development: an Exercise in Worldmaking
Best student essays of 2015/16

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All 2015-2016 Masters Students

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Acronyms
AFES – Agrarian, Food, and Environmental Studies
ECD – Economics of Development
GPPE – Governance, Policy, and Political Economy
Mundus MAPP – Mundus Masters in Public Policy
SJP – Social Justice Perspectives
SPD – Social Policy for Development
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Foreword

Philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways. The point, however, is to change it.

Karl Marx

Putting together this book has not been easy. Immediately after the research paper deadline, a small group of outgoing Masters’ students gathered to expedite the collection of some of the batch’s best essays before the convocation ceremony in December, a tradition repeated at the end of every year.

Sending emails to course leaders for the best student essays. Coming up with a set of criteria. Editing. Copyreading. Formatting. Layouting. Proofreading. Publishing. We did all of these steps in three to four weeks despite everyone’s apprehension with post-ISS life, anxiety over the release of research paper grades and nostalgia over leaving The Hague.

At first, balancing the themes of the best essays vis-à-vis the geographical and major representation of the students seemed not to be an easy task. After all, we do believe that each of us in the batch has something to say about how we see and interpret the world and how we make development happen in our own spheres.

Looking at the themes of the essays in this collection reminds us of our sixteen-month intellectual and personal journeys at the ISS. This book may not be able to encapsulate all of these concepts and themes. Nevertheless, we hope that this collection will do justice to the knowledge and perspectives gained from our course leaders and friends, and the many things we have learned from class discussions and group activities.
We have an essay from Belén Moro (Mexico, SPD) that explores how the artistic movement can be considered as a social movement and a civic innovation. There are policy analyses from governance and social development perspectives: Fausto Ribeiro (Brazil, GPPE) writes about the feasibility of reform in Brazil’s state-owned enterprises; Oleksandra Pravednyk (Ukraine, SPD) describes Ukraine’s structural pension reforms; and Marina Cadaval Narezo (Mexico, SPD) investigates the possibilities of higher education for indigenous people in Mexico.

The book also contains chapters that deal with issues of sexual health and rights in relation to the development process. Emma Frobisher’s (United Kingdom, SPD) essay examines female genital modification (FGM) and young men in affected communities in the UK, while Chris Ogwang’s (Uganda, SJP) essay looks at access to justice for male victims of sexual violence as a result of the conflict in Northern Uganda.

We also have essays that focus on the political economy and socio-economic underpinnings of commodities. Laurie Calverly (Canada, SPD) analyzes the commodity chain of cocoa through an historical lens. Asmita Vaidya (India, AFES) examines the political and socio-economic effects of globalization through the lens of saffron. Joseph Edward Alegado (Philippines, AFES) writes about the shifting meanings of the cultural heirloom, like brown rice, in the Filipino diet.

Discourse and narrative analyses are undertaken by Shikha Sethia (India, SPD) who provides a critical analysis of the Protect, Respect, Remedy framework for business and human rights as presented to the UN Human Rights Council, and Pablo Ruiz (Ecuador, GPPE) who develops a narrative and rhetorical analysis of Steve Job’s speech at a Stanford graduation ceremony.
We also have three essays from students of the Mundus MAPP Programme: Laura Cooper Hall (USA, Mundus MAPP) takes a critical realist approach to analyze the phenomenon of Hurricane Katrina within the neoliberal structure. Jack Mullan (Ireland, Mundus MAPP) discusses the Latin American trading bloc MERCOSUR and welfare governance in the region. Oliver Rix (United Kingdom, Mundus MAPP) looks at the demands made by developing countries with respect to the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) and potential benefits that might arise from this Agreement.

Finally, the book contains two critical definitions of development terms. Diana Ardilla Vargas (Colombia, AFES) discusses glocalization and how it relates to development, and Belén Giaquinta (Argentina, SJP) examines the concept of gender.

It is our hope, dear reader, that as you turn the pages and make your way through this book, you will find the following sixteen essays to be thought-provoking and inspiring as you go forward in your journey to make, unmake, and remake development.

Joseph Edward Alegado and Margarita Mecheva
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The shifting meaning of brown rice in the Filipino diet: a commodity chain analysis

Joseph Edward B. Alegado

Introduction

Rice has always been a stable food in the Philippines. From the fried rice in the morning that goes with fried eggs and dried fish to the steaming pork in tamarind soup during lunch or dinner to the chicken porridge during rainy days or the glutinous rice cakes during parties, family gatherings and town fiestas, rice is culturally and socially embedded in the Filipino diet.

Rice has been in the diets of the Filipinos since the precolonial era when rice was still considered a symbol of social stratification and was not yet a daily staple (Aguilar 2005: 2). During that time, those Filipinos have the means to eat rice are used to eating brown rice, the unpolished rice, the “dirty” rice, and how heralded as the the “healthy” rice.

Brown rice or unpolished rice’s prevalence in the Filipino diet can be traced back to the unavailability of milling machines during that period. Today, it is now becoming a fast commodity with the emergence of its image as a “healthy” rice in the last decade.

This essay will trace the historical nodes in the shifting production and consumption patterns of brown rice in the Philippines. What is its historical significance? What does it tell us about Filipino’s rich cultural tradition? What about its emergence as a healthy alternative to white rice? However, to analyze the consumption of brown rice, one should not remove it entirely from the over-all white rice production and consumption in the Philippines.
Finally, I will argue that the current state of the brown rice market production can be traced back to the colonization of the Philippines as well as its historical past through the Green Revolution and its localization in the Philippines – Masa-gana 99 under the Marcos regime.

**Analytical Framework**

For this paper, I will make use of Commodity Chain Analysis. According to Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977), commodity chain can be defined as “a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity (1986 quoted in Bair 2005: 155). Their conception encompasses all the steps in transforming raw materials into finished goods and how the nodes of productive activities are connected with the social relations of human labor power.

Gerefi’s further work on global commodity chains focused more on company’s upgrading more than looking and specifying certain nodes in a commodity chain. For Gerefi, a global commodity chain is a set of inter-firm networks which connect manufacturers, suppliers and subcontractors to industries and to the international markets. (Bair 2005: 175)

Commodity chain analysis will help us understand a particular commodity and unpack the various nodes – visible or hidden social relations that affect a particular commodity. Furthermore, doing a partial commodity chain analysis will help us “go beyond the fetishism” in a particular product.

Reading the “Follow the thing: Papaya” is also a helpful lens in looking at the tangled social, power and cultural relations in the production and consumption of brown rice. Looking at this extensive exploration on the commodity will also help inform a careful and thorough analysis of brown rice in the Philippines. Ian Cook’s (2004) work comprehensively followed the papaya from the papaya farmer, papaya packer and papaya consumer and used these narratives to explain how their entangled lives shaped papaya as a commodity and what does these tell us about the wider scheme and context to which a commodity is situated.
Cook’s attempt to “get behind the veil, the fetishism of the market” is an answer of scholars for the call to de-fetishise commodities and make the invisible visible by reconnecting producers and consumers who are all part of the dynamic social relations of a commodity in the global food chain. It allows the readers to work their way through them and, along the way, inject and make their own critical knowledges out of them. (Cook and Crang 1996: 41 as cited in Cook: 2004: 642)

For Cook (Ibid: 643), “commodity systems are imagined and acted upon from within are fragmentary, multiple, contradictory, inconsistent and downright hypocritical...but audiences can work their way through them and, along the way, inject and make their own critical knowledges out of them.”

This was also discussed in Barndt’s (2007) work titled Across space and through time: Tomatl meets the corporate tomato, where Barndt traces the history of tomatoes and highlighted critical chains from production to consumption to understand how it became what it is now. This approach would also be helpful in my analysis of brown rice. While I am only conducting a partial commodity chain analysis for brown rice, the author’s approach of untangling the coils of relationships embedded in the commodity chain guided me in this work.

The colonial and historical moments of the tomato as shown in Barndt’s work provided me with insights on how to situate my question on brown rice in Philippine setting. Further, the various techniques applied by Bardt proved to be beneficial in my analysis of the brown rice chain. It enabled me to make associations of the different nodes and how to connect it and find answers and meanings through these nodes.

Barndt also noted that like tomatoes, the commodification of life, has been further enhanced by the growing usage of information and communication technologies which according to Barndt (2002: 48), “are built on the earlier scientific, industrial and chemical moments and neoliberalism and globalisation build on histories of colonialism, evolutions of capitalism and reframing of development.”
In his landmark work titled “Sweetness and Power”, Sidney Mintz traced the evolution of sugar as a luxury good to a fuel for the working class. As sugar became a commodity, the author traced its history and looked into the historical tensions that turned it to be what it is now. Mintz (1985) argued that as the meaning of sugar in the consumer’s perspective changed throughout the years, one must also go beyond the ‘outside meanings’ – the wider social significance of those changes effectuated by institutions and groups, whose reach and power transcend both individuals and local communities: those who staff and manage the larger economic and political institutions and make them operate’ (Mintz 1995: 6). Desires and tastes of consumers change but we have to see it as structurally constructed and negotiated form of power relations that shape a commodity’s multiple meanings.

Mintz’s work helped me in tracing the rich cultural and historical backdrop of rice and brown rice in the Philippines and how it became a luxury product in the recent years transformed by capitalism.

In doing a commodity chain analysis, one cannot separate this from looking it at the lends of food regime analysis. McMichael and Friedmann define food regime as a critical analysis that “links international relations of food production and consumption to forms of accumulation broadly distinguishing periods of capitalist transformation.” (1989: 95).

Food regime analysis to “identify the agrifood foundations of historical periods, cycles or even secular trends of capitalism”. In doing food regime analysis, it is important to look at historical moments which serves to ‘identify the agrifood foundations of historical periods, cycles, or even secular trends of capitalism’ (Ibid: 1989: 95).

The first food regime was characterized by the overarching paradigm of international free trade between European powers and colonies. Friedmann (1999) called this “colonial diasporic’ food regime from 1870 to 1914. This was a flow of cheap grain (wheat) and meat (beef) from the US, Canada, Australia, Argentia, and New Zealand.
In exchange of these are manufactured goods, labor and capital. On the other land, spices, sugar, bananas, tobacco, coffee, tea have become mass products sourced out from colonies. Such that, they become monoculture through imposition of colonizers.

The second food regime period or the so-called ‘mercantile-industrial’ food regime flourished in the period of 1947 until 1973. This was characterized by the US domination of global economy with them sending subsidized grain exports from the US to Europe. It re-routed flows of surplus food from from the United States to its informal empire of postcolonial states on the strategic perimeters of the Cold War. A perspective on ‘development states’ adopting the model of national agro-industrialization prevailed. These so-called development states adopted Green Revolution technologies, and instituting land reform to further propagate market relations into the countryside. As these so-called development states adopt the ‘national’ model of economic development, this resulted to agriculture being brought into forming transnational commodity complexes.

Lastly, the third food regime can be summed up by further expanding of this process: supermarkets gaining further consolidation powers through various supply chains for those who can afford consumers of fresh fruits and vegetable as well as fish. This, however, resulted to displacement of slum-dwellers as smallholder farmers leave the land. For the purpose of this essay, I will refer to the historical moments in the Food Regime Analysis to situate how does it affect brown rice.

Using Friedmann’s Green capitalism also proved to be crucial in tracing the shifting consumption habit of Filipinos for brown rice. Friedmann’s article “From colonialism to green capitalism: Social movements and the emergence of food regimes”, tells us about the phenomenon which emergences from the convergence of environmental politics and retail-led organization wherein a game of naming played out around the terms natural, healthy, and organic. (Friedmann, 2005: 261).
Big agrifood manufacturing corporations became conscious of the criticisms that the products they are supplying into the market are “unnatural, unhealthy and not organic.” Thus, they became responsive and discerning to the changes in these trends in the market. The power of naming and semantics came into play as these big food corporations in the US bought some of the most prevalent alternative food networks into their companies thereby making a creeping cooptation of this supposedly “green and alternative” products.

Overview

Rice, a kind of grain, grass or wheat, grows heavily in Southeast Asia. According to Owen (1971:78), rice was discovered in Thailand about 4000 CB. Knowledge on rice production travelled from Thailand to Southern China, India and China during the late Stone Age. Rice then became widespread to other places like West Asia, Greece. It was also said that during the Roman Empire, people were growing some rice around the Mediterranean Sea, in southern Europe and North Africa including Egypt. By 800 AD, trade relations with India, Indonesia, and East Africa brought about further introduction of rice into diets. People were growing rice all over southern Africa, and by the Middle Ages people grew rice in West Africa. (Ibid:80)

According to Fernandez (2001: 82), in the Philippines, the term brown rice can actually refer to any kind of rice still has its outer layer of bran and the germ – where most of the nutrients can still be found. These include niacin, thiamine, and phosphorus. In the Philippines pre-colonial history, natives used to pound the grains and it was the only known processing technique available. This resulted to various unpolished rice with different colors prevalent in the Filipino diet in the Philippines: red rice was then associated to the Northern part of the Philippines especially in the upland rice planting areas.
The Philippines’ rice production and consumption through the years

Scott (1994) and Junker (2000) (as quoted by Aguilar: 2005) have produced enormous amount of research and work on how rice became part of the social fabric of early Filipinos. In the pre-colonial area, rice was high valued but it was not a daily staple. Furthermore, early Filipinos who are living in lowlands and in uplands, have developed unique techniques to plant rice. Economic transactions like barter or trading of products also shaped the meaning of rice back then. Lowlanders who want to own upland rice offered seafood, salt and pottery under the barter system. Rice was also given as dowry of grooms to the family of their future brides. Sometimes, it is even used as buwis (tax) or tribute to Spaniards (Aguilar, 2005: 66).

Rice is a symbol then of social, cultural, economic and geographic identities. Eating rice then symbolizes affluence because of it having high value. Historians have likened the situation of rice then to Japan where “rice was primarily the food for the upper class throughout most of history, and was not a ‘staple food’ for most Japanese until recently” (Ohnuki-Tierney 1995).

The growing conquest of Spaniards in the Philippines and its goal to consolidate its power over its colony in the Southeast Asian region forces the Spaniards to introduce plow technology that utilizes carabao (water buffalo), gravity irrigation, and waterways which resulted to having many areas ripe for wet-rice cultivation. (Aguilar: 2005: 57)

Towards the 18th century, as Chinese mestizos began to form a new breed of class native elites, this is when the large-scale commercialization of Philippine agriculture occurred. Trading with the Galleon Trade and the opening of Suez Canal made rice and other agricultural products as exports of Spaniards in the world trade system. (ibid: 58)

This resulted to the immense increase of rice production in the Philippines under the auspices of the Spanish regime. Rice then became a commodity as surplus was paid as tribute to the colonizers and as a rent for rent seekers embroiled in a rather complex landholding arrangements. Rice production was able to accommodate “a large population of noncultivators, including native elites, Spanish friars, and officials and Chinese traders (Aguilar 2005: 85).
While this economic and political consolidation over this commodity was happening, native elites and Spanish colonizers have also bastardized unpolished rice and conducted massive information campaign for people to eat white rice instead. Consumption of white rice would help them in their hold into the milling machines and mechanization they have brought into rice production. This would make the native rice farmers under their control and would propel the status this newfound commodity in the export market.

In the whole chain of rice production, native Filipinos did not act as landowners, middlemen, and traders. They were mainly consumers and the small holder farmers in the rice production and consumption cycle.

Aguilar (2005) noted that during the Spanish era, because of the relatively abundance of rice, and their storage in granaries, it was available and could be eaten year-round by wealthy consumers. This, in effect, says that the Spanish colonialism made the transformation of rice into a staple food, brown rice as the poor man’s food because of its color (dirt vis-à-vis rice as clean), and the commoditization of rice when they started exporting it. Brown rice disappeared from the meals of the Filipinos as more Filipinos whether rich or poor shifted to eating white rice. The politics of color association and dichotomy between white rice and brown rice ensued.

This further continued during the American and Japanese occupation of the Philippines. However, World War II resulted to some areas of conflict in the Philippines to stop the production of rice. The war resulted to rice insufficiency in most of the areas with people both rich and poor looking for alternative source of carbohydrates like sweet potato, cassava, corn, etc. (Fernandez 2001: 80).
A testimony of Benjamin Santos, 18 years old at that time, implies:

Since the Japanese commandeered most of the food supply, we had a hard time procuring ‘real’ food. The rice grains of our people, especially the farmers’ palay, were seized by the enemy... So in the mountains, we ate only cassava flour made into bibingka (a rice-cake), grated corn, cassava and castanog (toasted coconut meat). (Aguilar 2005: 95)

Post-war Philippines and the early decades before the Marcos regime saw a Philippines, which has relatively stable rice production and consumption. However, the practice of importation of rice which started during the Spanish period continued during the American colonization and even post-war republic. Instead of addressing the issues of rice production, importation became the dominant solution to moments of rice shortage. (Fernandez 2001: 86).

Figure 1. Per Capita Crude Estimates of Apparent Availability of Milled Rice For Consumption of the Philippines from 1909-2001 in Kg/year.

Green Revolution in the Philippines

The emergence of green revolution in the 1960’s-1970’s coincided with the Marcos-led and US supported Martial Law regime in the Philippines. This period saw the consolidation of economic powers to the propaganda of the dictatorship such as the Masagana 99 which actually was linked to the Green Revolution, saw the emergence of high-yielding varieties and modern chemical inputs to the country’s granary. In a study conducted by the International Rice Research Institute (1999: 6) Green Revolution in the Philippines was characterized by rapid yield increases and productivity. However, these high prices were actually fixed in the guise of world food crisis in 1974-1974 (quoted by Fernandez: 2001).

The Green Revolution was pioneered by President Marcos during the time when the movement was gaining traction worldwide. Marcos with the support of the Roosevelt-backed International Rice Research Institute, scientists developed ways to greatly increase rice production per unit area. According to Aguilar (2005: 27), rice hybrids were especially responsive to chemicals fertilizers “that necessitated careful monitoring of water levels.” Proponents of the Green Revolution envisioned the seeds to be scale-neutral and labor absorbing. It was actually intended to be scale-neutral and labor absorbing but scholars think otherwise. For them, the green revolution was successful in increasing yield of rice per unit. However, it failed to dismantle the structural problems like poverty, hunger, and unemployment. Furthermore, the assumption that technology is scale-neutral is flawed because it resulted to rice production more capital intensive.

The unequal relations of elite-peasant dynamic in the Philippines was dominant during the Green Revolution. Landed elites further concentrate land and wealth at their own hands while the peasantry does not have the power to seeds, fertilizers, irrigation and later, machinery. They also lacked financial resources and access to credit.
Post-EDSA regime: “organic”, healthy brown rice, quantitative restrictions on rice at the WTO, rice crisis, etc.
This section of the essay outlines key contemporary issues in rice which affects brown rice in the Philippines.

WTO and rice
In the post-EDSA regime, the Philippines continues to import rice despite the country’s lands allotted for rice farming. The advent of the inclusion of agriculture in the World Trade Organization also posed a challenge to agricultural products especially rice. For example, the proposed removal of quantitative restrictions on rice imports in the name of trade liberalization has been met with criticism and opposition from various groups.

There is a particularly stronger push to open up the domestic rice market as international rice supply relaxed a bit with the increase in production of several rice producing countries after the 2008 rice crisis. For farmers and non-governmental organizations working on rice issues, quantitative restrictions allow Filipino rice farmers to continue to enjoy protection from cheap imports. In doing so, this policy allows this to enter the local market only when there is an impending domestic production shortage. Once the tariff on rice is imposed, imports can come easy as long as importers pay the required tariff.

Organic rice and brown rice as a healthy option
In her work titled “Commodified Meanings, Meaningful Commodities: Re-thinking Production-Consumption Links through the Organic System of Provision”, Guthman (2002: 295) tried to understand “how the meanings that animate of consumption are translated and distributed as surplus value and rent, and for that matter, how surplus value and rent value are translated into meanings.” For Guthman (ibid.), there is dialectic tension between representations of organic agriculture and the political economy of organic food provision. She argued that values like a commodity being branded as “organic” can have far more consequences in both the production and consumption side of things.
Organic market is confronted with having two produce for the niche market and appeal to organicism, advocacy, innovation etc. while on the other hand it can mass-produce for the market and appeal to persuasions of health and safety. (Guthman: 305).

As it stands today in the market, brown rice is being marketed as a premium product accessible by the higher socio-economic classes because of the way it is being marketed and advertised. Today, this commodified meaning of brown rice has been facilitated by information and technology which according to Barndt (2002: 48) are constructed through the scientific, industrial and chemical moments and the new world order of neoliberalism and globalization where histories of colonialism, evolutions of capitalism and reframing of development have strong influences.

**Rice crisis of 2008**
The rice crisis in 2008 which was further affected by the spike in food prices proved to be unbeneﬁcial to rice as a global shortage has saw the increase to 50% of one of the world’s most important staple foods. (UN FAO 2010: 44)

In the Philippines, allegations of rice hoarding have been hurled against key government agencies like the Bureau of Customs, Department of Agriculture and rice cartel. This further exacerbated the already complex issue of the rice crisis in 2008. The food price spike and rice shortage further contributed to Philippines’ continued importation of rice and a detriment to its food self-sufficiency goal.

**Historical shifts in brown rice consumption**
Looking at the historical literature on rice and brown rice, one can see two historical nodes that changed brown rice consumption in the Philippines. Filipinos used to eat brown or unpolished rice before the milling machines were introduced and further enhancements on rice planting and farming were introduced during the Spanish colonization period. It is also during this period when rice became a commodity and was mass-produced.
Machines were proved to be crucial then as a mode of mass production not only globally but also locally as the need for production increases because of industrialization. However, this also resulted to the alienation of brown rice as “dirty”, “for the poor” and white rice as something “for the elites” and “educated”. This was done in order to propagate the consumption of white rice - the polished rice.

Indeed, modernization which brought increased more intensive post-harvest milling processes brought about a new perspective in agriculture. The rice farmer’s attitudes, aspirations, perceptions towards rice farming also changed. In 1975, Castillo (as quoted by Fernandez: 2001), in a study titled “All In A Grain of Rice”, conducted in select rice producing provinces in the Philippines found out that erosion of brown rice in the mainstream market was caused by the shift in the farmers attitudes. Filipino rice farmers became more attracted to producing white rice because of it lasts longer than unpolished rice.

The era of corporate-environmental food regime also played a role in the re-branding of brown rice as a highly premium product as it targets niche market who would go for products which have selling propositions like safe, organic, healthy, and sustainable.

**Brown rice – what happens now?**

In the recent years, government agencies in the Philippines like the Ministry of Agriculture and the Philippine Rice Institute (PhilRice) have called for a campaign on food self-sufficiency with an overarching goal to limit importation of rice. Dubbed as the Be Rice-ponsible Campaign, this sought to promote alternative food like root crops, sweet potatoes, cassava, and brown rice for Filipinos to consider this instead of white rice and to avoid importing rice.
Different non-governmental organizations have also conducted parallel campaigns like UK charity Oxfam in the Philippines and DAKILA, a collective of artists working on social issues. “Brown Rice: The Good Food” ran from September 2012 until October 2013. The campaign sought to promote eating of brown rice especially for the middle class because of the likelihood that they will be most likely to avail brown rice because of its higher price in the market.

**Conclusion**

Indeed, the lost cultural and historical meaning of brown rice in the Filipino diet can be attributed to the historical moments when rice millers were introduced to the Philippines by the colonizers enabling the sudden shift of diet from brown rice to white rice. It was also during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines when rapid changes in rice farming were introduced such that rice production became massive and the Spaniards started introducing rice from the Philippines as export product in the global trading.

This production-led shift from brown rice to white rice has also been culturally embedded when middle class started to attach connotations about brown rice as a “dirty rice”, a rice for the “poor” with white rice having a status symbol of affluence and exclusivity.

As I have written in my essay, brown rice should not be taken out of the discourse and the context of the rice production in the Philippines. While the Philippines remains to be one of the top producers of rice, it continues to be one of the largest importer of rice from its neighboring countries like Vietnam and Thailand. Historically and in recent times, the Green Revolution phenomenon tied to the second food regime altered rice planting and farming perspectives of farmers in the Philippines, Marcos’ Masagana 99 program, rice crisis in 2008, the WTO quantitative restrictions on rice import were also explored to see the interconnectedness of the brown rice to the over-all rice situation in the Philippines.
Today, brown rice is marketed as a “premium product” perhaps owing to what Friedmann calls as “green capitalism” or the corporate-environmental food regime when big agrifood corporations saw the opportunity to use environmentalism, buzzwords and concepts such as organic, fairtrade, etc. and capitalize on these things to further their interests.

Other factors like low demand brought about by the changed meaning of brown rice in the Filipino taste, its changed perceptions on its color further contributed to its current status as a niche product which people from upper brackets of socio-economic classes can purchase.

While the Ministry of Agriculture in the Philippines promotes brown rice as a possible solution to the country food self sufficiency, it continues to give not enough support to rice farmers. While this essay tried showing the current situation of brown rice production and consumption in the Philippines, this is beyond the scope of this study. Further research can be done to situate where exactly brown rice is in the Philippine market and to bring about the voices of smallholder rice farmers who continue to plant and harvest unpolished rice – the lost cultural heirloom.

References:


Glocalization

By Diana Ardila Vargas

Glocalization, has been analysed in terms of the interaction between global and local spaces with a consequent creation of networks (Roudoumetof 2015: 776-777). Although the concept does not necessarily imply one specific direction on those interactions, it has been focused as the process to incorporate global issues in localities (Ritzer 2011: 159). Nevertheless, the conception of glocality as multiple connection between places (Roudoumetof 2015: 776-777), could show how different scales can be influenced by these interactions. Specially, using this term to analyse how the development process, tendencies and agendas are settled and interact with logics in local spaces, it could be possible to understand ways in which development interacts with people and societies, using directions that goes from the global to the local, but also from local to local or even local to global levels.

Despite the common understanding of globalization reflected by Unwin (2009:16) as a “tendency towards uniformity”, the continuous interaction between global and local realities produces new facets, called by some authors hybrids as a result of the creativity and capacity of adaptation and innovation of societies (Vizureanu 2013: 70-71), creating diversity in the middle of the homogeneity.

In that sense, some results of the glocalization include the evolution of local dynamics due the connexion between places (Roudometof 2015:776), the opportunity of express local singularities into the global space (Unwin 2009: 16) and the generation of “unique outcomes in different geographic areas” (Ritzer 2011:159).

Taking into account the importance of adaptation and interaction in the concept of glocalization, this essay attempts to illustrate how development agendas are glocalized in local spaces creating new insights that reshape and influence the entire process.
To do so, I will bring one example of conservation of biodiversity linked to global development purposes. The Convention on Biological Diversity - CBD was signed between 168 countries, which jointly decided to run a defined strategy for conservation, sustainable use of biodiversity and equal share of their benefits, in order to achieve sustainable development (CBD 2000). Colombia, as a party of the convention has used this global agreement as source of the national strategy for conservation. One of the main topics is the establishment of protected areas that contributes to one of the convention’s goals that seeks to promote in-situ conservation.

The process of declaration of protected areas has produced a great number of conflicts between state and local communities, due especially the incompatibility between conservation and land use that is imposed through the categories of conservation. However, to move to the recognition of other ways of conservation including people, since 1999 the Colombian government, regulated the civil society natural reserves, to formalise initiatives from smallholders who decide to conserve natural ecosystems in their lands, including them in the National System of Protected Areas – SINAP which is the system that accounts for the protected areas at national level.

The strategy to include those reserves is nowadays increasing in importance due the growing difficulties to set public areas for conservation in a moment with high competition for land use and a sensible social process of land restitution and property recognition.

Nevertheless, the process of identification and registration of those private initiatives has been also a source of conflict, given the need of the government to homogenise the information to account for the national and international conservation goals. The homogenization process does not always fit in the concept of conservation interlinked with agricultural production that smallholders have, which is opposed to the strict preservation feature of the public protected areas.
Despite those conflicts, the continuous negotiation process, allows each year the registration of private areas as a complementary category of protected areas, allowing the increment of the Colombian area purposed to be under conservation, accounting for the obligations accepted in the CBD. The process of inclusion of this local-based category also had let the creation of different participation platforms in which those smallholders, now as members of SINAP, can share their own understanding about conservation and can influence the evolution of public policies that define and promote alternative ways to do conservation.

The analysis of glocalization generally focuses on the process to adapt and even transform locally ideas imposed in global scenarios. But aside from this one way to understand glocalization, the complexity and multiple relations that involve the process show other directions, relations and means that shape this network. In that sense, what travels, how travels and where it travels are key question to be analysed, in order to understand how different outcomes in a development process affect and modify other scenarios and scales.

In the case described previously, the glocalization of an international conservation agreement brings about conflicts, challenges but also a process of negotiation and recognition between the state and people. Besides this way, it is also possible to see how other means travel: local achievements in terms of private conservation areas travel to the global space mainly in the form of quantitative data, representing the extension of the national country destined for conservation that, however don’t reflect completely the diverse ways to do conservation from the local understanding.

The emergence of new actors, that discuss and influence the ways to negotiate conservation goals in the country can show also how new ideas and new stakeholders travel from local to national scenarios and, even to international spaces using the international ecological movements and associations that seeks similar objectives (Anguelovski and Martínez 2014:173)
In the current period in which the western development discourse is critically analysed and contested, the deeply understanding of the glocalization, not only in the way of adaptation of global trends, but also in terms of what travels and the multiple directions by which the glocalization occurs – in terms of development: how local initiatives, adaptations, understandings and solutions can jump to other scenarios – could be essential to include those side-stream or alternative ways to do development and get a successful scaling up that contribute to the construction of new ways to define and achieve development goals.

References


Higher education for Mexican indigenous people

By Marina Cadaval Narezo

Introduction

Education is a clashing resource. It can be “a tool for social domination and control” or “a liberating force and a correlate of social justice” (Majumdar and Mooji 2011: 4). It can construct dreams that move societies and individuals towards a better understanding of humanity or tighten mindsets that condemn it. Education might be identified as moral improvement and social mobility (Morarji 2014: 176) or with means to reproduce social inequalities and disadvantages. I think educations is all of it.

This report of research findings demonstrate the above by presenting a historic perspective of the Mexican education system in order to follow the policies that recently led to the inclusion of the indigenous people, particularly in higher education.

The first part is a brief summary about the political project that defined the education as a means to homogenize the society and to achieve development. The second section describes the general structure of the system, together with some figures as a mirror to visualize the current efforts and its undeniable deficiencies. Information on higher education is considered as a preamble for the third part, which offers an analysis of the actions taken at the systemic level to include indigenous people. The example of the Intercultural Universities as a contradictory educational policy that, on one hand, opens opportunities in rural and marginalized areas but at the same time reproduces the social exclusion that characterises those regions closes this mapping exercise.
Context

The education system in Mexico is the product of a long ideological struggle that started after the country’s Independence in 1810, but settled its principles in the Political Constitution of 1917. The State assumed the responsibility to deliver free and compulsory basic education in order to insert the country into the path of progress (Zorrila and Barba 2008: 3). However, the liberal thinkers that shaped Mexico’s political structure throughout the 20th C., envisioned that it was necessary to homogenize the social diversity resulted from the Pre-Hispanic and Colonial periods to foster Mexican nationalism and to become a modern society.

The *mestizo* as the ‘real Mexican’, was the product of a strategy “discursively constituted and produced” (McKee 2009: 468), that is still the core of the Mexican society. The interventionist practices of the Mexican State by the education system, promoted this stereotype through the design of a mainstream curricula and the mandatory used of official books for elementary and, later on, secondary schools. By establishing Spanish as the exclusive official teaching language and expanding a trickle-down model (Schmelkes 2009: 6), the education system extended the indigenous marginalization and its reproduction at the systemic level. It represents the social reproduction in its broader term, which “involves institutions, processes and social relations associated with the creation and maintenance of communities (Barker and Silvey 2008: 2-3).

The *mestizo* as the ‘single story’ of the Mexican social composition was challenged when the Zapatista Rebellion demanded the recognition of the cultural diversity in 1994. Since then, some initiatives and policies have been implemented, particularly in education as a socially accepted path to improve individual and community lives (Morarji 2014: 176), and also because

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1 The 3rd Article refers to the whole education rights and obligations. For practical issues I used the English version edited in 2010.
2 Based on Chimamada Adichi idea about the danger that represent one-sided narrative with only one perspective, which produces stereotypes often negotiated through power.
...in a democracy, every citizen is required to be capable of participating in decisions related to them, [which] is possible only through education. It follows, thus, that it is the duty of the state to provide education [...] as a public good.

(Bhatty et al: 44)

Higher education in Mexico is considered a public good “fundamental to drive the country’s development, improve the competitiveness and achieve an advantage insertion in the knowledge-based economy” (Tuirán 2013. Authors’ translation). However, the figures present in the next section demonstrates that universal access and quality are not yet accomplished.

The Mexican Education System

The current education system in Mexico considers free and universal access from pre-school to higher education. Although the curricula for elementary to upper secondary is the same as for public institutions, private schooling is available which the Ministry of Education has designed and implemented The system’s scheme and the enrolment for the 2011-2012 cycle is presented in Table 1. It also shows the figures of teachers and schools per level.

Table 1: Mexican education system at a glance (2011-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TEACHERS</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>SCHOOLS</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BASIC (compulsory)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-school</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Community colegios</td>
<td>4,706,565</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>236,166</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>92,253</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Community colegios</td>
<td>14,000,410</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>571,809</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>99,178</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>6,167,624</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>388,709</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>30,563</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High school</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper secondary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>4,331,509</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>285,954</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>15,424</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical / Vocational</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Technical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Higher Education</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>Student colegios</td>
<td>3,161,105</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>242,209</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>6,316</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical / Vocational</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical colegios</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>6-4</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other (Training for work)

| Total                  | 55,014,990| 100% | 1,876,539| 100% | 5,500   | 100% |

Basic education attendance represents the bottom of the pyramid, with 73.4 percent of the whole system’s enrolment. From 25.9 million students in 2013, only 76 percent concluded lower secondary school; 4.4 million continued to high school (8.7 percent attended vocational education) from which 85 percent registered to a higher education institution. The enrolment for the former was of 3.3 million students (PND 2013-2018: 60), that accounts to 29.4 percent of the youth between 19-23 years old (Fuentes 2013: 2).

From 1964 to 2012, the students from pre-school to higher education increased 4.7 times; the number of schools were multiplied by six and teachers by nine, while the population is 6.8 times bigger (Olvera 2013: 78). Although the investment is considerable, it is not enough to attend the demand and revert the negative numbers.

**Red figures**

Based on a national evaluation, 38.5% of adults (above 15 years) have not finished basic education, within which 5.1 million are illiterate. 15 million people have not finished high school, a requirement to access to better jobs (PND 2013-2018: 61). In 2009, Mexico was positioned 48 out of 65 countries in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), and last of the 33 OCDE countries (PND 2013-2018: 61). In 2014, it dropped to 53 (OCDE 2014: 5).

Indigenous and rural basic education is 35 percent behind private’s (PND 2013-2018: 61). Moreover, many indigenous students drop out of primary school because the lack of cultural and linguistic relevance. Telesecondarys\(^3\) and upper secondary schools in rural areas have low quality and higher education institutions are far away from indigenous settlements (Schmelkes 2009: 6). These are indicators of the social exclusion reproduce by the system, since “quality is fundamentally linked to social justice and equality (Majumdar and Mooij 2011: 6).

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\(^3\) Is an educational project from the 60’s that transmits official lectures through TV. The students complete a guide based on the lesson watched and a teacher monitors student’s work. It is still a teaching method in rural and remote areas.
Equity and quality policies are officially considered but not implemented. Access to diverse and inclusive education are the main goals in the governments’ discourses but the budget allocated to education has decreased in last 50 years, whereas in 1964, it represented 25.5 percent of the government expenditure. In 2012, it significantly declined to 13.7 percent (Olvera 2013: 76).

Higher and postgraduate education overview

In 2013, Mexico had 4,894 private and public higher education universities plus other 2,882 institutes and academic centres. Most of the best ranked institutions are public, which receive 2/3 of the students (Fuentes 2013: 2). In the past five years, its enrolment growth was 72% (Tuirán 2013).

Although the increase of students in this level from 2007 to 2013 (around 1 million) is equivalent to the growth from 1950 to 1982, 72.3 percent of women and 71.9 percent of men between 18 and 24 years do not attend higher education. Since 1964, higher education institutions have increased around 50 times, and the number of teachers/professors 25.9 times (Olvera 2013: 80). This represents that there is more demand for higher education and more universities but not enough teachers and professors.

In 2010, the government started a “massification” strategy to promote the massive access to higher education all over the country (140 new public institutions were created, out of which 122 were technological). This will be followed in 2017 by a “universalisation” stage to ensure relevant knowledge. The education policies to promote access and permanence consider scholarships for marginalized students: from 2007 to 2012, the total amount was quadruplicated from 220,000 to 813,000 (Tuirán 2012). However, the massification policy does not necessarily represent a positive solution. This might lower the quality of the studies and emphasizes social disparities. As in many other countries, “the increase in physical access [has been done] at a huge cost of quality” (Bhatty 2014: 49).
The strategies to strengthen technical and vocational careers is link to support the productive sector, but also to face the “challenges imposed by the globalization of knowledge” (PND, 2013-2018: 63). However, only 4 percent of the 2013 enrolment corresponded to technical institutions, versus 88.9% to general or academic universities. This is part of the inconsistency between the State investment in education as a strategy to stimulate economic growth, and the social perception of vocational schools as horizontal mobility (Woronow 2011: 97). This is not very well accepted in a country where education represents a dream for social improvement.

Higher education as a means to access better jobs and well-being is translated in the household investment. From 2002 to 2010 the households expenditure for higher education increased from 10.3 to 13.5 percent, while the general proportion of households consumption in educational services decreased from 71.4 to 68.6% percent (Tuirán 2012). This contrasts with the growth of the unemployed rate from 3.2 in 2006 to 5.2 percent in 2010 (World Bank 2015). Hence, this reflects “the gap between expectations and outcomes of education” (Morarji 2014: 180).

In 2013, only 7.2 percent of bachelors’ students continued towards postgraduate degrees (Fuentes 2013: 2). Thus, it is not surprising that Mexico’s contribution to world’s knowledge production is less than one percent. For every million adult inhabitants 30 have a PhDs (PND 2013-2018: 63), a figure behind the average from OECD countries, where some of them have more than doubled than Mexico´s (Fuentes 2013: 2). The budget to support postgraduate studies and research has decreased in the last years. For 2016 (of $2.3 billion USD), it is 31.6 percent less than for 2015 (El Economista 2015).

**Indigenous in higher education**
Indigenous participation in higher education is extremely low despite the fact that they represent 25 percent of Mexico´s population.4 This is already an indicator of social exclusion and educational inequality (Schmelkes 2009: 6).

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4 The intercensal survey 2015 shows an increase of the overall population that recognize themselves as indigenous. The previous official figure was of 10% (CDI, 2011: 25 and INEGI, 2015: 72).
Data and analysis on university education is scarce. The precise number of indigenous individuals who have studied at the graduate level is unknown, although the estimation is between 1 to 3% (Schmelkes 2009: 6). According to a survey made in 2003, only three of every hundred indigenous have studied at university, compared to 8.3 non-indigenous persons. One estimate based on the 2010 population census indicates that only 0.25 percent of the national indigenous population has reached this educational level, compared to 0.83 percent of the rest of the population (in other words 3.3 times more).\(^5\)

This unfavourable situation is due to several factors, especially because of the social exclusion reproduced by the education structure: starting with the deficient quality of the previous education, along with the lack of academic relevance and language barriers.

Indigenous students who want to study beyond upper secondary, in most cases have to travel long distances or move to close cities or to places where they have relatives that can host them during their studies. They have to pass admission exams that might require skills and knowledge they did not receive in primary or secondary (Schmelkes 2009: 6). They also might be older than the average students because it took them more years to finish the basic levels due to linguistic barriers or because they had to drop out from school for certain periods to collaborate more intensely in their households. With this scenario, indigenous youths have to compete for scholarships and grants with non-indigenous students with stronger academic backgrounds.

Some initiatives are taking place to tackle this gap. The most prominent is the creation of the Intercultural Universities that represent an example of different narratives and intersections within the education system.

\(^5\) Information obtained from the final report of the Ford Foundation International Fellowships Program (IFP-Mexico, 2013), initiative in which I worked.
Higher education for indigenous people
Walking towards an inclusive education

In 2001, various inclusive policies for indigenous people were implemented. Regarding education, the Office of Bilingual Intercultural Education (CGEIB) was founded as part of the Ministry of Education, within which a set of intercultural higher education institutions were created. These Intercultural Universities (IU) aim to serve indigenous groups by incorporating culturally relevant content and using innovative educational methods. The first campus was founded in 2003 (Schmelkes 2009: 6).

Other initiatives were the International Fellowships Program (IFP) and the Pathway for Higher Education, both initially financed by the Ford Foundation and afterwards supported with federal funds. In 2012, the Congress earmarked $5 million USD to National Council for Science and Technology (Conacyt) to launch different policies to promote higher (postgraduate) education for indigenous women. This was the first gendered perspective initiative for indigenous women.6

The Intercultural Universities
IU’s objective is to increase indigenous students in higher education and “educate intellectuals and professionals committed to the development of their peoples and regions” (Schmelkes 2009: 7). They are not designed exclusively for indigenous peoples, although the twelve campuses are strategically located in vulnerable indigenous regions and 70 percent of their students belong to an ethnic group (Schmelkes 2009: 8).

The IU’s are a top down initiative from the vertical structure of the Mexican state. They were designed by the Ministry of Education, the States’ education authorities, local indigenous organizations and academic institutions. The IU’s project fit into the description about the State spacialization by Ferguson and Gupta (2002: 982), which encompasses local needs and demands in a spiral movement from the communities.

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6 Information obtained from my experience working at those initiatives.
In this same line, the IU’s can be seen as a strategy to promote intercultural relations between indigenous and non-indigenous, thus securing the State’s legitimacy and authority among the whole society (2002: 982). The IU’s fulfil three basic indigenous people’s demands regarding education: access to a bilingual and relevant curricula; the promotion of practices and knowledges at national level; and the autonomy to decide about their own educational system (Schmelkes 2009: 9). The educational programs consider the different characteristics such as languages and geographic space. Hence, they are defined on specific regional needs but in relation with five clustered areas: Language and Culture; Intercultural Management; Intercultural Communication; Sustainable Development, and Ecotourism.

They do not have racial, gender or class quotes although their locations and the enrolment requirements consider student’s ethnic, social and economic disadvantages. These are important intersections for the design and implementation of inclusive policies but also represent a challenge to guarantee the permanence and the completion rates which are not yet considered. UI students come from families that mostly survive with less than one minimum salary (100USD a month), and even though they receive a monthly scholarship of approximately 65USD, the fragility of their household income represents a risk for dropouts. These circumstances “impact on the capacity for facing higher education studies with the creativity or critical approach needed” (Schmelkes 2009: 14).

Despite the challenges and deficiencies, the IU represents a “historic effort to decolonize the university system, to diversify it in linguistic, cultural and ethnic terms; to decentralize and regionalize it” (Dietz 2014. Author’s translation). They also embody new ways of thinking and doing, as Escobar invites us in order to unmake the current notion of development (Escobar 2012: 20).

However, as a policy to tackle education disadvantages, the IU faces the paradox of being inclusive and exclusive. They consider indigenous diversity and needs which are not considered by conventional institutions, this division generates segregation.
My perception is that in order to foster an intercultural education, besides the IU, indigenous knowledges and practices should be included in other conventional curricula. This might help to find answers and solutions to Mexico’s and worldwide problems, as Sousa Santos promotes by his Alice project.  

Conclusions

Education is a clashing resource. The education system was designed to shape Mexican society as a homogeneous cluster, but the multiple voices are claiming to be heard. The Intercultural Universities, as a decolonizing educational project, is already a step forward although it represents many challenges. An evaluation about its effects at individual, local, and regional level would be very useful to know and tackle the aspects to improve or modify. Financial resources and social involvement are key to continue this initiative as one of others that should take place to promote an inclusive and pluralistic education system. Its imperative is to create more spaces but it must also believe and support them and make them work.

References


For more information, visit the page of the project at: http://alice.ces.uc.pt/en/


Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (2010), Mexico: Supreme Court of Justice.


Marina Cadaval Narezo
Higher education for Mexican indigenous people


Commodity Chain Analysis - Cocoa to Chocolate

By Laurie Calverley

Introduction
‘Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it’, is commonly said and a truism of the social life of cocoa. Despite cocoa’s history of slave labour and previous attempts to eradicate slavery/slave-like conditions, the 21st century is shocked by reports of child labour and forced labour in the cocoa industry. Solutions raised to address the social problems associated with cocoa have been: trade sanctions, threats to boycott production from West Africa, labeling legislation, legislation to control the promotion and consumption of food that contributes to obesity, ethical sourcing, FairTrade certifications, shorter supply chains, moving production to large scale cash crops through the use of science (hybrid disease-resistant and pest-resistant trees), the production movement of organic sustainable farming and price fixing of cocoa beans. However, the 20th and 21st century approaches are primarily focused on economic, environmental and social sustainability, while the distance between the labour and the consumer is ever-present. Essentially, more importance appears to be placed on the production methods of the ‘Life Sciences Integrated paradigm’ and ‘Eco-logically Integrated paradigm’ as described in Lang and Heasman (2015), rather than on labour concerns. Although the paradigms attempt to address labour issues, ironically labour issues are overshadowed and the approaches appear to be window dressing rather than solutions to worker exploitation and labour shortages - both of which have been long standing issues for centuries.

The fuller story of cocoa is a historical entanglement on the politics of consumption: economic power, class status, cocoa fetishism, globalization and slavery. Marxist’s view on political economy includes ‘commodity fetishism’. Wherein the focus of commodities is on money and trade in the market. Any thought or conscious awareness of people behind the production is removed.
Ian Cook, in his story of the Papaya, raises consciousness about the concealment of labour and seeks to remove the ‘distancing’ (a method that separates awareness between the production and consumption sides of the commodity chain). Cook conducted a multi-location ethnography to ‘get behind the veil, the fetishism of the market, to make powerful, important, disturbing connections between Western consumers and the distant strangers whose contributions to their lives were invisible, unnoticed and largely unappreciated’ (Cook 2004: 642). Through these fuller stories of social reproduction he says we can diminish the distance between production and consumption. This method emerged from David Harvey, who seeks to have more researchers connect consumers to the production so they can understand their role in exploitation and provoke moral and ethical obligations (Cook 2004: 642).

This paper will focus on the concept of ‘distancing’ as raised by Cook in his story of the Papaya (2004). Cook’s story was a tale of people in various roles along the commodity chain—from farmer to consumer. In contrast, I will use a historical lens to unveil and de-fetishize the ‘distancing’ in the social life of cocoa. This is a useful analytical tool for the commodity chain of cocoa because its social life has been relatively consistent throughout history. The shock and dismay in the 21st Century, although warranted, is amplified due to the centuries of ‘distancing’. Through this fuller story of cocoa, the patterns in social reproduction will be unveiled and de-fetishized. By diminishing the distance, parties within the commodity chain will hopefully reflect on their role and contribution to perpetual worker exploitation in cocoa production.

1500 B.C. — Early social life of cocoa

The first known use and geographical location of cocoa dates back to the Olmecs (1500-400 B.C.) in South Central Mexico. The Olmecs were considered to be the first major civilization, characterized by its densely concentrated population, the emergence of an elite class and significant expansion of interregional trade routes and trade networks in Mesoamerica (Inaforesta, n.d.).
The early life of the cocoa was that of a beverage served cold or at room temperature (‘History of Chocolate in Spain’ 2015). The Olmecs had cultivating methods and drank cocoa with water, spices, chilies, herbs brought to froth (Inaforesta, n.d.) and fermented the pulp surrounding the beans into an alcoholic beverage (Fiegl 2008). Mayans and Aztecs also drank cocoa in the same manner. It was a beverage of the upper class, symbol of abundance, a religious offering to Mayan and Aztec gods, a monetary unit, a measuring unit and a method of post-war tax payment imposed on conquered regions (Fiegl 2008). The Mayans also believed that cocoa pods symbolized life and fertility, while the Aztecs believed it to be a health elixir with medicinal benefits (‘Chocolate History Timeline’ 2016).

1500 A.D. - Export, slavery, plantations

In the early 1500’s A.D., a visit between an Aztec Emperor and Spanish Conquistador changed not only the lives of the Aztec people but the social life of cocoa as well. The Spanish Conquistador left this visit with cocoa and the equipment to brew it. It was taken to the Spanish court were it was enjoyed hot or cold with honey/sugar cane, vanilla, cinnamon, and pepper (Fiegl 2008). “On occasions cornmeal and hallucinogenic mushrooms were also added to the drink” (‘History of Chocolate in Spain’ 2015).

By the end of the 1500’s, the Spaniards had colonized the land and its people. In “New Spain”, existing cultivation methods were used on Conquistador Cortez’s newly established cocoa plantation (‘Chocolate History Timeline’ 2016). It was operated with slave labour from New Spain and as part of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Fig. 1). The transatlantic slave trade/triangular trade supplied labour from the 1500’s -1800’s and “is often regarded as the first system of globalization...the biggest deportation in history and a determining factor in the world economy of the 18th century” (UNESCO, 2016). The 1500’s also marked the first export trade (1585). Its destination: the Iberian Peninsula (Spain, Portugal and Andorra) (Inaforesta, n.d.). Attempts to plant the cocoa tree in the Iberian Peninsula were attempted, but unsuccessful and led to their understanding that the tree needed to be planted in tropical surroundings (‘History of Chocolate in Spain’ 2015).
Figure 1: Transatlantic Slave Trade


1600’s - Class consumption, plantations

Through royalty and elite classes, cocoa traveled from the Spanish Court to the French court (1615) (Inaforesta, n.d.). Spanish royalty married into French royalty bringing with her the cocoa beverage. It was “believed to have nutritious, medicinal and even aphrodisiac properties” (Fieg 2008). “Chocolate’s reputation as an aphrodisiac flourished in the French courts. Art and literature was thick with erotic imagery inspired by chocolate” (‘Chocolate History Timeline’ 2016). Louis XIV appointed “a valet in the Queen’s household to open the first chocolate shop” (Paris, World Capital of Chocolate’ 2016). Shortly thereafter it reached England (1650) where the first chocolate lozenge and chocolate paste emerged (1674) (Inaforesta, n.d.).
Although there were plantations in New Spain, plantations were also emerging in other geographical locations throughout the 1600’s - 1800’s. By Royal decree, Brazil established its first cocoa plantations (1677). The cocoa tree was also brought to the Philippines where the explorer Helmsman Pedro Bravo do los Camerinos (1670) established plantations (‘Chocolate History Timeline’ 2016).

1700’s - Trade, cocoa the commodity, cocoa the monetary unit

In the early 1700’s cocoa was still predominately a beverage spreading amongst royal societies. In 1711 Emperor Charles VI (Holy Roman Emperor, King of Bohemia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Archduke of Austria and King of Spain) brought cocoa to Italy, when he moved his court from Madrid to Vienna (‘Chocolate History Timeline’ 2016). However, the 1700’s and 1800’s also marked cocoa’s industrialization and commercialization. Trade expanded throughout Europe (early 1700’s) and then North America (1765) by colonial trading companies under imperial ownership (‘Chocolate History Timeline’ 2016). With the emergence of plantation workers, plantation owners, traders, shipping companies, factories and confectionaries (Fig. 2) in place for consumption by the elite, the cocoa value chain had evolved and cocoa had truly emerged as a commodity to be bought and sold.

Figure 2: Cocoa Commodity Chain

Source: Healy and Ng 2013.
In terms of cocoa processing, the industrial revolution and the invention of the steam engine made the grinding process of cocoa more efficient and less costly to manufacture. However, cocoa remained a commodity for consumption by elite classes due to the increasing prevalence of import duties and consumption taxes (Fiegl 2008). Even still, the efficiencies of industrialization opened the doors to experimentation with cocoa products and a growth market of factories. New products made of cocoa were made available in France (1700’s), such as pastilles (tablets) and bars (‘Cadbury The Story’, n.d.). In the late 1700’s, Spain opened chocolate factories in Barcelona, Germany and Switzerland (Fiegl 2008). North America (1765) entered the factory market with the Baker Chocolate Company’s James Baker and John Hannon (‘Walter Baker & Company’ 2015).

The Mayans and Aztecs’ use of cocoa as a monetary unit re-emerged in the 1700’s. During the American Revolutionary War (1765 -1783) chocolate “was included in soldiers’ rations and used in lieu of wages” (Fiegl 2008), demonstrating itself as a powerful economic source, which would be repeated again in the 1900’s during World Wars I and II.

The associations of cocoa as a status symbol and form of wages, created a perception that the commodity is a ‘need’. Resulting in a psychological ‘distanting’ between the consumer and the people involved in the commodity chain. Thereby creating a notion that we need something, regardless of where it comes from or rather a lack of thought (conscious awareness) of where the commodity comes from.

**1800’s - Industrialization, consumerism, plantation expansion**

Industrialization and commercialization not only expanded the market geographically but changed consumption patterns. Experimentation and production of new cocoa products really took off in the 1800’s. “Coenraad van Houten’s father opened a chocolate factory in Amsterdam in 1815, with a mill turned by laborers” (‘Coenraad Johannes Van Houten’ 2016).
Cocoa powder and cakes emerged (Netherlands 1828) by Coenraad Van Houten (Inaforesta, n.d.) but “[i]n 1838 his patent expired, enabling others to produce cocoa powder and build on [his] success which made way for others to experiment” (‘Coenraad Johannes Van Houten’ 2016).

The ‘chocolate bar’ was sold for public consumption for the first time in England (1830) by Fry and Sons, shortly thereafter boxed chocolates by Cadbury followed (‘Cadbury The Story’, n.d.). In Switzerland, milk chocolate imbued with hazelnuts emerged (1830) by Daniel Peter with Nestle (‘Daniel Peter’ 2016) and chocolate fondue (1830’s) by Rodolphe Lindt, (Inaforesta, n.d.). In 1837, Ghirardelli moved from Italy to Peru where he started a confectionary. Not long after that (1852) he opened factory production in North America (‘Domingo Ghirardelli’ 2016). Milton Hershey followed suit in 1893 (Inaforesta, n.d.). The cocoa processing chain as we know it today is due to the experimentation that occurred over this time (Fig. 3).

**Figure 3: Cocoa processing chain**

![Cocoa processing chain diagram](source: Anti-Slavery International, 2004.)
The 1800’s was the era of capitalism. Karl Polanyi’s argues that capitalism began in the 1800’s with the “establishment of generalized markets for what he referred to as the ‘fictitious commodities’: land, labor, and money” (‘Capitalism’ 2016). With capitalism came trade associations and market advertising. The trade association known as the National Confectioners Association (NCA) was founded in 1884. “69 confectionery manufacturing firms fostering industry growth by advancing and promoting the interests of the confectionery industry and its customers” (National Confectioners Association, n.d.). One strategy for the advancement and promotion was advertising. The French art depicting cocoa consumption in the 1600’s made its transition to “market advertising” in the 1800’s. This shift in artistic medium wasn’t the only change. Its depictions of cocoa shifted as well. French art was erotic, in keeping with the Mayans associations of life and fertility. Advertising in the 1800’s was more consistent with Aztec beliefs - that of cocoa as a health elixir with medicinal benefits. In line with cocoa’s historical ties as a health elixir, “Advertisements for Van Houten could be found on trams throughout Europe and the United States. As early as 1899 Van Houten produced a commercial film that depicted a sleepy clerk who recovers miraculously after eating some chocolate” (‘Coenraad Johannes Van Houten’ 2016).

The location of production expanded through Colonization and the Industrial Era. At this point in time, cocoa plantations were in Brazil, New Spain and the Philippines. “The industrial epoch led to the slow decline of production in South America, despite its expansion from its original growing areas to the Amazon River ... a new cocoa empire emerged on African soil” (Inaforesta, n.d.). Behind large scale consumption and consumerism, large scale production began in 1880’s and cash crops or large scale production began in 1880’s in São Tomé and Principe plantations. “A Portuguese Baron of Agua Iz, took cultivation of cocoa from Principe Island to a neighboring island, Sao Thome, and then to the African continent in 1857 (‘Chocolate History Timeline’ 2016) where small/medium farmer production proved to be more favorable than large scale plantation methods. This method led to the country of Ghana’s current status as a major producer of cocoa today (‘Chocolate History Timeline’ 2016).
Although slavery had been abolished in 1875, the Ghanaian plantations were laboured by ‘freed’ slaves and trafficking of slaves mostly from Angola. In 1890’s Cameroon set up cocoa plantations with hired labour, slave labour, wage labour and family labour (multiple wives) worked on the plantations. German colonists also had plantations in Cameroon, which were manned by slave labour and debt labour. Other locations of slave labour in cocoa plantations were Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Fernando Po (Bioko) (Anti-Slavery International, 2004).

Plantations and their labour were closer in proximity to the European market and much more detached from the North American market (manufacturers and consumers). When slavery was the norm, there wasn’t much concern for labour exploitation in colonized countries. The focus was cocoa production and labour supply. The physical distance between consumer and production; the legal frameworks abolishing slavery and concealment of its ongoing use; market advertising inspiring desire for what cocoa could do for the consumer – All led to what Karl Marx coined ‘commodity fetishism’.

1900’s - Consumerism, cocoa trading, slave labour, NGO’s

Similar to the 1700’s, cocoa was a ‘need’, a ‘must have’, during the 1900’s. Market advertising on the health benefits of cocoa was perpetuated during war times (Fig. 4) (Fig. 5): “Chocolate followed the French and American infantry into the trenches of the First World War (1914-1918), and effectively all US chocolate production was requisitioned for the military during the Second World War” (Inaforesta, n.d.). During World War II (1939-1945) the US government “allocated valuable shipping space for the importation of cocoa beans” for production of rations. Today, the U.S. Army D-rations include three 4-ounce chocolate bars” (‘Chocolate History Timeline’ 2016). For the Mayans and Aztecs, cocoa was a standard unit of currency (not solely in the form of wages during war time). Interestingly though, it was also a preferred method of tax payment on conquered land during Mayans and Aztecs wars.
Post war advertisements catered to women with recipe ideas, opportunities for baking seminars/lectures, in an effort continue the market growth of cocoa (‘Sex, Chocolate and gendered marketing’ 2015). Further experimentation with cocoa occurred in the 1900’s as well. The praline was introduced to almond paste, cherries in alcohol, nougat, caramel (Inaforesta, n.d.). While still maintaining its health benefits, cocoa’s association with sensuality re-emerged by the mid - 1900’s through product advertising. This connection with sensuality was previously seen with the French in the 1600’s and the Mayans in 600 B.C. Essentially, cocoa was a symbol of eroticism in the bedroom yet but also a medicinal cure of premenstrual symptoms. In fact advertising was taking on a multi-pronged approach linked to all the traditional Mayan and Aztec associations of cocoa, including its link with pagan traditions and rituals.
Cocoa was a gift for the gods in Mayan and Aztec religious rituals; in modern times it was an iconic part of pagan traditions associated with Christian and civic holidays. An abundance of cocoa drinks and chocolate were consumed and gifted over the winter season. Starting in Halloween through Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Years, Valentine day, then Easter. It was also a gift for any occasion: romantic dates, housewarmings, weddings, births, dinner parties. Both the Mayans and Aztecs believed that the “cacao bean had magical or even divine, properties, suitable for use in the most sacred rituals of birth, marriage and death” (Fiegl 2008). Cocoa was not only forming part of everyday society and cultural expectations around gift giving, it was also forming part of the consumer’s identity. A personification, not with class status as in previous centuries (although unbeknownst to them, due to ‘distancing’ were of a class system higher than those producing cocoa) but with addiction -coined with terms of ‘chocolate addict’ or ‘chocolate lover’.

Trade relations and slave labour issues were prominent in the 20th century, but rather inversely from the early to the late 1900’s. Slave labour was an issue at the forefront in the early part of the century, where trade relations and the emergence of international organizations took a greater spot light in the latter part of the century. “In 1905 William Cadbury, concerned about reports of slavery, joined with Frys, Rowntrees and the Stollwerck chocolate firm of Cologne, and together sent Dr. Joseph Burtt to investigate conditions on the islands and in Angola” (Anti-Slavery International 2004). The findings confirmed their suspicions of slavery and they boycotted cocoa from these islands in 1909. Despite their efforts, slavery continued. In 1955, it was reported again that forced and directed labour continued in São Tomé and Principe due to labour shortages (Anti-Slavery International, 2004). It was believed that the choice of cultivation method could positively affect labour. Spurring a greater movement of the industry from plantations to the Ghanaian cocoa supply was warranted due to the belief that “small medium scale farming would eliminate the use of migrant force labour (Anti-Slavery International 2004).
“It also became clear during this period that cocoa adapted better to traditional African smallholding methods of agriculture and, in the rapid development of the industry after the Second World War (Fig. 6), the rest of region moved away from large plantations. This was particularly true of Côte d’Ivoire, which became the world’s largest producer” (Anti-Slavery International 2004).

Slave labour wasn’t the only labour trouble in the 1900’s. Between the World wars, an 8 month long strike occurred in 1937, by Ghanaian farm workers in the colonized Gold Coast (British rule). The strike was a means of withholding cocoa from the market in opposition to the low prices of cocoa to the market (’Ghana Cocoa Board’ 2015). In an effort to resolve the strike, the British Government agreed to establish a Cocoa Marketing Board to fix the buying price “as an attempt to protect farmers from the volatile prices on the world market” (’Ghana Cocoa Board’ 2015). However, the Board was not implemented until almost 10 years after the resolve was put on the table. In the meantime, unpredicted by strikers at the time, the British Government established a price control board three years later (1940) wherein cocoa prices were guaranteed at a low price to buyers for their supply in World War II. This interim board remained in place until the end of WWII. At which point the Cocoa Marketing board or “CMA” (1947-1979) renamed the Ghana Cocoa Board (1979), was established as promised by the British Government.

After the World War I, the New York Cocoa Exchange emerged (1925) as a trade forum for buyers and sellers of the cocoa commodity (’Chocolate History Timeline’ 2016). “cocoa beans, cocoa butter and cocoa powder [was] traded on two world exchanges: ICE Futures U.S. and NYSE Liffe Futures and Options. The London market [was] based on West African cocoa and New York on cocoa predominantly from Southeast Asia” (’Cocoa Bean’ 2016).
As most export countries were still under colonial rule during the emergence of these trade relations, existing power imbalances persisted between export producing countries and those who imported for processing/manufacturing. “Large variations in the world market price during the period from 1950 to 1980 led to linked changes in the rate of farm development and in the investment put into important issues such as pest control, the use of fertilisers and the development of higher yielding species. In the 1980s, and more markedly in the 1990s, these price changes were also linked to the demands for economic liberalisation led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Except in Ghana, governments in the region abolished the marketing boards set up to purchase the cocoa from farmers at a set price and to distribute and sell it on the world market” (Anti-Slavery International 2004).

Figure 6: Rise of world cocoa production

![Figure 1: World production of cocoa in the twentieth century](image)

Small farmers in Ghana were subjected to world market prices; experiencing rapid price movements and bearing the costs. “Labour costs [were] the main expenses borne by the farmers and the only one over which they [had] any direct control” (Anti-Slavery International 2004). While demand steadily increased, labour had to come from somewhere. Labour was in shortage during colonial times and had not changed in the next century. As such, migrant labour and family labour formed part of the solution.

In the 1900’s international organizations and interested parties (cooperatives and non-government organizations) surfaced. These parties were seeking economic sustainability and to give “care” to the industry but created further ‘distancing’ between the farmer and the consumer. The US chocolate industry had worked together in an organized fashion since 1923 when the Chocolate Manufacturers Association was founded. In 1947, the Board of CMA formed a separate non-profit research arm known as the American Cocoa Research Institute.” (National Confectioners Association, n.d.). In 1973, a London based global organization known as the International Cocoa Organization (linked with United Nations) was formed comprising the cocoa producing and cocoa consuming member countries to address sustainability of the cocoa economy with a focus on trade. Including, “customs tariffs on cocoa bean imports, cocoa semi-products and chocolate; (indirect) taxes related to cocoa consumption and processing; production costs in different countries and regions; market information for cocoa farmers; and Price Risk Management for farmers through co-operatives” (International Cocoa Organization 2015). The first International Cocoa Agreement (United Nations inspired) was in 1972. The approach was “to stabilize world cocoa prices by the use of export quotas for member countries and a buffer stock. This was unsuccessful as members experienced difficulties paying their levies and there were many disagreements about implementation” (Anti-Slavery International 2004). In 1984 the Ghanaian Cocoa Marketing Board (that was established after the Second World War) “underwent institutional reform aimed at subjecting the cocoa sector to market forces.”
Cocoa Marketing Board’s role was reduced, and 40 percent of its staff, or at least 35,000 employees, were dismissed. Furthermore, the government shifted responsibility for crop transport to the private sector. Subsidies for production inputs (fertilizers, insecticides, fungicides, and equipment) were removed, and there was a measure of privatization of the processing sector through at least one joint venture. In addition, a new payment system known as the Akufo Check System was introduced in 1982 at the point of purchase of dried beans” (‘Ghana Cocoa Board’ 2015).

The concept of FairTrade labeling began in the 1980’s followed by its International Fair Trade umbrella in 1997 (FairTrade International, 2011). FairTrade efforts focused on reducing the inequalities between producer (Fig. 7) and northern importer (Fig. 8) in the free market, and, reducing the ‘distancing’ of the supply chain from consumers. FairTrade “humanizes the trade process – making the producer-consumer chain as short as possible so that consumers becomes aware of the culture, identity and conditions in which producers live and work” (Anti-Slavery International 2004). “The Max Havelaar Foundation sold the first FairTrade labeled chocolate in Europe in 1993 (coffee launched in 1989) and the FairTrade Foundation introduced the same concept to the UK in 1994” (Anti-Slavery International 2004). FairTrade raised consumer awareness to labour production issues like wages, cultivation methods, inequities of post-colonialism, and ‘distancing’ that arose through globalization.

In 1993, the International Cocoa Agreement proceeded with a new strategy to address social problems in the industry. The buffer stock was liquidated and the parties sought to achieve “equilibrium between world production and consumption through indicative production targets for member countries, but this approach also didn’t work. Accountability was difficult to achieve, production fluctuated, members didn’t buy-in to the process and Indonesia was not a member despite its status as one of the largest producers” (Anti-Slavery International, 2004). Another revision of the International Cocoa Agreement occurred in 2001.
This agreement however, “did not contain any specific plan to limit production, whilst stating that ‘exporting members may undertake to co-ordinate their national production policies’ on the basis of production and consumption forecasts. The objectives included ‘promoting consumption’ and ‘a balanced development of the world cocoa economy’ (Anti-Slavery International, 2004).

Figure 7: Cocoa producers

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Figure 8: Cocoa importers

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<th>Table 9</th>
<th>Imports of cocoa products by country/area and by quantity, 1998/99 (in thousands of tons)</th>
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2000’s - Social environmental economic sustainability & slave labour

Naturally occurring cocoa trees in the rainforest contribute to shading, growth of other crops and biodiversity (‘The Cacao Tree’, n.d.). Conversely, production for the consumer driven market of the 1900’s had a negative environmental impact, with decades of production involving clear cutting and mono-cropping for the development of commercial plantations. During this time planting was mostly limited to a specific cocoa plant variety (Forastero) thereby reducing crop diversification, small scale farmer deforestation and encroachment on virgin forest for cash crops (‘Cocoa Bean’ 2016). Agroforestry emerged to address a sustainable land use system with shaded conditions needed for cultivated cocoa trees, to reduce the pressure on existing protected forests and to conserve biodiversity (‘Cocoa Bean’ 2016).

Cocoa tree pests and diseases have been century old obstacles in the production of cocoa. In the 1900’s, these obstacles were tackled with pesticides and fertilizers. However, it was a short-term solution because their use was deemed a contributing factor to the world’s environmental concerns. Environmental impact and climate change concerns were a significant focus in the early 21st century. “Cocoa pests and diseases have a very negative effect on annual cocoa production, requiring much more natural resources (land) than would normally be the case without such losses” (International Cocoa Organization 2013). Solutions have included: capacity building on farming ‘best practices’, resistant planting material, and, international organization development projects regarding the prevention and containment of the global spread of cocoa pests and diseases (International Cocoa Organization 2013). Additional environmental concerns were also the impact of agro-chemicals on the environment and on the health & safety of workers (Tulane University 2015). Talk of “global warming” raised questions and awareness to the geographical sustainability of the current center of global cocoa production. Particularly,
West Africa’s ability to continue as a major producer should temperatures continues to rise” (‘Cocoa Bean’ 2016). Cocoa waste was also added to the list of environmental concerns with “only about 10% by weight of the cocoa fruit is commercialized while 90% by weight (mainly cocoa pulp and cocoa pod husk) is discarded as cocoa waste and poses a serious waste disposal problem in most cocoa producing countries” (Nfor et al., n.d.). Project proposals, theoretically based on the ecologically integrated paradigm, started to emerge “seeking to improve the sustainability (economic, environmental and societal) of the cocoa value chain …through the transformation of the by-products of cocoa production such as cocoa pod husks and cocoa pulp into a variety of valuable new products of commercial value” (Fig. 9) (Nfor et al., n.d.).

Figure 9: By-products of cocoa production

Source: Nfor et al., n.d.
In contrast to how cocoa is naturally produced; the production of cocoa, the commodity, has been deliberately shaped. Cultivated trees are perceived to be economically productive for only 60 of its approximately 100 years and trees are trimmed shorter to make harvesting easier (‘The Cacao Tree’, n.d.). Due to its yields and greater resistance to disease the Forastero variety comprises “95% of the world production of cocoa” (‘Cocoa Bean’ 2016). Criollo and Trinitario are more delicate as they yield less and are more prone to disease and pests. Even though they are still used in production, it’s on a smaller scale and for ‘higher quality’ cocoa.

Forastero hybrid trees have been introduced into production and currently represent the majority of what is planted today (International Trade Center 2001). Hybrids are more resistant to diseases and yield more than the plant varieties in their natural state. “For example, where a cocoa farm cultivated under the traditional system of minimal maintenance may typically yield 300 to 500 kg per ha annually, newer hybrids cultivated commercially under ideal farming conditions have been known to yield as much as 2,500 kg per ha.” (International Trade Center 2001).

Due to the prominent role of social, environmental and economic sustainability in cocoa production, the “life sciences integrated paradigm” and “ecologically integrated paradigm” emerged as competing approaches to cocoa production. The life sciences integrated model (which combines elements of the productionist model) is a competitive theoretical underpinning to increase supply through science. In the previous paragraphs it was explained that supply is affected by disease or pest, low yielding, and labour issues. In addition to the hybrid plants (life sciences approach), scientists continue to seek new approaches including: “replanting of affected areas with disease-resistant and pest-resistant hybrids which would also enable large scale production... breeding and propagation programmes devoted to the distribution of the new plant varieties... and biological controls, such as the release of predatory insects which feed on pests, or the encouragement of fungi to inhibit the growth of disease” (International Trade Center 2001).
History showed that clear cutting and large crops were not as successful as small scale farming in West Africa because of pests, disease and the labour shortages facing large scale production (SUNDIATA 1996). However, the life sciences approach could significantly change production, by returning it to large scale plantations and reducing the amounts of labour needed.

Today, cocoa is produced on plantations and small crops with "more than 90% of world cocoa production originating from small farms” (International Cocoa Organization 2013). "Over half of the world supply of commercial Cacao comes from two East African countries: Ivory coast exports 41%, and its neighbor, Ghana 13% of the world’s supply. Indonesia is third in world exports at 11%. Brazil, Cameroon, Ecuador, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela export significant amounts. And Cacao is also cultivated for export in Columbia, Congo/Zaire, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Malaysia, south central Mexico, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Sao Tome, Sierra Leone, Togo, Trinidad and Western Samoa“ (‘The Cacao Tree’, n.d.) (Fig. 10).

**Figure 10: Cocoa exports**

![Map of global cocoa exports](image_url)  
*Source: International Cocoa Organization, n.d.*
At the turn of the century, similar to the turn of the 20th century, findings were shared linking slave labour to Africa. Media attention on matters of smuggling, trafficking and the use of child and forced labour in West Africa cocoa production shocked consumers and arguably chocolate companies alike (Haglage 2015). In an effort to increase corporate responsibility to end child and forced labour, the USA spearheaded dialogue on labeling legislation, but instead signed an international multi-party (government and companies) agreement called the Harkin–Engel Protocol/Cocoa Protocol in 2001 (Haglage 2015). The Protocol aimed at ending the worst forms of child labor (according to the International Labor Organization’s Convention 182) and forced labor (according to ILO Convention 29) in the production of cocoa, with particular attention to “elimination of the worst forms of child labor in the cocoa supply chain in West Africa” (International Labour Organization, 2016). Extensions and joint Statements in 2001, 2005 and 2008 and in 2010 occurred and timelines extended with the latest agreement “to reduce the worst forms of child labor by 70 percent across the cocoa sectors of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire by 2020” (International Labour Organization 2016). Despite the efforts of the International agreement (to date), the World Cocoa Foundation, the Chocolate Manufacturers Association, the American Cocoa Research, FairTrade, Government and Corporations - child labour and slave-like conditions have increased. A report released in 2015 “found a 51 percent increase in the number of children working in the cocoa industry in 2013-14, compared to the last report in 2008-09...[and] those living in slave-like conditions increased 10 percent” (Tulane University 2015).

Tensions arose regarding the most effective measure in unveiling the invisibility of labour behind the production of cocoa and regarding how to improve those labour conditions. Arguably, those efforts may have been lost in the overwhelming bureaucracy of the international market. However, civil society movements, cooperatives, FairTrade also pursued unveiling and sustainability practices. By approaching the issues with the theoretical underpinning of the ecologically integrated paradigm they promoted agro-forestry, organic chocolate, health benefit campaigns and research. FairTrade and cooperatives generally represented interests of the ethical labour and ethical sourcing.
They raised consumer awareness on labour issues like wages, cultivation methods, colonial ties and ‘distancing’ that occurred through globalization. Yet, their efforts also faced criticisms. As of 2014, less than 1% of the chocolate market was fair trade” (‘Cocoa Bean’ 2016). Criticism of labeling and certification methods included the cost of certification imposed on producers and the creation of unwarranted competition amongst small scale cooperatives (who were also seeking to help vulnerable farmers). Critics say “the biggest winners aren’t always the farmers - but can be retailers that sometimes charge huge markups on fair-trade goods while promoting themselves as good corporate citizens. They can get away with it because consumers usually are given little or no information about how much of a product’s price goes to the farmers” (Stecklow and White 2004).

The 21st century was also marked by a more complex international trade model, as can be seen in the model of Ghana (Fig. 11). The majority of the cocoa trade is covered by Kuapa Kokoo Farmer’s Union and the Ghana Cocoa Board, who “besides the price-fixing ... sells higher quality hybrid seeds, and does some research on cocoa plant-related diseases” (“Ghana Cocoa Board’ 2015). The Board appears to be primarily focused on the life sciences integrated paradigm. Organic and high-quality beans are not covered by the Board, likely because they fall more so with the ecologically integrated paradigm.
To date, it appears that the 21st century remained primarily focused on production and marketing for further demand. In order to increase demand and maintain cocoa’s healthy image as portrayed by the Aztecs and Mayans (Fiegl 2008). Notions that cocoa is an unhealthy food and contributor to illness and non-communicable diseases (i.e. obesity, diabetes, heart disease, tooth decay/gum disease, migraines etc.) were combatted with health research and health campaigning. In 2004, the International Cocoa Organization determined that a promotion committee was needed to “to counter the negative claims about chocolate and obesity and to emphasize the positive health and nutritional aspects of cocoa... as many countries [were] already considering legislation to control the promotion and consumption of food that is perceived to contribute to being overweight” (International Cocoa Organization 2015). Additional efforts had also been made to increase general consumption through Generic Promotion of cocoa and chocolate consumption projects in Japan (1998) and within the Russian Federation (2010’s) (International Cocoa Organization 2015).
Although economically important, it appeared that consumption and the creation of demand was still overshadowing labour. Labour is made rather invisible and fits into the notion that food comes from nowhere. Distanced from the consumer, these projects ignored the health detriments of food arising from hybrid trees, cheap chocolate (low levels of cocoa) and its subsequent impact on the livelihoods of those working on small farms.

**Conclusion**

"Where to conduct production?" and "where to get the labour?" are questions that have emerged repeatedly throughout history but kept safeguarded from the consumer. In light of the environmental challenges and delicate nature of the cocoa tree, small scale farming has settled in the West Africa pocket. Small scale farming is supported as a preferred cultivation method of the ecologically integrated paradigm; but large scale plantations appear to be more profitable and will likely be on the rise should genetic modification of the cocoa plant prove to be viable. In either case, the implications on labour is lost on the average consumer who struggles to know what information it true or simply doesn’t give any attention to where and how their food is produced.

‘Distancing’ is unconscious consumerism but also indicates a perpetuation of inequality. Cocoa has maintained itself as a status symbol of abundance and class differentiation. Initially bestowed by the Olmecs, Mayans and Aztecs, this pattern has been reproduced throughout the historical social life of cocoa. Modern times are no different. Currently, “Africa supplies nearly three quarters (73%) of the world’s cocoa, [but] consumption of cocoa beans in all of Africa put together is only 3%” (Nfor et al., n.d.). Some producers have not seen or tasted chocolate and is simply known to be “a crop that is grown in extremely poor areas with hot climates and manufactured into a product that is generally consumed in very wealthy areas with cool climates” (‘The Cacao Tree’, n.d.). “The situation in which African nations export crops while a significant amount of people on the continent struggle with hunger has been blamed on developed countries, including the United States, Japan and the European Union” (‘Cash crop’ 2016).
Maybe the concerns over social, environmental and economic sustainability are more about maintaining political power over other countries for competition or profits; but it’s clear that concealment of labour conditions is occurring and ‘distanting’ exists between the consumer, the manufacturer and plantation worker with detrimental effects. As Cook and Harvey have suggested (Cook 2004: 642), hopefully this fuller story on the historical journey of the social life of cocoa has created some self-awareness so we can explore and acknowledge our part in the story of cocoa.

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Identifying the neoliberal structure within natural disasters: A critical realist approach to Hurricane Katrina

By Laura Cooper Hall

Introduction
Hurricane Katrina, which started on 23rd August 2005 and lasted until 31st August 2005, was one of the five deadliest storms in the history of the United States, and it was the most expensive. Below is a description of this disastrous event:

The water crept to the top of the massive berm that holds back the lake and then spilled over. Nearly 80 percent of New Orleans lies below sea level—more than eight feet below in places—so the water poured in. A liquid brown wall washed over the brick ranch homes of Gentilly, over the clapboard houses of the Ninth Ward, over the white-columned porches of the Garden District, until it raced through the bars and strip joints on Bourbon Street like the pale rider of the Apocalypse. As it reached 25 feet (eight meters) over parts of the city, people climbed onto roofs to escape it.

Thousands drowned in the murky brew that was soon contaminated by sewage and industrial waste. Thousands more who survived the flood later perished from dehydration and disease as they waited to be rescued.

(Bourne 2004)
This description, however, was written (and published in the National Geographic) in 2004.

Hurricane Katrina was predicted to happen well before August 2005. Of course it is important to analyze the event within a context of environmental sustainability, however that is not the focus of this paper.

The amount of destruction that was predicted before this hurricane should have been enough to cause ripples within the political and local environments. Instead, New Orleans, a city “besieged by environmental, social and economic imbalances before the landfall of the massive storm and subsequent levee failures of 29 August 2005” (Pyles 2009: 1), and the other areas affected, were extremely unprepared for the hit, causing the displacement of about 1.5 million people and the deaths of between 1,200 and 1,800 people. Failures of the state to appreciate the vulnerability of Louisiana allowed for Hurricane Katrina to cause the most damage ever experienced by a natural disaster in the history of the country. The damage was so extensive that for the first time a superpower in the global economy was seen as requiring help, to the point that developing nations were sending assistance, exemplifying extreme failure of the state to support its own population.

Why weren’t the predictions and warnings taken seriously, especially if they predicted the potential loss of thousands of lives? Here the reasons behind why certain ideas were chosen and others were not in regards to the hurricane response in the Gulf of Mexico will be analyzed in order to better understand why certain ideas have resonance within the current global neoliberal context. This paper will incorporate selected elements of the ontology of critical realism and critical naturalism in order to best answer this question from a social scientific perspective.
The critical realist approach
The pursuit of explaining social relations debates began with binaries between subjectivism and objectivism and an attempt to explore the relationship between agency and structure. The subjectivists claimed “philosophical idealism”, while objectivists identified the world as one “without agents”, who never questioned how social relations are made and maintained (Manicas 1998: 314). Both approaches did not allow for the consciousness of the agents they were inevitably including in some form within their analyses, prompting other philosophers of social science to call for an inclusion of the “cognitive resources of agents” (Manicas 1998: 315) within new approaches. As new theories progressed, two new binaries evolved, that of the structuralist and post-structuralist positions. These two binaries involved a new treatment of agents, in which the former simply included agents as “bearers of autonomous structures which exist independently of them” (Manicas 1998: 316), and the latter caused structures to evaporate and became, essentially, “subjectivism without a subject” (Anderson 1984: 65).

The approaches within the above mentioned positions are not justifiable as methods to be used in understanding social interaction and explaining why certain ideas are picked up and not others as they incompletely account for the balance that exists between the material and ideational within social forces. In order to make up for what the former positions lacked in regards to a more complete and realistic combination of agent and structure, or ideational and material, a new set of positions arose within debates on the ideational/material balance. These debates aim to understand how individuals perceive their interests in the form of ideas, how ideas are chosen through communicative and coordinative methods. These chosen ideas were both products of social forces as well as sediments of the past (Manicas 1998) and how the sentiments of general society have managed to interact with one another.

Within this hybrid approach, the position of critical realism was nurtured, one that aimed to “transcend the polar opposition...between positivism and ‘humanist’ dualisms” (Benton 1998: 297). Within critical realist science the material and ideational are analytically combined, but ontologically distinct.
Within this context, the two are not separated, there is an interplay of structures on agents and agents on structures which encourages an endeavor of understanding its transcendental nature and the dialectical character, through a "determinate negation" or "elimination of absences" in which "the absenting of constraints (which could be viewed as absences) on absenting absences or ills, applicable quite generally, whether in the epistemic, ethical or ontological domains" (Archer 1998: xxii) is done in order to attempt to further understand the social structure. This paper therefore attempts to understand the dialectic nature of neoliberalism through the context of Hurricane Katrina by asking why predictions of the hurricane were never appreciated.

The nature of this dialectical interplay stems from the transitive and intransitive dimensions of the world. The intransitive dimension being that which is the "real structure or mechanism which exists and acts quite independently of men and the conditions which allow men access to it", and the transitive being the dimension in which "the object is the material cause or antecedently established knowledge which is used to generate the new knowledge" (Bhaskar 1975: 6). In other words, the intransitive are the "physical processes or social phenomena" and the transitive are "theories and discourse" (Sayer 2000: 10). This separation implies that "the world should not be conflated with our experience of it" (Sayer 2000: 11), and encourages social science to uncover layers of the transitive in order to attain an understanding of what is the intransitive, or conduct the dialectic method.

The social structure is considered to be both the "medium and product" of its members, not existing "apart from the practices of individuals; it is not witnessable; only its activities and products are" (Manicas 1998: 318). Due to its nature, this "structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and "exists" in the generating moments of this constitution" (Giddens 1979: 5). Because these structures are both practices and also exist independently of practices, due to their intransigent quality, this causes persons and their acts to be "situated" (Manicas 1998: 319), causing a "humanized natural and social world" (Manicas 1998: 319).
Here we approach the concept of critical naturalism, an approach within critical realism that acknowledges the possibility of "scientific knowledge of social and psychological mechanisms", which considers the possibility of "person-dependent mechanisms as potential intransitive objects of knowledge" (Benton 1998: 300), redefining the concepts of the transitive and intransitive. In the natural sciences the transcendental question is one of "what must the world be like for science to be possible?" which attempts to find the intransitive, universally recognized, scientific activities. In the social sciences, however, this question is also possible, the answer to which becomes the aim of critical realists. In order to conduct policy analysis and understand the conditions for existence of certain phenomena, the method retroduction is used, or the study of what are the conditions for those phenomena to be, "what must exist for phenomena to be possible" (Danermark et al. 2002: 97), the central aim of critical realist scientists.

Like critical realists, naturalists also emphasize the ability of social structures and those within this intransitive domain of having powers and an existence which do not manifest themselves in activities found in the transitive domain, therefore social structures can exist independently of the "activities they govern" (Benton 1998: 304). This illuminates the concepts of exercised and unexercised power, or activated and not activated, which critical realists attribute to being seen or observed within three levels of the transitive dimension.

The transitive dimension is constituted of the levels of the real, the actual, and the empirical. The "real" being what exists, natural or social, whether we see it empirically or not. This is the "realm of objects, structures, and power" whose presence at a given time "constrains and enables what can happen but does not pre-determine what will happen" (Sayer 2000: 12). The "actual" is what happens if and when the powers are activated, "what they do and what eventuates what they do" (Sayer 2000: 12). Finally, the empirical is what is experienced as a product of the real or actual, but it isn't necessary or impossible that those experiencing this know of the other two domains.
Critical naturalist scientists also outline a phenomena of concept dependence, where “society surrounds and sustains a relationship with sanctions, including coercive powers” in order to sustain relationships despite changes in those participating within the society (Benton 1998: 304). Change in society is therefore attributed to the change of an actor or agent’s conception of their actions as a cause or effect of those structures in which it is acting and participating. It is further important to note that changes do not necessarily have to be in coordination with their intentions of such actors.

This brings up the existence of the necessary and the contingent, or what things “must go together, and what could happen, given the nature of the objects” (Sayer 2000: 11). The idea that “everything that happens has to happen (necessity) but that there is no single causal process that requires this to happen”, is the product of contingency (Jessop 2006). This shows how one event or process or result can then be defined in many ways according to position, and how the process of explanation is also inexhaustible as at each point of explanation other “explanatory starting points” begin (Jessop 2006). The concept of contingent necessity is then when two or more objects, with their respective powers, are contingently related because they could exist without the other, but when brought together and interact “certain further, new mechanisms may arise” (Sayer 2000: 16), or emergence, when “situations in which the conjunction of two or more features or aspects gives rise to new phenomena” (Sayer 2000: 12).

Within this positionality, the pursuit of policy analysis is concerned with understanding the setting, and then how actors behave. Critical realists look at action and how that imposes and expects a reaction and counter reaction, as well as how the nature of ideas impacts a context. These “ideas” in a society being ideas “about features of that society” (Collier 1994: 151). Ideas are made further complex by the possibility of false, or incorrect, beliefs. These beliefs may be constituted within institutions which may have a functional relation, so are used and preserved within institutions that they constitute (Collier 1994: 151).
Hurricane Katrina: a critical realist analysis

In the pursuit of understanding social structures, Sayer encourages us to ask, “what is it about A or B that we want to interrogate regarding the status of their relations?” (Sayer 2000: 17) In this paper I aim to use retroduction in order to understand if Katrina was “predictable in detail” (Petterson et al. 2006: 644), what is it about the social system that didn’t allow for this prediction, of the largest natural disaster in the known history of the United States, to not have resonance and not be taken seriously? The transcendental question, as is appreciated in critical naturalism, becomes: what must be the case if this lack of resonance is possible? In order to investigate this, a relational approach is needed, an understanding of all levels involved and how they interact. This approach illuminates reasons for why certain things were not picked up, and introduces a subsequent question of the intransigent nature of the social structure of neoliberalism and how transient activities and products can aid in a deeper dialectic meaning. These activities and products are what will be analyzed in order to understand this structure.

Though Katrina was an environmental process, the causes and extent of its effects are social. Critical realist research aims to “highlight how scientific explanations of environmental change provide only partial insights into complex biophysical processes, and that existing models of explanation reflect the agendas of the societies that created them” (Forsyth 2001: 1). Hence, though there is the natural cause of the disaster, I aim to understand what the ideational cause of its effects was. In order to address this question, the interaction between the objects of capitalism and neoliberalism with the environment will be illuminated within the actions and discourses of actors involved.

Because the real is “independent of our representations of it” (Dobson 2002), it is important to attempt to identify what is the transitive and intransitive. Attempting to understand and identify the intransitive social structure calls for an appreciation of social systems as involving “dependencies or combinations which causally affect the elements or aspects, and the form and structure of the elements causally influence each other and so also the whole” (Lawson 1997: 64).
Critical naturalism rewords this pursuit as attempting to understand “whether there are any social scientific practices, and, if there are, which they are” (Benton 1998: 302). In the context of Katrina, this involves recognition of the context, history, agents involved, and discourse created as a result of these different factors. Here already certain causal mechanisms are identified as being activated, and their conditions will be investigated.

Katrina occurred in 2004, at a time when the concept of climate change was a common discourse. This concept of climate change exemplifies how the environment, though a natural phenomenon, is also a social one, as it is constituted of an “active construction of the imagination….there is an environmental imaginary, or rather whole complexes of imaginaries with which people think, discuss, and contend threats to their livelihoods” (Peet et al. 1996: 37). Here, and throughout this paper, the effects of discourses will be identified showing how hegemonic practices and policies are “often masked behind everyday discourses and other taken-for-granted assumptions” (Pyles 2009: 2).

Neoliberalism is the concept that “drives the globalizing economy today, emphasizing trade liberalization, deregulation and the privatization of public services” (Pyles 2009: 3). This neoliberal “agenda” is one often considered to have begun as a response to economic failures of post-Keynesian economics, and is now considered to be a stable global phenomena affecting global and national practices. These practices are then constituted within actions of individuals and groups. Critical naturalists argue that agents exercise both their own powers and the powers residing in “social structures, but operate through the activities of human agents (relational properties)” (Benton 1998: 305), so in the political and social context of the southern United States in the early 2000s one of the social structures affecting these activities would be neoliberalism.
The interests of those agents involved in and affected by Hurricane Katrina, which are also working within the structure of neoliberalism, are many, all with their own groups of interactions creating new transitive effects. Primary actors which will be included in this analysis are the government, the local population affected, oil companies and other private interests such as casinos and wealthy individuals. Each of these actors have their own construction of interests which they place their own value on, these interests being made up of ideas. These agents are causal agents, intentional and able to monitor their activity (Benton 1998: 300), as we can see in the context of Katrina. The different actors involved in the hurricane disaster all have the ability to be reflexive, or to think about their conduct and interpret and reinterpret the structures they are within, using their cognitive resources. All these interests are dialectic; both affected by and affecting the context of Katrina, and their interplay will be analyzed in order to have a more complete and dialectic understanding of the intransitive that explains why predictions of the disaster were not acknowledged.

**Historical context**

The historical context is vital to include as part of a critical realist, and naturalist, analysis as all social science is considered “inevitably historical” (Manicas 1998: 320). The present is made up of a "sedimented past" that has been transformed, in which material goods, knowledge, and social forms are “handed down” (Maninas 1998: 320).

For these reasons the relevant (as much as is possible to include within the limits of this paper) history is included in this analysis. The sedimentation of history here includes a number of relevant events affecting the ideas behind the interests of those actors involved. Environmentally, numerous floods and hurricanes both led to physical environmental and marsh degradation – about, 1,900 square miles of wetlands since the 1930s (Bourne 2004) – increasing the vulnerability of the area. Contributing to this degradation was the actions of certain groups. Since the 1950s, more than 8,000 canals had been cut through the marsh by engineers for petroleum exploration and ship traffic, and in 1968 the Corps of Engineers dredged “a 500-foot-side ship channel for freighters bound for New Orleans” (Bourne 2004).
This led to the ideational realization and recognition that a larger more disastrous storm was inevitable. In the early 2000s, for example, the Red Cross changed location of their storm shelters from New Orleans to higher ground, believing that the low city was too dangerous. The Louisiana Coastal Area (LCA) project was also drafted in 2003, with the aim of addressing the recognized problems of marsh degradation. The project, however, was considered too expensive and was therefore dropped by the Bush administration. The appreciation of the vulnerability of this area was not forgotten, however, and in 2004 the Federal Emergency Management Agency listed a hurricane strike on New Orleans as “one of the most dire threats to the nation” (Bourne, 2004).

Here we can see how the environmental concept of degradation is both natural and social, it has both “physical impacts, social framings and values that reflect the perspectives of…groups” (Forsyth 2001: 4). This process is both a brute fact, or “entities about which there is little debate concerning their existence” (Forsyth 2001: 4), and a translation of this brute fact into institutional fact which can be used by certain groups to further their ideas and therefore their interests. These discourses on the laws of nature help show how the natural science is related to the social.

Another historical factor affecting the ideas related to interests of actors involved was the terrorist attack of September 11th, 2001. This attack caused the focus of government and other actors to be on the human threat of terror, initiating the “war on terror” in October 2001. This attack, unrelated to the internal environmental and corresponding social problems of the USA caused a decrease in the emphasis given to problems associated with nature, and then became a factor to be considered when looking at reasons for why the LCA project was dropped. These historical events have a causal relationship on the contingency of natural disasters.
Effects of the oil industry

The oil industry in Louisiana accounts for nearly a third of national domestic oil production (Bourne 2004). In order to work within the state, companies need permits that oblige them to repair any environmental damage they have caused, according to a law established in 1980 (Rich 2014). These reparations, however, have clearly not been applied, as in 2003 the industry accepted responsibility for 36% of the marsh degradation, but refused to fund a reservation plan. The natural reason for this degradation was a phenomenon of "regional depressurization", caused by "induced subsidence from oil and gas withdrawal" (Morton et al. 2006: 268), where a drop in pressure leads underground faults to slip and the land to slump (Bourne 2004). The reason for gas companies to continue this phenomena is attributed to the price of natural gas.

In 1960, Liebling described Louisiana politics as “Oil gets into politics, and politicians, making money in office, get into oil. The state slithers around it.” (Liebling 1960: 71) In 2004 this was an understatement, with certain environmental activists referring to the state as “a petrocolonial” one (Bourne 2004). The Louisiana oil industry, which played a major role in the degradation of marshes in order to set up pipelines, contributes to over 30% of the oil production in the country. Bobby Jindal, the former Republican governor of the state, received more than $1 million in campaign contributions from this industry, and he had a significant say in policies attempting to address marsh degradation in 2004. In 2004, for example, a lawsuit was filed by a levee board against the oil industry. Once the lawsuit was filed, Jindal, as a recently elected representative in the House of Representatives, was able to appoint a few individuals to the board. All of those appointed were in some way connected to the oil and gas industry, either as owners or executives (Bourne 2004). Other senators and legislators involved have also been linked to, or have even been known to own or manage, other oil and gas companies, with their job as a state legislator being “part-time” (Bourne 2004). The interaction of the oil industry with state politics has clear effects on the abilities of the state to protect the population. Though the relationship existed prior to Hurricane Katrina, the hurricane serves as a crisis which calls attention to this interaction, highlighting the potential nature of the intransigent concept of capitalism and neoliberalism.
The democratic process

The connection of state politics and the oil industry obviously brings up the question of a conflict of interests. Despite this conflict, the fact that US governance is democratic therefore prevents individuals from being held accountable. The structure of democracy therefore acts as a constraint, as those agents who are potentially harmed by the structure are also constituting the reasons for the harmful structure itself. This relationship is particularly pronounced in a response by a state legislator in Louisiana prior to Katrina to the question of this potential conflict:

*I’m elected by the people in my district. They know who I am. They know what industry I’m in. They choose to send me there. It’s their right to make that decision — not yours, not anyone else’s.*

*(Bourne 2004)*

The rhetoric of freedom of choice within the democratic state is therefore used in order to continue the ideas and interests of this group. Here we are prompted to question whether the rhetoric is being used as a form of false belief, or at minimum as a mechanism for the abuse of certain ideas in order to further individual interests. The term “abuse” is particularly relevant here, as the concept being “abused” is that of democracy, as rather than being “for the people”, it is instead for the powerful.

Internal structure of the state

Here it is worth analyzing the position of the state in relation to the context of Hurricane Katrina in order to understand its ideas, informing its interest. One problem that contributed to the vulnerability of New Orleans is the structure of the main government body tasked with addressing issues concerning environmental degradation, the Army Corps of Engineers. The structure of the Corps has been described as “organizationally challenged” with lack of communication and confusion in particular roles being cited as distinct issues *(Bourne 2004)*. Prior to Katrina, the Corps was also described as having been restructured to resemble more of a business model, with engineers being replaced by program managers “who often lack engineering expertise” *(Bourne 2004)*.
Another extremely significant issue is the value given to the economy in relation to human life. In 1983, under the Reagan administration, often considered the impetus for neoliberal policy making, an executive order caused the Army Corps of Engineers to only be able to take economic development into account in its cost-benefit analyses of proposed projects, therefore excluding any value given to human life (Bourne 2004). This limited the Corps from taking any projects aimed at protecting the population from environmental disasters, unless there was clear economic gain to be made. The emphasis on economic gains reflects a lack of appreciation by the state for any warning regarding human lives. In 1965, for example, hurricane protection was authorized. However it was never completed due to a decrease in Corps funding and because of the lack of economic pay off. The Corps actually did have plans to fix the environmental issues faced by New Orleans, as it knew of the imminent threat of a potential hurricane. Despite this, no funds were allocated by the Bush administration for flood prevention projects due to a shuffling of resources “to pay for tax cuts and the Iraq invasion” (VandeHei et al. 2005).

Other private interests
After the hurricane it became clear how other private interests served to gain from the disaster, despite the overwhelming damage to the area and certain populations within it. Whether the beneficial effects of the hurricane were known to these actors or not is unknown, however, the substantial gains to these groups, and the actions taken post-disaster, encourage their inclusion within this analysis.

One such interest is those of the casinos. Prior to the hurricane the casinos were legally only allowed to exist off-shore. Post-Katrina, however, the group put united pressure on the government to change this, which led to the withdrawal of this law and the ability of the casinos to relocate to on-shore locations. This development significantly increased their income, as well as the availability of jobs in the area.
Other private actors involved are the wealthy landowners along the coastline. Within weeks of Katrina the community began discussions of “rebuilding and purchasing properties of those who were uninsured” (Petterson et al. 2006: 647). The process of gentrification, considered by some a process of “neoliberal urbanization” (Smith 2012: 430), of formerly public marinas also began, as they were replaced by high rises and private marinas, leading to a “hollowing out” of the local economy (Petterson et al. 2006: 661).

**Emergence: The idea of disaster capitalism**

Another intransigent neoliberal project identified post-Katrina is that of disaster capitalism. This term, campaigned for by Naomi Klein with her book titled The Shock Doctrine (Klein 2007), is an example of emergence. Katrina becomes a situation where the conjunction of the environment and neoliberal projects causes the concept of disaster capitalism to emerge.

Defined as a “predatory” form of capitalism, disaster capitalism is understood as using “the desperation and fear created by catastrophe to engage in radical social and economic engineering” (Klein 2007), also understood by social Marxist David Harvey’s idea of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2005: 4). This form of capitalism can be considered one of contingent necessity between environmental disaster and capitalism, as disaster provides “the means for business to accumulate profit” (Saltman 2007: 131). The privatization is not only understood as an economic project, but a cultural one as well, as certain agents act pedagogically to “define what is possible to think and what is impossible to imagine for the future” in order to idolize the ideas of capitalism (Saltman 2007: 149).

This concept is witnessed within the empirical example of the privatization of schooling in Louisiana post-Katrina. After the hurricane, most public schools were destroyed. The state could not provide immediate public schooling to those who returned to the city of New Orleans, and so Akima, a for-profit educational contractor, was allowed to build classrooms in the region.
During this process a discourse began, characterizing this privatization as the “silver lining” and a “golden opportunity” as a way of improving the educational standards of the state (Saltman 2007: 137). Private companies were then allowed to make up for failures of the state within the realm of public schooling, as more than 1,700 schools around the country had “failed to meet state standards for over five or six years in a row” (Lips 2006).

The contingent necessity between the neoliberal project and environmental disaster led to the emergence of the “largest-ever school voucher experiment for the region and nation”, established by the Department of Education (Saltman 2007: 137). Katrina presented itself as an opportunity for the political right to privatize the school system, which they were unable to achieve before 2004. This is attributed to the political connections with education rebuilding contracting firms (Saltman 2007: 137). This process involved a reframing of political control in line with other neoliberal discourses, that of advocating for “smaller government” and more “personal freedom”, with individuals now being given more “choice”. Here again we see the ability of structure to be both enabling and constraining, with this discourse being used to exemplify more individual choice while in reality it is considered by some to be removing individuals from “collective control” as it “eradicates the role of democratic participation” (Saltman 2007: 141).

Benton describes crises as when “the underlying generative structures of society become visible to them (actors)” leading to a “transformation of participant actors’ conceptions of their activities” (Benton 1998: 309). The emergence of disaster capitalism, as it begins to recognize neoliberal practices, can therefore be an example of crisis, however this does not necessarily mean that a change will occur.

**Interests of the local population**

The perspective of the local population is also valuable to include, particularly in examining its relationship with the oil industry. Prior to the BP oil spill in 2010, even with Katrina, the local population’s perception of the oil industry was one of “uncritical acceptance” (Rich 2014).
Because of its supply of jobs to the local population, about 65,000, it has been considered a “benign patriarch” (Rich 2014). Due to this relationship, the damaging relationship between the oil companies and the state has never been put into question by the majority of the local population, therefore preventing the natural crisis of Katrina to be considered a crisis capable of changing social structures. The gambling industry has also been considered a “regional savior”, as its relocation to on-shore locations post-Katrina allowed for an increase in jobs and income at a time when almost no jobs were in existence.

**Conclusion**

The common rhetoric around natural disasters is that they are an example of how current neoliberal systems must change. Though this may be true, the empirical example of Katrina shows how not only has this not happened in the context of one of the largest natural disasters in the history of the USA, but the structures have potentially been further reinforced. In order for there to be change, “practices must be altered, which means that most of those engaged in reproducing the practices must together alter their activity” (Manicas 1998: 322), and here we can see how this has not been the case. Despite the emergence of disaster capitalism, the interwoven connections between certain industries and the state, the emphasis on addressing the war on terror and economic gains, and the discourses created around individual freedoms are empirical examples of how the state and society are part of a larger neoliberal structure. This is particularly seen in the example of school privatization, disaster capitalism in the works, proof of unaltered practices, providing an attempt at a grasp of a neoliberal project, of the evasive structure of neoliberalism.

The Katrina context is an empirical example of the power of a natural structure coming into contact with the power of a social one. By asking what it is that caused predictions of this disaster to be left behind we are given a window into understanding the social structure of neoliberalism within the US in the 2000s. In order to do so the dialectic is used, through an understanding of the context, the different ideas and interests of actors, the discourses created, as well as the historical background. The empirical case shows concept dependence occurring, whether intentional or not, by actors functioning within this structure.
The warning and prediction of Katrina had no effect, which, after this analysis, should come as no surprise. These calls for action exemplified no resonance with the neoliberal structures and projects at play within the context they were acting.

**References**


Laura Cooper Hall
Identifying the neoliberal structure within natural disasters:
A critical realist approach to Hurricane Katrina


“Circumcision is a good thing for women”: Young men and female genital modification (FGM) in affected communities in the UK

By Emma Frobisher

Part One: Introduction

Background

The practice of female genital modification (FGM) has attracted much academic, political and media attention in recent decades. Defined by the World Health Organization (2016) as “all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons”, it is usually performed on girls between infancy and the age of 15 as a rite of passage into adulthood and to curb female sexuality. At least 200 million girls and women alive today have undergone the procedure in 28 countries across North Africa, Asia and the Middle-East (Rahman and Toubia 2000). FGM has no health benefits, and can cause serious prolonged physical complications. A study in Kenya found that over 80 per cent of women had experienced at least one medical problem after undergoing the procedure (Bashir 1997).
With increasing trans-national migration, this deeply-rooted traditional practice has travelled to Europe and North America. The United Kingdom is now known as the “European centre” for FGM with the highest rates of FGM in the continent: approximately 170,000 women and girls are believed to be living with FGM in the UK, with a further 65,000 girls under the age of 14 considered to be “at risk” (Burrage 2014).

Despite the UK’s illegalization of FGM in 1985 and repeated government attempts to tackle the practice, policy and campaigns have yet to translate into significant changes in prevalence (Toubia and Sharief 2003). As Rahman and Toubia remind us, “legislation alone cannot change social behaviour” (2000: xiv), a reality confirmed by Hussein’s (2010) study in which women in Sudanese and Somali communities in Bristol said the law would not prevent people from continuing to practice FGM. There is growing recognition on the part of policy-makers of the need to start tackling the issue from different perspectives in order to fully bring an end to the practice.

**Outline of the paper**

The objective of this literature review is to explore the dominant academic discourses that have surrounded FGM since it came to the attention of the West in the 1970s, and to demonstrate that, until very recently, there has been a clear omission in this literature of young men’s voices. While there has been a vast amount of work from medical, legal, economic, feminist and anthropological perspectives, in my view, many of these debates miss the point. It is important to understand the phenomenon of FGM within the broader context of social structures and to remember that “marriageability of girls is considered to be one of the main driving forces for the continuation of this practice” (Varol et al. 2014: 400). Given the wide acknowledgement that marriage is a key reason for FGM, and that marriage is a reciprocal arrangement, it is perhaps surprising that men have been so completely left out of the debate. It is equally puzzling that the input of young people has not yet been adequately explored, even though children and youth of both genders are the ones most directly affected by the practice of FGM.
This essay stresses the urgency of more research into the attitudes of FGM among young men living in affected communities across the UK. As potential suitors for marriage, campaigners must not underestimate the influence of this demographic in the continuation and termination of FGM. Recent work has shown there is often ignorance as to what FGM involves in practice, leading to a pervasive belief among many young men that it is a positive trait they would wish in a wife. However, increased awareness and education about the risks of this procedure have shown potential in helping to mobilise young men as essential allies in the drive for a comprehensive end to FGM (Fricker 2016, Gatigah 2013).

The paper is broadly divided into four parts. This introduction is rounded off with an overview of the different names that are employed for FGM and a qualification for my choice of terminology. Part Two traces the history of the academic work on this subject from different times and from different perspectives. Part Three identifies areas that are generally absent from this literature, notably the perspectives of young people, diaspora communities in the UK and the voices of young men. Part Four highlights some recent cases where young men have been enrolled in FGM research and campaigns, before concluding with calls for greater inclusion of their voices in the future.

The trouble with terminology: From “mutilation” to “modification”
There is wide debate on the use of terminology for the procedure. Historically, the term “female circumcision” (FC) was used in academic literature, however this term is anatomically incorrect and implies a misleading similarity with male circumcision, which is far less invasive. Since the 1980s, “female genital mutilation” has been widely adopted and is used in reports published by global development organisations including the United Nations. While many activists recognize this term as an effective international policy and advocacy tool for campaigning and awareness, opponents of the term find it offensive and judgmental towards affected women who do not necessarily consider themselves “mutilated”. More sensitive terms tend to be used when conducting fieldwork within affected communities (Rahman and Toubia 2000).
In addition to the above vocabulary, as well as the names in the languages of those conducting the practice, other terms have emerged since the 1990s, including “female genital cutting” (FGC), “female genital surgeries” (FGS), “female genital alteration”, “female genital operations”, “torture”, “infibulation”, “excision” and “clitoridectomy”. I prefer the term “female genital modification”, as it retains the FGM acronym by which the practice has come to be widely known, but is less emotive than “mutilation”, simply indicating that there has been a modification to the genitalia. Henceforth the abbreviation “FGM” will be used in this paper to mean “female genital modification”.

Part Two: Evolving debates surrounding FGM

Overview of the literature on the subject

Over the past half-century, there has been a growing body of literature on FGM. Initial interest came from writers in Africa such as Salama Moussa, but during the 1970s, the practice came to the attention of the West, largely due to the work of second-wave feminists including Fran Hosken and Gloria Steinem, who interpreted FGM as a symbol of patriarchal control over the female body.

Meanwhile, in the 1970s and 1980s, scholars in the field of medicine began to concentrate on the physical and psychological health damages caused by FGM (De Silva 1989, Dirie and Lindmark 1992). The role of national governments in ending the practice has also come under intense review with writers such as Bashir (1997) investigating the extent to which criminalization assists in deterring the practice. Other scholars have focused on the debate around “medicalization” and whether efforts to place FGM in a clinical context to reduce the potential medical risks would serve to legitimize and hence encourage the practice (Burrage 2015).

More recently, a number of academics have looked at the economics behind FGM, both in terms of the lucrative rewards it brings to the cutters – “FGM globally is big business” (Burrage 2014) – and its role in safeguarding economic and marital security for daughters. Chesnokova and Vaithianathan’s (2010) study in Burkina Faso found that FGM improves marriage prospects, identifying a correlation between women being “cut” and marrying earlier and into wealthier families.
Human rites versus human rights

Anthropologists have looked at the wider cultural contexts and social meanings of the procedure. As Burrage (2015) states, FGM is believed to reduce the sexual desire of women, preserve virginity, maintain fidelity and therefore preserve family honour. In essence, FGM is practiced to enhance the marriageability of girls. “Without it, she may be ostracized, perhaps even abandoned, because she has not adhered to the norms of the community and is therefore no longer part of it” (Burrage 2015: 102). Rahman and Toubia argue that FGM is “explicitly intended to show a woman her confined role in society” (2000: 5). According to Tamale (2008), there are two main reasons why patriarchal, capitalist societies need to regulate and control the sexuality and reproductive capacity of women: firstly to keep women’s bodies in the domestic arena as “good” wives and mothers so they remain dependent on their husbands as breadwinners, and secondly, to guarantee the paternity of children so that descent and property rights are retained through the male lineage.

Since the 1980s, a growing number of international human rights treaties have led to a shift in the discourse as FGM has been increasingly examined from a legal perspective and not simply as a gender, medical, economic or cultural issue (Boulware-Miller 1985, Bunch 1990). Rahman and Toubia (2000) consider the cutting of healthy organs for non-medical purposes to be a basic violation of women’s rights and children’s rights to physical bodily integrity, specifically prohibited by both the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). They argue that all states that have ratified these treaties have a legal duty to uphold them.

Mass media has played a key role in popularizing the issue of FGM around the world, particularly since the turn of the century, with the UK’s Guardian newspaper running an “End FGM Guardian Global Media Campaign” and the establishment of 6th February as annual “Zero Tolerance to FGM” Day. These campaigns take an explicit human rights-based approach in their drives to confront the continuation of FGM.
The need for new angles in anti-FGM activism

Alongside this increasing academic and media attention on FGM, a parallel body of work has emerged that is heavily critical of Western responses to the practice as “only thinly disguised expressions of racial and cultural superiority and imperialism” (Gunning cited in Dustin 2010: 11). Chandra Mohanty has examined the “discursive colonization” of Western feminists who take it upon themselves to speak on behalf of their seemingly “powerless” (1984: 338) counterparts in the global south, about whom they know very little. Dustin (2010) reflects on the inconsistencies and double standards of Western feminist campaigners who attack FGM while neglecting to challenge other unnecessary genital surgical interventions that exist in their own cultures, such as male circumcision, female genital cosmetic surgeries or gender reassignment surgeries in babies. Commentators such as Hernlund and Shell-Duncan (2007) have noted that the moral outcry behind the global movement to eradicate FGM has taken place in the context of growing Islamophobic sentiment in the West, despite the fact that FGM is a cultural, not religious, practice and is not prescribed in Islam.

Debates between cultural sensitivity and respect for individuals’ rights have ensured that FGM remains a highly polarizing issue (Bashir 1997). I position myself somewhere in between these arguments. Respect for minority cultures cannot always be entirely unconditional, and there needs to be an end to FGM because it involves “unnecessary pain and harm to girls” (Harcourt 2009: 198). However, the heavy-handed approach from Western critics is evidently having limited effect in ending the practice in the UK, because statistics show only marginal declines in numbers. Indeed, there are suggestions that concerted Western efforts to stop FGM can simply encourage practicing communities to operate in more clandestine ways (Burrage 2015), or can actively provoke a strong backlash if communities feel their cultural identities are under threat. Campaigns may have unintentionally sparked a greater determination to continue FGM as a way of holding onto the custom: “In large part because of the European animosity towards circumcision, the practice became a focus of African resistance to foreign encroachment and interference” (Abusharaf 2001: 114). Therefore, to effectively challenge the perpetuation of FGM, there is a need to combat the practice in new ways from different perspectives.
Part Three: What’s missing from these discussions?
The importance of bringing young men into the conversation

Although the combined sets of critical postulations outlined above convincingly cast light on the problems of FGM from a variety of different angles, still the question remains: what are the prevailing attitudes about FGM among young men in affected communities in the UK and how are these attitudes contributing to the continuation of the practice? As the anthropological literature shows, marriage is a socio-economic necessity for many women in affected communities. Therefore, as long as FGM is perceived by young men as a desirable trait in prospective brides, the practice is likely to continue. Western feminists can continue to criticize, but in order to see a robust end to the practice, there needs to be greater attention on marriage as the root cause of the practice. To explore this further, the focus of the research and discourse needs to involve the voices of men, and in particular young men, from within communities where FGM continues to be practiced.

Listening to young people on the subject of FGM

Despite the reality that children and young people are the ones most directly affected by FGM, their voices are generally lacking in the FGM debate (Burrage 2015). Over the past half-century, many scholars have argued the case for youth participation in different realms of social life and policy-making, emphasizing the agency of children and young people. Academics such as Cheney (2007) have highlighted the benefits for both researchers and participants of young people’s involvement in social research. As well as rights to protection, the Convention on the Rights of the Child includes the right of young people to participation, which can be “a way of enhancing children’s control over their own lives” (Ansell 2005: 225). Studies which have attempted to engage children in discussions of their perceptions of their social world have demonstrated that, far from being passive recipients of socialization, young people can make valuable contributions as social actors and cultural producers in their own right, actively negotiating and constructing their own social identities and the societies in which they live (Cheney 2007, Christiansen et al. 2006, De Boeck and Honwana 2005).
Despite this shift, it remains the case that children and youth are “often silenced and rendered invisible by the attitudes and practices of adult society” (Ansell 2005: 225) and this is evident in the literature on FGM, which, like much academia, has tended to treat young people as objects. Powell and Smith (2009) discuss how children with knowledge of sensitive issues are often excluded from participation and denied the opportunity to voice their opinions because of concern for their vulnerability. Since the harmful effects of FGM directly impact the lives of young women, and indirectly impact the lives of young men, academics need to include young people in the discussions and research, in order to end the practice. In this way, “participation is a means of protection” (Powell and Smith 2009: 129) and “the consequences of not participating can be more harmful” (ibid.).

As Fricker (2016) suggests, it is sometimes difficult to convince the previous generation to abandon the deeply embedded traditional practice of FGM, as they were raised to consider it acceptable. Ironically, FGM is “believed ultimately to be in the best interests of the girl” (Burrage 2015: 102), to protect her virtue, morality and future economic security. However, to adopt the child participation approach means that protection is no longer about adults protecting children, but rather “the child is an important individual with dignity, feelings, thoughts, and capacities. The child becomes a resource that we as adults should listen to” (Powell and Smith 2009: 129). As young people represent the future generation, it is important to understand their views on the practice and include them in discussions so that they are actively aware of what FGM entails in order to prevent its perpetuation.

Burrage agrees: “working with young people is particularly critical” (2015: 218) and the little research on FGM that has put young people at the forefront has provided very rich information. Hemmings and Khalifa (2013), for example, recognized that young people respond well to their friends and adopted a third person interviewing technique, known as Participatory Ethnographic Evaluation and Research (PEER) methodology, to develop a more thorough understanding of young people’s views on the practice.
Young people between the ages of 18 and 30 interviewed individuals they selected from their own social networks and used these relationships of trust to explore highly sensitive issues about the social contexts of FGM in a short period of time. This data reaffirmed young people’s potential as co-creators of knowledge, and more research is needed to comprehend their views on the practice, since they are the ones most affected by it.

Hearing the voices from within affected communities in the UK

While European governments since the 1980s have come to realize that FGM is a growing problem in the West due to increased migration, there is still limited information from within the diaspora communities from FGM-practicing countries. A recent Home Affairs Committee Report (House of Commons 2014) showed that UK government efforts do not go far enough to address the issue at the community level. “Little is known about their experiences, attitudes and perceptions towards FGM and what their main issues and concerns are” (Hussein 2010: 4). This lack of research is problematic, since it is the people within affected communities who are carrying out the practice, and it is therefore important to hear their views and opinions on FGM in order to move towards its termination. As Rahman and Toubia have suggested, “issues that result from dislocation and adapting to a new environment have created the need for new strategies and approaches to address FC/FGM in a broader setting” (2000: 12).

Evolving patterns of migration and resettlement have brought about significant changes in how FGM is played out in different contexts. As Hernlund and Shell-Duncan argue, “national frontiers have indeed come to play an important role in whether and how FGC is practiced and with what consequences” (2007: 3). In an ever-changing background of complex transnational and “transcultural” environments, postcolonial critiques argue that it is not so simple to categorize ethnic minorities in having set views, pointing to the “messy, globalized, and locally made quality of culture that does not exist in neatly compartmentalized national ‘containers’” (McEwan cited in Radcliffe 2015: 37).
Studies of younger members of the overseas diaspora in European democracies reveal that, while they significantly adapt to their environment, they generally retain their values concerning family, marriage and religion, which can provoke deep tensions “when they become caught between the values of home and host communities” (Hernlund and Shell-Duncan 2007: 5). Hemmings and Khalifa’s (2013) examination into issues of gender, marriage, cultural identity and social norms among young first- and second-generation migrants in Europe, found that migration had significant impacts on their values and relationships with the older generation. While many respondents valued human rights, choice and freedom, they also retained respect for their elders: “Addressing the issues of FGM and forced marriage could potentially bring young advocates into conflict with the older generations, something they may wish to avoid” (2013: 23). Further, the concept of the family name or honour – often closely linked to the maintenance of female virginity before marriage – remained an influential value in the day to day lives of young women in particular. (Hemmings and Khalifa 2013: 6)

Studies such as this make a significant contribution to investigating the attitudes of the current generation of millennials of ethnic minority backgrounds in the UK. However, the majority of this research fails to address young men’s views on FGM and the extent to which they consider it a requirement for marriage.

**Engaging men in the FGM debate**

A review of the literature on FGM reveals there is an almost exclusive concentration on women: women’s views on the practice, women’s role in the practice and women’s experiences of the practice, in both African and Western contexts. Research in communities has shown that it is often mothers and grandmothers who do the most to perpetuate the custom (Hassan 2016). FGM practitioners are traditionally elderly women, and more recently female health professionals including midwives.
Toubia and Sharief claim that “women and girls remain the main social group who suffer directly from this practice and are potentially the best agents to bring about its demise” (2003: 260). However, to focus only on the direct role of women is to ignore the indirect and passive role of men. Mothers and grandmothers may be the ones actively pushing their daughters to be cut, but this is largely based on the perception that FGM brings qualities that are necessary to attract suitable husbands. It is important to challenge the assumption that women are the ones to “blame” for FGM when the practice was originally initiated by men to preserve women’s chastity: “Although FGM is in a sphere which is dominated by women, the underlying realism of FGM is that women are circumcized by women for men” (Mohammad 2005: 141).

Reports from FGM-practicing communities suggest that men often see it as a “women’s issue” and are reluctant to interfere. “Because it’s taboo to talk about it, people often don’t know how damaging FGM is” (Fricker 2016). Burrage (2015) claims there is a limited understanding among men of what is actually involved in the procedure and men often make comparisons with the circumcision they themselves endured. Varol et al. (2015) found that it was only after men were married that they experienced the irrevocable consequences of their wives’ FGM. This disengagement is convenient, playing to men’s supposed interests in keeping women chaste.

However, discounting men from the academia only serves to maintain the distance between men and FGM, when in fact, this practice is both impacted by, and impacts, men. Several reports have shown that men feel physical and psychosexual problems as a consequence of being partners of women who have undergone FGM, including male sexual dissatisfaction and perceived challenges to their masculinity (Varol et al. 2014). As Burrage (2015) explains, men can feel deep compassion for female suffering and aversion to inflicting pain on their partners and loved ones.
Roy (2014) has discussed the irony that most men are oppressed by their own notions of masculinity: “Challenging these concepts is hardest of all, since it requires communities to come up with new concepts of masculinity – something every society is struggling with”. According to Hussein,

sexism affects both genders and men are also forced to conform to the stereotypes of what they should be like. Men who are caring, kind, sensitive and dare to stand against violence against women and girls often have their masculinity questioned.

(Hussein 2014)

These wider issues of gender stereotypes in relation to FGM would benefit from further research.

Part Four: Hopes for the future
Growing recognition of the role of men in helping to end the practice

Recently, scholars have identified the need to bring men into the conversation, suggesting growing acknowledgement that it is not only women that have a crucial role in ending the practice. Burrage highlights the responsibility of fathers, brothers and religious leaders in advocating to stop FGM, as well as men in the mainstream of modern society in the UK where “the majority of people who uphold the law are men”, such as police, lawyers, doctors and teachers (2015: 103).

There have been some recent attempts to involve men in the discussions. In 2015, the European Union and various charitable organizations launched the Men Speak Out Initiative, a jointly-funded project which aims to increase knowledge on men’s role in the perpetuation of FGM across Europe and to reach out to affected communities to expand awareness of FGM among men. There have also been some stories from various countries including Kenya of men coming together to refute FGM and to prevent the practice (Gathigah 2013).
Mobilizing young men as “champions for change”

While these examples represent a positive step, arguably the group with the most power at their disposal is young men, since this demographic consists of potential suitors for marriage, and the rationale behind FGM is marriageability. Whilst there are instances of fathers “going against the grain” to protect their daughters from undergoing FGM (Gatighah 2013), the practice is likely to continue while young men still consider it a prerequisite for marriage. If young men began to oppose the practice on a large scale, this could potentially make a greater difference than any amount of legislation enacted by Western and African policymakers. As Bashir claims,

parents who insist on this ritual for their daughters frequently state that if the ritual was not performed, their daughters would be perceived as immoral [and] would be unable to find a husband.

(Bashir 1997: 12)

This analysis has been supported by Varol et al.’s (2015) study in Northern Sudan, which revealed that men believed the practice of FGM would start to decline when young men began preferring women who had not undergone the procedure. ActionAid has identified a similar trend in Somaliland, and has started working with young men there, claiming that “boys are vital champions for change” (Fricker 2016):

If the male members of the family join in awareness-raising, showing that it is not only a women’s issue but a social issue that should concern all members of society, then we can and will end FGM.

(Fricker 2016)

Concentrating on the UK, however, it is evident that very few studies have attempted to investigate and address young men’s views on FGM in affected communities. One exception is a recent British television documentary,
The Cruel Cut (2013). In this programme, activist Leyla Hussein asked male youth from Somali backgrounds in London for their views on FGM and elicited positive feedback such as, “most guys think that circumcision is a good thing for women”, and “I heard that if you take it off, it calms the girl down”. However, when the boys were presented with a graphic visual representation of the procedure, most of them displayed sharp reversals in opinion with several of them becoming nauseous and emotional. This study demonstrated to great effect that more awareness of the realities of FGM can provoke deep antipathy among men:

When boys and young men know what FGM entails and how dangerous it is, they are often willing, wherever they are, to expose the reality behind the secrecy and conventions which uphold the practice.

(Burrage 2015: 218)

Activists therefore need to recognize that men are part of the solution and that they “have a responsibility to fight against such practices” (Hussein 2014). It would be unwise to underestimate the critical role and influence of young men in practicing communities, given their position as marriage prospects for young women at risk of FGM. With greater outreach and education towards young men on FGM, campaigners have the opportunity to secure their essential collaboration in preventing FGM. “Any campaign to end FGM must include the education and sensitization of men to increase their awareness of the practice and its physical and psychological consequences” (Mohammad 2005: 141).

Conclusion
This paper has aimed to highlight a major gap in the FGM literature on the voices and opinions of young men from within the UK’s affected communities. Recent studies that have attempted to investigate this area have demonstrated huge potential for further exploration, and given the limited effectiveness of previous academia and legislation in ending FGM, exploring young men’s perspectives is potentially a more beneficial direction for the discourse to follow in future. FGM continues on the basis that it promotes a girl’s marriageability for young men.
If FGM ceased to be seen as a marriageable asset by would-be husbands, it is to be expected that there would be a significant decline in FGM-reported instances. The current lack of understanding of young men’s opinions about FGM is therefore very troubling.

Policy-makers and activists need to appreciate the value of engaging young men as agents of change for the permanent abandonment of FGM. In the short term, greater investment in education at the school and community level can help address the ignorance of FGM among young men to make them more aware of the harmful nature of the practice. In the long term, however, the aim should be to address and improve deeply harmful gender stereotypes. “Perhaps the extent of increasing involvement of men in fighting FGM is one indicator of moves towards gender equality” (Burrage 2015: 104).

References


Gender: a women’s-issue ghetto

By Belén Giaquinta

In 1997, Wolfgang Sachs argued the "biases, [...] historical inadequacies and [...] imaginative sterility” of what he refers to as development “credos” standardize and kill the diversity of development discourse (Sachs 1997: xvi). Since then, very little has changed in the ways language dictates how development is practiced and understood. In this sense, gender is no exception as a particular rhetoric continues to delimit how we frame women, men and their identities, as subjects and objects of development projects.

The term gender refers to the social categorization of men and women, masculinity and femininity that guides social interaction in a specific time and place. Consequently, gender considers what appropriate behaviour, attributes, characteristics and activity for men and women are (Pearson 2000). Due to the strong ideological content of the term, it is impossible to overlook how gender (and gender relations) transverses all social, political, cultural and economic institutions and processes, making it a fundamental term in the development arena. Gender was brought to the attention of policy makers by feminist academics during the first feminist movement in the late 19th century. With time, development practice has seen a "widespread enthusiasm for applying gender analysis to all aspects of development” (Pearson 2000: 400); a process also known as gender mainstreaming.

Gender was incorporated into development through three main development approaches. Firstly, Women in Development (WID) tried to bring attention to women’s lack of inclusion in development policy. However, targeting women alone in development projects disregards structural inequalities, which led to many failures in the field. Eventually Women and Development (WAD) was adopted, which focuses on women’s role in productive and reproductive sphere’s.
Nonetheless, WAD disregards the importance of power relations, and thus once again a new approach came about. Gender and Development (GAD) problematizes the nature of gender relations between women and men, to deconstruct how these influence development initiatives and policies (Pearson 2000, Conrwall 1997). In this way, GAD offers a more comprehensive lens to understand how development issues are gendered. However, Conrwall (1997: 9) claims GAD is still over-simplifying for overlooking relationships among women and among men, and ignoring the “the intersection of gender with other differences such as age, status and wealth”. Consequently, a term that speaks to a spectrum of masculinities and femininities is reduced to women’s issue ghetto. This understanding not only overlooks the diversity within the term, but also how institutions and structures, subjective identities, ideologies and symbolic representations (Scott 1986) condition women’s experiences.

Smyth (2007) extends her critique of “gender” to the loose way in which it is used in development discourses. As a result, she argues certain aspects of the term are overemphasized, while others are not given enough attention or simply ignored. One of the most obvious silences is the limited consideration other genders receive in discussions of gender in development. Conrwall (1997: 8) highlights this limitation by showing the tendency of gender-aware initiatives to cast men as the “problem” and women and the “victim”. However, gender categories are far too nuanced and fluid to be reduced to static generalizations. Consequently, development practice disregards the vast diversity of gender identities, for example how there are different ways of being a man. While those most commonly associated with dominance and power are known as “hegemonic masculinities”, other forms that do not conform to the stereotype, such as “marginalized” and “subordinate” masculinities, are also subject to discrimination and repression (Davis and Connell 2014).

In addition to providing limited space for men’s involvement, the term gender shies away from the “explicit language of feminism”, thus making “real women and men, power and conflict all disappear behind bland talk of ‘gender’” (Smyth 2007: 144).
On the one hand, this depoliticizes feminist goals of bringing gender into the agenda. On the other hand, this use further disregards the role of intersectionality in underpinning someone’s oppression. Kandirikirira (2002) illustrates these tensions through an intersectional study of gender-based violence in Omaheke, Namibia. In her study she finds widespread violence against women is a result of gender biases – about masculinity particularly – and institutionalized racial and ethnic discrimination, grounded on a history of colonialism and apartheid. Therefore, to address this gender-relates issue, it was tantamount to look beyond conceptualizations of men as oppressor and women as the oppressed. Instead, it needed to recognize how “patriarchy is manipulated by systems of exclusion [to undermine men’s] capacity to fulfil the masculine roles and responsibilities assigned to them by the gender constructs of their culture” (Kandirikirira 2002: 116). Thus her research clearly illustrates how often gender relations are reduced to rigid categories that disregard the fluidity, history and contextual dimension of the term.

Therefore, to bridge the gaps in gender policy and practice, development recognize how gender language is devoid from its original meaning, and thus creates a single story about how women, men, and other genders fit into its narrative. This would entail extending the conversation about gender, to include men’s experiences with discrimination, marginalization and powerlessness. In turn, this will allow men to “reflect on their behaviour towards those they feel they have power over” (Cornwall 1997: 12). Otherwise, we will continue to impoverish gender analysis (Pearson 2000) and curtail its potential to redefine the way we understand and address gender-related issues.

To conclude, it is clear that gender language and how we use it can strongly determine how we understand gender in development. Albeit its good intentions, gender in development contexts has dangerously created a single narrative about what it is, who it represents and how to address it. As a result, recognition for how complex power relations and socially constructed identities of masculinities and femininities intertwine to condition someone’s identity is largely absent.
Forty-five years after feminism started to gain purchase in social and political debates, how much longer will it take the development community to recognize that gender is much more than a Third-World, oppressed and disempowered woman?

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Innovating from and with civic-creativity

Belén Moro

Civic innovation is about focusing on what is positive, creative and imaginative in the face of a world that seems beset by crisis narratives, whether financial, economic, ecological, social or cultural. (Biekart et al. 2016)

Since the very begging of the Social Movements and Civic Innovation course, words like energy, transformation, resistance and creative thinking started to sound like soothing bits to my ears and. In the introductory chapter of the recently published book by Biekart et al. (2016), leader and lectures of the course, the space for creativity was established as essential several times. The question about the place of art was as well brought by the participant’s of the CIRI Forum -held in 2013 at ISS under a series of interactive practices seeking for civic innovation and social change - and which messages are reproduced in the mentioned chapter (Biekart et al. 2016: 7). What triggered me was that despite this open call to bring creativity into development studies, the word itself is absent from the key concepts of the civic innovation mosaic (ibid.: 8). However, cleverly preventing this and other possible entries that could want to make their way in, the authors left a space for the reader to contribute to an on-going process of collective construction of knowledge. The opportunity to openly place the word creativity also took place during the mosaic exercise held in the first participatory session of the course.

From that initial interaction, the topic of this essay started also to draw its intentions, which became clearer during the study visit to Ruigoord, a squatted village near Amsterdam. There a group of artists, poets and families resisted for three decades the construction of a harbour that would not only modify their peaceful environment but also damage the natural region.
The mobilization and campaign against the destruction of the area was accompanied by their spirit to leave in a “artistic/social lifestyle experiment” as Ellenbrock et al. (2013: 5) describe it or as Rob van Tour said in our encounter in June 2016: “a free environment for free thinking and creativity’. The network and strategies developed and scaled up by this group of people was, as they declared, not moved by the desire to “change the world”; on the contrary they have called themselves a “non existing organization” where everybody is part of the community. This fits perfectly in the course’s theoretical framework as an example of a very innovative vision and way of performing social actions that can bring insights to other organizations and communities. What is also worth to learn from their non-violent resistance and experience is how they managed to keep occupying and “living without inhabiting” the village after the construction of the harbour, which finally came with the entry to the new millennium. The negotiations and dialogue with the city government of Amsterdam transformed them in a “official community” instead of the “illegal squatter” they had been; but they could adapt to the new rules and procedures and continue occupying the village within their perspectives and lifestyle. As Alan Moore (2015) states in his extent and also recently published book “Occupation culture”:

They don’t want to struggle, they want to live. Theirs is a utopia imbued with exotic spirits, carefully separated from the real world of neoliberal capitalism, mass migration and neo-fascist gangs. In some ways Ruigoord seems classically modernist

(Alan Moore 2015: 342)

**Picture 1:**

![Image of people and bus](image)

*Source: Moro, B.*
The visit to Ruigoord was overlapped by my research concerns and conspiratorial readings about how to bring art and culture pragmatically into social studies. Particularly related to the course is a chapter of one of John Clammer’s books that raises the question about why art movements have not been considered by sociologists or other scholars as social movements (Clammer 2014: 95). The first counter argument to this interrogative would be another question: Was it the intention of art movements, specially some of the avant-garde ones and those that came after the second World War, to become a social movement or to propose a social change beyond the ‘art world’ and the formal and conceptual views within it?

Certainly, as Clammer among many scholar says some groups, like Surrealism, Fluxus, Dada, the Bauhaus and the Mexican muralists, did have in mind more or less radical ideas about the world they wanted to foster and live in. Borrowing Edwards’s words about civil society’s expressions and participation in the public sphere we could say that these movements organized a series of “collective action in search of the good society” (Edwards 2009: 1).

It is important to define civil society before going deeper into the debate about what and how does art bring innovations into development for the construction of “new methods that can “perform” and capture the fluidity of changing understandings of identities, bodies, emotions, networks, power relations and knowledge in today’s “messy world” (Biekart et al. 2016: 16). Just in the same way as Mitlin et al.:

> We work from a broadly Gramscian understanding of civil society as constituting an arena in which hegemonic ideas concerning the organization of economic and social life are both established and contested. Gramsci (1971) perceived state and civil society to be mutually constitutive rather than separate, autonomous entities, with both formed in relation to historical and structural forces akin to our processes of little d development.

(Mitlin et al. 2007: 1702)
The “little d development” process described by these authors is also crossed by the debate and dilemma about how to achieve civil society’s and NGO’s alternatives and innovations in a consciously and practical way in order to contribute to counter-hegemonic production of knowledge and struggles for a “good society” (Mitlin et al. 2007). The last concept, used by Edwards and other scholar’s researching in civil society and its forms of organization, deserves a special reflection that can be traced back to Aristotle’s ideas about society and state. After a huge vary of interpretations that are of course beyond the scope of this essay to set out, the concept can assist us in the exploration around the basis of imaginative and creating paths that come from the art and cultural productions and thinking.

Then, what is relevant for this essay is the ethical and political aspects of the ‘good society’ that - as Marangos and Astroulakis (2010) interpret from Aristotle’s concept of “eudaimonia”- have contributed to development ethicists in looking beyond economic growth and including “the qualitative enrichment of human beings in all relevant aspects of human life” (Marangos and Astroulakis 2010: 556).

It is widely accepted in different schools of thought (Escobar 2010; Grimson 2014; Rao and Walton 2004; Sen 2004) that culture has a fundamental role in society. Again, focusing on the question that we are trying to unpack the issue is how it matters to development. In Clammer’s (2014) introduction about the ways in which art contributes to social change, we find also the place that many sociologist have considered for culture as primary basis of social cohesion and change:

*Arts are not simply as a peripheral leisure pursuit, but are actually the generative mechanisms of many a other forms of social and cultural behaviour, including (...) social protest, social movements, images of the ideal society, means of creating and maintaining social cohesion and other forms of social and interpersonal conviviality.*

(Clammer 2014: 5)
Rao and Walton’s (2004) idea of culture as part of the sets of capabilities that every person has can be associated to the concept of social sculpture, developed by the artist Joseph Beuys since the 1970s. Beuys places the idea of creativity as the fundamental driver to start the process of social awareness and change, as well as energy to strengthen individual and collective agency. These are understood as pre-conditions for working out and balancing inequality and poverty in a long term and sustainable form. The capability approach conceptualized mainly by Sen since the 1980s allows us to place freedom and creativity as part of the basic capabilities that can bring other inputs on individuals and communities.

Sen’s approach becomes less abstract when adding the “philosophically coherent normative (partial) theory of justice” (Wells 2012: 24) proposed by Nussbaum (quoted in Laderchi et al. 2003) and her categories of essential features for a full human life. It is possible to find the role of art and culture within almost every features of Nussbaum list:

a. Life: normal length of life  
b. Health: good health, adequate nutrition and shelter  
c. Bodily integrity: movement; choice in reproduction  
d. Senses: imagination and thought, informed by education  
e. Emotions: attachments  
f. Practical reason: critical reflection and planning life  
g. Affiliation: social interaction; protection against discrimination  
h. Other species: respect for and living with other species  
i. Play  
j. Control over one’s environment, politically (choice) and materially (property)  

(Nussbaum quoted in Laderchi et al. 2003: 256)

Social sculpture, also called social art, is part of Beuys expanded concept of art that is at the same time related to the idea of social capital, where ART=CAPITAL.
Art as a capital means it is a source of energy and a value to produce new meanings, products and services that can transform an individual and a community, not only on the system of representation but also on the social reproduction, economic and political structure. To this Clammer adds “art is a form of social capital for those who produce it, teach it, understand it, collect it and display it” (Clammer 2014: 105). The author links this to the gap he finds in sociology, including the “new sociology of arts”, “to reinstate art as a vehicle of social transformation” (ibid.: 105).

With the spirit to bring case studies to the debate and question raised by Clammer, the essay will focus on illustrating the relationship between art and social movements through the Fluxus “movement” and Beuys actions within the Free International University. Finally, using the time machine that literature allows, we will briefly jump into a recent project developing in Mexico: CACAO, a cooperative of artists gathered under the mission of creating a solidarity network, that seeks to “strengthen the independent cultural production and creation of symbolic capital; ... as well as creating new channels of exchange” (González 2015: 11-12).

**Art as social movements**

Art, as well as all social sciences and humanities studies, initiated after the Second World War a process of self-reflection and re-conceptualization. Within Benjamin’s (1936) “era of the technical reproduction” and the new roles and concepts about art and culture introduced by the school of Frankfurt, added to the art movements, groups and associations formed after the art vanguards, the art practice became much more diverse, not only in terms of aesthetics but specially in the relationship with society and social problems. The further ones had become more evident and urgent after the mediated representation of violence, conflict and increasing poverty and environmental problems over the world, to which artists’ sensibility and awareness were not indifferent.
Art movements and new interdisciplinary groups started to intervene and relate with society in different and wider ways; expanding the practices, spaces and modes of production, circulation and interaction. One of the most radical art movements in terms of organization was Fluxus, an open group that worked with objects and actions mixing music, theater and happenings to create flows of vital energy, creation and destruction and to expand the desire of uniting life and art. Fluxus was founded in 1963 and organized mostly by the ideologist George Maciunas under strong political goals:

- Fluxus objectives are not aesthetics but social and imply the gradual elimination of the fine arts and the employment of its material and capacities for social constructive means.
- Fluxus is an anti-art form... against the artificial separation between producers and spectators, between art and life.

(Marchán Fiz 1986: 206)

The core idea within Beuys thinking and concept of social sculpture is the transformative power that art has, in the broad sense of a creative energy that can bring innovative, pragmatic and bottom-up solutions and ideas to transform a conflict or a social problem, finding alternatives to work them out within the community level. As stated before, the conditions needed in each individual are the sense of awareness and freedom that enables other capabilities. According to this principle, Beuys realized a series of actions, two of them with Fluxus, that reflect the political and anti-art ideologies:
Beuys’s most famous Action took place in May 1974, when he spent three days in a room with a coyote. After flying into New York, he was swathed in felt and loaded into an ambulance, then driven to the gallery where the Action took place, without having once touched American soil. As Beuys later explained: "I wanted to isolate myself, insulate myself, see nothing of America other than the coyote". The title of the work is filled with irony. Beuys opposed American military actions in Vietnam, and his work as an artist was a challenge to the hegemony of American art.

Beuys covered his head first with honey, and then with fifty dollars worth of gold leaf. He cradles a dead hare in his arms, and strapped an iron plate to the bottom of his right shoe. Viewed from behind glass in the gallery, the audience could see Beuys walking from drawing to drawing, quietly whispering in the dead rabbit’s ear. As he walked around the room, the silence was pierced by intermittent sound of his footsteps; the loud crack of the iron on the floor, and the soundless whisper of the sole of shoe.

**Picture 2:**

![Image of Beuys with a coyote](Source: Tate Modern.org 2005)

**Picture 3: Beuys, Joseph (1974) “How To Explain Pictures To A Dead Hare”**

Beuys covered his head first with honey, and then with fifty dollars worth of gold leaf. He cradles a dead hare in his arms, and strapped an iron plate to the bottom of his right shoe. Viewed from behind glass in the gallery, the audience could see Beuys walking from drawing to drawing, quietly whispering in the dead rabbit’s ear. As he walked around the room, the silence was pierced by intermittent sound of his footsteps; the loud crack of the iron on the floor, and the soundless whisper of the sole of shoe.
The actions performed are clear embodiments of the ideas and critiques that this art movement was bringing as a counter-culture or alternative interpretations and views of the world. Nevertheless, as Marchán Fiz also recovers within the critiques made to Fluxus, the intentions to bring together art and life, as many avant-garde movements, may represent a “partial social movements” that needs the convergence with other social actions to not fall in mere aesthetics and alienated discourse (Marchán Fiz 1986: 205-209). It is possible to argue also that another limitation in achieving this nexus was that the space where Fluxus actions occurred continued pretty much confined to the “art world” (museums, galleries and other places within the cultural circuit) and even there, the specific public remained quite passive to the production process, having usually a pre-determined or suggested participation.

Beuys saw the limitations that the professional art sphere had and as part of the attempts to overtake it, he developed a series of ‘multiples’ that are artworks easily reproducible and therefore much more accessible.

With this multiple, Beuys sought to relay his message to commuters in the New York subway, an audience unlikely to be reached through his other artistic projects.

Commissioned by the artists collective Group Material, as one of 120 posters placed in subway trains, Beuys’s work is dominated by the slogan ‘Creativity = Capital,’ printed in red block letters. A detail from one of his blackboard diagrams, which he used to explain his social ideas, serves as a backdrop to this text. While the details of the diagram are difficult to decipher, the work’s slogan makes its message abundantly clear.

Beuys often described his multiples as ‘vehicles’ for placing his ideas in circulation.

Besides the ‘multiple’ strategy to approach broader publics Beuys, as well as many other artists, searched for the educative and ethic character of art (Marchán Fiz 1986: 207). Moved by the belief that education is a universal human right and following Rudolf Steiner’s teachings -based on the idea of intuition as a form of experience and knowledge and the ‘Anthroposophy’ theory- many of Beuys most engaged actions in terms of social impact were his conversations and classes at the Düsseldorf State Art Academy.
However, the relationship with the institution’s administration was not aligned with those universal principles. In the late 1960s and early 1970s it started to change the admission policy, to what Beuys resisted occupying the building and protesting with the students. Even though the actions succeeding at the beginning, he was dismissed in 1972 during an action interrupted by the intervention of police, who was called by the Academy’s director. The peaceful retreat by Beuys and the group of supporters is a clear example of what Clammer outstands as a positive attribute of most of the art social movements, which “are rarely if ever violent movements” (Clammer 2014: 117).

This screen print (Picture 5) depicts the moment, on October 11th, 1972, when Beuys was expelled from the Düsseldorf State Art Academy. It derives from a photograph by Ernst Nanninga, which was enlarged, recoloured and reprinted by the publisher Klaus Staeck.

**Picture 5: October 11th, 1972**

*Source: Pinakothek der Moderne 2012*
After the discharge from Düsseldorf Academy, Beuys and three other colleagues founded the Free International University for Creativity and Interdisciplinary Research (F.I.U.) with the purpose to expand the creativity potential to other professional and daily fields. After failed negotiations with state authorities in Düsseldorf to establish a university campus, the initiators of the project “opened small branch offices of the university in Düsseldorf, Achberg, Hamburg, Gelsenkirchen und Pescara... [that] served as platforms for public discussion and promotion of the institution’s goals” (Pinakothek der Moderne 2016). Beuys and Heinrich Böll wrote a manifesto to state the principles guiding the F.I.U.:

... Vision for a new society, governed in accordance with the socialist principles of freedom, equality and brotherhood. Among the sweeping changes for which the manifesto calls are the abolition of communism and capitalism, a new approach to work and production, and the adoption of a new financial system.

(Pinakothek der Moderne 2012)

This double-sided poster (Picture 6) on newsprint was produced by the Free International University (F. I. U.), an open university co-founded by Beuys in Düsseldorf in 1973. On its front face it bears the title of a manifesto, entitled “Appeal for an Alternative”, that Beuys published in the Frankfurter Rundschau newspaper on December 23rd, 1978.
As Clammer points, the manifesto, together with the identification of a leader and the three features that define a social movement according to Melucci, allow to identify in what ways certain art movements alike Fluxus and actions as the ones conducted by Beuys and his colleagues, share the same organization modes and mission with the one that identify social movements:

*The mobilization of a collective actor (i) defined by specific solidarity, (ii) engaged in a conflict with an adversary for the appropriation and control of resources valued by both of them, (iii) and whose action entails a breach of the limits of compatibility of the system within which the action takes place.*

(Melucci quoted in Clammer 2014: 102)
During the investigation for this essay, I discovered the Free International University World Art Collection (FIUWAC), based in Amsterdam. This research unit claims to promote the Beuys perspective and to gather an open and transparent Social Sculpture Study Collection, financed by Triodos Bank. The FIUWAC initiated as cooperation with the F.U.I. “to create a ‘modern collection’, which reflects new needs in the imagination for the future, and thinking for all resources, natural, human, ecological and social” (Bien 1999). Further insight about this initiative is certainly needed, but it is brought here as one of the many examples, being the Social Sculpture Research Unit from Oxford Brookes University another important network motivated by Beuys’ Steiner and other thinkers that “…sits within the liberatory stream of ‘free university’ and ‘free school’ initiatives across the world” (Social-sculpture 2016). It would be probably unlimited the list of platforms, schools, organizations and projects that are directly or somehow related to the core values and tools promoted by Fluxus and Beuys. Let us take a look to a recent case born in Mexico also from an artist and docent triggered by social change, Jose Miguel Casanova.

**Solidarity networks connecting creative actions**

As introduced in this essay, the Mexican Muralist is recognized not only by Clammer but also by many academics as an exemplifying art movement closely related to a social change, in this case the Agrarian Revolution and the popular social movements of the first half of the 20th century. The connection between education and culture in policy terms and was foster by the politician, educator and philosopher José Vasconcelos in the constitution of the modern and nationalist Mexican State. The muralist period and the multiplication of graphic-art workshops, groups and associations that raised since the early decades of the century took place under the transformative search of arts as a vehicle for politics and educational goals. Later, these movements and organizations that kept multiplying until the 1950s went through a process of fragmentation and many disappeared or radically transformed into market oriented and individual practices maintaining sometimes the discourses around social concerns but not getting directly involved in social practices.
However, especially between the 1970s and 1990s, when Fluxus and other organizations were also refreshing the artistic practices, new manifestations and social interventions took place in Mexico, acting directly in the public sphere and in the political arena. In the research process to construct the exhibition “La era de la discrepancia” (‘The age of discrepancies’) two of the most relevant Mexican art theorists and curators, Olivier Debroise and Cuauhtémoc Medina (2007), unpack the political and social relationships between the art movements framing it under the title that is related to the declaration made by the rector of the Universidad Autónoma Nacional de Mexico (UNAM) some month after the Tlatelolco massacre: “Long live discrepancy!” (Barros Sierra quoted by Debroise and Medina 2007: 31). The interpretation of the significance and appropriation of the phrase link us directly to the question explored here about the relationship between art and creativity and social movements:

Expressing opposition to a hegemonic vision of culture and an embrace of difference, Barros Sierra’s phrase seemed to us the best key for understanding a period when, despite the disdain of the establishment, crucial figures in the Mexican art world chose creative dissent with an intensity not shared by any other cultural sector of the time.

(Debroise and Medina 2007: 31)

What becomes a new interrogative is why the artistic manifestations of those decades, having so evident connections with the social context, were not considered in the debates around cultural policies, education and social development? It is important to recognize that there have been attempts to bring the perspectives and make visible the relationships between culture and development in the discursive level of the global debate, which has increased the synergies to re-think the connection in a more sustainable and diversified way especially since the early 2000s.

In Mexico already in 1994 Rosales Ayala review the cultural practices searching for those connections in the book Culture, Civil Society and Cultural Projects in Mexico. There Gustavo Esteva’s perspective of “re-localizing the cultural initiative” (quoted by Rosales 1994: 10) and Eduardo Nivón’s worries about the local cultural policies were calling upon the impact of cultural projects in the civil society sphere (ibid.: 11).

This on-going discussion was refreshed in the first edition and presentation of CACAO, an art project leaded by José Miguel Casanova. It consisted of an exhibition and market of artistic, editorial, food and design products that took place in the Museo Universitario del Chopo, which is part of the UNAM administration. Seeking to facilitate and foster alternative forms of exchange the cooperative created a time bank and the local currency CACAO.

The tianguis (a local pre-Hispanic word for market) was composed by 80 participants selected for their conceptual, formal and technical level of production and for being part of a distribution and consumption plan within specific public (Picture 7). The selection process was differentiated in: 10 artists working in the topic of arte and economy; 12 recognized cultural producers chosen after an qualitative research and recommendations; 16 producers selected through an open call and granted to develop a project and 48 micro-exhibitors invited with their high qualitative products (Gonzalez 2015: 12).
During the *tianguis* and show that took place for more than a month, there were conversations between the participants and organizers to evaluate and think on the next steps. Also a forum with scholars, artist and cultural agents that took place within the collective platform, brought into the reflection words and concepts that are core to understand the global sustainable crisis and the possible alternatives to undermine it: horizontal social relationships, new economic synergies (González 2015); creative agents and entrepreneurs; artists self-exploitation (Nivón); cultural, creative and digital economies; innovative capacity (Cruz Vázquez); digital dimension, reconstruction of cultural policies (Piedras); sustainable and solidary economy; digital and complementary currency; global multi-polarity (Ilich) urban branding, plurality of non-hegemonic positions (Paredes Cacho).

The experience of CACAO is an open project that displays the different layers and stages of the construction of a solidarity network. The first level starts, according to Gomez and Ritchie (2016) in the 24/7 citizens that the artists, designers, editors and cultural agents participating in CACAO represent. The second one is the organization, lead by González Casanova in cooperation with institutions as the UNAM, the federal and local government’s cultural sector that granted and supported the initiative, the press and social media used to communicate and promote the event, just to name the most important ones.
Unpacking the components of these institutions and analyzing the relationships within them and between them and the cultural agents is indeed a fundamental task to find the “beliefs, values, habits and rules (or social norms) as basic ingredients of those institutions” (Gomez and Ritchie 2016). These authors emphasize the loop between social structures, alternative institutions and individual and collective agency, which reinforces and conducts changes through an experimental process:

*Experimentation represents a creative achievement on the part of the actors that demands imagination and judgment, taking a reflexive distance from rule-following. Outcomes are evaluated and tested until an acceptable solution is reached.*

(Gomez and Ritchie 2016: 31)

Within the spirit of testing and seeking to establish more connections and repeating the experience of the *tianguis*, CACAO had a second edition in 2015 in Oaxaca, another Mexican state recognized for its cultural diversity, history of social struggles, resistance and civic driven-change. In that new phase of the project the intention was to expand and incorporate other agents and similar grass-roots experiences to its network. Here, a new and pending research topic, inspired by Gomez and Ritchie’s reflections, is to look at the motivations and political interest behind these endeavours to understand why and in what way they are challenging the status quo (ibid.: 37).

**Concluding notes**

The permanent “under construction” process of imagining, creating and experimenting changes within society’s institutions is, as this essay attempts to show, a constant and evolving impulse that artists and cultural agents have been pushing clearly after the second World War, or to use the art history timeline, after the avant-garde movements, which were already proposing models for a “new society”. This process has not been exempted from internal “art world” debates about whether artists should stay in their ivory tower or get out and connect their creative practices to the local and global social problems.
I believe that both can and have always coexisted, only that different periods, trends and places have given more importance, i.e. promotion, communication, support to ones over others. What is true is that the network that is being constructed by creative and civic-driven proposals is rooted in a long series of experiments that continue to challenge the hegemonic power and institutions.

To conclude it would be feasible to say that the Fluxus group and artistic projects like the ones developed by Beuys and González Casanova help to show how certain art movements share the same qualities and goals of social movements. Moreover, it is important to highlight how these cultural-driven innovations are carrying an increasing, potential and creative energy that is already building alternatives and bringing solutions to this unequal and ‘messy’ world.

References


Retrenchment via regionalization? MERCOSUR and welfare governance in Latin America

Jack Mullan

Introduction
Academic literature continues to grow in volume covering debates over globalization processes and the role of the state. As economic integration deepens across borders and modes of governance expand to the supranational level, to what extent does the nation-state remain relevant? While such a question is a crude oversimplification, the following research seeks to build on this discussion and go beyond the state-globalization dichotomy by examining regional integration in Latin America and its effects on social welfare regimes. Exploring the development and impact of MERCOSUR, which was born as a trading bloc but has evolved to incorporate social and political layers, this paper aims to understand how regionalization has affected social welfare policies at the national level while introducing elements of those policies at the regional level. Through a quantitative and qualitative analysis this paper finds that although trade integration negatively intertwined the MERCOSUR member states during the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the institutional legacies and nested groups within national welfare regimes were able to resist market-centred reforms and have begun to design policies and mechanisms in support of social welfare through regional governance.
Regional integration and welfare in Latin America: MERCOSUR amidst the ‘waves’

Much of the existing literature looking at the relationship between regionalization and welfare programmes has centred on the European Union, with some scholars concluding that a retreat in public social service provision can be attributed to the institutionalization of regional trade agreements and increased labour market flexibility (Beckfield 2009; van Vliet 2011). Researchers focusing on Latin American welfare states have considered the broader impact of globalization on welfare spending (Mayoral and Nabernegg 2014; Segura-Ubiergo 2007) but have yet to narrow the scope of this analysis to the regional sphere. Aside from filling this gap in the literature, a study of regionalization and welfare states in Latin America offers a worthy endeavour for two main reasons: welfare state development in the MERCOSUR member states has not followed the (mostly) linear path of retrenchment common to EU member states over the last two decades; and MERCOSUR has only recently begun to actively address and respond to demands for substantial social policies, as tensions between a market-centred integration scheme and national welfare models accentuated because of economic crises in the late 20th century.

In the Latin American context, it can be difficult to delineate the scope of regionalization given that there are so many layers and dimensions to regional governance and integration. There have been multiple ‘waves’ of integration in Latin America during which different supranational interests have converged and competed (Malamud 2010), and this has resulted in a complex web of more than a dozen cross-national networks. These include: Organization of American States (OAS), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), Association of Caribbean States (ACS), Caribbean Community (Caricom), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Andean Community (CAN), Latin American Parliament (LAP), Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), Latin American Economic System (LAES), Rio Group (RG), Central American Integration System (SICA), Pacific Alliance (PA) and Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA).
For the purposes of this research, which seeks to investigate the interaction between regionalization processes and welfare regimes, MERCOSUR offers a solid analytical anchor for a number of reasons. Established in 1991 through the Treaty of Asunción, MERCOSUR (Mercado Común del Sur; or MERCOSUL in Portuguese) formed a common trade area and customs union between a group of (initially four, now five) member states and has been considered “the key milestone in the process of Latin American integration” (Draibe and Riesco 2009: 87). Immediately following its activation, the bloc was responsible for tripling intra-regional trade flows and also boosting trade flows outside of the region (Malamud 2010: 642). With the accession of Venezuela in 2012, the coalition as a whole accounts for more than $3.3 billion, 82 percent of the entire GDP of South America, and encompasses 70 percent of the entire continent’s population (Lantos 2012).

In addition to its commercial prowess, MERCOSUR has begun to advance regional harmonization and collaboration on a number of policy fronts: legislative agreements in education have allowed for the mutual recognition of university degrees across borders, and tripartite commissions and taskforces have been organized to promote greater convergence on labour laws. Lately, a social and political agenda has begun to emerge, first with the formation of the MERCOSUR Parliament in 2007, and more recently with the explicit elaboration of ‘social clauses’ and the creation of a special commission on women’s rights (Draibe and Riesco 2009: 90). Yet historically speaking, the stated objectives of MERCOSUR have remained deeply deferential to market principles and a growth agenda, and its ability to address social schisms in the region has been questioned. As Alcides Costa Vaz (2002: 98) wrote at the turn of the century,

MERCOSUR has not had a meaningful impact on some of the most critical threats to democracy in the region: economic and social inequalities, exclusion, and the host of problems that have arisen from them. These include social and institutional disruptions, organized crime, drug trafficking, and urban violence, among others. The bloc’s performance in this regard is still extremely modest.
Therefore, due to its substantial economic and geopolitical presence in the region and its relevance and perceived culpability in failing to address the persistence of social problems across its member states, MERCOSUR offers a valid nexus for this study.

These factors make it worthwhile to explore the potential impact of MERCOSUR on social welfare regimes, and to evaluate how welfare policies and social programmes have navigated the pressures of regionalization. The aims of this paper are essentially twofold: I want to measure the impact of MERCOSUR, as an instrument of economic integration, on nationally-based social spending and reforms to welfare over the last 20 years; and to analyse how MERCOSUR has interacted with and been shaped by social welfare regimes in the development of an explicit social agenda. Thus, the questions that this research will address are:

1. How has trade regionalization through MERCOSUR affected the trajectory of social spending and welfare state policies in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay?
2. How has MERCOSUR evolved beyond its free market basis to incorporate a social and political lens, and how have these components interacted with and shaped social welfare regimes in the region?

To address these questions I will turn to some quantitative studies which gauge the impact of free trade on social spending in Latin America, as they offer a helpful overview of the direction of welfare regimes across the region over the last few decades. In order to gather a more nuanced and precise picture of this development, however, I believe that it is necessary to look beyond the statistical profile. For that reason I will complement these figures with a case study, examining the role that the Argentine debt crisis in 2001 played in binding together policy decisions across MERCOSUR member states.

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This moment revealed some significant strains and contradictions embedded in the MERCOSUR structure, and acted as a kind of ‘critical juncture’ at which member states recognized the need to articulate and sustain a more substantial social and political agenda through regional governance.

**Thinking about regionalization and welfare**

**Conceptualizing ‘regionalization’ and ‘welfare’**

Prior to beginning an analysis of MERCOSUR and its relationship with social welfare, it is important to outline and define some of the terms related to this enquiry. As units of analysis, both ‘regionalization’ and ‘welfare’ can take on variable forms and definitions across academic disciplines. By regionalization this paper refers to a process which promotes the binding of national polities and/or economies through the arrangement of structures and institutions which supersede the nation-state. At times regionalization can be difficult to distinguish from globalization, and is often superficially conflated with market liberalization and free trade. In the case of Latin America, regionalization has indeed coincided with globalizing forces and transcontinental trade agreements—however, the depth of regional integration remains much stronger, and to equate the development of regional relations with a corporate-driven push for free markets is a facile interpretation. Pía Riggirozzi points out how, in Latin America, regionalization “has manifested since the early 2000s as resistance to socially irresponsible [sic] market economies and neoliberal democracy”, arguing that

> What is particularly significant is that the logic of resistance has been articulated by rhetorical appeal and practices of new state leaders and civil society actors in response to a perception of vulnerability and exclusion. New practices and inter-linkages between these actors are at the same time redefining what the ‘from below’ or ‘bottom up’ processes of regionalization means. This notion of regionalization is supportive of a new manifestation of regionalism, where regionalism becomes the area for contesting governance at different levels of authority.

(2012: 12)
Further, as will be demonstrated in the following section of the paper, Latin American integration has not produced the kind of retrenchment in social spending and welfare support as is more the case with the European Union. The trajectory in this domain of policy has been more uneven and even asymmetrical among the MERCOSUR states.

This brings me to a second term that requires specificity. The ‘welfare state’ is defined by Alex Segura-Ubiergo as "a repertoire of state-led policies aimed at securing a minimum of welfare to its citizens—that is, protecting them against the risks of unemployment, sickness, maternity, and old age—and providing an adequate accumulation of human capital through public investment in health and education" (2007: 1). For this paper I will abide by this definition and will use state spending on health and education as proxies to measure statistical changes in welfare. However, the term ‘welfare regime’ is preferable to ‘welfare state’ as it captures the fact that welfare programmes and policies are governed and carried out not exclusively by the state, but also by a mix of private and government-sponsored entities\(^3\). Furthermore, welfare regimes often ingrain a redistributive ethos and notions of social solidarity which can be traced and accounted for in policies that go beyond risk-protection and skill accumulation. Consequently, I will be looking at deeper programmatic changes to welfare systems.

**Theoretical perspectives on regionalization and welfare**

The linkages between regionalization and welfare regimes, as the central relationship under focus in this paper, have also been framed in different ways, depending on one’s theoretical perspective. Colin Hay (2014), for example, has posited that any evidence of welfare retrenchment as a direct result of globalization processes is weak, and that globalization operates more as a discursive technique for decision-makers to shape policy at the national level. Other scholars have looked at regionalization through a historical materialist lens, as van Apeldoorn et al. (2003) have analysed European integration.

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\(^3\) For example: some welfare policies, like the Programa Alimentario Nacional (PAN) in Argentina or Participatory Budgeting, which started in Porto Alegre, can end up outsourcing the provision of public goods through community-led implementation.
Their thesis centres the role of transnational capital in fomenting a hegemonic bloc to promote European identity and unity in order to coordinate their financial interests across borders. This account shares some convictions with other ‘class-centred’ approaches, outlined by Beckfield (2009: 16) as form of power resources theory which situates the welfare state in capital-labour relations, and sees regionalization as a process which undermines labour protections and heightens the instability of market forces.

Beckfield also identifies a ‘polity-centred’ approach, a framework to which this paper will most closely adhere. This approach highlights the power of policy diffusion across a region and stresses how common rule regimes are mediated by prior institutional configurations which may buffer the infiltration of external policies. In the Latin American context, while transnational capital has existed as a key driver of economic integration, the political and cultural loyalties at the level of the nation-state—which are embedded in welfare regimes—have steered the development of regionalization. As I will seek to illustrate, the market integration imposed through MERCOSUR did have important repercussions for member states, particularly in interlinking and spreading crises, but the institutional mediation and policy responses coming out of these crises were deeply influenced by vested interests at the national level. These interests have also reshaped the dynamics of regional governance and are beginning to re-constitute welfare regimes at the supranational level.

**Quantitative findings: The pressures of market liberalization**

As mentioned earlier, there is a limited sample of academic literature which has investigated the relationship between welfare regimes and globalization processes (mostly free trade) in Latin America. Alex Segura-Ubiergo (2007) presents a strong quantitative study on the effects of ‘trade openness’ on spending for social programmes in Latin American countries. He generally finds that “trade openness has a strong and consistently negative effect on social security expenditures and a positive (although not statistically significant effect) on health and education spending”, producing the chart below (2007: 156-157):
Segura-Ubiergo dissects Latin American welfare regimes into two groups: those that are relatively more developed (welfare group) and those that are less developed (non-welfare group). His analysis illustrates how an increase in trade openness affected a sharper decrease in social security expenditure in more developed welfare regimes, while in those less developed welfare regimes saw less intense drops in expenditure (ibid.: 159).
This comparison could support the polity-centred theorization, in that it points out how the degree of institutional development to welfare regimes deeply conditions the effects of globalization on nationally-based welfare spending.

Mayoral and Nabernegg (2014: 15) reach the same conclusion in a similar paper, stating that “globalization increasingly imposes pressure on governments to favour market interests over social issues”. However, there are limits to how much value these studies can import to answering the research question at hand. These authors examine the more general phenomenon of globalization and conduct their analysis over a time frame which precedes the creation of MERCOSUR. They also look more generally at the Latin American region, while this paper is contained to just the four founding member states of MERCOSUR.

For a more appropriate, although still imprecise, overview of the development in welfare regimes during the MERCOSUR era, I have narrowed down this statistical survey. I compiled data from the World Bank and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to trace aggregate social spending measures and public expenditure on health and education over the last two decades, containing these measures to the four founding member states. Here are the results from this collection:

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4 Data on education expenditure is missing for various years in these states, hence the truncated lines.
Figure 3: Government Expenditures on Education as a Percentage of GDP

Source: World Bank Data

Figure 4: Government as a Proportion of Overall Health Expenditure

Source: World Bank Data
These figures paint a picture, which is both informative and misleading at the same time. It is important to note that, contrary to some theoretical expectations which stipulate that trade liberalization automatically leads to sharp welfare retrenchment, social spending has remained relatively stable in the MERCOSUR countries. In some cases, even, as in Uruguay, spending has reached historic highs. With the exception of Paraguay, public social spending (as a percentage of GDP) in the MERCOSUR member states exceeds the average rate for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. At the same time, aggregate data on social spending has the tendency to obscure, rather than illuminate, some of the deeper programmatic changes operating beneath the surface of government expenditure figures.

For this reason, I want to complement these quantitative findings with a more holistic investigation of the qualitative developments in welfare policies among MERCOSUR member states.
Especially focusing on the period around the Argentine debt crisis in 2001, when Argentina’s solvency issues submerged the economies of its neighbouring states (partially as a result of their increased market integration) and forced a number of social and economic policy reforms. By zooming in on these particular policy shifts, some of the critical features of welfare governance in the MERCOSUR era can be uncovered. Furthermore, in light of some of the political tensions and diplomatic conflicts that arose out of this economic bind, it is worth inspecting the institutional responses generated through MERCOSUR, like inaugurating the parliament and articulating common social objectives, and analysing these as potentially new avenues for building cross-national welfare policies in the region.

Qualitative case study: The Argentine debt crisis and its aftermath

‘Crisis contagion’ and the primacy of financial capital

Within the first decade of MERCOSUR’s existence, its stability and sustainability would face a stern test when Argentina’s economy collapsed under the weight of billions of dollars of debt. While Argentina experienced nominally high growth rates towards the end of the 1990s, a series of exogenous shocks (Russia defaulting on its debt in 1998 and Brazil’s currency devaluation five months later) diminished the availability of foreign capital needed to finance Argentina’s growing budget deficit (The Economist 2005). A lack of investor confidence, coupled with ineffectual bailout packages from the IMF, quickly escalated the situation into a legitimate crisis when, in 2001, the Argentine government defaulted on $100 billion in debt to its creditors and was forced to disband its ‘convertibility’ system pegging its currency to the US dollar at a 1:1 rate (Blustein 2004). By January 2002 this rate had dipped to .26 and the Argentine economy suffered immensely through skyrocketing unemployment and shrinking output.

The effects of this crisis go beyond Argentina’s borders. Because of the increased integration of neighbouring economies through MERCOSUR, economic shocks cannot usually be contained to just one member state. In fact, the devaluation in Brazil that preceded the Argentine debt crisis played a demonstrable effect in exacerbating economic decline. As Julia Gray makes clear:
Because both of these crises were currency crises, Mercosur members would experience contagion effects purely as a function of their increased trade ties. A devalued currency would mean that imports would become relatively more expensive in the wake of a financial crisis; thus, exporters to Brazil or Argentina would suddenly see a reduction in demand for their goods and would be stuck without hard currency coming into their economy. That is, investor reaction to these crises would reflect a changed assessment of Mercosur members’ ability to honor their own debt obligations.

(2013: 176)

Gray tests for the cumulative abnormal returns or losses that affected investors in the wake of the Argentine crisis (as well as the shocks that reverberated in other member states) and finds that “it was the other members of Mercosur that felt the pain most acutely”; more so than for non-members of MERCOSUR (Ibid.: 177). The table below is borrowed from her study, and illustrates the sharp and stratified effects of the Argentine crisis across the MERCOSUR bloc:

Table 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Debt Crises in MERCOSUR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Brazil Crisis</th>
<th>Arg. Crisis</th>
<th>Paraguay Crisis</th>
<th>Uruguay Crisis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>154.89*</td>
<td>927.38*</td>
<td>12.21*</td>
<td>9.83*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>(2.41)</td>
<td>(2.86)</td>
<td>(2.22)</td>
<td>(2.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>189.92*</td>
<td>59.93*</td>
<td>48.20</td>
<td>67.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.84)</td>
<td>(4.23)</td>
<td>(1.48)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>38.62*</td>
<td>31.44*</td>
<td>114.28*</td>
<td>23.78*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(13.31)</td>
<td>(13.78)</td>
<td>(4.93)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Mercosur</td>
<td>69.42*</td>
<td>96.64*</td>
<td>97.37*</td>
<td>132.26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countries</td>
<td>(2.01)</td>
<td>(14.98)</td>
<td>(19.23)</td>
<td>(43.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in means</td>
<td>35.52*</td>
<td>39.29*</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>4.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>(4.42)</td>
<td>(2.12)</td>
<td>(1.78)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative abnormal returns for Mercosur members (in rows) surrounding defaults or renegotiations (in columns). Test statistic (in parentheses) must be greater than the absolute value of t = .96 to indicate statistical significance; those that make the cutoff are indicated with an asterisk.

Source: Julia Gray (2-13: 177) (highlights added)

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5 Gray’s metric ‘cumulative abnormal returns’ calculates the losses that investors endured from the respective crises. Compared to Segura-Ubiergo’s work on ‘trade openness’ these measures focus more on currency and market downfalls and illuminate the risks of financial interdependence within the MERCOSUR bloc.
The intricate web of commerce and trade fostered through MERCOSUR has therefore had ramifications for its member states, including constraining their financial sovereignty and inducing ‘crisis contagion’; in effect financial instability became endogenous to the structure of MERCOSUR’s economies. In response to this volatility international policymakers immediately mobilised to protect the interests of investors and restore market confidence. Cortes and Kessler (2006: 6) point to a catalogue of market-oriented reforms that were initiated externally by the IMF and imposed internally by the Argentine government, including fiscal adjustments to limit public sector wages, privatising state-owned firms, weakening trade unions’ bargaining power, and freezing bank accounts in 2001. Of course, this top-down approach was not greeted kindly by workers and citizens in Argentina, who launched sustained protests and pushed for alternatives. The introduction of the *Jefes y Jefas de Hogar* programme in 2002—which transfers cash to families on the condition of complying with education and work requirements—appears to represent a nominal victory for those pushing for more progressive social reforms at the time. However, as Cortes and Kessler astutely note, the programme lacked the spirit of universalism that was embedded in prior welfare policies, setting out to define “the ‘deserving’ poor rather than awarding rights” (Ibid.: 7).

In other words, the policy paradigm in the domain of social welfare had shifted in nuanced ways following this cascade of financial crises. Financial security was prioritised, while labour protections and citizenship rights were often subordinated in favour of assuring capital markets. This was echoed in Uruguay, which endured significant collateral damage from the Argentine crisis. Uruguay was quickly engulfed in the aftershocks, so in order to assuage the concerns of investors, its government passed a number of financial regulatory reforms and sought to restructure the national debt (Gray 2013: 178). At the same time it is worth mentioning, as Jennifer Pribble (2013: 19) argues, that the historically strong coordinating mechanisms and trade union organisation in Uruguay meant that even in the midst of a devastating crisis, “the country was able negotiate spending protections for all social sectors with the IADB and the WB, allowing the state to maintain social expenditure at pre-crisis levels”.

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Therefore, while there were clear structural pressures to cut social spending as the interests of financial capital dominated the policy agenda, the institutional configuration and ingrained relationships of national welfare regimes still played a significant role in the outcome of policy reforms. These market-oriented pressures were external in nature, i.e. stemming from the supranational linkages through MERCOSUR. Yet they had to confront political interests which are internally cultivated and more prone to defending social welfare.

**Forging regional welfare: An institutional reformulation**

The tensions between the de-politicised market forces operating through MERCOSUR and the deeply politicised arenas of social action at the national level required some reconciliation. After the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s, member state leaders aimed to redefine the scope of MERCOSUR by injecting a political platform. Olivier Dabène (2012: 54) writes:

> In the years 2002–2004, MERCOSUR embarked upon an institutional reform, with the creation of a parliament and a judicial body, among others. MERCOSUR also enforced its first redistributive policy, with the creation of a structural convergence fund aimed at lowering the development differential between member countries and regions.

Through the Fund of Structural Convergence of MERCOSUR (FOCEM), Brazil and Argentina, as the larger economies in the bloc, allocated a (minimal) amount of money to Uruguay and Paraguay, serving as a mechanism for regional redistribution (Caballero 2012). This initiative has fostered cross-national solidarity, and over the last decade FOCEM has financed a variety of ‘pilot programmes’ designed to improve social housing, infrastructure and food safety (Dabène 2009: 191).
Other policies have been crafted with the intention of fostering a regional identity and establishing cross-border civil rights for migrants: Article 9 of the 2002 Residency Agreement delineates a number of key protections for member state citizens and their families living in any member state, including full equality with nationals regarding labour legislation, wages, and working conditions (Margheritis 2013: 547). More recently, the 2010 MERCOSUR Summit explicitly calls for “deepening the civic and social dimension of the bloc and consolidating citizens’ rights” (Ibid.).

The fundamental orientation of MERCOSUR remains centred on economic growth, as it has from its inception. Yet the push to incorporate a social agenda and develop a regional protocol for welfare standards has even begun to re-orient this core mission. Over the last decade we can observe a notable shift in the rhetorical objectives as outlined in MERCOSUR’s statement of purpose. In 2008, its ambition was to “promote economic growth, the expansion of internal and regional markets, and implement active policies to stimulate job growth, to elevate standards of living and rectify social and regional asymmetries” (Draibe and Riesco 2009: 90). By 2015, we can observe how the language of sustainability and social welfare has taken root: Member states affirm a commitment to “quality work, healthy working conditions and the welfare of workers” and “promoting sustainable development in the region; stimulating the creation and development of sustainable businesses” (Article 3, Declaración Sociolaboral del MERCOSUR, 2015). The Declaration also includes articles on rights to collectively bargain and strike, unemployment protections, health and pension benefits, and cross-border access to social security schemes.

The politics of regional governance in Latin America: A Double Movement

These changes reflect the legacy of the ‘pink tide’ in Latin America; among MERCOSUR member states, most governments in the mid-2000s to early-2010s were controlled by left parties. The post-crisis phase of MERCOSUR’s development contradicts theories which emphasize the inevitability of free market ‘neoliberal’ logics in regionalization processes.
The conclusions drawn from this paper broadly support a polity-centred approach to understanding regionalization in the Latin American context; more specifically, they point to the significance of labour activism and nested social partnerships as key factors which curtail the incursion of neoliberal regionalism. In other words, Latin American regionalization can be understood as a two way street, or a ‘double movement’ (Polanyi 1944) between the cross-border financial interests pushing market liberalization and the nationally-bound welfare regimes and their constituents which mediate and push back against these forces.

While we do witness the temporary degeneration of labour protections and welfare programmes in the depths of the Argentine crisis, this trend did not spread unabated throughout the region. Instead, ingrained state-labour relationships that were fostered through welfare arrangements resisted spending cuts and emerged to construct a more socially and politically-focused MERCOSUR in the 21st century. Although there are still market-led compulsions guiding the interests of regional governance, the articulation and expansion of welfare regimes beyond the nation-state has led to substantial citizenship rights being embedded in regional legislation. With many MERCOSUR member states undergoing potentially path-shifting political upheavals in the present moment, it remains to be seen how the nascent social agenda will mature, but it is clear that it has arrived and represents a new face of regional governance in Latin America.

References


Introduction

The question of access to justice for male victims of sexual violence in conflict situations has for long not featured in policy and academic discourses (Grey and Shepherd 2012: 115, Sivakumaran 2007: 255). This is in spite of evidence of sexual violence against men in armed conflict (Sivakumaran 2007: 253). The limited attention given to men as victims of sexual violence is attributed to the intersectionality of privilege, where societal norms view men as the privileged, superior and stronger, while women are seen as vulnerable and desirous of protection, a situation that consequently contributes to stigma, limited attention and under reporting of cases of male victims of sexual violence in conflict (Cos- ton 2012: 97). In addition, the extension of sex essentialism to the development and policy arena, including in formulation of legal standards, has implication on male victims of sexual violence in conflict (Scott 1986: 1060). This is in as far as it influences the framing of sexual violence offences in both international and municipal laws, in addition to determining individual victims and communal responses (Correa 2008: 24). As noted by Grey and Shepherd, "...the dominant representation of sexual violence in war in relevant scholarly literature tends to envision the victim of such violence as female in form..." (2012: 129).

Consequently, male victims are viewed as an ‘exception to the norm’, and their victimization not understood in terms of the power relational dynamics normally associated with violence against women (Grey and Shepherd 2012: 120). These have implications on access to justice (Apperley 2015: 96).

Moreover, recent evidence indicates that men are equally victims of sexual vi-
olence (Baker 2011: 245). One study conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for example, revealed that 39.7 percent of women and 23.6 percent of men reportedly experienced sexual violence during the conflict in Congo. Yet, this is not as widely reported or discussed compared to female victims (Zarkov 2011: 105). The situation in Uganda, which is the subject of this essay, is not any different. The more than 20 year conflict in the northern part of the country has produced many victims of sexual gender based violence, both male and female. For the male victims, their situation has been compounded by their dual identities; as victims on one hand, and as perpetrators of sexual gender based violence during the conflict (Baker 2011).

Using the case of the post-conflict situation in Northern Uganda, this essay seeks to illustrate how the dominant representations of masculinities and gender stereotypes influences access to justice for male victims of sexual violence. I begin with a contextual background of the post-conflict situation in Northern Uganda, followed by a conceptualization of sexual violence during conflict. I will then consider the framing of sexual offences in international and national legal frameworks. This will be followed by an analysis of the impact of such framing on male victims’ access to justice. My central thesis is that the social construction of masculinity influences the enactment of laws that hinder male victims of sexual gender violence from accessing justice. I argue that the way laws are framed, and how legal institutions operate, is to a large extent informed by the social constructions of gender.

**Background to the Northern Uganda conflict**

A lot has been written about the Northern Uganda conflict. In around 1987, civil war broke out in the northern part of Uganda, pitting a rebel group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), against the government of Uganda (Sengupta and Calo 2016: 287). This movement, which claimed to follow the biblical Ten Commandments, originally set their agenda as the liberation of the Northern Uganda people from the new National Resistant Government that had just taken over leadership of Uganda (Apuuli 2006: 180).

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1 They are considered victims in the sense that most of them were abducted and conscripted into the rebel ranks against their will.
However, it was not long before the rebel movement turned against the very people whom they purported to be liberating, unleashing upon them gross forms of atrocities (Moy 2006: 268).

The conflict was characterised by abductions, maiming and sexual slavery of the civilians by the rebels as well as government soldiers (Baker 2011: 246). Despite the recent peace in the region following the neutralisation of the rebel movement and their subsequent flight to the Democratic Republic of Congo, the effects of the sexual abuses on the population is still felt to date (Nannyonjo 2005: 477). These effects are both physical and psychological (Baker 2011: 247). Suffice to note that, although sexual violence was prevalent among Northern Uganda communities prior to the conflict, in most of the cases, men were viewed as the perpetrators while women were the majority victims (Sengupta and Calo 2016: 291). And, while intimate partner violence was considered a private matter by law enforcement agents, who often referred the parties back home for settlement, rape by strangers or those that occurred during the conflict were considered grave offences that needed to be punished. Yet, even with that recognition, the cases taken more seriously were those involving women as victims, since men’s cases were still seen as exceptions to the norm (Sengupta and Calo 2016: 292). As pointed earlier, the situation of male victims was further complicated by the fact that they are considered perpetrators as well as victims. This presented a barrier to their access to justice (Baker 2011: 246).

General challenges related to gender mainstreaming in post-conflict Northern Uganda are manifested both at the level of programme conception and also during its implementation (Omona and Aduo 2013: 131). However, for sexual crimes, the engendering of responses to sexual gender based violence, modelled along the social construction of gender and hegemonic masculinity (Coston 2012: 99), influenced the development of legislations and other development interventions targeting victims and perpetrators of such offences (Grey and Shepherd 2012: 116).
Conceptualising sexual gender based violence

According to the Special Rapporteur on Systematic Rape and Sexual Slavery during Armed Conflicts, sexual violence is "any violence, physical or psychological, carried out through sexual means or by targeting sexuality..." (Sivakamaran 2007: 261). Marsh and others make a distinction between sexual violence and gender based violence, a broader concept which although having the element of violence associated with one’s gender, does not necessarily have sexual intentions (Marsh et al. 2006: 133). They further identify rape as a common form of sexual violence during war (Marsh et al. 2006: 134). Acts of sexual violence during war situations have been explained in terms of the so called ‘pressure cooker theory’, where war time rape is seen as a result of heterosexual biological instincts of the male body that is naturally ‘seeking an outlet’ for their insatiable sexual urge; coupled with the feelings of freedom from societal scrutiny that is possible in a war situation, this gives people the feeling of not being bounded by the society’s rules and moral expectations (Baaz and Stern 2013: 17). Some observers have also argued that sexual violence in armed conflict is a reinforcement of hegemonic masculinity (Connell 2005: 832, Sengupta and Calo 2016: 292). Another alternative explanation, which goes beyond the biological essentialism, is that war time rape is a ‘war strategy’ (Baaz and Stern 2013: 19).

Moreover, it has been noted that sexual violence is not only a gender issue, but also has a power relational dimension (Baker 2011: 245). Whereas Sengupta and Calo attribute the increasing cases of violence against women by men in peace time to a ‘crisis of masculinity’, where men find it hard to adjust to their changing roles in society, which may not be compatible to what society ascribes to their gender (Sengupta and Calo 2016: 285), sexual violence in conflict is explained in terms of power dynamics and emasculation (Sivakaraman 2007: 261). It is further attributed to gender hierarchies that portray one gender as superior to another; thus sexual violence is seen as a way of exercising power and dominance over others (Sengupta and Calo 2016: 287). Grey and Shepherd, on other hand, link sexual violence in conflict to the concept of body politics, by posing the question as to “whose bodies are visible and whose bodies matter?” (Grey and Shepherd 2012: 122).
War time sexual violence is seen not only as a tool for punishing the victim, but also as an instrument for emasculating whole communities (Apperley 2015: 94).

Nevertheless, aside from the factors behind sexual violence in armed conflict, it is important to note that such acts pose not only a health and security concern, but are also fundamental social justice issues (Marsh et al 2006: 134).

**Sexual violence crimes in International law**

It has been argued that the framing of sexual gender based violence in legal and policy debates has implications on the nature and effectiveness of support to male victims (Grey and Shepherd 2012: 129). As pointed out by Sivakumaran:

> "Language generally, and legal language in particular reinforces certain views and understandings of events. Through its definitions and the ways it talks about events, law has the power to silence alternative meanings...to suppress stories..."

(Sivakumaran 2007:257)

This is true for violence against men in conflict, where the plight of male victims is exacerbated by silence and lack of gender sensitivity in the framing of most domestic and international human rights and criminal laws (Grey and Shepherd 2012: 121).

Accordingly, at the international level, the ideal place where one can seek protection for cases of sexual gender based violence in armed conflict is within the International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law (Lewis 2009: 18). However, International Human Rights Law offers limited protection since its wordings are biased towards women and girls as compared to men (ibid.: 18). Nevertheless, regarding the actual application of these legal norms, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is considered the most progressive in their trials, as far as issues of sexual gender based violence is concerned. This breakthrough is attributed to the work of feminist lobbyist during the formative stages of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Halley 2008: 2).
Such progress is manifested both in their legal framework and jurisprudence (Grey and Shepherd 2012: 127). Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute, for example, provides for a broader interpretation of the statute to cover a wide range of offences, including those relating to gender (Van Banning 2004: 224). This was greatly due to the influence of the women’s groups that advocated for the inclusion of sexual related offences in the statute (Grey 2014: 273).

However, despite this progress, the ICC statute does not offer an elaborate definition of what an act of sexual nature means and this is problematic when it comes to its actual implementation, since it leaves it open to interpretation (Sivakumaran 2007: 262). The above notwithstanding, the actual criminal trials at the ICC have led to the development of very useful case law, including the definition of sexual offences as:

“...rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancies, enforced sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity as crimes against humanity, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on civilian population”.

(Grey 2014:275)

The crime of sexual violence has also been defined to encompass "acts such as enforced nudity, often accompanied by threat or mockery; enforced masturbation and genital violence, which may include shocks or beatings" (Sivakumaran, as cited in Grey and Shepherd 2014: 275). A similar definition is that of "perpetration of an act of a sexual nature using force, the threat of force, or by taking advantage of a person’s incapacity to give genuine consent" (Baker 2011: 245). These definitions, largely developed during the actual criminal trials, can be taken as positive steps, when contrasted with earlier international criminal tribunals, like the Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals, that gave limited consideration to sexually related offences, let alone male victims (Grey 2014: 273). However, whereas the above definitions appear to be gender neutral, they still leaves gaps, especially when they fail to unpack what acts of sexual nature mean. This could affect male victims, who have traditionally not been considered as victims of sexual violence.
Domestic law and gender based sexual offences

Turning to the domestic setting, although there is some noted progress in recognizing male victims in international criminal trials, this has not trickled down to national courts in countries such as Uganda, where men as victims of sexual violence are still invisible (Grey and Shepherd 2012: 126). In Uganda, the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, the Penal Code Act, CAP 120, the International Criminal Court Act 2010\(^2\), and the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act, 2012 are some the legal instruments that define sexual offences. However, except for the International Criminal Court Act of 2010, which was enacted purposely to domesticate the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and is thus concerned with crimes committed during war time, the rest of the legal instruments are only applicable during normal peace time. These laws deal with the offences of rape, defilement, indecent assault, abduction and other sexual related offences.

The International Criminal Court Act (ICCA), an act of parliament intended to domesticate the International Criminal Court Statute, adopts all the definitions of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity that are provided for under the Rome statute (ICC Act 2010). Consequently, a special Division of the High Court charged with trying those suspected to have committed international crimes under the ICC statute was established. However, from its inception, only one person, Thomas Kwoyelo, a former rebel commander, has been tried before the court (Human Rights Watch 2011).\(^3\) Although the trial is still going on, none of the charges against him are related to sexual violence (JLOS 2009).\(^4\)

Furthermore, although the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda does not have any direct reference to sexual violence in conflict, it has a provision under Article 21 that offers general protection against discrimination on a number of grounds, including sex, and Articles 22 and 44, in respect to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment (GoU 1995).

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\(^2\) This law was enacted to domesticate the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court so as to try perpetrators of crimes during the northern Uganda Conflict within a special division of the High court in Uganda, instead of trying them in The Hague where the ICC sits.


In addition, section 123 of the Penal Code Act, Cap 120, in defining the ingredients of the offence of rape, provides that:

“Any person who has unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman, without her consent, or with consent, if the consent is obtained by force or by means of threats or intimidation of any kind or by fear of bodily harm, or by means of false representations as to the nature of the act, or in the case of a married woman, by impersonating her husband, commits the felony termed rape”.

(Penal Code Act, Cap 120)

For the offence of defilement, Section 129 (1) of the Penal Code provides that “any person who unlawfully has sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 18 years commits an offence and is liable to suffer death” (Penal Code Act, Cap 120).

While section 128 (1) on indecent assault states that “Any person who unlawfully and indecently assaults any woman or girl commits a felony and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years with or without corporal punishment” (Penal Code Act, CAP 120).

Regarding detention with sexual intent, Section 134 (1) of the Penal Code Act Cap 120, states that “any person who unlawfully detains another person for purpose of sexual intercourse commits an offence” (Penal Code Act, CAP 120). While for the offence of abductions, section 126 (1) of the Uganda’s Penal Code Act states:
any person whether male or female with intent to marry or be
made to or to have sexual intercourse with another person or to
cause that person to marry, be married or have sexual intercourse,
takes that other person away or detains him or her against his or
her will; or

Unlawfully takes another person under the age of eighteen years
out of the custody of any of the parents or of any other person
having lawful care or charge over that person, commits an offence
and is liable to imprisonment for seven years

(Penal Code Act, CAP 120).

The Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act, 2012 on the other hand, under
section 5(b), considers acts of sexual violence only as a form of torture and not
as crimes in their own right (Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act, 2012).

**Legal framing and access to justice for male victims of sexual violence in conflict**

From the examination of the legal provisions above, it is evident that the gender
blindness, manifested in the way sexual violence offences are framed, is not
only prevalent at the international level but also in domestic settings (Apperley
2015: 93). This is a function of societal perceptions regarding masculinity, which
has permeated through policy and legal drafting processes, to the extent that
it becomes an obstacle to male victims’ access to justice (Baker 2011: 245). Le-
gal drafting processes are biased with the dominant perception that men have
always been the perpetrators, while women are considered victims of sexual
violence. This binary lens prevents a critical appraisal of the situation of male
victims of armed conflict when it comes to getting redress for sexual related
violations (Apperley 2015: 92).

Another consequence of the legal framing of sexual violence cases, with impli-
cation on access to justice for male victims is the absence of appropriate words
within the local dialects and among legal and criminal justice administrators to
describe cases of sexual violence against men (Lewis 2009: 3).
In that case, the “frontline points of contact”, that is the doctors and humanitarian actors, who are the first people to meet the victims of sexual violence during armed conflicts, and are responsible for recording incidents may, for lack of better descriptions, categorise acts of sexual violence within other forms of torture (Lewis 2009: 9). In situations where the criminal justice system relies on referrals from medical and psychosocial support workers, the possibility of sexual violence cases against men reaching the legal system is thin, as most medical workers are not prepared to look for signs of sexual abuse in men (Sivakumaran 2007: 256). This is truer for the Ugandan situation where sexual violence is considered a form of torture under the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act, or as criminal assault within the Penal Code (Penal Code Act, Cap 120, Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act, 2012).

In addition, in rare situations where such cases are reported, proving male rape poses a big challenge during criminal trials due to heteronormativity, where society believes sexual acts are only between members of the opposite sex. As pointed out by Sivakumaran, how can one successfully prove that it was not consensual, failure of which one may be accused of practicing homosexuality, a criminal offence with very harsh penalties in countries like Uganda? (Sivakumaran 2007: 255). Related to this is difficulty in differentiating between sexual abuse and other forms of physical abuse such as torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment/punishment, offences that are also recognised under both domestic and international law (Sivakumaran 2007: 256). Consequently, an important question of who determines whether a case amounts to sexual violence is raised. This is because the cultural differences and meanings attached to the concept of sexuality vary. Contestation on who determines what is sexual and what is not, given the different interpretations according to specific cultures abound. Thus, what the victims may consider sexual violence may not be considered so by the prosecutors or even by the alleged perpetrators (Sivakumaran 2007: 257). Similarly, what is considered sexual in one culture may be different in another. These divergences also extend to defining what constitutes a sexual organ (Grey 2014: 276).
Regarding the actual prosecution of sexual violence offences against men in a conflict setting, challenges regarding investigation and proving such acts have been highlighted. For example, in a study conducted by Baker in Northern Uganda, police and judicial officers, who are responsible for investigation and sometimes the prosecution of some crimes, pointed out the challenge of getting the required evidence to prove sexual violence cases, given the time lapse between the occurrences of the violations and its reporting. Also cited was the difficulty in quantifying damages suffered by the victims (Baker 2011: 252). As Baker notes, “systems where lawyers seek to prove or disprove guilt would prevent the full truth from being told” (Baker 2011: 252). This is further reinforced by reluctance of men to report cases of sexual violence to the authorities (Apperley 2015: 96). Lack of reporting arises from the fact that visualization of a man as a victim does not conform to their masculinity.

Men are always expected to protect themselves from such forms of violence or when it occurs, society expects them to deal with its consequences in a ‘manly way’ (Sivakumaran 2007:255). For example, of the 4076 reports on sexual violence during conflicts compiled by several Non-Governmental Organisations, violence against men covered only 3 percent (Apperley 2015: 93). Men’s reluctance to talk about their experiences is attributed to gender stereotypes associated with masculinity (Baker 2011: 245). Consequently, most male victims are only willing to talk about the experiences of others and not their own (Sivakumaran 2007: 253). Specifically for Northern Uganda, the dilemma of being a victim on one hand, and a perpetrator on the other hand, gives most victims dual identities (Baker 2011: 250).

Furthermore, high levels of social stigma manifested both at family and societal levels constitute one of the biggest hindrances to access to justice for male victims of sexual violence. The stigma and humiliation associated with male victimhood, coupled with the long process of trials that involve sometimes rigorous questioning by lawyers, prevents most men from coming out (Apperley 2015: 95, Grey and Shepherd 2012: 121). In addition to fear of reprisal from members of the community, male victims are particularly conscious of their masculinity and what society expects of them (Baker 2011: 249).
This is coupled with negative perceptions and attitudes of caregivers and legal aid providers towards male victims (ibid.). Most caregivers still hold the view that men should “be tough, see themselves as leaders who can take charge of others” (Grey and Shepherd 2012: 119). They are expected to channel their natural urges into responsible social roles such as becoming family breadwinners or serving in the military (Kimmel 2006: 389).

Another dimension that needs to be taken into account while analysing access to justice for male victims of sexual violence in armed conflict is the perception of justice among survivors of such violence. A study by Baker revealed that most victims preferred restorative justice in the form of compensation as opposed to retributive justice (Baker 2011: 250). This is basically due to the fact that the victims and the perpetrators in most of the cases were from the same communities and they valued the need for reconciliation and healing as pertinent for the overall good of their communities (ibid.).

Conclusions

This paper has illustrated how sexual violence in conflict puts men in a situation where they are expected to “prove their manhood” (Zarkov 2011: 109). Faced with such a situation, the only recourse they have is to act up to the hegemonic masculinity imposed on them by society (De Neve 2004: 61). The form of gender stereotyping prevalent in societies has permeated the legal drafting processes, completely oblivious of the vulnerability of men to sexual gender-based violence. As a result, the absence of an adequate legal framework, including an all-inclusive definition of sexual violence offences to cover both genders, has proved detrimental to male survivors in post-conflict zones like Northern Uganda (Baker 2011: 251). This is in spite of some progress, manifested by the increasing recognition of rape as a weapon of war in media reports, as well as in some international criminal trials, where victims of sexual violence have been recognised, as opposed to being seen as a side effect or by product of war (Baaz and Stern 2013: 1).
Nevertheless, without adopting a more gender-sensitive approach to legislative drafting and implementation, bearing in mind that men too are vulnerable in situations of armed conflicts, justice will continue to elude male victims of sexual violence (Correa 2008: 31). Silberschmidt has also highlighted the danger of sticking to the old stereotypes regarding patriarchal dividend which assumes men are superior and have thus benefited from such power hierarchy, yet in reality, they could even be worse off than women (2001: 657). Thus, the acceptance of male vulnerability should be the starting point since it is clear that the idea of hegemonic masculinity can no longer hold. This ought to be followed by policy and legal reforms, beginning at the United Nations level (Apperley 2015: 97).

References


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Access to justice for male victims of sexual violence in conflict: experiences from Uganda


Ukraine’s Pension Reform: its weaknesses and contradictions

By Oleksandra Pravednyk

Introduction

Ukraine, like most countries today, has a mandatory and free pension scheme that is embedded in the insurance component of its social security system. Like average insurance, pensions preserve basic living standards to prevent poverty and inequality in the face of risks. Tolubjak identifies pension schemes as a “complex of institutions, relationships and mechanisms, with the help of which financial resources are formed and distributed amongst the population that cannot work” (2009: 2).

Ukraine’s system is now exposed to the market economy, in contrast to the past 40 years, and is at a crossroads. Concerns are growing about the falling financial security of the economically active population, with higher job loss risks, and the demographic shift to lower birth rates and longer life spans that result in an elderly population portion at almost 30% and unequal fiscal pressure on younger generations. As a result, Ukraine’s pension system has been pressured to change and become a better arbitrator for interests of diverse individuals and groups and a promoter of equality in distribution of resources (Tolubjak 2010).

Change occurred in the form of a structural reform, initiated from January 1, 2004, that established a new three-tier scheme (Rippa 2009). Within it, a pension is defined as “guaranteed regular monetary payment, determined on the basis of insurance record and paid contributions for the insurance of individuals of old age, in case of disability, loss of breadwinner on a level not lower than the one established by the government” (Tolubjak 2009: 5). All three levels cooperate in providing pensions through different means.
The first, solidary, level consists of universal minimum payments financed by compulsory contributions from all working citizens and employers that are instantaneously paid to current pensioners. Second and third levels are meant as additions to this minimum payment, and later on as replacements of it. They work as follows: accumulation takes place when a part of the universal security contribution, up to seven percent, is deposited in a single personal fund, from which investment is possible, and the voluntary third level functions through additional savings managed by non-governmental pension funds, insurance organizations, and banks (Zhmurko 2014, Ptashenko and Ptashenko 2012).

Its overreaching aims are guaranteeing financial security and adequate livelihoods of pensioners, establishing an accumulation system, ensuring financial stability of the system, promoting economic growth, encouraging savings for old age, and creating more effective administration (Tolubjak 2009). Considering these aims and the system’s role as an arbitrator, a critical analysis will be performed to elaborate on the reasons and processes that result in implementation imperfections. The next section will introduce policy actors, and following section will provide explanations of present weaknesses and contradictions. Finally, the conclusion will provide concise recommendations for implementation based on previous analysis.

**Critical analysis of policy**

This pension is a result of pension politics, as shown in Figure 1 below - a translation of the original illustration in Tolubjak’s academic article. Actors within this scheme include people, society, political parties, private and public enterprises, agencies and organizations, self-employed people, pension funds, civic associations and groups, social communities and institutions, and government. All actors participate in the scheme and are entangled in power relations that affect, and create, spheres of exclusion and inclusion that give rise to intersectional inequalities, and affect social reproduction at multiple levels (Tolubjak 2009).
Before this new scheme, pensions were delivered through a system of solidarity where the economically active population paid for retirees or unemployable people. Today, pensions can be delivered through three channels, two of which depend on accumulation and the third remains a solidarity system. Many people in Ukraine are not confident about the introduction of a second pillar, but believe that, if successful, the possibility to accumulate and increase their pension will be the central advantage (USAID 2010).

**Existing Weaknesses and Contradictions**

**Intergenerational Relations**

Most discernible is the relationship between generations: young employed people and pensioners of different ages. Pre-retirement employed people pay a single social security sum that insures they receive services when required. However, through the solidarity system these people pay for the pensions of others; a certain amount of their inputs is directed towards the budget of Ukraine’s national pension fund, which is then monthly distributed to pensioners (Ptashenko and Ptashenko 2012).
As a result, pre-retirement employed people have an extent of power over the elderly. Whether there is awareness concerning this situation is not as important as the fact that pensioners, at least at the solidarity level, depend on younger generations. This relationship is not simple like employed people denying to contribute money or demanding a full accumulation scheme. Ukraine’s younger generations are beginning to stay in school for longer periods, which results in late entrance to work markets, lower total contributions to pension funds and smaller pensions (Libanova 2010; Zhmurko 2014). Simultaneously, pension reform may urge young people to start working as soon as possible to accumulate higher sums.

However, even increased employment will not guarantee higher pension insurance contributions due to a growing shadow economy and persisting widespread support of the solidarity system. Employers are another actor in this multifaceted relationship, and they exert power over employees and pensioner in the form of wages. Technically, they are supposed to pay more than 30 percent of the single social security payment for each employee (Beztelesna and Yurchik 2013). Unfortunately, many academic articles have identified an issue stemming from the large percentage that employers have to contribute. Ukrainians call it “envelope” payments, which are wages that do not necessitate a contract and therefore employees are not officially employed (Zhmurko 2014). An article by Velyksar (2013) also discusses situations in which employers had to pay twice for their workers due to coverage by different legal acts. An example is pregnancy leave, which results in employers paying mandatory social security and a specific payment for the leave. Possibility of loss, sadly, leads to low employment of women in well-paying and formal economy jobs. As a result, employees cannot contribute as much to their social security, which financially affects them as future pensioners and current ones. At the same time, employers that do hire officially and pay these inputs simply hire less people thus promoting unemployment and lower contributions.
Results of this situation can be negative and positive: higher pensions for current and future pensioners through increase work, unemployment and worse social reproduction. The latter refers to “both biological reproduction of the species… ongoing reproduction of the commodity labour power… [and] institutions, processes and social relations associated with the creation and maintenance of communities” (Bakker and Silvey 2008). Basically, younger people choosing work over education may reduce human capital while financial pressure on employers leads to lower production; thus reproduction of labour power, and social order in general, is at risk. This issue is especially relevant due to Ukraine’s demographic situation of an increasing elderly population, with a projected ratio of pensioners to working population of 1:1 by 2025 (Zhmurko 2014). Sustaining social reproduction is crucial in the face of such circumstances, labour quantity dwindles quality must rise, and yet a growing elderly population of more than 13 million can demand more pension reforms and employment promotion as their power in the political arena grows (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2014: 23). In fact, increased support for pensioners is necessary to ensure generational reproduction. As a whole, this circumstance represents a policy dilemma as theoretical promotion of pensioner welfare clashes with disproportional populations and future wellbeing of current employees and their futures.

**Internal inequalities**

This point brings me to a similar situation amongst pensioners themselves. New generations of pensioners can receive higher pensions compared to previous ones, and within these two groups intersectional inequalities grant power to certain groups of people. Crucial factors are age, gender, place of residence, pension status, and work length. The latter create divisions between the elderly; for example certain pensioners do not receive payments from the accumulation level due to a pre-reform retirement, others receive very high pensions due to a special pension arising from their employment history, and rural women receive miniscule amounts. Numbers range from 1,252 to 15,303 Hrivna per month, and to satisfy budget constraints pensions of other people, who do not fall under special categories, are cut (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2014: 161).
Considering that the minimum necessary income for unemployable people is 1,399 and for employable is 1,450 Hrivna per month, these numbers demonstrate that there are obvious inequalities between pensioners, supplemented by new intersections like age and work length, that contribute to the risk of a social reproduction crisis (National Office of Statistics of Ukraine 2016, Pension Fund of Ukraine 2016). For instance, if pensioners suffer poverty they will have to look to their families for welfare support. This will create financial burdens, and lead to an outcome like poverty. The latter will create a barrier for reproduction of labour power, social relations and values. Such a simple example does not capture the complexity, but does capture the severity of this possibility. These inequities are also present in power, which privileged groups of pensioners, a majority of which are government employees, use to retain their special statuses and sphere of exclusion and inclusion in economy and society. However, change may begin to occur as an USAID survey found that 90 percent of respondents disapproved of special pensions awarded to high state officials and civil servants (2010: 12).

**Power relations**

Continuing on the subject of power, it is remarkable that though the goal of this reform was to increase pensioner’s power over their own retirements, they themselves cannot really do anything beyond contributing money to their funds. Pensioners can only claim their monthly sums after they reach pension ages including 30-35 years of work, and they are not able to decide whether their accumulations are invested (Beztelesna and Yurchik 2013). Thus, in addition to the relationships described above, both employed and retired people are in a power dynamic with the government. In fact, it is possible to assert that government is the strongest actor of pension politics as they set up the chessboard, while other actors enter as participants afterwards.

In a less metaphorical sense, the Ukrainian government plays a key role in establishing and legalizing inequalities; it creates policies that limit people’s agency to monetary contributions, it created approximately 20 different special categories of pensioners, and determines distribution of pensions.
Additionally, what has been taking place for a while now is coverage of the deficit of Ukraine’s National Pension Fund by the government, caused by a variety of reasons one of which includes political popularity (Libanova 2010). However, considering that constraints exist, the money that is necessary to cover this deficit comes at the expense of other governmental programs like health care, education, and so on. A majority of respondents from a survey conducted by USAID (2010) confirmed support for these actions, but it is unclear what expenditures they were referring to. The simple fact is that youth ends up in an unfavourable power position compared to current pensioners, as their ability for financial security during old age is threatened. This can result from a crisis of social reproduction, as decline can lead to consequences like worse health and education of youth and prevent reproduction of labour and social order at the systemic level. It may even weaken certain long-term societal relationships like care for relative during old age.

Nonetheless, it’s also important to observe the positive characteristics. For example, the fact that minimum pension has risen, that regional equality of pension size has increased, and that percentages of pensioners receiving less than 1000 Hrivna per month have decreased to 7.4 percent of total pensioner population (Statistics Service of Ukraine 2014: 50). It is also necessary to take into account that some special pensions are justified, for example the one for Chernobyl disaster victims.

Principal role of marketplace
An actor that is gaining more power through this scheme is the marketplace. This three-tier scheme is supposed to promote responsibility, poverty reduction, and self-sufficiency, financially stabilize Ukraine’s pension system, increase employment and investment, and promote economic growth. This short list of goals demonstrates one overlapping theme within the whole scheme: income or money. As mentioned, Ukraine’s pension system has only recently faced a market economy. Before independence Ukraine had a command economy, and therefore its pension system didn’t have to deal with competition and market aspects like unemployment.
At that point in time, the welfare system was based on the value of solidarity between generations and equalizing.

Today, Ukraine’s pension scheme has changed by gaining the accumulation levels and reducing the solidarity level. In other words, it is transitioning from solidarity and equalizing into accumulation and self-provisioning (Rippa 2009). This reflects a general trend in social order from state provisioning of welfare and commonality, to market provisioning and individualism, and has led to “encroachment on the capacity of the institutions of family and community to assure the economic security of members” (Kabeer and Cook 2000:2). The pension system, and its beneficiaries, is now much more dependent from the marketplace and individualized, even though it is supposed to be grounded in generational solidarity. Cases referred to earlier, such as ‘envelope’ payments, reflect this new power dynamic; marketplaces now play a decisive role in people’s future security and configurations of exclusion and inclusion. For example, if certain population groups are able to accumulate more money, they will also have more possibility to provide rewards. The latter is a part of Ukraine’s social order; people use money or gifts to receive passport faster or schedule the best doctors. Consequently, exclusion of people unable to do this will be reinforced.

Another example concerns the relationship between future pensioners and pension funds. The latter control investment of people’s accumulated money, but are at the mercy of the market. This situation contrasts with the goal of covering and preventing risks; livelihoods of future pensioners are exposed to risk to promote economic growth. This begs the question of the true goal behind this scheme, for example endorsing marketization. And yet, these actions are identified as promoting better future livelihoods by increasing accumulated funds and promoting economic growth (Ptashenko and Ptashenko 2012). This creates another complication in this scheme – a confrontation between reproduction of economy and society.
Commodification is an unexpected consequence, considering the fact that welfare policies like pension provision is meant to reduce it. Instead, pensions, you could almost say age, have been commodified into manufactured products that increase in value over time, can be sold and promote economic growth. For example, one aspect of the scheme is a precept that guarantees a certain increase in percentage of total accumulations on the second level if its beneficiary works over his or her pension age. A monograph by Libanova (2010) points out the possibility of market exploitation of older people, power abuse, to promote employment in unpopular and low paying fields. This leads one to think of whose power leads to this outcome and the role of incentives in it. These kinds of details stress the uncertain nature of this welfare policy.

Inclusion

A final important aspect arising from the implementation of this policy is a struggle between universalism and targeting. Through its three-tier organization this scheme was supposed to promote universalism, through mandatory payments, and embrace market economy simultaneously. Nevertheless, previous discussions revealed that inequalities have been upheld and sharpened. As mentioned, introduction of accumulation levels has led to an increased dependence of pensions on markets. Consequently, people that are unable to contribute as much and as often to funds will receive a lower pension. Such a possibility reveals the underlying targeting process. Ukrainian government, by promoting market involvement, created a possibility and then markets exploited it. This means that markets exert their power and implicitly identify the deserving and non-deserving people. Unlike governmental targeting, which is based on rules like having less than a minimal income, markets abide by an implicit rule of deserve through work and salary.

At first look this isn’t unjust, but two issues come up. First, this targeting principle is biased towards employable people and excludes groups like disabled people that may be deserving, but simply cannot work and must face inequality just because of that. The second issue relates to the instability of markets. Within the marketplace people can lose their jobs quickly and due to reasons out of their control, or salaries are simply too low. An example is private enterprises reducing costs by firing workers.
This may be temporary, but also long-term, depending on the circumstances. People who cannot find stable jobs or remain unemployed are deemed underserving according to the simple principle. Merely the possibility of this outcome should rouse questions concerning a bias in the market towards people with stable jobs and decent salaries. The result would create a serious conflict between social stability and openness, and a system of inclusion and exclusion based on years of work and salary, which are ultimately dependent on unpredictable market conditions that perpetuate inequalities.

**Conclusion**

All things considered, this scheme has a long road of adjustments ahead of it. Though the scheme has good intentions and theory, its practice is flawed in certain aspects. Crucial recommendations would include a review of power relations and inequalities produced or supported by the scheme and its connection to economic markets, so that it becomes more efficient in delivering equity between and within all generations.

**References**


Increasing Capacity and Autonomy in Brazilian State-Owned Enterprises: building consensus for a feasible reform of political appointments

By Fausto Ribeiro

Introduction

Federal administrations in Brazil face a continuous struggle to form and maintain political coalitions that ensure governability. The expression ‘coalitional presidentialism’ ('presidencialismo de coalizão') has come to symbolize this complex and strenuous institutional design, in which 35 political parties compete for scarce portions of the state apparatus. This bargaining process, played out in an often fragmented legislative, forces the executive to form coalitions involving parties that are not necessarily aligned in their ideologies and political platforms.

The conceptual framework of coalitional presidentialism has become a broad analytic umbrella for the research of institutions in Brazil. Power (2010) describes how the literature that followed the democratic transition of 1985 has first focused on the dysfunctionalities of the new political regime; then discovered ‘corrective’ institutions within the 1988 Constitution; and finally coalesced into the synthetic framework of coalitional presidentialism.

While the consequences brought about by the persistence of this political model are manifold, the focus of this paper will be on the nomination process of managers and board members of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
It is common knowledge in Brazil that such process is one of the conduits through which corruption is made possible. This widely held perception has been greatly reinforced by the several corruption scandals that have emerged in the past years, particularly the ‘Lava-Jato’ (‘Carwash’) Operation. The politicization of the bureaucratic machinery, understood as the “political dominance of individual parties within each agency” (Bersch et al. 2016: 1), is a central element of this process, since it detracts autonomy and capacity from federal state agencies and SOEs.

Reforms that seek to curtail the bargaining power that parties possess over the process of political appointments are likely to face resistance in Congress, since many of its members are covert beneficiaries of such power and of the corruption that it allows. Nevertheless, the political momentum provided by the Lava-Jato means that “the separate streams of problems, policies and politics” (Kingdon 1995) might be joining together, thus providing a policy window for a feasible reform to be pushed through.

The aim of this paper is to present a model for such reform. In order to do so, we will first conduct a synthetic overview of the concepts of autonomy and capacity as traits that shape the quality of governance. Then, we will discuss these two indicators, as well as their correlation with bureaucratic politicization, in the specific case of Brazilian SOEs. Later, we will engage in a stakeholder analysis that will assess the feasibility of reforms in the process of political appointments. Finally, we will present a proposal of reform.

**Capacity and Autonomy as Indicators of State Quality**

Fukuyama (2013) has convincingly argued that the current empirical techniques employed to measure state quality or capacity have significant shortcomings. Expert surveys present intrinsic inadequacies, since the concept of good governance has not yet been unequivocally established, causing different experts to often refer to different concepts when answering the same survey. The notion that impartiality should be the measure of the quality of government, presented by Rothstein and Teorell (2008), is received with caution by Fukuyama, due to its lack of empirical verification.
Finally, the author also recommends care in adopting rule of law measures to assess bureaucratic quality, given the ambivalent definitions that have been given to these, as well as the fact that "many rule of law measures measure what is measurable rather than the underlying quality of law" (Fukuyama 2013: 350).

Fukuyama then describes four methods to evaluate the quality of governance:

Procedural measures, centred on the classical notion of Weberian bureaucracies and their basic tenets: hierarchy of offices, impersonality, meritocracy, etc.;

Capacity measures, which comprises extractive capacity (that is to say, the ability to levy taxes) and the degree of education and professionalization of public officials;

Output measures, which show how well governments are faring in providing services such as schooling, healthcare or security; and

Bureaucratic autonomy, which is "the notion that bureaucrats themselves can shape goals and define tasks independently of the wishes of the principals" (Fukuyama 2013: 352).

The author then rejects output measures, mainly because outputs cannot be exclusively attributed to state action. Additionally, he presents bureaucratic autonomy as often incompatible with the classic conditions of a Weberian bureaucracy, particularly with the latter's requirement that bureaucrats are placed under a regime of strict discipline. Therefore, he argues that a twofold framework of autonomy and capacity is an apt tool for assessing the quality of governance.
Capacity, Autonomy and Bureaucratic Politicization in Brazil

The profile of career bureaucrats at SOEs in Brazil indicates that their capacity is frequently underutilized. It also means that a higher degree of autonomy would probably increase the quality of SOEs, in the format proposed by Fukuyama (2013):

Graph 1: Optimal levels of autonomy for different levels of capacity

Optimal Levels of Autonomy for Differing Levels of Capacity


Besides the high degree of qualification required of employees who are hired through public examinations, another indicator of the level of capacity at SOEs is the fact that their total number of employees has grown 14.2% between 2009 and 2013, while the number of SOEs has remained roughly the same, as seen in the figures below:
However, in an institutional framework such as the one in Brazil, it is arguable that capacity and autonomy alone are not sufficient measures of the quality of governance. Building upon Fukuyama’s framework, Bersch et al. (2016) find that in Brazil (and arguably in all multiparty democracies), a third dimension bears importance in assessing the performance of states: bureaucratic politicization through partisan dominance. According to them, “the dimension of partisan dominance suggests that the calculus of capacity formation may not be solely about political autonomy, but also about the degree to which parties are forced to share agency control” (ibid 2016: 15).
While to our knowledge no methodologically thorough studies have been conducted that show how Brazilian SOEs fare in the variables of autonomy, capacity and partisan dominance, there is no reason to expect that the correlation found by these authors while researching Brazilian government agencies is not applicable to SOEs as well.

**Graph 3: Capacity, autonomy, and partisan dominance**

**Capacity, Autonomy, and Partisan Dominance**

First Quartile is low dominance; fourth quartile is high dominance

*Source: Bersch et al. (2016: 9).*
Nevertheless, despite criticisms of excessive political interference in bureaucracies, the rationale that explains the need for political appointments remains valid. Indeed, as power switches hands in representative democracies, newly-elected office holders need to ensure that policy decisions taken at the cabinet level are actually implemented as they trickle down the hierarchical ladder and reach the permanent bureaucracy. In order to do so, it is necessary that the strategic apex of agencies is at least in part run by professionals who are aligned to the current administration. Peters and Pierre (2004: 7) point that “the usual complaint about the bureaucracy is that the decisions taken by ministers simply trickle into the sand.” This justification for the existence of political appointments is certainly pertinent in the case of Brazil.

Even so, such improvement of accountability among bureaucrats is coupled with less desirable side effects. Bersch et al. (2016: 2) argue that “the political considerations behind appointments may move civil servants away from the Weberian ideal of loyal, neutral servants of the state.” In the Brazilian case, this risk seems to be increased by a multiparty system that functions under the principles of coalitional presidentialism.

The authors provide evidence that the three variables – autonomy, capacity and partisan dominance – relate to corruption. Partisan dominance, in particular, is strongly associated with higher levels of corruption. These findings indicate that sharing political appointments with multiple parties within the same agency, as well as fostering SOEs that combine high capacity with high autonomy, should lead to less corruption and to optimized service delivery.

**Stakeholder Analysis**

**Senate**

Although there are several senators implicated in the recent corruption scandals, it seems that the Senate as a whole is motivated to enact changes in the nomination process in SOEs, or at least willing to yield to popular pressure to do so.
This is evidenced by the targeted changes that have already been proposed by Senator Tasso Jereissati, specifically related to quarantine periods for nominated directors and to the requirement that they are not formally involved in partisan activities. This bill has been swiftly approved by the Senate, but is facing resistance in the lower chamber. It seems that lobbying the Senate to push for an even more ambitious reform might produce a positive outcome. Some specific senators who are likely to favour the measures proposed in this paper are: Cristovam Buarque (PDT); Lindbergh Farias (PT); Tasso Jereissati (PSDB); and Randolfe Rodrigues (REDE). This list ensures multiparty support for the reform.

**Chamber of Deputies**

The lower house of the Brazilian Congress seems to be more recalcitrant in regards to changes in the process of political appointments in SOEs. Many of the corruption scandals that are linked to this process, such as the *Mensalão* (monthly bribes), have originated in the Chamber of Deputies. The extent to which individual members of Congress yield their political clout through their ability to nominate appointees seems to be higher in the Chamber than in the Senate. In other words, Deputies seem to be more dependent upon this nomination process to obtain political influence and bargaining power.

Nevertheless, there are specific deputies who exhibit an earnest interest in promoting effective reforms in the current model. If these deputies reach a consensus among themselves as to the format of the reform, and then galvanize the already existent popular support for it, the remaining members of the Chamber could be compelled to accept the proposals, even if for no other reason than to avoid having their reputations tarnished for a refusal to do so. Ensuring that these selected deputies are from a wide range of the political spectrum would increase the chances of approval of the reform. Some possible deputies are: Luiza Erundina (PSOL); Alessandro Molon (REDE); Erika Kokay (PT); Antônio Imbassahy (PSDB).
Executive
At the moment, the Brazilian executive branch is in turmoil due to the impeachment process faced by President Rousseff. As we write, the President is suspended from office pending a final vote in the Senate. The interim President, Michel Temer, has taken office, changed the entire cabinet and announced new economic policies.

This period of uncertainty, coupled with the fact that Temer’s party, PMDB, has been widely involved in the recent scandals, could lead one to assume that the Presidency is not a stakeholder that would favour the proposed reform. However, there are some indications that Temer could be convinced to support it. After taking office, he has been forced to fire three of his newly-appointed ministers, because of revelations in the press that they had taken part in corruption and plotted for the impeachment with spurious motives. Contrary to his predecessor at the Presidency, Temer has not hesitated to fire these influential political figures. Additionally, the interim President has voiced his support for the limited reform proposed by Senator Jereissati. It is not yet clear whether Temer is sincerely willing to promote changes that would counter systemic corruption in Brazil, or if he is in fact merely trying to garner popular support to be able to successfully conclude Ms Rousseff’s impeachment. In any case, it appears that there is a window of opportunity to convince the Presidency to back up the reform.

Ministry of Planning
The Ministry of Planning counts with a highly capable technical body. However, its Minister is invariably a political figure closely aligned with the Presidency. If in other ministries this is not something that affects autonomy (e.g. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), for the Ministry of Planning this appears to be the case. The Departamento de Coordenação e Governança de Empresas Estatais (Department of Coordination and Governance of State Enterprises, or Dest) is said to be lacking in resources and, most importantly, authority to conduct its tasks of oversight vis-à-vis SOEs (Estado de Minas 2015). Nevertheless, the operating core of this Ministry is likely to strongly favour the proposed reform and to lend its technical expertise in advocating for it.
Organizations within the Anticorruption Framework

Several state bodies have different competencies regarding the oversight, investigation and punishment of corruption. Control agencies such as the Tribunal de Contas da União (Federal Accounts Tribunal, or TCU) and the Controladoria-Geral da União (General Comptroller’s Office, or CGU) are tasked with detecting corruption through audits and accounting methods. The Policia Federal (Federal Police, or PF) investigates criminal charges of corruption at the federal level. The Ministério Público da União (Federal Prosecutor’s Office, or MPU) works in tandem with the PF in order for the investigations to result in criminal charges. Finally, the Judiciary has specialized courts for dealing with corruption cases, such as the one in the southern state of Paraná which is handling the Lava-Jato.

All of these bodies have shown a continuous commitment to enforce anticorruption legislation. They are endowed with high capacity professionals and are highly independent. The increased popularity which they have enjoyed because of their roles in uncovering and punishing the recent cases of corruption will surely motivate them to continue pursuing the improvement of the anticorruption framework. Recent public statements by their members, particularly in the MPU, indicate that they are likely to support the proposed reforms. The CGU staff, specifically, is concerned about threats to its high degree of autonomy, since recent changes made by the interim President in its name and organizational structure have not been welcomed by its staff, who perceive them as an attempt of political interference in their work.

Career members of SOEs

Most of the staff at SOEs is hired through concursos públicos, which are extremely competitive public exams that are aimed at objectivity, impersonality and transparency. This ensures the high capacity and technical acumen at the operating core of SOEs.
Political appointments at the SOEs strategic apexes have two consequences for concursados: 1) their expertise and capacity is underutilized by the companies, since relevant managerial decisions are often taken by those who lack capacity and are frequently imbued with malevolent objectives; and 2) their career progress is habitually limited by an upper threshold, above which only those who are politically well connected will climb.

These two reasons will likely cause career members of SOEs to strongly support the proposed reform. However, their level of political influence is limited, particularly in Congress. Therefore, raising public awareness about the importance and quality of their work is advisable.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Political Movements
The role that organized civil society plays in the debates about corruption in Brazil had been quite limited until recently. However, the increased attention that the country has dedicated to the topic has meant that a few CSOs and movements began to emerge as relevant voices in the policy arena.

On the one hand, there are social movements, which have mainly emerged from social media, such as Movimento Brasil Livre (Free Brazil Movement, or MBL) and Vem pra Rua (Take to the Streets). Although these are highly spontaneous and somewhat disorganized movements whose political platforms are not always clearly defined or coherent, they have shown tremendous capacity to mobilize masses of citizens, many of whom had hitherto been politically inactive. The central theme of this mobilization has been the struggle against corruption.

On the other hand, there are more traditional CSOs, whose advocacy has been conducted in a relatively subdued manner, mainly focusing on activities whose scope is limited to the epistemic communities dedicated to governance and anticorruption in Brazil. These include NGOs such as Observatório Social do Brasil (Brazil Social Observatory, or OSB), Contas Abertas (Open Accounts) and Transparência Brasil (Transparency Brazil).
The participants in these two very different forms of social organization are likely to support the proposed reform. Together, they can act to increase political will among stakeholders who are reluctant to offer their support.

**Voters**

The tremendous media attention given to corruption scandals in the past years, as well as the detection of widespread corruption in SOEs, has meant that the issue of their management is now a widely debated one. Brazilians have recently chosen corruption as the country’s most serious problem (Datafolha 2015). Although public debates have been particularly contentious and polarized, there seems to be a growing popular consensus that institutional reforms should create mechanisms to curb political interference in SOEs and government agencies. With a reform being proposed in a multi-partisan manner, it seems likely that it would attract large popular support, from different segments of the political spectrum.

**Reform Proposal**

The theoretical and practical remarks above lead us to the immediate conclusion that while political appointments are a useful tool for coordinating bureaucrats at SOEs with politicians at ministries, it is clear that the abuse of this prerogative is a central cause of dysfunctionalities at SOEs.

All of these findings indicate that a reform that can improve the quality of governance in Brazilian SOEs is one that increases their autonomy; makes full use of their already existing capacity; and diminishes the level of political dominance within them. However, given the constraints presented in the stakeholder analysis, as well as the complexities of the system of coalitional presidentialism, the feasibility of the reform depends on how successfully consensus is built around it. Our assessment is that this period of strong political momentum should be taken advantage of, in order to finally overhaul the process of political appointments at SOEs, since this is one of the thornier aspects of their governance.
Increasing the number of career members of SOEs that climb their ranks and reach their strategic apexes will increase their autonomy, since political interference and capture will now face the resistance of highly capable and empowered managers. Therefore, higher quotas must be established for concursados to occupy management positions and to be members of the boards.

However, ensuring the participation of career officers at the strategic apex is not enough. It is also necessary for the remaining political appointments to be less contaminated by clientelistic loyalties, by keeping a healthy distance from strictly partisan activities. We recommend measures such as periods of quarantine and minimum standards of qualification for occupying senior positions at SOEs.

Specifically, the following measures should be implemented:

1) Political appointees must not have been members of political parties nor have run for any elections in the 5 years prior to their nomination;

2) Political appointees must not have belonged, in the 3 years prior to their nomination, to the staff or board of private companies that have donated over R$100,000.00 to political campaigns in the previous two elections;

3) Political appointees must have 2 years of proven experience in the field for each level of the position they will occupy, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAS</th>
<th>Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAS-1</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAS-2</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAS-3</td>
<td>6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAS-4</td>
<td>8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAS-5</td>
<td>10 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4) Holders of DAS-1 and 2 must have a higher academic degree in the pertinent field;

5) Holders of DAS-3, 4 and 5 must have an advanced degree in the field;

6) Political appointments can be vetoed by career members of SOEs who occupy managerial positions therein, provided 3/5 of them vote to do so;

7) At least 2/3 of the managerial positions at SOEs (DAS-3, 4 and 5) must be occupied by career staff;

8) Salaries of equally qualified staff in different SOEs shall be standardized;

9) Salaries for top-level career members of SOEs shall be increased, creating a more noticeable progression in their careers and a further incentive for qualified staff to remain in their jobs until they achieve managerial positions;

We recommend that the bill proposing this reform is initiated in the Senate, rather than the Chamber of Deputies, since there is a higher probability of it being approved there. This first approval would draw increased media attention to the reform, thus strengthening popular pressure to convince the lower house to approve it as well. In any case, it is essential (and feasible) to garner consensual support from social movements and NGOs, who are in a position to yield the political clout acquired in the protests that took place in the past years. Career members of SOEs should be mobilized to increase pressure on the political establishment to approve the reform. The support of career members of strategic ministries, such as the Ministry of Planning, should also be sought.

The suggested changes do not require any gradual implementation; the new rules can be applied as soon as the bill is approved in Congress.
Once this bill is approved, lobbying efforts should be initiated to promote further changes in the governance of SOEs and in the regulatory framework. These could include:

1) To improve Dest’s mandate to assure that this department is granted the authority necessary to demand information and promote accountability and transparency in SOEs;

2) To promote similar selection criteria that diminish political interference in regulatory agencies;

3) To prohibit private companies that have contracts with SOEs to be campaign donors; and

4) To promote further organizational reforms that would increase the autonomy of SOEs, in order to achieve the optimal level allowed by their high capacity.
References


Estado de Minas 2015 (this is a newspaper. The ref is on p.8 and does not give any more detail than Estado de Minas 2015).


Fausto Ribeiro
Increasing Capacity and Autonomy in Brazilian State-Owned Enterprises: building consensus for a feasible reform of political appointments


What changes are developing countries asking for with respect to the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)? How beneficial are these changes likely to be for developing countries?

By Oliver Rix

Introduction
Developing countries have asked for amendments to the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) throughout the Doha Round. Some proposed amendments would enable developing countries to implement certain policies and others would change the way that wealthy countries support their domestic agricultural sectors. The benefits which particular changes would bring to developing countries are likely to vary from country to country and over different time periods. This paper will argue that amendments relating to developing country policy are likely to be beneficial across developing countries, with the amount of benefit gained depending on the resources available and existing agricultural sector of the country. Changes to how wealthy countries support their agricultural sectors are likely to have mixed effects, especially in the short term, however there is a strong case for developing countries benefiting from them over the long term if these amendments are implemented in a specific wider context.
The paper will begin by outlining the background to the AoA. Then changes proposed by developing countries will be presented with their current statuses. The section following this will consider arguments made in the literature, which discuss how beneficial these changes would be for developing countries. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the findings.

**Background**

The AoA was an outcome of the Uruguay Round of negotiations ending in 1994 and has been described by the World Trade Organization (WTO) as "a significant first step towards fairer competition and a less distorted sector" (2016). It was subsequently perceived by many developing countries as having involved sacrificing a number of policy options and failing to deliver on the anticipated benefits (Bellmann et al. 2013, Gallagher 2008, Khor 2010, Li and Wang 2008, Malig 2014, Srinivasan 2002). Negotiations on agriculture have continued throughout the Doha Round from 2001 to the Nairobi Ministerial Conference in December 2015 (WTO 2016b, Watkins 2015).

Alliances of developing countries have proposed amendments to the AoA including the G20, G33, G90 and G100 (Hawkes and Plahe 2012: 29-30). Studies have grouped developing countries based on their income, level of economic development and status as a net food importer or exporter. The impacts are likely to differ from country to country and within countries, such as for farming households compared to the wider population. This paper will remain sensitive to the heterogeneous impacts of potential amendments to the AoA whilst attempting to answer the question relating to developing countries as a whole.
## Proposed changes to the AoA

Changes to the AoA proposed by developing countries in recent years are presented in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change proposed by developing countries</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To allow public stockholding of staples under certain circumstances.</td>
<td>A peace clause was agreed at the Bali 2013 Ministerial Conference relating to public stockholding of staples, protecting governments from legal action if they exceed their agreed limit on agricultural support (Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS)) because of public stockholding. The peace clause has subsequently been reaffirmed and a commitment made to seek a permanent solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and Special Products. The former are designed to limit imports in certain conditions temporarily and the latter for particular products on a more permanent basis.</td>
<td>The use of SSMs and Special Products by developing countries was agreed in principle at Hong Kong in 2005. There was a commitment made at the Nairobi 2015 Ministerial Conference to negotiate a specific SSM for developing countries. Developing countries have concerns with conditions attached and limitations that may be placed on the use of these instruments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exempting programmes relating to land reform and rural livelihood security from the AMS.</td>
<td>A list of these programmes was added to the list of services in the AoA which are exempt from AMS calculations at Bali 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of support provided by wealthy countries to their domestic agricultural sectors.</td>
<td>A significant amount of support continues to be provided by wealthy countries to their agricultural sectors through different measures. Developed countries committed to removing export subsidies, “except for a handful of agriculture products,” at Nairobi 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement in administration of Tariff Rate Quotas.</td>
<td>A Ministerial Decision was made at Bali 2013 intended to make use of Tariff Rate Quotas more transparent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We will discuss proposals relating to public stockholding of staples, use of Special Safeguard Mechanisms and Special Products and reduction of support provided by wealthy countries to their agricultural sectors. Changes already made in these areas are either temporary or limited compared to the original proposals made by developing countries. We will not discuss further exemption of land reform and rural livelihood security programmes or administration of Tariff Rate Quotas, since the first proposal has been approved and the second proposal has not been reported with the same prominence since the Ministerial Decision made in 2013.

**Public stockholding of staples**
The G33 proposed changing the AoA to lessen constraints on public stockholding of staples in general and on public stockholding designed to support “low-income or resource-poor producers” and the urban and rural poor. They have argued that the way that the AMS is calculated should be updated because of higher food prices and that any expenditure on programmes designed to support “low-income or resource-poor producers” and the urban and rural poor should be excluded from the AMS (Bellmann et al. 2013, WTO 2015a).

**Use of a SSM and Special Products**
Originally only countries who had commenced tariffication, that is begun converting other forms of state support into tariffs, could use SSMs to protect their agricultural sector from significant changes in import quantities or prices (Das 1999). Access to this instrument has been expanded to developing countries in principle, but as commentators noted after Nairobi 2015, there has been “no concrete agreement” on a special SSM for developing countries (The Hindu 2015). Developing countries can designate Special Products which are not subject to the general tariff reduction commitments but there are limitations on the number that can be designated. Also there is the general principle in the AoA that permanent tariffs cannot be increased, which means that developing countries will be limited to maintaining existing levels of protection on these products (Khor 2010, Murphy 2005).
Reduction of support provided by wealthy countries to their domestic agricultural sectors

Support provided by wealthy countries to their own agricultural sectors has been a concern for developing countries since subsidized products compete with their domestic production and because the support acts as a barrier to developed country markets (Li and Wang 2008). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Total Support Estimate, “the overall transfers associated with agricultural support”, for the US and EU were $96bn and €94bn respectively in 2014 (OECD 2016). Some observers have suggested that the removal of export subsidies agreed at Nairobi 2015 does not represent a significant gain for developing countries since they had been a declining form of support (Patnaik and Wise 2015, The Citizen 2016).

How beneficial are the proposed changes likely to be?

This section will draw on the literature to argue that proposed changes relating to developing country policy will be beneficial for developing countries at a general level and that proposed changes to wealthy country agricultural support will have mixed effects in the short term, but could be beneficial for most developing countries in the long term in a specific wider context.

Public stockholding, SSMs and Special Products

Regaining policy space is a value in itself which would be achieved by changes relating to public stockholding, SSMs and Special Products. Hawkes and Plahe, in their evaluation of the AoA in relation to the right to food, argue that the agreement compromises developing country governments’ responsibility and capacity to uphold this right. They suggest that the necessary policy space and tools have been lost in the process of market-oriented reform (2012). Whilst the distortion of trade in food and agricultural products can negatively impact on access to food, minimizing trade distortion through market-oriented reform is not equivalent to securing access to food. Other approaches, including public stockholding, SSMs and Special Products, can be used to secure the latter.
Public stockholding
Weissman and De Schutter note that public stockholding can be an important tool for achieving food security (Weissman 2008, De Schutter in Matthews 2014: 3). Prices of food and agricultural products have become increasingly volatile. Public stockholding can protect domestic consumers from these fluctuations (Das 1999, Pal 2002). Importing food requires foreign exchange which can be an issue for some countries (Das 1999). Valdés and Foster have highlighted how programmes, which provide smallholder farmers with extra income can result in increased farm productivity (2012). In addition, agriculture is often valued for social and environment reasons that go beyond its economic contribution. Income from public stockholding programmes can support low-income or resource-poor farmers to bring these broader benefits (Li and Wang 2008).

Governments must however have resources to fund public stockholding programmes and so these proposed changes are more likely to benefit middle income developing countries. Some developing countries have been described as “ambivalent” towards the proposals, but have noted that having the freedom to pursue these programmes in the future would be a gain in itself (ICTSD 2013). It has been suggested that public stockholding in countries that can afford to do so can negatively impact on the stability of income and market share for producers in other countries (Bellmann et al. 2013, Matthews 2014). Srinivasan notes how “in absolute terms most of the poor live in non-LDCs such as China, Egypt, and India” (2002: 9). Public stockholding programmes in these countries might then be justified because of their potential to alleviate poverty at the aggregate level across developing countries, whilst other measures may be necessary to support food security and the agricultural sectors in Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

SSMs and Special Products
SSMs and Special Products are a means of protecting the domestic agricultural sector from fluctuations in the international market. They can be used to protect domestic farmers against dumping by other producers, which is a practice described by the WTO as “selling at an unfairly low price” (2016c).
SSMs can prevent a temporary loss of income and market share and the longer term damage that this can cause to the agricultural sector (Hawkes and Plahe 2012). Developing countries could benefit from access to SSMs and Special Products given that competing with subsidized products from wealthy countries leaves their producers at a disadvantage (Murphy 2005). There are concerns “about how further import liberalisation would worsen the extent of import surges” and these instruments could limit the effects (Khor 2010: 32).

Access to SSMs and Special Products coupled with investment in the agricultural sector through public stockholding has the potential to improve productivity in developing countries’ agricultural sectors. Greater productivity would help with food security and could generate a surplus to be invested in agriculture or another part of the economy. Another advantage of SSMs and Special Products, highlighted by Valdés and Foster, is that tariffs are a measure that governments with limited “resources and institutional capacity” can use and so they would be beneficial in the short term for a wider range of developing countries than public stockholding (2012: 2).

**Reductions in wealthy country agricultural support**

Alongside these proposed changes, there have been calls for wealthy countries to reduce the support that they provide to their domestic agricultural sectors to create a more level playing field (Hawkes and Plahe 2012). Assessments based on the status of countries as net food importers or exporters and model-based analyses have pointed to potential winners and losers in developing countries (Bhagwati 2005, Panagariya 2005, Tangermann 2005). Following the removal of subsidies, prices are predicted to increase and impact negatively on net food importers and positively on net food exporters (Das 1999, Srinivasan 2002, Bellmann et al. 2013).
More developing countries have become net food importers in recent decades and they make up a significant proportion of the whole group. Cheap subsidized products from wealthy countries are competition for producers in developing countries, but they also reduce costs for consumers in the same places (Tangermann 2005). LDCs and some other developing countries benefit from preferential treatment in trade with some developed countries and this arrangement could become less beneficial if prices rise (Ibid, Pal 2002).

The effects described above are not negligible but are mainly the immediate impacts of reforms rather than the medium and long term consequences. Beyond the direct impact of price changes for agricultural products for consumers, Tangermann cites one analysis which suggests that developing countries would receive greater income from trade at the aggregate level when:

> As a result of OECD area agricultural policy reform and the resulting higher world market prices for agricultural products, resources in the importing developing countries shift into agriculture, and this pushes up the prices they receive on nonagricultural exports. The resulting gain on terms of trade outside agriculture actually drives the overall welfare gain for the NFIDC [Net Food Importing Developing Countries].

(2005: 1139)

This finding should be treated with caution with Tangermann himself stating that “whether this model result is a realistic finding is debatable” (Ibid: 1140). It relies on a number of assumptions relating to the allocation of resources and interactions between different markets which may not hold in practice. It does however highlight possible benefits and the complexity of anticipating the impact of changes, which affect the economic structures of developing countries.
As noted above, a number of developing countries have become net importers of agricultural products in recent decades. There is a potential that this trend might change with the use of public stockholding programmes, SSMs, Special Products and other policies relating to land reform and rural livelihood security. Overall increases in agriculture and food prices due to reductions in wealthy country subsidies would become a benefit were this to happen. If stronger domestic agricultural sectors developed in more developing countries, they could provide better food security, become more productive and generate higher income in the long term. This development would be more likely following reductions to wealthy countries’ domestic support.

Also in relation to the wider context, Chang has noted that developing countries have been under pressure to make concessions on industrial tariffs in exchange for reform in agriculture (as quoted in Weissman 2008). However, the benefits of agricultural reform are conditional on agriculture being developed in conjunction with, and not at the expense of, other sectors. As Schumacher has noted, “[n]ations that specialise in agriculture have a lower growth rate”, and for this reason the agricultural sector can contribute best as part of a diverse domestic economy (2013: 97). This feature of the wider context would influence the extent that reductions to wealthy country agriculture support could benefit developing countries in the medium and long term.

**Conclusion**

This essay has outlined proposed changes to the AoA and potential consequences for developing countries. The impacts of public stockholding programmes, SSMs, Special Products and reductions to wealthy country agricultural support have been discussed with reference to the literature. Public stockholding is likely to be beneficial for middle income developing countries in the present and represents a useful policy option for all developing countries in the future. SSMs and Special Products are a more accessible instrument for developing countries with less resources and could provide more immediate benefits.
Reductions in support provided by wealthy countries to their domestic agricultural sectors are likely to have mixed effects across developing countries in the short term, with net importers facing a rise in costs. However, in the medium and long term and in conjunction with a specific wider context, reductions could lead to stronger agricultural sectors and improve food security in developing countries.

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What changes are developing countries asking for with respect to the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)?
How beneficial are these changes likely to be for developing countries?


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Narrative and rhetorical analysis of Steve Job’s discourse in 2014

By Pablo Ruiz

Introduction
On 12th June 2005, Steve Jobs, computer scientist, entrepreneur, the father of the first personal computer, the founder of Apple Computer, probably the most innovative company in the sector, was invited to give a speech at Stanford University at a graduation ceremony (Stanford 2016). This speech, given by Jobs, has long been considered one of the world’s most inspiring speeches (La Nación 2016). However, the question that may arise is: why does this computer business-person influence people by his words and thoughts?

This paper aims to better understand the speech of Steve Jobs at Stanford University, including his construction of his philosophy, using discourse analysis. To permit for a profound reading of the speech, careful content and narrative analysis using Roe (1989) will be used, and will be paired with Gill and Wheedbee’s (1998) approach to rhetoric analysis.

As mentioned above, the context within which and by which this speech emerged is multifaceted. In order to understand this speech in context, a discussion of the context in which the speech was expressed will be provided. Then, the methodology for the analysis will be described. This will be followed by a presentation of the findings of the content, narrative and the rhetoric examination. Finally, some conclusions will be argued.
Context of the speech

To establish the cultural, political, social and historical context of the speech, it is necessary to study the biography of Steve Jobs beyond that of his life, for it represents the start of the personalized computer in the United States.

Steve Jobs entered Reed College, a liberal arts college based in Portland, Oregon, but left college a semester later. After an internship at Hewlett-Packard Company in Palo Alto in 1974, Jobs was hired as a designer by Atari, a pioneer company of the gaming industry. He then joined with his first partner, the engineer Stephen Wozniak, and together they created an imaginative plate base and then a full computer, the Apple I, which was considered the first personal computer in history. They continued their work and in 1976 they founded the company Apple Computer that created the Apple 2. The company became recognized in the US, which made Jobs and Wozniak millionaires. (Biography 2016).

In 1981, the strongest competitor of Apple, IBM, released its first personal computer. With the aim to maintain the competitiveness of Apple, Steve Jobs decided to recruit the president of the multinational “Pepsi”, John Sculley, as director of the company, who later fired him. Consequently, Steve Jobs founded a new computer company, NeXT Computer in 1985. He then bought Lucasfilm Limited, and in 1986, he created Pixar Animation Studios. His old company, Apple, had difficult times and remained on the market until Microsoft created the first version of the Windows operating system (Windows 3.1 in 1992, Windows 95 in 1995), and Apple lost one of its main selling points. In December 1996, Apple decided to buy NeXT Computer, which meant the return of Steve Jobs to the company he founded, as an advisor and then he became president again. He developed innovative products such as the iMac, the iPod and the iPhone (Biography 2016).
To summarize, and based on the above, this speech, from the technological point of view, condenses the technological advancement of personal computing and the democratization of technology in the same context; from the economic point of view, the speech is given in consideration that Apple is one of the most profitable companies in the world; from the cultural point of view, the speech is given at a time when Jobs was considered a computer genius who revolutionized technology; and finally from a historical point of view, the discourse is a product of technological history itself. The immediate context is marked by the graduation ceremony.

The speech
The text that is analysed in this essay is a reproduction of the discourse that Steve Jobs gave at Stanford University on 12th June 2005 at a graduation ceremony. In this intervention, the speaker communicates three stories of his life. First, the story about connect the dots, second, the story about love and lost, and third, the story about death.

Moreover, this text is interesting due to the fact that it presents a storyline perspective to develop the arguments and to produce a connection with the audience. It allows us to identify a particular narrative in each story with a final message and also the rhetoric sources that the speaker uses. Hence, my objective is to identify the type of narrative and the focus of the discourse in logos, pathos and ethos.

This essay is relevant for two reasons: first, it shows the use of two techniques of persuasion that can be used to get support of the audience; and second, it illustrates how information is presented to the audience in order to influence it.
Methodology
The full transcript of Steve Jobs’s speech can be found in Appendix 1.

Simple content analysis will be elaborated as an exploratory introduction to the speech itself. This was done with the help of an online content analysis software, Online Utility, that counts both word and phrase frequencies. The frequent words and phrases that were found to be most remarkable to the analysis are offered in the next section, in Table 1. Some of these results will be methodologically analyzed in greater depth in relation other stages of the analysis.

After content analysis, to further examine the discourse mentioned, two methods are used for analyzing the text. First, a narrative method will be used, in particular Type 6, a narrative infra-structure in thought. With this technique, the storyline of Steve Jobs in his discourse recognizing the plot, the characters and the final point of the narrative will be identified. As Roe (1989) claims, much development planning, especially where there is foreign aid, has a folktale structure: 1. Problem/crisis; 2. A hero/project, who strives hard to overcome; 3. Many difficulties/constraints/villains; 4. Succeeds and then all live happily ever. Results will be more explored in relation with other methods.

Second, rhetorical analysis will be applied, Ann N. Gill and Karen Whedbee (1998) suggest an entry point into rhetorical analysis. They define the analysis process as a interrogative of the importance of specific features of a text in which an analyst

draws on her particular store of knowledge; she crawls around and through a text, inspecting it from every angle, from some distance, as well as up close, and she makes judgements about how it operates and what is says (and does not say) (1998: 161).

1 Appendices for this essay can be found online at www.iss.nl/appendices
They offer three guiding questions, these are

What expectations are created by the context? [exigence, audience, genre, rhetor credibility]
What does the text present to an audience? [rhetorical persona, implied audience, contextual understanding, absence]
What features of the text are significant? [structure and temporality, argumentation, metaphor, iconicity] (ibid.).

Taking this into account, some questions are more productive than others. Results are discussed in the section on rhetoric analysis findings.

In order to justify the chosen methods, it is important to clarify first that content analysis allows an initial exploration to the text in terms of words and frequency of them. Second, the rhetoric approach was chosen because it seeks to explore the social functions of rhetorical events. Third, the narrative approach was chosen because rhetoric can involve as an umbrella a narrative, as this example, so both methods can be complementary, and also because it helps to identify the storyline of the discourse.

To show the implementation of the methods, we will proceed in an Excel table to divide the speech in cells. This will be done according to general ideas expressed in paragraphs that maintain the essence of the idea, therefore: Firstly, for the rhetoric table three extra columns will be used, one to analyze ethos of ideas, one to analyze the pathos that are in the text, and another to analyze the logos that the text has. A value of 1 in each column when the text corresponds to one of these rhetoric features will be given. It also will enable a quantitative analysis of the rhetoric.

Then, for the second method, four more Excel columns will be used, one to establish the crisis, other to establish the villains, other to establish successes and another to set the heroes of history. A value of 1 in each column when the text corresponds to one of these rhetoric features will be given. It also will enable a quantitative analysis of the rhetoric.

It is generally recommended with rhetorical analysis to use an analysis table,
however, a new table, as described above, will be used to identify the narrative and its relation with the rhetoric. This because the text is eminently narrative, descriptive and clear.

**Analysis**

**Content analysis**

According to the content and frequency of words, it can be determined, first, that the speech is developed in the first person, maintaining an intensified use of pronouns like “I” and “you”. In fact, the word “I” is used more often than connecting words like “and”. This may support the idea that discourse uses clear, simple and direct language to the audience. Another distinctive feature that can be taken into account is the use of the word “was”. In this case, its frequency shows that much of the discourse is formulated in the past tense. Some words have a considerable frequency as “Apple, death, love and college” which suggests that issues of the company, the dilemma of death, the value of love and of course education, are issues that are present in text. However, the noun that has more frequency is “life” which suggests that the discourse orbits around this issue. See Table 1.

**Table 1. Content analysis of words**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Unfiltered word count</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>I / you</td>
<td>86 /31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>and</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Is / was</td>
<td>29/ 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>My / your</td>
<td>30/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>life</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>college</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>We / they</td>
<td>10/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>apple</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>death</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Love</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The author*
One thing to note is that there are some phrases that maintain a double repetition and suggest tips by the speaker, such as “love what I did”, “follow your heart” or “you have to trust” which connotes an emotionally charged language. See Table 2.

**Table 2. Content analysis of phrases containing 4 words**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Some top phrases containing 4 words (without punctuation marks)</th>
<th>Occurencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>loved what i did</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was one of the</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to follow your heart</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>turned out to be</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the only way to</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>so i decided to</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and the only way</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you have to trust</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>connect the dots looking</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The author*

**Narrative analysis**

To begin with this analysis, first I will examine the plot, protagonists and end motive, and then, I will analyse the results found with the application of the quantitative narrative method that reflects the narrative infra-structure in thought (Type 6 of narrative analysis). (See Appendix 2 for the complete narrative table).

**General analysis of narrative**

Firstly, the overall plot goes around a protagonist, the speaker, and suggests the story of unfortunate events and problems, that the protagonist faces to reach success. It can be reduced to this image, he dropped out of college but in the end he gives a graduation speech.

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2 Appendices for this essay can be found online at www.iss.nl/appendices
This is the plot; this is developed in the first person and explained in simple language in three stories that make up the whole story of how Steve Jobs, the protagonist, is where he is. These stories are: connect the dots; love and loss; and death.

The plot shows that Jobs, the character of the story, the American dreamer, had the misfortune marked for him since before his birth, his mother put him up for adoption because she did not have economic welfare, but he was rejected in the process. He was finally adopted, he entered college, but the character believes that it is not a world for him, it is a world that he does not understand, so he dropped out of college. He maintains problems but he overcame these. He found a new company and became a millionaire. It has a happy moment.

However, he is fired from his own company, and falls back into the problems, making problems again as opportunities, creating another company and feels reborn. This company is bought by his first company, so he returns to work in it, he has another happy moment. However, he is diagnosed with cancer, and feels that he will die soon from back problems. Nevertheless, he overcomes the disease. He has another happy moment.

In short, the plot suggests the traditional story of the idealist and dreamer who starts from nothing, and beats every difficulty to succeed, considering that this person understands his present, because he understands his past, he loves what he does, and he recognizes that every day he dies. If we understand the story as a play, it has three scenes: the past, love and death.

Secondly, regarding the protagonists, the narrative advises that the narrator of the story, which is the main character in the story, is the successful man. Secondary characters are all those that appear throughout protagonist’s life. There are of two types, collaborators and villains. Collaborators, for instance, are worker partners, parents who adopted the protagonist, college friends who helped him, the fellow with whom founded his company, his wife and children. Villains, for example, are his mother that put him up for adoption, parents who did not adopt him, and co-workers who fired him.
Thirdly, on the final point that has the narrative, it is possible to determine three messages. First, connect the dots, the author invites audiences to follow their heart. We cannot connect the dots looking forward, we can only connect them to look back and see what has happened to us over the years, so right now we can only hope that one day connects. Second, love and loss. The second advice is to do what you love to do and losses are opportunities to start things better. Third, Death. It is the destination we all share but perhaps is the best invention of life itself as it is the agent of change that makes us restart. Stop living the lives of others. The speech ends with a metaphor “stay hungry, stay foolish”.

The narrative infrastructure in thought (type 6 of narrative analysis)
In this regard, taking into account Appendix 2, and the four points of this type of narrative, it is possible to determine the next results (see Figure 1):

**Figure 1. Narrative analysis**

![Narrative Analysis Chart]

**Source**: The author
1. Problem (crisis) this element considers the elements of a problem, for example when the speaker says, "I never graduated from college"; "she decided to put me up for adoption"; "I had just turned 30. And then I got fired"; "About a year ago I was diagnosed with cancer".

2. A hero/project, who strives hard to overcome: This item has been identified in the actions of the speaker where he demonstrate resilience, such as "I didn’t have a dorm room, so I slept on the floor in friends’ rooms"; "I had been rejected, but I was still in love. And so I decided to start over"; "I didn’t see it then, but it turned out that getting fired from Apple was the best thing that could have ever happened to me".

3. Many difficulties / constraints / villains: In this area in particular, there are minor difficulties in relation to the general problem, for example when the speaker says "I had no idea what I wanted to do with my life and no idea how college was going to help me figure it out". Moreover, it has also given importance to identify the villains here, who are people that do not collaborate with the narrator, for example, when he states "our visions of the future began to diverge and eventually we had a falling out".

4. Succeeds and then all live happily ever after: This part has specifically identified the success achievements that speaker gets and the happy ends of each story and of the general story, for example when he says: "looking back it was one of the best decisions I ever made"; "If I had never dropped in on that single course in college, the Mac would have never had multiple typefaces or proportionally spaced fonts"; "I decided to start over"; "Apple bought NeXT, I returned to Apple, and the technology we developed at NeXT is at the heart of Apple’s current renaissance. And Laurene and I have a wonderful family together". The analysis suggests that it is given more importance to the narration of the success.

Rhetorical analysis
The rhetorical analysis method, as mentioned in the methodology, proposes three questions: exploring what the expectations are, what the text actually says, and what significant effects these have. In this sense, I’ll start with a discussion of the expectation that is created by the context. Given the earlier argument of the context in which the speech was presented, maybe there are two perspectives, for the author and the audience.
To understand this, considering exigence is helpful Gill and Whedbee’s (1998).

Exigence speaks to the understanding of why the speech would be required. On the one hand, the exigence of the audience may be a formal discourse that enhances students to study more and achieve their goals, because in spite of the economic, social, cultural context that is behind the speech, the real context when the speech is given is the graduation. On the other hand, the pretension of Jobs is not to promote formal ways of living and traditional paths of existence, on the contrary, he attempts to advise students to choose to be free in the real world day by day, loving what they do.

After this, Gill and Whedbee suggest identifying the genre of the text, meaning a “group of texts that share specific discursive features” (1998, 162). In the case of this speech, the genre is maybe best described as a “motivational speech of life”. In particular by giving a message of resilience throughout the speech with emotional language (pathos). Finally, a discussion of the rhetor’s credibility (ethos) is recommended. Steve Jobs’s status, as informatics genius and millionaire businessman is immensely important for his credibility. See Figure 2.

In relation to an analysis of the text itself: First, Gill and Whedbee (1998) suggest identifying the rhetorical person created in the text. In this case the person created is very much connected to the genre of the speech, that of a “motivational speech” because the protagonist of the story is the speaker. Gill and Whedbee’s recommendation to explore the contextual understanding was particularly helpful in probing Jobs’ discourse of life. Gill and Whedbee (1998) say that a contextual understanding can be revealed “by [the] naming [of] event, objects, and other aspects of the context in a particular way” (1998, 167-8). In this part, the narrative events complement the context that is analyzed, there are three events, the three stories that build the discourse. This is corroborated with narrative analysis.
As the final element to be explored in the text itself, Gill and Whedbee point to what is absent from the text. It can be stated that the speech considers in a general way a unique philosophy of life and success based in taking into account only the past, follow your heart to do something; the idea of die every day and of course think differently. This is the framing, as the speaker says “the only way to do”. Nonetheless, different perspectives can be absent from the text, for example, the consideration of utopias in order to achieve goals means considering the future, thinking in a pragmatic way instead of thinking different, and being rational instead of being emotional.

For the third line of questioning, Gill and Whedbee recommend the examination of the significant characteristics of the text. For Jobs’s speech, the most significant features seem to be structure and temporality. The structure is a big story of problem-success divided in three stories as is follows: the beginning of life with its problems - overcome problems and success; then, the beginning of love with its problems - overcome problems and success; after that, the consideration of death with its problems - overcome problems and success. Discursively, it can be presumed that the temporal structure of Job’s speech implies the hermetic connection between past and present, the speaker always goes to the past to justify his present. Maybe it was thought that through the intention of persuasion because the future is not known and the past is. He reinforces this idea with the metaphor of connect the dots. Moreover, the principal metaphor is at the end “stay hungry, stay foolish” where he uses food language to explain that people have to be ambitious in life, and on the other hand that people have to think different.

Furthermore, the speech has interesting features in relation to logos, pathos and ethos. See Appendix 2. More emphasis is given on the pathos aspect. See Figure 2.
RETHORIC ANALYSIS

- Pathos 40%
- Logos 31%
- Ethos 29%

Source: The author

1. Arguments related to ethos: they are affective and moral and are part of the speaker. The attitudes that must take the speaker to inspire confidence in his audience. For example, when the speaker says “Truth be told”, maybe he expresses that he tells the truth because he has morals. “Remembering that I’ll be dead soon is the most important tool I’ve ever encountered to help me make the big choices in life”. He has the authority to say this because he did and he got success.

2. Arguments related to the pathos: purely affective and directly related to the audience. Appeals to emotions of audience. For example when the speaker says “I didn’t have a dorm room, so I slept on the floor in friends’ rooms” perhaps he tries to generate the feeling of compassion in the audience. “There is no reason not to follow your heart”, he says as he wants the audience to be emotionally reflexive.
3. Arguments related to logos: use of words to build a system of arguments of the speech. For example, when the speaker says, “If I had never dropped out, I would have never dropped in on this calligraphy class, and personal computers might not have the wonderful typography that they do”, possibly he emphasizes the logos. His logic is that he dropped out of college, so he dropped in calligraphy class, so he designed the Mac computer. His logic is linear, considering the past-present and not the future. “And most important, have the courage to follow your heart and intuition. They somehow already know what you truly want to become”. The logic is if you are emotional, you are going to be fine.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, and considering the initial question: why does this computer business-person influence people by his words and thoughts? It can be assumed that the discourse of Steve Jobs can be analyzed as narrative to invite people to think in a resilient way, because he contrasted problems with success and built from these problems opportunities. Moreover, it can also be supposed that the effect of discourse on audiences is important because the speech frames social values as love, life, time and death with a positive end. Besides the narrative, it has to be considered that the use of logos, ethos and pathos is substantial but the speech is more focused on pathos, maybe because emotions are more digestible in a heuristic way to audiences.

Some considerations that we have to take into account, are on the one hand that the methods applied are part of interpretative research and that some results could change with a dissimilar interpretation. On the other hand, and in relation with other fields like sociology and psychology, the discourse can be interesting as an object of study. For example, it can be assumed that the emotional charge is effective because the mass is emotional, it can be further analyzed by social psychology; or it can be presumed that the narrative presented in the speech is strong because it corresponds to the American Dream, the story that a person with nothing can achieve everything in America, as Steve Jobs has done. It can be analyzed further by sociology.
References


A Critical Analysis of John Ruggie’s “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework for Business and Human Rights

By Shikha Sethia

Introduction

This paper attempts to undertake a critical analysis of the text titled, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights” (hereafter, the Text), developed by the UN Special Representative John Ruggie and presented to the UN Human Rights Council in 2008 (A/HRC/8/5). The “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework is now an extremely popular approach in the field of business and human rights.

The author, Professor John Ruggie, is a Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School and has also served as UN Assistant Secretary General. In 2005, at the request of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Secretary-General Kofi Annan had appointed Professor Ruggie as the Special Representative on business and human rights (Davis 2009) to fulfil the following mandate:

a) To identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights;

b) To elaborate on the role of States in effectively regulating and adjudicating the role of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights, including through international cooperation;
c) To research and clarify the implications for transnational corporations and other business enterprises of concepts such as “complicity” and “sphere of influence”;
d) To develop materials and methodologies for undertaking human rights impact assessments of the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises;
e) To compile a compendium of best practices of States and transnational corporations and other business enterprises.
(Ruggie 2006)

This Text was his third report, wherein he presented the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework, as the three pillars guiding the agenda for advancement of human rights in business. The report was unanimously accepted by the Human Rights Council at its meeting in 2008, the first such support an instrument of this nature has received from a UN intergovernmental organization. The framework was also later operationalized by the Special Representative through the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework”, presented in March 2011 (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, N.D.)

These principles have since been adopted by various important sub-national, national and international agencies on business and human rights, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation’s (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability and the International Standards Association’s ISO 26000 standard on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Schoemaker 2011: 6) It has been recognised by the UN Global Compact and incorporated into the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act in the United States. Many companies have also adopted these principles into their own human rights approaches. This demonstrates the widespread acceptability of the principles among many of the stakeholders who are addressed through the framework.
Methodology

The analysis of the Text involved a combination of methods. Initially, a simple word frequency count was undertaken, to identify the words that appeared most often within the Text. Key words were then clustered with other words that were synonyms or from the same family, to see if that affected the frequency of their use (Grbch 2013). This was used to identify the major actors involved, the frequency with which the three pillars were referred to and also the frequency with which certain concepts, such as “rights” made an appearance.

The Key Word in Context (KWIC) technique was then used to analyse the way the language of rights has been employed, within the Text. This led to the hypothesis that the Text largely employed human rights discourse and associated vocabulary (e.g. remedy, instead of compensation), rather than the two other obvious alternative frames used in the context of business and human rights, namely, corporate social responsibility and legally binding agreements.

Frame analysis was then used to analyse the implications of this choice on the reading of the Text. First, the overall frame has been analysed, with a discussion on alternative frames, to understand why this specific choice was made. An analysis of both the problem and the solution frames is then undertaken for Section I - “The Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework”, a key part of the Text which first introduces the challenges in the field of business and human rights as understood by the Special Representative (including the idea of “governance gaps”), and then proposes, the framework as a solution to these challenges. This part of the Text was selected as it provides an overview of the arguments that are elaborated upon later in the Text, clarifies the role of various actors in responding to the challenges presented and the fact that it shares a title with the whole Text, reinforcing its centrality to the Text.

Lastly, there is an attempt to critically analyse whether the solution frame meets the challenges posed in the problem frame and if choice of the human rights framework was a successful lens for the author to use in this Text, in terms of its overall impact.
The human rights framework
This section analyses the choices that were made as regards the overall framing of Professor Ruggie’s “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework.

The Text uses the human rights framework as its basis – this is relatively unsurprising, given that the mandate was given by the UN Secretary General and led by the UN Human Rights Council, to whom it was presented. Had the audience been only business organisations or only civil society, the framework may have been very different. Yet, the formulation of the “business and human rights” framework itself is relatively new and the choice of taking this particular approach in the context of business regulation is noteworthy, which I will discuss in more detail later in this section, when I examine some possible alternative frameworks.

As Professor Ruggie himself notes, “the framing of policy challenges can have profound consequences for assigning responsibilities to relevant actors and determining whether the combination is capable of meeting the overall policy objectives” (Ruggie 2008: para 10). Human rights are made reference to, directly or indirectly, with a very high frequency, within the paper and are also prominently referred to in the main title. All three pillars of Professor Ruggie’s framework have been formulated in relation to human rights, i.e. the State’s duty to protect against human rights violations by other entities, the responsibility of businesses to respect human rights and the need for access to remedy for human rights violations. The Text also employs both neutral language with respect to human rights, such as human rights impact, issues, domains and debates, as well as more obviously negative language, such as grievances, harms, violations and abuse. In addition, there are clear choices made between the various frameworks, for instance through the use of the word “remedy”, as opposed to compensation.
In terms of its overall tone, the Text is presented as evidence-based, as opposed to a theoretical enquiry, making frequent reference to the case studies that formed the basis of Professor Ruggie’s findings, such as his assertion that it is not a realistic exercise to identify a limited set of rights that corporations may be held accountable for (Ruggie 2008: para 51-52).

**Two alternative frameworks**

The two other dominant frameworks in the field of business and human rights are those of Corporate Social Responsibility and that of International Law.

The Corporate Social Responsibility movement has for a very long time been the only framework within which most for-profit business organisations have addressed their human rights obligations. However, it has been heavily criticised by many non-government and civil society actors for having been insincere, tokenistic and co-opted by businesses for serving their own ends. It often involves funding and participation in projects unrelated to a corporation’s core activities. As a result, a major criticism of this approach has been the fact that it does not treat social responsibility as an intrinsic part of doing business, which explains why budgets for CSR activities by businesses are often prepared separately and managed by teams distinct from those involved in the day-to-day operations. Professor Ruggie’s approach addresses many of these criticisms— in elaborating on the due-diligence processes, he notes the importance of “integration” (Ruggie 2008: para 62) or embeddedness of human rights policies through all of a company’s processes and activities, pointing to the danger of human rights policies being formulated and implemented in isolation. He also mentions in an earlier section that “a company cannot compensate for human rights harm by performing good deeds elsewhere” (Ruggie 2008: para 55). Therefore, by moving the debate to into the terrain of human rights, while keeping the nature of obligations voluntary, Professor Ruggie manages to assign stricter responsibilities to corporations, without threatening their overall control over the implementation of rights protection. It is noteworthy that he retains the use of the word “responsibility” in relation to corporations (as opposed to “duty” which has been used when referring to the obligations of States) making the rights framework proposed by Ruggie appear somewhat analogous to the CSR framework.
The other major framework that is relevant to governance of businesses is that of legally binding agreements, repeatedly demanded by civil society members as the only long-term solution to governing business activities. The effort to impose legally binding obligations upon corporations with respect to human rights within the UN has been long and largely unsuccessful. While some breakthroughs have been seen in applications of both national and international law in relation to businesses, these cases are few and far between, and most international instruments have restricted themselves to voluntary guidelines for corporations. Within the debate of voluntary versus binding agreements, Professor Ruggie is very much on the side of voluntary frameworks – this is clearest in his indictment of the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2), a treaty prepared by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, prior to his appointment as Special Representative. While the Sub-Commission approved the Norms in August 2003, the Human Rights Commission responded by noting that the document was unsolicited and had "no legal standing" (UN 2004/116). Professor Ruggie is in agreement with the view of the Human Rights Council and refers to the Norms as "engulfed in their own doctrinal excesses" (Ruggie 2006: para 59). He also notes that international law is yet to reach a point where it is possible to attach international legal obligations to corporations and that such an exercise may "undermine efforts to build indigenous capacity and to make governments more responsible to their own citizenry" (Ruggie 2006: para 68). He stresses instead the need for consensus and cooperation among the various social actors, which he proposes is a more successful strategy for action.

Overall, Professor Ruggie uses a social, rather than a natural framework (Goffman 1974: 21-23) for his analysis, believing that relations between various entities and norms that shape their interactions are socially constructed through shared ideas.

1 See, for instance, the submission by the Global Campaign to Dismantle Corporate Power and Stop Impunity at the First Session of the United Nations Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights (U.N. document A/HRC/WG.16/1/NGO/12).
This is visible in his broader strategy for action. For instance, Professor Ruggie mentions in his report how “First, insofar as the overall global context itself is in transition, standards in many instances do not simply “exist” out there, waiting to be recorded and implemented, but are in the process of being socially constructed. Indeed, the mandate itself inevitably is a modest intervention in that larger process.” (Ruggie 2006: para 54).

**Protect, Respect and Remedy: A review of the Problem and Solution Frames**

The “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework is introduced in Section I of the report, which comprises of two sub-sections; the problem frame is given in sub-section “I. A. The Challenge” (Ruggie 2008: para 11-16), which elaborates on Professor Ruggie’s perception of the challenges facing the field of business and human rights. The solution frame in given in sub-section “I. B. The Framework” (ibid. 2008: para 17-26), where Professor Ruggie attempts to demonstrate how the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework addresses these challenges and what are the specific roles of the various actors involved in this process.

While this framework is elaborated upon in greater detail later in the Text, Section I most clearly and succinctly sets out the challenges that the framework must respond to, in order to initiate change. Therefore, the strength of the argument presented here has great bearing on the argumentative strength of the report – should the solution frame be unsatisfactory in responding to the problem frame, an elaboration would be a fruitless exercise.

**Problem framing**

According to Professor Ruggie, the key issues are “governance gaps” in the system, which allow human rights violations to occur as a result of corporate operations. Governance gaps, as a concept, allow for a relatively broad form of problem framing, absolving corporations in relation to allegations of intent to cause harm and locating the problem instead as a technical and procedural issue.
He notes that governance gaps permit harm “where none may be intended”, possibly to make the case that not all violations are premeditated but could also result from negligence or ignorance about the consequences of their operations. This is important as it also influences the way the solutions are framed – for instance, Professor Ruggie proposes that corporations are able and willing to regulate but lack the systems to do so, hence the need for due diligence.

The first governance gap that is demonstrated is the mechanism of the investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism enshrined in various bilateral treaties, whereby investing corporations are able to hold host States responsible for legislations that adversely affect and raise the costs of their operations (ibid. 2008: para 12). This form of protection granted to corporations is considered “legitimate”, according to Professor Ruggie, establishing the right of corporations to claim benefits and protections, which provides incentives for trade and investment flows between countries. However, he notes how the shift in power that has resulted from this one way mechanism, where States do not have an equal capacity to hold investors accountable, has led to unfavourable outcomes and abuse of the process to unequally benefit investor corporations. It follows from this that Professor Ruggie does not fundamentally disagree with corporations having the right to hold States accountable but instead suggesting that the solution could be a more equitable power relationship between the two, with States also having a reciprocal ability to sue corporations for rights violations.

Professor Ruggie also notes how corporations often operate through subsidiaries, which are considered distinct legal entities but do not operate exclusive of their parent company’s objectives (ibid. 2008: para 13). Here, the governance gap that is highlighted is the fact that legal frameworks have not kept up in incorporating these new forms of operations in their assessment of a corporation’s responsibility towards human rights violations undertaken by entities over which the parent corporation exercises significant control, despite being a separate legal entity. In broader literature, holding a corporation accountable for the actions of its subsidiary is often referred to as “piercing the corporate veil”.

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The third governance gap that is highlighted is that the operations of a corporation are no longer restricted to within their home state’s territorial boundaries but laws remain largely domestic in their influence (ibid. 2008: para 14). This gap needs to be addressed, as implementation of laws varies across nation states and corporations should not be able to take advantage of this loophole by locating their operations overseas, where laws are less strict than in their home country. Professor Ruggie notes that the lack of enforcement in some countries is a consequence of the lack of institutional capacity to implement laws or because they have to compete with other countries for investment, fearing the relocation of valuable investment and trade opportunities to countries where laws are not implemented as strictly. Thus, commercial interest and competition may compel both home and host states to be lenient in their requirements of corporations.

Professor Ruggie attempts to highlight where the human rights harms occur, to strengthen his argument. He shows how the worst cases of harm occurred where governance was weakest and hence, presumably, the governance gaps widest. He highlights three types of countries that are especially vulnerable—low-income countries, those that are affected by conflict and those where rule of law is weakest. However, Professor Ruggie clarifies that harm also occurs in places that do not meet these criteria but does not clarify what sort of reasons underlie those cases. It can therefore be assumed that he wishes to deal with harms enabled by the conditions that have been identified, as they cover the majority of the cases reviewed. The focus, once again, is on addressing the governance gaps, rather than the motivations of corporations that choose to locate their operations in countries that meet these criteria or the motivations of States that frame laws that enable harm to occur.

**Solution framing**

In his framing of the solution, Professor Ruggie begins with the assertion that governance gaps are “the root” of the issue (ibid. 2008: para 17). He proposes that the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework could be a potential solution, as it foresees a part for all actors involved – state, corporations and civil society.
However, while civil society actors are mentioned as an important stakeholder in this process, it is not clear how and where they are expected to contribute within this framework, which seems largely directed at States and corporations. In fact, corporations and States are mentioned very frequently within the Text, while civil society, although presented on par with the other two actors, is mentioned only thrice and in passing.

Professor Ruggie pairs each of the three pillars within the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework with the relevant actor, starting with the State duty to protect against human rights violations by other, non-state actors. Here, in order to assign responsibility to the State, he appeals to the authority of international treaty bodies in establishing that there is broad consensus on the State’s role as a duty-bearer with respect to human rights (ibid. 2008: para 18). Professor Ruggie makes explicit reference here to one of the governance gaps highlighted in the previous section – the issue of extraterritoriality and the difficulty faced by States in regulating offshore operations of corporations based in their country (Appendix A, Table 4). While not going so far as to imply that the State has a duty or an obligation to take action, he instead asserts that States are “not prohibited” from doing so, if the reasons for intervening are legitimate. He also clarifies that this does not in any way threaten the sovereignty of host-States, anticipating it as a concern. (ibid. 2008: para 19)

Professor Ruggie then appears to address the governance gap related to the changing nature of corporates and their new ways of operating. He points towards the “expanding web” (ibid. 2008: para 20) of corporate liabilities that reflect international standards but are implemented by domestic courts in various countries, which could potentially serve as a precedent for holding corporations liable for human rights violations. He points to the need for clarity and further intervention by relevant national and international bodies in this regard, without explicitly stating who these bodies might be and the process for influencing States to adopt policies conducive for holding corporations accountable (ibid. 2008: para 21).

2 Appendices for this essay can be found online at www.iss.nl/appendices
Unlike the Norms, which attempt to establish a new treaty document, the foundation of the State’s duty to protect are existing treaty documents and international guidelines, according to Professor Ruggie. He proposes greater coherence within these documents, as opposed to a reformulation.

Professor Ruggie then moves on to the second pillar of his framework, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Once again, he appeals to the authority of various international instruments that address this issue, but notes that various corporations also claim to respect human rights, thus establishing that there is broad consensus on the issue not only between international instruments but also between international instruments and global corporations, on viewing corporations as duty-bearers. Professor Ruggie makes a case for the need for effective due diligence, for companies to be made aware of the impact of their operations, which is necessary for reducing the potential for harm (ibid. 2008: para 23-25). It is unclear how this particular pillar relates to the three governance gaps and therefore seems isolated from the problem frame. There instead seems to be an unstated suggestion that corporations should self-regulate, so that they do not commit human rights violations, despite existing governance gaps and perhaps even compensating for them.

Lastly, Professor Ruggie briefly addresses the third pillar of his framework – the access to remedy. He notes the need to strengthen both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms for grievance redressal, in cases of disputes (ibid. 2008: para 26). Here, again, there doesn’t seem to be a focus on directly addressing the governance gaps identified but rather on providing redress when corporations do commit harm.

In this part of the Text, the sections on the Protect and Respect pillars have been elaborated upon with great detail, whereas the Remedy pillar has not been given much attention. This is also true of the full Text, where the incidence and detail with which the first two pillars are discussed are much higher than for the third pillar.
Conclusions

Overall, the human rights framework is an appropriate lens through which to present the argument, for the purposes of Professor Ruggie, as it prevents the Text from being driven by the history of the two other major alternatives: legally binding agreements (the on-going demand of many civil society organisations and resisted by the corporate lobby) and corporate social responsibility (the frame most acceptable to the corporate lobby but heavily criticised by civil society), all the while acknowledging their contribution to the debate. In addition, both business and States have been by and large cast in a positive light and their actions have been attributed to, among other factors, governance gaps, lack of capacity, commercial interests, “competitive dynamics” (ibid. 2008: para 17) or even just plain ignorance of the harms resulting from their actions. While this excludes many cases where corporations and States have been consciously involved in human rights violations, framing of the actors in such a benevolent light is no doubt strategic. Both these choices allow Professor Ruggie to appear to be a neutral entity within this debate – as a result, he has a much higher chance of support from both corporations and States, the two major actors whose roles in the process of advancement of human rights in business are elaborated upon in this Text.

The silence around the role of civil society in this process is a major gap within the Text, given their contribution to the process of evidence collection in the preparation of the Text and their significant efforts in highlighting human rights violations by corporations in the face of threats, violence and intimidation, e.g. “the courts of public opinion” (ibid. 2008: para 54) referred to in the Text. What is even more surprising is their absence from the section on Access to Remedy, where they have historically played a major role in both assessing the human rights impact of corporate processes, as well as in demanding remedies for those affected. As clarifying the role of civil society within the framework was not expressly part of Professor Ruggie’s mandate (Ruggie 2006: para 1), this is understandable but significantly reduces its appeal to important actors within this debate.
It is not surprising, therefore, that while this Text has been highly influential and enjoyed significant support from the UN, from corporations, from industry organizations and from States, its take-up by civil society groups has been relatively weak. Many of these groups continue to demand a legally binding treaty as the only way to address the governance gaps identified and influence both businesses and States into respecting, protecting and promoting human rights in business. It is largely due to their efforts that an Open-ended inter-governmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights was set up in 2014 by the UN Human Rights Council, with a mandate to “elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.” (UN 2014: 2) Thus, despite this comprehensive Text and its wide appeal, it is clear that negotiations for a framework on business and human rights, which is acceptable to all the social actors involved, is still ongoing.

References


A changing world through the Saffron lens: Tracing political and socio-economic effects of globalization

By Asmita Vaidya

Almost as costly as gold, sometimes smuggled and sold, also known as Iran’s red gold— we are talking about the precious spice saffron. Merely a pinch can transform a dish. Just as well considering the hefty price tag: anywhere from $2,000 to $8,000 per kilogram, retailing between $10-25 per gram. It is a must in Kashmiri Lamb ribs, Iranian Saffron Rice, Spanish Paella or Moroccan Tagine recipes, as well as some modern fusion cuisine. Saffron is said to be rich in minerals, vitamins and antioxidants, which is why it can increasingly be found in supplement form in specialty stores. Since ancient times people have attributed magical, medicinal and healing properties to saffron. Today it is being researched for possible contribution in treatments for neurodegenerative diseases, tumors and as an antidepressant amongst others. Saffron has been in regular use in the Mediterranean region, Middle East and Asia for millennia. It is not new to the west either since its introduction during the colonial period. After that it did become scarcer in the west until recently though. But now saffron is becoming more visible in homes, recipe books, on cooking shows and blogs, newspaper articles and in supermarkets.
Saffron is not humble like a potato, or exotic and addictive like cocoa, coffee or tea, nor important to feed the world such as rice, wheat, maize and meat, or a staple like banana, milk and sugar. In fact, it is exotic and expensive and not a necessity at all. So why conduct a study using a luxury good? Well, for one, this precious traditional spice, which was produced only in a few countries to begin with, has started to see diminishing production. Some reports say the genetic pool has eroded considerably because of this decline. But now saffron production is experiencing a revival with big corporations and supermarkets, like Costco, stocking it across the world. Therefore, its journey promises to have an intriguing story about the political and economic changes occurring in the areas where it is grown and the dynamics between different actors and institutions involved (farmers, states, corporations, international organizations, biotechnology industry, etc.). Also, because, as Appadurai writes, “we regard luxury goods not so much in contrast to necessities, but as goods whose principal use is rhetorical and social” and because “the necessity to which they respond is fundamentally political” (1998: 38). In this sense the commodity saffron lends itself to analysis in a similar way to other agricultural produce and therefore helps shed light on the critical “forces of international trade that structure connections between different localities” (Lind and Barham 2003: 48).

Global saffron production, although on the rise, is still less than 300 tons. The FAO does not list saffron production separately, instead classifying it under spices. It would be interesting to have statistics and information on changing land concentration and its effects on farmers in Iran (as well as Kashmir1 and Spain), because increasingly international brands are operating out of Iran now. Secondly, Iran has a complex web of middlemen that facilitate saffron distribution to mainly the Middle East, Spain and parts of Asia. These relationships too must have first evolved from the basic trading system with small distribution centers, and today once again are witnessing a transformation because of international companies and their standard operating procedures. Or to have information on the effect of wars and changing climate on farmers in Kashmir, or where the laborers come from and what they do during the off-season.

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1 Officially known as Jammu and Kashmir or J&K, a state in northern India.
And how many of them own farms (as opposed to being workers separated from means of production) and what they grow during the rotation period. And now, if farmers adopt modern technology for cultivation and processing, will the cultivators or the companies continue with crop rotation. But since detailed information on these aspects is not available or accessible yet, this paper examines broader trends in saffron’s journey. For this, we first briefly look at how food acts as a ‘provocative’ lens helping one decipher socio-economic changes in the society followed by a few words on commodification of food. Then come the details of the commodity itself and what is transpiring around the world vis-à-vis saffron trade, ending with analysis that includes hinting at implications of modernization and its effects on society, along with its varied relations as unveiled by the saffron lens.

**Picture 1: Package of saffron at Albert Heijn, Den Haag, March 2016.**
*Place of Origin: ‘Mediterranean’, no specific country given.*
*Cost: € 1.25 for 0.05 grams*

*Source: Photographs taken by the author.*
Food as lens

This paper does ‘follow the thing’ (Cook 2004) but not as in a commodity chain. Rather, it looks more at the variation in quantity of production and geographical distribution of saffron to trace the changing political and economic scenarios over the last three decades occurring in regions around saffron cultivation. Like Counihan uses bread for analyzing the socio-economic change in Bosa (1984), and Lind and Barham, using tortilla, look at changing meanings and global interconnectedness (2003), this paper attempts to use saffron production and distribution - not transformation in the processes, but changes in quantity and locations of cultivation - to trace political, economic and social changes occurring in Iran and Spain specifically, as well as a few other associated places. There are numerous perplexing questions about the saffron trade that when answered reveal complex market and geo-political dynamics about the business and, therefore, also the respective countries and people involved. Especially so, between Iran and Spain as the study reveals. Following the changes then, over decades, in production and distribution of saffron helps reveal the “interconnectedness between material and symbolic exchanges around the world that are commonly associated with globalization” (Lind and Barham 2003: 47).

For this essay, the pertinent questions were: why is Iranian saffron purportedly turning up in American and Canadian markets despite the economic and trade sanctions? Why is Spain buying considerable quantities of saffron from Iran when it itself used to be one of the largest producers of saffron? If Indian companies too are buying from Iran, then who is buying the saffron produced is Kashmir? Why are people smuggling saffron? And, finally, how is saffron connected to poppy cultivation in Afghanistan?
The commodity saffron

But, first, how can food act as a lens to analyze and understand the social and economic consequences of development and ‘modernization’? Or help in comprehending and tracing social change? The answer lies in globalization’s profound effect on how, how much and what we produce and consume. Development today is defined mainly by economic growth through the implementation of a neoliberal capitalist economic model of production, distribution and consumption. Industrialization and free trade, and the associated deregulation and liberalization, through commodification of as many things and aspects of life as possible, including land and natural resources, in pursuit of profit, is fundamental to the workings of capitalism. Thus, commodities assume a central place in today’s globalizing world. Commodities, for some, explains Jackson, “are simply objects of economic value” (1998: 96) and for others “products that are intended for exchange” (ibid). But Marx showed, explains Jackson, how this process “involved the conversion of use value into exchange value” (ibid). Consequently, goods are then produced purely for their market value, for exchange or sale and not personal use (Jackson 1998). Food has always been central to how societies organized and interacted, but today as a commodity, because it is produced and distributed in accordance with the fundamentals of the marketplace (Counihan 1984), its various processes reorganize and transform all those relationships, creating ever more complex links, webs and parallel industries across the world.

And, as has been recorded and written about extensively by scholars, the process of voluntary or forced integration into the free market system considerably alters the lives of people who have had a traditional mode of practicing agriculture, along with trading and customs related to consuming foods. In the case of saffron too, when acting as commodity, the processes of development have affected how and where it is produced, who benefits and who loses, and resulted in connections and relationships that did not exist before. The ups and downs in its quantity and exchange are the result of broader political and economic transformations happening in the world around. These no doubt had deep socio-cultural implications.
But unfortunately we do not have much accessible information on that. Instead we look at larger aspects of which these changes were a consequence and imagine what the effects might be or have been.

“A commodity ... satisfies human wants of some sort or another. The nature of such wants, whether, for instance, they spring from the stomach or from fancy, makes no difference” (Marx 1972). Saffron is a commodity to be marketed, packaged and sold. Thus it is no different from other agricultural goods produced only for their exchange value, for profit maximization, and in the process subject to all the effects of “globalization of production systems” (Jackson 1998: 95) under the commodity obsessed economic model. Especially now that saffron is becoming more visible and perhaps more integrated into the free-market economy, with increased interest in market expansion and mechanization of steps involved in processing saffron.

As for saffron consumption and its increased popularity worldwide, there could be several reasons. Saffron production is buyer driven (Gereffi 1994) in countries where mainly supermarkets store saffron. This was not the case in regions where saffron has traditionally always been part of food preparation, since producers played a primary role in distributing saffron and cultivating relationships with individual buyers as well as traders. But that has almost completely changed now. And in places where it is not readily available or too expensive, saffron consumption demands an attribute of Appadurai’s luxury goods as a “special ‘register’ of consumption” (1998: 38): ”specialized knowledge as a prerequisite for their ‘appropriate’ consumption, that is regulation by fashion” (ibid). But in the context of advertising and demand creation, Appadurai says ‘their’ strategy is to present “perfectly ordinary products” and ”make them seem desirable - yet - reachable” creating an “illusion of exclusivity” (1998: 55). In the case of saffron, on the other hand, it is indeed an exclusive product and therefore will have to be, and perhaps is being, presented as an exclusive - yet - reachable commodity.
And since saffron is also available on supermarket shelves, thus making the exclusive commodity a bit more accessible, in as little quantity as 0.05 gram to 1 gram, now the demand or consumption is more about “cultural globalization” (Cook and Crang 1996: 133). Cook and Crang, talking about the possibility of cultural differences coming in the way of marketing or selling something, and therefore in the way of capitalism, say in fact that these differences assist in profit making. Thus saffron consumption, it can be argued, qualifies for the “double commodity fetish” (Cook and Crang 1996: 135), the second related to locality or “touristic quality” (ibid.) of a commodity.

**Know your flower, its origins, and its price**
*Picture 2: Saffron Gatherer in Fresco from Akrotiri, Thera*

*Source: Wikipedia.org*
In *Follow the thing: Papaya*, Ian Cook et al. (2004) commenting on papaya fetishism say,

“Who needs to know what these fruits look like. What to do with them. How you know when they’re ready to eat. Which bits are edible. What they taste like. Where they come from. The ‘geography’? often fetishised”.

*(Cook et al. 2005: 658)*

So is saffron thus fetishized. But in a way this was always so, with most spices that were traded. Of course, the fetishism, or the power attributed to the commodity is quite different today, and hence too the associated marketing and imagery.

Saffron’s origin is somewhat contested but usually traced to Persia, specifically the mountains of Iran, with the earliest mention found 4,000 years ago in medicinal use and evidence as color pigment in art 50,000 years ago (Wikipedia n.d.). It is believed by some that Persian invaders brought this spice to Kashmir and China 2,500 years ago, with Chinese medical texts mentioning its various medical uses written in 200-300 BC, but some historians believe saffron was never grown in China where it was always known as the *flower of Tibet* (Levy 2014). In South Asia, it was primarily used as an offering to the Buddha, as food, fragrance and dye (ibid). Saffron was probably brought to Europe, it is believed, in the 9th century AD by the Arabs.

Crocus Sativus is the botanical name of this plant, which grows up to 20-30 centimeters in height and yields 3-4 flowers. Contained within each of these flowers are three crimson stigmas. These dried styles and stigmas make the spice saffron. Growing saffron is limited to certain geographical areas because of the specific environment it requires and its Mediterranean origins: mild to cold winters and warm and dry weather in the summers, requiring very little water.
So why is saffron so expensive? The main reason is that saffron cultivation is a delicate process and therefore highly labor-intensive. In addition, it is estimated that around 150,000 to 225,000 flowers are required to yield 1 kilogram of saffron (Aytekin and Acikgoz 2008). The process involves sowing the delicate corms, then harvesting at the right time by carefully plucking flower fields when in bloom, that too within only a few days before the flowers start to decompose. Then the stigmas are plucked and laid out to dry while still fresh. Once dry, the spice is ready to be packed and sold. This is all done manually, at least until recently. Now Italy and Spain are experimenting with mechanizing steps in the cultivation process, and some companies prefer roasting or freeze-drying the stigmas instead of drying them in a dry, heated room, which was how it was traditionally done. Traditional methods also included drying in the sun or open-air drying to remove up to 90 percent of moisture and then storing it for a few months prior to selling.

Today saffron is grown mainly in the regions between the Mediterranean Sea and Kashmir to the east with Iran, Morocco, Spain, Italy, India (mostly Kashmir) and Greece being the main producers. Iran is the world’s largest saffron cultivator.

**Changing world, its implications**

Spice trade is considered to be the precursor of the current global trade networks. Control of spice routes and spice trade resulted in empire building and establishment of European dominance in the Middle East and Asia. Spices, though exotic and luxurious, at one time were also deemed essentials as food preservatives and as flavor enhancers. Saffron and pepper were definitely the stars. Today saffron is very expensive and there is not much of it around, at least until recently. Perhaps that is why it is subject to much adulteration. Sometimes saffron is diluted and sometimes completely replaced. Regular users with a keen sense, or science, of it across the world know this to be true and are therefore careful from where they acquire saffron, and skeptical of gifts from well-meaning but unsuspecting friends who return from Greece or Morocco with a saffron gift box. Why did the production go down though?
Spain
In 1971, Spain reportedly had 6,000 hectares of land under saffron cultivation, and until the 1980s, was responsible for 70 percent of the global saffron output (Hesser 1999). By the year 2000 though, Spain’s production was down to only 200 hectares (ibid.). What led to this massive move away from saffron? In the 1970s, Spain invested heavily in industrialization. Then, after Franco’s death in 1975, while Spain was undergoing a government transition and dealing with the oil crisis, it went into a recession. This economic downturn throughout Western Europe led to a “reversal of migration trends... and the steady outflow of labor from agricultural areas despite declining job prospects in the cities” (CountryStudies n.d.). This must also be the reason why people gave up cultivation of saffron since saffron is expensive to produce and did not afford them a decent income.

Iran
In Iran, the opposite was happening. Saffron production saw an expansion after the revolution in 1979. Iran was encountering trade restrictions in the form of sanctions or embargos since the revolution. Though these were adjusted and varied during the subsequent decades, they remained in place continuously and intensified through the 2000s. The agriculture sector was not directly sanctioned, but it was impacted by restrictions on banks and logistics. With the strong sanctions on oil, which was the main export revenue generator for Iran, and thereby foreign exchange used to buy agriculture produce, this sector invariably suffered. Even though International companies could ship to Iran, the difficulty was paying for the produce. This resulted in the Iranian government intensifying efforts to be self-sufficient, which included subsidies on certain produce. Saffron and pistachios received a boost as well since these made up the bulk of non-oil exports. Agricultural land under saffron cultivation increased to approximately 50,000 hectares in 2013 from roughly 15,000 hectares in the 1970s (Ghorbani 2008). This reportedly increased employment and revenue for farmers in the Khorasan, Fars and Kerman provinces.
So, for the last 30 years, there has been a steady increase in Iranian production, making Iran the largest producer of saffron, accounting for 90-92 percent of the global produce today (ibid.). Another reason is the availability of relatively cheap labor in Iran. The high cost of labor and extensive work involved in picking and processing saffron is also cited as the reason for its decline in Greece, Italy and Spain.

**Kashmir**
Indian companies too buy saffron from Iran. One reason is “saffron costs around £1,100 per kilo in Iran, it fetches double that figure in India” (Wardrop 2010). Secondly, because Kashmir does not produce nearly as much as it used to; not only has the acreage under cultivation fallen but so has production per hectare from 3.1 kilogram to 1.3 kilogram per hectare (Yasir 2013). Thus the Indian companies could be getting a better deal from wholesalers in Iran. The reason for decrease in hectares under cultivation in Kashmir is believed to be the longstanding conflict between India and Pakistan, that has led to infrastructure damage, displacement, and inadvertently yet predictably affected various sources of livelihood including agriculture, especially in the late 1990s to mid-2000s. Today the compromised yield is because, claim farmers, good infrastructure and support by the government is provided for the lucrative fruit orchards, like apple and apricot, which are the main exports of the state, thereby neglecting the saffron farmers. In addition, saffron production in Kashmir is different from the techniques used in Iran and Spain. Farmers in Kashmir have traditionally been using longer cycles of up to 15 years, because of the climate and soil, on the same farm compared to 2-3 year cycles in Spain and Iran (Husaini et al. 2010). Changing weather patterns bringing unseasonal rain have also affected their crop.
Fraud in the market place
Spanish saffron enjoys a good reputation and has been increasing in popularity worldwide. European traders manage up to 80 percent of the global saffron trade and have been responsible for the perceptions surrounding Spanish saffron as being the best. Iran, even though the world’s largest producer and exporter of saffron, commands only $250 million of the $1.5 billion global trade. In fact, Spain is one of the major exporters, with exports listed at 3,978 kg per year between 1997 and 2013 (Science Daily 2016). However, Spain’s annual domestic production between 1997 and 2013 was listed at 2,813 kg. A difference of 33,165 kilograms! According to Science Daily, scientists from UCT Prague tested and proved that more than 50 percent of the saffron labeled as ‘produced and packaged in Spain’ was actually not of Spanish origin. So the remaining 33,165 kg of saffron is mostly procured from Iran, Morocco and India at a much lower price than in Spain (ibid.). There are also reports of it being labeled as coming from Greece and India, besides Spain. Which is strange since Spain itself acquires some from India. Perhaps Spanish traders manage to buy it cheaply but because Kashmiri saffron enjoys a good reputation, are able to sell it at a much higher cost. Which explains why saffron from these countries is priced higher. But considering Iran produces one of the best qualities, why does this not apply to Iranian saffron? This is mostly attributed to the number of middlemen and poor packaging responsible for bringing down the retail value and marketability of Iranian saffron. It transpires then that the majority of Iranian saffron till now was sold wholesale to Spain, where it was repackaged and exported to other countries as Spanish saffron or of other origins.

Cooperatives, seals, La Mancha and Morocco’s produce
Friedmann and McNair cite the example of how, in the 1980s, Parmigiano Reggiano went about building customer loyalty and became a premium product by guaranteeing ‘quality’ through establishing of “specific production protocols” (2005: 417).
In such a world of standardization, since food has to travel a long distance, it loses its “symbolic power” (Fonte 2002: 18) and therefore “has to tell the story of its origin, preparation and identity through certification processes and labels” (ibid.). Thus the product message in a way is first to inform the consumer about what they should be getting and then tell them that is exactly what they are getting. And ironically, precisely because it covers a great distance and requires more ‘input’ for increased yield do we need assurance that the food is ‘safe’, and that there is less adulteration and fewer chemicals in the product. For this reason, the standardization and quality assurance industries and institutions are set up, different from and in addition to the regular government regulatory agencies. Saffron also has a grading system based on various traits like the ISO 3632.

For saffron consumers who have had difficulty finding a trustful source, this might be good news. As Fuchs expounds, with stricter standards “of food production and traceability schemes, the safety of the food chains has improved” (2009: 42). Yet, saffron is often diluted with turmeric, paprika or dyed poppy petals and, sometimes, with carcinogenic dyes (Marcus 2011). In powder form it is difficult for consumers to tell whether indeed they are buying pure saffron since it is easy to adulterate with similar-color imparting powders. In 2010, mainly due to the disparity in prices, saffron smuggling was said to be on the rise, with the Indian government reporting at least three cases every day (Wardrop 2010). The reputation of saffron in most places is that it is quite difficult to acquire pure saffron.

The La Mancha region of Spain to some extent has managed to deal with these issues through the use of cooperatives. Today, saffron from the La Mancha is one of the costliest in the world. Although there is no consensus on which is the best really, and some swear by the saffron from parts of Iran and Kashmir to be the most potent and flavorful, La Mancha has gained a worldwide reputation. In the early 2000s, the regional government of La Mancha, in the light of sanctions against Iran, started “promoting its saffron as a luxury export, following the success of other gourmet Spanish ingredients such as olive oil and wine” (D Fuchs 2006).
One of the steps taken to boost saffron as a luxury gourmet brand was to establish a quality control board and create a seal. As part of the embargo, US customs studied La Mancha saffron’s composition to be able to distinguish it from Iranian saffron. These factors boosted Spain’s La Mancha saffron prices compared to Iranian and other locally produced saffron. This eventually led to the doubling of La Mancha saffron’s price, from €800 to €1,500 (£1,000) a kilo, compared with only €400 for the Iranian spice” (ibid). The standardization process also resulted in increased interest in saffron farming in Spain with production touching almost 1 tonne compared to less than 100 kilograms in 1999. Since May 2008, the Seattle based Costco Wholesale Corporation, a warehouse club retailer, is buying saffron from La Mancha and selling it under its Kirkland Signature brand. This has been a huge boost for the La Mancha brand. In fact, US imported only around 1.5 tonnes in 1960, which increased to almost 10-12 tonnes in the 2000s.

In order to appeal to consumers and market to distant places, old practices of trademarks, brands, seals of approval and certifications become central to supply chains of all kinds. They become an arena of contestation, multiplication, confusion, and therefore open opportunities for creative strategies.

(Friedmann and McNair 2005: 410)

But as Fonte expounds, “the variety of certification systems testifies to the complexity of the agro-food system” (2002: 18). Consequently, these standards are also a compromise and not absolute guarantees, but they do help the product retain a sense of territory and tradition. More importantly, when it comes to market creation and building customer loyalty, these aspects play a crucial role. Protected Designation of Origin (PDO), Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) or other certifications and product labeling are used with the notion that these enable the consumer to make the right choices. But these can also theoretically be used for premium pricing (Rodriguez et al. 2008). The WTO TRIPS currently protects wine and spirits and does not fully protect agricultural produce, instead leaving it to national governments to do so. The EU has been trying to get the restriction changed so as to extend the full TRIPS agreement to agricultural goods.
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The EU proposed this in the WTO Doha round; once passed it will extend preferential status to saffron from EU Mediterranean countries (WTO 2016), that is Greece, Italy and Spain, who already have EU’s ‘appellation of origin’ status for certain regions.

Morocco currently is the fourth largest producer with approximately 4,000 kilogram/year of output. Taliouine region in the south-west part of Morocco is the main producing region possessing the right combination of dry climate, geography and rich volcanic soil. Cultivation of saffron has been embedded here for centuries with traditional agricultural skills still in use (Aziz and Sadok 2015). A number of cooperatives are in existence with members owning most of the land and are predominantly smallholder farmers. Harvesting, separation of the stigma and drying tasks are mostly undertaken by women and is usually a communal affair. Taliouine saffron is priced approximately around $3 per gram at the local cooperative, which in turn fetches 2-3 times this price in Europe or even in the capital Marrakesh (ibid). Regional authorities here are working with FAO to give the Taliouine saffron a geographical identity and increase exports. This comes with increased regulation as proof of authenticity and guarantee of quality become important. Around two dozen cooperatives have been granted the IGP protected status so far. The regional growers and cooperatives are now trying for the EU PDO status that would allow them access to European distribution networks and stores. “The government of Morocco has developed its own legislation on appellation of origin and geographical indication”, Emilie Vandecandelaere of the FAO explains, “which corresponds to the PDO in the European Union” (Koehler 2013).

On a different note, some producers are seeking to adopt modern techniques such as used in Spain to improve production with reduced labor and to mitigate impact of climate change. The Taliouine region is also home to other produce such as olives, almonds and aromatic herbs. Climate change has seen reduced yields and has been a factor in migration of the younger work force seeking higher incomes in nearby cities.
This migration impacts saffron directly due to its labor-intensive nature of cultivation. Some of the modern techniques include drip irrigation, changing the planting date, cycling the crocus at shorter durations of five years as opposed to seven years, spreading the harvest time to manage labor shortages, and finally using mechanical aids to dry rather than open-air drying. While the percentage of farmers modernizing is small, it is a sign of changing times and gradual loss of traditional ways.

**Modernization and related changes**

There are photographic and fine art renditions from various saffron producing regions depicting men and women sitting in groups around tables, sipping tea and plucking stigmas from heaps of flowers. The entire process of plucking and removing stigmas is a community activity requiring a lot of labor. For these reasons, saffron production has resisted mechanization so far. A recent World Bank feature titled “Saffron: A Major Source of Income and an Alternative to Poppy” reported on how saffron cultivation in Afghanistan was being encouraged.

> According to the National Union of Saffron Growers (NUSG), Herat Province currently produces more than 90 percent of Afghanistan’s saffron although farmers in 25 other provinces grow it too. More than 6,000 Herati farmers grow saffron and some 18 companies sell and export it abroad. Saffron production reaches 3 tons annually in this province, 60-80 percent of which is exported. (Worldbank.org 2015)

But today increasingly companies, especially in Italy and Spain, are investing in research to adapt technology to mechanize the process of saffron harvesting. This is mainly so that companies can save on high labor costs while increasing saffron production by growing it on a large scale, and ultimately making it more profitable. But so far Spain is the only country where slightly modern production techniques are being pursued, from irrigation to genetic improvement studies.
There are and have been studies trying to apply laser technology and air separation to stigma and stamen removal; machines used for onion and potato plantation or zinc cages for corm planting (Negbi 1999: 102); and, of course, various drying methods. But because of one particular step, that is removing or pulling out the stigmas delicately, saffron might just resist full mechanization yet.

A Swiss company’s Research and Development team has undertaken the task to biologically synthesize saffron, primarily to bypass the requirement of crocus flowers altogether from which the saffron threads are extracted (Evolva.com 2016). This bio-synthesis using fermentation process will, they report, result in higher yields at lower costs, which could open up new markets and lead to significant changes in the existing supply chain (ibid.). It is possible that once in production, this will greatly reduce the price, especially for the perfume industry, and thereby affect small-scale farmers further. Thus we might soon have saffron without the flower and therefore without any of the associated traditional methods of production and distribution, as well as related institutions and social organizations.

**Picture 3: Saffron pickers in a saffron field in Kashmir**

Source: Taazakhabarnews.com 2014
Conclusion

By following the changing patterns of saffron production and distribution, this paper has tried to provide a glance, as an example, into broader political and economic processes of globalization and how, in turn, these reshape relations and dynamics in society. Until a few years ago, and probably even today, this field had more small-scale farmers practicing traditional methods of cultivation and distribution, but that is fast changing and undergoing ‘modernization’: efficient and clinical processing, quality seals, marketing, distribution and competition for increased recognition and market penetration. We also see how one of the catastrophic repercussions of heavily skewed growth under capitalist free market economic model — climate change — has affected cultivation in Kashmir and Morocco, both places where smallholder family farmers so far have been responsible for production.

Whether it is migration as labor or relocating due to climate change or trying to keep up with the changing nature of the trade or competition with other emerging crops and industries, it is clear that it is the small scale or subsistence farmers who hitherto were doing well — because even subsistence farmers usually had something extra to sell for income — who are the most affected by globalization and its business model and underlying philosophy. Fortunately, saffron production does not easily lend itself, at least not yet, to full-scale mechanization and therefore large-scale production.

Thus we see how food as lens can shed light on the changing society, its condition, its motivations and how it treats its people and creates or destroys relationships and traditions, since no matter how much we distort, intentionally or otherwise, this holiest of processes, that is growing and consuming food, in Wendell Berry’s words the soil will always remain the great connector of lives, the source and destination of all.
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