Citizens, dictators and networks: A game theory approach

In a society composed of citizens and a dictator, what are the conditions for a successful citizens’ revolt? What kind of strategies do governments follow to prevent such revolts?

In this article, Wilson Perez-Oviedo will argue that the concept of networks is a very powerful tool to understand these issues, as shown, for example, by the prominent role of social networks during the recent revolts in the Arab world and current political relevance of social networks.

He models these types of societies as a game played between a leader, who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income, and a group of citizens who have the opportunity to revolt if they are unhappy with the distribution (or if they dislike the regime).

Coordinated action by citizens is possible because they form nodes in a communication network. However, communication through the network is distorted, which could preclude the emergence of collective action among citizens. The network structure and the distortion level are determinants of the political equilibrium and wealth distribution.

The model explains how the dictator could use propaganda, cooptation, and repression to increase his expected utility. He also uses the framework to provide a formal proof of Wintrobe’s Dictator’s Dilemma. Using numerical simulations, the speaker will also reflect on the relation between network structure and the arising of collective action.

About the speaker

Wilson Perez-Oviedo finished his undergraduate studies as Mathematician at the Politecnique National School in 1992. In 1996, he got his Masters in Development Economy at the Latin American Faculty of Social Science (FLACSO). In 2003, he finished his Masters in Arts at Cornell University. He holds a PhD in Economics at Cornell University.